The EU Struck a Deal for Detention Centers and Desert Dumps: A Crisis for African Migrants
In 2024, the European Union (EU) signed bilateral agreements and memorandums with several Muslim-majority nations, including Tunisia, Morocco, and Libya, that contained financial agreements to curb migrant flow through border control and closure or violent action towards migrants if necessary. These agreements come as a result of a well-documented rise in anti-immigrant sentiment across Europe as thousands of migrants from the Middle East and North Africa have fled conflict and persecution in their homelands to establish a better life on the other side of the Mediterranean. Migrants, particularly those from Libya and Syria, are fleeing the violence of the ongoing war and factional power struggle, where they are vulnerable to extortion, violence, and other abuses by the government and armed groups. One individual interviewed had fled military service in Syria under al-Assad’s regime due to conflict with his oath as a medical professional–he, along with 125 other refugees, fled Syria to Europe for freedom from violent conflict since 2009, 4.48 million Syrian refugees have sought asylum in Europe.
With the increasing immigrant population, especially from Muslim countries, many white Europeans fear that low fertility rates among “European natives” will create a self-effacing Europe devoid of Western identity. Xenophobic political sentiment has begun to influence the EU and its agreements with North African countries, regions that groups such as Liberian migrants must traverse before attempting to cross the Mediterranean. These agreements have already dropped irregular border crossings by an overall 38%—the lowest level since 2021 (due to COVID-19)—though the West African route saw an 18% increase, the highest since data collection began in 2009. This means that while efforts have been made to close off points of crossing, immigrants are finding alternative routes and bypassing blocked routes.
In response to the increased migration across the Mediterranean, Tunisia and Italy have developed a coordinating strategy that integrates migration control with national identity and economic policies. Tunisia stated that the reason for their aggressive migration crackdown and policy development is a defense against migrants who threaten to transform the state into an “African” country rather than an “Arab-Muslim” one. EU nations such as Italy have pitched migration policy as a facet of plans to boost the economies of African countries directly involved with migrant flow into the EU. Last year, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen both presented plans with economic benefits in tandem with stricter migration policy. Leyen’s partnership package plan held over 1.08 billion dollars in assistance, with approximately 164.5 million dollars targeted towards border management.
This is not the first time agreements have been used to curb migration into the EU. In 2017, an EU summit in Malta saw the promise of greater funding for migrant containment and the closing of the Liberian and Tunisian Central Mediterranean migrant routes. This is the same route that experienced a 59% drop in crossings in 2024, according to Frontex. The EU’s concerted response differs greatly from those in 2015, alongside the growth of xenophobia and the election of far-right politicians. There is a fear that Europe is losing its Western identity, particularly from invading Arab populations who, from their perspective, terrorize the white European population. Germany had committed 6.6 billion dollars to support 800,000 migrants entering the country and take in 500,000 migrants a year, with Chancellor Angela Merkel publicly stating that the EU cannot fail on the matter of supporting refugees if they wished to remain “the Europe [they] wished for.”
These recent agreements have increased the expulsion of migrants in North Africa who sought to cross the Mediterranean, some even using brutal tactics, including documented human rights violations and imprisonment. As a result, migrants face threats of torture, sexual violence, starvation, serious injury, and death. Doctors Without Borders (MSF) has now been denied access and obstructed from providing treatment to those individuals inside two of Libya’s major detention facilities after more than seven years of access, from 2016 to 2023. At one detention center, Abu Salim, women reported to MSF workers that they were told they could be released in exchange for sexual favors, and that they experienced sexual abuse at the hands of armed guards and men brought from outside the facility. Prisoners described being routinely denied life-saving medical treatment. In response to the exposed abuse, MSF has called for a stop to detention practices and the release of all those held, and for refugees to be provided with safe and legal pathways out of Libya.
Other countries, such as Tunisia, have begun a process known as “desert dumping,” abandoning migrants into the no-man’s land along their border in the Sahara Desert, providing them with no food or water and adequate medical care. Funded with more than 400 million euros by the EU Trust Fund under the pretense of migrant management, these operations use the funds to operate vehicles and commute out to remote regions of the Sahara to abandon migrants, according to a year-long investigation from Lighthouse Reports. Many who are left in the desert face threats of kidnapping, extortion, torture, violence, and death; others are sold and held for ransom. Vehicles used to round up migrants during raids and transport them to desert regions have been matched to vehicles donated to Tunisia by Italy and Germany. Some people, like African-American citizen Timothy Hucks, have been wrongfully arrested and subsequently abandoned in the desert following a police interrogation.
