The Ghosts of Past and Present - Why the US and Iran Can’t Find a Way to Revive the Iran Nuclear Deal, and its Haunting Implications

How long does it take to bring a treaty back to life? As diplomats from Iran and the United States work to renew a version of the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal, they are finding out that the answer may be longer than the world would have expected - and longer than it can afford. Tehran and Washington continue to duck in and out of negotiations as pressure from their constituents and their people continues to mount. Disappearing and appearing like apparitions, the two have left political analysts puzzled about the prospect of new nuclear policy. Although 2023 has marked a promising turn of events in rekindling diplomatic relations between the two after eight years of hostility, disagreements and demands small and large keep the two powers from coming together to revive their 2015 deal.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly referred to as the Iran Nuclear Deal, was an agreement between Iran and member nations of the UN Security Council in collaboration with the EU. Encompassing issues from uranium enrichment to sanctions relief, it was able to broadly address the various complexities of the situation at that time. The 2015 deal made significant strides towards limiting Iran’s development of nuclear capabilities: it saw strict restrictions on the construction of nuclear centrifuges, limits on uranium enrichment and plutonium, two key components powering nuclear warheads, and an extensive monitoring and verification system, amongst other terms. In return for Iran’s compliance with these requirements, many of the sanctions levied against the nation by the EU, US, and UN would be raised, and progress would be made towards lifting the arms embargo on Iran’s transfer of military weaponry. 

Two years after taking office, however, former President Donald Trump terminated US involvement in the deal, calling it “defective at its core.” Spurred on by hardline Congressional Republicans who claimed the 2015 negotiations represented a striking loss of ground and a sullying of American power on the world stage, he cut diplomatic ties with Iran and reinstated crippling sanctions on the nation’s trade capabilities. According to UN reports, European leaders and UN representatives condemned Trump for abandoning a commitment to global security. Meanwhile, Iran itself lamented the US’s departure from the agreement, with then-President Rouhani pledging to continue to abide by its terms in the hopes that cooperation may be revived. In the years following the 2018 scuffle, Iran struggled to find its direction for the future.

Their direction was charted in 2021 with the election of President Ebrahim Raisi. A political hardliner and staunch combatant of Western influence, Raisi’s nuclear policies are in striking contrast to those of his relatively progressive predecessor. The US Institute of Peace has estimated that within the first year of his leadership, Iran had exceeded the amount of enriched uranium permitted by the 2015 deal by over 18 times. Particles enriched up to 84% were found in late 2022, per a report published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); these levels draw dangerously close to the 90% purity mark necessary for its use in a nuclear warhead. 

Rather than quell proliferation efforts, the past year’s negotiation attempts seem to have only further fueled Iran’s dash towards nuclear capabilities. In August of 2022, talks between Tehran and Washington nearly resulted in a deal that would restore key components of the JCPOA. Negotiations fell apart at the last minute due to disagreements over investigation and verification practices, however, and by November of that year, Iran had unveiled plans for the construction of fourteen new nuclear centrifuges. In a blatant nod towards the failure of the summer 2022 talks, the government also suspended safeguard arrangements, rendering nuclear energy inspectors from the IAEA unable to access and determine the status of Iran’s centrifuge workshops and uranium mines. 

The threat of Iran holding nuclear warheads extends beyond distrust of the government’s intentions or the paranoia of other world leaders, although both play a meaningful role in the issue. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy points to the potential for an arms race to break out as other Middle Eastern nations seek defensive measures against Iranian nuclear weapons. In fact, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman has stated unequivocally his intentions to begin nuclear proliferation should Iran obtain a bomb. “If they get one, we have to get one,” he posited in a recent interview, citing their need to maintain balance of power in the region. A nuclear arms race in a region already rocked by conflict and instability has the potential to produce catastrophic consequences; thus, a nuclear-armed Iran must be looked at in the context of other key players in the region.

Issues also lie within the nation itself. Tehran is known to be one of the most notorious state sponsors of terrorism, having been found providing groups like Hamas and Hezbollah with weapons and funding. For the government of Iran to possess large amounts of weapons grade uranium means the risk of some of it ending up, intentionally or not, in the hands of terrorist organizations. If they are able to construct even small-scale, rudimentary nuclear weaponry, these groups would shatter the nuclear security of the world like a glass pane, rendering established concepts like “mutually assured destruction” and “no-first-use” inapplicable. The scope of the danger of terrorism would explode, driven by the threat of future attacks that are unprecedented in death and destruction. 

As world leaders grapple with these possibilities, looking to the UN Security Council to intervene, US President Joe Biden has seen diplomatic efforts hindered by conflicting interests within government. Hardline Congressional republicans, many still proponents of Trump-era political sentiments, have criticized the Biden administration for participating in negotiations with Iran in the first place. They argue that the US has already afforded Iran far too many concessions and that compromising with the Iranian government would represent a significant blow to America’s image and perceived power on the world stage. Just last year, forty-nine out of the fifty Republican senators in office pledged to vote against any revived version of the JCPOA unless its terms are akin to that of a harsh crackdown, placing strain on Iran’s self-determination and their allocation of resources. Promoting this iron-fisted approach in lieu of collaboration has, as in years past, antagonized diplomats in Tehran and left multiple empty seats at recent attempted peace summits. Given that any new deal would have to gain a ⅔ majority for approval and confirmation, the Biden administration faces the puzzling task of forging a deal that would be amenable to both its domestic constituents and to the Iranian government.

President Raisi faces similar struggles in reconciling disputes with Iranian legislators. Despite his belligerent political reputation, the leader of Iran has begun to demonstrate a willingness to participate in peace talks, understanding the importance of extending communication with the West after a challenging past few years. After the US abandoned the JCPOA in 2018, sanctions levied by the Trump administration plunged Iran into a deep, lengthy two-year recession. One of the world’s largest exporters of energy, Iran’s sales of oil and gas across the world represent a whopping 47% of its national revenue and comprises 1/5th of its foreign exports, making it a prime target for strict embargos. Their economic woes worsened as EU nations joined in to implement more restrictions, angered by Raisi’s efforts to reinvigorate his country’s nuclear program. The extent of trade sanctions were staggering: Iran exported an average of 2.1 million barrels of crude oil each day while the JCPOA was in effect. Post-2018 restrictions saw this rate plummet to just one hundred thousand barrels daily. Coupled with social and economic strife from the Covid-19 pandemic, government officials have recognized the pressing need to finalize a resolution that would grant them relief from Western sanctions.

The Iranian Revolutionary Guards, a branch of the Iranian armed forces with significant influence in government and policy-making, however, remain staunchly opposed to cooperation with the global West. They claim that retaining control of their nuclear program is essential to Iran’s national autonomy and dignity. These ideas echo the sentiments of other non-nuclear regimes across the world who seek nuclear capabilities, citing their importance in deterring attacks from foreign adversaries, maintaining national security, and balancing out global power inequities. Iran, in particular, emphasizes their precarious position in a highly volatile Middle East, arguing that their nuclear program will act only as a mechanism of protection and national defense. 

Due to Iran’s bifurcated government structure, Raisi’s administration also has to contend with the interests of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who holds the final say in all matters of domestic and foreign policy and who, unfortunately for world leaders, stands by the Revolutionary Guards in opposing compromise with the US. At each turn in negotiations, Khamenei has fended off proposals and pledged not to sign an agreement until significant concessions are provided to bolster Iran’s power - that is, the complete lifting of sanctions, the reintegration of Iran into the world financial system, and a decrease in oversight regulations demanded by the US. With Iranian interest groups attempting to stretch their benefits beyond even the scope of the 2015 Nuclear Deal and US congressional Republicans hesitant to even approach the JCPOA’s level of compromise, negotiations and even informal talks between the two leaders drag on without resolution. With the onset of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the outbreak of war in the Gaza Strip region, the diplomats on either side have had to table their efforts to revive an agreement, dashing global hopes that a rekindling of communication between Iran and the US will translate into a new frontier in nuclear security.

Today, debate continues over whether the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action could be deemed successful. Critics argue that the deal provided Iran too many concessions because it still permitted some quantities of uranium enrichment. Proponents, on the other hand, point to the agreement’s unprecedented verification system, which ensured there would never be enough resources available for an Iranian warhead. Regardless, it remains the only comprehensive and successful approach towards preventing nuclear proliferation in Iran in history, and today’s no-deal world faces pressing dangers as relations between the parties break down, economic strain from sanctions mount, and nuclear operations in Iran continue at a faster rate than ever. Despite popping in and out of negotiations repeatedly, the two phantom-like powers seem unable to reach a point of alignment in their paranormal game of peek-a-boo, never sticking around long enough to work together and form a resolution. Until they emerge from the shadows and meet in the middle, the world will have to continue with bated breath for an answer to their question - how long will it take to resurrect the Iran Nuclear Deal? And if they stop playing altogether and the ghost of the JCPOA fades away, they will never get an answer; instead, they will face even more daunting questions and haunting uncertainties regarding the state of global security itself.

A $6 Billion Deal: The US-Iran Prisoner Swap

aljazeera.com

On September 19th, five Americans returned home after being imprisoned, some for years, in Iran. Their return was swapped for the five Iranians held in U.S. custody–accused of violating U.S. sanctions– along with the unfreezing of $6 billion in Iranian oil revenue funds. After two years of volatile negotiations, President Biden said the swap was finally executed bringing innocent Americans home. However, the deal garnered much criticism from Republicans claiming the release of billions in Iranian oil revenue would only incentivize the capturing of more Americans. 

The swap was cautiously arranged with mediated talks between the U.S. and Iran through Qatar when the oil revenue funds were successfully transferred to banks in Doha. When the transfer was confirmed, the five U.S. prisoners departed on a Qatari plane from Tehran– Iran’s capital– while simultaneously, two of the Iranians in U.S. custody arrived in Doha on their route home. Three of the five Iranian hostages chose to not return to Iran. 

Businessmen Siamak Nazami, 51, and Emad Sharqi, 59, along with environmentalist Morad Tahbaz, 67, are amongst some of the freed Americans– the other two choosing not to be publicly named. 

The exchange dissipates a small portion of the extensive tense relations between the U.S. and Iran. Although this major humanitarian issue has been resolved between the two countries, it is uncertain whether or not they will work on other issues they have– such as Iran’s nuclear program– or if tensions between them have even deescalated despite President Biden’s efforts. Although there is still much contention between the countries, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi believes the prisoner swap “...can certainly be a step based upon which in the future other humanitarian actions can be taken." Although it is a mere point of friction that has been resolved, it poses a possibility of cooperation between Iran and the U.S. in renewing their relations. 

On the contrary, many Republicans believe that this swap has further polarized relations between the countries as it may prompt Iran to hold more Americans hostage in anticipation of some monetary reward. Biden aides, however, express that the $6 billion in oil revenue belongs to Iran and is not some extraneous form of payment. The money was wired to restricted bank accounts in Qatar for the purpose of surveilling the money– laden with financial sanctions– to ensure it is spent on humanitarian goods. Both parties acknowledge, however, that the deal may allow Iran to spend the money they were previously allocating towards humanitarian goods for other purposes. There have been concerns not only about the issue of releasing extensive funds to Iran but the issue of American safety. Republican Senator Tom Cotton, of Arkansas, declared on X, the social media platform previously known as Twitter, that “Joe Biden’s embarrassing appeasement not only makes Iran stronger, it makes America less safe.” There is concern that the money they once dedicated towards humanitarian goods are now freed to be used as funding for their nuclear program, which is another strained conflict between Iran and the U.S. 

Before freeing the prisoners, there were talks between the U.S. and Iran to convene on a broader conflict– Iran’s nuclear program. The countries strived to reestablish the Obama nuclear deal, which limited Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief, but Iran continued making insistences on its nuclear program that was not sustainable for the U.S. Along the way, talks of a redefined nuclear deal had become intertwined with the release of the American prisoners. To the negotiators acting on behalf of each country, it was eminent that the U.S. would not continue with an expensive prisoner swap when a nuclear deal was not settled. Suddenly, the release of the prisoners was contingent upon a solidified nuclear deal, which showed potential for a breakthrough in a cooperative relationship between the countries in easing tensions. However, it has also illuminated the growing concern for America’s safety in regards to Iran’s nuclear program. 

Despite this, much time elapsed and no deal was confirmed. Many individuals, including the families and lawyers of the prisoners, urged President Biden to overlook politics and bring their loved ones back home. Iran had come to the conclusion that, if they could not obtain a nuclear deal with the U.S., they first had to settle smaller matters– the prisoner swap– to begin to minimize tensions with the U.S. in order to eventually settle larger matters such as achieving sanctions relief and a nuclear deal breakthrough. Within a few weeks, a written agreement was  produced and the American prisoners were finally free. However, there was yet another delay. The fifth prisoner, a California woman, was recently arrested while doing aid work in Afghanistan. The release was delayed for another several weeks as they had to rearrange the agreement to encapsulate her release as well. Finally, the American prisoners were released– some from the Evin Prison (a detention center in Iran notorious for torture) and returned home. 

The success of bringing the prisoners back home sparked hope for Biden’s vow to continue to work for the release of more U.S. citizens imprisoned internationally. The Democratic party, in particular, views this as a stepping stone in working together with Iran to solve its humanitarian issues along with other broad affairs between the countries. However, there is widespread concern from the Republican party on this exchange and what it implies for the future. Many believe it is far too costly of a deal and there is no insurance of whether or not Iran will spend the billions in funds on humanitarian purposes. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken asserts that the deal did not give Iran access to U.S. funds but their own money. He also claimed Washington will ensure that the $6 billion oil revenue only goes toward humanitarian purposes. But how will this be ensured? On September 12th, just days before the prisoners’ release, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi proclaimed in an interview with NBC News that Iran will spend the $6 billion “wherever” it wants. This assertion goes directly against the convictions of government officials assuring Iran will spend the money on humanitarian needs leaving much uncertainty around the deal. 

There is certainly heightened polarization between the parties regarding the prisoner swap. With the multitude of views on the issue, it is difficult to discern what it implies for the future of Iran-U.S. relations. Most Democrats believe that the deal has opened up a forum for the countries to work together in resolving more of their conflicts. Most Republicans believe that this return of immense funds will only propel Iran to capture more Americans. They also believe it has generated a state of precariousness as we wait to see what Iran does with the funds. Republican Senator Marsha Blackburn condemned the swap on X writing, “On the anniversary of 9/11, Joe Biden handed over $6 billion to Iran. Under this administration, our enemies are getting stronger.” However, Iran was not a part of the 2001 terrorist attack. This post undeniably contributes to the already prevalent racial and cultural polarization between the U.S. and Iran by associating a Muslim country– Iran– with the 9/11 attack. This narrative along with the uncertainty surrounding the use of the funds may add to an already tense, polarized relationship between the U.S. and Iran. 

It is not yet clear whether the swap bolsters polarization between Iran and the U.S. In a way, they have worked together on an agreement that solved a common conflict; however, there are still many more central issues between them to be resolved along with the apprehension of what is to arise from Iran’s choice of spending on the funds. Although the return of American prisoners has restored hope in the United States’ future dealings with Iran, the premises on how the deal was arranged may prove to further sever the countries relations with one another.     

Social Media in the Middle East: A Double-Edged Sword

In late March 2023, three YouTubers received prison sentences ranging from three months to six years for content deemed inappropriate by the Houthi government in Yemen. A court in Sanaa, the capital city of Yemen, found that the YouTubers were guilty of “inciting chaos, disrupting public peace and insulting the Houthis,” according to their lawyer. One of the YouTubers, Ahmed Hajar, posted a video on December 22, 2022, that alleged corruption and oppression by the Iran-backed Houthi regime. Hajar was violently detained by armed rebels the same day the video was uploaded; the other two YouTubers involved in the case were subjected to similarly terrifying and unjust detainments. The recent crackdown on YouTubers is emblematic of the Houthi government’s continuing crusade against free speech. Since its takeover of Sanaa in 2014, the Houthi rebel group has clamped down hard on both the free press and political dissent on social media. “Sanaa has become the heart of a republic of fear,” writes exiled Yemeni journalist Afrah Nasser. Problems around social media and free speech are not unique to Yemen, though. Social media has become an increasingly important tool for activists and youth across the Middle East, but those using it face challenges like the rampant spread of misinformation and propaganda, as well as the ongoing threat of government repression. This article will examine the complex role of social media in the Middle East—both as a platform for connectivity and change and as a battleground for geopolitical conflicts.

Social Media Trends in the Middle East

The people of the Middle East region are some of the most avid social media users in the world. According to the New Media Academy, the average social media user in the Middle East spends over 3.5 hours on social networks per day, which is significantly higher than the global average of approximately 2.5 hours per day. Users in the Middle East also have an average of 8.4 social media accounts each, with those in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) having 10.5 accounts. This is “the highest number of social media accounts per person globally,” according to Forbes. The most popular apps in the region are Whatsapp, YouTube, Facebook, and Instagram, with TikTok and Snapchat seeing explosive growth in recent years. Twitter is the only app that has seen a recent decline in usage as social media users move to newer platforms and the platform’s functionality declines. 

The benefits of social media in the Middle East are readily apparent: the region has seen massive growth in e-commerce, and social media platforms like Snapchat were useful tools for facilitating the dissemination of essential public health information during the COVID-19 pandemic. But while the ubiquity of social media in the Middle East has positive implications for connectivity and commerce, it has also facilitated the spread of dangerous misinformation in recent years. In 2020, Facebook removed two networks of fake accounts linked to digital marketing firms in Egypt and India because they were pushing false narratives that pitted the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Egypt against Qatar. Twitter has similarly removed hundreds of fake accounts of so-called “experts” that were actually fake personas pushing propaganda. 

Although the problem of misinformation is not unique to social media platforms in the Middle East, it can pose a heightened threat when it is weaponized to tip the delicate balance of one of the many ongoing conflicts in the region. For instance, journalists in the United Kingdom found that the Iraqi terrorist group Kata'ib Hezbollah has established a large social media network and paid vast sums of money to Facebook to boost engagement with its fake news posts. According to the nonprofit Journalismfund Europe, “failure to clamp down on these networks is hugely damaging to efforts to stabilise Iraq and negatively impacts the lives of millions of Iraqis.” While many governments in the Middle East have made legitimate attempts to crack down on misinformation from groups like Kata'ib Hezbollah, some states have merely used misinformation as an excuse to crack down on free speech by citizens, as was seen in the case of the Yemeni YouTubers. The following section will examine the ways that these governments have used social media to advance their interests—often harming their own people along the way.

A New Kind of State-Sponsored Militia

Saudi Arabia has spent the last several years building a bot army—a coordinated network of fake social media accounts used to spread pro-state information. This army has seen action on multiple occasions. For instance, after the arrest of seven prominent women’s rights defenders in May 2015, concerned Saudi citizens started an Arabic hashtag “Where are the activists?” on Twitter to raise awareness about the detainments. Almost immediately after this hashtag began to trend, hashtags labeling the activists as “Agents of the Embassies” and “traitors” were circulated by state-backed news organizations and countless additional Twitter accounts. These hashtags were “pushed” in a highly coordinated way, according to John Kelly, CEO of social media intelligence firm Graphika. Researcher Marc Owen Jones of Exeter University says tactics like this amount to “digital authoritarianism,” a fad that is spreading rapidly in the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. Other nations, like Bahrain, have been experimenting with bot armies for more than a decade. An Institute for the Future report found that government-backed Twitter accounts were engaged in “mass identity-revealing and doxing” of critics during the 2011 uprising against the Bahrain monarchy.

