Twenty thousand mourners congregated to bid a somber farewell to Halit Gecaj, a revered Kosovar Albanian teacher who had been killed by a stray bullet during a fight between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and Serb policemen. Amidst the solemn crowd were a trio of masked figures, shielded by a cloak of enigma. One of the men took a stride forward and addressed the crowd, calling upon his fellow countrymen to resist the “inhuman violence of the Serbian invader” (Mueller 26). It was November 28th, 1997 and the KLA had made its first public appearance (“Background”).
The KLA was instrumental during the Kosovo War, which lasted from February 28th, 1998 to June 11th, 1999, an irredentist conflict fought over control of Kosovo, a province composed of majority ethnic Albanians yet dominated by Serbia under communist rule. Belligerents consisted of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia) versus the ethnic Albanian guerilla groups, the KLA and Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo (FARK), which were joined by NATO in March 1999. A Muslim-majority nation, secular nationalism had superseded religious infiltration in Albanian politics since the 1878 founding of the League of Prizren, a party which coalesced at the cessation of the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish War, opposing the proposed partition of neighboring Balkan states and asserting Albanian independence (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 1 and Gawrych 147). Albanians had never been granted sovereignty until November 28th, 1912, coincidentally the same day as Halit Gecaj’s funeral. Fighting an enduring struggle for independence, Albania, and by extension, Kosovo, boast a history rampant with guerilla movements, yet most of those that existed between 1979 and 2001 enjoyed a brief glory period, then withered away as fast as they emerged. The sheer resilience of the KLA shocked western policymakers who had been monitoring regional trends (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 1). The KLA suffered tremendous losses, yet achieved massive success mobilizing popular support and won the war, alongside NATO. A plethora of factors have contributed to the success of the KLA, which arose out of severe ethnic strife. Thus, this article explores the ethnic conflict that permeated Kosovar society and analyzes the origins and success of the KLA.
Ethnic Conflict in Kosovo
Spirits lifted for Kosovar Albanians in the mid-1960s through the 1970s. Long-time communist president Josip Tito had dismissed anti-Albanian secret police chief Aleksandar Rankovic in 1966, and in 1974 Yugoslavia had adopted a new constitution which granted Kosovo de facto republic status under Serbia, permitting it to “Albanize.” Almost immediately, a backlash erupted: The following years witnessed a mass exodus of Serbs, Turks, Roma, and other ethnic minorities from Kosovo as Albanians gained stride toward equality. Those fleeing complained of discrimination from Albanians, who had always been the majority ethnic group in Kosovo. Kosovar Albanians refuted these claims, suggesting economic despair as the impetus.
Simmering ethnic tensions finally boiled over after 1980 upon Tito’s death, splintering the decentralized political system and abandoning it to the reckless forces of nationalist politics (Woehrel and “Background”). No longer barred by repressive barriers integral to the communist regime, March 11th, 1981 witnessed mass demonstrations led by students in favor of full republic status for Kosovo. Students were joined by thousands of laborers who demanded better living conditions in addition to independence. The standard of living had certainly exacerbated under decaying economic conditions during the 1980s, fueling the strength of the protests and the violence of the retaliation (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 2). Massive crackdowns and incidents of police brutality ensued: Serbian police arrested over 2,000 protestors, between 1,200 and 2,000 of whom received lengthy prison sentences (Walsh and Koktsidis and Ten Dam 2). Officials of Kosovo’s League of Communists, who were blamed for the protests, were fired from their positions, and expelled or convicted. Serbian authorities claim the crackdown resulted in 11 deaths, Albanians assert 1,000 people perished, while Amnesty International suggests the figure is closer to 300. Belgrade’s ruthless response radicalized a portion of Kosovar Albanians, although until the late 1990s most adhered to peaceful resistance against Serbian oppression (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 2, Judah 21 and Walsh).
The trend of brutality soared after Slobodan Milosevic was elected as president of Serbia in 1989. Milosevic weaponized centuries of anti-Albanian sentiment and fabricated tales of Serbian historical linkages to Kosovo in a strategic attempt to rouse public support for the regime’s suppression of independence claims. This rhetoric was prevalent not only in his speeches; Serbian nationalism and anti-Albanian sentiment were deeply embedded in law. In 1990, Serbia adopted a new constitution which revoked the autonomy of both Kosovo and another de facto republic, Vojvodina. 350,000 Kosovar Albanians fled during this time. Police brutality, arbitrary detention, and torture continued within the corrupt penal system, ethnic Albanians the usual target. Police invaded civilian homes lacking a warrant and arrested those merely passing through areas with high rebel activity. Ethnic Albanians were even increasingly fired from their professions (“Background”). Amidst this ethnic turmoil the KLA had been born.
