The Middle East’s Stake in the Ukraine Crisis

Introduction

Scholars, strategists, and pundits alike would agree that the Ukraine crisis has escalated far beyond what many originally envisioned on February 24th, 2022. Where early pieces championed a surefire Ukrainian victory and the incompetence of the Russian military, recent articles have speculated that the conflict might rage for weeks to months from now. Although unbiased stories are difficult to find, vivid descriptions of Russian war crimes pepper the firsthand accounts of Ukrainian refugees. Initial articles, such as those reporting on Russian soldiers using children as hostages in Kyiv, shocked few. But it was on April 6th, 2022 that the first mass-media reports of torture, rape, and executions in the recaptured city of Bucha emerged. The bodies of more than 300 civilians were discovered scattered around the city and its outskirts, most clearly having been bound and immobilized before being severely beaten and shot from point-blank range. In response to this and other acts of brutality, the UN General Assembly passed an emergency resolution to suspend the Russian Federation from the Human Rights Council. With 93 countries in favor and only 24 countries—mostly common opponents like China, the DPRK, and Belarus—directly opposing the motion, it is clear that numerous states view Russia as an aggressor and support Ukrainian sovereignty.

However, this leaves 58 countries remaining that voted to abstain from the resolution, each with their own reasons for sitting on the fence. Some of these neutral states, like Angola, Barbados, or Vanuatu, likely lack a stake in the conflict and would prefer to avoid angering either side. But the diversity in these abstentions betrays an observable trend in the action, that being the Middle East’s near-universal desire to remain exempt from opining on the matter. Of the states comprising the Middle East and North Africa, only Israel, Libya, and Turkey joined with the states that pushed through Russia’s disbarment from the HRC. A majority of the remaining states refused to formally strike a side in the debate, with nations from Iraq to Saudi Arabia remaining non-aligned. Three countries in the area—Syria, Iran, and Algeria—even went as far as to officially reject the UN resolution, effectively aligning themselves closer to Russia in the wake of the conflict. Thus, one can easily see the complex relationships between the Middle East and the two forming sides in this situation. This article aims to provide an overview of American, European, and Russian relations with the Middle East and North Africa, particularly with regards to oil, as well as what stakes—if any—exist for countries in this region and what predictions surround the how these states will address the crisis as it develops.

The Middle East & The World: Addressing the Oil Derrick in the Room

It is impossible to holistically examine the Middle East’s relationships with the US, Europe, and Russia in the course of a single article. Entire volumes of literature have been written analyzing the associations between just one of these groups and the Middle East, with usually little more than lip-service provided to the others. That being said, in order to effectively organize the narrative which revolves around this issue, I have chosen to examine these relationships with respect to the common denominator present in all of them: oil. The world quite literally runs on oil. Aside from providing fuel for the estimated 1.3 billion passenger and commercial vehicles that exist across the world, oil (or petroleum) provides use in heating and electricity generation as well as in the production of the various plastics, chemicals, and other synthetic materials we use in our day-to-day lives. Understandably then, a key point of contention between states in the course of national development and prestige has been the exchange (and occasionally the appropriation) of global oil reserves. Vital players in the oil industry are largely clustered in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq all possessing a billion barrels or more in oil reserves compared to the US’ 400,000. This fact alone has irreversibly transformed the Middle East into a region composed mostly of rentier states, and has further shaped the Middle East’s relationships with the major players in the Ukraine Crisis.

Historically, the United States has engaged in a complicated relationship with the Middle East as a result of its dependence on the region’s oil reserves. Dubbed the “American Oil Strategy”, politics between the country and MENA has been almost entirely influenced by politicians shoring up support in the region to secure oil for trade. In fact, the US has even gone so far as to insist on military presence in the region, and further, to ignore blatant policy inconsistencies to maintain this oil relationship. This explains, rather grimly, why America will effectively ignore Saudi Arabia’s horrid human rights record or Turkey’s incremental shift toward authoritarianism. Anywhere else, these crimes might otherwise serve as catalysts for sanctions, condemnation, or military intervention. But the US views its stake in maintaining this Oil Strategy to be far too great to be jeopardized by moral grandstanding. Although the US has made effort in recent years to decouple itself from dependency on foreign oil—largely by way of off-shore drilling and domestic fracking—the US will be at least partly reliant on overseas oil for the foreseeable future. In turn, the Middle East’s relationship with the US is similarly blemished by the latter’s reliance on Gulf oil. While some politicians in the region praise the US as a harbinger of democracy, freedom, and liberal thought, others decry America as a neo-imperialist state with the primary concern of lining its coffers. Every praise for the Abraham Accords can be met with blame for the Iraq War, War in Afghanistan, or war crimes in Yemen, meaning few in the area view the United States as a wholly benevolent power.