Bot armies are not confined to a nation’s borders, though, and they are not the only tactic used by Middle Eastern governments. Some nations have mounted much more complex disinformation campaigns to influence public opinion on global conflicts. Iran, for example, barrages both its neighbors and its own population with propaganda on multiple fronts. A report by ClearSky Cyber Security found that Iran created many fake websites in multiple languages to impersonate legitimate news organizations in surrounding nations. Examples of these include the phony “Yemen Press News Agency” and “Tel Aviv Times”. Iran also steals propaganda from other authoritarian governments, such as Russia, to promote on its pro-state social media accounts and websites. In 2018, an Iranian news source that targets American and European audiences published an article titled "Idlib to become Syria’s final battle with terrorists… if the West stays out of it,” an article that was first published on a website that is a known source of Russian propaganda. 

While tactics like these are incredibly frightening, there is still some good news. “Fortunately,” writes Brookings’ Daniel L. Byman, “Middle Eastern regimes are not at the level of Russia when it comes to disinformation” (hence their need to plagiarize Russian propaganda). Middle Eastern regimes’ efforts to spread misinformation are often “hasty in execution” and easy to spot, especially in unstable nations like Iran. Another piece of good news is that there is already an incredibly strong safeguard in place against authoritarian misinformation campaigns: the youth of the Middle East.

Young Voices of Resistance

The young people of the Middle East are extremely engaged with social media, and many of them use it as a tool for political mobilization. For instance, in the aftermath of the 2020 Beirut explosion, Lebanese activists and youth used social media to share the aftermath of the disaster and appeal to the international community for aid. They later used it to hold their government accountable after it was discovered that it was the government’s failures that had caused the blast. These efforts were successful—millions of dollars of aid poured into Lebanon and multiple government officials resigned in recognition of their role in the tragedy. Youth in Lebanon and across the Middle East are aware of the failures of their governments and remain a consistent driving force for change. 

When it comes to social media misinformation campaigns by their governments, young people in the Middle East remain incredibly vigilant. Although their heavy reliance on social media for news puts them at risk—some 79% of Arab youth say they get their news from social media—81% of teens are aware of the prevalence of internet hoaxes. Many young activists use their platforms to bravely call out government misinformation, despite the risk of punishment from their authoritarian regimes. But the burden of taking on authoritarian regimes on social media cannot fall solely on youth. As Daniel L. Byman writes, “The United States and other democratic governments must improve their technical capacity and, with it, their ability to detect these [misinformation] campaigns.” Social media platforms must also improve their ability to both protect the accounts of activists and to take down accounts spreading false information. Further, these platforms should increase the availability of their data so that independent researchers can study and monitor potentially dangerous activities. Social media has taken on a complex role in the Middle East, and the entire international community must unite to ensure that it remains a largely positive one.

The United States is Failing Yemen

Earlier this year, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced $585 million in humanitarian assistance for the war-torn nation of Yemen. The US was quick to celebrate its own generosity, asserting that it remains “one of the largest donors of humanitarian assistance to Yemen” in the world. US leaders also called on other nations to contribute more to the chronically underfunded international response. However, while America takes its victory lap, the people of Yemen will still have to shelter from barrages of US-provided missiles. The US government has quietly facilitated the Yemeni Civil War through “incoherent” policy that the US media and public have largely failed to notice. Meanwhile, the struggles of the Yemeni people caught in the “world’s worst humanitarian crisis” are lost in the background. This article will examine the origins of Yemen’s current conflict, its impacts on civilians, and the many ways in which the United States is failing the desperate nation.

Origins of the Yemeni Civil War

The conflict in Yemen began in 2014 when Houthi rebels seized control of Yemen’s capital, Sana’a. The Houthis are Shiites who have long been at odds with their nation’s Sunni government. Contrary to popular belief, however, the Yemeni Civil War was not caused by Sunni-Shiite antagonisms alone. Fuel price hikes and corruption in former President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s government also caused tensions to rise throughout the early 2000s and 2010s. Massive protests erupted from these tensions when the Arab Spring reached Yemen in 2011. President Saleh was eventually ousted in 2012 and succeeded by his vice president, Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi. Hadi’s tumultuous presidency came to a brief pause in January 2015 when he resigned as president after rebels took Sana’a. The Houthis took advantage of his absence and seized control of the Yemeni government. However, while Hadi fled his palace and sought exile in Saudi Arabia, he rescinded his resignation a month later, declaring himself the rightful leader of Yemen.

Hadi has since been embroiled in various clashes with the Houthis. However, these two parties are not the only ones involved in the conflict. Saudi Arabia and a cohort of other Gulf nations sided with Hadi’s government and launched a campaign against the Houthi insurgents, with arms and logistical support from the United States. Iran, Saudi Arabia’s bitter enemy, has supplied the Houthis with weapons, deepening the divides between the two nations. Although separate from the civil war, there are also ongoing military operations in Yemen that target Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). 

Despite the occasional ceasefire, the conflict and chaos in Yemen only seem to be escalating, and innocent civilians are undoubtedly suffering the most. According to UNICEF, hunger and starvation are widespread, with 17.4 million people in need of food assistance—over half of Yemen’s population. This number is expected to balloon to 19 million by 2022. Further, nearly six million people have been displaced from their homes, most of them internally displaced in Yemen. Access to healthcare, clean drinking water, and sanitation services is scant at best. There are few areas of Yemen that are untouched by poverty and adversity.

Meanwhile, the Russo-Ukrainian War has compounded the suffering of the Yemeni people. “It’s another blow to Yemen, driving food and fuel prices further up,” said Abeer Etefa, a senior spokeswoman at the UN World Food Programme. Exports continue to fall as Ukraine grapples with its own conflict, sending shockwaves through the global food supply chain. The Middle East, Asia, and Africa have been hit the hardest, and the burden is the greatest in conflict-stricken nations. “Yemen depends entirely on food imports, with 31% of its wheat coming from Ukraine over the past three months.” Wheat has disappeared from Yemeni food markets, making it extremely difficult for families to meet their basic needs. At the same time, humanitarian donors are feeling the financial strain of providing aid to both nations, and given that the conflict in Yemen has stretched on for eight years, its assistance is dwindling rapidly.

The Yemeni people are clearly in dire need of help from the international community, and the responsibility for their situation lies with those who created it in the first place. As a contributor to the conflict and subsequent humanitarian crisis, the United States must do more to provide meaningful help to Yemen.

Policy Problems 

The United States has allocated $4.5 billion to humanitarian assistance for Yemen since the conflict began. However, it has also sold more than $355 million worth of arms to Saudi Arabia—one of the main instigators of the Yemen conflict—and has signed off on $4.5 billion more in future sales. It appears that America wants the world to think that they care about Yemen while they quietly pour money into the war. Not only does this render the $4.5 billion in humanitarian aid a very poor investment, but it is endlessly destructive to the Yemeni people. The Biden administration made moves to rescind support for Saudi Arabia and prioritize peace, but foreign policy experts agree that these are now nothing more than “broken promises.” US policymakers have also consistently blamed the Houthi rebels for the Yemen conflict and crisis. While the Houthis undoubtedly have a large role, breaking the war down into this “false binary” fails to account for the massive role that Saudi Arabia plays in Yemen. The United States must sever its ties with Saudi Arabia and put down its arms if it truly wants to end the conflict.

Experts also point out numerous issues with the peace process that has been led by the United States for the last several years. Katie Kizer of Foreign Policy writes: “The peace process led by the United States and United Nations has remained where it has for years: pursuing a top-down ceasefire between the men with guns—a strategy that has already failed multiple times—instead of engaging Yemen’s vibrant civil society which is interested in peace.” This assertion is true, as the UN brokered a six-month truce in early 2022 that temporarily reduced hostilities, but negotiators were unable to renew it. It expired on October 2nd, leaving civilians uncertain about their future. The US should be focusing its efforts on the resilient Yemeni people and rebuilding the local and state institutions that have collapsed since the start of the war. However, the US government currently faces little pressure to change its ways, so the gaping holes in its foreign policy will persist until the rest of the world takes notice.

Media Mistakes

America has clung to stories about conflict in the Middle East for the last several decades. The public hung onto journalists’ every word about the invasion of Afghanistan throughout the 2000s and the conflict in Syria for the last decade. Both of these wars have one thing in common: one big, scary enemy. It seems clear to Americans that Al-Qaeda was the enemy in Afghanistan and ISIS was the enemy in Syria. This makes both wars classic cases of good vs. evil (as it is painted by US media, at least) and portrays the United States as the hero of the Middle East. The conflict in Yemen, on the other hand, is complicated. It is difficult to sort through the complex politics and culture of the region and find the heroes and villains. Since it does not make Americans feel like they are on the right side of history, it is not worth covering for many news organizations.

As easy as it may be to point the finger solely at the media, its audience is also partly to blame. The conflict in Yemen is largely contained to the Middle East, meaning spillover onto US soil is unlikely. Since the conflict has no tangible effects on American citizens, many are content to live in their blissful ignorance. Journalists will understandably not go out of their way to cover an event that their audience will not read about, so the lack of public interest perpetuates negligent reporting. However, in the interest of fairness to US media, it is important to note that the sheer complexity of Yemen’s situation can make reporting particularly difficult. “You don’t see photos of Yemeni refugees anywhere because a lot of them are actually inside of [Yemen],” says activist Sama’a Al-Hamdani. Most Yemeni refugees are internally displaced, meaning they are trapped in dangerous areas and unable to speak to journalists. Despite this, it should also be remembered that journalists were willing to fly into war zones with troops to cover Afghanistan, but they do not seem to display the same drive to cover the situation in Yemen. Once again, this is due to the lack of public concern.

The Lost Generation

Why should the United States care about Yemen? In the middle of all the bad arms deals, failed attempts at peace, and the massive humanitarian crisis are the Yemeni people. They are just as entitled to security and peace as the citizens of every other nation involved in the Yemen conflict. But the United States' contributions to the conflict that surrounds them are part of the reason that they now face the loss of an entire generation of children. If Yemeni children make it through the conflict and into their adult lives, they will be forever hindered by illiteracy and lack of education. Two years ago, then UN humanitarian coordinator for Yemen Lisa Grande said, “If the war doesn’t end now, we are nearing an irreversible situation and risk losing an entire generation of Yemen’s young children.” The war still rages two years later. The lack of tangible impacts on US soil does not merit citizens’ ignorance of this conflict, and the US government certainly cannot continue to fund it. The US owes the suffering Yemeni population so much more.

The World Cup: Sustainability, Human Rights and the Economy

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Every four years, spectators from around the world come together to celebrate their passion for soccer, more importantly, their love for their national team. The FIFA World Cup 2022 has been the most anticipated event for soccer fans for the past four years, as many wonder who will win the championship and dethrone France as the world champion. This year - and for the first time - soccer fans will gather in Qatar from mid-November to mid-December, marking the first time a World Cup will take place during the winter season. The decision was made in 2010 after the county won a ballot of Fifa's 22 executive members. The country has been preparing ever since for this highly anticipated international competition. However, as Qatar prepares to welcome hundreds of thousands of fans, questions about sustainability, human rights, and regulations are raised. 

Qatar is a country in the Middle East; although small, the current population of Qatar is 2,995,736 as of Sunday, November 12th, 2022. Qatar has the world's third-largest proven natural gas reserve and the second-largest natural gas exporter. As a small oil country, Qatar has been preparing to host the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 for the last 12 years, a competition expected to generate a lot of revenue. However, Qatar's economy is expected to slow down after the World Cup. Indeed, the country has estimated the influx of 1.2 million visitors will add $17 billion to its Gross Domestic Product. However, after the World Cup, tourism and consumption will decrease, which will slow down the economy of Qatar, a very well-known country for its oil economy.

It was in 2010 that FIFA Executive Members designated Qatar to host the World Cup in 2022. As a result, the country has had to make massive investments to host this five-week competition. Qatar has spent $200 billion on infrastructures and other development projects since winning the bid to host the World Cup. To build these infrastructures, the country employed migrant workers, which exposed the country's history of human rights violations. These migrant workers from Nepal, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh came to Qatar because they lacked job opportunities in their home country. In order to build such infrastructures for the World Cup, Qatar needed the help of migrant workers who seek better opportunities and higher pay. However, the harsh reality of the life of migrant workers in Qatar was unveiled. Many migrant workers lost their lives by working on construction sites in the host country's most essential soccer tournament, which unites millions of people every four years.  

The World Cup will be played following years of serious migrant labor and human rights abuses in Qatar, Human Rights Watch said. The only way through which Qatar could build so many infrastructures was by hiring migrant workers from Nepal, India, Pakistan, or Bangladesh. Nonetheless, FIFA awarded the games to Qatar in 2010, with little human rights due diligence and no clear restrictions regarding protections for migrant workers who would be required to build the vast infrastructures. This lack of control and regulations has led to the death of hundreds of migrant workers, who allegedly passed away while working on the infrastructure for the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022. As a result, more people became aware of the human rights violations in Qatar over the last decades. Human Rights Watch identified Qatari laws, norms, and practices that enforce discriminatory male guardianship standards that deprive women of the ability to make important life decisions in a report from 2021. In Qatar, women must seek their male guardians' consent before getting married, receiving reproductive health care, working in several government jobs, and studying abroad on government scholarships. In 2017, FIFA adopted a Human Rights Policy, pledging to take "measures to promote the protection of human rights," saying, "FIFA will take adequate measures for their protection, including by using its leverage with the relevant authorities. However, by granting Qatar the right to host the World Cup, FIFA is going against its words to promote the protection of human rights as the host country has been the source of various human rights violations over the last decades.

Fifa, the World Cup organizer, has been blamed by many for its lack of recognition and responsibility in electing Qatar to host and organize the World Cup. This worldwide event is expected to have an influx of over 1 million visitors in a country with a population of less than 3 million. FIFA ought to have understood that millions of individuals providing their foreign labor would be required to create and maintain the World Cup's infrastructure. This was anticipated to have cost US$220 billion and included eight stadiums, an airport expansion, a new metro, numerous hotels, and other significant infrastructure. Additionally, FIFA is responsible for those workers and ensuring safe working conditions. However, according to Human Rights Watch, FIFA failed to impose strict conditions to protect workers despite repeated warnings from the workers themselves and civil society organizations and instead became a complacent enabler of the widespread abuse workers endured, including illegal recruitment fees, wage theft, injuries, and deaths.

Qatar is a country with many rules that have been extended to visitors of Qatar, even during the World Cup. Such restrictions have created a lot of controversies but also shine a light on government laws in Qatar that indicate human rights violations. For example, a rule that visitors and fans must follow is no sexual intercourse outside of marriage. Qatar's penal code criminalizes all forms of sex outside marriage, with sentences of up to seven years in prison. In addition, Qatar's penal code punishes consensual sexual relations between men above age 16 with up to 7 years in prison. A penalty of up to 10 years is imposed on anyone who engages in consensual sexual relations, which could apply to consensual same-sex relations between women, men, or heterosexual partners. Minky Worden, a news reporter and writer for Human Rights Watch, said that journalists would help ensure that these crucial issues of human rights violations are brought to light by the World Cup, as Qatar, FIFA and its sponsors still have a chance to rescue the tournament's legacy by addressing migrant rights abuses related with the World Cup and enacting reforms to increase protections for women, LGBT people, and migrant groups - not just during the World Cup but also beyond.

Currently, there are no reports of tourists being arrested for violating any of the rules stated above. However, tourists and fans are expected to abide by Qatari laws, with the risk of getting arrested, detained, and potentially put into jail. It has been reported, however, that fans have attempted to enter the stadium with an LGBTQ+ flag. This was the fan's way of showing their support for the LGBTQ+ community of Qatar, which is subject to abuse and mistreatment in the nation. These fans were denied access to the stadium unless they gave up the flag. 

While human rights abuses are still present in Qatar and millions of migrant workers work in horrible conditions, questions arose regarding the environmental effort of Qatar during this World Cup. According to Fifa, an international governing body of association football, "The FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 Sustainability Strategy includes a comprehensive set of initiatives to mitigate the tournament related emissions, including energy-efficient stadiums, low emission transportation, and sustainable waste management practices".The 2022 FIFA World Cup sustainability strategy will enable the host country to deliver a tournament that sets new benchmarks in social, human, economic, and environmental development. However, according to recent discoveries, Qatar has been going against the above ethical standards established by FIFA. In its recent report, Carbon Market Watch found that when FIFA tabulated the carbon footprint for building seven new stadiums, it ignored enormous carbon sources, underestimating emissions by a factor of eight.

Furthermore, with newly built air-conditioned stadiums and 150 daily flights to bring in fans, the 2022 World Cup has been dubbed one of the competition's biggest environmental disasters. Even though Qatar claimed that its World Cup met the environmental standards that FIFA set, many concerns have arisen as to whether or not this World Cup is sustainable or greenwashing. After further research, it has been discovered that although Qatar has shown sustainable efforts, this promise of carbon neutrality is not possible, according to Gilles Dufrasne, lead author of the Carbon Market Watch report published in May 2022, examining Qatar's claims.

Known for being an oil country, Qatar's economy will only benefit from this international tournament, even at the cost of human rights and sustainability. In the past, it has been shown that hosting the World Cup could generate a lot of revenue for the nation. However, it is also true that hosting this competition may be a bad idea for others. The Qatar World Cup in 2022 is estimated to generate $4.7 billion in income. However, given the amount of money invested on investments and infrastructure for this internationally known competition, Qatar's unprecedented outlay is unlikely to pay off. There is the typical assumption that billions of people will witness this mega-event, putting Qatar on the figurative map and encouraging tourism, foreign trade, and investment. It might also give Qatar a larger influence in geopolitics. The historical data is negative for these promises of developing "soft power" and long-term economic gains. Being seen on the global stage is a two-way street. Qatar receives a lot of attention, but the majority of it could be more positive. It paid bribes to secure hosting privileges. It has brought in tens of thousands of foreign laborers and subjected them to its cruel kafala labor system, which has reportedly killed thousands of people. The games were rescheduled from summer to November/December due to the extreme heat. Its unfinished investment projects will be prominently shown. The expulsion of foreign workers from their homes to accommodate soccer fans and, ultimately, the removal from the country, among other embarrassments, is not likely to enhance Qatar's positive power.

The FIFA World Cup Qatar 2020 has been the most controversial sporting event in the last few decades. While the renowned competition unveils the ongoing issues that the host country has been facing for decades, it is also leaving the future of the country unknown as hatred has built up against Qatar, a small oil country under the spotlight for hosting the World Cup, but also for its violations of human rights, and allegations of greenwashing. It is now up to Qatar and its Executives to live up to the expectations that it set for itself.

Covering the Regime: The Story of Iranian Journalists

Journalist Niloofar Hamedi boldly stood up against a brutal regime and now is facing the consequences.

On September 16th 2022, Hamedi gained access to Kasra Hospital in Tehran— the capital of the Islamic Republic— to document the final hours of a young woman being treated there. Later that day, this young woman by the name of Mahsa Amini would die from injuries sustained during detention by Iran’s morality police. Hamedi, a journalist for the reformist daily newspaper Shargh, broke the news of Amini’s death with a tweet that rocked the core of Iran. In this tweet, Amini’s parents are holding each other in tears outside of their daughter’s hospital room. Amini’s father who looks small in the lifeless emergency room hallway is burying his head into his wife’s neck. He holds her veiled body and whimpers. From the place that Hamedi took the picture, her camera captured Amini’s mother’s head poking out above her husband revealing a sliver of her black hair— the same crime that killed her daughter.