Origins of the KLA
Economic tensions and concerns over living conditions enabled radical political groups to swarm in, casting a tinge of communism to cries for secession. Such groups included the Group of Marxist-Leninists of Kosovo (GMLK), the Movement for the National Liberation of Kosovo (MNLK), the Communist Party Marxist-Leninist of Yugoslavia (PKMLSHJ) and the Movement for the Albanian Republic in Yugoslavia (LRSHJ) (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 2-3). The LRSHJ, for example, was a Maoist organization founded in 1982 by loyalists to Albanian communist dictator Enver Hoxha. They asserted Kosovo could only be freed from Serbian oppression through an armed uprising and longed for a “greater Albania,” comprising Kosovo, western Macedonia, eastern Montenegro, and Albania itself (Judah 21). In 1982, these four communist parties consolidated into one, the Popular Movement for the Republic of Kosovo (LPRK). At a clandestine conference in August 1993, the LPRK renamed itself as the People’s Movement of Kosovo (LPK) and abdicated from its communist stance. Furthermore, it officially declared an army, the KLA (Walsh and Koktsidis and Ten Dam 3). The KLA, however, had debuted its first attack earlier that year in May: In Glogovac, a town in central Kosovo, KLA members murdered two Serbian police officers and wounded an additional five (Hedges 26). In 1996, the KLA began executing coordinated attacks on both Serbian police and civilians, although research suggests an opposing group, the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo (LKCK) to have been responsible for the February 11th, 1996 series of assaults on Croatian Serb refugees (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 2 and “Background”). By the spring of 1998, the group had seized control over roughly 40 percent of Kosovo, forcefully expelling Serbs, resorting to abduction and murder in the process (“Background”). Unlike the LPK, the KLA was never a unified movement that adhered to a single ideology. After the outbreak of war in 1998, its tremendous popularity propelled it to the center stage of the fight, eclipsing the LPK and rival groups. Ultimately, the KLA was a collection of armed formations stringed together by a shared desire for independence. Furthermore, several armed groups were strictly “KLA” in name only.
Researchers have identified six factions of the KLA, the first being the LPK. The second is the LKCK after the outbreak of war in 1998, which merged with the KLA. The third is KLA official Hashim Thaci and his crowd of student activists, the fourth is longtime KLA rival Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK)’s prime minister Bujar Bukoshi and his supporters, the fifth Adem Demaci, often deemed the “Yugoslav Mandela,” who served as the KLA’s spokesman from August 1998 until May 1999, and the sixth the Jashari Clan, who had been massacred by Serbs in 1998 (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 3-4).
Ideological Makeup and Membership
The KLA is unique as a guerilla group for its pervasive ideological divide: it attracted both fascists and communists. Among fascists were those descended from Albanians who served in right-wing militias and the Skanderbeg volunteer division of the SS during World War II. Many also claimed ancestral ties to Albanian right-wing kacak rebels who led revolts against Serb rulers in the 19th and 20th centuries. Among the kacak descendants were the Jasharis (Hedges 26 and Koktsidis and Ten Dam 3). The communists who staffed the KLA were largely Stalinists and loyalists to Hoxha who had been educated at the University of Pristina (Hedges 28). A substantial portion of KLA members had been incarcerated during Tito’s reign for separatist activity (Hedges 26). A collective yearning for independence and adherence to Albanian nationalism sustained the ideologically messy KLA and undoubtedly contributed to its success.
Opposition to Ibrahim Rugova and the LDK
Before the official outbreak of war in 1998, the KLA battled with its opposition: Ibrahim Rugova’s LDK. Former literature professor Rugova presided over the LDK from its founding in 1992 until 2000. Rugova advocated nonviolence and peaceful resistance, citing Serbia’s wins in the Croatian and Bosnian wars as reasons to stray from outright armed uprising (“Background”). Until the late 1990s, the general Kosovar Albanian public gravitated toward the LDK’s pledge to nonviolence (Walsh). Yet a pivotal moment occurred in 1995 that would steer the public in the direction of the KLA’s calls for an armed struggle. In 1995, the 1992-1995 Bosnian War ceased upon the signing of the Dayton Agreement. Conditions of the accords humiliated Kosovar Albanians, whose struggle for independence was omitted entirely. Furthermore, Bosnian Serbs were also handed control of nearly half of Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite being responsible for genocide and Serb-dominated Republika Srpska was granted EU recognition. Feeling betrayed by western powers and disillusioned with peaceful resistance, Kosovar Albanians increasingly mobilized in favor of the KLA (Hedges 31).