Of the 613 men arrested and sent back to Niger in December 2024, a majority reported mistreatment by authorities during their time in detention centers and while being transported. Few, including a 25-year-old from Guinea, are detained despite holding UNHCR refugee status papers. Those detained also include pregnant women and children; one group interviewed reported suffering hallucinations and heel infections. Many were dehydrated, injured, and abused by organized crime and trafficking rings that operate in the dumping zones. One group reportedly had been photographed by Spanish officers before knowingly being abandoned in an al-Qaeda-linked active war zone in the Malian desert.
Damaging migration policies from the EU and partnering African nations have resulted in the forceful return of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers to Libya and neighboring regions, where they face horrific and abusive conditions in detention centers and abandonment in the Sahara Desert. When groups are finally able to reach nearby cities, often the same from which they were rounded up, many risk being detained and dumped again, creating a cycle of violence and abuse. Using violent and abusive detainment as a solution to reduce migration will not reduce the influx of migrants and refugees into Europe, but rather force those desperate enough to create newer and potentially more dangerous routes to the EU and their assumed freedom from violent conflict. Scholars have long since connected this crisis to the colonial historical legacy left by many nations that participate in the prevention of African and Muslim migration into the EU. If the European Union is desperate to contain and prevent migrants at the cost of billion-dollar economic deals, it would be a greater use of funds to build instead grassroots support for democracy and peace-building efforts in regions of conflict.
Marine Le Pen Barred From Running in 2027 French Elections
On March 31st, French courts found the leader of the far-right Rassemblement National (National Rally) party, Marine Le Pen, guilty of embezzling millions of euros of European Union funds. This decision shook national politics, making Le Pen ineligible for the 2027 presidential election in France.
This court decision has massive implications. Before the verdict, Le Pen was the frontrunner in national polling ahead of the 2027 French election. Projected to win 32.0 percent of the vote, with the runner-up only receiving 23.5 percent, Le Pen was the clear national favorite. After running three times before, the next election would have been Le Pen’s best chance at winning the French presidency.
There are still chances Le Pen could run for president. She is determined not to back down, stating that “I’m a fighter and I’m not going to be eliminated.” Part of her strategy to undermine court supremacy has been attacking the legitimacy of the institution, calling the court’s decision a “‘nuclear bomb detonated by a corrupt system.” Moreover, Le Pen has received support in her fight against the judiciary, as some supporters have sent death threats to the judges who issued her conviction. A French court of appeals also said it would expedite her case, allowing for her trial to take place before next summer. This would allow her to run a successful presidential campaign for the following election.
What’s next for the Rassemblement National?
In light of this crisis, the Rassemblement National must decide its next move. Although Le Pen is a cornerstone of the party, which was founded by her father Jean-Marie in 1972, the wisest decision could be to look towards another candidate. Even if her appeal is heard in 2026, there is a chance the current sentence will be upheld, shortening the time another candidate might need to prepare for the presidential election.
Within the Rassemblement National, the clear choice for successor is Jordan Bardella. Le Pen’s charismatic 29-year-old prodigé has taken over the party since her conviction. But, this does not mean the Rassemblement National is prepared to support him in a presidential race. Le Pen stated that Bardella is “a tremendous asset for the movement. … I hope we don’t have to use that asset any sooner than we have to.” Bardella is remaining committed to Le Pen, affirming that he will “continue to fight with her to the end, hand in hand. I am totally loyal to her.”
All in all, Rassemblement National members are likely to stand by Le Pen’s side, with Politico stating that she is “almost universally worshipped within her party. None of her allies appear ready to tell her that endorsing Bardella now, rather than waiting for the courts to rule on her case, is the safest way to protect her movement.” Even at the risk of an underdeveloped presidential election, her allies are unwilling to jump-ship to Bardella.
If Le Pen refuses to offer her support, this could cause a rift not only in their party but in far-right French politics at large. It seems unlikely, but depending on the outcome of the appeal case and the level of support garnered by Bardella before the 2027 presidential campaign, it is possible that he could step out from behind her shadow.
Even if Le Pen and the Rassemblement National choose to endorse Bardella, this is not universally viewed as the best option. “Bardella is still quite a young politician. It would be a big step for him to be the presidential candidate in two years’ time” states Nicholas Starin, associate professor at John Cabot University in Rome.
