Ukraine: Voting Under Martial Law

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Ukraine’s parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, has voted to keep the country in a state of martial law. The initial decree, issued by Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on February 24, 2022, had dictated that all national and regional authorities must come together to ensure the defense and public safety of all of Ukraine. The Law on the Legal Regime of Martial Law (passed in 2015) regulated temporary restrictions of the constitutional rights and freedoms of both individuals and legal entities. Additionally, all citizens of Ukraine aged 18-60 eligible for military service have been liable to be called to serve, as regulated by general mobilization. For Ukrainian citizens in their daily lives, martial law has meant restricted freedom of movement, banning public demonstrations, stricter ID checks, and an enforceable curfew. Additionally, the government can “use the capacities and workforce resources of public and private enterprises for defense needs,” including controlling public media.

The continued enactment of martial law may complicate Ukrainian elections next year. During the entire course of Russia’s invasion, Ukraine’s head of state has remained the same. President Zelenskyy was elected to serve a five-year term in 2019 and would be up for reelection in March during the 2024 cycle. In early September 2023, while the question of elections being held was still up in the air, President Zelenskyy stated that he was “ready for the elections,” but he stipulated, “I mean, we’re ready if it is necessary” — noting the challenges accompanying a wartime vote. Under martial law, elections are currently suspended, meaning Ukraine would not need to hold presidential elections in 2024. However, until early November, the question remained of whether the elections would occur. In a November 6th address, President Zelenskyy cleared the uncertainty, saying it is “not the right time” for elections in Ukraine. He continued with a message of unity, telling listeners, “We must realize that now is the time of defense, the time of the battle that determines the fate of the state and people, not the time of manipulations.”

Zelenskyy’s message touched on the difficulties of holding elections during wartime. Free and fair elections require a significant effort and devotion of time on the part of the government. For Ukraine to hold an election now would present considerable challenges for the entire country. But what should be prioritized? Even in a time of war, do democratic elections take ultimate precedence? Does holding elections protect individual rights, or does it make the entire country vulnerable? If so, should overall safety supersede personal freedom?

An election during wartime is a familiar concept to many parts of the world. For instance, the 1944 United States presidential elections took place in the throes of WWII. They ran relatively smoothly, with incumbent candidate Franklin Delano Roosevelt securing the victory. However, in 2023 Ukraine faces a vastly different situation than 1944 United States. Consider that WWII was fought primarily on European soil, and the United States was part of an alliance; it was not fighting on home soil by itself like Ukraine. So, while wartime elections are not unprecedented, Ukraine’s situation is relatively novel, which makes it challenging to seek guidance through historical comparisons.

Another complicating factor is that Ukrainians can be conscripted for service at any time. According to martial law, all males between 18 and 60 are considered liable for military service. Although many of those who are eligible for service have volunteered, Ukraine faces a troop shortage, and mobilization is a matter of survival for the country. Mandatory service adds a deeper layer of complication to a situation where elections are not being held. When individuals are called to serve a country but do not have adequate voting representation in that country, it presents serious qualms about the state of democracy. And in these times, a decision must be made – does safety come before freedom?

Understanding the impact elections have during wartime is essential to recognizing how war often prevents the full exercise of democracy. Elections are another measurable loss the people of Ukraine have suffered since Russia’s full-scale invasion. And they make a peaceful resolution of the war all the more necessary.

From Terrorist to NATO Ally: Kosovo Liberation Army

Twenty thousand mourners congregated to bid a somber farewell to Halit Gecaj, a revered Kosovar Albanian teacher who had been killed by a stray bullet during a fight between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and Serb policemen. Amidst the solemn crowd were a trio of masked figures, shielded by a cloak of enigma. One of the men took a stride forward and addressed the crowd, calling upon his fellow countrymen to resist the “inhuman violence of the Serbian invader” (Mueller 26). It was November 28th, 1997 and the KLA had made its first public appearance (“Background”).

The KLA was instrumental during the Kosovo War, which lasted from February 28th, 1998 to June 11th, 1999, an irredentist conflict fought over control of Kosovo, a province composed of majority ethnic Albanians yet dominated by Serbia under communist rule. Belligerents consisted of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia) versus the ethnic Albanian guerilla groups, the KLA and Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo (FARK), which were joined by NATO in March 1999. A Muslim-majority nation, secular nationalism had superseded religious infiltration in Albanian politics since the 1878 founding of the League of Prizren, a party which coalesced at the cessation of the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish War, opposing the proposed partition of neighboring Balkan states and asserting Albanian independence (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 1 and Gawrych 147). Albanians had never been granted sovereignty until November 28th, 1912, coincidentally the same day as Halit Gecaj’s funeral. Fighting an enduring struggle for independence, Albania, and by extension, Kosovo, boast a history rampant with guerilla movements, yet most of those that existed between 1979 and 2001 enjoyed a brief glory period, then withered away as fast as they emerged. The sheer resilience of the KLA shocked western policymakers who had been monitoring regional trends (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 1). The KLA suffered tremendous losses, yet achieved massive success mobilizing popular support and won the war, alongside NATO. A plethora of factors have contributed to the success of the KLA, which arose out of severe ethnic strife. Thus, this article explores the ethnic conflict that permeated Kosovar society and analyzes the origins and success of the KLA.

Ethnic Conflict in Kosovo

Spirits lifted for Kosovar Albanians in the mid-1960s through the 1970s. Long-time communist president Josip Tito had dismissed anti-Albanian secret police chief Aleksandar Rankovic in 1966, and in 1974 Yugoslavia had adopted a new constitution which granted Kosovo de facto republic status under Serbia, permitting it to “Albanize.” Almost immediately, a backlash erupted: The following years witnessed a mass exodus of Serbs, Turks, Roma, and other ethnic minorities from Kosovo as Albanians gained stride toward equality. Those fleeing complained of discrimination from Albanians, who had always been the majority ethnic group in Kosovo. Kosovar Albanians refuted these claims, suggesting economic despair as the impetus. 

Simmering ethnic tensions finally boiled over after 1980 upon Tito’s death, splintering the decentralized political system and abandoning it to the reckless forces of nationalist politics (Woehrel and “Background”). No longer barred by repressive barriers integral to the communist regime, March 11th, 1981 witnessed mass demonstrations led by students in favor of full republic status for Kosovo. Students were joined by thousands of laborers who demanded better living conditions in addition to independence. The standard of living had certainly exacerbated under decaying economic conditions during the 1980s, fueling the strength of the protests and the violence of the retaliation (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 2). Massive crackdowns and incidents of police brutality ensued: Serbian police arrested over 2,000 protestors, between 1,200 and 2,000 of whom received lengthy prison sentences (Walsh and Koktsidis and Ten Dam 2). Officials of Kosovo’s League of Communists, who were blamed for the protests, were fired from their positions, and expelled or convicted. Serbian authorities claim the crackdown resulted in 11 deaths, Albanians assert 1,000 people perished, while Amnesty International suggests the figure is closer to 300. Belgrade’s ruthless response radicalized a portion of Kosovar Albanians, although until the late 1990s most adhered to peaceful resistance against Serbian oppression (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 2, Judah 21 and Walsh).

The trend of brutality soared after Slobodan Milosevic was elected as president of Serbia in 1989. Milosevic weaponized centuries of anti-Albanian sentiment and fabricated tales of Serbian historical linkages to Kosovo in a strategic attempt to rouse public support for the regime’s suppression of independence claims. This rhetoric was prevalent not only in his speeches; Serbian nationalism and anti-Albanian sentiment were deeply embedded in law. In 1990, Serbia adopted a new constitution which revoked the autonomy of both Kosovo and another de facto republic, Vojvodina. 350,000 Kosovar Albanians fled during this time. Police brutality, arbitrary detention, and torture continued within the corrupt penal system, ethnic Albanians the usual target. Police invaded civilian homes lacking a warrant and arrested those merely passing through areas with high rebel activity. Ethnic Albanians were even increasingly fired from their professions (“Background”). Amidst this ethnic turmoil the KLA had been born.

Origins of the KLA

Economic tensions and concerns over living conditions enabled radical political groups to swarm in, casting a tinge of communism to cries for secession. Such groups included the Group of Marxist-Leninists of Kosovo (GMLK), the Movement for the National Liberation of Kosovo (MNLK), the Communist Party Marxist-Leninist of Yugoslavia (PKMLSHJ) and the Movement for the Albanian Republic in Yugoslavia (LRSHJ) (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 2-3). The LRSHJ, for example, was a Maoist organization founded in 1982 by loyalists to Albanian communist dictator Enver Hoxha. They asserted Kosovo could only be freed from Serbian oppression through an armed uprising and longed for a “greater Albania,” comprising Kosovo, western Macedonia, eastern Montenegro, and Albania itself (Judah 21). In 1982, these four communist parties consolidated into one, the Popular Movement for the Republic of Kosovo (LPRK). At a clandestine conference in August 1993, the LPRK renamed itself as the People’s Movement of Kosovo (LPK) and abdicated from its communist stance. Furthermore, it officially declared an army, the KLA (Walsh and Koktsidis and Ten Dam 3). The KLA, however, had debuted its first attack earlier that year in May: In Glogovac, a town in central Kosovo, KLA members murdered two Serbian police officers and wounded an additional five (Hedges 26). In 1996, the KLA began executing coordinated attacks on both Serbian police and civilians, although research suggests an opposing group, the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo (LKCK) to have been responsible for the February 11th, 1996 series of assaults on Croatian Serb refugees (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 2 and “Background”). By the spring of 1998, the group had seized control over roughly 40 percent of Kosovo, forcefully expelling Serbs, resorting to abduction and murder in the process (“Background”). Unlike the LPK, the KLA was never a unified movement that adhered to a single ideology. After the outbreak of war in 1998, its tremendous popularity propelled it to the center stage of the fight, eclipsing the LPK and rival groups. Ultimately, the KLA was a collection of armed formations stringed together by a shared desire for independence. Furthermore, several armed groups were strictly “KLA” in name only. 

Researchers have identified six factions of the KLA, the first being the LPK. The second is the LKCK after the outbreak of war in 1998, which merged with the KLA. The third is KLA official Hashim Thaci and his crowd of student activists, the fourth is longtime KLA rival Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK)’s prime minister Bujar Bukoshi and his supporters, the fifth Adem Demaci, often deemed the “Yugoslav Mandela,” who served as the KLA’s spokesman from August 1998 until May 1999, and the sixth the Jashari Clan, who had been massacred by Serbs in 1998 (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 3-4).

Ideological Makeup and Membership

The KLA is unique as a guerilla group for its pervasive ideological divide: it attracted both fascists and communists. Among fascists were those descended from Albanians who served in right-wing militias and the Skanderbeg volunteer division of the SS during World War II. Many also claimed ancestral ties to Albanian right-wing kacak rebels who led revolts against Serb rulers in the 19th and 20th centuries. Among the kacak descendants were the Jasharis (Hedges 26 and Koktsidis and Ten Dam 3). The communists who staffed the KLA were largely Stalinists and loyalists to Hoxha who had been educated at the University of Pristina (Hedges 28). A substantial portion of KLA members had been incarcerated during Tito’s reign for separatist activity (Hedges 26). A collective yearning for independence and adherence to Albanian nationalism sustained the ideologically messy KLA and undoubtedly contributed to its success.

Opposition to Ibrahim Rugova and the LDK

Before the official outbreak of war in 1998, the KLA battled with its opposition: Ibrahim Rugova’s LDK. Former literature professor Rugova presided over the LDK from its founding in 1992 until 2000. Rugova advocated nonviolence and peaceful resistance, citing Serbia’s wins in the Croatian and Bosnian wars as reasons to stray from outright armed uprising (“Background”). Until the late 1990s, the general Kosovar Albanian public gravitated toward the LDK’s pledge to nonviolence (Walsh). Yet a pivotal moment occurred in 1995 that would steer the public in the direction of the KLA’s calls for an armed struggle. In 1995, the 1992-1995 Bosnian War ceased upon the signing of the Dayton Agreement. Conditions of the accords humiliated Kosovar Albanians, whose struggle for independence was omitted entirely. Furthermore, Bosnian Serbs were also handed control of nearly half of Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite being responsible for genocide and Serb-dominated Republika Srpska was granted EU recognition. Feeling betrayed by western powers and disillusioned with peaceful resistance, Kosovar Albanians increasingly mobilized in favor of the KLA (Hedges 31). 

The opposition between the LDK and the KLA furiously raged on. The KLA accused Rugova of being a “traitor” while Rugova publicly alluded to Serbian infiltration within the KLA (Chossudovsky 31 and Perritt 15). Both groups operated competing funds, the LDK orchestrating the “Three-Percent Fund” calling on the Albanian diaspora to donate three percent of their income to the Kosovar cause, while the KLA administered the “Homeland Calling Fund” which employed revenue for training and purchase of arms (Perritt 16 and Walsh). During the war, money meant for the LDK was often diverted to the KLA (“Background”).

In the mid-1990s Bukoshi established the LDK’s military wing, FARK, advertised as a better-organized, more professional alternative to the KLA (Perritt 81 and 86). FARK membership consisted of ethnic Albanians who had served Sarajevo during the Bosnian War (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 4). Both groups endured a vicious rivalry, KLA officials referring to FARK as “cowards” and “traitors,” suspecting them to be sympathizers of the Serbian regime (Brown 6). Curiously, FARK soldiers had been spotted donning the KLA insignia (Brown 6). Perhaps this choice was a manifestation of the rivalry, for Serbian-aligned paramilitaries were documented to have sported similar KLA patches in mockery (HRW D1108). On September 21st 1998, the conflict reached a climax when KLA members assassinated FARK official Ahmet Krasniqi (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 4). FARK continued to battle with the KLA until later that year when the KLA absorbed it as the 138th Brigade (Rathfelder).

Ultimately, FARK had been established too late in the conflict to gain an advantage over the KLA’s superior recruiting and funding. The KLA had been preparing for an armed rebellion since its founding in the early 1990s and dutifully manufactured propaganda and recruiting networks. The LDK’s harsh scrutiny toward the KLA led a substantial portion of the public to lose their trust in the LDK (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 5). The public was also ready to embrace an armed struggle after a decade of immense violence inflicted toward them and the overall futility of peaceful resistance. 

The Kosovo War of 1998-1999

Kosovo was crawling with Yugoslav army personnel, who numbered 50,000 by February 1998. Between February 28th and March 5th, 1998 units of the Serbian Army assembled in Kosovo’s central Drenica valley and unleashed a maelstrom of destruction under the guise of “anti-terrorism.” On February 22nd, U.S. official Robert Gelbrand branded the KLA as a “terrorist organization,” greenlighting the attacks (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 5 and “Background”). Collectively known as the Drenica Offensive, this series of attacks is considered the beginning of the Kosovo War. Unable to beat the more powerful Serbs, the KLA’s first major offensive attempting to capture Orahovac in July 1998 failed. Serbia rapidly regained control over Kosovo territory, including areas that had once been KLA strongholds (“Background”). Despite suffering brutal losses during the summer, the KLA refined its strategy as the war progressed: In the few areas still dominated by the KLA, police and courts remained functioning. Accounts from the battlefield reveal KLA soldiers were disciplined, obeyed commanders, adhered to strict security procedures for foreign journalists, distributing press passes and regulating entry (“Forces of the Conflict”). Nevertheless, the KLA conducted precarious tactics that jeopardized the safety of civilians. For example, they often directed guerilla attacks against Serbian checkpoints or patrols located not far from villages, heightening the risk of retaliatory assaults on innocent villagers. A theory put forth is that the KLA intended to lure the Serbs into retaliation, in which they would reap the benefits of publicized massacres. In other words, increased publicity generated from civilian death would boost sympathy for the KLA’s cause (“Forces of the Conflict”).

Ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians occurred during the war. Evidence suggests the campaign was tactical in motive, directed toward residents of KLA strongholds (Hedges 25). During the Kosovo War, ethnic cleansing was marked by summary executions, forced relocation, mass killings, false imprisonment, rape, and the systematic destruction of farmland and towns (Kosovo War Crimes doc 1999). By March 11th, 1999 over 400,000 people had been forced to flee Kosovo. Estimates range from 20,000 to 45,600 for the number of rape victims (House Committee, Kosovo’s Wartime Victims). A multitude of firsthand accounts confirm Serbian forces brutalized anyone they suspected of having ties to the KLA. Broken limbs, shattered jaws, and gunshot wounds were among the most commonly reported injuries (“Background”). 

The KLA owes much of its success during the latter portion of the war to Western aid, specifically NATO’s involvement. The January 15th, 1999 slaughter of 45 Kosovar Albanians in Racak appalled the West. Thus, the Rambouillet Conference was convened in February, where Milosevic refused to sign a peace treaty that Albania had agreed to. Given Serbia’s unrelenting refusal to concede, NATO launched the air-bombing campaign Operation Allied Force on March 24th, 1999. The war finally concluded on June 11th, 1999 (“Background” and Koktsidis and Ten Dam 6).

Albanian Gun Culture

A profound and enduring affinity for firearms saturates Albanian culture, dispersing into nearby Albanian-dominated Kosovo: By early 1989, Kosovars held permits for 58,612 weapons (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 7). The Kanun, the secular law code integral to Albanian society, stipulates a “blood feud” if one’s honor has been tainted. During a “blood feud” the aggrieved family attempts to kill a male relative of the offending family. Thus, Albanians utilize guns to streamline this process. In post-war Kosovo, many produced guns in the event of a property dispute (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 1-2). Guns and weaponry are vital components of Albanian society and this is one reason why the KLA successfully rose.

The KLA endured through tumultuous times because of the easy access to weapons after neighboring Albania’s catastrophic economic crisis: In 1997, its pyramid scheme economy collapsed. Dissatisfied with ruling President Sali Berisha of the Democratic Party of Albania (DPA), people rioted in the streets, burning down police stations and town halls, looting the weaponries (Koktsidis and Ten Dam 5). Over 100,000 small arms found their way smuggled into Kosovo, where they were sold for prices as low as fifty Deutsche Marks (2 USD in 1997) (“Background”). The economic collapse of Albania fueled the resilience of the KLA, providing the guerilla group with an adequate supply of arms.

Conclusion

The KLA suffered tremendous losses during the 1998-1999 Kosovo War yet managed to maintain its reputation as a formidable force and, with the aid of NATO, ultimately won the war. Their success stemmed from a deeply embedded gun culture in Albania, assistance from NATO and the West, poor capabilities of rival groups, a single unifying demand for independence that cut across political divides, and a significant history of ethnic tensions that invigorated the Kosovar population’s drive for armed conflict.

References

Brown, Justin. “New Guerillas Rival Old Rebels to Kosovo.” The Christian Science Publishing Society. 3 Sept, 1998, p. 6.

Chossudovsky, Michael. “Kosovo ‘Freedom Fighters’ Financed by Organized Crime.” Peace Research 31, no. 2, 1999, pp. 29-42.

Gawrych, George. The Crescent and the Eagle: Ottoman Rule, Islam and the Albanians, 1874-1913. Bloomsbury Academic: London, 2006.

Hedges, Chris. “Kosovo’s Next Masters?” Foreign Affairs 78, no. 3, 1999, pp. 24-42.

Human Rights Watch. “Background” in Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo, 1st. Human Rights Watch, 2001.

Human Rights Watch. “Forces of the Conflict” in Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo, 1st. Human Rights Watch, 2001.

Judah, Tim. “The Growing Pains of the Kosovo Liberation Army” in Kosovo: The Politics of Delusion, 1st. Michael Waller and Kyril Drezov and Bulent Gokay, eds. New York: Routledge, 2001. Pp. 20-24.

Koktsidis, Pavlos-Ioannis and Caspar Ten Dam. “A Success Story? Analyzing Albanian Ethno-Nationalist Extremism in the Balkans.” East European Quarterly 42, no. 2, 2008, pp. 1-20.

“Kosovo: ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ in the Glogovac Municipality.” Human Rights Watch. D1108. 1 July 1999.

Mueller, Jennifer A. “International Norms as Weapons of War: The Kosovo Liberation Army, 1996-1999, A Preliminary Discourse Analysis.” American Political Science Association, 2011.

Perritt, Henry H. The Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2008.

Rathfelder, Erich. Kosovo: Geschichte eines Konflikts. Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2010.

Walsh, Lynn. “The KLA and the Struggle for Kosovar Self-Determination.” Socialism Today 39. June 1999.

Woehrel, Steven. “Kosovo: Historical Background to the Current Conflict.” CRS Report for Congress. CRS Issue Brief 98041. Washington D.C.: GPO, 5, June 1999.

Schrodinger’s Breakaway Region: Russia and the Issue of Transnistria

euronews.com

Since February 2022, the existence of “breakaway” or separatist regions in Eastern Europe have skyrocketed into mainstream news and political analysis. A full year into the Russian-Ukrainian war has heightened the discussion of what could come post-war for separatist regions and the consequences of those outcomes. This also has implications for the separatist region of Transnistria, located in Ukraine’s neighboring country of Moldova. While recognized only by Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and the Republic of Artsakh, Transnistria, or the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, has operated as a quasi-state since the government of Moldova designated it as an autonomous territorial unit in 2005. It is crucial to remember that the day when the existence of Transnistria is questioned is imminent. It is not whether this question will be raised, but more so when Transnistria’s existence will be questioned, how it will be questioned, and whether there is an answer to the “problem of Transnistria.” 

Before delving into these questions, it must be explained why Transnistria is a “problem.” From a Western perspective, Transnistria is occupied territory. With the war in Ukraine raging, more conversations are being had about the status of separatist regions with a Russian military presence. Increasingly, these areas are being looked at as regions that must be liberated from Russian militarization. In the words of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, “we believe that the territory of Transnistria is the territory of the independent state of Moldova, and they [Russians] are constantly making provocations.” The outcome of the war in Ukraine will have ripple effects globally. As such, from a western democratic perspective, the existence of Transnistria is a problem that will eventually need to be resolved. 

In early 2023, it seemed the day of reckoning for Transnistria was on the horizon. On February 9th, President Zelenskyy announced that Ukrainian intelligence had discovered a Russian plot to “destroy” Moldova. Moldova, like Ukraine, has continued to drift further away from Moscow’s sphere of influence after the election of President Maia Sandu in 2020. Since her election, Sandu has been vocal in her belief that Russia should withdraw its military personnel from Transnistria. Early in her presidency, Sandu stated that it was her opinion that there was foreign interference during the dissolution of the Soviet Union which created the Transnistrian conflict to hinder Moldova’s strides towards independence. There has been a Russian military presence in Transnistria since 1992, when the cease-fire agreement between Moldova and Transnistria established the presence of troops as “peacekeepers.” As of today, Transnistria houses approximately 1,500 Russian armed forces personnel, seven Mi-24 attack helicopters, and around 100 armored vehicles. While these numbers may not call for immediate alarm, the presence of Russian military, and the memory of the Transnistrian war in the early 90’s, has been a looming presence since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Zelenskyy’s announcement of Russia’s plans for Moldova stoked pre-existing concerns over whether Moldova is the next country to be invaded.  

As one of the Eastern Bloc’s “frozen” conflicts, Transnistria has remained in stasis since the end of the Transnistrian War in 1992. The region itself is often referred to as a relic of the Soviet Union, complete with a statue of Lenin in front of its parliament building. As a result, Transnistria can be viewed as one of the few remaining areas that is deeply entrenched in the Soviet sphere of influence. Over the years, as tensions and annexations in Eastern Europe have ebbed and flowed, so have concerns over conflict flaring in Transnistria. None of these concerns have resulted in tangible conflicts, but with the war in Ukraine seriously upending the status-quo, there seems a real possibility that Russia may jolt Transnistria out of its liminal state and into conflict.  