Europe possesses a similarly complicated relationship with the Middle East and its near-monopoly over energy. Like the US, Europe is no stranger to hydrocarbon imports from the Middle East, with figures from Eurostat’s 2020 energy memo reporting 18% of Europe’s crude oil and 12.4% of its natural gas deriving from the region. In this same report, Saudi Arabia alone was reported to have provided more than 7.8% of Europe’s crude oil imports. Moreover, the region’s historical association with Europe in regards to its oil means that this relationship is nothing new. As early as the late-19th century, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company began surveying Gulf sites for extraction. The consequences of this arrangement—especially in relation to its history of upholding authoritarian states in the interest of protecting British and French aims—have had a jarring effect on the region’s modern political and economic stability. This has led to a paradoxical relationship over time, with European states sometimes directly interfering, for example during the Gulf War, while simultaneously staying silent on other issues. Understandably then, few living in the Middle East view the European Union or its member-states in an outright beneficial light.

Starkly contrasted with these relationships is that of Russia with modern Middle Eastern states. Unique to Russia is its heavy supply of oil and natural gas, largely attributable to its massive geographic and topographic scale. As such, although Russia has historically not been one to ignore the bountiful gains of hegemony in the Middle East, it certainly is not suffering from oil crises or shortages. Russian influence in the region has been idiomized as that of a “Jack of all trades, master of none”. What this means is that, although Russia has begun to work its way into better relations with virtually all modern Middle Eastern countries—most notably Syria, Israel, and Turkey—few (minus Syria) are willing to directly align themselves too closely to the Kremlin. Part of this is historical, owing to Soviet proxy management during the Cold War, while most of it stems from Russia’s inability to deliver on its promises for aid and support. Foreign aid inefficiencies have been best shown in Syria, where the Russian Center for Reconciliation of Conflicting Sides (CRCS) has been critiqued for 717 of its 731 communities having been symbolically serviced only once over the last five years. It is for this reason that Turkey has notably denounced Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and officially labeled it a “war”. However, states in the region continue to look to Russia as an alternative to American beneficence. Although Russia has failed in many regards, it has impressed Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and Qatar along with other Levantine states simply by virtue of valuing the status quo over democratization. Where American officials might arrange for oil exchanges that include clauses—however fleeting—on the importance of liberalized economies, Russia is more relaxed, caring little about whether these countries respect civil liberties or uphold human rights. It is because of these complicated, often conflicting variables that Israel’s PM Naftali Bennett has pledged a “measured and responsible” response to the Ukraine Crisis while still hesitating on formally condemning Russia or Vladimir Putin.

All of this is to say that it has become clear in recent years that support toward the Russian sphere is slowly but surely ramping up. Where Europe and the US are constricted in their ability to influence the region based on past crimes, blunders, and miscalculations; Russia is poised to drastically shape the politics of the region. Although few states would publicly—or even privately—praise Russia and its leaders, trends in the region point toward a closeness to the Kremlin that Europe and America could only dream about.

Shut-Offs and Sanctions: Stakes At-Home and Abroad

Thus, the question remains, where does the Middle East sit in all of this? During a time when supply-chains have been disturbed, trade agreements have been terminated, and sanctions have been employed by countries everywhere, no country can sit on the sidelines. Whether they want to be involved or not, states around the world must accept the geopolitical shift that comes with this crisis, along with the immediate, tangible ramifications that come with continued conflict between Russia and Ukraine. As indicated above, the most prominent points for policymakers right now center around how to compensate for the intense reduction in oil and natural gas imports from Russia. Although Europe certainly relies on energy from the Middle East, the same Eurostat report referenced earlier in this piece pointed out that, in fact, 25% of European crude oil and 38% of natural gas actually come out of Russia. The US, although not nearly as reliant, still imports over 8% of its crude oil from Russia and continues to import 20% of its unrefined petroleum products as well. Whether or not a state directly garners its petroleum from Russia, the fact remains that consumer-side and producer-side markets alike are suffering from the conflict. World prices for a barrel of oil have skyrocketed, hitting upwards of $130/barrel in early March of this year, while drivers everywhere have complained of soaring prices, with gas hitting roughly $4.50/gallon in the US and upwards of $7.50/gallon in Italy and $8.00/gallon in the UK as of April of this year.