Beyond that, Le Pen’s conviction could have devastating consequences for her and the Rassemblement National. While some believe her protégé Jordan Bardella could take the presidential ticket if she is prevented from running, others think rival right-wing parties will benefit most from the situation. As France demonstrates increasingly conservative tendencies, far-right politicians such as Éric Zemmour, Gérald Darmanin, or Bruno Retailleau could seize the opportunity and gain votes with Le Pen out of the picture.
Le Pen and Trump
After a life spent in right-wing politics, Le Pen has recently focused her attention on demonstrating that she will put national interests first, building the narrative that she is the best candidate for France. By not praising President Donald Trump’s electoral victory and not attending his inauguration, Le Pen may be acknowledging that many French citizens view Trump as a threat to Europe, even if they agree with his far-right stances, prioritizing her people above pleasing the American president.
For his part, despite a cold relation with Le Pen in the past, Trump has expressed his support for her after the indictment. Trump wrote on his Truth Social platform that the “Witch Hunt against Marine Le Pen is another example of European Leftists using Lawfare to silence Free Speech, and censor their Political Opponent.” His comparison reflects the image of martyrdom he has used to rally support behind himself in previous presidential elections.
Many have drawn parallels between Le Pen’s sentencing and the multiple cases called against Trump, namely “for covering up a hush money payment to a porn star, for attempts to overturn the results of the 2020 election that he lost, and for retaining classified documents after his first term ended.” In the United States, as Trump regained control of the White House, it seems his charges had little impact on the political landscape, potentially demonstrating that some Americans do not take powerful criminals seriously: if one has enough influence, they may be able to get away with illegal activity. If anything, Trump’s anti-establishment rhetoric capitalizes on his convictions, using them to portray the idea that judicial institutions target far-right leaders who challenge the “corrupt” system, giving him a clear motivation to support Le Pen in her appeals process.
Yet, unlike Trump’s charges, France will feel the consequences of a prominent politician’s indictment. Le Pen’s four-year prison sentence was reduced to two under house arrest, and her 100,000€ fine should not cause too much trouble, but the five-year ban on running for office could have severe consequences. Despite his wrongdoings, Trump’s criminal and civil charges resulted in few consequences, as he has run for president twice since the original charges were pressed. On the other hand, French judges are not willing to let Le Pen go free for her crimes, even though she was predicted to win the next presidential election.
Could Marine Le Pen’s sentencing set an international, or at least European or French, precedent of prosecuting high-level politicians when they commit crimes? What this means for far-right French politics is yet to be seen as Le Pen’s appeal is processed and the 2027 election approaches.
Trump’s Decision to Invite Zemmour
French far-right pundit Éric Zemmour - Stefano Rellandini, AFP
When creating the guest list for his inauguration, American president Donald Trump carefully chose which international attendees he wanted there. So when far-right politician Éric Zemmour arrived from France, instead of President Emmanuel Macron, or his counterpart Marine Le Pen—who has lost to Macron in the past two presidential elections—it may indicate a change of pace in US-Franco relations for the next few years.
Tensions between Trump and Le Pen are not a new phenomenon. In January 2017, Le Pen waited hours to see Trump at his New York City hotel, but the meeting never took place. This caused a rift between the two politicians, decreasing Le Pen’s admiration for Trump and leading her to ban lower-ranking members of her party from commenting on the 2024 election, stating that his style is “incompatible” with her party.
On the other hand, Éric Zemmour has gained media attention since he boasted of a “warm” 40-minute phone call with Trump back in February 2022, where the American president told him: “Don’t give in to anything, stand your ground, remain courageous, it’s tenacity and endurance that pay off.”
Despite receiving Trump’s backing, Zemmour’s party – Reconquête, meaning “win back” – did not win a seat in either the 2022 or 2024 parliamentary elections. Being invited to Trump’s inauguration indicates that Zemmour is likely to remain on the fringes of French society, despite Trump’s politics becoming more mainstream in the United States. While there are certainly far-right sentiments in France, even those citizens are concerned with their safety and prosperity. As such, while they may agree with Trump’s politics, his disregard for European interests is worrying for those on the continent.
This is where Marine Le Pen comes in. Le Pen might be taken more seriously by the French in the next election precisely because of her absence from Trump’s inauguration. Le Pen represents far-right tendencies while also protecting the nation rather than disregarding French concerns about Trump.