Skeptics of this argument would claim that Russia will not want to risk angering the West further by instigating violence in a second country. However, one must look back to February 2022 and realize that Russia fully intended to drag Moldova into its invasion of Ukraine. In late January of 2022, it was reported that Russia intended to pursue a false-flag operation in Eastern Ukraine, supposedly to justify what was at the time, a hypothetical invasion. If this plan had worked, it is not unfounded to say that Russian troops could have moved into Ukraine through Transnistria. American officials even went so far as to say that this operation could occur in Transnistria as well as in place of Eastern Ukraine. In March 2022, a photo showed Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko in front of a war map wherein there appeared to be Russian troop movement into Transnistria from Odessa. So far, none of these scares have resulted in troop movement or violence in Transnistria- potentially because Russia has yet to formulate a feasible excuse to do so. While the Russian invasion of Ukraine is in flagrant violation of international law; Russia has stuck with its claims of “denazifying Ukraine” and “protecting the Russian minority” in Ukraine while also preventing Western encroachment via NATO expansion.   

In early 2023, news coming from Russia and Moldova told a story of a frozen conflict thawing out at a concerning rate. After President Zelenskyy’s announcement on February 9th, Russia moved quickly to deny these claims. However, these claims were soon corroborated by President Sandu who announced that Russia’s plans were to use foreign saboteurs to attack government buildings in Chisinau with the goal of creating violence and havoc in the city. Externally, Russia has started to increase the severity of the narrative involving Transnistria. On February 23rd, Russia stated that Ukraine intended to launch an invasion into Transnistria as retaliation for an “alleged” offensive by Russian troops from the territory of Transnistria.” The Russian Defense Ministry alleged that Ukraine was “amassing troops” along Ukraine’s border with Moldova and that this provocation posed a “direct threat to the Russian peacekeeping contingent legally deployed in Transnistria,” which Russia would protect if necessary. 

This builds to answer the question of how the existence of Transnistria may be reckoned with. Despite Russia’s leaked plans and thinly veiled threats, as of April 2023, it seems unlikely that Russia has the military capacity or wherewithal to successfully invade Transnistria and/or Moldova. As reported by The Economist in March 2023, Russia has had an estimated 60,000-70,000 fatalities in Ukraine since the start of the invasion in February 2022. Adding the additional soldiers who were wounded or missing brings the total losses to an estimated 200,000-250,000. For perspective, in the early days of the war, it was estimated that approximately 150,000 Russian troops had entered Ukraine. This would mean that approximately a year after the initial invasion, Russia has lost 100% of its initial troops plus anywhere from 50,000-100,000 more. The rate at which Russia is losing troops is also incredibly high; American General Mark Milley said in an interview, that an estimated 1,200 Russian soldiers were killed in a single day around the area of Bakhmut. Russia has also suffered heavy artillery losses, having lost 1,000 tanks with another 544 tanks captured by Ukrainian forces. These losses have accumulated to roughly 30% of Russia’s tank force. Oryx, an open-source monitoring website, calculates total Russian equipment losses at 9,100, while Ukraine’s total losses are estimated to be 2,934.  

It could be argued that Moldova does not have the military strength to fend off a potential Russian invasion regardless of Russia’s troop losses. Moldovan Armed Forces only consists of approximately 6,500 personnel with an additional 2,000 yearly conscripts. They also face a modernization issue. In October 2022, Moldovan Defense Minister Anatolie Nosatii said that roughly 90% of Moldova’s military equipment is of Soviet origin, ranging as far back as the 1960’s. However, it would be counter-productive for Russia to send forces to Transnistria when they are facing such significant troop and artillery loss in Ukraine.  Doing so would only further strain Russia’s army, diverting it away from Ukraine, and further Western involvement in the conflict.  

Now, why must the issue of Transnistria be dealt with? Most simply put- Moldova’s current westward trajectory is fundamentally incompatible with the existence of a Russian-occupied Soviet state.  

From the Russian perspective, there is Russia’s russkiy mir and sphere of influence ambitions. Russkiy mir or translated “Russian world” refers to a policy and cultural belief that all Russian speakers globally are part of Russian civilization and therefore must be protected against “persecution.” Unlike Ukraine, which has contended with conflicting claims over Kyivan Rus, Moldova has almost always been considerably distinct from Russia. The Principality of Moldavia was formed in 1346 and existed until 1859 when it formed with Wallachia, the geographical area of modern Romania. Today, the western section of Moldavia is part of Romania, and a portion of the eastern section is now Moldova. The Russian Empire did hold Bessarabia, a section of Moldavian territory in 1812, however it was ceded back in 1856. The native population spoke Romanian, although it was banned in 1836 as part of forced Russification. Stalin also mandated Moldovans to write Romanian in Cyrillic, a process which continued to drive a wedge between Moldova and its cultural ties to its western neighbor. As per the Moldovan 2014 census, (excluding Transnistria,) 4.1% of the population identified as Russian. In Transnistria, 29.1% identified as Russian. In the same census, 90.1% of Moldovans who reported to be religious self-identified as Eastern Orthodox; another key component of russkiy mir. With a respectable Russian minority and a majority Orthodox faith, Moldova, and more specifically Transnistria, have all the makings of a state to be incorporated into the “Russian World” that Putin so desires.  

With NATO expansion also being a key player in the Russo-Ukrainian conversation, it can argued that Russia is looking to prevent NATO expansion, and Western influence further eastward. As of 2022, Russia is surrounded by NATO on its western side. Despite Moldova being considerably smaller than Belarus or Ukraine, the “loss” of it to either NATO or the European Union would be antithetical to Russia’s desire to maintain and even expand its sphere of influence. Russkiy mir is even enshrined in Russia’s national security policies. The National Security Strategy outlines the perceived threat to russkiy mir as “the erosion of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values and the weakening of the unity of the Russian Federation’s multinational people by means of external cultural and information expansion (including the spread of poor-quality mass cultural products), propaganda of permissiveness and violence.”  Although the population of Transnistria is only 475, 373, it remains of symbolic importance to the Kremlin’s ideas of preserving Russian culture and influence.  

From the Moldovan perspective, the shift westward has already begun. The beginning of this change could be felt when Maia Sandu was first elected in 2020. Running on a pro-Western campaign, she won with 57.7% of the vote against Igor Dodon, who was backed by Russia. This was further reinforced with parliamentary election results in 2021. Sandu’s Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) won 63 of 101 seats in Parliament with 58% of the vote. The Party of Action and Solidarity is pro-European, and prior to the invasion of Ukraine had the long-term goal of Moldova’s accession to the European Union. The success of the PAS in the parliamentary elections was broadly considered to be detrimental to Russia’s influence in Moldova.  

The invasion of Ukraine has expedited Moldova’s political movement westward. In March, the Moldovan Parliament passed a bill which formally restored Moldova’s national language to Romanian. Although 80% of Moldovans speak Romanian as their native tongue, the official language of Moldova was legally “Moldovan” which remained until March 2023 as a cultural relic of Stalinism. While the linguistic differences between Romanian and Moldovan are negligible, the change in policy represents a substantial distancing of Moldova and its ties to Russia. Other significant policy maneuvers include submitting Moldova’s official application for European Union candidacy in the early days of the Russo-Ukrainian war. As of April, the European Union agreed to accelerate European Union-Moldovan entrance negotiations to take place before the end of 2023. 

While Sandu is facing falling approval rates because of high inflation and multiple energy crises; general approval of Moldova joining the European Union remains steady among the Moldovan population. The International Republican Institute’s Center for Insights in Survey Research reported that in November of 2022, 36% of Moldovans were reported to “strongly support” Moldova joining the European Union, and 27% “somewhat supported” this motion. In the municipality of Chisinau, 42% of respondents strongly supported accession, and 37% somewhat supported it. The study also showed that Moldovans believe the European Union is Moldova’s strongest political partner, with Romania placing second and Russia third. In 2019, The European Union and Russia were tied in the IRI’s data on top political partner to Moldova. In 2018, Russia placed higher than the European Union. While Russia remains of political importance in the eyes of Moldova, it clearly has been losing primacy to Moldova’s Western neighbors.  

However, the question of whether or not the issue of Transnistria can actually be solved remains.  

In October 2017 (the last year that the IRI asked about Transnistria in annual polling,) 70% of Moldovan respondents said that Transnistria should be a regular region in Moldova, without autonomous designation. This is the largest percentage since 2010, with numbers dipping as low as 48% in March 2016. This would indicate that Moldova would like to see Transnistria be reintegrated into Moldova. But what about Transnistria? Unsurprisingly, Transnistria has remained politically inclined towards Russia since its inception. Russia originally backed Transnistria during the civil war and has continuously provided economic support, despite not formally recognizing Transnistria’s statehood. After the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, Transnistrian officials appealed to the Duma to consider accepting Transnistria into the Russian Federation. Political scientist Antoly Durin, who himself is from Transnistria, said of public opinion, “people here feel Russian. Not just as a nationality, but as a people who love Russia and want to be part of a Russian civilization.”  So, while Moldova, (as an entity separate from Transnistria,) does not wish to be part of the Russian world/russkiy mir, Transnistria regards itself as intrinsically Russian.  

This creates a scenario wherein the existence of Transnistria diametrically opposes Moldova. This opposition, combined with the economic and militaristic realities of Moldova, Transnistria and Russia means that despite all the posturing and polling numbers, Transnistria may very well remain frozen for the foreseeable future. There are multiple hypotheticals about what could happen, all under different sets of circumstances.  

The scenario wherein Transnistria agrees in diplomatic negotiations to be reabsorbed into Moldova is currently too unlikely to be discussed here.  

A second possibility is another civil war. Moldova could attempt to use military might to forcibly reunite Transnistria with Moldova. This scenario also seems unlikely. Any military action taken by Moldova that is “unprovoked” would greatly jeopardize Moldova’s foray into the Western European community. There has also been no rhetoric from the Moldovan government that would indicate a desire to utilize military action. In fact, the rhetoric has been the opposite, with Maia Sandu reaffirming her commitment to diplomatic resolution throughout her presidency. With Moldova facing a cost-of-living crisis, and increasing concerns over inflation, avoidable conflict would be highly unpopular. Additionally, Neither Moldova nor Transnistria have the military capacity to engage in unnecessary conflict. If there was conflict between them, Russia would likely get involved to support Transnistria. However, Russian involvement in a conflict would divert resources and attention away from Ukraine, which is of higher importance to Russia.  

The third scenario is that an economic collapse in Russia and/or Transnistria would force the dissolution or reintegration of Transnistria and Moldova. Transnistria has a semi-independent economy; however, it remains reliant on Russian support. As with other quasi-states, Russia acts as a “patron” of Transnistria and subsidizes a large portion of the Transnistrian economy. This allows Transnistria’s continued existence despite their lack of international recognition. In February of 2023, a leaked contract between Russian company Gazprom and Moldovan company Moldovagaz unveiled that Transnistria owes roughly 7 billion dollars in gas bills. Russia has continued to supply Transnistria with gas, even though (as of 2019,) Transnistria had not paid for gas since 2009. In Moldova, it costs approximately $1,000 per thousand cubic meters of gas. In Transnistria, the same amount of gas is estimated to cost around $168. Russia also provides millions annually to Transnistria in humanitarian support, which keeps the economy afloat. In the event of a Russian economic collapse, the Transnistrian economy theoretically could collapse as well. If Russia forces Transnistria to repay their gas debt, or can no longer subsidize the Transnistrian economy, the Transnistrian economy could give way. An economic collapse could force Transnistria to reintegrate into Moldova.  

However, a Russian economic collapse does not seem to be predicted any time soon. When Russia initially invaded Ukraine, it was predicted that the economy would contract by 10%. A contraction of 10% would have effectively crippled the Russian economy and potentially had rebound effects on the Transnistrian economy. However, heavy western sanctions have only been marginally successful in stifling the Russian economy. In the first 2023 fiscal quarter, the Russian economy contracted by 2.2%. Organizations like the International Monetary Fund are projecting that the Russian economy will recover in the coming year as a result of military production and mass amounts of state spending.  

So, what does all of this theorizing accumulate to?  

For better or worse, it seems that the situation is too tumultuous to make a long-term prediction. What can be said is that given the paradoxical nature of its existence, Transnistria will be stuck in its interjacent state until it is galvanized by external circumstances. As a quasi-state, it has not made any recent moves to change its status. Despite saying that they wish to join the Russian Federation, Transnistria has not properly attempted to join, nor provided military support to Russia.

In all, the answers to the question of Transnistria can only be found in due time. There is not a singular clear path for the future of Russia, Moldova, or Transnistria. Time will tell how the domino effect of events in Ukraine will play a role in the future of its neighbors. What can be said is that the global community must continue to monitor the situation in Transnistria. One day Transnistria will be called out of its intangible state, and when it is we must all watch with a critical eye. 

The Most Violent Police Force in Europe: Police Brutality in France

theguardian.com

“Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité.” This phrase, meaning “Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity,” first appeared during the French Revolution of 1848 and has since become entrenched in the history of France. It is part of their current constitution and is considered to be a central piece of French heritage; however, France has yet to successfully live up to this promise, due in part to deeply entrenched institutional racism. One dangerous manifestation of this racism is in the country’s policing. French police officers are more heavily armed than any other police force in Europe and, in recent years, they have also been the most aggressive. Since 2022, French police officers have killed 15 people during traffic stops. Most recently, on June 27, 2023, a 17-year-old boy named Nahel Merzouk was shot in the chest at point-blank range by a French police officer during a traffic stop in Paris. The police officers claimed that Merzouk (who is of Algerian descent) had been physically threatening them with his car; however, witness statements and video footage told a different story. According to passengers in the car at the time of the shooting, the two police officers pulled up on motorcycles next to their car in stand-still traffic after Merzouk, who was too young to have a license, failed to stop for them. One passenger claimed that the officers took turns hitting Merzouk with the butt-ends of their rifles while they threatened to shoot him. On the third hit, the witness recounted that Merzouk let go of the brake pedal, causing the car to restart. It was at this moment that one of the officers fatally shot the teenager, causing the car to continue to accelerate until it crashed. Merzouk was pronounced dead at the scene. Merzouk’s mother believes the shooting was racially motivated, having said the officer “saw an Arab face, a little kid, and wanted to take his life.” The murder of Merzouk sparked nation-wide protests against racially-motivated police brutality. President Macron responded to the protests by employing heavy police presences, which resulted in the arrests of over 3,600 people. Still, Macron was quick to condemn the murder of Merzouk and one of the police officers involved in Merzouk’s death has been charged with voluntary homicide. However, proponents of racial justice movements in France point out that this incident is part of a larger pattern of excessive use of force by police officers in which police officers are rarely charged.

Police brutality in France has been a heated topic of discussion for years. It first became a major political issue after the gilets jaunes (meaning “yellow vests” in English) protests in 2018 and 2019, in which French workers with long commutes took to the streets in yellow vests to protest against the proposed rise in diesel taxes. The movement slowly transformed into a larger movement against President Macron’s general economic decisions, and, at its peak, 285,000 people were protesting across France. During these protests, around 2,500 protesters were injured (some losing eyes and limbs) in violent encounters with police. While this led to a smaller movement calling for a ban on police use of explosive grenades and rubber bullets, government representatives argued that this use of force was necessary because, while the overwhelming majority of protesters were peaceful, some did turn to acts of vandalism and violence. In fact, the French Ministry of the Interior reported that around 1,800 security personnel were injured in the protests. In response, Lauren Nuñez, Secretary of State to the Minister of the Interior from 2018 to 2020, expressed that he had no regrets about the use of force against protesters and stated that “Just because a hand has been torn off or an eye damaged doesn’t mean that this [response] is illegal. Above all, it’s important to make it clear that it’s not acceptable for police officers to be attacked in a violent manner by those wishing to express their convictions.” The general argument made by those supporting the police is that police officers are using an appropriate amount of force because some of the protests have turned into riots with significant property damage. They argue that police officers must use teargas and other weapons to protect themselves and to quell the riots in order to protect French society.

While some excuse the violence perpetrated by French police in response to the gilets jaunes protests as a necessary evil, others like Dunja Mijatovic, the human rights commissioner for the Council of Europe (an international human rights organization), have argued that police brutality is never acceptable. In response to police violence committed during anti-pension reform protests in March of 2023, Mijatovic stated “violent incidents have occurred, some of which have targeted the forces of law and order. But sporadic acts of violence by some demonstrators or other reprehensible acts committed by others during a protest cannot justify excessive use of force by agents of the state.” French police forces have demonstrated a pattern of increasingly violent behavior, especially in regards to their handling of protests and demonstrations. From March through May of 2023, French police forces were criticized for their excessive use of force against protesters during the anti-pension reform demonstrations as some felt that the heavy police presence at the protests escalated the potential for violence. On March 25, 2023, police officers engaged in another polarizing, violent confrontation with protesters during a separate demonstration in Sainte-Soline over environmental concerns. During this confrontation, police officers launched tear-gas grenades at protesters, injuring 200 demonstrators and sending one demonstrator into a coma with life-threatening injuries. Similarly to the anti-pension reform protesters, protesters at Sainte-Soline blamed the police presence for the violence that erupted. An engineering student (referred to as David) who was present at the protests said, “This is the first time I have attended a demonstration that was this violent, but, in fact, the violence did not come from the protestors. It was violent because the police were violent.” Human rights organizations have increasingly raised alarms over police violence in France as they use aggressive crowd control tactics even against peaceful protesters. French police forces have been criticized for using weapons that are often banned elsewhere, including flashballs, grenades, water cannons, batons, and firearms. These weapons exacerbate the risk of injury at the hands of an overzealous, potentially aggressive police force.

While police forces in France have been criticized for racial biases in their application of force, this violence does not exist in a vacuum. It is heavily influenced by the larger social dynamics and stigmas present in French society, which include racial and religious biases against minority groups. In a study presented to the French national assembly by the Representative Council of France's Black Associations, 9 in 10 Black people in France reported experiencing racial discrimination. This racial prejudice manifests in a variety of ways, including in the country’s policing practices. The Défenseur des droits, an independent constitutional authority in France, found in a 2017 study that a young man who is perceived to be Black or Arab is 20 times more likely to be stopped than other members of the French population. However, these French racial biases do not only manifest in policing policies. For example, recent public discourse has revolved heavily around discriminatory educational practices. France has strict laws banning religious symbols in public schools. The French government justifies these laws by arguing that they are necessary to promote secularism; however, they have a disparate impact on Muslim students and are often said to be targeted to restrict the wearing of hijabs and other articles of clothing associated with Muslim students. Most recently, in August of 2023, the Minister of Education Gabriel Attal announced that students will no longer be allowed to wear abayas in schools. Abayas are long, loose traditional dresses worn primarily in North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. This decision caused outrage since there is no direct link between abayas and Islam, so these dresses could be considered a cultural item rather than a religious one. France has attempted to guard against racial biases by creating laws without explicit mention of people's race; however, this does not prevent laws from disproportionately impacting minority communities. The French police can provide information on how many people have been killed by police officers; however, they cannot provide information on the race of those victims because it is illegal to collect that information in France. The French government’s attempts to create color-blind laws ignores the realities of life in France for minorities. It exacerbates the problem of racial injustice because it strips the oppressed of the ability to quantify their oppression as a weapon to combat it.

Still, some are working to combat racial prejudice in policing. In 2021, six French and international human rights groups, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Open Society Justice initiative, filed the first class-action lawsuit against French police forces in which the plaintiffs are asking for mandatory police reform. This lawsuit, heard by the Conseil d’État (the highest administrative authority in France), began proceedings on September 29, 2023. The plaintiffs argued that there is significant, systemic discrimination in police action, including racial profiling and discriminatory identity checks. On October 11, 2023, the court found that police activities surrounding racial profiling in identity checks did constitute discrimination and were not “limited to isolated cases”. However, the court did not impose measures to force the French government to end these discriminatory practices because the court said it did not have the authority to change political policy. While this decision was disappointing to proponents of this case, the court did recognize the repeated abuses of identity checks in policing as racial discrimination. This is significant because some political leaders have historically denied the notion that racial discrimination exists in policing at all. For this reason, it is possible that proponents of racial justice in France could still use this finding to force their political leaders to confront the realities of racial inequality in France and enact some real change.

Unveiling Gender Inequality: The Balkan Sworn Virgin and the Ongoing Struggle for Equality in Albania

bulgarianphotographynow.com

Introduction

Enshrouded in swathes of clouds and adorning the landscape with lush forests and jagged cliffs, the formidable Accursed Mountains envelop the traditional, patriarchal societies of Northern Albania. Ancient traditions linked to rural mountain life linger here, such as that of the Balkan Sworn Virgin. Abiding by the duty to maintain family honor, a woman— perhaps even a child— relinquishes her femininity, abandoning her gendered clothing. Adopting her new role, the woman will abdicate total compliance to men purely on the basis of sex and will now serve as the guardian of family honor, upholding a tradition rooted in both misogyny and the strict respect for honor in Albanian culture. The woman converts her gender from female to male. This is an illustration of the Balkan Sworn Virgin, a phenomenon native to the Balkans, originating from at least the fifteenth century under Ottoman rule (Brujic 114).

Typically, a woman becomes a Balkan Sworn Virgin in order to preserve household honor. Other reasons include avoiding an arranged marriage, proceeding with an otherwise “dishonorable” or illegitimate divorce to continue the male family members’ manual labor duties in the event of a blood feud, in which male presence beyond the household is forbidden, or at the very least, unwise (Brujic 117).

Once a woman became a Balkan Sworn Virgin, she took an oath (besa) of celibacy and could no longer marry (Young 42). Many of these women donned clothing typical of men, associated with men, disdained the company of women, adopted male names and male pronouns, took on male social obligations, such as participating in the blood feud, and enjoyed the privileges of men, such as being able to smoke, drink, and enter spaces reserved purely for men (Brujic 115). Some entered the world as newborns already having been dictated as a Balkan Sworn Virgin by their father, while others either had the choice made for them during childhood or opted themselves to take the besa (Brujic 117). 

Nevertheless, the tradition, which has been vanishing since the decline of Ottoman rule and the beginnings of communism, remains a significant relic of patriarchal tribal society in the Balkans for its portrayal of a deep ridge between men and women. Gender equality has been on the rise today in the region, but this cultural practice, despite its perishing, reveals the violently patriarchal conditions responsible for sustaining it (Brujic 114). Few ethnographic studies have been conducted, although most existing documentation focuses on the practice in Albania rather than in the rest of the Balkan nations. Therefore, this article will concentrate on the practice conducted in Albania and how notions of honor uphold the endurance of patriarchal standards today.

Historical Context: The Kanun, Honor, and the Bloodfeud Among Gheg Albanians

Historically, Albania had been a feudal society dominated by tribes and ruled by the Ottoman Empire in name only, for the Accursed Mountains proved too difficult to trek (Young 2 and Brujic 125). Despite acknowledging Turkish suzerainty and the technical supremacy of sheriat (Ottoman Sharia Law), Albanians were, and still are, heavily guided by the Kanun, a set of twelve books of oral tradition regulating “all aspects of mountain life,” codified not until the nineteenth century but in existence long before Ottoman domination (Young 41, 51, and 132). Several versions of the Kanun exist, all named after a patriarchal figure, but the Kanun of Lekë Dukagjini reigns supreme in Northern Albania. Book Eight of this version outlines the crucial need for preserving honor, stipulating that if honor is offended, only a pardon or the “spilling of blood” (a blood feud) can redeem the transgressor (Young 41). A blood feud is a form of honor killing in which the men of one family are tasked with murdering a male relative of the offender’s family. Since Ottoman authority lacked the capacity to regulate Albanian society, the blood feud emerged as a disincentive for offensive violence (Brujic 125).  

Here, a paradox emerges, for the Kanun’s authority couldn’t counter the extreme sensitivity of “honor” in Albanian society. Not much violence had been prevented: Until the 1920s, up to 30% of Albanian men died from blood feuds, leaving a severe shortage of men (Young 2). In one instance, eighteen men were noted to have died in a disagreement over a dog, while Albanologist Edith Durham records a dispute that killed seventeen and maimed eleven over which star was actually the biggest in the night sky (Shryock 114). 

