How long does it take to bring a treaty back to life? As diplomats from Iran and the United States work to renew a version of the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal, they are finding out that the answer may be longer than the world would have expected - and longer than it can afford. Tehran and Washington continue to duck in and out of negotiations as pressure from their constituents and their people continues to mount. Disappearing and appearing like apparitions, the two have left political analysts puzzled about the prospect of new nuclear policy. Although 2023 has marked a promising turn of events in rekindling diplomatic relations between the two after eight years of hostility, disagreements and demands small and large keep the two powers from coming together to revive their 2015 deal.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly referred to as the Iran Nuclear Deal, was an agreement between Iran and member nations of the UN Security Council in collaboration with the EU. Encompassing issues from uranium enrichment to sanctions relief, it was able to broadly address the various complexities of the situation at that time. The 2015 deal made significant strides towards limiting Iran’s development of nuclear capabilities: it saw strict restrictions on the construction of nuclear centrifuges, limits on uranium enrichment and plutonium, two key components powering nuclear warheads, and an extensive monitoring and verification system, amongst other terms. In return for Iran’s compliance with these requirements, many of the sanctions levied against the nation by the EU, US, and UN would be raised, and progress would be made towards lifting the arms embargo on Iran’s transfer of military weaponry.
Two years after taking office, however, former President Donald Trump terminated US involvement in the deal, calling it “defective at its core.” Spurred on by hardline Congressional Republicans who claimed the 2015 negotiations represented a striking loss of ground and a sullying of American power on the world stage, he cut diplomatic ties with Iran and reinstated crippling sanctions on the nation’s trade capabilities. According to UN reports, European leaders and UN representatives condemned Trump for abandoning a commitment to global security. Meanwhile, Iran itself lamented the US’s departure from the agreement, with then-President Rouhani pledging to continue to abide by its terms in the hopes that cooperation may be revived. In the years following the 2018 scuffle, Iran struggled to find its direction for the future.
Their direction was charted in 2021 with the election of President Ebrahim Raisi. A political hardliner and staunch combatant of Western influence, Raisi’s nuclear policies are in striking contrast to those of his relatively progressive predecessor. The US Institute of Peace has estimated that within the first year of his leadership, Iran had exceeded the amount of enriched uranium permitted by the 2015 deal by over 18 times. Particles enriched up to 84% were found in late 2022, per a report published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); these levels draw dangerously close to the 90% purity mark necessary for its use in a nuclear warhead.
Rather than quell proliferation efforts, the past year’s negotiation attempts seem to have only further fueled Iran’s dash towards nuclear capabilities. In August of 2022, talks between Tehran and Washington nearly resulted in a deal that would restore key components of the JCPOA. Negotiations fell apart at the last minute due to disagreements over investigation and verification practices, however, and by November of that year, Iran had unveiled plans for the construction of fourteen new nuclear centrifuges. In a blatant nod towards the failure of the summer 2022 talks, the government also suspended safeguard arrangements, rendering nuclear energy inspectors from the IAEA unable to access and determine the status of Iran’s centrifuge workshops and uranium mines.
The threat of Iran holding nuclear warheads extends beyond distrust of the government’s intentions or the paranoia of other world leaders, although both play a meaningful role in the issue. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy points to the potential for an arms race to break out as other Middle Eastern nations seek defensive measures against Iranian nuclear weapons. In fact, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman has stated unequivocally his intentions to begin nuclear proliferation should Iran obtain a bomb. “If they get one, we have to get one,” he posited in a recent interview, citing their need to maintain balance of power in the region. A nuclear arms race in a region already rocked by conflict and instability has the potential to produce catastrophic consequences; thus, a nuclear-armed Iran must be looked at in the context of other key players in the region.
Issues also lie within the nation itself. Tehran is known to be one of the most notorious state sponsors of terrorism, having been found providing groups like Hamas and Hezbollah with weapons and funding. For the government of Iran to possess large amounts of weapons grade uranium means the risk of some of it ending up, intentionally or not, in the hands of terrorist organizations. If they are able to construct even small-scale, rudimentary nuclear weaponry, these groups would shatter the nuclear security of the world like a glass pane, rendering established concepts like “mutually assured destruction” and “no-first-use” inapplicable. The scope of the danger of terrorism would explode, driven by the threat of future attacks that are unprecedented in death and destruction.