Six days later on September 22nd, Iranian security agents raided Hamedi’s house, arrested her, searched her home, and confiscated her belongings, according to her lawyer Mohammad Ali Kamfirouzi. Her twitter accounts were suspended and she was taken to Evin Prison which has grown in infamy for its vile treatment of prisoners and mass imprisonment of journalists and activists. Iranian-American researcher Holly Dagres tweeted October 15th that Evin Prison holds “so many of the country’s best and brightest that it earned the nickname ‘Evin University’.” Hamedi’s reporting was the spark for nationwide protests which began in opposition to treatment of Iranian women but grew to oppose the Islamic Republic’s iron-fisted rule. Anonymously, journalists at Shargh spoke in support of Hamedi after her arrest. One of which said that “if it weren't for her courage, the tragic incident that happened to Mahsa Amini would not have been reported to the media so quickly.” Another of her colleagues shared their fears with a foreign correspondent that their conversations about Hamedi would be overheard by Iranian security and said “I might be next.” These two accounts represent competing sentiments from Iran’s press. The first is that brave journalism is impactful and necessary for the protection of human rights under a brutal dictatorship. The second quote shows the well-founded fear that any act of brave journalism will threaten one’s freedom, life, and family.

This truth effectively silences the journalists of Iran. Either the press bends to the tremendous pressure from the regime to report falsehoods and keep silent or journalists such as Niloofar Hamedi report truth and are imprisoned, disappeared, or found dead. 

Iran has a deep history of criminalizing journalism. Under the rule of Reza Shah between 1925 and 1941, any reporting critical of the state was censored and all other publishers were strictly monitored. Media controls loosened under the less powerful Mohammed Reza Shah. In 1951 Mohammed Mosaddeq became Prime Minister with the aid of print media as a national mobilizer. This period of partial press freedom quickly ended with the US-Britain orchestrated 1953 Coup which reinstated and strengthened Mohammed Reza Shah. Under his new royal dictatorship, criticism was muzzled and free thought was outlawed. Then, the 1979 Iranian Revolution— which saw the rise of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini— outlawed any expression counter to the goals of the Islamic Republic. Since the revolution, at least 1000 journalists have been arrested, detained, murdered, disappeared or executed by the Iranian regime. However, it is not only journalists based in Iran that are subject to harassment but journalists throughout the world.

In July 2021, the FBI foiled an Iranian plot to abduct and transport back to Iran exiled journalist and woman’s rights activist Masih Alinejad. Alinejad is a prominent critical voice of the regime who received a human rights award in 2015 for creating a Facebook page that encouraged Iranian women to remove their headscarves in opposition to the government’s gender based repression. One year later a man carrying an AK-47-style assault rifle was arrested outside of Alinejad’s Brooklyn home. Fortunately, no harm came to her and today her voice rises loudly in support of Iran’s protestors. However, the message from the regime to both Alinejad and exiled reporters is clear: criticism of the regime will not be tolerated whether it happens in the streets of Tehran or from a bungalow in Brooklyn. 

The threat that Iran poses to journalists is credible and deadly in some unfortunate cases. In September 2019, while traveling in Iraq, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards detained and abducted exiled-Iranian journalist Ruhollah Zam. He was transported to Evin Prison to await trial. Iranian officials stated that the reason for his imprisonment was stoking the 2017 nationwide protests through his popular news service, Amad News, that ran on the messaging app Telegram. During a June 2020 trial, prosecutors unfairly accused Zam of “crimes against national security” and “cooperation with the hostile state of the United States.” He was sentenced to death and, on December 12th 2020, Zam was hanged leaving husbandless his wife and fatherless his two daughters.

The Islamic Republic does not only extend its foreign threat to journalists but all free-thinkers. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini issued a fatwa February 14th, 1989 condemning author Salman Rushdie to death after Rushdie published the “Satanic Verses” which fictionalized parts of the Prophet Muhammad’s life. Rushdie began living under 24-hour protection in a secured safe-house in Britain for the next ten years after the fatwa. Proponents of the fatwa targeted people connected to the publication of the book. In July 1991, an unknown man stabbed to death the novel’s Japanese translator, Hitoshi Igarashi. That same month Rushdie’s Italian translator Ettore Capriolo was attacked and suffered stab wounds to his neck, chest, and hands. Two years later the novel’s Norwegian publisher William Nygaard was shot three times outside of his home. 

Three decades after the initial fatwa was issued, 24 year-old Hadi Matar charged a stage in Chautauqua, New York to stab and punch Rushdie 10 to 15 times as he was being introduced. Rushdie and the event moderator Henry Reese who sustained facial injuries were set to discuss the United States as a refuge for writers in exile before the attack. The Iranian state is committed to ensuring that there is no refuge safe enough for anyone who is deemed an enemy of the regime. Rushdie survived the attack but lost vision in one eye and movement in one hand, according to his agent Andrew Wylie. Iranian newspaper Kayhan praised the attacker: “Bravo to this courageous and duty-conscious man who attacked the apostate and depraved Salman Rushdie in New York. Let us kiss the hands of the one who tore the neck of the enemy of God with a knife.” Although there appears to be no links between Matar and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, there has been consistent pressure towards Rushdie. As recently as 2019, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reaffirmed his predecessor’s death sentence towards the novelist stating in a tweet that the fatwa was “based on divine verses” and is “solid and irrevocable.” With the continued reign of the ayatollah, global freedom of speech and thought is threatened. While violence is perpetrated abroad to silence the government’s critics, it is doubly as prevalent at home in Iran.

In a shocking moment of defiance, Iranian hacktivists under the Twitter username @EdaalateAli1400 bypassed the cybersecurity measures of Iranian State TV to broadcast the live message: “Join us and stand up.” More text which appeared above the head of Mahsa Amini and three young women who had died in the protests read: “The blood of our youth is dripping from your hand.” Just before the State TV broadcast resumed, an image of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei appeared burning in flames. Upon the Supreme Leader’s forehead, a sniper’s target drifted from eye to eye. 

Social media and the internet have been useful tools for many modern opposition movements. Twitter, Instagram, and Facebook megaphoned young people’s anger in Tunisia against President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali where some began to refer to his overthrowing as the “Twitter revolution”. The Iranian state recognizes the power of the internet and limits its citizens’ access whenever possible. One week into the protests, Iran restricted access to Instagram and WhatsApp. According to Reporters Without Borders (RWB), 81.92 % of all Iranian social media traffic in 2021 occurred on Instagram. The government has blocked access to free VPN services and mobile networks are shutdown. An Iranian journalist interviewed by RWB explained that the “duration of network shutdowns depends on the region. In Tehran, the network may only be cut from mid-afternoon until midnight, but in Iranian Kurdistan, the shutdowns may start in the morning with no prospect of the network returning before midnight.” These conditions leave few options for information spreading; the journalists and people of Iran are left guessing the state of their country and the protests.

Since the protests began in September, 450 people have been killed; however the regime has only acknowledged the deaths of 300. As of December 5th 2022, 71 reporters and citizen journalists have been arrested for covering the anti-regime protests. Niloofar Hamedi remains in Evin Prison. In November, government officials stated that she had been charged with “colluding with the intention of acting against national security and propaganda against the state.” More human rights violations will occur in Iran. The regime aims to occupy Evin Prison with every Iranian journalist living at home or abroad. The duty of telling stories of abuse will fall on the Iranian people. Niloofar Hamedi may remain in prison for exposing the murder of Mahsa Amini, but her example of bravery will empower Iranian women and men to raise their voices higher than the threats from an ayatollah. It is words that will defeat this regime that thrives in silence.

Turkish Honor Culture and the Philosophy of Surveillance

By all accounts Pınar Gültekin was an ordinary, young Turkish woman studying economics at the Muğla University School of Economics. She was bright, ambitious, and beloved by her family. In the summer of 2020 she disappeared. After days of searching, her body was found, having been brutally strangled. Following a police investigation and court case it was revealed that Gültekin had been killed by her former partner, Cemal Metin Avcı, who claimed to have murdered Gültekin in a “moment of anger.” However, further investigation revealed that Avcı had the help and support of his family members in covering up his crime. Originally condemned to life in prison, Avcı’s sentence was then dramatically reduced to twenty-three years, given the “unjust provocation” by Pınar Gültekin that drove him to murder her.

Femicide

         The tragic and horrifying death of Pınar Gültekin is unfortunately one of many murders of Turkish women in recent years. Femicide, the intentional killing of women or girls, is the most violent form of misogyny, and its rise across Turkish society is cause for international concern. The Stockholm Center for Freedom recently reported that thirty-one Turkish women in the month of August alone were victims of femicide. These women were murdered by their male partners and relatives, frequently after having already issued a restraining order or having left the relationship.  The World Health Organization defines femicide in four distinct categories: intimate femicide (committed by a current or former husband or boyfriend); non-intimate femicide; “honor killing” (when the motive is to preserve/restore his family’s honor); and dowry-related femicide (the husband and in-laws kill the bride when the family does not meet the dowry demands) (Toprak and Gokhan, 2). Experts have traced the increase in femicide killings to the “policies of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, which protects violent and abusive men by granting them impunity.” Cemal Metin Avcı’s reduced sentence and the practice of reducing sentences on the basis of female provocation are examples of such policies.

Pınar Gültekin’s death is an example of both an intimate death and an honor killing within the categories of femicide. Examining the origins of honor-based femicide killings lies in the Turkish societal practice of honor and surveillance.

Honor Culture

Honor culture is an international phenomenon which has existed across societies for thousands of years. Across cultures and continents there are thousands of examples of varying forms of honor culture. In ancient Rome, honor culture frequently led to justified honor killings, and Roman law punished men who refused to kill their adulterous female family members. Thousands of years later, the British Empire established the British Penal Code of 1860 which introduced “the notion of ‘modesty’, and related concepts of ‘chastity’, ‘enticement’ and ‘abduction’, as part of a framework of collective ‘honor’. Rather than safeguarding the rights of the affected individual woman, the law upheld the rights of third parties, be it the state, community or immediate family members.” Honor culture exists in varying forms; it can not be understood as a national issue applying to each and every citizen, but varies at a regional, familial, and individual level. In contemporary Turkish culture, honor determines both an individual's worth and societal structure through connecting individual honor to one's family. Therefore, honor exists as a collective that can be applied and upheld by an entire family. However, this complicates an individual’s relation to honor, because their honor can be destroyed by the actions of another family member. Turkish families must broadcast their honor as a collective unit to society. When women break behavioral norms, such as by acting more masculine or immodest, they not only destroy their own honor, but also the honor of their male family members which in-turn affects societal harmony by destroying the honor of the family unit. Retaliation often takes the form of violence or murder which has led to the increase in femicide and phenomena of “honor killings.” Honor killing refers to the cultural practice of killing an individual to protect the family or society’s honor. However, in Turkey there is a further complicated element in which “there seems to be a social apprehension that man’s violence against the ‘insubordinate’ female is understandable and justified.” Turkish male violence is directly linked to the longstanding multicultural acceptance of justifying violence when it stems from defending one’s honor. Consensual understanding that women’s purity is seen as the symbol of family honor, thus allowing family members to avenge anyone who compromises her honor, especially if it is the woman herself.

Unpacking the Origins of Honor Culture

French philosopher Michel Foucault was fascinated by society’s obsession with surveillance as a means of control and regulation, and much of his philosophical analysis can be seen as an attempt to create a visual metaphor for modern day surveillance. Applying the Foucauldian [BJ1] concept of surveillance provides a new lens of analysis and method of understanding for the intersection between honor culture and surveillance. Foucault described societal surveillance as a panopticon: a philosophical concept based on a unique prison design that was structured to ensure constant surveillance for all individuals within the prison. The panopticon has become a metaphor in surveillance studies as a tool to analyze the role of surveillance in a certain culture or industry. Honor culture relies on the societal acceptance of being watched constantly, as if under  the watch of an ever-present panopticon. Constant surveillance creates a unique human experience, as individuals adjust their behavior to cope with the limitations imposed upon them due to a constant “assumed gaze.” Much of the self-regulation that exists in Turkish honor culture is directly linked to individuals dealing with the pressure of being constantly watched.  Foucault also wrote about how self-regulation due to surveillance creates a “discipline blockade” that refers to how individuals regulate their behavior in dangerous and fatal ways as a response to surveillance. Although it may not directly kill, constant surveillance creates environments in which individuals can put their own life at risk because of the constraints against them. In Turkey the highest rates of suicide occur for young women under the age of twenty-four. Although experiences of suicide are highly individual, there are numerous reports of Turkish women attempting to end their own lives as a result of the pressure they felt from their family and community to protect their honor and purity. When seventeen year old Derya’s [BJ2] family discovered her romantic relationship, they informed her that she had blackened the family name and needed to kill herself in order to end the family’s shame.  Despite wanting to live, Derya felt immense pressure and obligation: “My family attacked my personality, and I felt I had committed the biggest sin in the world..I felt I had no right to dishonor my family, that I have no right to be alive. So I decided to respect my family’s desire and to die.” Thankfully, her suicide attempts failed, and she sought refuge at a Turkish women’s [BJ3] shelter. However, Derya’s story reveals that the lack of agency and opportunity that Turkish honor culture gives to young women is deadly.

The severity and devastation of Turkey’s honor culture lies in its systemic surveillance, which both requires and encourages a constant shared observation of every individual. Justified male violence against women may first appear as a result of patriarchal culture that is dominated by misogynistic thinking; however further examination of honor culture reveals that it is rooted not in misogyny, but in surveillance. Pearce and Vitak explain that “Surveillance is the norm in such cultures because others must validate that an individual is adhering to the behavioral code.” An individual must be constantly watched by their family and society, while simultaneously watching others, in order to make sure that their collective honor is respected. As previously mentioned, an individual cannot determine one’s own honor, instead it is directly linked to their family and community; this collective concept of honor therefore demands a culture of surveillance. Individuals are both constantly watched and constantly watching others.

Surveillance as a tactic

An awareness of constant surveillance is behind the fear and motivation for engaging in honor culture, but awareness also requires understanding how surveillance can appear as different manifestations of power. Surveillance can exist at the state sanctioned level; this type of surveillance manifests itself in virginity examinations imposed upon women that can be requested at the behest of individuals, police, and schools. In a survey conducted on virginity examinations, 70% of Turkish doctors reported conducting at least one virginity examination that year. The legal system is another form of institutional and state sanctioned surveillance. By refusing to adequately punish men accused of honor killings, the legal institution is indirectly contributing to surveillance culture by creating an atmosphere in which surveillance and violence can thrive. However, surveillance can also occur at the private level, such as between families. As revealed above, honor killings are frequently carried out by a woman’s male relations, thus revealing how surveillance is conducted in the home. Familial surveillance builds relationships of cynicism and distrust between family members.

Conclusion

Understanding the role that systemic surveillance plays in honor culture is key for Turkey to overcome the issue of femicide. In order to eradicate femicide rooted in honor killings, Turkish legal institutions must place greater effort towards recognizing the larger institutional barriers that surveillance supports. Although there is dire need for reform and justice, Turkish activists are rallying and protesting across the country to ensure that the deaths and lives of Pınar Gültekin and other victims of honor killings are not forgotten or ignored. Organizations, such as the Turkish Women and Democracy Association, known as KADEM, work tirelessly to advocate for greater gender equality for men and women across Turkey. The Turkish Women Union seeks to promote women’s political rights and agency across the country. Other organizations, such as We Will Stop Femicide (WWSF) actively combat the issue itself. These varying organizations all demonstrate the important role of Turkish civic society and collective organization. Despite Turkey’s current authoritarian regime, the brave work done by feminist and human rights organizations, as well as individual citizens can allow us to be optimistic.

Iraq at an Impasse

On August 29th, Muqtada al-Sadr, an influential Iraqi politician, tweeted “I hereby announce my final withdrawal” from politics. Several hours later, his followers had stormed the Green Zone (home to foreign embassies and many government facilities in Baghdad), resulting in a confrontation that led to the deaths of almost 20 people. The violence only ended at the demand of Sadr himself, who publicly rebuked his followers for their actions. 

This outbreak of violence was not random - it had been brewing for months as Iraq descended into political chaos in response to failed negotiations aimed at forming a government based on the national election of October 2021. The political scene in post-ISIS Iraq has largely been dominated by Iranian-backed militias and their affiliated political wings. These militias, known as the Popular Mobilization Forces, have organized themselves into an electoral alliance known as Fatah. In the leadup to the 2021 elections they were the second largest party - after Sadr’s - and many analysts expected them to retain their strong position. 

In a surprising turn of events, Muqtada al-Sadr’s party won the most seats, with Fatah falling dramatically to become only the fifth largest party. The election was marked by low turnout, with many parties - including Sadr’s at one point - announcing a boycott. These elections are particularly notable as they were originally scheduled to occur sometime in 2022, however in response to widespread protests, Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi called for early elections in June of 2021, before ultimately holding them in October. 

Sadr and Fatah both largely compete for the votes of Shia Arabs. However, Fatah represents those often religiously conservative Iraqis who prefer closer ties with

neighboring Shia Iran. That is not to say that Sadr is Western aligned or secular. In fact, Sadr comes from a long and influential family of Shia clerics. What sets Sadr apart is his deep commitment to Iraqi nationalism that places a heavy emphasis on removing all foreign influence from Iraqi politics. Part of his notoriety comes from the fact that he led the ‘Mahdi Army,’ a Shiite insurgent group that targeted American soldiers during their occupation of Iraq. Many feel that he has given voice to the many Iraqis who resent the growing influence of Iran in Iraq. While many Iraqis welcomed Iranian aid against ISIS, they are uncomfortable with the continued presence and influence of Iranian militias. While Sadr and his followers had won the most seats in the October elections, forming a functioning government was by no means a guarantee. 

Iraq is a parliamentary republic with a president as head of state and a prime minister as head of the government. Sadr, while taking the most votes and seats, needed to form a coalition to enter government. A simple parliamentary majority is required for the appointment of a prime minister. Filling the post of President is a much more complicated task that requires ethnic consideration. In the post-invasion era the president of Iraq has always been a Kurd, an ethnic group that inhabits the northern part of the country and makes up between 15-20% of the population. The Kurds have their own autonomous region with their own local government and political parties. 

In order to form his coalition, Sadr first reached out to the Kurdistan Democratic Party, the largest of the Kurdish parties. After reaching a tentative agreement with the KDP, Sadr then worked out a similar deal with influential Sunni Arabs as well. This multiethnic alliance theoretically should have secured Sadr a majority, and a functioning government.

But his opponents, Fatah chief among them, were desperate to stymie his efforts. They delayed votes and appointments by months, usually through byzantine legal processes, but occasionally by force as well. 

After months of failure, Sadr abruptly instructed the MPs aligned with him to resign from the parliament. 73 lawmakers suddenly resigned, making it almost impossible for any coalition to reach the numbers needed to form a government. Sadr had hoped to spark a mass resignation beyond his bloc, triggering another set of elections. Sadr and his followers were further enraged when instead of dissolving in order to facilitate early elections, the Iraqi Parliament swore in new members. Iraqi electoral law requires that if a member resigns, they are to be replaced by the candidate with the second most votes in their district. In effect, the resignation of the Sadrist bloc resulted in the swelling of Fatah (and their allies) to a majority of 122 seats. 

The final straw came in August of 2022, when Sadr’s mentor, Ayatollah Kadhim al-Haeri, publicly announced his retirement from what is usually a lifetime religious position and asked his followers to look to Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei for guidance. This was tantamount to a significant and unexpected rebuke of Sadr that in turn led to his resignation from politics and in turn pushed thousands of his supporters to riot in the heavily protected streets of Baghdad, even going so far as to storm the parliament building itself. 

After ten months of deadlock that had failed to result in a government and riots that led to more than twenty deaths and hundreds injured, Iraq finds itself still without a government and in uncertain territory. The one thing that is for certain though is that this

is not a sustainable state of affairs. The Iraqi people have suffered without a reliable government to provide services, and are rapidly losing faith in their country's leadership. Experts are divided on what a post-Sadr Iraq will look like - on whether it will open a vacuum for Iran and its proxies, if a new movement will replace the Sadrists, or if Muqtada al-Sadr is even being honest on his intention to retire. Regardless, the precedent of armed parties influencing the formation and process of government does not bode well for the future of Iraq. While the elites and foreign powers fight each other, the Iraqi people will continue to pay the price. 