It is precisely this sensitivity of honor which drives the Balkan Sworn Virgin custom. A family deprived of an honorable male heir, meaning one who exudes respectability and embodies Albanian customs, would turn to a daughter to attain this role to further the prestige of the family. Furthermore, refusing to enter an arranged marriage with the intent of marriage to someone else would certainly insult the proposed fiance’s family, leaving women who wanted to break off a marriage little choice but to become a Balkan Sworn Virgin. Many divorcees and widows also took this role instead of remarrying. In addition, women would also have to fulfill both household duties and the additional tasks of men outside the home during a blood feud, for their status as women made them immune to death or injury from the rivaling group (Brujic 117-120).

Historical Gender Inequality in Albania

The Kanun and Domestic Violence

While honor initiates the custom, when combined with a strictly patriarchal culture, the Balkan Sworn Virgin illuminates the stark reality of gender inequality in Albania. Men can only preserve the family’s honor; otherwise, no gender conversion would be necessary, and neither would be an oath to virginity, a relic of purity culture which only serves to sustain esteemed morality (Brujic 127). Anthropologist Berit Backer notes that Albanian tribal culture is considered “one of the most patriarchal in the world” (Young 14). The Kanun’s dictates on familial life underscore this claim: Article XX of the Kanun of Lekё Dukagjini “considers a woman as a superfluity in [her parents’] household,” and elsewhere within the Kanun are provisions providing for domestic violence when “appropriate” (Gjeçov 28 and Young 22). Unfortunately, even today, little record of domestic violence exists in Albania and the other Balkan states; harsh societal stigma dissuades most women from reporting it, and among those who do present their case to court, many receive an adverse response from male lawyers and judges. Up until the late 1990s, the Albanian government recorded no statistics on domestic abuse and no shelters existed for battered women (Young 148). 

Marriage and Family Life

In the heyday of tradition, girls in Albania were expected to remain in the house to perform household duties, leaving little opportunity to socialize. Meanwhile, their male counterparts were permitted to come and go as they please, with no requirement or expectation to engage in household chores (Young 22). Even in the modern era, some girls face restrictions to their education on account of household duties as well as  preservation of family honor (Young 22 and 25). The maintenance of a girl’s reputation and her family honor is integral to the marriage custom of rural Albania: the value of the bride-to-be depends on the girl’s “purity and her willingness and ability to work hard” as well as the status of the girl’s entire family (Young 24). Simply attending school and being away from the family compound can jeopardize a girl’s, and by extension her family’s, reputation, for she might be raped or fall in love with someone outside the arrangement (Young 26). Traditionally, betrothals are arranged before birth or during childhood, and the bride or groom may not meet beforehand (Young 22). Following the wedding ceremony, the bride will relocate to her husband’s house, where she must “take a humble place in the corner, standing,” for three days and three nights, as well as going six months without speaking unless spoken to by the elder men (Young 28). Albanian women interviewed by ethnographic researcher Susan Pritchett Post in the late 1990s describe the “dictatorship of [the] husband,” claiming divorce is not socially accepted, domestic violence is permitted and enforced, and women are not allowed to make decisions nor can they even speak to men or enter their spaces (Young 23 and 28-29). Albanian women are also expected to birth children, although only sons are considered respectable. To have a daughter is a tragedy (Young 30). One woman comments that she only became a Balkan Sworn Virgin to prevent her family the shame of birthing five daughters and no sons (Young 57). Today, these attitudes and the custom of arranged marriages have largely died out in Northern Albania, although the UN has assessed the custom is still practiced in some isolated rural communities.

Contrasting Behavior and Attitudes Ascribed to Respective Sexes

In some cases, men are free to express themselves, while women are not. This division begins as early as childhood, as one researcher observing a Kosovar refugee camp in Macedonia notes that only boys were permitted to swim and play as children do (Young 32). Muslim women of the south were expected to renounce their religion to marry the Catholics populating the north, even though the opposite trend would have been considered apostasy and an affront to family honor (Whitaker 148). Deep in the foothills of the Accursed Mountains, male homosexuality was permitted when no women were around. In fact, homesexual relations were viewed as “expected” among younger men, arousing no sense of shame. Women, on the other hand, could not pursue such relationships, for deriving pleasure from sex was not the woman’s prerogative; only procreation was (Whitaker 149). The rich heritage of Albanian epic songs features many lyrical interpretations relating to male sexual gratification, juxtaposing this idea with the woman’s duty to maintain her sexual morality and family honor by remaining chaste until marriage (Whitaker 149). 

Historically, attitudes toward women were quite demeaning, viewing their existence and role in the social order as a cause of the blood feud and as an obstacle to maintaining family honor (Shryock 115). The utilization of women as points of arbitration among feuding families denied their humanity, for they would be stripped of any remaining scrap of autonomy and sold to a rival family in marriage as a form of remediation. (Shryock 115). Durham, who visited Albania and is responsible for most information recorded on the Balkan Sworn Virgin, writes that her position as a “writing woman,” was viewed negatively by some Albanian men, who claimed such a woman would not perform household duties (Durham 36). The Balkan Sworn Virgin, by preserving her family’s honor, escaped bearing the burden of this patriarchal system, though continued to reinforce it through adopting a form of misogyny of their own, having nothing but scorn for the company of women (Brujic 115).

Additionally, a woman, by account of her gender, did not have the capacity to possess honor of her own accord; it came through the decisions her male relatives made for her. A woman could simply remain “pure,” execute a diligent work ethic within the household, and birth sons to further her family’s dignity, though she had no stake in the blood feud and no say in the decisions of the tribe. Women were not considered individuals of their own right.

The Balkan Sworn Virgin and Gender Inequality in Modern Albania 

Before analyzing the status of the Balkan Sworn Virgin and of women in Albania today, it is important not to misconstrue Albanian society as “savage” or one that needs “saving” based on this account of the misogyny deeply embedded in its society. It’s long been a tendency for academics and other professionals to castigate the alleged violence of unusual depravity in the Balkans, despite Durham aptly pointing out that Western critics, too, engage in the blood feud and call it “war” (Durham 25). The verb “to balkanize,” meaning the fragmentation of a state into smaller states, typically as a result of war, presents a derogatory usage, deriving from the “lawlessness” and “chaos” of the Balkans (Young 131). Although a woman had to surrender her female identity and assume a male role in order to enjoy the privileges a man receives on the mere status of his gender, Albanian society is not primitive and has come a long way in achieving gender equality today since the era of the Balkan Sworn Virgin.

Balkan Sworn Virgins as a practice have largely died out as the state emerged as a legitimate political force with subjugation over the population. State authority means the law is no longer up to the people to enforce; thus, the grip the blood feud once had on the population is not as strong as it traditionally was, although it is still practiced in the northern region. With an ample supply of men, women no longer had to convert their gender in this circumstance. Modernization has also reduced the impact of rural isolation and improved women’s status through a greater exposure to external influences in the region (Brujic 127). Therefore, the extent to which women are subjugated by patriarchal ordinance isn’t as tremendous as it had been. Women are free to divorce and no longer need to adopt a male status to preserve the honor of a household in the event no suitable man exists (Molla 122).

Gender Inequality Under Communism

Women achieved much of their gains in post-socialist Albania, although subtle progress began under the communist era. In 1941, Enver Hoxha began his reign as the country’s first communist leader, enforcing a strict interpretation of Stalinism. Between 1945 and 1991, Albanians were not permitted to leave the country or freely practice religion (Young 3). Despite significant isolation and harsh authoritarianism, communism still presented an external force that granted women some freedoms, such as opening up participation in government, improving access to education, and furthering the state of adequate women’s healthcare. However, Hoxha’s reign did little to improve women’s status within the domestic sphere. This resulted in a double workload for women as they worked outside the home and continued to perform household duties. Furthermore, even though healthcare had been improved, birth control and abortion were still illegal in order to conform to the societal expectation to bear a large family (Young 147-148). Despite a handful of gains for women under communism, it’s rumored several women in northern Albania became Balkan Sworn Virgins in the 1950s as a form of protest against Hoxha’s communist regime, implying the persistence of structural misogyny (Young 149-150).

Gender Inequality After Communism

In 1992, Sali Berisha and the Democratic Party took over the government (Young 4). Abortion had been legalized a year prior in 1991, and by 1996, up to fifty five groups advocating for equality for women had been established (Young 150). Despite feminism soaring in popularity, violent manifestations of misogyny still plague Albanian society today. According to the UN, 60% of Albanian women aged fifteen to forty-five report having been victims of domestic violence. In addition to domestic violence, prostitution and sex trafficking persist. After the fall of communism, the opening of borders and the country’s prime location along the Ionian and Adriatic Seas made it a “haven” for sex trafficking of women into Western Europe (Tabaku 99). Organized crime thrived during the transition from communism to democracy and was further strengthened by the Kanun’s emphasis on honor and loyalty as criminals swore their allegiance (Tabaku 100). Furthermore, studies have found that notions of male honor exacerbate male violence, which has already been reflected in the blood feud and domestic violence of Albania’s history (Maguire 64). Trafficking of women and girls from Albania to Western Europe reached its peak between 1997 and 2001 and is now on the decline, but enough Albanian women and children are still lured into trafficking rings with false promises of marriage or work for the U.S. Department of State, as of 2022, to classify the country as “Tier 2” out of three tiers along the Trafficking in Persons Report guideline (Tabuku 99).

In the 2020s, Albanian feminists demand justice for rape and domestic violence victims, taking to the streets in Tirana in support of 28-year-old Irvana Hyka, who was murdered by her husband in 2021. When interviewed, these feminists claimed domestic violence is a “normalized social routine within a patriarchal suppressive system.” Unfortunately, improvements in gender equality have not been able to counter the violent misogyny that persists in Albania, even if women no longer have to become men to be treated like human beings. Albanian feminists of today condemn the insidious Balkan Sworn Virgin practice for being “anti-feminist” and “horrible” as they combat widespread societal acceptance of domestic violence and prostitution.

Conclusion

Although the Balkan Sworn Virgin custom has died out, it presents a drastic contrast between the status of men and women which, unlike the phenomenon, still hasn’t died out today. Albanian women continue to face challenges in securing their equality with men, facing domestic violence and exploitation through prostitution at alarming rates. Multiple avenues for future research present themselves through this exploration on the history of Balkan Sworn Virgins, which may also be illuminated by the phenomenon.

References

Brujic, Marija and Vladimir Krstic. “Sworn Virgins of the Balkan Highlands.” Traditiones, vol. 51, no. 3, 2022, pp. 113-130.

Durham, Edith. High Albania. London: Centre for Albanian Studies, 2015.

Gjeçov, Shtjefën. The Code of Lekë Dukagjinit. Translated by Leonard Fox, Gjonklekaj Publishing Co, 1989.

Maguire, Sarah. “Researching ‘A Family Affair’: Domestic Violence in Former Yugoslavia and Albania.” Gender and Development 6, no. 3, 1998, pp. 60-68.

Molla, Alketa. “Divorce in Albania and the Problems that it Carries.” European Scientific Journal 11, no. 26, 2015, pp. 122-129.

Shryock, Andrew J. “Autonomy, Entanglement, and the Feud: Prestige Structures and Gender Values in Highland Albania.” Anthropological Quarterly 61, no. 3, 1988, pp. 113-118.

Tabaku, Arben. “Ethnic Albanian Rings of Organized Criminals and the Trafficking and Smuggling of Human Beings: An International, Regional and Local Perspective.” SEER: Journal for Labour and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe, 11, no. 1 2008, pp. 99-109.

Whitaker, Ian. “A Sack for Carrying Things: The Traditional Role of Women in Northern Albanian Society.” Anthropological Quarterly 54, no. 3, 1981, pp. 146-156.

Young, Antonia. Women Who Become Men: Albanian Sworn Virgins. Oxford: Berg, 2000.

Meloni's English Ban: An analysis into Italian Prime Minister, Giorgia Meloni's proposed legislation to fine foreign languages

In March of 2023 the party of Italian Prime Minister, Girogia Meloni, proposed introducing a new piece of legislation that would seek to address the growing issue of the dominance of the English language across Italy and the issue of Anglomania (the obsession with English customs), all in hopes of countering growing fears over the loss of Italian language and culture. The legislation proposes fines of up to 100,000 euros on public and private entities using foreign vocabulary in their official communications and requiring all company job titles to be spelled out in the official local language. 

Meloni’s new legislation seeks to address what her party sees as key cultural issues affecting Italian society. On the surface level, the legislation is an attack against EU integrationist policy and an attempt to promote Italian cultural power. Although this legislation may seem both amusing and bizarre from an outside lens, its implications, both politically and socially, could be tremendous. Only through placing this language ban in the context of Meloni’s immigration policies can we understand the greater intent; Meloni’s legislation is a direct threat towards Italy’s growing immigrant population, who often lack Italian language skills and can often only hope to communicate with Italian government officials in a shared second language, English. 

Italy’s changing image 

At its core, Meloni’s legislation reveals a growing fear and frustration brought on by fear over losing Italian cultural identity and frustration with the English language's dominance across all sectors. 

Like their fellow EU neighbors, Italy has struggled in recent decades to come to terms with its new multi-cultural identity, brought on by increases in immigration and participation in international communities and systems. Italy’s recent immigrant population is largely dominated by migrants and refugees from Eastern Europe and Northern Africa. Non-white Italians report a level of discrimination and isolation despite spending decades in the country. Michelle Ngonmo, a Black Italian fashion designer stated that “there is a real struggle between the people-of-color Italians and [white] Italian society. Asian Italians, Black Italians are really struggling to be accepted as Italians.”

The changing demographics of Italy reflect a country grappling with its newfound cultural identity. While many have embraced the tide of immigration as both a benefit and reality of globalization, Meloni’s political party has deliberately ignited anti-immigrant spirit. 

The Brother’s of Italy

Meloni leads the Brother’s of Italy party (Fratelli d'Italia), a nationalist and conservative far-right party that has its roots in neofascism. After co-founding the party in 2012, she led the party through a series of political victories, eventually emerging as the preeminent far-right party in Italy. 

Similar to other far-right parties across the continent, such as the National Rally in France or the UKIP party of the UK, the Brother’s of Italy embodies many populist values and policies, including anti-globalization efforts, xenophobia, and an emphasis on national unity and heritage. However, the Brother’s of Italy has deeper roots in historical notions of facism, tracing back to the first postwar Italian neo fascist party known as the Italian Social Movement (Movimento Sociale Italiano or MSI, which existed from 1946 to 1995) as well as the Salò Republic which was known for its Nazi-origins. The predecessors behind the Brother’s of Italy party reveal a political party that is steeped in decades of fascist theory. Meloni was a member of the MSI youth party in the early 90s that became known for its far-right magazine, Fare Fronte and adoption of French far-right ideals. Political upheaval and turmoil caused by political corruption scandals across Italian politics led to the end of the MSI in 1995, but elements of the party continued.

Meloni’s rise to power

The well known youth party transformed into Azione Giovani (Young Action) which was at this point associated with the Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance party or AN) the successor of the MSI. Meloni held a position on the youth leadership committee which led her into politics. At age 19 she was filmed praising fascist dictator, Benito Mussolini, as an example of strong leadership in Italian politics. 

 She was elected as Councilor for the Province of Rome in 1998 which she held for four years. She continued to develop her political career by becoming the youngest Vice President to the Chamber of Deputies in 2006. Her experience in far-right youth organizations led her to become the Minister of Youth under the fourth Berlusconi government. Then in 2012, she founded the Brother’s of Italy party alongside fellow politicians, Ignazio La Russa and Guido Crosetto. Throughout Italy’s rocky political climate of the 90s and 2000s, Meloni positioned herself as a politician loyal to far-right causes, but also able to adapt to contemporary political climates. 

In a speech from 2021, Meloni identified her far-right values, saying, “Yes to the natural family, no to the LGBT lobby, yes to sexual identity, no to gender ideology... no to Islamist violence, yes to secure borders, no to mass migration... no to big international finance... no to the bureaucrats of Brussels!”

Meloni has routinely denied that her party has any connection with fascism; she has denounced Mussolini and his reign of fascist terror in speeches, citing Mussolini’s racial laws as one of the darkest points in Italian history. However, her latest proposed legislation to restrict the use of English and promote Italian reveals Meloni’s nationalistic approach to uniting the Italian people as well as a denial of Italy’s multiculturalism. 

Contemporary fascism

Meloni’s political career has flirted with fascism from the beginning. We can witness it in her blatant statements of support for Mussolini as a young youth leader, but also in the inherent nature of her political positioning in parties rooted in fascism. Meloni’s critics are quick to call her a fascist or “fascist-adjacent” for her political remarks, her friendship with Hungary’s authoritarian leader, Viktor Orbán, and her ultraconservative values. Although these points are all valid and true, they do not actually threaten Meloni’s political standing or reputation, but instead allow her to counter the remarks and paint her opponents and critics as irrational left-wing radicals. Meloni simply has to deny her associations with fascism, something she has done on numerous occasions, such as during her pro-EU speech following her inauguration in which she also spoke out against Italy’s fascist past. International attention on Meloni’s fascist roots has shifted attention away from the real danger of her ultra-conservative politics, which intend to restore traditional Italian values and relies on tactics of alienation and discrimination.  

Anglomania 

Meloni has stated that her proposed legislation is an attempt to protect Italian national identity, which she sees as weakened by the dominance of English as the international language of business and politics. It is true that English has become the lingua franca of the world, dominating arenas such as international institutions, cultural interests, and educational institutions. However the bill does not only call for the ban of English but words from all foreign languages in businesses. The legislation also called for university classes that are “not specifically aimed at teaching a foreign language” should only be taught in Italian, thus preventing the likelihood of English-speaking classes taking precedence. Yet Meloni’s legislation makes it clear that her desire to protect Italy’s cultural heritage is rooted in populist and far-right xenophobia.

Foreign residents make up around 9% of Italy's population. Italy is also home to the third largest migrant population in Europe, following the migrant crisis of the past decade. The change in population has brought varying forms of anti-immigration sentiment. Meloni has been at the forefront of the movement during her political campaign and time in office. Her first act of anti-immigration legislation in November of 2022 attempted to prevent adult male asylum seekers from entering the country. Italy’s interior minister, Matteo Piantedosi, claimed that the reason behind this policy was that these people are “residual cargo,” unworthy of being rescued and Meloni referred to recent immigrants to Italy as “ethnic substitution,” implying that ethnic Italians are in danger simply from their population’s change in ethnic and racial diversity. 

Meloni’s proposed language ban must be understood in the context of her prior legislation and political  viewpoints; this is more than a critique of the dominance of the English language and the promotion of Italian culture. Meloni’s ban is a threat to all immigrants and foreign-born Italians as a sign of Italy’s growing preference for an homogenous ethnic population and anti-immigration policies.

How I Learned to Stop Worrying about the Bomb

In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, many scholars last year wrote about the ramifications that the war would have on international security. Among the concerns was the distress about the potential impacts that the war would have on the nuclear nonproliferation regime. In their article for Foreign Policy (published in March of last year), Andreas Umland and Hugo von Essen, analysts at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, argue that the war in Ukraine will cause middle power states to derive three main lessons. First, nuclear weapons remain a powerful source of power in the international system. Second, if you are a state with nuclear weapons, it is foolish to relinquish said weapons. Third, treaties, alliances, and the like cannot be trusted as a means of ensuring security. In this article, I aim to expand the discussion via addressing and disputing these claims. I argue that even though middle power states may recognize that nuclear weapons are a powerful tool, they’ll still refrain from acquiring them and instead make use of other methods (such as international agreements), either willingly or by the coercion of a great power, to quash their security concerns.

Umland and von Essen argue that states with nuclear weapons or aspirations to acquire such weapons will perceive the invasion as proof that nuclear weapons are essential to their security. They argue that states will see Ukraine’s past efforts to denuclearize as foolish, as they eliminated the deterrence effect that was preventing a Russian invasion. Because of this, they conclude that non-nuclear weapons states are likely to rush to obtain nuclear weapons before their regional adversaries, and that nuclear weapons states are unlikely to agree to disarmament measures in the future.

I disagree with the notion that states will take away that Ukraine was invaded because it denuclearized. To start, Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons 30 years before the invasion. Assuming Umland and von Essen are right in their claim that the decisive factor determining whether Russia decided to invade the former Soviet state was its possession of nuclear weapons, then it seems illogical that they would wait so long to launch an invasion. Instead, I would argue that there is another factor that has more explanatory power regarding Russia’s behavior: Ukraine’s position relative to the West. Simply put, it seems as though the more Ukraine has panned towards the West, the more aggressive Russia’s behavior has become.

In February 2014, after Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych rejected a proposal to increase cooperation with the European Union in favor of expanding ties with Russia, large-scale protests erupted across the country, culminating in the ousting of Yanukovych on February 22nd.  As the reality became increasingly clear to Russian elites that their attempts at influencing Ukraine were facing staunch resistance from the populace, they responded by launching an invasion of Crimea, a region in southern Ukraine. Russia’s response then was motivated primarily by the fear of a Ukraine that aligns itself more towards the West and away from Russia. This factor remains prevalent in their decision calculus today, as it likely undergirded the decision to launch a full-scale invasion in February of last year, a decision that coincided with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s goal of Ukrainian integration with the EU and NATO by 2024.

Additionally, an important caveat I’ll add to Umland and von Essen’s argument is that, while the weapons were on Ukrainian soil, Ukraine didn’t have control over the weapons, which limits the ability of the weapons to act as a deterrent. For a nuclear weapon to act as a deterrent that changes the behavior of other actors, there must be a credible threat that the state would use it in the face of a provocation, a condition that cannot be meet if a state is unable to use them, whether initiated in a conflict or otherwise. Regardless, while the weapons nonetheless influenced Russia’s decision to invade, I disagree with Umland and von Essen’s analysis that states will believe their presence (or lack thereof) was the single most decisive factor behind the invasion. 

Instead of focusing on their nuclear weapons, I would argue that states will recognize that Ukraine was not part of a regional alliance, such as NATO or the European Union, with a guarantee to protect its members in the face of encroachment or invasion. This development will compel states to strengthen bilateral relations with a great power, realizing that it is a much more efficient and effective means of ensuring security than pursuing a nuclear weapon, as states can enjoy the same benefit of security without the costs of acquiring nuclear weapons. 

To clarify, I think that Ukraine was in a unique situation, in which a country’s pursuit of a network of alliances prompted an aggressive response from another. Russian President Vladimir Putin has long sought after Ukraine, a former Soviet state that he argues is “ethnically Russian” and should therefore reintegrated into Russia. Ukraine suffered from the illusion of choice: either pursue alliance commitments and aggravate Russia or don’t and risk fighting Russia alone in the event of an invasion. The lack of alliance commitments left Ukraine as a sitting duck in the event of Russian encroachment. Conversely, the shift towards the West to form alliance commitments angered Russia and accelerated any desire to invade. In this case, what Ukraine believed was in their self-interest clashed with what Russia believed was in their self-interest, which caused conflict.

In terms of the international reaction, this is where Umland, von Essen, and I agree: middle power states will look to avoid an instance in which a conflict emerges from their self-interest clashing with another state, and thus will look to bolster their security. Where we disagree, however, is in the methods by which these states will use. Umland and von Essen argue that other middle power states will interpret Russia’s attack as an indication of the necessity of nuclear weapons to ensure international security, whether it is to deter confrontations with regional adversaries or encroachments from great powers. While I won’t deny that middle power states will reconsider the power of nuclear weapons on the international stage in the wake of the war in Ukraine, I don’t think that sentiment will necessarily translate into them seeking a nuclear weapon of their own. Instead, I would argue that it provides a reason why they should enhance cooperation with their allies, especially great power allies, to achieve an enhanced sense of security.