As world leaders grapple with these possibilities, looking to the UN Security Council to intervene, US President Joe Biden has seen diplomatic efforts hindered by conflicting interests within government. Hardline Congressional republicans, many still proponents of Trump-era political sentiments, have criticized the Biden administration for participating in negotiations with Iran in the first place. They argue that the US has already afforded Iran far too many concessions and that compromising with the Iranian government would represent a significant blow to America’s image and perceived power on the world stage. Just last year, forty-nine out of the fifty Republican senators in office pledged to vote against any revived version of the JCPOA unless its terms are akin to that of a harsh crackdown, placing strain on Iran’s self-determination and their allocation of resources. Promoting this iron-fisted approach in lieu of collaboration has, as in years past, antagonized diplomats in Tehran and left multiple empty seats at recent attempted peace summits. Given that any new deal would have to gain a ⅔ majority for approval and confirmation, the Biden administration faces the puzzling task of forging a deal that would be amenable to both its domestic constituents and to the Iranian government.
President Raisi faces similar struggles in reconciling disputes with Iranian legislators. Despite his belligerent political reputation, the leader of Iran has begun to demonstrate a willingness to participate in peace talks, understanding the importance of extending communication with the West after a challenging past few years. After the US abandoned the JCPOA in 2018, sanctions levied by the Trump administration plunged Iran into a deep, lengthy two-year recession. One of the world’s largest exporters of energy, Iran’s sales of oil and gas across the world represent a whopping 47% of its national revenue and comprises 1/5th of its foreign exports, making it a prime target for strict embargos. Their economic woes worsened as EU nations joined in to implement more restrictions, angered by Raisi’s efforts to reinvigorate his country’s nuclear program. The extent of trade sanctions were staggering: Iran exported an average of 2.1 million barrels of crude oil each day while the JCPOA was in effect. Post-2018 restrictions saw this rate plummet to just one hundred thousand barrels daily. Coupled with social and economic strife from the Covid-19 pandemic, government officials have recognized the pressing need to finalize a resolution that would grant them relief from Western sanctions.
The Iranian Revolutionary Guards, a branch of the Iranian armed forces with significant influence in government and policy-making, however, remain staunchly opposed to cooperation with the global West. They claim that retaining control of their nuclear program is essential to Iran’s national autonomy and dignity. These ideas echo the sentiments of other non-nuclear regimes across the world who seek nuclear capabilities, citing their importance in deterring attacks from foreign adversaries, maintaining national security, and balancing out global power inequities. Iran, in particular, emphasizes their precarious position in a highly volatile Middle East, arguing that their nuclear program will act only as a mechanism of protection and national defense.
Due to Iran’s bifurcated government structure, Raisi’s administration also has to contend with the interests of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who holds the final say in all matters of domestic and foreign policy and who, unfortunately for world leaders, stands by the Revolutionary Guards in opposing compromise with the US. At each turn in negotiations, Khamenei has fended off proposals and pledged not to sign an agreement until significant concessions are provided to bolster Iran’s power - that is, the complete lifting of sanctions, the reintegration of Iran into the world financial system, and a decrease in oversight regulations demanded by the US. With Iranian interest groups attempting to stretch their benefits beyond even the scope of the 2015 Nuclear Deal and US congressional Republicans hesitant to even approach the JCPOA’s level of compromise, negotiations and even informal talks between the two leaders drag on without resolution. With the onset of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the outbreak of war in the Gaza Strip region, the diplomats on either side have had to table their efforts to revive an agreement, dashing global hopes that a rekindling of communication between Iran and the US will translate into a new frontier in nuclear security.
Today, debate continues over whether the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action could be deemed successful. Critics argue that the deal provided Iran too many concessions because it still permitted some quantities of uranium enrichment. Proponents, on the other hand, point to the agreement’s unprecedented verification system, which ensured there would never be enough resources available for an Iranian warhead. Regardless, it remains the only comprehensive and successful approach towards preventing nuclear proliferation in Iran in history, and today’s no-deal world faces pressing dangers as relations between the parties break down, economic strain from sanctions mount, and nuclear operations in Iran continue at a faster rate than ever. Despite popping in and out of negotiations repeatedly, the two phantom-like powers seem unable to reach a point of alignment in their paranormal game of peek-a-boo, never sticking around long enough to work together and form a resolution. Until they emerge from the shadows and meet in the middle, the world will have to continue with bated breath for an answer to their question - how long will it take to resurrect the Iran Nuclear Deal? And if they stop playing altogether and the ghost of the JCPOA fades away, they will never get an answer; instead, they will face even more daunting questions and haunting uncertainties regarding the state of global security itself.