“If she wants to claim to govern and defend the interests of France, she cannot appear as someone who’s in the immediate proximity of Donald Trump, especially since Trump has a very aggressive discourse towards Europe,” states Olivier Costa, director at the Sciences Po Center for Political Research.
Le Pen’s distance from Trump may help her win the presidency next, and it will be interesting to see the direction that French far-right politics takes in the coming years. With Macron unable to run for a third term in 2027, Le Pen is the front runner in polling, with projections giving her about 37% of the vote, placing her far ahead in the first electoral round. If given the choice between Zemmour and Le Pen, will supporters side with a fringe American-backed politician, or a more established candidate doing more to protect French and European interests?
Although Trump’s first presidential term was difficult for Europe, many fear his second could be worse. France and the European Union are already steeped in political and economic struggles of their own. These could be exacerbated by tensions between the United States and China, and Trump threatening to pull out of NATO would mark a decisive turn for the war in Ukraine.
Trump’s decision to invite a fringe far-right French politician—instead of the republic’s president—demonstrates that he is not interested in maintaining traditional relations with France. Instead, he favors non-mainstream alternative elements of the country, such as parties and individuals not actually representing the French people. Trump wants to pick and choose how he handles transatlantic relations, doing it on his own terms rather than following traditional diplomatic customs.
However, it is curious that Macron was not invited to Trump’s inauguration, as Trump was invited to the reopening ceremony of Notre-Dame de Paris in December. Unfortunately, Trump’s inauguration guest list seems to be evidence that Macron’s attempt to get in the U.S. president’s good graces was ineffective.
Macron echoed the fears of many Europeans when he stated: “The United States of America has two priorities. The USA first, and that is legitimate, and the China issue, second. And the European issue is not a geopolitical priority for the coming years and decades.” While it remains to be seen how Trump will navigate the future of transatlantic relations, it is clear that the nation’s link with France will change during the first two years of Trump’s presidency, as well as after the upcoming French elections in 2027.
Hungarian Spy Scandal with the EU
Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán speaks at the European Parliament - EP/Flickr
Last month, the European Parliament reviewed concerns about illegal espionage conducted by Információs Hivatal (IH), Hungary’s civilian foreign intelligence service, on European Union (EU) officials between 2015 and 2017. This information was first revealed in an investigation by the Belgian daily newspaper De Tijd and the Hungarian NGO Direkt36 published last December. In their article, journalists Szabolcs Panyi and András Pethő detail how the Hungarian government initiated multiple espionage attempts against the EU’s Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). This came at a time when the office was investigating the Hungarian Prime Minister's son-in-law’s company, Elios, on the suspension of corrupt tenders. The espionage included phone tapping and IH officers stalking the officers, with the latter activity eventually leading to their discovery, as they were unable to maintain their cover.
More recently, the Hungarian government has continued to spy on its own citizens. In a 2021 interview with the Committee to Protect Journalists, Panyi discussed how the IH used Pegasus spyware to surveil journalists, inhibiting their ability to conduct investigative journalism. Panyi, an outspoken critic of Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán and a member of one of the few remaining Hungarian news outlets insulated from government influence, was a top target for the attacks. In both instances (2015-17 and 2021), the Hungarian government has not denied their involvement in the espionage, instead maintaining that it was used legally to investigate “national security threats.”
This intrusion is yet another instance of Orbán’s broader crackdown on independent media in Hungary, and a symptom of the broader democratic backsliding that’s happening in the state. This blatant violation of democratic norms fractures their trust with the EU and the other democratic members in the alliance. Despite these tendencies, as of February 11th, the EU has not taken any concrete action against Hungary in regards to their espionage or established any additional laws protecting against espionage. The EU’s hesitation likely stems from fears of further increasing tension with Hungary, , though the national security risk that this poses would seem to merit a swift and decisive action.
More broadly, as the war in Ukraine continues, and pressure from Russia and China intensifies, the EU needs to project unity to protect themselves from foreign interference. Without a firm condemnation of Hungary, they risk setting a dangerous precedent for other global powers or EU members to gather intelligence on the EU. This precedent could also lead to the erosion of the integrity of democratic norms, both in Hungary and other EU countries, as Hungary continues to spy on their citizens. Ultimately, this dispute exacerbates the already existing rift between the EU and Hungary, as Budapest has increasingly pushed back against the alliance (including recently threatening to withhold support for the EU’s prolongation of sanctions on Russia).