Regarding treaties, Umland and von Essen argue that the war in Ukraine undermines the credibility of treaties to prevent non-proliferation, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and leaves middle power states with little incentive to abide by treaties writ large, given the willingness of great powers (such as Russia) to completely disregard them. However, it seems as though the opposite is happening. Instead of abandoning treaties, assurances, and the like, middle powers have begun to (and will likely continue to) cling to them, recognizing that their livelihood may depend on the security provided by a great power. 

Consider the increase in cooperation between Taiwan and the US in the past year, as evidenced by high-profile meetings, for example. Taiwan, a state that many would argue is a likely candidate for an amphibious invasion in the coming years from its neighbor China, is reaffirming the importance of its relationship with the United States. Former Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan and current Speaker Kevin McCarthy’s meeting with president Tsai Ing-Wen have signaled to China that the US’ commitment to Taiwan remains stronger than ever. These visits are rooted in a Taiwanese desire for security, as enhanced cooperation is an indication that the US recognizes the vital role Taiwan plays in advancing its national interests. This recognition is informally hinting towards a willingness by the US to defend Taiwan in the event of a conflict, thus deterring a Chinese invasion without involving the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Based on Umland and von Essen’s analysis, one would expect Taiwan, as a middle power, to pursue nuclear weapons to resolve their security qualms. Instead, they’ve taken steps to fortify their relationship with the United States, leveraging their relations with a great power to hedge back against China. 

Additionally, even if states decide that it is in their best interest to pursue a nuclear weapon, international actors will intervene to prevent this desire from translating into concrete action. China has played a key role in preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, because (among other reasons) they recognize that any such effort would be seen as aggressive by its adversaries in the region, namely Israel and Saudi Arabia, and set off a regional arms race. China cannot afford such an outcome, as they benefit immensely from stability in the region, as it ensures they can continue to trade extensively with both Saudi Arabia and Iran. As a result, they have a unique incentive to step in to prevent any actions that would jeopardize access to those markets, which, much to their dismay, means no bomb for Iran.

Regardless of whether this is an instance of a middle power reaching out to a great power to ensure its security (without the pursuit of nuclear weapons) or a great power reaching out to a middle power to provide security (to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons), or something in between, the result remains the same: no nuclear proliferation by the middle power.

Umland and von Essen’s fears that the war in Ukraine will collapse the non-proliferation regime are overblown. The war in Ukraine has done little to fundamentally change the costs and benefits of pursuing a nuclear weapon as a means of addressing security concerns, meaning that states will opt to pursue treaties and other agreements. These declarations allow countries to achieve the same security without the international backlash associated with developing a nuclear weapons program. Additionally, while the NPT in its current state may have lost credibility, any residual loss will be supplemented by the intervention of state actors. The interest of great powers to cap the proliferation of nuclear weapons (and their accompanying destabilizing effect on regional and international security) will ultimately continue to prevent any remaining desire by states to pursue nuclear weapons from materializing. 

The Implications of the Inflation Reduction Act and our Allyship with the EU

In the summer of 2022, the Biden Administration signed the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) into law. This massive bill allocates federal spending towards reducing national carbon emissions, lowering healthcare costs, funding the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and improving taxpayer compliance. One of the most significant aspects of this bill concerns clean energy and advancing climate technology. This aspect works in conjunction with the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) and the CHIPS and Science Act. All three of these bills invest spending in manufacturing, job creation, infrastructure, and research and development in clean energy. The Inflation Reduction Act directs nearly $400 billion in federal funding to clean energy via tax incentives, grants, and loan guarantees. Clean electricity and transmission received the largest sum, followed by clean transportation, such as electric vehicles. The goal of the IRA, in addition to the IIJA and the CHIPS Act is to improve U.S. economic competitiveness, innovation, and industrial productivity while considering advancing clean energy efforts and encouraging investment. Leaders of the European Union have voiced their disapproval of the U.S. enacting the IRA for fear that it will disrupt the clean energy market, driving investment away from EU member states due to incentives offered by the U.S. However, the EU’s fears have no real merit. The U.S.’s commitment to clean energy generates a net positive on the global scale in terms of addressing climate change and puts no significant dent in Europe’s clean energy economic sector.  

Europe’s biggest concern in the IRA are the incentives it offers for private investment. The majority of funding for the bill is in the form of tax credits which are going primarily to corporations, approximately $216 billion of the nearly $400 billion bill. To be eligible for the full IRA tax credits, corporations must meet a set of criteria. These include prevailing wage and apprenticeship requirements, domestic-production, or domestic-procurement requirements, and in some cases a percentage of critical minerals that have been recycled, extracted, or processed in North America or a country that has a free trade agreement with the U.S. as well as being manufactured or processed in North America. EU leaders believe these incentives will encourage European corporations to relocate to the U.S. and their worries are not entirely unfounded.

During the World Economic Forum in Davos, U.S. governors from Michigan, Georgia, Illinois, and West Virginia Senator Joe Manchin attempted to lure European clean energy businesses to their states, promising cheaper costs of production. German, French, and Belgian leaders all denounced the U.S. politicians’ attempts to strip Europe of their clean energy producers. In response,  French President Emmanuel Macron has indicated that he believes the EU should introduce a comparable spending package to the IRA to bolster clean energy corporations in Europe. Some potential issues with this reaction is that the EU is unable to provide tax credits in the way the U.S. can, as only nation states have this authority. Many nation states do provide tax credits and Germany is already operating under a similar model to the IRA, however it is unlikely it would make a significant impact due to the smaller scale of their clean energy production market. Other EU leaders, such as Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, believe throwing money at their existing system would make no difference, rather they should redistribute funding that already exists in clean energy investment. 

If the EU is content with the current state of the clean energy market, which considering their reaction to any possible shift they are, then they are realistically making a mountain out of a mole hill. Almost half of the funds provided by the IRA will be spent on upgrading, repurposing, and replacing the energy infrastructure and will be used as loans rather than subsidies. The biggest sector the EU may have concerns with is electric vehicles, however the EVs they are already manufacturing will most likely qualify for subsidies. Germany is the only major exporter of cars to the U.S. and Volkswagen is the only corporation that produces large numbers of electric vehicles. Its best-selling model is already being produced in Tennessee, making it qualify under the IRA as a corporation who will receive subsidies. Other major European automobile corporations such as Audi, BMW, and Mercedes already produce in North America as well. Because they all produce in either the U.S. or a nation with a U.S. free trade agreement, they will also qualify for subsidies. 

Concerning our transatlantic allyship, any significant shift would be an overreaction. Although these new subsidies concern European nations, the primary focus should be on coordinating with the U.S. on how to approach the clean energy market. Europe’s trade commissioner, Vladis Dombrovskis said as a reaction to the IRA that the fight against climate change should be done by “building transatlantic value chains, not breaking them apart”. Importantly, the U.S. and the EU need to ensure that they do not battle to drive away business and investment through distortionary subsidies and place reasonable boundaries on the support they are able to give to corporations. 

At first glance, it is reasonable for Europe to approach the enactment of the Inflation Reduction Act with a degree of hesitancy. It appears to threaten their existing clean energy market and disrupt this sector of the economy. Their fears were validated by U.S. politicians attempting to lure these corporations stateside with the appeal of subsidies, tax credits, and easy access to loans. Upon further analysis, however, it is highly unlikely Europe’s clean energy market will be disrupted at all by the IRA. The corporations which draw the most concern are manufacturing in the U.S. and already qualify for most of the IRA’s benefits. It is necessary for European leaders to take a less reactionary stance on the bill and focus on further coordination with the U.S. on how to approach clean energy and climate technology efforts moving forward.

Demystifying the Iron Lady and Her Legacy

Margaret Thatcher remains one of the most influential figures in modern international politics; a hardline conservative, a groundbreaking woman, and an inspiration to the many world leaders who have followed in her footsteps. What factors led to her enduring impact? Historically, opportunities for women in political leadership have been limited due to the domination of male gender bias in society. For the majority of human history, women have been denied the keys to power; even in the most democratic societies – from the birthplace of democracy, Athens, to our shining city on a hill, America – women were, as a matter of course, forced to the sidelines of political affairs. Though most women in the 21st century, in democratic countries, now have the right to vote, entrenched biases against women have only recently started to crumble. Perspectives on Thatcher’s rule have fluctuated over the decades, with some seeing Thatcher as a reactionary, others as a status-quo politician, and for some still as a pre-Reagan Reaganite. But for a woman to attain a position of such high relative importance in global affairs signifies something special. How did she manage to overcome negative biases against women in a time when those biases reigned supreme? How have female leaders since Thatcher adopted her strategies? 

In the second half of the 20th century, female leaders were few and far between, and it was still a rather foreign concept for a woman to be the head of a world power. Margaret Thatcher recognized this bias and adjusted her persona accordingly. She knew that the simple fact of her gender could close political doors before she could so much as try to knock. This meant that appearing friendly might as well have been the lowest of her priorities. Her fight to implement  “Britain First” policies eventually led to her infamous designation as the "Iron Lady.” (It is worthwhile to note that this nickname was originally intended as a derogatory slur by the Soviet press.) By the end of her tenure, Thatcher was often thought of as being tougher than most men.    

Over 30 years since Thatcher’s time in office, how much has the stigma around being a female Head of State changed? In the present day, there are, of course, more female leaders than when Thatcher was serving as prime minister; as of September 2022, there are 28 female Heads of State. Has Thatcher’s legacy shaped how women in power act today? Do women in leadership positions feel the same need to correct for their femininity today? 

      In the summer of 1979, Margaret Thatcher was appointed Britain's first female prime minister by the Conservative Party. Growing up through World War II and attending college as the Cold War began in earnest, Thatcher carried through her 11 years of leadership a deep-rooted opposition to communism and a desire to correct the policies she believed were crippling English society. 

Thatcher was a staunch capitalist who believed in the principles of classical liberalism, decrying the interventionist economic policies that she felt had led to Britain’s stagflation in the 70s. With rising inflation, constant energy shortages, frequent labor strikes, and expensive oil prices, this wasn’t hard to believe. Throughout her time in office, she worked to limit the power of trade unions and tighten what she saw as the state’s overly generous welfare programs. All of Thatcher’s actions in office were in furtherance of her goal of restoring England’s former economic status as a major player in Europe and internationally. By privatizing state-controlled and public goods industries, she also cut the amount of government subsidies to underperforming businesses, further increasing the country’s rising unemployment rate. These high unemployment rates significantly reduced the power of the trade unions and, some economists argue, successfully cut down on inflation. As her policies caused unemployment to skyrocket, Thatcher’s popularity declined equally precipitously. All the same, Thatcher is often cited as a pioneer for bringing Britain out of economic decline, and her legacy shaped policies of the Conservative and Labour parties for decades to come. Since Thatcher, there have been a small number of women in a position as powerful as hers, an even smaller number with the influence and political capital to shape their countries around their political ideologies. 

      Perhaps the closest analogue to Thatcher in recent years would be the first female chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, at least in terms of international stature. Merkel served as Germany’s head of government for over 16 years, from 2005 until 2021. Of course, the similarities between Thatcher and Merkel are apparent but rather limited. Similar to Thatcher, Merkel inherited a country during a time where the economy wasn’t as strong as it could have been. She was able to systematically balance the prioritization of safeguarding and promoting German economic interests with protecting her own popularity as a leader. This was always challenging for Thatcher, who was almost single-mindedly focused on economic protection. Merkel’s legacy shaped her as someone just as influential as Thatcher, but who is seen in a very different light. Merkel was given the endearing term “Mutti” (or “mother”) by the German people. In 2021, she was the leader who scored the highest approval rating of any world leader in a survey of six countries for her work in strengthening the German economy and the European Union (EU) as a whole. So how did she learn from Thatcher’s mistakes? By finding the delicate balance between seeking the public’s trust and fighting for her policy goals.

While Thatcher fought for a dramatic reduction in the English welfare state, Merkel’s tenure was characterized by support for expanded social programs. Merkel was widely considered to be a defender of liberal democracy, prioritizing national social welfare programs and helping to lead Europe’s response to faltering international economies. Merkel didn’t seek to command the center stage of EU politics, but her decisive actions had a tendency to put her there anyway. Merkel’s balanced decisiveness echoes Thatcher’s leadership style, but through a completely different tone. Merkel’s leadership personality was “understated but achieving,” vouching for herself as a servant to the German people. This was something Thatcher couldn’t relate to; during her career, she was famously quoted saying “society does not exist.” Considered an underdog by her own party, as the only woman, Protestant, or East German to become chancellor, Merkel was accustomed to fighting for the “little guy” in her pursuit of policies. She advocated for debt relief during the aftermath of the financial instability in the years following 2008 and loosened the country’s immigration laws when other European countries were turning refugees away. 

Her cool handling of a crisis became her trademark, as Merkel’s leadership spanned across multiple issues of foreign and domestic upheaval. Merkel, perhaps, learned from Thatcher’s legacy and understood that being a true “Iron Lady” didn’t mean she necessarily had to lead with abrasiveness and what was interpreted as a lack of compassion towards the people of her country to accomplish political goals. The takeaway from her legacy comes down to one characteristic: Merkel’s balance of her maternal nature coming into how she enacted policy and led the country. This was one of the biggest traits that Thatcher lacked, and it appears to have worked wonders for Merkel’s political legacy.     

Of course, it is important to note that Merkel was not without her own criticism. Merkel faced strong opposition for supporting continued robust trade with Russia following its occupation of Crimea – an economically-advantageous move –  rather than taking a more hardline position. Critics argue that this policy not only helped Russia protect its advantages over Europe, but also that Merkel’s lack of a reaction was taken as a sign that further incursion into Ukrainian territory would not be treated harshly by Germany.   

In 2017, Jacinda Ardern was elected as New Zealand’s third female prime minister by the Labour Party. She is also the country’s youngest prime minister in over one hundred years to hold office. The similarities between the leadership of Thatcher and Ardern are antitheses of each other. Ardern’s leadership can be understood in a few words: compassion, honesty, and strength through unity. Ardern’s charisma, her ability to come across as a person rather than a politician, sets her apart from Thatcher and most other political leaders. This core strength is something that helped Ardern gain favor with the people of New Zealand, winning election and a subsequent reelection by a landslide majority. Her policies focused around enacting government subsidies for impoverished citizens and families as well as climate change legislation. Unlike Thatcher, the world saw Ardern’s policies having dual priorities of both social and economic reform. Recently, Ardern spoke to the press, announcing her decision to resign from the role of Prime Minister, which she had held for five and a half years. When asked about how she wanted people to remember her legacy, she responded by saying, “As someone who always tried to be kind.” 

The last statement Ardern left the public with was one of honesty and grace: “I hope in return, I leave behind a belief that you can be kind but strong, empathetic but decisive, optimistic but focused, that you can be your own kind of leader.” Jacinda Ardern’s leadership style is trailblazing in the face of modern politics where the narrative has been centralized around maintaining power by any means necessary. This also means not appearing weak and therefore, incapable of leading. The power struggle of politics leaves little room for the appreciation of empathy and kindness. Ardern’s leadership approach is a sharp contrast to Thatcher’s as a result. 

Her tenure, too, was not without its own controversies. Ardern was praised for her swift and effective policies on controlling the COVID-19 outbreak in New Zealand; a major policy critique of Ardern’s administration, however, was its reported failure to fairly distribute vaccines among indigenous populations in the country. By the end of 2021, 49% of Māori were fully vaccinated compared with 72% of the entire eligible population. 

While Thatcher, Merkel, and Ardern are all widely considered to be successful politicians and changemakers, their legacies can teach new generations of female leaders and politicians that policy is important, but nothing is more vital than personality of a leader, because this is the backbone of their policy decisions. Since Thatcher, there have been leaders such as Merkel and Ardern who have shown that a politician doesn’t have to be a forceful, unrelenting, and manly person to be followed and respected; their empathetic effectiveness and popularity have convinced us that this should not be the grand narrative of politics. Thatcher might have assimilated into this role to become the “Iron Lady” because she felt the burden of her gender and needed a way to gain respect in a masculine world. The widespread popularity of Merkel and Ardern’s policies and personalities is something that world leaders, both men and women, would do well to remember when faced with difficult leadership decisions. Rising female leaders might find it helpful to consider that aggression is not the only way to demonstrate strength.

National Pride and a National Healthcare System: The Strikes Defining the UK’s Future

In December of 2022, months of separate public service worker protests spiraled into the largest national health service strikes ever witnessed in British history.. Now, more than three months on since their start, Britain’s National Health Service workers show no signs of stopping as the stakes have only strengthened. At the core of these strikes are key demands by employees that have been routinely denied by the British government. The workers are asking for pay raises due to historic levels of inflation and greater overall funding for the NHS. 

This marks the NHS’ largest strike, and yet the government is still refusing to meet union demands. The government is refusing to meet the pay raises of NHS workers because they claim to be unable to afford it and for fear of increased pay leading to higher prices, thus worsening inflation and raising interest rates and mortgage payments. 

The UK has undergone a ‘cost of living crisis’ since late 2021 which has led to an decrease in British disposable incomes thanks to inflation. Although the government has attempted to aid in this crisis through support packages, such as capping household energy prices, many NHS workers say that this is still not sufficient support. Over 120 NHS trusts are expected to strike, including nurses in cancer wards, A&E departments and intensive care units.

The strikers are adamant that the public understand their need to protest. David Hendy, a 34 year old nurse, revealed his thoughts on the issue: “This job is slowly killing nurses. The nursing workforce in the last 10 years has been through hell and back. We've got through COVID, I've got colleagues who died from COVID. I myself have had it three times…morale is rock bottom.” Hendy is not alone in his experience, after decades of poor pay and the trauma of the COVID-19 pandemic, nurses are fed up. Despite being publicly supported for their heroism throughout the pandemic, many NHS workers feel unappreciated and ignored. Victoria Banerjee, a nurse for over two decades, stated that "The workload is phenomenal now and our patients are sicker than they’ve ever been.” 

Many nurses feel unable to keep up with the pressing demands placed upon them. There is a resource and staffing crisis within the NHS, magnified by over 25,000 nurses leaving the profession in the last year alone. The staff shortage means that many nurses are forced to double up on shifts and patients, performing unprecedented levels of care. Nurses have expressed their fear at endangering patients simply because they cannot adequately attend to each and every one. Pediatric nurse, Jessie Collins, revealed that “During one of my worst shifts I was the only nurse to 28 unwell children … it’s not safe and we cannot deliver the care that these children need at times.” Nurses on the picket lines have described their working conditions as dangerous and scary and their testaments reveal not just anger, but blatant fear for themselves and their patients. 

A Department of Health and Social Care spokesperson stated in an interview that “Ministers have had constructive talks with unions, including the RCN and Unison,” however these talks have not led to any sufficient action. The RCN (Royal College of Nursing) have rejected pay deals that do not properly address the impact of inflation. The core argument of the government is one of financial prudence. They refuse to increase salaries given the increase it will lead to in regards to the national budget and its potential to only worsen inflation. 

The National Health Service has played an influential role in the national fabric for decades, ever since its creation in 1948. It is regarded as a source of pride and unity for all citizens, which adds to the intensity of the recent strikes. 

History of the NHS

In 1948, following the devastation of World War II, a recently established Labour Party prime minister, Clement Attlee, set about establishing a radical new system for the British people. Atlee’s government implemented the economic reforms advocated by famed economist, John Keynes, that prioritized nationalizing industries, improving national infrastructure, and developing a welfare state designed to actively take care of three vulnerable groups in society: the young, the old, and the working class. Perhaps the most pivotal creation brought about by the new welfare state was the National Health Service, founded in 1948. 

The NHS did not provide new forms of medicine or care, but it radically transformed the average British individual’s relationship to healthcare. No longer did people pay for healthcare service on an individual basis, instead they paid collectively as taxpayers. The NHS redistributed and equalized the healthcare process, allowing everyone access to care for the first time in British history. British citizens no longer had to worry about affording care or going into debt due to high medical bills. Aneurin Bevan served as Minister of Health under Atlee’s government and was directly responsible for the creation of the NHS. The son of a coal miner, he spent his political career advocating for the working class. His foundational philosophy of the NHS can best be understood through his poignant statement that “Illness is neither an indulgence for which people have to pay, nor an offence for which they should be penalised, but a misfortune the cost of which should be shared by the community.”

The NHS continued to grow all throughout the latter of the 20th century despite major economic crises, such as the Winter of Discontent in 1978 and the rise of mass striking and inflation. Developments in healthy living and improved national knowledge surrounding daily health habits brought about lower mortality rates and changes in fatal diseases. The NHS sought to expand their care process and better understand how more external factors, such as diet, exercise, geography, and economic class were playing a role in the health of British citizens. Changes in daily habits and medical breakthroughs transformed people's understanding of the modern medicine and the NHS was capable of. 

The Politicization of Healthcare 

By the end of the 20th century, the NHS was widely beloved and respected for its life-changing impact on the British public; but it was also becoming an increasingly controversial institution in politics, with both Labour and Conservative using the NHS as a campaign and voting strategy. The demand of the NHS seemed endless and the services continued to grow in number, but this constant growth fueled by media and political attention only created a gap in which “what was possible and what was provided seemed to be widening.”

As the NHS continued to grow, so did the political debates surrounding it. Both Labour and Conservative argued over funding and regulation. In particular, many of the debates focused on the distribution of the financial burden to taxpayers and overall distribution of the national budget. Increases in immigration and national health crises became key factors in helping to politicize this institution. 

The British government has been defined by Conservative, Tory rule and a large variety of prime ministers for the past decade. As a result, the changes made to the NHS are rooted in Conservative policies. The recent downfall of the NHS is rooted in over a decade of underfunding from a Conservative government. 

A lack of staff and available resources destroyed the NHS. Waitlists for appointments are now a factor of daily life, forcing many citizens to wait months to receive basic care. This shortage has a death toll; in November of 2022, at least “1,488 patients are estimated to have died in Scotland as a result of waiting too long in emergency departments.” British citizens are dying in emergency rooms because nurses and doctors cannot tend to them with the urgency required but they are also slowly dying at home as they wait for an appointment. Delayed appointments are affecting overall well being according to a survey in which 25% of individuals said the wait for treatment has a “serious impact on their mental health” as over 7.2 million people are currently waiting for treatment. The inability of the NHS to properly support its citizens reveals a profound failure in matters of funding and organization. 

Identity Lost

Viewing the NHS strikes solely as a salary issue does not accurately portray the true issue at large. NHS employees are striking because the system is failing and the UK government is unwilling to help. The inability of the NHS to effectively provide for its patients reveals a far darker issue that goes beyond low salaries and inflation: The United Kingdom can no longer afford to take care of itself. 

The NHS is a tremendous source of pride for individuals all across the United Kingdom. In a recent study by Engage Britain, over 77% of British citizens polled stated that the NHS makes them feel proud to be British. However 20% of those surveyed also revealed that they had been forced to turn to private sector care due to limited appointments and resources. Private healthcare companies are growing rapidly as the “market for private health care in the United Kingdom has doubled since before the pandemic.” The growing influence of private healthcare across the UK demonstrates the dire nature of the situation. 

Perhaps that is why these strikes feel more intense than any other historically, and not just due to record turnout. The strikers are asking for more than a living wage; they are asking for a sense of dignity and pride that they can collectively unite behind, and above all they are asking for a sense of hope. The NHS strikes show a healthcare system that is clearly in shambles, but they also show a nation destroyed and without a unifying identity to rally behind. Even if the strikers and the government can come to an agreement based on each of their demands, it is unlikely that the true underlying issues of the strike will be solved anytime soon.