The opposition between the LDK and the KLA furiously raged on. The KLA accused Rugova of being a “traitor” while Rugova publicly alluded to Serbian infiltration within the KLA (Chossudovsky 31 and Perritt 15). Both groups operated competing funds, the LDK orchestrating the “Three-Percent Fund” calling on the Albanian diaspora to donate three percent of their income to the Kosovar cause, while the KLA administered the “Homeland Calling Fund” which employed revenue for training and purchase of arms (Perritt 16 and Walsh). During the war, money meant for the LDK was often diverted to the KLA (“Background”).
In the mid-1990s Bukoshi established the LDK’s military wing, FARK, advertised as a better-organized, more professional alternative to the KLA (Perritt 81 and 86). FARK membership consisted of ethnic Albanians who had served Sarajevo during the Bosnian War (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 4). Both groups endured a vicious rivalry, KLA officials referring to FARK as “cowards” and “traitors,” suspecting them to be sympathizers of the Serbian regime (Brown 6). Curiously, FARK soldiers had been spotted donning the KLA insignia (Brown 6). Perhaps this choice was a manifestation of the rivalry, for Serbian-aligned paramilitaries were documented to have sported similar KLA patches in mockery (HRW D1108). On September 21st 1998, the conflict reached a climax when KLA members assassinated FARK official Ahmet Krasniqi (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 4). FARK continued to battle with the KLA until later that year when the KLA absorbed it as the 138th Brigade (Rathfelder).
Ultimately, FARK had been established too late in the conflict to gain an advantage over the KLA’s superior recruiting and funding. The KLA had been preparing for an armed rebellion since its founding in the early 1990s and dutifully manufactured propaganda and recruiting networks. The LDK’s harsh scrutiny toward the KLA led a substantial portion of the public to lose their trust in the LDK (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 5). The public was also ready to embrace an armed struggle after a decade of immense violence inflicted toward them and the overall futility of peaceful resistance.
The Kosovo War of 1998-1999
Kosovo was crawling with Yugoslav army personnel, who numbered 50,000 by February 1998. Between February 28th and March 5th, 1998 units of the Serbian Army assembled in Kosovo’s central Drenica valley and unleashed a maelstrom of destruction under the guise of “anti-terrorism.” On February 22nd, U.S. official Robert Gelbrand branded the KLA as a “terrorist organization,” greenlighting the attacks (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 5 and “Background”). Collectively known as the Drenica Offensive, this series of attacks is considered the beginning of the Kosovo War. Unable to beat the more powerful Serbs, the KLA’s first major offensive attempting to capture Orahovac in July 1998 failed. Serbia rapidly regained control over Kosovo territory, including areas that had once been KLA strongholds (“Background”). Despite suffering brutal losses during the summer, the KLA refined its strategy as the war progressed: In the few areas still dominated by the KLA, police and courts remained functioning. Accounts from the battlefield reveal KLA soldiers were disciplined, obeyed commanders, adhered to strict security procedures for foreign journalists, distributing press passes and regulating entry (“Forces of the Conflict”). Nevertheless, the KLA conducted precarious tactics that jeopardized the safety of civilians. For example, they often directed guerilla attacks against Serbian checkpoints or patrols located not far from villages, heightening the risk of retaliatory assaults on innocent villagers. A theory put forth is that the KLA intended to lure the Serbs into retaliation, in which they would reap the benefits of publicized massacres. In other words, increased publicity generated from civilian death would boost sympathy for the KLA’s cause (“Forces of the Conflict”).
Ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians occurred during the war. Evidence suggests the campaign was tactical in motive, directed toward residents of KLA strongholds (Hedges 25). During the Kosovo War, ethnic cleansing was marked by summary executions, forced relocation, mass killings, false imprisonment, rape, and the systematic destruction of farmland and towns (Kosovo War Crimes doc 1999). By March 11th, 1999 over 400,000 people had been forced to flee Kosovo. Estimates range from 20,000 to 45,600 for the number of rape victims (House Committee, Kosovo’s Wartime Victims). A multitude of firsthand accounts confirm Serbian forces brutalized anyone they suspected of having ties to the KLA. Broken limbs, shattered jaws, and gunshot wounds were among the most commonly reported injuries (“Background”).