Iraq deserves a better future after decades of suffering under dictatorial rule, warfare, and sectarian violence. It deserves a better class of politicians - better than Sadr or his opponents - it deserves non-sectarian public servants dedicated to improving their country. The status quo of the last few years, and the last few months especially, is unsustainable for the Iraqi people, and either the system changes - and soon - or it will break.

From False Promises to Pioneering Leadership: Climate Policy in MENA

The Middle East and North Africa region is likely to be one of the hardest hit by climate change. Rising global temperatures are expected to strain the already waning water sources of several MENA nations, according to a World Bank report. This will place extreme stress on food production, public health, and access to resources for millions of people. Given that many MENA nations are already attempting to cope with social injustice, civil war, poverty, and terrorist violence, the added burdens of climate change could send the region into a crisis. Experts expect to see a particularly sharp rise in violent conflicts as resources become increasingly scarce. This is already the case in nations like Mali, where terrorist groups have exploited climate-related tensions to increase recruitment and violent extremism. There is no question that action must be taken swiftly to avert the most catastrophic effects of climate change in MENA.

On the whole, the responses of MENA governments to climate change have been inconsistent at best. Since many of the region’s economies depend on fossil fuels, their reluctance to mount a large-scale response to climate change is unsurprising. Some nations like Saudi Arabia have launched flashy but ineffective climate campaigns to gain international favor while protecting their oil. Other nations have done little to nothing to address the climate crisis. Still, there are a few beacons of hope in nations like Morocco, which are leading the charge towards a greener future for MENA. This article will examine a few of the region’s approaches to climate policy—and the inconsistencies between them that point to a need for broad, systematic intervention by the international community. 

Saudi Arabia

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is one of the most oil-rich nations in the world. According to Forbes, it ranks as the largest exporter of petroleum, which accounts for 87% of its budget revenues, 42% of its GDP, and 90% of its export earnings. Saudi Arabia also plays a leading role in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Given the nation’s reliance on oil, the international community was surprised when Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman recently unveiled plans to attain net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2060. “The Kingdom, the region, and the world need to go much further and faster in combating climate change. We reject the false choice between preserving the economy and protecting the environment,” he proclaimed. The announcement made a big splash on the global stage ahead of COP26, the 26th annual UN climate summit, as Saudi Arabia was attempting to assert itself as a climate leader in the Middle East. However, a closer look at their climate policy plans reveals a stronger resemblance to greenwashing than to true environmental progress.

The Crown Prince asserted that Saudi Arabia would be using the “circular carbon economy" approach to reach its goals. This framework for managing emissions involves capturing carbon dioxide and (a) reusing it in other energy-intensive processes; (b) recycling it into other materials; or (c) storing it underground. As part of this plan, the Kingdom has also pledged to plant ten billion trees, increase the size of its protected natural areas, and generate 50% of its energy from renewable sources by 2030. While this sounds promising at first glance, the circular carbon economy approach has come under significant scrutiny. Activists argue that reliance on carbon capture encourages corporations and governments to delay meaningful action like transitioning to renewable energy (note the absence of reduced oil production from Saudi Arabia’s climate plans). Similarly, scientists assert that carbon capture technology has strict limits, both economically and geologically. Overall, Saudi Arabia’s commitments have been labeled as “highly insufficient” on the Climate Action Tracker. Despite its eco-friendly rhetoric, it is clear that Saudi Arabia will not commit to comprehensive climate action in the near future due to its reliance on fossil fuels.

Iran

More ineffective than Saudi Arabia’s climate policy is Iran’s. Climate Action Tracker rates its plans as “critically insufficient,” the lowest rating a country can receive. Iran has signed but not yet ratified or approved the Paris Agreement, which means it is not subject to its mandates. This means that while the nation has established some internal programs for addressing climate change, there are few mechanisms by which the international community can hold it accountable. This is problematic as Iran is also one of the world’s major oil producers, although it is only responsible for 2.48% of global greenhouse gas emissions.

Contrary to Saudi Arabia, a comparatively wealthy nation, there are questions as to whether Iran and nations like it are capable of addressing climate change on their own. Iran has been subjected to heavy sanctions by the international community over its nuclear program in recent years. It has also faced immense population growth, extreme poverty, and rising crime and violence for the last several decades. As Iranian environmental journalist Sanam Mahoozi writes, “While the Iranian government officially recognizes climate change as an existential threat, fighting it does not seem to be high up on its to-do list.” The nation simply does not have the bandwidth or funds to tackle climate change alongside the other humanitarian crises it must face.

Morocco

Contrary to the previous two nations, Morocco has emerged as a quiet and effective climate leader in MENA. The nation has maximized the potential of its desert locale and become a world leader in solar power generation—renewable sources now meet almost two-fifths of their electricity needs. Morocco first set its eyes on renewable energy in the late 2010s when it pledged that 42% of the nation’s power would be generated using renewables by 2020. The nation missed this target by a small percentage (having only 37% capacity by 2020) but saw a massive expansion of its renewable energy sector. This included the construction of the Noor Ouarzazate Solar Complex, the largest concentrated solar power plant in the world. Morocco has planned to continue the growth of its renewable energy capacity to 52% by 2030. 

Climate Action Tracker rates Morocco’s climate strategy as “almost sufficient,” which indicates that its policies are nearly on track with the 1.5°C warming target laid out in the Paris Agreement (and could be completely on track with only moderate improvements). While Morocco certainly still has progress to make, its efforts are currently some of the best of all the MENA nations. 

Common But Differentiated Responsibilities

While most agree that fighting climate change must be a global effort, there is still significant debate about exactly how much responsibility each nation should bear. For instance, Iran and Saudi Arabia emit roughly ten times more carbon dioxide than Morocco annually, yet Morocco has the most ambitious climate strategy of the three nations. This trend can be seen throughout the world, as many of the largest emitters have become “free riders,” receiving the benefits of carbon emissions without paying their share of the costs. This begs the question as to how the responsibility of fighting climate change should be apportioned. Should it be by a nation’s share of current global emissions? Historical emissions? Or should the most developed nations take on more responsibility? Some have even posed that entities like corporations should be called upon. For instance, Saudi Arabia’s state-run oil company Aramco has never been subject to meaningful regulation and is the largest source of corporate emissions in the world. Their sizable contributions to global emissions may give the argument for corporations’ participation some merit.

The United Nations attempted to settle this debate by laying out the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” (CBDR) at the 1992 Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit. CBDR acknowledges that all countries share a common imperative to fight climate change. More importantly, however, it distinguishes between developed and developing nations, charging developed nations with more of the financial responsibility of climate change. This means that nations like the US, UK, Canada, and Japan should shoulder more of the climate burden in underdeveloped regions like MENA since many of its nations are unable to address the problem themselves.

Looking Forward

One of the largest hurdles for the Middle East will be the world’s transition away from fossil fuels. While some nations might have the capability for a rapid switch to green energy, such a move would be catastrophic for the oil-dependent MENA economy. Furthermore, the region’s extreme vulnerabilities to climate change make its situation even more precarious. World leaders must develop an innovative approach to climate policy and aid to address the complexities of MENA’s case. For instance, Ranj Alaaldin, a non-resident fellow at the Brookings Institution, advocates for an investment in knowledge and culture by the international community. “An investment in research and awareness could trigger a cultural shift within government and society that allows for a re-calibration of public sector reform approaches and that adjusts good governance strategies to encourage and enable innovations that alleviate climate-related challenges.”

The climate crisis poses unprecedented challenges to the MENA region, and the current support regimen has not resulted in consistent action or tangible results. The interconnectedness of our rapidly globalizing world means that nearly every nation will suffer if the MENA is devastated by climate change. Not only will the global economy face serious threats, but the world will also face the loss of a region rich in history and culture.

Make way for the King: Saudi Arabia’s Destructive Modernization

A European tourist visits Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to see the setting sun on the Red Sea and the city’s unending amenities. Driving along the highway is a blur of luxury. Wide, smooth paved roads pass by palm trees, street lights, and pedestrian pathways. Bold steel buildings jut toward the sky demonstrating the excellence of modern Arab architecture. In a square below, men and women congregate separately for the start of a music show. The city feels like it’s from the future, everything is planned. Walking along the streets, the tourist feels the pulse of Jeddah. Men wear the traditional ankle-length robe thawb with gold Rolexes and women wear the abaya in delicate silk that cover their bodies while showcasing their wealth. Modesty and exorbitance live alongside each other here. This is Crown Prince Muhammed bin Salman (MBS)’s vision for Jeddah and for Saudi Arabia.

Tourists typically do not venture past the sterile limestone boulevards near the sea, but past the luxury and modernity, al-Kandarah sat. Once with the hope of becoming the next posh district of Jeddah, by 2017 garbage accumulated, water pipes broke, and buildings were abandoned. Today, al-Kandarah is rubble. This is the same story for much of the old towns of Jeddah. Among the goals of MBS’s Vision 2030 is his hope to diversify the Saudi oil-based economy to include tourism. He believes that the cracked stone façade buildings belong in the city’s past. Authorities say that the demolition of these neighborhoods is to create new areas which have proper infrastructure, amenities, and are not criminal hotspots. This reasoning follows the Kingdom’s promotion of a unique family-friendly tourism style. These residential neighborhoods, such as al-Kandarah, will be replaced by flashy art-deco apartments and retail spaces, green parks, and entertainment venues. With the fantastic modernity of MBS, what in Jeddah is lost?

In February 2022, a Twitter video circulated of a young Saudi woman walking around al-Saghr, her soon-to-be demolished neighborhood. For forty-five seconds she waves “goodbye” to the homes of her family and friends. The video ends with her message to al-Saghr: Farewell Al-Saghr, for what it contains of hope, loved ones, and neighbors. Farewell to those who taught me belonging, love, and adoration. Goodbye to the past buried among the rubble of dust.” The woman dares not show her face in the video. Her hand waves in defiance against a vision for her city which excludes her. 

The demolitions which started in October 2021 affect 60 neighborhoods and 558,000 residents, reported Amnesty International (AI). “A Jeddah Municipality document shows that project plans were finalized almost three years ago, yet the Saudi authorities failed to engage in a process of genuine consultation with residents” said Diana Semaan, AI’s MENA Acting Deputy Director. Some residents were only given 24 hours to leave after red spray paint on their doors told them to EVACUATE. Without providing proper time to residents, Saudis have become “refugees in their own country” as a Twitter user put it, posting a video of Jeddah’s newly homeless sheltered under a bridge with their surviving belongings. A displaced Saudi doctor, who wished to remain unnamed for fear of government retaliation, said that it is still unclear when or if he will receive compensation for his property’s destruction. The same went for a businessman who had invested in residential and commercial properties in Jeddah for them to be torn down only two months later.

Due to a history of repressive government control, finding residents willing to speak honestly about the demolition’s impact is difficult. In 2020, another of MBS’s grand projects displaced 20,000 people for the construction of the futuristic vacation-city, Neom. Among the displaced, Abdulrahim al-Huwaiti refused to be silent, posting a video to the internet criticizing the government. A day after the video was posted, al-Huwaiti was killed by Saudi special forces. Despite the strong threat posed by the Saudi government, citizens under anonymous usernames have posted Twitter videos and messages with the #hadad_jeddah (“Jeddah_demolition” in Arabic) denouncing the injustices.

The government portrayed the neighborhoods as criminal dens and slums, but residents suspect that the neighborhoods were targeted because “they are home to different nationalities” and, alike Jeddah itself, are socially liberal. Compensation schemes exclude foreign nationals, which make up 47% of the evicted population. Exclusion and discrimination of foreign nationals is a common story in Saudi Arabia. The labour system called kafala allows Saudi companies to employ foreign workers without adequate accommodations, and below the national minimum wage. Additionally, any worker who attempts to leave their job without consent face imprisonment and deportation. Possibly it is not buildings nor architecture that do not fit into MBS’s Vision 2030, but it is the people, themselves, that must go.

Among the MBS’s goals is to increase non-oil government revenue from SAR (Saudi riyal) 163 billion to SAR 1 trillion. He emphasizes the importance of diversifying the Saudi economy beyond oil by investing in the creation of logistic, tourist, financial, and industrial zones. Vision 2030 states that the Kingdom will “create attractions that are of the highest international standards.” For Vision 2030 to be a success from the eyes of the crown prince, Saudi Arabia must become a place that is viewed from the outside with admiration. The Vision 2030 Document reads much as a wish list to create the perfect vacation spot as it does to create a well-functioning, stable economy and society. Despite its recent forays into relaxing the stringencies of daily Saudi life, the Kingdom still remains far more conservative than its neighbors. Tourism marketing has promoted Saudi Arabia as a “family-friendly” tourist destination. “[Saudi government officials] with more moderate viewpoints see this as an opportunity to encourage more reforms in the future, as the presence of foreign tourists introduces more conservative elements of Saudi society to the potential benefits of adopting certain outside influences” while conservative constituencies appreciate that the effort will focus on the family, writes Kevin Newton, the founder of Newton Analytical, a consulting firm specializing in MENA affairs.

As the Saudi government begins to cater itself to a greater quantity of foreign national tourists, it will have more incentives to lessen the strictness of daily life. People will not be satisfied with the luxuries of the cities if they also feel the repressive hand of the government on their shoulders. Naturally, freedoms of expression and behavior would need to be extended to tourists, because if people believe that Saudi Arabia will be hostile towards them then they will not bring their business. This process has gradually already begun, despite push-back from conservative elements of the country. In 2017, cultural events such as a packed musical performances in Riyadh and Comic-Con in Jeddah, which had been outlawed, were given permission to occur in the Kingdom. “What we aim to do is create happiness,” said Ahmed al-Khatib, the Chairman of the General Entertainment Authority (GEA). A year prior, the government declared that the Mutaween, a religious police organization which harass women to remove nail polish, cover their hair, and, in an extreme example, prevented 15 school girls from fleeing a burning building resulting in their death because they did not wear proper Islamic dress, become more “gentle and kind” in their conduct. All of these changes are a ringing dinner bell to a whole host of policies which will create a more open society if just for the sake of visitors. 

Although the Saudi government’s incentive to socially liberalize comes from tourists’ sensibilities, as the Saudi economy becomes more dependent on tourism and entertainment revenue, it too will become more dependent on its Saudi hospitality workers and their sensibilities. The threat of government violence will still be present, but any suppressive actions would create more anger by the working class populations who are most subject to strict law enforcement. In 2019, the World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC) reported that travel and tourism comprised 9.8% of Saudi GDP. In the same year, tourism totaled 12.2% of Saudi employment. As MBS continues to accomplish his goals within Vision 2030, both of these numbers will rise. Hospitality workers in Saudi Arabia will gain significant bargaining power to demand more freedom, economically and socially. They will become participants in the economy who will have a voice— whether the government wants to listen or not. No longer will they be subjects to the throne under current petroleum-based rentierism. 

Economically empowered by tourism, dissatisfied Saudis will have leverage to protest the government’s inevitable toe-stepping. If the kingdom wants to develop a strong “family-friendly” tourism sector, they have incentive to accommodate their citizens. The horror stories from Jeddah’s neighborhoods turned rubble cannot coexist with the international tourism market. More visibility from visitors and leverage in the hands of workers may make Saudi Arabia look very different in 2030; MBS may not like it.

The Middle East’s Stake in the Ukraine Crisis

Introduction

Scholars, strategists, and pundits alike would agree that the Ukraine crisis has escalated far beyond what many originally envisioned on February 24th, 2022. Where early pieces championed a surefire Ukrainian victory and the incompetence of the Russian military, recent articles have speculated that the conflict might rage for weeks to months from now. Although unbiased stories are difficult to find, vivid descriptions of Russian war crimes pepper the firsthand accounts of Ukrainian refugees. Initial articles, such as those reporting on Russian soldiers using children as hostages in Kyiv, shocked few. But it was on April 6th, 2022 that the first mass-media reports of torture, rape, and executions in the recaptured city of Bucha emerged. The bodies of more than 300 civilians were discovered scattered around the city and its outskirts, most clearly having been bound and immobilized before being severely beaten and shot from point-blank range. In response to this and other acts of brutality, the UN General Assembly passed an emergency resolution to suspend the Russian Federation from the Human Rights Council. With 93 countries in favor and only 24 countries—mostly common opponents like China, the DPRK, and Belarus—directly opposing the motion, it is clear that numerous states view Russia as an aggressor and support Ukrainian sovereignty.

However, this leaves 58 countries remaining that voted to abstain from the resolution, each with their own reasons for sitting on the fence. Some of these neutral states, like Angola, Barbados, or Vanuatu, likely lack a stake in the conflict and would prefer to avoid angering either side. But the diversity in these abstentions betrays an observable trend in the action, that being the Middle East’s near-universal desire to remain exempt from opining on the matter. Of the states comprising the Middle East and North Africa, only Israel, Libya, and Turkey joined with the states that pushed through Russia’s disbarment from the HRC. A majority of the remaining states refused to formally strike a side in the debate, with nations from Iraq to Saudi Arabia remaining non-aligned. Three countries in the area—Syria, Iran, and Algeria—even went as far as to officially reject the UN resolution, effectively aligning themselves closer to Russia in the wake of the conflict. Thus, one can easily see the complex relationships between the Middle East and the two forming sides in this situation. This article aims to provide an overview of American, European, and Russian relations with the Middle East and North Africa, particularly with regards to oil, as well as what stakes—if any—exist for countries in this region and what predictions surround the how these states will address the crisis as it develops.

The Middle East & The World: Addressing the Oil Derrick in the Room

It is impossible to holistically examine the Middle East’s relationships with the US, Europe, and Russia in the course of a single article. Entire volumes of literature have been written analyzing the associations between just one of these groups and the Middle East, with usually little more than lip-service provided to the others. That being said, in order to effectively organize the narrative which revolves around this issue, I have chosen to examine these relationships with respect to the common denominator present in all of them: oil. The world quite literally runs on oil. Aside from providing fuel for the estimated 1.3 billion passenger and commercial vehicles that exist across the world, oil (or petroleum) provides use in heating and electricity generation as well as in the production of the various plastics, chemicals, and other synthetic materials we use in our day-to-day lives. Understandably then, a key point of contention between states in the course of national development and prestige has been the exchange (and occasionally the appropriation) of global oil reserves. Vital players in the oil industry are largely clustered in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq all possessing a billion barrels or more in oil reserves compared to the US’ 400,000. This fact alone has irreversibly transformed the Middle East into a region composed mostly of rentier states, and has further shaped the Middle East’s relationships with the major players in the Ukraine Crisis.

Historically, the United States has engaged in a complicated relationship with the Middle East as a result of its dependence on the region’s oil reserves. Dubbed the “American Oil Strategy”, politics between the country and MENA has been almost entirely influenced by politicians shoring up support in the region to secure oil for trade. In fact, the US has even gone so far as to insist on military presence in the region, and further, to ignore blatant policy inconsistencies to maintain this oil relationship. This explains, rather grimly, why America will effectively ignore Saudi Arabia’s horrid human rights record or Turkey’s incremental shift toward authoritarianism. Anywhere else, these crimes might otherwise serve as catalysts for sanctions, condemnation, or military intervention. But the US views its stake in maintaining this Oil Strategy to be far too great to be jeopardized by moral grandstanding. Although the US has made effort in recent years to decouple itself from dependency on foreign oil—largely by way of off-shore drilling and domestic fracking—the US will be at least partly reliant on overseas oil for the foreseeable future. In turn, the Middle East’s relationship with the US is similarly blemished by the latter’s reliance on Gulf oil. While some politicians in the region praise the US as a harbinger of democracy, freedom, and liberal thought, others decry America as a neo-imperialist state with the primary concern of lining its coffers. Every praise for the Abraham Accords can be met with blame for the Iraq War, War in Afghanistan, or war crimes in Yemen, meaning few in the area view the United States as a wholly benevolent power.

