Narcoculture as a Crisis of Dignity: Examining Abstract Leadership

Understanding the Narcoculture as a Case Study of the Deprivation of Somatic Dignity

To situate Narcoculture in this historical framework, I will examine the characteristics which Alberto-Sánchez and those who have been directly affected by Narcoculture argue define the cultural phenomenon and demonstrate how these characteristics correlate to the indicators of somatic dignity deprivation. Because the existential crisis of Hegel’s time was largely sparked over the rise of the Enlightenment Movement that politically took the form of numerous violent revolutions, including, notably, the Reign of Terror of the French Revolution, his analysis of the character of dignity crises is largely colored by examples from that historical moment. As such, this discussion will seemingly unfold as a comparative analysis of the nature of the French Revolution and Narcoculture, but the principles of comparison apply to all similarly sourced conflicts. In other words, as per the discussion of the historical trend of conflict from the previous section, these are not to be taken as coincidentally similar examples, but part of a larger analytical framework that speaks to how and why a mindset of mastery manifests out of the systemic deprivation of recognition for human dignity.

While Alberto-Sánchez offers a description of narcoculture in conversation with its philosophical relevance that will be used as well to understand its character, it will be put in conversation with The Three Deaths of Marisela Escobedo. This documentary, examining a mother’s launch of a consciousness-raising movement against femicide, or intentional violence against women on the basis of their sex, in order to attain justice for her daughter not offered by the corrupt Mexican legal system, discusses Narcoculture as a source of this violence against women, as well as the political failures to address it. In doing so, it illustrates through first-hand experiences the culture of and sheer power held by the authoritative regime of Narcoculture, these being drug Cartels and their hierarchical leadership. The defining characteristics of Narcoculture which are agreed upon between the documentary and Alberto- Sánchez’s book are the nature of the power of the Cartels, including their hierarchical order, subversive control over other institutions, and “economy of excess,” the sensationalism of the brutality Cartels inflict on their victims, and juxtaposed to that, their treatment of their dead leaders (The Three Deaths of Marisela Escobedo; Alberto-Sánchez, 2020, 5).

Indicator 1 of Dignity Deprivation: The Culture of Abstract Power

To examine the first characteristic, this being the culture of abstract power in a moment of historical contradiction, the drug cartels which hold the power in narco-culture are generally extremely hierarchical, but in no arbitrary sense. Rather, their leaders are regarded by members as almost mystical, religiously divine figures. They are never seen, nor use their real names. They are sublime forces of terror, causing “men [to] simply vanish and…never [be] heard of again,” (Alberto-Sánchez, 2020, 4). Most exclusive members will never know who they are, according to the speakers of the documentary. There is an elitist culture in their peripheral circle, such that to be a member of a cartel is to put you at some level of “intelligence clearance,” taking on the character of a national security protocol, or to generalize, a sovereign state of its own. Given that, as Escobedo’s story reveals, these cartels have bought out high level government officials and cemented this control with terrorizing threats, capable of killing anyone in their way in the most brutal way imaginable, they have in many ways become the sovereign power of Mexico and nearby territories. Existing in opposition to the previously dominate political regime or mainstream culture, as we will come to in a moment, in itself is not accidental, but an expression of resentment for those institutions rooted in their perceived failure to recognize the leaders of the Cartel, such that they have now gone after this recognition through force, or mastery.

Further, the leaders live in an extraordinary, immeasurable and frankly inhuman excess of wealth, as a result of their complete domination, but also focus a majority of their resources towards maintaining that control through all of their “slaves,” or lower members. Usually, leaders live in enormous mansions, with all of the finest consumption goods they can dream of. They spend their lives consuming that which is brought to them through the sales of lower members. These lower members are blindly consumed instead by their overwhelming desire to be recognized as the same level of power as their leaders, and hope to climb the ladder, but also seek fulfillment through this joining of the collective, which promises meaning, though it often never gives it. Instead, most members will inevitably die young as a result of the intensity of the violence, having spent most of their time on the run living secret lives, rather than for themselves and the sake of meaningful relationships with those they care about, or some positive purpose in the world.