A Deliberate Strategy

Introduction

On February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine, violating the UN Charter and creating the largest threat to European unity and security since World War Two. While the threat to European security is undeniable, the threat posed to international humanitarian law is equally alarming. In the year since the invasion, more than 8,000 civilians have been killed and 8 million Ukrainians have become refugees. As the war continues and Russia retreats from regions it once occupied, evidence of possible violations of international law is being discovered. 

While media coverage in the West has focused on alleged violations committed by Russia, that does not mean Ukraine is innocent. In the eyes of the law, Russia and Ukraine are equal and they are held to the same standards. Any breach of those standards, even once, cannot and should not be tolerated because any potential violation that is not investigated or prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law risks being repeated, either in Ukraine or elsewhere by states who watch how this war is being conducted and think they can do the same. Understanding the various alleged violations of international law that have been committed by both sides since the war began is critical if we are to not repeat them and if there is to be any measure of justice once this war is over. There are people still alive today who remember the horrors of World War Two, who remember what this world was like without the Geneva Conventions to regulate the conduct of war. 

History of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Tensions between Russia and Ukraine can be traced back to 2004 and the Orange Revolution. The revolution began in November 2004 after the second-round results of the presidential election proclaimed Viktor Yanukovych the winner, despite exit polls showing opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko in the lead. The elections were marked by widespread voter fraud and corruption in favor of Yanukovych, the Kremlin’s candidate. Russian election monitors had “validated” the results of the run-off and proclaimed Yanukovych the winner. However, the Supreme Court of Ukraine annulled the results of the first run-off and ordered a repeat of the vote in December. Yushchenko won comfortably, much to the chagrin of people in eastern and southern Ukraine, as well as Russia. Yushchenko’s victory was a setback for Russia’s plans to keep Ukraine within its sphere of influence. However, Russia got its way in 2010 when Yanukovych became president after Yushchenko’s term was riddled with infighting and he failed to integrate Ukraine with the West.

Yanukovych’s presidency did not last long before he was ousted during the Euromaidan Revolution in 2013 when protests erupted across Ukraine after he rejected a deal that would have led to greater economic integration with the EU. The protests spread across the country and Yanukovych fled to Russia in February 2014. A month later, Russia annexed Crimea, citing a duty to protect the rights and lives of ethnic Russians, who comprise a majority of the Crimean population. Not long after the annexation, separatist groups in Luhansk and Donetsk in eastern Ukraine declared independence from Ukraine. Russia supported the separatist groups in the war against the Ukrainian military, with some reports suggesting that Russian soldiers had crossed the border and were fighting alongside the separatists and that some shelling had come from inside Russia. 

In 2015, Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany began negotiating the Minsk Accords, with “provisions for a ceasefire, withdrawal of heavy weaponry, and full Ukrainian control of the regions.” However, the agreement and ceasefire collapsed, and fighting resumed. In October 2021, Russia began substantially building up its troop presence on the Ukrainian border, with over 100,000 troops stationed there by the end of the year. In early February 2022, Russia deployed troops to its border with Belarus, surrounding Ukraine from the north, east, and south. Finally, on February 24, 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and the war has only deteriorated: more than 71,000 alleged war crimes are being investigated by the Ukrainian authorities. 

International Law

After World War Two, the international community agreed that the conduct of war needed to be regulated or the atrocities committed during that time would be repeated. The Geneva Conventions, which are the foundation of international humanitarian law (IHL), are a set of four treaties and three additional protocols that regulate how states can wage war. One of the innovations of the Geneva Conventions is the concept of grave breaches, which are the most serious breaches of the law of war. Grave breaches are unique in that they are only applicable in international armed conflicts (e.g., the current Russo-Ukrainian war). There are articles common throughout the four conventions (the Common Articles) that describe what a grave breach is. Articles 50 and 51 of the first and second conventions describe grave breaches as “wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body of health, and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.” Article 130 of the third convention includes the previous language, adding that “compelling a prisoner of war of the right of fair and regular trial prescribed in this Convention” is also a grave breach. Finally, Article 147 of the fourth convention, building on the three previous articles, includes “unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a protected person of the right of fair and regular trial” and the “taking of hostages.” Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions are legally and colloquially referred to as war crimes, which must be prosecuted by the High Contracting Parties. 

It is widely accepted that international human rights law (IHRL) is applicable during times of war and that principle has been affirmed by numerous international legal bodies. Even though states are technically allowed to derogate some of their responsibilities under IHRL, they are only allowed to do so “to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. The measures of derogation may not be inconsistent with the state’s other international obligations, such as those under IHL.” There are also certain human rights that are considered non-derogable, such as the right to life, the right to liberty and security, and freedom from torture and inhumane or degrading punishment. Crimes against humanity are the most serious breaches of international human rights law, including violations of non-derogable rights.

This is where international criminal law (ICL) becomes applicable. ICL applies to four broad sets of crimes: war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and the crime of aggression. These are the four crimes the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over, as outlined in the Rome Statute. The Rome Statute defines war crimes as both grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, as well as “other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict” such as intentionally targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure. The Rome Statute also has defined crimes against humanity as acts “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.” Examples of crimes against humanity include, but are not limited to, “murder, extermination, deportation or forcible transfer of population, imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty, torture, and rape, sexual slavery… and any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity.” Even though neither Russia nor Ukraine are state parties to the Rome Statute, war crimes and crimes against humanity committed on the territory of Ukraine are within the International Criminal Courts' jurisdiction because the situation was referred to the ICC by 43 state parties, and Ukraine lodged a declaration formally accepting the ICC's jurisdiction over crimes committed on the territory indefinitely.

Probable Violations of International Law

On October 18, the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine published a report detailing the findings of its investigation into events that occurred between February and March 2022 in the Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Sumy provinces of Ukraine. The Commission “has found reasonable grounds to conclude that an array of war crimes and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law have been committed in Ukraine since 24 February 2022.” Russian armed forces were responsible for the vast majority of war crimes and human rights violations. The Commission found that Russia most likely used explosive weapons indiscriminately in civilian areas, including indiscriminate attacks on residential buildings, schools, hospitals, and other buildings of non-military importance. Attacking civilian infrastructure not out of military necessity is a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions. Additionally, “The Commission found numerous cases in which Russian armed forces shot at civilians trying to flee to safety and obtain food or other necessities, which resulted in the killing or injury of the victims.” The Commission also found that “violations against personal integrity” were committed in the four provinces under Russian occupation. “These violations included summary executions, torture, ill-treatment, sexual and gender-based violence, unlawful confinement and detention in inhumane conditions, and forced deportations.” These are also grave breaches under the Geneva Conventions. Furthermore, the Commission found “a pattern of summary executions in areas temporarily occupied by Russian armed forces" including in Bucha, where over 400 people were executed during the month of Russian occupation. Many Ukrainian civilians were also illegally confined, tortured, and forcibly transferred to Russia. “Russian armed forces inflicted severe physical and mental pain and suffering upon the victims.” Sexual and gender-based violence was rampant with victims as young as 4 and as old as 83. Each of these crimes described by the Commission constitutes grave breaches under the Geneva Conventions and can be considered war crimes. 

Even though Russia is responsible for most of the violations of international law, Ukraine is not absolved of wrongdoing. The Commission also found evidence of war crimes committed by the Ukrainian armed forces. “The Commission has also documented two cases in which Ukrainian armed forces shot, wounded, and tortured captured soldiers of the Russian armed forces.” In the first case, between March 24 and March 26, Ukrainian soldiers deliberately shot three Russian prisoners of war while interrogating them. The second instance occurred on March 29 when a Ukrainian soldier shot an already wounded Russian soldier three times at close range. 

The Commission’s investigation was limited in scope. It only investigated violations of international law committed through March 2022. As more Russian forces began retreating, evidence of possible war crimes and other violations of international law have been reported. In September, the Ukrainian news agency, Ukrainska Pravda, reported that 447 bodies had been exhumed from a mass grave in Izium, Kharkiv Oblast. Most of the bodies are civilians and their exact causes of death will be investigated, although most show signs of violent death, and 30 showed evidence of torture. As stated above, attacking civilians is a war crime, and the evidence, in this case, speaks volumes, but it must be properly investigated for this to be definitively called a war crime. 

A Deliberate Strategy?

International law is clear, but it seems that every day the world discovers another possible war crime or another violation of human rights. This begs the question: why? Why violate the laws of war and international human rights law? The answer is different depending on which country you are asking about, even though the law is equally applied to both. "This equal application of IHL to both belligerents is particularly difficult to accept in the current situation, where Russia is the aggressor and therefore responsible for all human suffering in Ukraine, whether or not it results from violations of IHL and even when it is directly caused by Ukraine because even that would not have occurred if Ukraine had not to defend itself from the Russian invasion.” The answer to why Ukraine committed those two war crimes is very simple: self-defense. The extent to which committing war crimes is the best way to defend your country is questionable, but that is the reason. 

On the other hand, Russia appears to be violating international law as part of a deliberate strategy. In the months and days before the war, Vladimir Putin made a series of addresses to the nation. On July 12, 2021, Putin wrote an article titled “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” in which he wrote there is no historical basis for Ukrainian independence from Russia, that Ukraine is a product of historical Russia and as such owes its existence to Russia. In this article, Putin accused Ukraine of fratricide by forcing Russians to assimilate into Ukrainian culture to create an “ethnically pure Ukrainian state, aggressive towards Russia.” Ironically, Putin ends the article by stating “we respect the Ukrainian language and traditions. We respect Ukrainians’ desire to see their country free, safe, and prosperous,” but the only way to do that is by aligning itself with Russia.” 

Exactly eight months later, three days before the invasion, Putin addressed the nation, repeating the same sentiments on the historical unity of the two nations, and proclaiming that Ukraine “actually never had any stable traditions of real statehood.” On the day of the invasion, Putin's intention for Ukraine became clearer. He stated that Ukraine was perpetrating genocide against ethnic Russians. "The purpose of this operation is to protect people who… have been facing humiliation and genocide perpetrated by the Kyiv regime. To this end, we will seek to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine, as well as bring to trial those who perpetrated numerous bloody crimes against civilians, including against citizens of the Russian Federation.” Vladimir Putin’s thinly veiled eliminationist rhetoric is contrasted by the outright eliminationist rhetoric of Russian media pundits like Timofey Sergeytsev. At the beginning of the war, Sergeytsev called the Ukrainian masses “passive Nazis” and “accomplices of Nazism” and called for a “total lustration” of Nazis (i.e., the Ukrainian people and government). Sergeytsev, echoing Putin, wrote, “Ukraine, as history has shown, is impossible as a nation-state, and attempts to "build" one naturally lead to Nazism.” Any Russian citizen or soldier, reading these articles and listening to these speeches in the Russian state media echo chamber, would undoubtedly internalize this as the truth. Many Russians have: 74% support the military’s actions in Ukraine.

Russia has made it abundantly clear it does not recognize the existence of an independent Ukraine, going as far as saying that Ukraine is run by Nazis that need to be “liquidated.” To achieve this goal of demilitarizing and denazifying Ukraine, the Russian armed forces have been deliberately brutal towards civilians in the towns they occupied. For example, Germany’s foreign intelligence service, the BND, intercepted radio communications among Russian military personnel when they were north of Kyiv. One soldier said that they shot a person on a bicycle and another soldier said, “First you interrogate soldiers, then you shoot them.” Killing a civilian and prisoners of war are both violations of the Geneva Conventions.  Committing atrocities serves as a means to an end. By terrorizing civilians and committing gross violations of international law, Russia is trying to deter resistance and assert its dominance over the Ukrainian people. “Russia’s political goals in Ukraine lend themselves to violence against civilians, even more so after Moscow’s narrative shifted the motive for the war from liberating the Ukrainian population to cleansing it from “Nazi” elements.” Asserting control over the Ukrainian people can only be achieved by dehumanizing them to the point where they no longer have the will to fight back. 

Moving Forward

There is strong evidence both Russia and Ukraine have violated international law during this war. The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine found evidence of such violations, disproportionately committed by Russia. There is also evidence supporting that this is a deliberate strategy by Russia to assert control over the Ukrainian people. Atrocities do not happen in a vacuum, but when they happen, they must be documented and investigated with the utmost urgency and respect for the people harmed. There are currently numerous international and domestic investigations open, but investigations of this nature can take months, even years, to complete. The Commission of Inquiry needed seven months to investigate crimes committed in just one month. This war has lasted for over a year, so the world may not find out the extent of war crimes until long after the war has ended. This poses its own set of challenges. Witnesses could emigrate, evidence could be destroyed, and victims, who are severely traumatized, may need years before they can tell their stories. It is also highly improbable that Russia will cooperate with any investigation, seeing as it does recognize the authority of the International Criminal Court, nor does it recognize Ukraine as a sovereign nation. None of these challenges should deter the international community from investigating, documenting, indicting, and, hopefully, prosecuting these gross violations of international law. Europe has seen the ‘cleansing’ narrative before and it, along with the rest of the world, must set the precedent now that any crimes and violations of a similar nature in a similar context will be thoroughly investigated and prosecuted, lest they will be repeated.

Crumbs in the Breadbasket: A Global Food Crisis on the Horizon

In September 2022, Ukraine’s farmers began sowing winter wheat, rye, barley, and rapeseed with the echoes of Russian artillery and the smell of burning cities fresh in their minds. Many agricultural fields such as those in Ozera, Ukraine were cratered by rockets, flattened by tanks, and littered with the vestiges of war. Tractors started with no guarantee that Russia would respect Ukraine’s right to export grain from its Black Sea ports. Many of those who would be working in these fields were off fighting against the Russian military. Ukraine’s rich black soil and its seaports which give it access to international markets make the country a critical global agricultural exporter and is the reason why it is commonly referred to as “the breadbasket of Europe.” Unfortunately, Ukraine’s Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food anticipated the land dedicated to winter grain crops would decrease by up to 35 percent. The time and resources lost to Putin’s war not only threaten Europe’s food security but could cause a devastating disruption in global food distribution. The international community recognized this threat and has acted. In November 2022, Türkiye and the United Nations negotiated a deal to extend the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI), which assures Ukraine’s grain exports safe passage past Russian naval blockades, by 120 days. Although the BSGI took a critical step in staving off the worst consequences of a global food shortage, there is more to be done.

As the March expiration-date soon approaches, Russia has telegraphed that reupping the crucial deal will come with some foot-dragging. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Vershinin said during a February 13 interview that without the “real removal of sanctions restrictions on Russian agricultural exports,” the extension of the deal is “inappropriate.” However, this statement bends reality, because Western sanctions have not explicitly targeted Russian agricultural exports. Moscow has argued that blocks on its payments, logistics, and insurance industries are a “barrier” to the export of grains and fertilizers. The Kremlin seems to be using the threat of a global food crisis to further its own interests and weaken Ukraine’s economy.

Moscow is not too proud to hide its intentions. As a condition of the BSGI, joint teams from Ukraine, Russia, the United Nations, and Türkiye must inspect each ship to prevent the arrival or departure of unauthorized cargo and passengers. Ukrainian ship inspector Ruslan Sakhautdinov claims that his Russian counterparts systematically delay inspections by double and triple-checking fuel gages and scrutinizing crewmembers’ personal belongings. The practice has become routine and created serious backlogs. In October 2022, Istanbul’s typically beautiful sunrise on the Marmara Sea was littered with 165 cargo ships waiting for inspection. In January 2023, Ukraine exported 3.1 million tonnes of grain which fell far short of its 5 million tonne goal. In fact, the BSGI has not once met its goal since the deal was signed in August. October was the month that came closest to the target— when 194 ships were cleared for passage exporting 4.3 million tonnes of grain (compared to the 85 ships in January). October’s brief success was thanks to Moscow stepping away from the deal which in consequence allowed for the Ukrainian, U.N., and Turkish inspectors to work without the obstruction of their Russian colleagues.

One consequence is that, as the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service observed in January, “Ukraine farm prices remain low due to the increased stockpiles and decrease in export demand as some countries shifted to other suppliers.” Facing market volatility and lower expected returns, many of Ukraine’s wheat producers have made the calculation that it is in their best interest to plant fewer acres so that they aren’t stuck with silos of grain which can’t be sold. Russian farmers on the other hand have increased their grain production and exports since the war started. However, they don’t have the capacity to supplant Ukraine’s agricultural losses. Moscow has critically damaged Ukraine’s production capabilities and continues to undermine global food networks with threats to the BSGI.

Russia’s actions come as World Food Programme (WFP) boss David Beasley stressed at the Munich Security Conference that nonrenewal of the grain deal would be catastrophic for millions in Africa who are on the cusp of starvation. Beasley noted too that the initiative’s current grain flows have still not been sufficient for the needs of poorer countries that are reliant on regional exports.

Together, Ukraine and Russia constitute 12 percent of the global market share in calories. The most vulnerable countries to food shortages share some common characteristics. They typically (although not all applicable) are reliant on Ukrainian and Russian imports, are low-income, have active conflicts, and lack robust internal food distribution systems. Countries in the Middle East & North Africa (MENA), Central Asia, and Eastern Africa are most at-risk due to the Ukraine conflict. In the MENA region, Jordan, Yemen, Israel, and Lebanon are most vulnerable. Armenia (92 percent of its grain imports come from Ukraine and Russia), Azerbaijan, and Georgia are the most vulnerable Central Asian countries. In Eastern Africa, the countries with the highest reliance on Ukraine and Russian grain imports are Eritrea, Rwanda, Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, Kenya, Djibouti, Burundi, and Ethiopia.

The Brussels-based thinktank Bruegel in March 2022 following Russia’s invasion anticipated the global food implications of the conflict and forecasted three possible scenarios. In their worst-case scenario, Ukraine would need all of its grain for domestic consumption and exports fell 100 percent year-over-year. Thankfully this has not materialized and unless there is a dramatic turn in the war (possibly from Russian use of strategic nuclear warheads), this will scenario will remain a hypothetical. The second worst-case scenario would see Ukraine export half of its normal production. In the best-case scenario, Ukraine would export roughly 70 percent of its normal production. The current situation hovers in between the second-worst case and best-case scenarios. Although Ukraine exported 23.6 million tonnes of grain in the 2022/23 season (70.4% of its exports from the same stage the year prior), decreases in production will allow Ukraine to harvest only 51 million tonnes which is 59 percent of 2021 pre-war harvests.

High food prices also pose a danger to global food security. In the first stages of Russia’s War in Ukraine, food prices lept and the greatest costs were felt in low-income countries. For instance in August 2022, it cost Ayan Hassan Abdirahman— a mother of 11 children who lives in the capital of Somalia— twice as much as it did just months before to buy the wheat flour that she needs to prepare breakfasts. Increases in crude oil prices and disruption to Russian fertilizer exports have increased food production costs globally. These consequences are most visible in the ports of Brazil. The South American country is the 4th largest agricultural producer in the world and imports 85 percent of the fertilizer it requires— mostly from Russia. Sea ports across the country reached their maximum capacity due to growing stockpiles of imported fertilizer. Farmers were unable to purchase the products, delaying the sowing process, because the price of fertilizer became too expensive. In recent months, prices have decreased but are still roughly 150 percent more expensive than the 5-year average. The higher cost of production will result in higher food prices which would be unreachable from millions globally without international assistance.

WFP estimates that today 349 million people across 79 countries are facing acute food insecurity (which the Global Network Against Food Crises defines as when a person’s inability to consume food puts their life into immediate danger). This number rose nearly 200 million from pre-pandemic levels. 60 percent of the world’s malnourished populations live in areas affected by armed conflict which makes the successful delivery of food assistance more difficult. Food insecurity can be both begotten and beget violence with the notable examples of the 1789 French Revolution and the 2011 Arab Spring which were precipitated by historically-high food prices. Global food instability caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine would not only be a dramatic humanitarian catastrophe but could bring a massive destabilizing event to the world order.

Although the situation seems overwhelming, many policymakers and groups such as the Consortium of International Agricultural Research Centers (CGIAR) propose solutions to systematically reduce the risks and consequences of a global food crisis. CGIAR emphasizes the importance of reliable, real-time data analyses of food and input price volatility which can inform appropriate international and national policy responses. Governments must provide their farmers with targeted subsidies for productivity-enhancing inputs, machinery, fertilizer, and energy costs to increase yields in low and medium productivity environments. International assistance must be provided to low-income countries so that the higher costs of inputs is not passed onto consumers. Governments should invest in sustainable crops which require less water than wheat and barley and can better survive climate shocks such as quinoa and seaweed. However, not all policy responses are made equal and many government interventions could worsen the situation. Experts recommend that countries should avoid sanctions and export restrictions on food and fertilizer products and refrain from hoarding or panic buying input-products. This is not a crisis of anyone but Vladimir Putin’s making, yet it is incumbent upon the international community to make comprehensive policy solutions so that the world’s breadbasket can hold enough for everyone.

The Reports of the UN’s Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated

Disclaimer: The author is currently an intern for the United Nations within the Department of Peace Operations. This article was written by the author entirely in his personal capacity. The opinions expressed in this article are entirely the author's own and do not reflect the view of the Department of Peace Operations or the United Nations as a whole.

When Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24th, 2022 it was one of the most  geopolitically destabilizing events since the end of the Cold War. Every major international  organization and national government has been challenged and forced to re-evaluate its role in an  increasingly dangerous world. NATO has begun to add traditionally neutral Sweden and Finland  to bolster their eastern flank, while the European Union has organized severe sanctions against  Russia and temporarily resettled millions of Ukrainian refugees. No organization has perhaps  faced as much criticism as the UN. The popular perception that the UN has been impotent in  Ukraine and gridlocked elsewhere because of great power conflict couldn’t be further from the  truth. Despite the looming threat of a Russian veto, the UN has been able to help Ukraine as well  as conducting business as usual elsewhere. While there is room for improvement, this success  should be greater recognized. 

In the immediate aftermath of the invasion, the criticism of the UN was harsh. Russia, a  permanent member of the Security Council charged with upholding the UN Charter, had  blatantly violated the Charter with the UN wholly unable to prevent it. One observer described it  as an “extraordinary failure of the UN Security Council to live up to its primary responsibility to  maintain international peace and security.” Another said that there is “no better example of the  United Nations’ failure to live up to its founding ideal.” A third argued that the UN “became a  forum of superpower rivalry.” 

This has been accompanied by predictions that the UN will become increasingly  dysfunctional and unresponsive to international needs and calls for the UN to either be seriously  reformed or replaced entirely. Ukrainian President Zelenskyy has repeatedly called on the UN to  boot Russia from its permanent seat on the Security Council, and the UN general assembly has passed a resolution mandating they meet after a veto. This has been accompanied by more  outlandish proposals to disband the UN entirely and create a successor organization based  exclusively around democratic states. In the short term, there were grim predictions for UN  effectiveness. Seasoned UN observer Richard Gowan argued “the Security Council (is) facing a  period of increasing fragmentation and paralysis.”  

The UN, however, has been able to beat back these excessively pessimist predictions. In  Ukraine, the UN under Secretary-General António Guterres has been able to organize  humanitarian aid for Ukrainian civilians, mediate several key agreements that have helped  reduce the potential international impacts of the conflict, and galvanize international opinion against Russia in the UN General Assembly. Outside of Ukraine, Russia and the other great  powers have shown a remarkable ability to cooperate through the UN on other international  issues such as the Afghan crisis, despite massive disagreements over Ukraine. 

With regards to the Ukraine war, the UN and its various organs and agencies have proven  surprisingly able to reduce the conflict’s human suffering, despite the ever-present threat of a  Russian veto on their activities. While these efforts have so far been unable to end the conflict  entirely, they still show that the UN can provide value during a crisis. 