Europe possesses a similarly complicated relationship with the Middle East and its near-monopoly over energy. Like the US, Europe is no stranger to hydrocarbon imports from the Middle East, with figures from Eurostat’s 2020 energy memo reporting 18% of Europe’s crude oil and 12.4% of its natural gas deriving from the region. In this same report, Saudi Arabia alone was reported to have provided more than 7.8% of Europe’s crude oil imports. Moreover, the region’s historical association with Europe in regards to its oil means that this relationship is nothing new. As early as the late-19th century, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company began surveying Gulf sites for extraction. The consequences of this arrangement—especially in relation to its history of upholding authoritarian states in the interest of protecting British and French aims—have had a jarring effect on the region’s modern political and economic stability. This has led to a paradoxical relationship over time, with European states sometimes directly interfering, for example during the Gulf War, while simultaneously staying silent on other issues. Understandably then, few living in the Middle East view the European Union or its member-states in an outright beneficial light.

Starkly contrasted with these relationships is that of Russia with modern Middle Eastern states. Unique to Russia is its heavy supply of oil and natural gas, largely attributable to its massive geographic and topographic scale. As such, although Russia has historically not been one to ignore the bountiful gains of hegemony in the Middle East, it certainly is not suffering from oil crises or shortages. Russian influence in the region has been idiomized as that of a “Jack of all trades, master of none”. What this means is that, although Russia has begun to work its way into better relations with virtually all modern Middle Eastern countries—most notably Syria, Israel, and Turkey—few (minus Syria) are willing to directly align themselves too closely to the Kremlin. Part of this is historical, owing to Soviet proxy management during the Cold War, while most of it stems from Russia’s inability to deliver on its promises for aid and support. Foreign aid inefficiencies have been best shown in Syria, where the Russian Center for Reconciliation of Conflicting Sides (CRCS) has been critiqued for 717 of its 731 communities having been symbolically serviced only once over the last five years. It is for this reason that Turkey has notably denounced Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and officially labeled it a “war”. However, states in the region continue to look to Russia as an alternative to American beneficence. Although Russia has failed in many regards, it has impressed Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and Qatar along with other Levantine states simply by virtue of valuing the status quo over democratization. Where American officials might arrange for oil exchanges that include clauses—however fleeting—on the importance of liberalized economies, Russia is more relaxed, caring little about whether these countries respect civil liberties or uphold human rights. It is because of these complicated, often conflicting variables that Israel’s PM Naftali Bennett has pledged a “measured and responsible” response to the Ukraine Crisis while still hesitating on formally condemning Russia or Vladimir Putin.

All of this is to say that it has become clear in recent years that support toward the Russian sphere is slowly but surely ramping up. Where Europe and the US are constricted in their ability to influence the region based on past crimes, blunders, and miscalculations; Russia is poised to drastically shape the politics of the region. Although few states would publicly—or even privately—praise Russia and its leaders, trends in the region point toward a closeness to the Kremlin that Europe and America could only dream about.

Shut-Offs and Sanctions: Stakes At-Home and Abroad

Thus, the question remains, where does the Middle East sit in all of this? During a time when supply-chains have been disturbed, trade agreements have been terminated, and sanctions have been employed by countries everywhere, no country can sit on the sidelines. Whether they want to be involved or not, states around the world must accept the geopolitical shift that comes with this crisis, along with the immediate, tangible ramifications that come with continued conflict between Russia and Ukraine. As indicated above, the most prominent points for policymakers right now center around how to compensate for the intense reduction in oil and natural gas imports from Russia. Although Europe certainly relies on energy from the Middle East, the same Eurostat report referenced earlier in this piece pointed out that, in fact, 25% of European crude oil and 38% of natural gas actually come out of Russia. The US, although not nearly as reliant, still imports over 8% of its crude oil from Russia and continues to import 20% of its unrefined petroleum products as well. Whether or not a state directly garners its petroleum from Russia, the fact remains that consumer-side and producer-side markets alike are suffering from the conflict. World prices for a barrel of oil have skyrocketed, hitting upwards of $130/barrel in early March of this year, while drivers everywhere have complained of soaring prices, with gas hitting roughly $4.50/gallon in the US and upwards of $7.50/gallon in Italy and $8.00/gallon in the UK as of April of this year.

Obviously, the initial plan to offset this supply shortage was to contact Middle East suppliers—specifically the 7 of those within OPEC+—and increase crude oil flow into the European continent and toward the US. Initial hopes that the organization would respond eagerly to the hope of renewed demand following the COVID-19 plunge were dashed when an emergency meeting on March 2nd between OPEC member states ended with them agreeing to only raise supply by the prescribed amount (400,000 barrels per day in April). Only lasting 13 minutes, the meeting went without a mere mention of the Ukraine crisis and its pressures on the industry. Outside of OPEC, responses are not exactly positive either. Even former-OPEC member Qatar has expressed hesitation in helping the West in its scramble to secure more oil, with Energy Minister Saad al-Kaabi stating even before tensions erupted that it lacked the capacity to remotely replace Russian oil in Europe let alone abroad. Fears have only grown after this response, with Europe increasingly eyeing an outright ban on Russian oil and petroleum products and prices only continue to rise.

The situation is not without its light, of course. On March 9th, Emirati Ambassador to the US Yousef Al-Otaiba, expressed the UAE’s desire to hike oil outputs from OPEC. Saudi Arabian officials offered the same sentiments on March 10th, and countries with the capacity to continue bolstering oil supplies to Europe and the US have attempted to support the call to arms. In yet another show of the American Oil Strategy, US officials are increasingly looking to Iran to cover the difference. In the words of Alex Vatanka of the Middle East Institute, “Iran’s Achilles’ Heel is the state of its economy…and the possibility of a new [JCPOA] presents Tehran with an opportunity.” While circumstances are continuously developing and little is certain, these factors mean that hope might not be lost for the Middle East to assist the West during a time of crisis.

But it is not only in the West that the ripple-effects of the Ukraine crisis have been felt. Virtually every state in the Middle East has reported severe economic and supply consequences directly resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It was Egypt that was first hit hardest by these ramifications, specifically with respect to its food supply. Disruption in Ukrainian supply and export chains, coupled with intense sanctions placed upon Russia, have prevented Egyptian ports from receiving wheat shipments that make up 85% of the country’s grain supply. Iran too has been hit hard by the situation, with severe threats to their supply of sunflower oil, wheat, corn, barley, and soybeans due to economic obstacles. Similar stories have played out across the Middle East and North Africa, as the two combatant states collectively make up 25% of global wheat production, 15% of barley, and 45% of sunflower. Prices have escalated not just for grain itself, but also for fertilizer and general agricultural supplies, meaning countries are increasingly incapable of growing their own crops let alone relying on others. Not only does this threaten to disintegrate the global agro-economy, it risks subjecting millions to food insecurity in a region already wracked from drought and famine. Part of the issue also stems from the fact that NGOs themselves often relied on Ukraine and Russia for food security aid. This was best put by CEO of the World Food Program David Beasley with regard to continued food aid to Yemen: “We have no choice but to take food from the hungry to feed the starving.”

Luckily, this situation is also not entirely insurmountable in the region, even in the face of the worsening conflict. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar have already pledged a collective of $12 billion in aid (with an additional $10 billion promised from Saudi Arabia in the future) to Egypt. Western leaders have been similarly jolted to action by the conflict with regard to food security, as European powers and the US have begun promising increased food aid to suffering countries. A major part of the COP26 Agriculture Innovation Mission in the Middle East involves bringing 140 public, private, and non-profit partners together to normalize the region’s dependence on foreign food imports. $4 billion has been provided by the US to the program, of which a sixth of the budget is intended to be allocated toward the MENA region’s crippled agricultural infrastructure. So soon after over 132 million in the area were made victim to starvation in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and its supply-chain deficiencies, this cannot be allowed to stand. Increasing direct investment into the region should be a top priority for not just the United States but the European Union and the developed world as a whole.

As often said, in every crisis, there arises an opportunity. Growing food insecurity in the Middle East is the perfect means through which the US and EU can not only leverage its own oil stakes in the situation, but improve relations, rehabilitate their images and save lives in the process. Especially in Iran, the time is right to completely reform relations with a state which has become increasingly abrasive over the last few decades.

Women in Terrorist Organizations- Victims or Accomplices?

The role of women in terrorist organizations, particulary jihadist groups in the Middle East (the most notorious of which are the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, and the current governing force of Afghanistan, the Taliban) has been studied from a variet of perspecties, mostly focusing on their victimization. Terrorism is both a consequence and perpetrator of instability and violence, which, as is the case with most marginalized populations, affects women in particular. Women living under terrorist-controlled strongholds in the Middle East are brutally subjugated, forced into sexual and domestic slavery, forced to serve the organizations dominating them, and tasked with indoctrinating the next generation. When we consider the women who willingly join terrorist groups and engage in acts of terrorism such as suicide bombing, we more often that not only consider women in the West - to take one infamous example, Shamima Begum, who traveled from the United Kingdom to an Islamic State-controlled region of Syria and was charged with terrorism upon her return to the United Kingdom. However, plenty of women in the Middle East have willingly joined terrorist organizations, defying the “jihadi bride” trope which will be examined in more detail later in this article. In refusing to acknowledge the agency of Middle Eastern women - in the negative context, the agency to commit crimes and harm others, not just the agency to obtain an education or to start a business - we risk not only underestimating the security threat that women pose, but we deny ourselves the possibility of a more well-rounded and well-informed counterterrorism strategy and fail to fully comprehend the socio-political factors that both breed terror and inspire women to join the movement. 

Chief amongst those factors seems to be a well-documented feeling of a lack of agency on the part of many women who join terrorist organizations. As a Washington Institute study found, “one of the principle reasons these women can choose to take part in terrorism is to gain a sense of agency and power that they were never given in their communities through leaning into extremist ideology and accepting the new leadership roles opening up for women within those structures–even as these organizations treat them as second citizens and will even use women to generate revenue through sex trafficking.” In other words, women frustrated with a lack of agency viewed jihadism and joining terrorist organizations as a way to reclaim a sense of independence previously lacking. The emphasis on preserving a patriarchal system was part of a broader rejection of diversity that included the repression of racial and ethnic minorities. Put simply, those who tried to choose a life outside of the communal norm were seen as threats, an attitude that has suffocated the creative and productive abilities of women and, indeed the this region as a whole. What is relatively new is that some of the women who have lived through these traumas, especially those already exposed to a radical upbringing, increasingly see joining terrorist groups as a way of recapturing the agency denied to them by society. In a twisted way, some women respond to socially accepted oppressive traditions to women’s rights, as well as social pressures that encourage radical thoughts and definitions of self-sacrifice in the name of the sacred, by seeking agency through the most extreme performance of these 'values.' The fertile soil in which some women naturally harvest radical ideas stems from the lack of alternative ways to express their inner anger-turned-hatred. An interesting perspective to explore 

The BBC has warned of the dangers of falling into the habit of assuming women only join or are affiliated with terrorist organizations as ‘jihadi brides’.  ISIS’ capture of the Syrian city of Raqqa in 2013 led to a a shift in their online propaganda; not only were women actively recruited for traditional roles like wife and mother (which still remains their primary function), but as doctors, nurses, teachers, and administrators. “Notably, women were eventually given the responsibility to monitor compliance among other women, evident in the establishment of the all-female al-Khansaa police brigade. This adaptation by the Islamic State to changing circumstances was later reflected in the seventh edition of the group’s online propaganda magazine, Dabiq, which included a new section directly addressing women.”

One of the most vital roles that women play in terrorist organizations is that of a recruiter. As USAToday found, “Western women have also been highly effective online recruiters for young girls from their countries of origin. Teenage girls — justifiably skittish about conversing with strange men online — are likely to be less circumspect about communicating with someone of the same gender who holds allure by being slightly older, sharing their interests and confidences and conveying a sense of inclusion. Thus Hoda Muthana from Alabama recruited American girls, while Aqsa Mahmood from Scotland successfully recruited girls from Great Britain.”  Failing to recognize this can have deadly consequences, with the Washington Post stating “Extremist groups rely upon women to gain strategic advantage, recruiting them as facilitators and martyrs while also benefiting from their subjugation. Yet U.S. policymakers overlook the roles that women play in violent extremism—including as perpetrators, mitigators, and victims—and rarely enlist their participation in efforts to combat radicalization. This omission puts the United States at a disadvantage in its efforts to prevent terrorism globally and within its borders.”

The Washington Post summarized it best, saying that “Pull factors for joining a terrorist organization were a desire for a new environment, pride, support of a political cause, free education and training, image, and access to social and political roles. Push factors were deprivation, redemption and honor, revenge, romantic ties, family influence, commitment to an ideological cause, traumatic experiences, and protection of self and family.”

It has already been established in the literature on terrorism that a wide range of social, political, cultural, and economic trend contribute to the rise of terrorist organizations. Almost ironically, the global war on terror has both caused and strengthened many of these trends. By recognizing the veritable threat that female terrorist fighters pose, as well as the vital role that they play in terrorist networks and their strengthening, we can more holistically broaden our understanding of terrorism dynamics, and in doing so, our understanding of effective counterterrorism strategies.

The Islamic State- Beaten but Not Broken

In the early morning hours of February 3rd, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, the second leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, was killed in an American operation in northwest Syria. His death followed that of the organization's founder and self proclaimed caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2019. Al-Qurashi’s death is an important milestone in continuing the struggle against the forces of ISIS - yet it appears to have overshadowed the more significant events of the previous month. 

On January 20th, a truck in the northeastern Syrian city of Al-Hasakah suddenly veered towards the walls of the Al-Sina’a prison. It detonated, marking the beginning of a prison break at the largest detention camp of ISIS fighters in the world, and the largest and most complex operation of the organization since their territorial defeat three years earlier. 

The military defeat of ISIS and the loss of its territory did not mean the end of the organization's existence, despite the rhetoric and lack of attention paid by many Western governments. For the tens of thousands of the organization's fighters, there were few options. Many fought to the death, others attempted to slink away into unpopulated or barren areas to try and avoid detection - but thousands of fighters, along with their wives and children, were either captured or surrendered. These fighters have been held in a kind of purgatory - crammed into massive detention centers for years with no end in sight. 

The Al-Sina’a prison in Al-Hasakah was one of these detention centers and held an estimated  3,500 and 4,000 prisoners, all either ISIS militants or their children - some of whom were child soldiers. Al-Hasakah is under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces, a multi-ethnic - but primarily Kurdish - armed group seeking to carve out an autonomous zone in northwest Syria.

Al-Sina’a has long been infamous for holding both the former militants and their children (the so called ‘cubs of the caliphate’) in atrocious and inhumane conditions. The prison is overcrowded, with food, water, and medicine being in short supply. 700 of the prison's occupants are children, and their continued incarceration without charge or chance of rehabilitation is particularly problematic. 

Yet it's important to note that these conditions are not on account of the SDF’s cruelty but instead of a lack of resources. Of the 3,500-4,000 prisoners, only a quarter are from Syria. The diverse makeup of the prison population is representative of the global nature of ISIS' membership. Indeed, the continued presence of these multinational prisoners is due to the refusal of the rest of the world to repatriate their citizens who left to join ISIS. It is an underreported absurdity that the international community has abandoned the people of Syria and Iraq to deal foreign citizens. So these fighters are stuck, with their countries unwilling to bring them home and prosecute them. They have no chance at rehabilitation by rotting away in sweltering inhumane conditions surrounded by hardened terrorists. Without any program of rehabilitation, the militants remain ready and committed to their ideology. This situation is particularly unjust for the children of these prisons, imprisoned for the crimes of their parents, still surrounded by a hateful and twisted ideology.

Beyond its horrid conditions, Al-Sina'a has been commonly referred to as a "ticking time bomb" for an ISIS resurgence. Several months earlier the Aisyah, the police of Rojava, had intercepted an earlier attempt by ISIS to attack this very same prison. On January 20th, they were not so lucky. 

The ISIS attack was sudden and intense. The first car bomb cleared the way for an ISIS cell to rush into the prison, bringing arms to the prisoners, who had been ready and rioting for their comrades - an indication of the complexity of the operation - before they raided the prison armory. What followed was the beginning of a brutal week of urban warfare. Fighting raged for days as the SDF, with air support from the American led-international coalition, mobilized troops to confront the sudden and massive insurgency. The residents of the Ghweiran neighborhood of Al-Hasakah, where the Al-Sina’a prison is located, found themselves in the midst of a ferocious battle. Approximately 45,000 people were displaced on the first day of fighting alone. It also appeared that the SDF had prematurely declared victory at times - after the battle had been declared over, a new ISIS pocket would either be found in door to door sweeps or would suddenly open fire on SDF forces. When the dust truly did settle, close to 500 militants and escapees were killed, with close to one hundred SDF fighters and prisoner workers dying as well. Worryingly, it is still unclear how many members of ISIS were able to escape. 

Though the battle ended with the defeat and capture of the prisoners and their would be liberators, it is frankly too early to conclusively call this operation a victory against the ISIS. It is still unknown who the escapees are and if high level leaders may have been able to disappear and rejoin their organization's insurgency. Notably, experts worry about the attack’s implications. It is a clear propaganda victory for ISIS, demonstrating that they still have the capability to stage large, complex, and deadly operations. This attack was also not an isolated event. On the contrary, the last few months have seen a resurgence in ISIS' activity in both Iraq and Syria. When this prison break is viewed with the proper context - that of an emboldened ISIS willing and able to operate a cross border insurgency - the implications are worrying.

Which leads to the question - what is to be done? Multiple conditions must be addressed in order to remedy the underlying problems that led to this attack. More significant aid must immediately be distributed to the people of Iraq and Syria that are responsible for ensuring hardened ISIS veterans remain behind bars. Assistance should provide for both more humane conditions for prisoners as well as address the ability for inmates to properly repatriate back into normal society. In the case of the SDF in Rojava, the issue of Turkey must be addressed as well. Turkey has been hostile to the Kurdish-dominated SDF since its inception. This hostility can be seen in both the Turkish invasions of Rojava as well as in the allegations that Turkey had bombed SDF reinforcements on their way to the Al-Sina’a prison. Continued Turkish aggression towards the SDF in Rojava only serves to pull resources away from the detention of ISIS fighters and produces the instability that allows for the ISIS to continue to fester.

In the long term, the international community must come to terms with the fact that they cannot merely wash their hands of their own civilians and must repatriate the foreigners that joined ISIS. The presence of thousands of foreign fighters held in detention camps in Iraq and Syria is not a viable solution. Only with the action of the international community can this issue be truly resolved. In the future, these attacks will continue to occur unless these changes are made. The rest of the world needs to begin to repatriate their citizens and must stop delegating the task to the people of Syria and Iraq. If nothing is done, the prospects of an ISIS resurgence remain high and the future of northern Syria looks bleak.

Forgotten: The Druze of the Levant and the Legacy of the Syrian Civil War

Few can deny the historical importance of the Levant region in rearing the foundations of human civilization. Thousands of years and hundreds of generations transformed the desolate, arid sands of the Fertile Crescent into functioning cities and irrigated farmland. Out of the ziggurats of Ur and the Hanging Gardens of Babylon, long histories and mythologies emerged, nurturing some of the earliest societies known to man. It was along the banks of the River Jordan and the Nile that not only human life arose, but human spirituality as well, with the stories and scriptures of the Semitic tribes coalescing over hundreds of years into Judaism. Millennia later, Christianity would emerge, and centuries after that, Islam. This brief description does little justice to the sheer volumes that could be written on the complexities of these developments; the conflict and strife that forged pious steel from godless iron and the peace and harmony that tended the barren twigs of Gethsemane into olive branches. But it is telling of the arduous history which surrounds the Middle East and the people that live there that the present is not so different from the past. Persecution runs rampant in the modern states of the Arab World, leaving countless communities without basic necessities or the agency to change the course of their lives.