Hegel notes in the introduction to The Phenomenology of Spirit that this kind of sublime, systemically controlling power is that which comes from a cultural mindset of mastery paired with societal yearning for stability during a moment of existential crisis on a historical scale, often as a result of a contradiction between consciousness that humans at that historical point have uncovered of their dignity, and the dignity which is bestowed upon them or recognized by the social norms and institutions of their day. When their consciousness of their own dignity is different than the institutional recognition, they feel that deprivation in a deep anguish that creates a revolutionary nature for change. They desire, above all else, the recognition they are now aware they deserve.

The master believes that it is only by risking their own life that they can receive recognition for their status as a human being from another conscious being. If the animal’s existence, including all of their thoughts and behaviors, are teleologically oriented to the highest goal of survival, then demonstrating one’s humanity can only be possible by subordinating that goal of survival to a higher, meaningful purpose- this being the desire for recognition. However, if one risked their life merely through killing another person, that person would no longer be alive, and therefore have consciousness with which to recognize the humanity of the other who desires it, defeating the goal. If one died in risking their life, they would also not be alive to receive recognition. Further, both parties have to have a Desire for recognition so as to understand what is at stake and have a capacity to therefore be conscious of what is gained or lost through this risk in a mutual recognition of the outcome. As such, the dynamic which comes out of the pursuit for recognition is a power differential, where one person “risks their life” but remains alive and free as another person chooses to preserve themselves by giving up their agency in exchange for safety from that figure which doesn’t back down from the risk of their life, thus deeming them the “slave” to the “master.”

On a cultural scale, the desire for dignity recognition, or psychology of mastery, requires the submission of all former authorities or institutions under the control of a new dominating movement of authority. In the case of the rise of the Enlightenment, this meant overhauling the previous religious authority, and replacing it. As Hegel put it, “If superstition and prejudice [religious authorities] have been banished [as a result of their denying recognition], the next question arises, what next? What is the truth Enlightenment has propagated in their stead?” (Hegel, 1977, §557). Being so driven by the fervent desire for a fast solution and more immediate acquisition of recognition, or a mindset of mastery, rather than committing to an institutional shift that could engage in the arduous, historical level of shifting institutions to a higher consciousness of dignity, the Enlightenment chose to define itself through the lens of its resentment; the opposite of religion. Where religion subordinated nature and human outcomes to a divine authority, or God, Enlightenment promised the power to have a domination of nature in a controllable God-like fashion.

That domination of nature, or focus on materialism and being for Earthly selves, culminated in the notion of “Utility,” or working for the consumption of human beings under their control. “Just as everything is useful to man, so man is useful too, and his vocation is to make himself a member of the group [or: “herd”], of use for the common good and serviceable to all. The extent to which he looks after his own interests must also be matched by the extent to which he serves others, and insofar as he serves others, he is taking care of himself: one hand washes the other.... he makes use of others and is himself made use of,” (Hegel, 1977, §560). “The Useful is the object insofar as self-consciousness penetrates it and has in it the certainty of its individual self, its enjoyment .... The two worlds are reconciled and heaven is transplanted to earth below....” (Hegel, 1977, §581). As we will come to in a moment, this is the epitome of the psychology of mastery, thus, again, confirming the desire for recognition present in the historical crisis.

­In order to actualize this Notion of utility in the form of institutions, the Revolution worked to redo all social norms and existing institutions under the “most Rational form.” Democratic constitutions were adopted, and then thrown out and rewritten over an over in a deliberative form (which illuminates the contradiction of mastery we will come to in that Reason clearly could not be trusted in an instantaneous moment of deliberation, so how could these institutions be so certain as to reconcile killing anyone who disagrees?). They replaced religious iconography with divine illustrations of principles of reason and equality. The Guillotine replaced former methods of state killings in an “efficient design,” and was used as a public display of the deaths of numerous religious leaders and followers, or even suspected ones. The calendar and clock were both reworked to remove any religious history and operate under the most “Rationale system,” which for the Reign of Terror meant ten hour clocks that complied with the metric system. Currencies were adjusted, units of measurement changed, and names of cities, streets and other important monuments changed to secular versions. By violently taking on systemic control of all institutions, Hegel says, Enlightenment, “ascend[ed] the throne of the world without any power being able to resist.” (Hegel, 1977, §585). It cannot receive recognition in any way but forcing the submission of former institutions through force and a complete replacement of their overhaul. Subtler but everyday shifts such as the calendar, as well as the culture of suspecting all opponents and murdering them mirror the subversive monopoly of sovereignty of cartel leaders.