A Fractured EU Navigates a 2nd Trump Term
French President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen EPA-EFE/REX/Shutterstock
While President Donald Trump returned to office in the United States, leaders throughout the European Union (EU) were busy mapping out their own course at the World Economic Forum. At the latest conference, held in Davos, Switzerland, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen outlined a plan for Europe’s future on the world stage. While von der Leyen avoided direct criticism of the U.S. president, her speech marked a crucial pivot in EU foreign policy: independence from the U.S. Seeking to avoid a repeat of the tariff headaches from Trump’s first term, it seems the EU president has opted for Europe to separate its political fortunes from the volatile superpower. Amongst the alliance, however, the response has lacked cohesion; factions have emerged as leaders reconcile and navigate the converging crises of Trump’s “America First” foreign policy and Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Some European leaders, such as Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, have stuck close to the American business mogul. Meloni, who attended Trump’s inauguration, has been a stalwart ally of the GOP strongman, leading some to call her Europe’s “Trump whisperer.” The Italian PM’s close ties with Trump, and the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) head Elon Musk, suggest her administration may maintain warm relations with the U.S., and move in lockstep with its transatlantic partner for the next 4 years. Similarly, several members of Germany’s far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party also made an appearance at Trump’s inauguration. While the conservative Christian Democrats party, led by Friedrich Merz, are best positioned to win Germany’s upcoming elections, the AfD may still influence a strengthening of German-American relations and an increased closeness to the Trump administration.
Conversely, French President Emmanuel Macron, who has long been the EU’s top proponent of strategic autonomy, has responded to Trump’s inauguration by calling for an increase in defense expenditures among EU countries. While Macron’s pleas for European strategic autonomy fell on deaf ears during the Biden administration, Trump’s return–and the continued Russia-Ukraine war–have reignited talks of the EU forging its own path, independent of the U.S. Indeed, Macron’s ambition has been reinvigorated, as he’s urged his fellow European leaders to face the realities of the Trump administration and end the EU’s reliance on the U.S. for defense. The alliance may be positioned to achieve this feat, as EU defense spending hit record highs in 2023 and 2024, and is expected to balloon this year, with 22 of the 27 EU states increasing their defense spending.
Support for stronger European defense has been echoed by Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who has condemned the U.S.’ inability to pass legislation that would provide more aid to Ukraine. Poland, whose estimated defense expenditures as a share of GDP (%) in 2024 were the highest among the NATO alliance (at 4.12%), has given dozens of packages in military aid to Ukraine and served as one of Kyiv’s most steadfast allies in their fight for sovereignty.
Tusk’s concerns are undoubtedly geographically motivated, as Poland’s proximity to Russia makes conflict a perennial concern. This geopolitical anxiety has also motivated the Nordic-Baltic states (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden) to increase their military spending in recent years. Beyond that, in November, Tusk and other leaders of Nordic-Baltic countries held a security summit in Sweden, issuing a joint statement on the need to take greater responsibility for their own defense. This recognition of the necessity of European strategic autonomy was music to the ears of Macron, who attended the conference virtually. While the U.S. has historically been the champion of the liberal international order and Western security, these moves from Europe suggest a willingness to take the mantle in the event that Trump abdicates the throne.
Meanwhile, Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico has charted a different course: a pro-Russia one. Since his return to office in 2023, Fico has met with Putin, ended Slovakian military aid to Ukraine, and pushed back against EU sanctions on Russia. While the Slovakian PM has defended his move, citing the necessity of developing strong relations with both sides, the Slovakian people haven’t bought it. Tens of thousands of protestors throughout the country have called for Fico’s resignation in recent months in opposition to his foreign policy pivot.
Similarly, in Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán threatened to condition his support for Ukraine on the maintenance of a pipeline to provide Budapest with energy. Orbán has defended this stipulation by arguing that Hungary, who imports 80% of their oil from Russia, has lost €19 billion from EU sanctions on Russia. While the Hungarian PM backed down and voted to continue sanctions, his threats should not be dismissed, as they’re emblematic of a broader cohesion problem that the alliance is facing. While the unanimity requirement for EU decisions didn’t prevent action this time, if Orbán’s hesitation grows, or Fico drags his feet too, it could damage the ability of the bloc to show resolve against Russia–and illiberal values–and support for Ukraine–and democratic values.
As the EU navigates a period rife with uncertainty, it remains to be seen which factions will shape the alliance’s foreign policy going forward. Only time will tell whether Macron’s plans for the alliance manifest in the coming years or are destined to remain a pipe dream forever.