Obviously, the initial plan to offset this supply shortage was to contact Middle East suppliers—specifically the 7 of those within OPEC+—and increase crude oil flow into the European continent and toward the US. Initial hopes that the organization would respond eagerly to the hope of renewed demand following the COVID-19 plunge were dashed when an emergency meeting on March 2nd between OPEC member states ended with them agreeing to only raise supply by the prescribed amount (400,000 barrels per day in April). Only lasting 13 minutes, the meeting went without a mere mention of the Ukraine crisis and its pressures on the industry. Outside of OPEC, responses are not exactly positive either. Even former-OPEC member Qatar has expressed hesitation in helping the West in its scramble to secure more oil, with Energy Minister Saad al-Kaabi stating even before tensions erupted that it lacked the capacity to remotely replace Russian oil in Europe let alone abroad. Fears have only grown after this response, with Europe increasingly eyeing an outright ban on Russian oil and petroleum products and prices only continue to rise.

The situation is not without its light, of course. On March 9th, Emirati Ambassador to the US Yousef Al-Otaiba, expressed the UAE’s desire to hike oil outputs from OPEC. Saudi Arabian officials offered the same sentiments on March 10th, and countries with the capacity to continue bolstering oil supplies to Europe and the US have attempted to support the call to arms. In yet another show of the American Oil Strategy, US officials are increasingly looking to Iran to cover the difference. In the words of Alex Vatanka of the Middle East Institute, “Iran’s Achilles’ Heel is the state of its economy…and the possibility of a new [JCPOA] presents Tehran with an opportunity.” While circumstances are continuously developing and little is certain, these factors mean that hope might not be lost for the Middle East to assist the West during a time of crisis.

But it is not only in the West that the ripple-effects of the Ukraine crisis have been felt. Virtually every state in the Middle East has reported severe economic and supply consequences directly resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It was Egypt that was first hit hardest by these ramifications, specifically with respect to its food supply. Disruption in Ukrainian supply and export chains, coupled with intense sanctions placed upon Russia, have prevented Egyptian ports from receiving wheat shipments that make up 85% of the country’s grain supply. Iran too has been hit hard by the situation, with severe threats to their supply of sunflower oil, wheat, corn, barley, and soybeans due to economic obstacles. Similar stories have played out across the Middle East and North Africa, as the two combatant states collectively make up 25% of global wheat production, 15% of barley, and 45% of sunflower. Prices have escalated not just for grain itself, but also for fertilizer and general agricultural supplies, meaning countries are increasingly incapable of growing their own crops let alone relying on others. Not only does this threaten to disintegrate the global agro-economy, it risks subjecting millions to food insecurity in a region already wracked from drought and famine. Part of the issue also stems from the fact that NGOs themselves often relied on Ukraine and Russia for food security aid. This was best put by CEO of the World Food Program David Beasley with regard to continued food aid to Yemen: “We have no choice but to take food from the hungry to feed the starving.”

Luckily, this situation is also not entirely insurmountable in the region, even in the face of the worsening conflict. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar have already pledged a collective of $12 billion in aid (with an additional $10 billion promised from Saudi Arabia in the future) to Egypt. Western leaders have been similarly jolted to action by the conflict with regard to food security, as European powers and the US have begun promising increased food aid to suffering countries. A major part of the COP26 Agriculture Innovation Mission in the Middle East involves bringing 140 public, private, and non-profit partners together to normalize the region’s dependence on foreign food imports. $4 billion has been provided by the US to the program, of which a sixth of the budget is intended to be allocated toward the MENA region’s crippled agricultural infrastructure. So soon after over 132 million in the area were made victim to starvation in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and its supply-chain deficiencies, this cannot be allowed to stand. Increasing direct investment into the region should be a top priority for not just the United States but the European Union and the developed world as a whole.

As often said, in every crisis, there arises an opportunity. Growing food insecurity in the Middle East is the perfect means through which the US and EU can not only leverage its own oil stakes in the situation, but improve relations, rehabilitate their images and save lives in the process. Especially in Iran, the time is right to completely reform relations with a state which has become increasingly abrasive over the last few decades.