We can tell this is a shallow, abstract power grab tactic, or the result of the mentality of mastery, through the contradiction, however, that arises in the foundational claim of this new regime as superior to the last. According to Hegel, while Enlightenment principles identify themselves as being the opposite of and a necessary alternative to faith, this judgement is ‘not very enlightened,” and fails to recognize that Enlightenment “principles are implicit in faith itself” (Hegel, 1977, §564). In other words, Enlightenment’s self-identification as superior to faith does not overcome, but is subject to the same epistemological fragility as religious faith. The Enlightenment movement, according to Hegel, substantiates its supremacy of insight over faith through a sort of causal efficacy. In specific moments, at which technology works or experiment results match up with those predicted by models or theories, followers of Enlightenment principles believe that they have seen the whole causal innerworkings of a system in order to produce a particular effect, and therefore, gain mastery over or transform the natural world (Hegel, 1977, §564). This causal knowledge requires them to differentiate between a desired outcome, or whole, and posit it as opposite to a different outcome which would have occurred without this particular set up or environmental interaction of components. It brings these ideas together of cause and failed cause, positive and negative, into one Notion (Hegel, 1977, §564).

Religious faith, on the other hand, believes that it will not look to falsify theories or search for the negative of a particular outcome so as to understand that something works because another causal path does not (Hegel, 1977, §564). To form such connections faith believes would pervert or make up falsehoods, according to Hegel, about each concept as it exists independently. However, even in faith, Hegel argues that such distinctions are made in order for a ‘believing consciousness,’ or one’s active belief in any explanation, theory, or narrative, including religious ones, to be true (Hegel, 1977, §564). It is simply that religious faith inclines followers to supress the consciousness of this behavior. Just as religious faith, however, fails to recognize its participation in a search for causal explanations, so does Enlightenment fail to see that they are not in fact opposite movements, but instead, share a common activity that cannot substantiate, therefore, Enlightenment’s supremacy over faith (Hegel, 1977, §564).

By also failing to see that both movements participate in the same activity of reasoning, and still positing itself as the opposite of faith, Enlightenment, according to Hegel, mistakes its own character in the same way religious faith does (Hegel, 1977, §565). Enlightenment instead takes for granted that religious faith is its opposite because the Enlightenment movement defined itself as a critique of religious faith out of pragmatic concerns of authoritative power and a fervent desire for mastery over nature rather than true epistemological sturdiness (Hegel, 1977, §565). As Hegel puts it in the Introduction to the Phenomenology, the movement itself falls into the trap of becoming drunk on the illusion of stable answers through its method which it assumes to be correct, rather than engaging in the arduous, long term task of real truth or epistemological knowledge of the whole, which is not so clear cut or accessible. As such, the Enlightenment does not see its own character in the religious faith’s shared search for negation, and thus does not create a unified Notion of the two movements (Hegel, 1977, §565). Yet, to search for unity between a phenomenon and its negation is in fact the asserted “method” of Enlightenment principles. As such, Enlightenment does not follow its own method, which is the same cause for which they attribute religious faith being less “pure.” Instead, by taking for granted its character as the negation of faith, missing Enlightenment and faith’s unified search for causal explanations, and thus sharing in one Notion, the Enlightenment movement positions itself as existing on a basis of faith, or unquestioned assumptions, as well (Hegel, 1977, §565).