Guterres, has emerged as a key part of the shuttle diplomacy system that allows for  Russo-Ukrainian negotiations. For instance, he visited both Moscow and Kyiv in April in an  attempt to broker a ceasefire. While this effort failed, it positioned the Secretary-General so he  could negotiate two important agreements between the two states. First, he arranged for a UN-led  civilian evacuation mission from the besieged city of Mariupol. The UN and the Red Cross  would evacuate over 600 civilians on May 12th, only a few weeks after the Secretary-General's  visit. In July, the UN and the Turkish government would broker a deal that let several Russian and Ukrainian ports export wheat and other agricultural products to the rest of the world. While  the implementation of this deal has been at times shaky, the deal is critical. The war runs a  significant risk of sparking famine and high food prices in the Global South, due to a previous  inability to export grain from Russian and Ukrainian Black Sea ports. If this deal continues to  hold, the risk of mass famine and food instability will be minimized throughout the world. 

The UN has also been able to provide on the ground aid to those most affected by the  conflict, Ukrainian civilians. The UN’s various humanitarian aid services, including the World  Food Program (WFP) and World Health Organization (WHO) amongst others, have provided  basic services to over 11.5 million Ukrainians. The UN has provided over 250,000 children with  education, over 1.5 million with food, and over 8.5 million with medical care as of September  14th. This is despite the fact that the Russian government, which has frequently attacked  civilians over the course of the conflict, has significant influence on where and how the UN  operates as a result of the country’s permanent membership on the UNSC.  

Russia doesn’t, however, have veto power over the UN General Assembly. The General  Assembly, which doesn’t have the ability to make legally enforceable resolutions like the  Security Council, is still a key way to gauge international opinion. The general assembly acted  swiftly following Russia’s February invasion. The General Assembly took advantage of United  Nations General Assembly Resolution 377 (the “Uniting for Peace '' resolution), which lets the  general assembly begin an emergency session if the P5 fails to act on a matter of international  security. This was the first time that “Uniting for Peace '' was activated since 1997. The General  Assembly would pass General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1, which deplored Russia’s invasion  and demanded they withdraw their forces from Ukraine. The actual vote was a disaster for  Russia, with 141 states voting in support and only five opposed. This decisive vote left Russia isolated diplomatically, and empowered the US and EU to further support Ukraine and sanction  Russia safe in the knowledge that there would be little international backlash. While the UN has served a useful role within the Ukrainian conflict, its ability to manage  conflict outside of Ukraine is also notable. Despite the frequently espoused new era of great  power competition that has accompanied the Russian invasion, the UN has still been largely able  to maintain its prior ability to manage international security. 

Before the invasion, many international observers thought that Afghanistan would be the  UN’s most pressing issue of 2022. The Taliban victory has caused a massive humanitarian and  financial crisis throughout the country, the response to which has been constrained by an  American unwillingness to recognize and (implicitly) assist the new Taliban regime. After the  Russian Invasion of Ukraine, many observers worried that the UNSC would be unable to work  together on Afghanistan. These fears came to a head in March, only a few weeks after the  invasion, when the mandate for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan  (UNAMA) needed to be authorized. Despite concerns that the Russians might veto the extension,  the Russians abstained and UNAMA was re-authorized with an expanded humanitarian and  political mandate. 

The UN has also been able to continue its peace and security functions even when there is  a direct Russian interest. The Russian mercenary Wagner Group is currently highly active in  Mali, where they are supporting the military junta and frequently massacre civilians, The military regime, with the support of Russia, has begun to move away from its traditional security  partners and limit the ability of the local UN peacekeeping mission, MINUSMA, to protect  civilians and monitor human rights abuses. Given that MINUSMA is frequently in conflict with  the Russian-backed Malian military regime, a Russian veto of the operation would be in its interests. However, MINUSMA was reauthorized in June, with Russia and China abstaining.  While the resolution did little to improve MINUSMA capabilities, the fact that it passed at all  shows that the UN can still pass meaningful resolutions in a post-Ukraine world. 

After the invasion, the permanent member of the Security Council decided to pursue a  strategy of “compartmentalization.” While the P5 would trade sanctions and extraordinarily  harsh language over Ukraine, they agreed to try to avoid letting that “poison the well” with other  issues. UN observer Richard Gowan, who previously said “the Security Council (is) facing a  period of increasing fragmentation and paralysis,” now argues that compartmentalization appears  to have largely worked. This is because doing so remains in both the national interests of Russia,  America, and Europe. For American and Europe, it continues to let the UN continue an agenda  they broadly support. For Russia, it keeps diplomatic channels open, prevents further  international isolation, and lets them influence UN operations by threatening, but not using, the  veto. While the situation in Ukraine demonstrates the continued limited ability of the UN to  intervene in a conflict where a P5 state is a party to the conflict, its action outside of Ukraine  shows that it still has its uses. 

While the Russian invasion of Ukraine is the most destabilizing international event in decades, it isn’t unprecedented in the UN’s history. Nearly two decades prior, another permanent member of the Security Council launched an invasion of another state in brazen violation of the UN Charter. While the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine have several key differences, they sparked similar outcries and criticisms of the UN. In the decades since the war, however, the UN has been able to support peace in war torn countries, provide humanitarian assistance to millions, and foster economic development. It’s important to keep these successes in mind as we visualize the role of the UN in a post-invasion world order.

Strong Together: Why Europe’s Security Crises Invite Opportunities for Cooperation

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen delivered this year’s State of the Union address in Strasbourg, France, like every other year. But events still occurring in another location far to her east dominated her thoughts and remarks. Though she waxed poetic about Europe’s united and swift response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine this February, von der Leyen did not mince her words about the dangers remaining for Europe: “this is a war on our energy, a war on our economy, a war on our values and a war on our future.”

Ukrainians bear the biggest brunt of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war against their nation, but its ramifications extend across the European continent. The conflict presents a security dilemma with immediate and lasting dimensions, as well as domestic and external implications. In particular, Europe has recognized the necessity of indigenous military capacity, prompting renewed focus on defense spending. More abrupt, perhaps, is the challenge of securing energy supply as winter approaches and many countries can no longer look to Russia. A significant rethink is accordingly underway in most capitals about how much to trust Moscow as long as it is led by Putin or someone likeminded, rewriting the playbook of currying a cooperative relationship through security pacts and economic exchange.

Although some European Union (EU) member-states face more daunting threats than others, this new security environment imperils the entire bloc. It also presents overwhelming incentive for enhanced cooperation across national borders. Several member-states, however, from those friendly with Moscow to those skeptical of deeper alignment to those whose political landscape skews nationalistic, may not be as keen on “more Europe” in these times. As the Euractiv Green Brief newsletter suggests, von der Leyen likely aimed her comments at “national governments who tend to pursue national interests when confronted with crises on a European scale.” 

Unilateralism would squander this opportunity. The impetus to pool resources is not simply for European integration’s sake, but because multilateral action could deliver better results. Not only would joint development, purchasing, and planning of military capabilities yield a more formidable Europe, but current energy insecurity endangers the European market and threatens to leave citizens literally out in the cold. Though von der Leyen’s address was promising, the present challenge is to translate her sentiment into attitude and action.

Toward a Geopolitical Europe

February 24, the day Putin launched his most recent invasion of Ukraine, is seen as a turning point for Europe. With Washington’s support, Brussels quickly marshaled numerous sanctions packages that have eroded Russia’s post-Cold War economic progress and upended its relationship with Moscow. Since then, the European Commission has adopted a more “geopolitical” approach, embracing candidate status for Ukraine and Moldova, and becoming more deeply involved in Europe’s foreign policy toward Russia. At the core of these developments is a recognition that efforts to build a constructive relationship with Russia since 1991 have failed. 

Germany’s recent history with Russia underscores these challenges. Berlin pursued Russian energy resources, even after Putin’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, through natural gas pipelines like Nord Stream 2, believing sustained commerce might incentivize Russia to temper its foreign policy so as to sustain such lucrative arrangements. Europe hoped Putin was truly “rational,” or, as writes Nathalie Tocci of Italian think-tank Istituto Affari Internazionali, subscribing to “a rationality that puts material interests above ideology.” But despite the threat of losing Germany’s business, Putin launched his attack on Ukraine and cut supply to European countries as retribution for supporting Kyiv. Reflecting on the unfolding war, then-recently elected German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock acknowledged that Europeans should have diversified their energy imports to rely less on Russia years ago, as “energy policy is always power policy… always security policy.” Because Putin has used energy as a political tool since the invasion, and indeed in other moments in the past two decades, this ideal relationship based on sanctity of contract, interdependence, and trade is unlikely.

Putin’s behavior seeks to anchor Ukraine in Moscow’s mir, or world, consistent with the Russian president’s conception of upholding Russian civilization and great power status. That Kyiv could opt to “join the West” through pursuit of EU or NATO membership was thus an unacceptable prospect, especially considering Putin’s view that the Western world is incompatible with Russia’s. This sense of historical right, if taken to its conclusions, is a different mode of thinking than that which underpins the European project, which in theory rejects sphere of influence politics and embraces the sort of peace through common progress that makes the EU’s promise so special. Because this undertaking does not interest Putin, the EU should adapt and fortify itself, not in the pursuit of war but of internal security. This pertains especially to the two most glaring areas: defense capabilities and energy.

Building European Defense Capability

In recent years, an increasingly complex security situation has imperiled Europe’s defense. The continent relies on U.S. capabilities, including military aid, troops, and large-scale sophisticated firepower, to guarantee its security. Though EU member-states’ military budgets have increased since Putin’s incursion in Crimea in 2014, Donald Trump’s presidency sparked unique concern over American commitment to Europe, given his questioning of NATO commitments and transactional approach to foreign policy. Most rank-and-file Republican lawmakers still support NATO, but a growing, vocal wing of the party shares Trump’s antipathy toward Europe. 

Perhaps the most durable shift in U.S. politics, however, is a bipartisan prioritization of great-power competition with China, auguring a strategic shift toward the Indo-Pacific. Though war in Ukraine returned considerable focus to Europe, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan reaffirmed the Biden administration’s view of China as “the most consequential geopolitical challenge,” a belief echoed by the most recent U.S. national security strategy. Realizing these trends will persist, Europeans – notably French President Emmanuel Macron – have emphasized a need for “strategic autonomy,” or development of continental defense apart from Washington. So long as these efforts do not replace NATO or entirely reject the United States, but instead enhance existing systems, Europe will better insure itself against U.S. domestic volatility and strategic shifts as well as external threats by adopting this path.

The Ukraine crisis has introduced new urgency by demonstrating that war is still possible on the continent and that lack of preparation will prove costly. Europe’s dilemma thus remains improving capabilities in a productive manner, fearing that a lack of coordination and planning will limit the benefit of any additional spending. In EU High Representative Josep Borrell’s words, “after the Cold War, we shrunk our forces to bonsai armies. If each European state just increases its military capabilities… the result will be a big waste of resources. We’ll just have 27 bigger bonsais.” The EU has little competence over military strategy and, like NATO, does not have its own independent armed forces separate from the member-states. Its initiatives instead rely on the contributions of national forces.

Building the necessary technology will prove daunting. Ian Bond and Luigi Scazzieri of the Centre for European Reform write that, given current spending promises, it will still take years to procure necessary equipment and higher inflation rates will erode the value of new spending. And because the EU does not have a unified defense industrial base from which to draw, capacity development between member-states is limited and procurement processes remain biased toward national companies. This leaves European countries vulnerable to duplication and financial or practical obstacles. For example, two fighter aircraft programs in progress – one between Britain, Italy, and Sweden and another between France, Germany, and Spain – may both take longer and cost far more than might occur with greater cooperation, as both struggle to achieve economies of scale. Further, without common agreement on standardization and interoperability, EU member-states could find collaboration difficult in times of crisis. 

For its part, Brussels seeks to facilitate this process through initiatives like Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) aimed at easing integration of member-states’ armed forces. The European Commission is also preparing proposals to incentivize joint procurement of weapons through VAT waivers and update the European Defense Fund (EDF) accordingly. Such steps toward greater multilateral planning could help maximize the defense of the European project and, in turn, each individual member.

Powering a New Energy Security

The more immediate concern for most EU member-states, however, is energy insecurity and economic havoc, especially with the downgrading of EU-Russia energy trade. As Jason Bordoff and Meghan L. O’Sullivan caution in Foreign Affairs, Moscow is “the dominant supplier of natural gas to Europe and a major exporter of coal and the low-enriched uranium used to power nuclear plants.” Some member-states like Lithuania or France rely less on Russia for energy to varying degrees, but before war broke out, others like Germany and several Central European counterparts counted on supplies from the east. Even before the EU’s ban on Russian oil imports, the European Commission and member-states like Italy resorted to a diplomatic blitz in preparation for a harsh winter without a key source. 

Russia progressively sealed the spigots to several countries over the course of the summer, weaponizing energy trade. With commodity prices so high, persistent supply disruptions threaten to worsen inflation and usher in a recession with global ramifications. Europe has turned to alternatives in lieu of Russia, between bilateral agreements and large-scale deals with partners like Norway, Algeria, Qatar, and Azerbaijan, to compensate for vulnerability. The United States has been supplying more liquified natural gas (LNG) than expected, resulting from the European Commission’s energy diplomacy early on in the crisis. These efforts have hardly been for naught; EU gas storages are 90% full and von der Leyen has expressed confidence ahead of winter. Among the most vulnerable are Central and Eastern European countries lacking the infrastructure to diversify quickly. However, bilateral deals like the one Greece and Bulgaria have reached on a long-delayed gas pipeline, providing the latter with an affordable alternative to its usual Russian flow, are promising. 

European countries’ collective efforts have evidently already yielded dividends. However, continued consensus may be necessary to deal with two additional challenges: weathering price fluctuations and ensuring future supply, especially ahead of the winter of 2023. Member-states have increasingly been engaging Brussels given the implications of energy policy in the European market. Discussion of price caps has dominated, alongside Germany’s announcement of a relief package worth 200 billion euros for households and businesses, which has attracted widespread criticism for undermining a level playing field in the single market. Whatever the result of these debates, divergent national measures threaten to unsettle markets and fracture an integrated approach to energy, which is why continued bloc-wide solutions to additional challenges like decreasing consumer demand are of paramount importance.

On the supply front, Ben McWilliams, Simone Tagliapietra, and Georg Zachmann write that the EU stands the best chance if member-states pool their resources with an eye to securing supply for the entire bloc if necessary. Just as with national defense capacities, having 27 different energy strategies makes the pursuit of EU-wide supply more costly and risks leaving some countries out in the cold. If breakthroughs on other fronts arrive, such as on the stalled pipeline between Spain and France, Europe would further be equipped to supply all of its members, especially with future winters in mind.

“Forged in Crisis”

As new obstacles confront the EU, a united front presents the greatest chance of success at handling them. Countries like Hungary – whose prime minister, Viktor Orban, maintains close ties with Putin – within the bloc are cumbersome realities that must be managed. Further, governments must stand firm in their support of Ukraine through sanctions on Russia when the temperature drops. Brussels has been quite active in and recognizing a new geopolitical imperative and seeking a uniform policy since February. However, not all authority needs to be centralized in Brussels for member-states to communicate with each other. This is significant, considering governments skeptical of greater European integration but seemingly likely to support Ukraine and improved European defense, like the one likely to form in Italy following September’s elections, can still engage productively in building European capacity.

It has long been said that the EU is forged in crisis. Russia’s behavior has granted EU member-states even more reason to mold a new security architecture, from heating homes this winter to deterring future aggression for years to come. Though Putin continues to wreak havoc on Ukraine, the EU can emerge a more capable ally by fortifying its own security. The chilling scenes emanating from Europe’s east this year are stark warnings of a new geopolitical relationship to come, but also reason to take action. If member-states maintain their momentum and unify behind this common motivation, they can realize von der Leyen’s goal of “a union that stands strong together,” and turn platitude into prophecy.

The World’s Economy Weakens Amid Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

On 24 February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine in a major escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian War, which began in 2014. Ever since, the effects of this invasion have been felt by most – if not all – countries around the world. The Russia-Ukraine war has significantly impacted the economy and stability of many nations that heavily relied on both Ukraine and Russia for trade and supply chains. 

Covid-19, a two-year long pandemic that greatly disrupted global markets and Europe’s economy due to the fact that many were forced to stay at home for an extended period of time, which caused trade and production to slow down, causing the Gross Domestic Product of many nations to collapted. As the continent was resurging from a two year global pandemic that greatly impacted its economic stability, the war triggered by Russia only weakened an already frail economy.

Worldwide, consumers can feel the weight of this conflict that has disrupted supply chains and affected many global markets, more specifically the global energy market. As a response to this conflict, many nations have imposed economic sanctions on Russia, in the sole purpose to economically pressure the country to put an end to this war that had already cost the lives of many. The volatility in European energy markets caused by the European Union  and United Kingdom sanctions on Russian energy - imposed in retaliation for Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February - have cut out a slice out of the continent's economy. 

The disruption of supply chain and trade caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has led to an increase in the price of many goods, energy, and gas related goods in many European nations, which has created inflation throughout the continent.The reason for such increase in price is due to the fact that many nations were heavily dependent on Russia and Ukraine for many goods. Most importantly, Russia was an important oil and energy trade partner with European nations. Inflation is a general increase in the prices of goods and services in an economy. Inflation affects the economy of a country by increasing the price of food, energy, higher utility cost, while not receiving an increase in wages and higher interest rates on home loans which negatively affect consumers, and thus the economy, as inflation lowers the purchasing power of many.

Inflation is a hard thing to get rid of in an economy. Triggered by the disruption of trade as a consequence of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, policy makers and governments are actively attempting to mitigate the negative effects of inflation on their country’s economy. However, while inflation remains a big issue in Europe and the rest of the world, the energy market is slowly collapsing under the sanctions against Russia.

As a response to inflation, the European Central Bank, the Bank of England and other central banks across Europe have aggressively raised interest rates to bring down high inflation. Raising interest rates is an economic policy used for the sole purpose to slow the economy down and bring down inflation. As a result of high interest rates, companies and individuals will cut back on spending, which will naturally bring down the price of goods and services that were previously increased due to the disruption of global markets. 

While interest rates rise around the world, stocks and bonds are being sold off. The reason behind which bonds are being sold off is that when interest rates rise, new bonds pay investors higher interest rates than old bonds, so old bonds tend to fall in price. Inflation caused by political instability  has led to this increase in interest rates as well as stocks to go down, which further highlights the lack of confidence in the economy from consumers, investors, and businesses. In a bear market—stock prices are falling—consumers and companies have less wealth and optimism—leading to less spending and lower GDP.

Households have found it challenging throughout the continent to keep up with inflation. While inflation results from changes in the cost of a market basket of goods, wages, on the other hand, are driven by changes to supply/demand for labor. As the weight of this conflict weighs on the shoulders of consumers and governments, Russia’s current economic and political instability keeps on harming the global economy, while disrupting markets.

While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has greatly disrupted supply chain, trade, and global markets, all of which have had negative repercussions on Europe’s economy, the most important challenge to consider as to this day is the energy crisis that nations have been facing and are currently facing as a result of this bloody conflict. 

The repercussions of the war in Ukraine have "distorted" the natural gas market, leading to higher energy prices. Indeed, natural gas, used to generate electricity and heat, is now about ten times more expensive than it would have been a year ago. Electricity prices, which are tied to the price of gas, are also several times higher than what was considered reasonable. The reason behind such volatility in natural gas prices is due to the fact that Russia is an important producer of natural gas and thus, its role in trade is crucial.  The rise in natural gas’ prices is a fear that Europe will run out of gas this winter. 

On the bright side, governments are actively attempting to stem the energy crisis. European Union countries, such as Germany and the Netherlands, are scrambling to fill gas storage facilities to guard against a possible complete shutdown of Russian gas this winter. Governments have also taken steps to secure additional supplies in the form of liquefied natural gas from the United States and other countries. While France and other countries provide financial assistance to consumers, but not enough to offset the dramatic increase in costs faced by households. A wide range of politicians, consumer advocates and even energy executives are calling on governments to do much more.

The European Central Bank, which oversees economic policy for the 19 nations that use the euro, took an aggressive step to fight inflation with its biggest rate hike ever, three-quarters of a percentage point. 

European Union ministers were scheduled to meet on September 9th to discuss a plan to intervene in energy markets in order to control prices. At this meeting, they have discussed strategies that could include price caps and mandatory cuts in energy consumption.

The sharp drop in supplies from Russia, which previously provided about 40 per cent of the European Union's gas needs, has left governments scrambling to find alternative energy resources and raised fears of possible power cuts and a recession. After suffering an increase in the price of many goods amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, citizens of many countries now fear spending a winter in the cold, as the price of energy is going up. 

Nations across the continent are still attempting to fight inflation through different economic policies, the main one being the rise of interest rates by central banks. Although this has proven to be an efficient method to bring down prices and ultimately lower inflation, this method has also led to a collapse in the stock market. Ultimately, nations are attempting to find alternatives for natural gas, alternatives that will be less costly and harmful to their economies. 

Putin, President of Russia, offered the European continent gas through Nord Stream 2. Nord Stream is a natural gas pipeline through the Baltic Sea. The pipeline is a key factor in securing energy security in Europe. For many, this was interesting news, knowing that the country has been reducing gas supplies through Nord Stream 1 for a number of months. While this reduction in gas supplies is affecting many countries, Germany has been the most affected by it, as Russia contributed to 55% of its natural gas. Additionally, the pipelines were damaged, which only further impacted gas supplies, while having a negative impact on the environment. 

Aware of the natural gas shortage that Europe is currently facing, Putin offered Europe gas through Nord Stream 2. Germany, on the other hand, said it would not take Russian gas via the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which has become a major focus of the Ukrainian crisis. Indeed, accepting Russia’s offer now would only go against all of the economic sanctions that were set up against the country to mitigate the repercussions of the crisis that has already affected the world’s economy. While nations seek alternatives to find natural gas, accepting gas from Russia would benefit Putin and his country, as he attempts to gain political power, and economic dominance, amid the war that he started back in February of 2022. 

Political and economic instability persist across Europe as relations with Russia are tense. Economic sanctions against the nation have proven to be effective, even if they are harming the world’s economy in the short run, through the disruption of global markets that have weakened the economy of many European countries. In the long run, the economy will self-adapt to these new changes in global financial markets, but in the meantime, governments are attempting to find in which they can alleviate economic and political tensions, in the sole purpose to achieve economic prosperity while improving relations between Russia and its trading partners.

As of today, it seems as if the future of Europe lies within the hands of Russia. The country’s next steps in this crisis will ultimately affect the economic and political stability of neighboring nations. Until Russia puts an end to this war, the world will feel its negative  repercussions. 

It’s Looking a Lot like 1979 in the UK… or Is It?

I am not the first to note that Queen Elizabeth II’s death on September 8th, 2022 heralds the end of an era. For many, her presence was the one constant during these past seventy years of change, and her death has come at the tail end of a summer representing a fork in the road for Britain. Public uncertainty surrounding the fate of the monarchy has also become representative of the general sense of unease that the United Kingdom has dealt with over the past year. In the few months since Boris Johnson stepped down, inflation has skyrocketed, energy bills have nearly doubled, the pound sterling has slumped nearly to parity with the dollar, strikes have continued to intensify, the airlines have continued to face challenges, and public satisfaction with the much-lauded National Health System (NHS) is at an all-time low. As such, it comes to nobody’s surprise that the very real fears of a recession have dominated the headlines. All of this comes at the heels of a fraught few years of former PM Boris Johnson’s repeated scandals, echoes of the coronavirus pandemic, and the continued economic fallout of Brexit.