One group for whom this has proven especially true is the Druze: a community for which a single definition, much like the Middle East as a whole, gives little justice. The Druze are an oft-forgotten subsect of the Abrahamic faith, numbering between 800,000 and 2 million. Druze are dotted across the region and the United States, with a great majority of the known Druze population residing in Syria. Traditionally classified as ethno-religious in nature, the beliefs of the Druze are often explained as more monastic philosophy than deistic religion. In this sense, the Druze faith shares much in common with Taoism, meaning that while they still believe in spirituality and an almighty being, more emphasis is put on daily living rather than worship or the afterlife. This is not to say that the Druze snub ritual practices and belief in a god, in fact it is quite the opposite. Polls from Pew Research have shown that an astounding 99% of Druze believe in the Abrahamic God. Like the Five Pillars of Islam, Druze follow the Seven Duties, which include a strict adherence to monotheism and mutual solidarity with fellow Druze. However, the Druze faith is also considered by most to be confusingly esoteric. Druzite clergy maintain a strong chokehold over the “full” scripture, creating a laity which is unaware of the true nature of their religion.

Nevertheless, Druze remain steadfast in their beliefs and customs. Moreover, Druze are unique to Abrahamic faiths having solidarity with denominations, namely Jews. While Christians might consider Jews heathens and vice versa, Druze value their long history of solidarity with the Jewish people, having both been oppressed repeatedly by the caliphates and Muslim states of the area. It is with the Jews that Druze possess the greatest solidarity, having interculturally developed alongside one another and having been treated with greater tolerance and acceptance in Israel. The Druze, much like the Sikhs of India, are also renowned for their militant culture, serving in the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) up until 2015 under the separated Herev Battalion. While the group has since integrated with the IDF at-large, Druze continue to be overwhelmingly loyal to Israel as their home and protector.

Yet while the state of Israel has repeatedly expressed and demonstrated support for this ethnoreligious minority, surrounding Arab Muslim states have not been so kind. Political representation is rare if not entirely non-existent. For example, while Lebanon theoretically guarantees the same rights and privileges to Druze that it does to its other citizens, the reality is usually starkly different. While treated better than in other Arab countries, differences between the Sunni Muslim majority and Druze minority makes integration into daily life difficult. Although the Druze gained political representation in Syria in the Ba’athist takeover in 1963, they were quickly sidelined to prioritize the agenda of other Muslims and Arabs, and have remained a political minority ever since. As is to be expected, leaving the Druze politically ostracized has had considerable ramifications for the treatment of the Druze in all other facets of life.

Druze and Islam: A Complicated History

Mistreatment of Druze and ill-will from the Muslim majority of the region stems from a long history of religious suppression, social isolation, and the killing of Druze by fundamentalist Muslims. Two facts are important to acknowledge at this point: the first being that the term “Druze” is, technically, a misnomer. The term Druze, while disputed by some as possibly deriving from the Arabic word darasah (“those who learn”), is largely accepted to derive from the name of 11th-century adherent Muhammad bin Ismail Nashtakin ad-Darazi. An early follower of the faith, Ad-Darazi himself was soon categorized as a heretic and expunged from the sect entirely. Before this could spread, Benjamin of Tudela—a 12th-century Jewish European chronicler—published a history of the Levant which labeled the people as “Dogziyin”, which over time became bastardized to “Druze”. Druze will often go by many names, but the accepted label used by clergy and when referring to themselves is Al-Muwahhidun (“The People of Monotheism” or “The Unitarians”). For the purpose of this article, and given that the debated etymology has resulted in a lack of care or offense from the community, I will continue to use the term “Druze”.

The second fact which requires some elaboration is that the Druze technically arose from a sect of Islam known as Isma’ilism which is itself a branch of Shi’a Islam. Without delving too deeply into the complex—and disputed—history of the faith, Druze slowly developed into its own religion, eventually becoming persecuted under the Fatimid Caliphate, leading to a closing of the faith in 1043. This means that every Druze individual born past this era has been born directly into the Druze faith, culture, and lifestyle. Additionally, while the Druze emerged from a sect of heretical Islam, it has since abandoned a majority of the guiding principles of Islam. Indeed, the Druze are known as a cosmopolitan people, entertaining philosophy from the Old Testament, New Testament, and Qur’an alike. However, contemporary Druze communities reject the rite of Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca), requirement of zakat (alms to the poor), and other important aspects of Islam. Druze theology is instead directed by the Epistles of Wisdom and other such texts.

It is from this division that deep, long-standing animosity arose between the Islamic and Druze communities in the Middle East. Sunni Islamic scholar Ibn Taymiyyah codified this distrust and hatred, labeling their prophet al-Hakim a dajjal (“deceiver” or “devil”) and declaring the Druze “the most evil of people in apostasy.” Islamic theologians like Ibn Taymiyyah came to issue fatwas—legal-religious orders—calling for massacres of the Druze, and that they be fought against until they accepted Shari’a (Islamic rule) as the highest and most important of all laws.

Druze history has been marked by intermittent moments of conflict and cooperation between Muslim communities and Druze minorities. On the one hand, as stated previously, Druze living in Syria and Lebanon have faced discrimination and prejudice throughout their history on behalf of Muslim governments and religious leaders. Lebanon, for instance, has not pursued an actual census of the Druze since 1932 out of fear of inciting pogroms and infighting. On the other hand, as also stated before, the militant nature of the Druze tradition has made them desirable in combat units. Notable examples of this include Druze involvement during the Arab Revolts under the Ottoman Empire in World War I into the 1920s and uprisings against French Syrian rule into the 1940s. Paradoxical as this willingness to fight alongside followers of an enemy faith might initially appear, it makes sense strategically. Small numbers means the Druze are eager to win the trust of their Muslim neighbors, and fighting alongside them is one way of doing that. A similar phenomenon can be seen with the aforementioned Herev Battalion within the IDF. 

Culling: The Syrian Civil War and the Druze

While it has been shown that the history of the Druze has been one fraught with conflict and bloodshed between themselves and their Muslim counterparts, instances of organized violence were relatively few and far between throughout the twentieth century. This trend continued up until the early-2010s with the rise of ISIS and the beginning of the Syrian Civil War. Incidents were at first scattered, blending into the wholesale slaughter of Christians, Jews, Syrian Armed Forces (SAF), counter-revolutionary fighters, and foreigners. It was with the creation of the al-Nusra Front (also known as al-Qaeda in the Levant) in late 2011 that the frequency of attacks against the Druze skyrocketed.

It was around this time that an avalanche of reports began to emerge of flagrant prejudice against the Druze in Syria, specifically in territories occupied by ISIS and al-Nusra. Episodes of persecution began with the desecration of graves and houses of worship in Idlib, Syria, with al-Nusra fighters destroying well over 500 burial sites and around 100 Druze temples within the span of six months in 2012. Eventually, al-Nusra and ISIS began to escalate its methods to forced conversion, with several hundred Idlib Druze issuing statements renouncing their faith in November, 2013 and February, 2014. Finally, militant insurgents in Syria began to actively pursue violence against the Druze minority. While these instances of violence became widespread into the mid-2010s, this horror culminated in the Qalb Lawzeh Massacre. In the early hours of June 10, 2015, al-Nusra fighters—who had previously dug-up graves in the village—began to argue with townsfolk and ransack homes for food and blankets. Over the course of the day, this built up from verbal confrontation to physical violence, ending with the death of 20 Druze villagers.

There is no doubt that the fundamentalism of ISIS and al-Nusra fighters played into the reasoning behind these attacks; but just as there are material incentives for misguided youth and listless vagabonds to join jihadist groups, there were and continue to be material causes behind these injustices. According to Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, an Iraqi expert on ISIL and the Syrian Civil War, the events which transpired at Qalb Lawzeh and the rampant destruction of property and displacement of Druze is not solely rooted in religious differences. Instead, evidence suggests that these principally arose out of land disputes, with al-Nusra forces having promised supporters land in the Jabal al-Summaq area. Underlying facts like this are essential to explaining not only the growth of ISIS and al-Nusra in the 2010s but also the ensuing conflicts between Salafists and easy prey minority groups like the Druze.

Conflict between the Druze and militant insurgencies did not stop with the Syrian recapture of Aleppo in 2016. Rather, attacks became rarer but more deadly. Bombings like the Swedia attacks in July, 2018 that killed more than 200 people (with another 24 taken hostage) highlighted the continued risk to Druze communities in Syria. 

Druze in the Middle East—Tomorrow and Beyond

The greatest tragedy facing the Druze is not only that these crimes continue into our present time, but continue without much notoriety or coverage. Calls for attention to the plight of the Druze date back to as early as the 1980s when Lebanese politician Walid Jumblatt—an important figure in the international Druze community—called for American Druze to lobby against American interference in the Lebanese Civil War. There have been occurrences of Druze involvement in international politics, most recently with the hosting of Sheikh Moafaq Tarif at the UNHCR in 2019, but these have remained scattered and infrequent. Coverage of the horrors at Qalb Lawzeh and Sweida settled down soon after the attacks, and critics have noted the lack of response from the US and international organizations.

The Druze are an ancient and proud people who will not go quietly while injustice faces their communities. They have shown their dedication not only to their fellow Druze but to their countrymen, a unique trait which should garner far more attention than it has received. In assessing proper channels for encouraging democracy and free agency in the Middle East, the US, UN, and all groups concerned with stabilizing the region should look to the Druze as a community to empower and protect. 

UNESCO and the destruction of Afghan cultural heritage: How the Taliban’s return to power threatens the legitimacy of western-led international organizations

Earlier this year when the Taliban regained power for the first time in Afghanistan since the US-led military invasion of 2001, all attention was immediately centered on the fall of Kabul and Afghan government, as well as the devastating effects and tragedy that the Taliban’s reprise of power would have on the Afghan people. The outside world watched in horror the scenes at Kabul airport and the heartbreaking interviews with citizens fearing for their lives and the future of Afghanistan. Adding to this discourse at the time was the anger and frustration expressed towards the American government and other western governments at their inaction and inability to prevent the return of the Taliban. The twenty year long US military presence disappeared as did their supposed ‘success’ at quelling the Taliban’s dangerous presence. 

Now, as the world is starting to sadly adjust to the reality of the Taliban regime, greater analysis can be done to recognize the true levels of destruction that Afghanistan is experiencing, particularly the loss of their rich cultural heritage. Adding to the failure of the US military presence in Afghanistan is the failure of international institutions, such as UNESCO, to protect the country’s cultural heritage. 

The history of Afghanistan’s cultural heritage 

Afghanistan is home to a diverse and rich cultural heritage, thanks in large part to its history which includes a strong religious legacy of a variety of religions including Buddhism, Islam, and Christian and Jewish sects. Unlike other parts of the world, humans have inhabited Afghanistan for at least 50,000 years, living primarily in farming communities. Early records of human interaction in Afghanistan in the ancient world reveal the presence of the Persian Empire, Alexander the Great, and a wide variety of kingdoms that would be defined by both Buddhism and Islam. Modern day Afghanistan represents a land that is home to thousands of years of human interaction, leaving it with an impressive cultural heritage. Historical monuments in Afghanistan include the Bamiyan Valley that once held the great Buddha statues and the Minaret of Jam, the famous tower built by the Ghurid sultan. Yet now, Afghanistan risks losing its precious cultural heritage due to the Taliban, and their desire to rewrite the narrative of Afghanistan's history. 

Afghanistan has already lost much of its most important and oldest forms of cultural heritage. When the Taliban first took power in 1996 they horrified the outside world by destroying the Buddhist Bamiyan statues of the 6th century. The statues were regarded as examples of the oldest forms of religious monuments worldwide and were part of UNESCO’s many world heritage sites. The Taliban's decision to destroy these sacred, 600 foot tall monuments revealed their intense desire to rid Afghanistan of its Buddhist influence and anything that went against the terrorist organization’s strict rules and image. The Taliban did not only destroy ancient sites, they also attacked more recent forms of cultural heritage as well as Afghanistan’s contemporary art and culture. Museums, libraries, and music were all forms of culture that fell victim to the Taliban. Author and academic, Ahmad Rashid Salim describes the danger of cultural heritage destruction: “When you kill history, when you kill language, when you kill leaders, when you kill intellectuals, when you kill the religious and spiritual leaders of a society, you can do whatever you want with the people who no longer have a past.”

Now, the Taliban’s return to power threatens the few remaining ancient cultural heritage sites as well as the renaissance of culture that the Afghan people have worked so hard to protect and promote in recent decades. Indeed, it appears as though our worst fears are being realized. Following the Taliban’s initial return to power back in August of this year little was known of their intentions regarding the country’s cultural heritage. A Taliban spokesperson was quoted in February of 2021 on the subject of Afghanistan’s cultural heritage: “As Afghanistan is a country replete with ancient artifacts and antiquity, and that such relics form a part of our country’s history, identity and rich culture, therefore all have an obligation to robustly protect, monitor and preserve these artifacts...All Mujahideen must prevent excavation of antiquities and preserve all historic sites like old fortresses, minarets, towers and other similar sites...to safeguard them from damage, destruction and decay.” Officials within the Taliban promised to protect the country’s cultural heritage, including Kabul’s National Museum of Afghanistan; yet suspicions and distrust lingered given the events of previous decades. Tragically, it appears as though our worst fears are being realized: a recent video from early November shows the Taliban conducting a target practice at the limited remains of the Bamiyan Buddhas, despite their supposed promise to protect the cultural heritage site. This blatant disrespect for the cultural heritage site and disregard of their promise reveals the level of destruction that the Taliban is capable of. Afghanistan risks losing all of its influential cultural heritage, a tragedy that will be deeply devastating not just for the country, but for the world. 

UNESCO and the protection of world heritage sites 

Afghanistan is not the first country worldwide that risks losing its history and heritage due to a change in government and desire to redefine a national identity. The destruction of cultural heritage is a tragic part of every culture's history. However, the 20th century saw the first large-scale attempt to recognize the importance of cultural heritage worldwide and implement efforts to protect cultural heritage in all of its forms. 

UNESCO, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, was established with the goal of protecting and promoting peace and cooperation, specifically through cultural work. The UNESCO World Heritage Sites are one of the defining roles of the international organization. Founded thanks to the 1972 Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, the World Heritage List seeks to protect cultural heritage all across the world in the forms of monuments, buildings, geographical landscapes, and other forms of cultural sites. The UNESCO World Heritage List also labels sites that are in danger and must be protected. Heritage sites in danger can be labeled for a variety of reasons including environmental threats, political threats, or economic threats. Afghanistan is home to several cultural heritage sites on the World Heritage List, of which some, such as the Bamiyan Buddhas, have tragically been destroyed. The remaining cultural heritage sites in Afghanistan are high on the list of those in danger. 

Despite the global impact of UNESCO and worldwide recognition of the importance of protecting cultural heritage sites, UNESCO has been helpless in the face of Taliban destruction. While the international organization could evidently not prevent the return of the Taliban in power, their blatant failure to succeed in any form of protection towards Afghanistan’s cultural heritage sites threatens the legitimacy and future of the organization. In the face of the Taliban’s takeover, UNESCO was only able to call for the preservation of the historical sites, despite their implementation of a safeguard protection program with the Afghan Interior Ministry in 2004. Yet, even this protection program appears worthless now.  How can the world guarantee the protection of its cultural heritage when the one organization tasked with promoting and protecting cultural heritage cannot live up to its own goals?  The Taliban’s return to power and their decision to blatantly target Afghanistan’s cultural heritage sites reveals a far larger issue than the blatant destruction seen on the surface: The inability of international organizations to live up to their roles.

The recent failure of international organizations 

UNESCO is not the first international institution that has been unable to live up to its original promise and mission statement, many other prominent international organizations have been unable to meet their promises to the world for a variety of factors. Examples of failure within other international organizations include the European Union’s recent failure to implement western-European influence in Bosnia following the UN’s security council’s vote to end the EU’s peacekeeping mission there. Other more infamous failures include the UN’s tragic inaction throughout the Rwandan genocide, in which UN blue helemt troops evacuated foreigners, but failed the protect the horrifying mass murder of the Tutsi people. Despite UN recognition of their own blatant failure, the organization’s peacekeeping missions in recent decades reveal a clear and obvious struggle of the organization to live up to its goals, following its creation after World War II. 

The liberal international order in conflict

The destruction in Afghanistan and UNESCO inability to protect the country’s cultural heritage sites reveal another larger issue: the failure of the liberal international order. Following the devastating destruction caused by the Second World War, dozens of international institutions and organizations were established with the hope of promoting global cooperation and thus preventing war and mass conflict. Aimed with the goal of spreading liberal, western democracy throughout the world, the victors of World War II believed that through western-led international organization and western influence world wide, nation states would become democracies over time. Therefore making the world a safer place through nation states’ attempts to evolve into the traits encouraged by the western powers. 

The liberal international order is defined by its norms of multilateralism and its promotion of international institutions. The liberal international order has been a central theory that has defined world politics following the second of World War II. The theory was seen as the future of democracy and peace; it promised a more connected world of western-led power and economic, political, and cultural cooperation. However, recent decades have seen the failing of the liberal international order, as the theory could not account for the recent developments of bipolarity between China and the United States, or its failure in its countries of origin, caused by populist movements seen in the United Kingdom and United States. The rise of non-state actors and the rejection of Western values and traditional concepts of nation state sovereignty have also been central to the liberal international order’s decline. The threat of the Taliban stems not just from their capacity to cause mass violence, but also their rejection of the pillars of liberalism. 

International institutions were once established to be the defining pillars of the liberal international order. The establishment of the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, or the World Health Organization all reveal how following their creation, western powers intended for the organizations to engage in multilateral cooperation worldwide, while being largely dominated and funded by the western powers themselves. However, the recent failures of many international institutions reflect the larger failure of liberalism as the defining theory of world order. 

UNESCO’s inability to act in Afghanistan does not just threaten their own stability and legitimacy as an organization designed in part to protect world heritage, but reveals the broader trend of failure within international institutions and the change in world order. The stability and protection once promised by these western led international institutions can no longer be guaranteed; the Taliban’s destruction of Afghanistan’s cultural heritage simply proves it.

Resistance in Syria

In early 2011, protests broke out against Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria as part of the Arab Spring. The government responded to the protests - whose motto was ‘the people demand removal of the regime’ - with a violent crackdown. The attempted suppression of the protests quickly backfired, with many Syrians beginning to call for a revolution and taking up arms against the regime. The resulting violence quickly escalated into the Syrian Civil War. For years, the civil war has had the attention of the world as the Syrian people struggled against the dictatorial Assad. The Ghouta chemical attacks in 2013 horrified the world, as the regime killed 1,429 people (426 of whom were children) with sarin gas. This blatant massacre prompted the first, of many, foreign interventions in the civil war, as the United States and its allies threatened to retaliate against the regime if all chemical weapons were not turned over. A few years later, ISIS emerged from the power vacuum and conflict in eastern Syria, fighting both the regime and the rebel opposition. This prompted another foreign intervention, as much of the world cooperated to combat the rise of ISIS’ caliphate. The most significant intervention of the entire war though began in 2015, when Russia began a mass bombing campaign in order to support its ally Assad and keep him in power, which has been tragically effective and deadly.