This reality of the Enlightenment movement as truly defined from a pragmatic concern for mastery explains the need for leadership to both be hierarchical and pursue continued terror and violence, but also ultimately why it will fail to attain what it truly desires- dignity- due to a core contradiction of the “master/slave” dialectic. While “mastery” is first desired and pursued out of its believed capacity to assert one’s human dignity, the achievement of mastery doesn’t lead to this fulfilment. Instead, it is the Slavish consciousness which results in one’s ability to transcend an animalistic existence. In achieving mastery, one doesn’t truly achieve freedom, Hegel says, but becomes dependent on the slave for their status as a master, and therefore must maintain that risk of life for recognition in a precarious balance of powers rather than calmly exercising their autonomy to become who they should want. We see this in the constant funneling of cartel resources into acts of terror to maintain its reign, and subjection of its members’ entire lives to ones of violence rather than true living for themselves.

By instead doing physical embodied work to produce for the master’s consumption, the slave, or person who does not take on the master’s mentality but lives in fear of them, reflects on how to transform Nature by his own hand, discovering transcendent power where he can rid a natural existence of its character, including his own. The Slave has also, in the becoming a slave, seen the prospect of death (or experienced existential dread) and chosen to evade it, melting away any sense of stability and existing for their own self for protection, thus teaching that their position is not stable either, but can be transformed to a higher being for themselves. Through work, this ability to transform nature and oneself becomes a permanent habit, or longer sustainable autonomy (freedom) over some things while not the universal powers of death. The master, however, only feels freedom as a shallow fleeting sentiment, and can only continue to consume through the slave’s work, which is a more bound to Nature experience than the control a slave has over nature through production. We again, see this in the cartel leaders living for grandiose consumption through wealth obtained by the selling of drugs by their lower members, or slaves.

Scaling this to a cultural level of mastery, the “Absolute Monarchy,” or this assertion of a monopolizing sovereign power that has completely wiped out all previous authorities, amounts to an empty name in the long term, according to Hegel, because the position does not become acquired by the particular self who holds it. Rather, the title expresses a universal notion of a hold on power, which is alienated from that particular self. As such, it belongs to the universal I, or realm of the absolute. By holding the position of absolute power, the particular I does not achieve full mastery of all those below it, as they feel they will through wealth and power which allow them the illusion of controlling nature and other people in the grand dialectic. Rather, the particular “I” becomes subordinated or consumed by the position, such that their name has no meaning except that of contingency. They mean nothing outside the meaning of that position as an absolute universal construct. Their being-for-self was meant to be maximized by having this extreme power and control, but instead, disappears entirely as to be fully defined by the absolute is to no longer exist as a being-for-self at all.

To explain further the notion of absolute monarchy being one of a universal, the idea of control power, and specifically of the state, is to have everyone under that power relinquish their being-for-self to the notion of the state and identity of the state. Thus, to rule over those people is not to do so as a particular individual whose being for self is maximized, but to hold the position of a universal notion that binds all other contingent beings and absorbs them into an abstract universal. As such, by holding the position of absolute power, one holds all the power “of the state,” not for oneself, so the nationalistic or political identity, or that which defines the region of power, is now the identifying being, not the particular being, who is a mere contingency. Despite not having any real payoff, or being shallow, destabilized by this complete upheaval sparked by the new authority and the previous want for a clear path to dignity due to the initiating contradictory historical crisis, the masses seek stability in the new, seemingly stronger answers promised by the new regime. They become drunk on its lies, unable to see the truth, and held into that belief through the master’s terror that cements the gaslighting.

Judith Butler, in her recent book, The Force of Nonviolence, offers a related discourse to this Hegelian framework, arguing that governments and ideological bodies often artificially manufacture divides or conflicts to identify all those who might oppose it or threaten it through protests against its power moves, be they policy changes or cartel killings (Butler, 2020; Samay Das, Saswat, Shankar, Dhriti, 2021, 102). In doing so, it reveals the fragility of its mastery, or shallowness of its sovereignty. It is this positioning of it as a victim that needs to protect itself against threats, or more simply, rhetoric of self-defense, that is used as a moral justification for its dehumanization of others (those that demonstrate its weakness). In reality, Butler argues that the failure to see the mythical reality of these sovereign, abstract powers and truth of the self being just one of a dynamic body of interconnected selves is what leads to these large, forceful movements only doing damage to themselves by searching for and exercising justifications for violence against others.