To anyone who gives even a cursory look to 20th century British history, it is hard to stave off comparisons to the political and economic situation that gripped the UK in the mid to late 1970s, which was also characterized by internal turmoil. During the unprecedented freezing winter of 1978-1979, the so-called Winter of Discontent took hold, during which the country realized the status quo was no longer tenable. Over forty years later, the country seems poised at an eerily similar turning point. While the winter of 1979 heralded Margaret Thatcher’s rise to power, the 2022 so-called “Summer of Discontent” has left the country with new Prime Minister Liz Truss. Ms. Truss has famously attempted to fashion herself as a second Thatcher, and while there are similarities between the two, there are 40 years between them and the contexts in which they are operating. While there isn’t a single solution to fix national sentiment, Britain must understand that Truss is no Thatcher and that the new government must take immediate strides for structural reform, or face a series of dark, recessionary years in the foreseeable future.

For context, in the two decades following the Second World War, Britain experienced an economic "Golden Age”, during which the country experienced its fastest ever economic growth, 2% unemployment, the construction of national motorways, increased productivity, housing construction, the establishment of a strong welfare state, and overall raised standards of living. The prosperity reached such a degree that in 1959, Queen Magazine–now Harper’s Bazaar–declared that “Britain has launched into an age of unparalleled lavish living,” where average wage was high and unemployment low. Keynesian economic thinking came to dominate the post- war economic consensus, and Britain enjoyed nearly twenty years of economic success. All of this came to a screeching halt in the mid 1970’s.

Even though the UK finally entered the European Economic Community in 1972, throughout the decade, Britain experienced mass strikes by coal miners and rail workers, the effects of the 1973 oil crisis, and widespread blackouts due to lack of available electricity. Unemployment rose once again, exceeding 5%, and inflation peaked at a staggering 25%. In 1976, the Labour Government was forced to borrow $3.9 billion from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to prop up the value of the pound sterling, which had severely dropped in value in relation to the dollar. All of which culminated in the aforementioned Winter of Discontent, where nearly every industrial union went on strike. This included everyone from gravediggers to waste collectors, NHS employees, and truck drivers. They demanded pay raises greater than the limits the Labour government was willing to give, as the government was desperate to tamp down inflation. The strikes caused massive public unrest and inconvenience amid unprecedented freezing temperatures. Unsurprisingly, the Labour government fell in 1979 and Margaret Thatcher was elected as Prime Minister.

Thatcher is perhaps the most controversial figure in modern British politics, equally reviled and beloved. Her government marked a new era in economic policy, adopting what is recognizable to Americans as traditional conservative policies. This included deregulation, privatization, an emphasis on the free market, an overhaul of relations with labor unions, and massive tax cuts. The government adopted stringent economic and fiscal policies to reduce inflation and stuck to them. And to Thatcher’s credit, they were overwhelmingly successful, as inflation was tamped down from 20% in 1980 to around 4% in 1987.

British conservatives are famously known for flip-flopping on issues and are not known for their ideological consistency. Most cynically put, the Conservative manifesto is to adopt policies that will help them stay in power and remain popular with voters. But Margaret Thatcher was famous for sticking to her policies. While there is no doubt as to the widespread suffering Thatcher’s policies caused through cuts to welfare and reduced government spending, she took the country off the brink of economic collapse. 

Returning to the present, it is easy to see where the parallels lie, and on the surface, the current economic situation does not look so different. Liz Truss, another young, female star of the party, from a state-school background, has quickly risen through the ranks to become Prime Minister. Truss has leaned wholeheartedly, and sometimes ridiculously, into this comparison, positioning herself as the second coming of Thatcher. A much-lampooned photo-op saw her in Moscow wearing a nearly identical outfit to Thatcher, and she is even known for wearing the same kind of blouse for which the Iron Lady was famous. However, there are some more meaningful parallels, perhaps best encapsulated by her Reagan-esque belief that cutting taxes will somehow spur productivity growth.

However, this is not 1979, Truss is no Thatcher, and ultimately, her policies make little coherent sense. The ongoing war in Ukraine has defined the current energy crisis, and it was recently announced that the UK was going to face a staggering 80% increase in household energy prices due to limited supply. One of Truss’s first announcements as PM was to cap the per unit cost of energy that providers can charge. This was too popular not to pursue, as the public was nearly united in a push for the government to do something about it. However, this seems to be more of a band aid on a bullet wound, as the government cannot credibly control inflation for the long term by placing a price cap on a good. 

The panic surrounding the Nord Stream 2 Pipeline sabotage is representative of this crisis and how a continued reliance on energy sources from Russia will continue to plague the UK. While Thatcher was saved by the discovery of North Sea oil, a miraculous new discovery of oil and gas resource in British waters seems unlikely. If the war drags on, which it seems likely to do, the scarcity of natural gas available to the UK will persist and prices will continue to rise, ultimately placing more pressure on the government to cover the difference, increasing the deficit––which could ultimately cause inflationary effects. Whether it be a serious investment in renewable energy sources or a shift back towards nuclear, Britain must shift away from this continued reliance on natural gas and oil, especially from foreign sources.  

Despite the inflationary effects that seem bound to occur, Truss seems determined to cut taxes, even as the government remains adamant that they will cover the shortfall between what consumers pay for energy and the market rate. The plan to avoid a fresh windfall tax on energy producers would mean pushing costs on to taxpayers, with as little as 1 pound in every 12 spent on energy support for households recouped from higher taxes on energy firms. Even Thatcher made the unpopular decision to raise taxes in 1981 to manage the deficit and inflation.

While currently Truss appears to hold steadfast in her views to not raise taxes and remain tough on labor unions, for many, she embodies the flip-flopping for which the conservatives are so well-known. For a historical example, she backed the Remain campaign during the 2016 election, but as the tide began turning, and looked as if they were going to lose, she quite suddenly changed her tune and became one of Boris Johnson’s most ardent supporters. While she has timidly announced increased government spending in the form of energy cost caps, she also remains determined to cut taxes, and reduce inflation. But this mixture is far from the Thatcherite policies that worked, and by pursuing what is popular, she remains sailing with the prevailing wind.

While Truss attempts to pursue Thatcherism 2.0, her government must face that they are operating in a completely different time and context. Thatcher was successful in dismantling the postwar economic consensus that was centered around Keynesian thought and instituting neoliberal economic policies, but Truss is operating in a country that is already neoliberalized and thus must face the fact that state intervention is necessary. The war in Ukraine is certain to drag on, and energy prices will continue to rise, especially during the coming winter when demand goes up as well. The leadership also must accept the reality that if they don’t stop the flood of discontent surrounding the party, they are in danger of losing the next general election in two years, as it was under their watch, not Labour’s, that the country has entered its current predicament. And the leader to get the economy back on track does not need to be from the Conservative party.

For millions, Queen Elizabeth II represented stability, reliability, and greatness. Now, without her constancy, the future state of the United Kingdom has been thrown into sharp relief. National sentiment is polling at an all-time low, and it's hard to find anyone in Britain who is optimistic for the future. The Conservative party must adopt hard and fast policies that take aim at the ailments of our time or risk losing the next election. But whether it occurs under Labour or the Tories, a serious change to the status quo is in order.

A special thank you to Daniel Dorey Rodriguez, who contributed much needed economic policy facts and lived experience for this piece!   

How France Lost its Mustard: A Story of War, Famine, and Western Negligence

 An unusual phenomenon has struck France in the last six months; where once sat jars of mustard lining the condiment aisle at grocery stores now sits empty. Upon first glance this may seem as just another random food shortage, likely spurred by the seemingly never-ending production and shipping issues resulting from the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. But for the average French citizen who consumes one kilogram of mustard a year, and for a country that describes mustard as its favorite condiment, this is no small issue. Thus, outrage ensued. The national mustard shortage has made the product impossible to find, leaving individuals to turn to social media to beg fellow users for donations or to show off their sacred spread. French shoppers were forced to deal with a grim reality: mustard was nowhere to be found. 

At the root of this shortage lies a much larger international crisis: the war in Ukraine. Indeed, mustard production is a large part of both Russia and Ukraine’s agricultural yield. Ukraine is the fourth largest producer of mustard seed, and the second largest exporter. However, they produce a different mustard then the French, Dijon variant. The Ukrainian mustard seed is typically a milder one, and hugely popular within Eastern European countries. However, due to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, production and export of the mustard seed has stopped, forcing Eastern European buyers to turn to French mustard instead, which has upped demand for French mustard, thus causing the shortage.

Mustard seed production is not the only export that has halted ever since Putin ordered the Russian army to invade earlier this year, other valuable exports such as wheat, barley, and corn have faced similar deficits due to the conflict. The widespread fighting has significantly decreased the areas available for harvest, particularly in the territories of Kherson, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv, Sumy, Chernihiv and Kyiv. 

International Food Shortages

         Ukraine’s countryside is home to some of the most fertile land on the planet. The US International Trade Administration (ITA) estimates that Ukraine possesses close to a third of the world’s black soil reserves, (a fertile and moist soil that produces the highest agricultural yields). It is thanks to this fertile land that Ukraine is commonly labeled “the breadbasket of the world.” The country produces large amounts of grain, wheat, and barley, and exports around 90% of its total production. Alongside grain production, Ukraine also exports large amounts of corn and sunflower oil. Ukraine exports its goods to all four corners of the globe, but its primary areas of export are to Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia. Ukraine sends its food to the places that need it most: developing countries that are heavily reliant on wheat and corn and are sensitive to price increases and shortages. These countries include Somalia, Libya, Lebanon, Egypt and Sudan. During times of peace, Ukraine was easily able to export its wheat and other grain products, but current Russian blockades along the Black Sea coast are preventing the trade of necessary food supplies.

         According to Ukrainian crisis management scholar, Anna Nagurney, over 400 million people across the world rely on food from Ukraine. Additionally, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, estimates that around 181 million people could face a food crisis or famine this year, caused by shortages and increased prices. [*3] At the root of this issue lies the millions of tons of Ukrainian agricultural production that has halted ever since the war began. Now, millions of vulnerable people across the world face the threat of a deadly famine.

         For many across the Western world, this minor mustard shortage in France marked the first realization of the ongoing war’s broader implication. Since the start of the War in early 2022 the West has been largely concerned with Europe’s reliance on energy from Russia. The threat of a gas shortage in Europe has dominated Western media headlines, leaving little room for concern or interest in the ways Ukraine has supported other corners of the world. Although it is an inherent truth that a country’s media primarily focus on issues that affect its own people (European and American news sources and media cannot be blamed entirely), the neglect of this crisis reflects a deep failure within Western media to document crises unrelated to us.

The Failure of the West

Since the start of the war in Ukraine, European and American war and conflict experts have neglected to draw attention to the wider implications of the war. There has been little to no analysis or discourse on Russia’s role in Africa’s food crisis and Russian hunger politics. Instead, much of the discourse around the war in primary news outlets has analyzed the psychology behind Putin’s decision to invade, or how the West should have seen the war coming. Other popular opinions tend to focus on the war’s implications for shifting the balance of power, the return of NATO, and the impact sanctions will have on the energy crisis. What is missing from this conversation is a thorough understanding of Putin’s ambition in other parts of the world, and how war routinely affects vulnerable and dependent populations first.

By choosing to focus on the ways that the West will be affected, politicians, scholars, and other experts have fundamentally failed to understand the global stake of this war and the true global reach of Russia’s intentions. Russia is starving the Global South as a political tactic to help them win the war. Putin is employing Stalin’s tactic in the 1930’s of political famine once again to help end sanctions against Russia, and create a narrative for African and Asian countries in which Ukraine is seen as the witholder of food and fuel. Yale historian and author, Timothy Snyder, believes that Russia’s tactic of global starvation is a modern attempt at Russian colonialism. In June this year Snyder reflected on the increasing signs of starvation and tweeted that “a world famine is a necessary backdrop for a Russian propaganda campaign against Ukraine. Actual mass death is needed as the backdrop for a propaganda contest.”

The Politics of Starvation

2022 was already expected to be a year of famine and starvation, thanks to ongoing droughts and inflation, but Putin’s role has only magnified the famine’s effects. Countries have already started to prepare for increased food prices and lack of goods: “Some countries are reacting by trying to protect domestic supplies. India has restricted sugar and wheat exports, while Malaysia halted exports of live chickens, alarming Singapore, which gets a third of its poultry from its neighbor.” Snyder believes that Russia’s international famine campaign has three components, each designed to weaken a different part of the world. Firstly, Russian blockages of Ukrainian goods hope to end the narrative of Ukraine as the “breadbasket of the world” for the vast majority of countries that receive its wheat and grain, such as Somalia, Libya, and Lebanon. Putin hopes this will decrease support for Ukrainian freedom and destroy the concept of Ukrainian statehood. Secondly, Putin hopes that this famine will increase the rates of refugee migration into an already politically unstable Europe, as people from Sub-saharan Africa flee into Europe in hopes of finding food and a better quality of life. Putin’s final goal within his mass-starvation tactic is one of political propaganda. Putin plans to blame Western sanctions for food supply issues, thus creating a narrative in which the West is to blame for global starvation. A successful change in narrative for Putin will thus ensure that Russian citizens (many of which are already angry at the war and the effects of sanctions) remain ignorant and naive of the true nature of Putin’s strategic thinking. 

Russia’s need for strong and powerful propaganda is only growing, thanks to Russia’s first military mobilization since World War II, which was announced in late September. The latest increase in military efforts has led to more protests by Russian citizens angry at the Kremlin. Over a thousand citizens were arrested in cities across the country as they protested the need for the 300,000 new troops that Russian officials are demanding.

Frustration and resentment across Russia will only grow as the war continues, therefore Putin’s need to create global implications and shift Russian anger outward will only become more pressing as time goes on. By framing the issues and effects of the war as part of a larger Western-led campaign to starve the world, Putin can prevent his citizens from rising up against him. Russians are already subjected to misinformation and propaganda about the war. The Kremlin has successfully convinced millions of Russian citizens that the war is Ukraine’s fault, spreading stories that “Ukrainians had fired on Russian forces during the cease-fire, and neo-Nazis were “hiding behind civilians as a human shield.” This disinformation tactic makes Russians particularly susceptible to Putin’s lies and less likely to understand his starvation politics. 

Putin has also applied the same tactics of disinformation to African nations, in an attempt to spread anti-West and anti-UN sentiment, while gaining political influence. Putin’s expansion of propaganda to Africa reveals the true diabolical nature of his intentions. Already aware of the need to provide an explanation for the lack of resources exported from Ukraine, Russia has established at least sixteen known operations of disinformation across the continent, otherwise known as dezinformatsyia. The goal of these campaigns is to shift anger onto the West, deny Russia’s role in withholding exports, and prop up political regimes that support Russia’s political ambitions. Through the use of sites such as Twitter, Facebook, and Tiktok, Russia has actively succeeded in creating often untraceable campaigns of lies. The extent to which Russia has spread falsehoods through the continent should both alarm and frighten the West. 

         It is time for Western leaders to acknowledge the global implications of the war in Ukraine, and their correlation to famine and food shortages.  In an attempt to spread concern and awareness, U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres stated “Global hunger levels are at a new high. In just two years, the number of severely food insecure people has doubled, from 135 million pre-pandemic to 276 million today … More than half a million people are living in famine conditions — an increase of more than 500 percent since 2016.” These numbers are already alarming without the added implications of war. Given these circumstances, it is vital that Western leaders work directly with countries already affected by these devastating food shortages. Similarly, Western media must turn its gaze to the international crisis of halted Ukrainian exports. Western negligence has not only led to widespread famine, but it has also allowed Putin to create a devastating narrative of political propaganda in which millions will starve as unknown casualties of a senseless war. 

The European Economy under Russia’s Threats

Early morning on February 24th  2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. While Russia first invaded Ukraine in 2014, and annexed the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine, this time, the invasion of Ukraine by Russia was considered by the international community to be an act of aggression.  The invasion triggered the largest refugee crisis in Europe since World War II, more than four million Ukrainians have left the country and a quarter of the population has been displaced. In response to this invasion, the international community imposed a number of economic sanctions on Russia, in an aim to limit its power and influence in Ukraine. Economic sanctions, as defined by the Council on Foreign Relations, are “the withdrawal of customary trade and financial relations for foreign- and security-policy purposes. Sanctions may be comprehensive, prohibiting commercial activity with regard to an entire country … or they may be targeted, blocking transactions by and with particular businesses, groups, or individuals.” These sanctions have been imposed by many, such as the United States, the European Union, and G7.  

Vladimir Putin, president of Russia, has mentioned that Russia invaded Ukraine in the sole purpose of denazifying Ukraine, as well as protect its citizens who have been facing humiliations and genocides by the Kyiv regime. Ukraine has a long history with neo-nazis. Indeed, Azov is a far-right military group that has been accused of harboring neo-Nazi and white supremacist ideology. The group is now part of Ukraine's armed forces. However, Putin’s claim to denazify Ukraine was quite an interesting and bold statement given that the current president of Ukraine is Jewish, and lost relatives in the Holocaust. 

This invasion of Ukraine has mostly - as expected - affected the country and its citizens. Many were forced to flee the country and seek asylum in neighboring countries such as Poland, Romania, and Moldova. However, many Ukrainians were forced to stay, and fight for their country. Ever since the invasion, Ukraine’s economy has contracted. According to the International Monetary Fund, “the loss of life, damage to critical infrastructure, trade disruption and an outflow of refugees would lead to gross domestic product falling by a minimum of 10% in 2021”. However, many countries have stepped up and helped Ukraine in these difficult times. Countries have donated weapons, funds, and have delivered humanitarian and non-lethal aid. While many countries have helped Ukraine, they have also simultaneously worked against Russia. Through economic sanctions, they hope to weaken the country and its president, Vladimir Putin. But many challenges have arisen as economic sanctions against Russia persist.    

Many Ukrainians have fled the country to a safer place. While most women and children are able to successfully escape the war and seek refuge in neighboring countries such as Poland, men are forced to stay in Ukraine to fight and protect their country. However, this conflict has greatly affected Ukraine, who found itself cut off from the world by war. Trade has been disrupted throughout the country, and according to the UN, hundreds of thousands of people inside Ukraine have been cut off from life-saving aid such as humanitarian aid due to the military encirclement of cities. Vulnerable populations in Ukraine such as elderly citizens, or the economically disadvantaged are most likely to become refugees and will have the greatest difficulty coping with rising food and fuel costs. Relief efforts are underway around the world to ensure that people's basic needs for food, shelter and psychological safety are met in the conflict zone and beyond.

Trade-wise, the conflict has disrupted the global supply chain of diverse goods, and affected international trade as a whole. Ukraine is a massive producer and exporter of seed oil, corn, wheat, and iron ore. However, since the beginning of this war, the country’s production has declined as people have fled the country and men were forced to give up their occupations to join the army and help fight against the Russians. Similarly, the concentration of wheat, fertilizer, and related production in Russia will strain food supplies globally. Securing the continuous supply of food to the countries most tied up to exports from these regions is becoming an issue. Stocks - about half of the corn Ukraine was expected to export for the season - are increasingly difficult to get to buyers, providing a glimpse of the disruption caused by the war in Russia, which accounts for roughly $120 billion global grain trade. Already disrupted by supply chain blockages, surging freight rates and weather events, markets are expecting further turmoil as shipments from Ukraine and Russia - which together account for about a quarter of the global grain trade - become more complicated and raise the specter of food shortages.        

Ports, railroads, and roads throughout Ukraine have either been closed, or taken over by the Russian army. No foreigners have really been able to get in the country ever since the start of the war due to fear. Thus, the Ukrainians that remain in the country have found themselves unable to access foreign goods and services that the country once imported. The lack of production, manufacturing, and transportation in Ukraine due to the war has also disrupted the global supply chain, as previously mentioned, which has had and will keep having a negative impact on the world’s economy and other countries that relied on Ukrainians and Russians export of agricultural goods, which consisted of a wide variety of goods. Citizens that remain in Ukraine have done so to fight for their country against the Russian army, as a result, there are fewer people than ever that work to produce and provide goods not only for Ukrainian citizens, but also for foreign citizens who relied on such goods. 

As the effects of war can be felt everywhere, other countries such as the United States and NATO cannot get involved in the conflict due to the concern that it will become a war between Russia and the West. Since Ukraine is not a member of NATO, the alliance is not obligated to defend the country. Similarly, as the United States is an ally of NATO, the country cannot get involved in the conflict, unless Russia invades a NATO country, which is not so likely to happen as this could result in World War III. However, both NATO and the United States are determined to do all that is in their power to support Ukraine. 

Their inability to get physically involved in this conflict is due to the fact that Ukraine is not a member of both the European Union and NATO. Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelenskiy, whose country is facing a massive unprovoked invasion from neighboring Russia, has called on the European Union to grant Ukraine EU membership under a special procedure as soon as possible. However, it is not as easy as it sounds, the process to gain EU membership is very long and many EU countries are against an expansion of the European Union. Similarly, Ukraine is unable to join NATO just yet, but the organization is committed to helping the country and its citizens in these difficult times.

As a response to the war, many countries have set up a number of economic sanctions in the aim to weaken Russia. But as these sanctions take place, a big question arises: who do these sanctions actually hurt? Economic sanctions on Russia have a goal to affect the economy of the country. SWIFT - the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, is a Belgian cooperative society providing services related to the execution of financial transactions and payments between banks worldwide - has banned Russia. As a consequence, Russian banks are no longer able to use the financial interface to transfer money. But financial sanctions, not banishment from SWIFT, are the key economic punishments being imposed on Russia. Economic sanctions on Russia such as a ban on exports, blocking of Russian assets, sanctions against individuals, ban of oil and gas imports from Russia. Additionally, all Russian banks have had their assets frozen. But who are these sanctions truly affecting? The government? Or the people? 

As horrible as it is, economic sanctions against Russia are actually impacting Russian citizens who have seen their assets abroad frozen, and who also cannot access goods and services that they once did. The lower class in Russia is the one suffering the cost of these sanctions, but as time passes, Russia as a whole will feel the effects of these sanctions, as many foreign companies have pulled out of the country in response to its invasion of Ukraine. Sanctions would prohibit Russian energy exports, which would traumatize the European economy, which is heavily dependent on Russia, and would worsen the surge in energy prices. As companies have pulled out of the country, Russia’s GDP is expected to heavily shrink as an outcome. Russia's central bank has been struggling to stabilize the value of the ruble and prevent a sharp rise in interest rates without access to about half of its foreign exchange reserves. The Russian stock market was also closed for weeks, suspending shares of domestic companies that could plunge as soon as trading resumed. 

The sanctions also have an impact on the European and global economy, which is heavily dependent on Russia for oil, gas, and different goods. The country is also a big importer of luxury goods, so countries such as France and Italy will see their export of luxury goods decline in the next year (and more). This will greatly impact the economy of these countries as such exports contribute to a big portion of their gross domestic product. Businesses have also been hurt, they have lost a lot of their revenues as they pulled out of Russia. However, if they had stayed in the country, with the increasing number of economic sanctions, they would have suffered the long lasting effects of these sanctions on their businesses, which would have also impacted other countries that are also home to such companies.

Oil prices have gone up throughout the world. The United States, France, or the United Kingdom are all three big importers of Russian gas and oil. The “Russian oil ban” as it is called has created a lot of discontent in many European countries, whose citizens have to suffer the cost of an increase in oil and gas prices. Europe exports 45% of gas from Russia, and has pledged to reduce its purchases of Russian gas by two-thirds before the end of the year. However, an alternative must be found in the aim to reduce the price of oil and gas in European countries. Europe has become too dependent on Russia for gas, but until an alternative is found, citizens will have to deal with the increase of gas and oil prices in their respective countries. 

Overall, the economy of Europe has been slowing down as a result of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Not only was the supply chain disrupted by this invasion, but citizens in both countries are completely left alone. No one can really get into Ukraine, as a result, the country struggles to import goods that its citizens once consumed on a daily basis. They are left with local producers and manufacturers. Similarly, countries who used to trade with Ukraine can no longer do so. Wheat and grains are agricultural goods that the country used to export, however, as a port has been destroyed, the country has been cut off from the world, unable to export its goods to countries who relied on them. But similarly, many companies have backed out of Russia, leaving citizens unable to access certain goods and services.