The Syrian Civil War is still ongoing today and has been marked by intense violence, different factions, and the presence and interventions of multiple foreign powers, each with their own proxies. Today the civil war is far from settled, though the Assad regime has conquered, or pacified, large parts of the country - largely as a result of the brutal bombing campaign by its Russian ally. Despite the fact that the conflict is still ongoing, the international community has inexplicably moved on, acting as if the war had been won by Assad’s government. It seems that much of the world, and now recently even the Biden administration, is treating the Syrian Civil War as solved, and is now considering rapprochement towards the regime. This is a gross rehabilitation of a vicious regime. One that has utilized chemical weapons to kill thousands of its own people, and developed horrific new weapons of war, such as barrel bombs. It also ignores and downplays the conflict and continued resistance that occurs within Syria today in cities like Daara and Idlib, and the Kurdish northeast.

The city of Daara in southwestern Syria has been called the ‘birthplace of the Syrian revolution.’ The arrest of two teenagers in 2011 for anti-Assad graffiti led to an outbreak of protests, to which the regime had a brutal and deadly response. This incident was one of the opening salvos of the civil war. Only after seven long years of fighting was Daara largely captured during a Russian-led offensive in 2018. The remaining areas of the city soon came to an agreement with the Assad regime, brokered and guaranteed by Russia.

Disgruntled and dissatisfied by the lack of good faith shown by the regime in honoring their side of the deal, protests broke out in Daara in late July. Assad’s forces responded swiftly in their usual manner - an indiscriminate bombing campaign and siege of the city. The regime specifically targeted the neighborhood of Daara Al-Bahad, whose representative Central Committee has begged for a ceasefire to solve the water and food shortages. To date the regime’s bombings have killed at least 15 people, with some estimates rising to four times that number.

Yet the bombing of Daara has attracted little to no international attention or support. Daraa represents not only the birth of the struggle against Bashar Al-Assad’s regime, but also that it is ongoing. The regime’s ‘control’ of much of its claimed territory is tenuous at best, and fresh resistance is still taking place.

Similarly, fighting has intensified in and around the city of Idlib in northwestern Syria. A Russian bombing campaign seeks to displace the opposition forces that control most of the governorate. This campaign carries additional risks as well - the situation in Idlib is not as straightforward as in Daara. The city of Idlib and much of the governorate is controlled by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an Islamist group. But a significant portion of the governorate is controlled by the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, an opposition group, which risks a larger regional conflict between Turkey and Russia. Russia’s bombing campaign in Northern Syria also extends to areas firmly in control of the Syrian National Army, deep within the so-called Turkish ‘safe zones’ like Afrin.

But the most significant remaining opposition to Assad’s government is the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria - better known as Rojava. To the east of the Euphrates river, Rojava is a self-governing democratic region of Syria. While dominated by the Kurds, Rojava is notably multi-ethnic, especially in the wake of the influx of refugees and internally displaced persons created in the civil war. With its own armed wing - the Syrian Democratic Forces - Rojava has enjoyed great success combating not only Assad’s forces, but ISIS as well. In fact it was the SDF who led much of the ground fighting against ISIS in Syria.

But for the moment, it is not Assad’s regime that poses the greatest threat against the continued existence and independence of Rojava. Ever since President Trump pulled American troops from their supportive role in Rojava, Turkey has carried out a number of operations against Rojava, invading from the north and seizing territory - making the largest remaining resistance to Assad’s rule fight on two fronts. Turkey sees the existence of an independent Kurdish state as a threat, as they harshly oppress and persecute their own Kurdish minority. The threat posed by Turkey to Rojava is so great, the government of Rojava has indicated they would be open to some form of alliance with Assad’s government against Turkey. Yet despite all these challenges, Rojava has maintained its independence, making the recent attitudes towards Assad all the more strange.

Despite the fact that continued resistance to the regime is still ongoing throughout Syria, the last few months have seen a shocking movement towards acceptance of Assad’s regime. The governments of Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar have all sent emissaries to meet with Assad in the past year, a stunning change of policy when most of these states have previously harshly opposed him. Interpol, the international police organisation, announced in October that Syria - as in Assad’s government - would be readmitted to the body. Not only is this an immoral recognition of the regime, but in time the government will have access to red notices  - the international equivalent of an arrest warrant, allowing the regime to target and harrass dissenters and critics abroad. Recently, even the Biden administration has begun to open negotiations with the regime. Washington is in the early stages of a deal to transport Egyptian natural gas through Jordan and Syria to energy deprived Lebanon - with Assad’s government getting a cut in the process. 

This deal would be a betrayal of those who continue to struggle against the regime and would be a disgusting acceptance of someone who has butchered those who protested against him. Worse, it would make the United States complicit in the crimes of Assad’s regime. Supplying Assad with resources like natural gas only makes it easier for him to keep his grip on a country that rejected his rule. The attempt to alleviate Lebanon’s energy crisis is laudable and humanitarian, and doubtlessly would do much in the way of reducing suffering there. But there has to be another way in which Lebanon’s crisis can be relieved without tying the solution to Assad. This deal would not only help legitimize his rule - recognizing him as the power in Syria - it will provide him with material assets to continue his oppression. The money and energy that the regime will gain from this deal could go straight to propagating the security forces that terrorize the Syrian people.

The United States should reject cooperation and recognition with the Assad regime. It is wrong to ignore the continued resistance towards his regime, and to abandon the allies that we have supported in Syria - especially the bastion of resistance that is Rojava in the Northeast. It is wrong for the international community as well to wash their hands of what is happening in Syria, to pretend that the war is over when the humanitarian crisis is still ongoing. The international community should not seek diplomatic rapprochement with Bashar al-Assad, should not let him and his cronies out from the cold. To do so would be an insult to all the Syrians that he has slaughtered and those that continue to languish under his rule.

The Era of Desalination: Israel’s Success & The Future of Water in the Middle East

The Water Crisis in the Middle East

For many living in the developed world, a day spent thinking about where their next glass of water will be coming from is an oddity. Although many countries in Europe suffer from issues concerning water scarcity, these are more exceptions to the rule. The issue of water stress and scarcity primarily concerns the developing world, especially the Middle East and North Africa, where access to potable drinking water (or any water at all for that matter) is extremely limited. For instance, while 8% of France and 10% of the Netherlands reside in water-scarce areas, more than 49% of Egypt and 63% of Saudi Arabia lack this essential resource, due to a variety of factors both natural and man-made. Climate change aside, the environment of the Middle East—hot, arid, and seldom rainy—makes for a harsh lifestyle devoid of water. More importantly though is the overuse of water for agricultural purposes. Close to 85% of the region’s water is allocated for irrigation, and often inefficiently. Even wealthier Arab countries find themselves confronted with this issue. As awe-inspiring as the infrastructural marvels of Dubai may appear; even the UAE is close to the breaking point, with groundwater scarcity and water reuse mismanagement creating a deadly storm on the horizon. Combining these aforementioned points with rising populations and increasing water sanitation costs, it is no wonder that so many suffer from this emergency.

Understandably, the question must be asked: How can the governments of these countries provide enough water for the needs and wants of their populations? As the water crisis of the Middle East has become increasingly dire, countries have developed a slew of solutions to the problem, along with mixed results. Initiative include repairing piping infrastructure and water trading, and many countries have focused on sequential water management, which involves sanitizing wastewater for industrial or domestic purposes. Even still, the numbers don’t lie; swaths of the Middle East rely on insufficient water resources. While water reserves continue to plunge and water quality issues constantly spring up, water conflicts—armed and otherwise—are on the horizon.

The answer to this devastating issue lies with Israel’s success. Reeling from its water crisis of the late-2000s, Israel has developed techniques in desalination, water treatment, and drip-irrigation that may aid the entire region. How is it that a country which once teetered on the brink of full-scale collapse from water shortages is now the only country which doesn’t suffer from acute water shortages? And how can we apply these lessons of success in confronting the water crisis of the region as a whole?

What is Desalination?

Before jumping into the specifics, it is important to identify what exactly “desalination” means and what constructing desalination plants actually entails. As the word implies, desalination involves the removal of salt (as well as other minerals and potential inorganic and organic contaminants) from water to make it potable. Desalinated water is most often processed from seawater, although desalination sites might be erected as salt interception schemes (SIS) along irrigation lines to desalinate agricultural runoff or as temporary infrastructure to desalinate waterways along desertified areas. Likewise, the purpose of the desalinated water can vary by context. While a majority of desalination plants are used for drinking water or auxilliary uses (showering, dishwashing, latrines, etc.), the aforementioned salt interception schemes are used to desalinate water to be piped back into natural rivers and waterways as “blue water” for ecological purposes. After all, freshwater fish need water too.

Two primary desalination methods exist: reverse osmosis and thermal distillation. The former works on the science of “water equalization”, whereby the natural properties of water demand equal volumes of water in two separate spaces if divided by a semi-permeable membrane. In layman’s terms: A container is divided in two by a wall of microscopic netting, one half empty and the other half with water. The netting selectively allows water to pass through while leaving salt, minerals, and other contaminants behind. In the case of reverse osmosis, the benefit is its increased thoroughness, especially in separating organic contaminants from the water. Unfortunately, the process remains extremely expensive and energy-intensive—leaving reverse osmosis a strategy that has popularized in Europe and the United States rather than elsewhere in the world.

As for thermal distillation, one can derive the basic premise from the word as well. Rapidly heated water produces steam, which in turn—having separated the water from the leftover compounds—can be recondensed into distilled water for drinking or other various uses. Thermal desalination has become popular in the greater Middle East and North Africa, mostly for the lower energy requirements and the simplicity of design. Admittedly, in contrast to other desalination plants in the area, a majority of Israeli sites utilize reverse osmosis technology, which may not be appropriate for the bulk of Middle Eastern countries which suffer from debt and frequent budget misallocations. However, by taking advanatage of the simplicity and the lower energy requirement associated with thermal desalination technology, it is possible for the region to harness the same wealth of water that Israel enjoys.

Timeline of the Water Crisis in Israel

Not so long ago, Israel itself was another unfortunate example of the rampant water crisis afflicting the Middle East. Historically, Israel’s water was provided from a variety of sources like groundwater spots, natural bodies of water like the Sea of Galilee and Lake Kinneret, and wastewater reuse systems. Further sources, like personal wells and runoff from Mount Camel, provide Israelis with the water they need on a day-to-day basis. Israel’s water politics are heavily influenced by its 1959 Water Law, which designated water as a national public good. This not only confirmed the government’s responsibility in providing safe water to all citizens of Israel, but also the government’s monopoly of power concerning the handling and allocation of water.

At the turn of the 21st century, Israel was in the midst of one of the greatest droughts the country had seen since its founding (lasting from 1998-2002). Israel’s government acknowledged the problem by encouraging water conservation, but continued to distribute water arbitrarily to industry, pollute waterways, and over-sanitize non-drinking water. Much of this misallocation can be attributed to Mekorot: the nationalized water company of Israel. In the absence of competition, Mekorot remained a poorly-managed government monopoly which substantially undercut the price of water to levels that did not meet operation costs. Further mismanagement and lack of attention to the growing crisis from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development meant that the crisis only worsened. Attempts were made to compensate with water conservation efforts; installation of low-flow toilets and showerheads and investment into innovative water treatment systems. Israeli officials even advised their constituents to take “zionist showers”, or shared family showers. Still, the nation was struggling more than it ever had in providing adequate water.

It was not until 2005 that the government finally built its salvation: the Ashkelon desalination plant. Then-providing over 101 million cubic meters of water to the state of Israel, the Ashkelon plant’s success transformed the state of the Israeli water crisis. Since then, Israel has constructed five more desalination plants, with a bid for a seventh plant in northern Israel to provide >100 million more cubic meters of water. Overall, more than 585 million cubic meters of water are provided by desalination plants in Israel. Today, desalination is an essential part of day-to-day life for a near-majority of Israelis, with 35% of Israel having received their water through desalination channels in 2014, and a projected 70% to be drinking desalinated water by 2050.

Challenges to the Israeli Model

Of course, a solution which seems too good to be true is, quite often, simply that. Plenty of evidence exists to support desalination’s promise for the Middle East, but plenty also exists to point out the risks that come with feverishly constructing desalination plants. Two primary concerns lie with expanding desalination: cost and environmental impact.

With regard to the first, it cannot be overstated how expensive a desalination plan can often become. Projections vary, but according to a survey from the Texas Water Development Board, construction of a 2.5 million gallon per day plant (equivalent to ~100,000 cubic meters per day, less than half the daily production of Israel’s planned seventh desalination plant) would cost more than $32 million. Combine this with supply-chain problems, corruption, and a host of other barriers, and it is little wonder why countries in the Middle East are so unwilling to throw money at a problem which could yield very little. Low returns on desalinated water further dissuade most companies or national agencies even willing to look into desalination.

As for environmental impact, this itself can be further broken down into concern over the power source and the ramifications for sea life because of wastewater. Powering desalination plants can be a heavy undertaking—estimates for the carbon output of Australia’s construction of desalination plants alone in 2015 are around 1,200 kt of carbon dioxide, a number which skyrockets when accounting for year-by-year emissions once the plant goes into operation. Effects on marine life also remain a concern as the amount of wastewater pumped back into the environment increases. Desalination is not a zero-waste process; the contents removed from the salinated water have to go somewhere, which very often means right back into the ocean. Dozens of desalination sites, all pumping gallons of warm, brackish water back into the coastal waterways, could seal the fate of innumerable species of sealife.

All of this is certainly a concern, and few reasonable people would argue that these issues should be ignored in favor of securing freshwater for humans alone. Much of humanity’s mission today involves securing the environment for future generations and not plunging them into unpayable debt. But there are alternatives; desalination sites can easily be powered via renewable energy sources like solar or geothermal power. Studies have shown the positive yields from reverse osmosis plants coupled with renewable energy sources, not only in reducing carbon outputs but in reducing future energy costs too. Additionally, as new processes develop, the outlook on brine treatement techniques has become optimistic. Instead of simply pumping wastewater directly back into the environment, water treatment can further purify water bound for the sea and dispose of contaminants elsewhere (repurposing salt and minerals, etc.).

The Future of Water in the Middle East

At this very moment, more than 66 million people in the Middle East lack basic sanitation. Of the 17 most water-stressed countries in the world, 11 of them lie in the Middle East and North Africa. Water provided a catalyst for conflict when ISIS threatened to take over the entire region (such as when the Islamic State captured the Taqba Dam in Iraq in 2013 which was only reclaimed in 2017) and it continues to provide a spark for political disputes and military clashes alike. In Yemen, where potable water stores have reached a mere 198 cubic meters per capita, widespread water shortage contributes heavily to the famine and in-fighting amongst rebel groups. In northeastern Africa, Ethiopia’s construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam—which would greatly restrict the already-lessening upstream flow of the Nile which provides for Egypt’s and Sudan’s agro-economies—threatens to spark war between these countries and others upstream. As has become increasingly evident, awareness campaigns and changes to individual consumption are not enough. Macro-problems demand macro-solutions, and desalination could be just the answer the Middle East is looking for.

Some scholars have suggested promoting the synergystic relationship between water and other resources like food and energy (hydroelectricity). Part of the impasse with politicians may be the fact that water may be a necessity, but it’s difficult to profit off of in our existing economic system. If we then expand water’s necessity to include agricultural production and hydropower production, we could expand the interest in powerful groups to secure wider access to water resources. 

The reality is that increasing access to water in the Middle East will involve more than internal solutions; a problem that transcends borders such as this demands collaboration and diplomacy between states. Arab-Israeli hydropolitics are complicated, and it’s unfortunately unlikely that the inevitable catastrophe that would come with remaining politically-unilateral would mean Arabs and Israelis finally seeing each other as more than enemies. Perhaps there will come a day when people of Muslim and Jewish faith can live harmoniously in their respective homelands, and perhaps the water crisis will not be that watershed event. But the present and growing problem does provide an opportunity for interstate relations that rises above differences in identity or ideology. We cannot continue to ignore the suffering of those experiencing this crisis, just as we cannot continue to ignore the opportunity that this creates for diplomacy and greater peace in the Middle East.

Should the UN Deploy to Afghanistan?

In the immediate aftermath of the fall of Kabul and the Taliban’s takeover of the government, Afghanistan is facing several pressing crises. The delivery of vital humanitarian aid is in a state of logistical limbo, threatening the food security of millions. Furthermore, the human rights of women and members of the old government are under threat. In light of this crisis, several commentators have endorsed the idea of deploying a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation (or PKO) to the country. While noble, these efforts are misguided. Any PKO in Afghanistan would lack the ability to complete its objectives if the Taliban opposed them, and the resources required for such an operation would be better allocated elsewhere. 

The most prominent proposal for a PKO in Afghanistan comes from Georgetown professor Lise Howard, who laid out the case in an op-ed for the L.A. Times. In it, she proposes a PKO lead by China and Muslim nations with the objective of monitoring the situation and to“help the Taliban consolidate less radical control.” Another consistent source of advocacy has been from UMass Amherst professor Charli Carpenter, who argued in favor of a full-scale UN peace enforcement operation aimed at preventing a total Taliban takeover. 

Other proposals have supported the establishment of a PKO with the objective of preventing a possible civil war. Carpenter and Howard argue in Foreign Policy that “the Taliban have only a tenuous hold over the country” which has the potential to become a “multisided conflict that, unless checked, could metastasize and spread across borders, similar to the conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and Libya.” In their view, a small (5,000 strong) mission from Muslim countries could prevent the outbreak of conflict. US Army Major Ryan van Wie of West Point proposed a new type of peace operation, aimed at boosting Taliban legitimacy and moderating its human rights problems. He has also developed several different options, each with its own capabilities and price tag. 

In response to these arguments, GWU professor Paul D. Williams outlined several potential flaws in any such operation. He notes that no UN forces would be able to arrive for at least 60 days, as well as an inability to find willing troop contributors. He also highlights how the Taliban’s consolidation of control over the Afghan government contrasts with the situations in which peacekeepers excel, such as when “there’s a viable peace process to help implement and a host government to support.” Adam Day of the United Nations University highlights how much of this discourse ignores both the reality on the ground and the opinion of the Afghan people 

In response to this critique, Carpenter argues that much of the opposition to a PKO in Afghanistan comes from a sense of fatalism, the idea that the inability to deploy to Afghanistan is set in stone, so there is no real sense in debating over it. While I wouldn’t describe this attitude as fatalism, I believe this perspective is valid. The UN will not and should not deploy to Afghanistan, even if there are some potential benefits to doing so. The political will and financial resources allocated to any such operation would be better utilized elsewhere. Before we address if such a deployment would be viable, we must address whether such a deployment is likely. Will the UN go? 

At this point in time, it is highly unlikely that the UN Security Council will authorize a deployment to Afghanistan. The UNSC hasn’t debated the proposal and none of its recent resolutions or statements on the crisis in Afghanistan have mentioned the possibility of deployment. 

At a time where smaller budgets have already led to cuts in UN Peacekeeping missions (such as the end of UNAMID in Sudan), the idea of paying for another large-scale operation seems unlikely to attract much interest on the Security Council. Neither is the idea of deploying to such a politically charged situation. UN peacekeepers have traditionally stayed out of countries (such as Libya and Syria) where there is discord between the Permanent Members. Afghanistan is one such case. While some Permanent Members, such as China, have displayed a willingness to recognize and work with the Taliban other Permanent Members, namely the USA, have displayed far less willingness. 

Even if the Security Council were to authorize a mission to Afghanistan like the ones proposed, a mission would take time to deploy. The UNs rapid reaction force is the Vanguard Brigade units of several member states. It would take 60 days from when the Secretary-General requests deployment to when the first forces would arrive in Afghanistan if the member states consent to deployment. The arrival of additional specialized forces-such as trained observers, helicopter units, and permanent command staff-would take even longer. The Secretary-General can’t begin the 60-day countdown until authorized to do by the Security Council and the long debate and process for such authorization have yet to be considered. 