The KLA owes much of its success during the latter portion of the war to Western aid, specifically NATO’s involvement. The January 15th, 1999 slaughter of 45 Kosovar Albanians in Racak appalled the West. Thus, the Rambouillet Conference was convened in February, where Milosevic refused to sign a peace treaty that Albania had agreed to. Given Serbia’s unrelenting refusal to concede, NATO launched the air-bombing campaign Operation Allied Force on March 24th, 1999. The war finally concluded on June 11th, 1999 (“Background” and Koktsidis and Ten Dam 6).
Albanian Gun Culture
A profound and enduring affinity for firearms saturates Albanian culture, dispersing into nearby Albanian-dominated Kosovo: By early 1989, Kosovars held permits for 58,612 weapons (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 7). The Kanun, the secular law code integral to Albanian society, stipulates a “blood feud” if one’s honor has been tainted. During a “blood feud” the aggrieved family attempts to kill a male relative of the offending family. Thus, Albanians utilize guns to streamline this process. In post-war Kosovo, many produced guns in the event of a property dispute (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 1-2). Guns and weaponry are vital components of Albanian society and this is one reason why the KLA successfully rose.
The KLA endured through tumultuous times because of the easy access to weapons after neighboring Albania’s catastrophic economic crisis: In 1997, its pyramid scheme economy collapsed. Dissatisfied with ruling President Sali Berisha of the Democratic Party of Albania (DPA), people rioted in the streets, burning down police stations and town halls, looting the weaponries (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 5). Over 100,000 small arms found their way smuggled into Kosovo, where they were sold for prices as low as fifty Deutsche Marks (2 USD in 1997) (“Background”). The economic collapse of Albania fueled the resilience of the KLA, providing the guerilla group with an adequate supply of arms.
Conclusion
The KLA suffered tremendous losses during the 1998-1999 Kosovo War yet managed to maintain its reputation as a formidable force and, with the aid of NATO, ultimately won the war. Their success stemmed from a deeply embedded gun culture in Albania, assistance from NATO and the West, poor capabilities of rival groups, a single unifying demand for independence that cut across political divides, and a significant history of ethnic tensions that invigorated the Kosovar population’s drive for armed conflict.
References
Brown, Justin. “New Guerillas Rival Old Rebels to Kosovo.” The Christian Science Publishing Society. 3 Sept, 1998, p. 6.
Chossudovsky, Michael. “Kosovo ‘Freedom Fighters’ Financed by Organized Crime.” Peace Research 31, no. 2, 1999, pp. 29-42.
Gawrych, George. The Crescent and the Eagle: Ottoman Rule, Islam and the Albanians, 1874-1913. Bloomsbury Academic: London, 2006.
Hedges, Chris. “Kosovo’s Next Masters?” Foreign Affairs 78, no. 3, 1999, pp. 24-42.
Human Rights Watch. “Background” in Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo, 1st. Human Rights Watch, 2001.
Human Rights Watch. “Forces of the Conflict” in Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo, 1st. Human Rights Watch, 2001.
Judah, Tim. “The Growing Pains of the Kosovo Liberation Army” in Kosovo: The Politics of Delusion, 1st. Michael Waller and Kyril Drezov and Bulent Gokay, eds. New York: Routledge, 2001. Pp. 20-24.
Koktsidis, Pavlos-Ioannis and Caspar Ten Dam. “A Success Story? Analyzing Albanian Ethno-Nationalist Extremism in the Balkans.” East European Quarterly 42, no. 2, 2008, pp. 1-20.
“Kosovo: ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ in the Glogovac Municipality.” Human Rights Watch. D1108. 1 July 1999.
Mueller, Jennifer A. “International Norms as Weapons of War: The Kosovo Liberation Army, 1996-1999, A Preliminary Discourse Analysis.” American Political Science Association, 2011.
Perritt, Henry H. The Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2008.
Rathfelder, Erich. Kosovo: Geschichte eines Konflikts. Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2010.
Walsh, Lynn. “The KLA and the Struggle for Kosovar Self-Determination.” Socialism Today 39. June 1999.
Woehrel, Steven. “Kosovo: Historical Background to the Current Conflict.” CRS Report for Congress. CRS Issue Brief 98041. Washington D.C.: GPO, 5, June 1999.