As Russia keeps invading Ukraine and does not seem to be willing to put an end to this conflict that has already cost the lives of many, I wonder whose economy will be the most impacted: Russia’s economy, or Europe’s economy? Both are really powerful, but the sanctions that countries in the European Union and NATO have set up against Russia have also affected more than just Russia. Although Russia’s GDP is expected to shrink this year as a result of this invasion, I wonder how much longer can the country go without the help and support of other countries, or even companies that were once in the country. Left completely alone, Russia is left with its own resources, and is fully aware that its citizens are suffering from this conflict. It makes me wonder how much longer will they be able to fund this war, and allow for its citizens, especially the lower class, to be impacted by it.

Although much has been done by the international community in response to this conflict, Ukraine is still being invaded by Russia, and many face the consequences of this conflict every day. It is extremely hard for other countries and NATO to physically be involved in this conflict as it could lead to world war III. Many fear Russia, a powerful nation that has access to numerous nuclear weapons. While it is understandable that the international community is unable to get too involved in this conflict, and with the long process that is for Ukraine to be able to join NATO and the EU, the international community is left with the options to use sanctions against Ukraine, or to donate to Ukraine, military aid, humanitarian aid, weapons, and funds. As the situation does not seem to be getting any better, the international community should do everything that is in their power to limit the influence of Russia on Ukraine, in the hope that one day, Russia will back out. 

To conclude, this conflict has taken a turn that no one really expected. While many were aware of Russia’s threats, it was still a big shock when Russia actually invaded Ukraine. As the international community is doing everything that they can to help Ukraine in these difficult times. Many countries have welcomed refugees, sent humanitarian and military aid, as well as many other resources, Ukraine and its citizens that have remained in the country still greatly suffer from this war. Russia’s citizens have also been greatly affected as the economic sanctions are directly affecting them. The economy of Russia, Ukraine, and Europe is shrinking. Unless Russia backs out of Ukraine, the consequences of this conflict will be long lasting and an entire economy will have to be rebuilt, which will take time. In the meantime, we can hope that Ukraine will be able to join the EU and NATO, in the aim to get more support and help from other countries, as Ukraine puts up a big fight against the superpower, Russia.

The Middle East’s Stake in the Ukraine Crisis

Introduction

Scholars, strategists, and pundits alike would agree that the Ukraine crisis has escalated far beyond what many originally envisioned on February 24th, 2022. Where early pieces championed a surefire Ukrainian victory and the incompetence of the Russian military, recent articles have speculated that the conflict might rage for weeks to months from now. Although unbiased stories are difficult to find, vivid descriptions of Russian war crimes pepper the firsthand accounts of Ukrainian refugees. Initial articles, such as those reporting on Russian soldiers using children as hostages in Kyiv, shocked few. But it was on April 6th, 2022 that the first mass-media reports of torture, rape, and executions in the recaptured city of Bucha emerged. The bodies of more than 300 civilians were discovered scattered around the city and its outskirts, most clearly having been bound and immobilized before being severely beaten and shot from point-blank range. In response to this and other acts of brutality, the UN General Assembly passed an emergency resolution to suspend the Russian Federation from the Human Rights Council. With 93 countries in favor and only 24 countries—mostly common opponents like China, the DPRK, and Belarus—directly opposing the motion, it is clear that numerous states view Russia as an aggressor and support Ukrainian sovereignty.

However, this leaves 58 countries remaining that voted to abstain from the resolution, each with their own reasons for sitting on the fence. Some of these neutral states, like Angola, Barbados, or Vanuatu, likely lack a stake in the conflict and would prefer to avoid angering either side. But the diversity in these abstentions betrays an observable trend in the action, that being the Middle East’s near-universal desire to remain exempt from opining on the matter. Of the states comprising the Middle East and North Africa, only Israel, Libya, and Turkey joined with the states that pushed through Russia’s disbarment from the HRC. A majority of the remaining states refused to formally strike a side in the debate, with nations from Iraq to Saudi Arabia remaining non-aligned. Three countries in the area—Syria, Iran, and Algeria—even went as far as to officially reject the UN resolution, effectively aligning themselves closer to Russia in the wake of the conflict. Thus, one can easily see the complex relationships between the Middle East and the two forming sides in this situation. This article aims to provide an overview of American, European, and Russian relations with the Middle East and North Africa, particularly with regards to oil, as well as what stakes—if any—exist for countries in this region and what predictions surround the how these states will address the crisis as it develops.

The Middle East & The World: Addressing the Oil Derrick in the Room

It is impossible to holistically examine the Middle East’s relationships with the US, Europe, and Russia in the course of a single article. Entire volumes of literature have been written analyzing the associations between just one of these groups and the Middle East, with usually little more than lip-service provided to the others. That being said, in order to effectively organize the narrative which revolves around this issue, I have chosen to examine these relationships with respect to the common denominator present in all of them: oil. The world quite literally runs on oil. Aside from providing fuel for the estimated 1.3 billion passenger and commercial vehicles that exist across the world, oil (or petroleum) provides use in heating and electricity generation as well as in the production of the various plastics, chemicals, and other synthetic materials we use in our day-to-day lives. Understandably then, a key point of contention between states in the course of national development and prestige has been the exchange (and occasionally the appropriation) of global oil reserves. Vital players in the oil industry are largely clustered in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq all possessing a billion barrels or more in oil reserves compared to the US’ 400,000. This fact alone has irreversibly transformed the Middle East into a region composed mostly of rentier states, and has further shaped the Middle East’s relationships with the major players in the Ukraine Crisis.

Historically, the United States has engaged in a complicated relationship with the Middle East as a result of its dependence on the region’s oil reserves. Dubbed the “American Oil Strategy”, politics between the country and MENA has been almost entirely influenced by politicians shoring up support in the region to secure oil for trade. In fact, the US has even gone so far as to insist on military presence in the region, and further, to ignore blatant policy inconsistencies to maintain this oil relationship. This explains, rather grimly, why America will effectively ignore Saudi Arabia’s horrid human rights record or Turkey’s incremental shift toward authoritarianism. Anywhere else, these crimes might otherwise serve as catalysts for sanctions, condemnation, or military intervention. But the US views its stake in maintaining this Oil Strategy to be far too great to be jeopardized by moral grandstanding. Although the US has made effort in recent years to decouple itself from dependency on foreign oil—largely by way of off-shore drilling and domestic fracking—the US will be at least partly reliant on overseas oil for the foreseeable future. In turn, the Middle East’s relationship with the US is similarly blemished by the latter’s reliance on Gulf oil. While some politicians in the region praise the US as a harbinger of democracy, freedom, and liberal thought, others decry America as a neo-imperialist state with the primary concern of lining its coffers. Every praise for the Abraham Accords can be met with blame for the Iraq War, War in Afghanistan, or war crimes in Yemen, meaning few in the area view the United States as a wholly benevolent power.

Europe possesses a similarly complicated relationship with the Middle East and its near-monopoly over energy. Like the US, Europe is no stranger to hydrocarbon imports from the Middle East, with figures from Eurostat’s 2020 energy memo reporting 18% of Europe’s crude oil and 12.4% of its natural gas deriving from the region. In this same report, Saudi Arabia alone was reported to have provided more than 7.8% of Europe’s crude oil imports. Moreover, the region’s historical association with Europe in regards to its oil means that this relationship is nothing new. As early as the late-19th century, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company began surveying Gulf sites for extraction. The consequences of this arrangement—especially in relation to its history of upholding authoritarian states in the interest of protecting British and French aims—have had a jarring effect on the region’s modern political and economic stability. This has led to a paradoxical relationship over time, with European states sometimes directly interfering, for example during the Gulf War, while simultaneously staying silent on other issues. Understandably then, few living in the Middle East view the European Union or its member-states in an outright beneficial light.

Starkly contrasted with these relationships is that of Russia with modern Middle Eastern states. Unique to Russia is its heavy supply of oil and natural gas, largely attributable to its massive geographic and topographic scale. As such, although Russia has historically not been one to ignore the bountiful gains of hegemony in the Middle East, it certainly is not suffering from oil crises or shortages. Russian influence in the region has been idiomized as that of a “Jack of all trades, master of none”. What this means is that, although Russia has begun to work its way into better relations with virtually all modern Middle Eastern countries—most notably Syria, Israel, and Turkey—few (minus Syria) are willing to directly align themselves too closely to the Kremlin. Part of this is historical, owing to Soviet proxy management during the Cold War, while most of it stems from Russia’s inability to deliver on its promises for aid and support. Foreign aid inefficiencies have been best shown in Syria, where the Russian Center for Reconciliation of Conflicting Sides (CRCS) has been critiqued for 717 of its 731 communities having been symbolically serviced only once over the last five years. It is for this reason that Turkey has notably denounced Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and officially labeled it a “war”. However, states in the region continue to look to Russia as an alternative to American beneficence. Although Russia has failed in many regards, it has impressed Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and Qatar along with other Levantine states simply by virtue of valuing the status quo over democratization. Where American officials might arrange for oil exchanges that include clauses—however fleeting—on the importance of liberalized economies, Russia is more relaxed, caring little about whether these countries respect civil liberties or uphold human rights. It is because of these complicated, often conflicting variables that Israel’s PM Naftali Bennett has pledged a “measured and responsible” response to the Ukraine Crisis while still hesitating on formally condemning Russia or Vladimir Putin.

All of this is to say that it has become clear in recent years that support toward the Russian sphere is slowly but surely ramping up. Where Europe and the US are constricted in their ability to influence the region based on past crimes, blunders, and miscalculations; Russia is poised to drastically shape the politics of the region. Although few states would publicly—or even privately—praise Russia and its leaders, trends in the region point toward a closeness to the Kremlin that Europe and America could only dream about.

Shut-Offs and Sanctions: Stakes At-Home and Abroad

Thus, the question remains, where does the Middle East sit in all of this? During a time when supply-chains have been disturbed, trade agreements have been terminated, and sanctions have been employed by countries everywhere, no country can sit on the sidelines. Whether they want to be involved or not, states around the world must accept the geopolitical shift that comes with this crisis, along with the immediate, tangible ramifications that come with continued conflict between Russia and Ukraine. As indicated above, the most prominent points for policymakers right now center around how to compensate for the intense reduction in oil and natural gas imports from Russia. Although Europe certainly relies on energy from the Middle East, the same Eurostat report referenced earlier in this piece pointed out that, in fact, 25% of European crude oil and 38% of natural gas actually come out of Russia. The US, although not nearly as reliant, still imports over 8% of its crude oil from Russia and continues to import 20% of its unrefined petroleum products as well. Whether or not a state directly garners its petroleum from Russia, the fact remains that consumer-side and producer-side markets alike are suffering from the conflict. World prices for a barrel of oil have skyrocketed, hitting upwards of $130/barrel in early March of this year, while drivers everywhere have complained of soaring prices, with gas hitting roughly $4.50/gallon in the US and upwards of $7.50/gallon in Italy and $8.00/gallon in the UK as of April of this year.

Obviously, the initial plan to offset this supply shortage was to contact Middle East suppliers—specifically the 7 of those within OPEC+—and increase crude oil flow into the European continent and toward the US. Initial hopes that the organization would respond eagerly to the hope of renewed demand following the COVID-19 plunge were dashed when an emergency meeting on March 2nd between OPEC member states ended with them agreeing to only raise supply by the prescribed amount (400,000 barrels per day in April). Only lasting 13 minutes, the meeting went without a mere mention of the Ukraine crisis and its pressures on the industry. Outside of OPEC, responses are not exactly positive either. Even former-OPEC member Qatar has expressed hesitation in helping the West in its scramble to secure more oil, with Energy Minister Saad al-Kaabi stating even before tensions erupted that it lacked the capacity to remotely replace Russian oil in Europe let alone abroad. Fears have only grown after this response, with Europe increasingly eyeing an outright ban on Russian oil and petroleum products and prices only continue to rise.

The situation is not without its light, of course. On March 9th, Emirati Ambassador to the US Yousef Al-Otaiba, expressed the UAE’s desire to hike oil outputs from OPEC. Saudi Arabian officials offered the same sentiments on March 10th, and countries with the capacity to continue bolstering oil supplies to Europe and the US have attempted to support the call to arms. In yet another show of the American Oil Strategy, US officials are increasingly looking to Iran to cover the difference. In the words of Alex Vatanka of the Middle East Institute, “Iran’s Achilles’ Heel is the state of its economy…and the possibility of a new [JCPOA] presents Tehran with an opportunity.” While circumstances are continuously developing and little is certain, these factors mean that hope might not be lost for the Middle East to assist the West during a time of crisis.

But it is not only in the West that the ripple-effects of the Ukraine crisis have been felt. Virtually every state in the Middle East has reported severe economic and supply consequences directly resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It was Egypt that was first hit hardest by these ramifications, specifically with respect to its food supply. Disruption in Ukrainian supply and export chains, coupled with intense sanctions placed upon Russia, have prevented Egyptian ports from receiving wheat shipments that make up 85% of the country’s grain supply. Iran too has been hit hard by the situation, with severe threats to their supply of sunflower oil, wheat, corn, barley, and soybeans due to economic obstacles. Similar stories have played out across the Middle East and North Africa, as the two combatant states collectively make up 25% of global wheat production, 15% of barley, and 45% of sunflower. Prices have escalated not just for grain itself, but also for fertilizer and general agricultural supplies, meaning countries are increasingly incapable of growing their own crops let alone relying on others. Not only does this threaten to disintegrate the global agro-economy, it risks subjecting millions to food insecurity in a region already wracked from drought and famine. Part of the issue also stems from the fact that NGOs themselves often relied on Ukraine and Russia for food security aid. This was best put by CEO of the World Food Program David Beasley with regard to continued food aid to Yemen: “We have no choice but to take food from the hungry to feed the starving.”

Luckily, this situation is also not entirely insurmountable in the region, even in the face of the worsening conflict. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar have already pledged a collective of $12 billion in aid (with an additional $10 billion promised from Saudi Arabia in the future) to Egypt. Western leaders have been similarly jolted to action by the conflict with regard to food security, as European powers and the US have begun promising increased food aid to suffering countries. A major part of the COP26 Agriculture Innovation Mission in the Middle East involves bringing 140 public, private, and non-profit partners together to normalize the region’s dependence on foreign food imports. $4 billion has been provided by the US to the program, of which a sixth of the budget is intended to be allocated toward the MENA region’s crippled agricultural infrastructure. So soon after over 132 million in the area were made victim to starvation in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and its supply-chain deficiencies, this cannot be allowed to stand. Increasing direct investment into the region should be a top priority for not just the United States but the European Union and the developed world as a whole.

As often said, in every crisis, there arises an opportunity. Growing food insecurity in the Middle East is the perfect means through which the US and EU can not only leverage its own oil stakes in the situation, but improve relations, rehabilitate their images and save lives in the process. Especially in Iran, the time is right to completely reform relations with a state which has become increasingly abrasive over the last few decades.

Uniting Europe: How Closing the Digital Divide Between Eastern and Western Europe Will Strengthen the EU

Putin’s invasion of Ukraine destabilized the entire international world order by bringing war back to Europe, but more importantly it has revealed the greater need for stability and unity between Western and Eastern Europe. One method to counteract Putin’s threats and to improve the international standing of the European Union is to close the digital divide between Eastern and Western Europe, thus working to unite the continent, bring technological innovation to regions previously untouched by it, and promoting EU initiatives and popularity. The OECD defines the digital divide as “the gap between individuals, households, businesses and geographic areas at different socioeconomic levels with regard both to their opportunities to access information and communication technologies (ICTs) and to their use of the Internet for a wide variety of activities.” The technological gap also reflects broader socio-economic issues of the impact of Communism. 

A Geographical Digital Divide 

The history of the digital divide lies in the legacy of the Cold War, a difference in economies, and the devastating impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic. Technology innovation has defined much of the European Union in the twentieth century. The member states involved have sought to digitize their economies and industries, while also setting the world wide standard for regulations regarding data and privacy. Yet, Eastern European countries, both in and out of the European Union have largely failed to adopt the same technological success of countries such as Germany and Finland. 

The root of this issue is an economic one. Eastern European countries tend to be poorer than Western Europe and thus have less financial resources to spend on investing in new technological projects or working to adapt to modern tech innovation. The Cold War deeply impacted Eastern Europe’s ability to adapt to technology. Although the internet boom occurred after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the countries under the Iron Curtain had already been cut off for decades from Western modernity. Despite the Soviet Union heavily promoting science and technology during its reign of power, the eventual weakening of their economy and the larger socio-economic issues of the late eighties prevented the Soviet Union from maintaining their high standards of technological innovation. When integration and trade between East and West finally started, the East was forced to exist in a state of perpetual “catch up” compared with their Western peers. 

The European Union has welcomed more and more former Soviet countries into its membership. In 2004 the largest enlargement took place, in which the EU added Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Since 2004 many Eastern European countries now play a role in the EU, but according to a report from the World Bank, they lack “​​the composition of spending across innovation activities and the allocation across the different types of technologies.” While the EU has attempted to spread its technological incentives throughout all states, the fact remains that some member states are better at adapting and implementing new technology given their stronger economic stability or prior interest in technological advancement. 

The COVID-19 Pandemic both worsened the digital divide but also highlighted the need for change. WIth in-person connection no longer a possibility, companies and economies were forced to adapt to a more digitized world, in which many firms moved entirely online. Member states such as Germany proved to adapt more easily to the digitalization required by the conditions of the pandemic and even thrive under it. During the pandemic, the city of Berlin developed the Digital Skills Map (DSM) to promote the sharing of ideas and encourage  “pan-EU dialogue around how digital developments are transforming the labor market. It also seeks to showcase the many effective interventions designed to boost digital skills, while giving a local voice to the EU debate around the future of work at the same time.” The success of Berlin and other cities across EU member states proves that there are benefits to the digital shift caused by the pandemic: businesses will no longer struggle to conduct work from peripheral regions, and both consumers and businesses have a better knowledge and understanding of digital tools. 

In contrast to Germany’s tech success story during the pandemic, a report from OECD revealed the devastating nature of the digital infrastructure challenges in the Western Balkans. The biggest issues in this region consisted of the low digitalization of households and the limited number of enterprises that were able to employ teleworking. The inability to shift to teleworking and digital work processes meant that businesses were far likelier to experience labor shortages caused by movement restrictions. Now that the pandemic has exposed the digital divide and the need for change, the European Union can actively begin improving digitalization within their Eastern European member states. 

Role of the EU 

The World Bank’s report on the digital dilemma in Europe reveals that there are three key goals for Europe’s digital future: “competitiveness, market inclusion of small and young firms, and geographic cohesion.” The report explains that for the European Union to achieve these goals they must better invest in the three types of digital technology, which are transactional, informational, and operational. Taking this information into account, the EU must now help member states including Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland, and Romania, to properly invest in technology creation and adoption. The report also details the distinction between the three most prominent digital technologies: transactional, informational, and operational. According to the World Bank, transactional technologies, mostly e-commerce related, are the only ones truly capable of achieving the European Union’s goals, due to their ability to bring together all forms of the digital sector. 

Bridging the divide between rural and urban areas is key to promoting technological development. Romania’s cities, such as Bucharest, have much higher rates of transactional technology initiatives compared with more rural areas where digitalization barely plays a role in local firms. Specifically targeting rural regions will also benefit the member state as a whole, as it will allow greater investment and collaboration between regions. 

The European Union should also work to promote telecommunication policies (policy concerned with the economic regulation of interstate as well as international communication, across the broader region). One way for Eastern European countries to improve digitalization is by driving competition through tech creation, but to do this they need to establish an institutional and legal environment that is ideal for tech development and can guarantee them the support of both public and private investors. Therefore promoting telecommunications policies is the quickest and most effective way to establish stability and legitimacy, thus drawing in external support. Ideally, states such as Poland and Bulgaria would create a telecommunications market with lower costs, greater competition, and a more diverse array of services provided. 

The Success of Estonia 

Despite many Eastern European member states being decades behind in regards to their Western peers, one nation stands out as an anomaly and example of the success of digitalization. Estonia, a former Soviet republic, has achieved the unthinkable. The nation state has achieved unprecedented digital success thanks to a variety of factors, and serves as a model for all other European Union member states.

The origins of Estonia’s digital success can be traced back to the early nineties when a group of amateur politicians developed a public digital architecture that specifically targeted IT. The goal was to promote IT as a public skill that would improve socio-economic skills nationwide. Estonia built up their digital network through the creation of small networks with dedicated government workers and support from the private sector. The collaboration between both public and private sector proved tremendously in creating a digital state which collaborated effectively. Since all sectors were being digitized at the same time, they were able to rely on each other for support and collaboration, such as the simultaneous development of cybersecurity alongside the online banking sector. Much of Estonia’s success can be attributed to its young politicians who possessed the energy and drive to completely rebuild Estonia, the close networks already in place, and their decision to digitize right as the internet was entering the mainstream world. However, there are still aspects of Estonia’s success story that other countries can copy. 

Estonia focused on convincing their citizens of the benefits of digitalization early on by creating digitization projects specifically designed to make their citizens' lives easier; this helped to convince skeptics and united the population. The digital Estonian ID card was launched in 2002 with a digital signature in place to allow citizens to make legally-binding decisions remotely and use their digital signature to easily sign documents. When asked about his country’s success, Chief Information Officer of Estonia, Siim Sikkut, stated that “ Digital leadership needs to be continuous across different administrations. This also involves a deeper understanding of the need to educate not just the wider society, but also government officials behind the transformation.” He also stressed the importance of creating a streamlined and efficient system: “one of the most important factors that helped streamline the government structures, authorities and databases is  the once-only-principle which exists to this day. This means that any type of data related to an individual can only be collected by one specific institution, thereby eliminating duplicate data and bureaucracy.” Studying the principle factors behind Estonia’s success reveals that other Eastern European countries must first focus on creating transactional technologies that better their citizens' lives through transparent, cooperative, and efficient digital systems. 

The EU’s Future in Eastern Europe

Closing the digital divide between East and West also begs the question: What would a digitally united and equal European Union look like? There are a multitude of ways in which digital cooperation would improve the EU’s status both on the continent and internationally. The end of the digital divide would help unite EU member states and promote the overall stability and success of the European Union. It would ease the burden felt by states such as Germany, Finland, and Estonia, who currently possess strong digitized systems, and allow then to confidently invest in the CEE countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia). The CEE countries do not possess the same economic power and stability of the ‘Big Four (France, Germany, Italy, and Spain) who do not need to rely on digital innovation efforts to promote their economies and international investment. However, greater digital innovation would most certainly draw in international investment which would strengthen Eastern European member states and the EU by extension. 

The  European Union is considered by many to be the leader in data privacy regulation. The institution has set precedents through its legislation that have created global benchmarks through privacy regulation. Despite angering many American tech companies through their strict enforcement of data protection legislation, the EU has remained firm even in the face of outlash from Google over the Digital Markets Act which prevents Google and Apple from collecting data from different services to offer targeted ads without users’ consent.  By demanding data protection of their member states and the outside world, the EU has been able to shape the global standard through its creation of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) which has become the de facto global network. However, implementing greater digitization efforts in Eastern Europe would also provide the EU to ensure that their data protection regulations are more deeply ingrained throughout the continent and provide more opportunities to demonstrate the norm of implementing data privacy regulations in states with newly developing technologies. 

The past decade has severely weakened the European Union. Brexit, a damaged relationship with the US, China’s growing desire for tech domination, and now Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has damaged the EU’s internal and external reputation as a strong and powerful institution, but by solving the digital divide the EU would show the world the strength of their initiatives and their dedication to improving access to technology for citizens across all member states. Closing the digital divide does more than benefit the CEE countries, it also allows the EU the chance to redefine itself in the face of Russian aggression, Chinese domination, and American tech companies' anger over data privacy regulations.