This means that, should a PKO be deployed, it won’t be effective for several months. By that time the full-scale civil war that proponents hope the PKO could prevent may have already begun. UN Peacekeepers have never worked well as a rapid reaction crisis response force, even though efforts have been made to improve that capability. PKOs work best when they deploy to deadlocked conflict areas with a solid framework for peacebuilding. For example, missions in Namibia, Liberia, and East Timor were all able to bring peace but only after there was an outlined peace agreement. In contrast, there is no such peace agreement between the Taliban and any of its potential opponents (such as ISIS-K). Thus, we must examine the several potential obstacles to mission effectiveness.

Is the Mission Viable? 

Even if the UNSC were to authorize deployment, and even if such a force could deploy in time to make a difference, the entire operation hinges on Taliban consent. While UN PKOs are military units, they are not capable of sustained counterinsurgent or offensive military operations. This is because they are drawn from dozens of different countries, each with its own language, equipment, procedures, and wartime doctrines. It also lacks unity of command or the idea that military units should be subordinate to a single commander because UN Peacekeepers take orders from both their national capitals and the UN Force Commander. Peacekeepers have traditionally overcome this military deficiency by operating with the consent of the (major) parties to the conflict. While Peacekeepers can undertake offensive operations against spoilers (smaller combatants who hope to disrupt the peace process), such as in the DRC, they lack the ability to fight major parties like the Taliban. 

Even ignoring the Taliban, other armed groups in the region would present a significant problem for any UN PKO. ISIS-K, for example, is highly unlikely to cooperate with any form of foreign intervention force. As the Kabul airport bombing tragically showed, ISIS-K has the ability to inflict significant casualties on any such force. Any large number of casualties would imperil the viability of the operation, as troop-contributing countries have been unwilling to contribute troops after taking casualties. The only way the threat of ISIS-K and other spoilers could be minimized is through potential military and intelligence cooperation with the Taliban. 

That means the Taliban must consent to the mission, which they have shown no indication of doing. The Taliban have spent twenty years fighting against a foreign military presence in Afghanistan, it’s unlikely they would consent to another. It also means that the prospective mission would have relatively few ways to reform the Taliban’s human rights abuses

if the Taliban refuse to cooperate. Many of the levers that the UNSC can use to effect Taliban behavior on human rights (such as humanitarian aid, sanctions, and diplomatic recognition) can be effected without the presence of a PKO. Which raises the question: what specific problems in Afghanistan would a PKO address? 

Is the Mission Needed? 

Besides improving the Taliban’s respect for human rights, proponents have identified two other major purposes for a PKO. They are first to Prevent the outbreak of civil war and second to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian aid. At this point in time, it appears that both of these objectives are being met without the presence of a PKO. The last remaining resistance to the Taliban was in the northwestern Panjshir Province, which fell to the Taliban in early September. While the threat of civil war is still looming over Afghanistan, no armed groups have taken advantage of the uncertainty and chaos to directly challenge the Taliban. 

Furthermore, the Taliban have pledged to uphold the safety of humanitarian aid providers on the ground and have requested even more humanitarian aid from the UN. The Taliban realize that they need humanitarian aid to prevent starvation (and thus opposition to their rule) among the Afghan people. Furthermore, they realize that they need Western recognition for their long-term survival, and harming aid workers would complicate that effort. 

Finally, we must consider not just the feasibility of success when considering an action, we must also consider the opportunity cost of undertaking such an action. Under Van Wie’s proposed options, the annual cost of a PKO in Afghanistan would be between $500 million and $2 billion, which would be between 8 to 31% of Peacekeeping’s current $6.47 billion budget. That is a substantial amount of resources either being raised by member states or taken from

other operations. Despite the large amount of money being allocated to peacekeeping, there are still several unmet budgetary requests in current peacekeeping operations. Many large-scale operations, such as the ones in South Sudan, Mali, the Central African Republic, and the DRC, lack the needed personnel to fully fulfill their mandate and lack a sufficient number of high-cost assets. As an April 2020 UN report notes, peacekeeping missions in Mali and the Central African Republic face “critical gaps” in their inventory of helicopters, UAVS, and medical units. These missions have already been established and have already proven capable of effecting meaningful change in their countries of operation. A 2019 Norwegian Institute of International Affairs report, for example, highlights how without the PKO in Mali “the security situation in Mali … would likely deteriorate significantly,” and could accomplish much more if additional capabilities are funded. It would be more prudent to allocate funds and assets to these existing missions instead of an unproven and possibly unnecessary mission in Afghanistan. 

Conclusion 

While the arguments in favor of deploying a UN PKO to Afghanistan have some validity, it would be unwise to deploy to such a mission. UN PKOs are largely effective at certain tasks, such as protecting civilians in active combat zones and implementing peace agreements. The current environment in Afghanistan, however, is not one where UN PKOs thrive. There is no large-scale active conflict to protect civilians in, or a peace agreement to help implement. Furthermore, The UN lacks the rapid reaction ability to prevent the outbreak of a new war, and it lacks either the Taliban consent or military power needed to improve the Taliban’s human rights situation.

It’s unclear if a PKO is even needed to prevent the outbreak of civil war or ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid. As it stands, without a PKO, a civil war has failed to materialize and humanitarian aid deliveries have continued undisrupted. Thus, any mission to Afghanistan would be costly, risky, and with limited upside. In the age of COVID and great power rivalry, the budget for peacekeeping is currently shrinking. Thus, the substantial resources needed for a potential Afghan mission would be better served by further funding other existing PKOs.

How Local Governments Help Afghan Refugees

Anti-immigration sentiment rings loudly throughout the American political scene. However, with a recent influx of refugees from Afghanistan, the United States has to pool together depleted resources in order to help those escaping the Taliban. Citizens of Afghanistan continue to face human rights abuses at the hands of the Taliban, exemplified by a deadly attack on a school in Kabul. Not only are civilians facing this terror, but so are thousands of Afghan citizens who assisted the United States military during the two decades of military occupation.

Immigration is a multilateral issue and pools resources from every level of the government, including local government. Municipal governments play an intricate role in integrating refugees with the communities they arrive in, and their role is often overlooked and under-funded.

What is Happening in Afghanistan?

After 20 years of United States military presence in Afghanistan, the United States pulled almost 60,000 troops out of the country in the summer of 2021. The aftermath left the nation of Afghanistan in shambles and vulnerable to the Taliban. The terrorist organization rapidly gained power, causing thousands to flee the nation. Over 122,000 people have evacuated Afghanistan including Afghan citizens, Afghan interpreters, and United States citizens. Those fleeing Afghanistan qualify for a Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) under U.S. law; however, the process of obtaining a SIV takes 14 steps over the span of months—keeping 65,000 applicants stuck in Afghanistan. The Biden administration is working to expand access to visas through means of work or humanitarian parole to allow more refugees into the United States in as swift a fashion as possible.

Refugee Resettlement in America

Whether an SIV is required, or a refugee is on humanitarian parole, those who come to America are sent to one of seven military bases for health screenings and work authorization. This process can take longer than one week, and as of October 3, 2021, there are 53,000 refugees waiting across the seven military bases. When the initial screenings are completed, refugees are placed with resettlement organizations, which help them obtain housing, utilities, furniture, food, work, and English literacy training. Marisol Girela, the Associate Vice President of social programs at RAICES in San Antonio, Texas, stated that their organization alone has seen a dramatic increase in refugees arriving over the summer. Many resettlement organizations, such as RAICES, work closely with local governments, but federal barriers block effective partnerships.

Federal Barriers to Effective Resettlement

The Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS) sued the Trump administration in November of 2020 over an executive order passed by President Trump. The goal of the executive order was to require municipal governments to obtain approval for refugee resettlement programs on the city, state, and federal level. This order put up more bureaucratic barriers when it comes to refugee resettlement, and HIAS, along with Church World Services and the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Services, sued the administration on the basis of the undue burden that the executive order placed on resettlement agencies who are legally required to obtain formal city and state approval for their work.

The Trump administration’s anti-immigrant ideology strained refugee resettlement organizations, who do crucial work on the local level. Reuters acknowledged that the decrease in immigration caused resettlement groups to downsize, as they operate as nonprofits. With the current increase in refugees from Afghanistan, these groups are too under-funded and under-staffed to provide the best quality assistance to the refugees. They are left scrambling for resources, due to the quick and urgent demand for safety in America. As of September 2021, President Biden’s administration requested funding from Congress to resettle 65,000 Afghan refugees this fall and eventually 95,000 refugees by September 2022. The administration told state governors and refugee resettlement coordinators to prepare themselves for a sharp increase in demand, as refugees are coming to America whether Congress grants the administration funding or not.

Local Government’s Role in Resettling Afghan Refugees

The bulk of refugee resettlement is done at the local level with resettlement organizations. Cities across America such as Rochester, NY,  Buffalo, NY, Cleveland, OH,  Pittsburgh, PA, and Elizabeth, NJ have committed to welcoming refugees and actively push back against anti-immigrant rhetoric. Support for resettlement comes from all levels, from the U.N. to private citizens’ donations, but it is a city or town’s local government that gets into the intricacies of resettlement. Yet, due to aforementioned federal barriers, local authorities are isolated from policymaking on the topic of resettlement, but still placed with the majority of the responsibilities. Additionally, issues that face local governments in the wake of COVID-19 impact refugees particularly hard. Cities are currently struggling with a housing boom which makes finding a larger, family home increasingly difficult. These are the kinds of homes refugee families are in need of. Furthermore, there is a shortage of rental properties in cities across America, and landlords are hesitant to rent to those without credit as they are already losing out due to the economic impacts of COVID-19. Difficulties that municipal governments face are exacerbated when those strained resources are needed to help incoming refugees.

According to the German Marshall Fund of the United States, local governments play an essential role in coordinating medical appointments, English literacy courses, and job training. Community leaders know what resources are needed to effectively resettle in their unique location in terms of cost of living and neighborhood engagement. The federal government’s Afghan Placement and Assistance Program, while effectively expanding refugee assistance, does not take diverse housing costs across America into account which can lead to further fiscal difficulties. By processing a deep understanding of the municipality, local officials and organizations are equipped to know the intricacies of resettlement in their particular community. Additionally, people in a community tend to trust their local leaders, so when their mayor, town supervisor, or city council shows active support for refugees, it puts pressure on federal legislators to do the same by continuing to expand access to America.

Refugee Resettlement in the District of Columbia

Due to the sudden nature of increased violence in Afghanistan, those who flee are coming to America with incomplete documentation, a single bag of possessions, and barely any support system. Dire needs for necessities such as clothing, housing, and food prove the local government’s vital role in directly assisting refugees. The nation’s capital can serve as an example for how local governments aid in refugee resettlement, especially for those coming to America with little to no resources. The D.C. Office of Refugee Resettlement (DCORR) provides “temporary assistance for needy families, medical assistance and screenings, employment services, case management services, English language training, education assistance, and foster care placement.” Children accompanied by parents and unaccompanied children are eligible for the Children’s Health Insurance Program and Refugee Cash Assistance. Aside from gaining access to medical assistance and screenings, refugees settling in the District of Columbia also are eligible to receive health literacy in physical and emotional wellness services through the D.C. Department of Human Services. Refugees that come to the District of Columbia are commonly moved to the city from the military base for refugees in Fort Lee, Virginia and then, through the DCORR, placed with Catholic Charities Refugee Services or Lutheran Immigrant and Refugee Services—who are a part of the aforementioned lawsuit with HIAS. Nonprofits serve as the liaison between both federal and local governments and the refugees themselves, ensuring that the services offered by the city governments make it to the refugees. This can include coordinating housing arrangements, picking up families and individuals from military bases, and assistance with benefit applications for social security and Medicaid. Both Catholic Charities Refugee Services and Lutheran Immigrant and Refugee Services in the District of Columbia provide these services to the refugee community. Their role is important to ensure direct connections are made with the refugees who arrive from Afghanistan.

The Community’s Role

Local governments and nonprofits play a critical role in refugee resettlement, but so do members of the community. In the District of Columbia, local businesses and charities are accepting donations. Items that are in demand include household items, utensils and cookware, furniture, clothes, food, and toiletries. Along with accepting donations, the same organizations are putting out Amazon wish lists for those resettling in America from Afghanistan. Organizations are also coordinating volunteers to help set up refugees with apartments, and rides from the airport. Support for Afghan refugees starts from the top and trickles down to individual volunteers and donors. HIAS has set up resources and instructions to contact federal representatives to advocate for greater support for refugees. 

The increase in refugees coming to America is sudden, but urgent. Those coming from Afghanistan are vulnerable to the Taliban and are relying on American organizations to provide safety and stability. Local governments are not often thought of in this process, but they are immensely important to it. However, years of depleting resources from refugee resettlement at the federal level has trickled down to hit local governments, as they carry the bulk of resettlement responsibilities for vulnerable populations with the least number of resources.

Violence Against Yazidi Women

Since 2014, the Yazidi people have made international headlines and attracted the attention of local activists and heads of state alike as the targets of an ethnic cleansing campaign led by the terrorist organization known as Da’esh, ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), or ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), which will be referred to here as the Islamic State. While horrific violence has been inflicted upon Yazidis as a whole, women, as all too often happens during wartime, have borne the brunt. Victims of sexual violence range from eight-year-old girls to married, pregnant women - those women who are considered too old are killed and buried in mass graves. The UN Human Rights Council’s Commission of Inquiry for Syria found that the Islamic State showed “intent to destroy the Yazidislack, in whole or in part,”, and accordingly characterized the Islamic State’s crimes as acts of genocide. 

But who are the Yazidi people? Little is widely known about them besides their current state of suffering. As much as the Yazidi genocide deserves attention - and indeed, for its magnitude, is not covered nearly enough in the media - failing to recognize, address, discuss, or celebrate Yazidi culture contributes to cultural genocide and the further erasure of the Yazidi people. Instrumental in any genocide or concentrated violence towards one ethnic or religious group is the erasure of their identity; in addition to telling the story of the Yazidi’s suffering, we must tell their whole story. 

The Yazidi people are a religious minority of the Kurdish people, concentrated in Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Iran, and the Caucasus mountains. Depending on the region where the population is located, Yazidi is alternately spelled Azidi, Zedi, Yezidi, Izadi, Ezidi, or Yazdani. Yazidism is more of a religious than an 

ethnic minority - the term “Yazdanism”, under which Yazidism falls, was coined by Dr. Merhad Izady as a blanket term for the pre-Abhrahamic religions of Kurdistan. The Yazidi people originated in northern Iraq, stemming from the last remnants of the Umayyad dynasty. There are records of a Yazidi community in what is now Mosul dating back to the twelfth century. Today, Yazidis number between 200,000 and 1,000,000. These staggeringly low numbers of these ancient people are not the result of the genocide carried out by the Islamic State: Yazidis have a long, bloody history characterized by hatred, persecution, and ethnic cleansing. First viewed as rivals for political power by other Muslims in the fifteenth century, then suffering severe casualties through massacres and conversions alike, many Yazidi people fled to Germany in the late twentieth century to escape the bloodbath that had become the Yazidi experience in their ancestral homeland. In more recent history, Saddam Hussein’s regime carried out a mass displacement of Yazidis around the turn of the century: carrying us to the genocide of today. 

A central tactic that the Islamic State has utilized against the Yazidi people is dehumanization. Victims have reported being sold into sexual slavery, describing being bought and sold the same way people would buy or sell cars. The Islamic state has granted its members permission to “buy, sell, or give as a gift female captives and slaves, for they are merely property, which can be disposed of.” Their treatment of their captives reinforces their position of power over them, often transferring them more than ten times in under sixth months, and heightening their victims’ sense of fear and disorientation. Beyond pure sexual violence, this is particularly classified as genocide as they are stripped of their Yazidi identity - Islamic

State fighters marry them in order to “purify” them. These women are almost always forcefully converted to Islam, and Islamic State leaders “elevate and celebrate each sexual assault as spiritually beneficial, even virtuous”. The Islamic State puts out many of its communications through a publication called Dabiq, and victims have reported that it has been stated in here that if a captured woman is raped by ten different members of the Islamic State, she will become Muslim. As far as lineage goes, it is culturally held by the Islamic State that lineage is passed down through the father which is reiterated in Dabiq, which claims that that “the child of the master [man] has the status of the master”, meaning that if a child is born to a member of the Islamic State and a Yazidi woman, the child will not inherit the Yazidi identity - in this way, a new generation of Yazidis is being prevented from being born. 

The magnitude of atrocities committed against Yazidis by the Islamic State is clear. But under what conditions can they be classified as genocide? The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court established in 1998 four core international crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of agression. As per the ICC, “"genocide" means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 

1. Killing members of the group; 

2. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 

3. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 

4. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 

5. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 

Clearly, each of these acts have been committed against the Yazidi people, specifically, women and girls. In a March 2015 report, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights stated that the perscution of the Yazidi people by the Islamic State qualified as genocide, and almost exactly one year later, the United States House of Representatives voted unanimously that violent actions performed by ISIL against groups such as Yazidis, Christians, and Shia were acts of genocide. Additionally, former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry stated shortly after the House of Representatives vote that the violence initiated by ISIL amounted to genocide. The violence has also been strongly condemned by Islamic scholars and Muslim organizations alike. 

Since the term “genocide” was first coined in 1944 by Polish-Jewish lawyer, it has been regarded as one of, if not the most atrocious crime possible. What, then, has the international response to the Yazidi genocide been? Iraq, where the majority of atrocities have occurred, has proposed a legislative solution. This draft law called for crimes committed against Yazidis, women in particular, to be classified as genocide, establishes a national day of remembrances, and demarcates processes for reparations. This law, however, has stalled several times in negotiations, with questions of who should be included being hotly debated. It has since been amended to include other minority groups suffering persecution by ISIL as well as children born of rape. In accordance with the bill, the Iraqi Ministry of Migration and Displacement has created a relief program for Yazidi female survivors, with a grant allocating roughly 2 million Iraqi dinars (which translates to about $1700 U.S. dollars) to each victim.

The difficulties faced by survivors expands beyond financial and humanitarian. For survivors, a powerful stigma remains. They are often unable to access trauma care, mental health support, or access to justice, either due to stigma or proximity. Nearly all survivors were converted to Islam, raped, or both - making it difficult for them to integrate back into the Yazidi community, regardless of location, as they are now seen as impure. The stigma surrounding survivors escalated until it was necessary for the Head of the Yazidi Supreme Spiritual Council to issue an edict, both welcoming Yazidi women back into their community and acknowledging their suffering at the hands of the Islamic State. However, no such welcome has yet been made for the children conceived out of rape. 

Despite these recognitions and reparations, the international community is certainly not doing as much as it could for the Yazidi people. This opinion is shared by Nadia Murad, a Yazidi peacebuilder, activist, and UN Goodwill Ambassador. Murad launched the Murad Code in partnership with the United Kingdom, which is a protocol for collecting information from survivors on conflict-related sexual violence. Though this was undoubtedly a triumph, Murad has insisted that, considering that thousands of Yazidi women and girls still face sexual violence daily, a larger effort is necessay. Specifically, she has “called for a collaborative grass roots approach with international organizations, the United Nations, and governments working closely with local non-governmental groups to develop contextually specific approaches”, as well as the rebuilding of the Yazidi homeland, Mount Sinjar. 

Ultimately, it is up to both Iraq and the international community to provide better recognition, reparations, and support for the Yazidi community, particularly Yazidi women and girls. One can only hope that apart from simply attempting to repair the horiffic damage done to the Yazidi community, it will be addressed at the root and the Yazidi genocide will be stopped before its final goal is reached.