Treaty Negotiations in the Face of Strained India-Bangladesh Relations
Introduction
India-Bangladesh relations are at a historic low ever since the August 2024 ousting of former Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. Her regime was accused of enforced disappearance, power abuse, and other human rights violations in protests that left almost 1,400 people dead, according to a press release by the United Nations. Hasina subsequently fled to India, which granted her asylum, and whose historic ties with her Awami League party have fuelled accusations of India supporting her authoritarian rule. Since her removal, Bangladesh has been under a caretaker government led by Nobel Prize economist Mohammad Yunus for almost 18 months. A return to a democratically elected government may provide India with the fresh start it needs to revitalize relations between the two countries.
However, this is not guaranteed. On February 12, 2026, Bangladesh elected Tarique Rahman of the Bangladesh National Party (“BNP”) to the position of prime minister in a landslide victory, with the Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami coming in second. Rahman campaigned on a Bangladesh First policy, reflecting the strained ties between India and Bangladesh. Although this is a slight change from Yunus’s foreign policy positions, which favored closer ties with Pakistan and China, India faces an uphill battle in relations with its eastern neighbor.
Extradition Treaty
Arguably, the most pressing diplomatic issue between India and Bangladesh recently is the extradition of former prime minister Sheikh Hasina, who is currently being granted asylum in India. Although India and Bangladesh have a bilateral extradition treaty, New Delhi has denied Dhaka’s request for extradition, arguing that she is being extradited for a political offense — an exception under the extradition treaty. Bangladesh has sentenced Hasina to death in absentia, along with former Bangladeshi home minister Assaduzaman Khan Kamal, through its International Crimes Tribunal, originally established by Hasina to prosecute war crimes in the Bangladesh Liberation war.
It is unclear whether Bangladesh and India will come to a solution via negotiations on this issue.
Ganges Water Treaty
Bangladesh and India are also set to renegotiate the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty, set to expire at the end of this year. The treaty, signed in 1996 after India constructed the Farakka Barrage, aims to regulate water-sharing issues on the Ganges river. The treaty mainly focuses on downstream water flows for agricultural purposes. Bangladesh also cites climate change as a concern for renegotiation, as the drawing of water at Farakka and changes in climate patterns have increased salt-water flows from the Bay of Bengal into the Sundarbans mangroves, an ecologically protected site straddling the India-Bangladesh border. This is causing erosion on the Indian side of the Sundarbans, and salinity levels and sea level rise issues are being exacerbated. Additionally, the lack of freshwater, an issue raised by Bangladeshi negotiators, is causing health problems on both sides of the border. Women who work planting crops in the mangroves report sores, infections, and other health issues caused by bathing in and consuming salt water.
The issue is further complicated by Bangladesh’s plans to construct a water management system on another shared river, the Teesta, with Chinese help, Bangladesh alleges that the current arrangement benefits India at the expense of Bangladesh’s freshwater flows. A previous proposal that would have granted Bangladesh almost 40% of the dry season river flow was blocked at the last minute by West Bengal’s chief minister, Mamata Banerjee, citing farmers’ concerns over adequate irrigation in India. The Teesta River Master Plan was originally devised by the Sheikh Hasina government, who wanted India to help manage the river. However, Yunus sought the help of Chinese technology, calling China a “master of water management” at a meeting with Chinese Water Resources Minister Li Guoying.
India cites security concerns as this river flows through the Siliguri Corridor, a thin strip of land connecting India’s northeastern states to the rest of the country. As this is an important strategic and military zone for India, they argue that any Chinese activity in the area poses a security and intelligence threat. The BNP, who were recently elected to a majority in the parliament, have voiced support for the project, so bilateral negotiations may be back on the table if New Delhi wants to have a say in the management of the river.
Identity Politics
Identity politics, particularly with regard to religion, have further strained relations between New Delhi and Dhaka. Additionally, Bangladeshi protesters are not pleased with India’s perceived influence over their country’s affairs. Although India may prefer a democratically elected government for stability, it has voiced concerns with attacks on Hindus in Bangladesh and the rise of Jamaat, an Islamist political party. Dhaka claims that these attacks are exaggerated and not the result of sectarian tensions. However, due to these tensions, Bangladesh has suspended visas for Indian travelers for about two months. This has also spilled into sports, with the Bangladeshi cricket team boycotting the T20 Cricket World Cup for alleged security reasons that may stem from political tensions with the World Cup host, India.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the ability of India and Bangladesh to resume peaceful relations depends on the political will of both sides. Their interdependency, coupled with India’s desire to remain the guiding force in the subcontinent may force negotiations to occur. Rahman’s new government has indicated that it is open to talks to ease tensions between New Delhi and Dhaka, but it is to be seen whether they will simmer down for good.