Burkina Faso and the Resurgence of Coups in West Africa

nytimes.com

Towards the end of January, the Patriotic Movement for Safeguard and Restoration (MPSR) announced that the government and national assembly had been dissolved, and they had removed democratically-elected Roch Marc Kaboré from his position as president of Burkina Faso. Kaboré was detained and replaced by Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, an overnight curfew was implemented, land and air borders were closed, and the constitution was suspended for one week. A coup d’état had struck.

While this is the most recent one, a trend has emerged in the past year and a half as Mali, Guinea, and Chad have faced military takeovers. There is a resurgence of coups in West Africa, and the contributing factors are not adequately being mitigated. With the presence of everything from violent extremism to poverty, democratic institutions are struggling to stay alive in the region, and there has been controversy regarding international response. Moreover, discussion of this subject has been full of generalizations and blanket policy suggestions. Examining the coup in Burkina Faso can provide a deeper understanding of the circumstances in West Africa and why it is important to acknowledge each country’s distinct identity, advancing the global conversation surrounding intervention and aid.

Growing Violence in West Africa

The buildup to the coup in Burkina Faso was multifaceted, but a major reason for the overthrow was the rising threat from violent extremists. As with the 2020 coup in Mali—the one often seen as the trigger for the other military takeovers—many civilians thought that their government had failed to protect them. Since 2016, over 230 terrorist attacks have taken place in Burkina Faso. Last November, 53 people were killed after a gendarmerie post was attacked, which was “the worst strike on Burkinabe security forces in years.” Just one month later, a civilian militia trained by the government to contain insurgents was ambushed, and at least 41 members were killed. According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “violent events linked to militant Islamist groups” increased by 70 percent between 2020 and 2021 in the Sahel region, and the United Nations reported that almost 12,000 people were displaced within two weeks in December. There were at least 2,354 fatalities from the violence in 2021. 

Many believed that the government response was not enough, and the people of Burkina Faso made that clear. As gunfire erupted at Kaboré's residence and several of the country’s military barracks on the day of the coup, protests raged in the capital. The headquarters of Kaboré’s party was looted and set on fire, and people were tear gassed by police as hundreds marched through Ouagadougou. The events of this day showed what Damiba explicitly said in his first speech since taking power: the takeover was due to their former leader’s failure to stop attacks across the country. 

Repercussions Regarding Sanctions and Aid

A major player in how the world has responded to the coups is the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). After the coups in Mali and Guinea, ECOWAS responded by closing member states’ borders and imposing economic sanctions. However, these sanctions were highly controversial, in part because the affected economies were already poor. If the goal of these sanctions is to promote stability in the region, the long-term consequences may backfire. As explained by the International Peace Institute, the sanctions may be “necessary” but “counterproductive,” and the people whose lives could be altered the most would be marginalized groups in rural areas, those displaced from the violence, and unemployed youth. A large portion of the protestors on the day of the coup in Burkina Faso were showing up in solidarity with the affected population in Mali. 

While the possibility of sanctions remains and ECOWAS has warned of them, Burkina Faso has only been removed from the bloc thus far, and the African Union (AU) also suspended the country pending the reinstatement of the constitution. Additionally, while sanctions have not been imposed, the United States has paused $450 million in aid to Burkina Faso. The United States has been the largest international donor to the country, but U.S. law requires the suspension of non-humanitarian aid to countries where a democratically-elected government has been taken over unconstitutionally, and there is still much uncertainty regarding Burkina Faso’s path forward. Although the constitution has been restored now and MPSR ensured “the continuity of the state pending the establishment of transitional bodies,” those transitional bodies are yet to be established. 

In a more recent development, Burkina Faso may see a steep decline in aid due to the invasion of Ukraine. For example, the Norwegian Refugee Council spokesperson in West and Central Africa said, “Some donors have already indicated that they would proceed to a 70% cut of our funding to support operations in Ukraine…” Additionally, a regional advocate from Refugees International said that “Russia is one of the leading grain exporters in the world,” and more people in sub-Saharan Africa will be in need of emergency food assistance as the international community cuts ties with Russia. Finally, certain impacts of foreign aid on political stability as a whole are still debated, but time will tell whether the military government is able to successfully carry out their plans. 

However, a timeline has been given for the transition of power in Burkina Faso, and it was announced a week after the invasion of Ukraine. Damiba was officially inaugurated as president back in February and a team of 25 ministers stood by his side, but it took until March for other plans to be released. On March 3, an economist and professor named Albert Ouedraogo was announced to be the interim prime minister, and the plan as communicated by the military government is for Damiba and Ouedraogo to work towards political stability for the next three years before hosting elections. 

International Response to the Coup

Countries in other parts of the world have also reacted to the coup, including France. Although France has been less involved in Burkina Faso than it has in some neighboring countries, Burkina Faso is a former French colony, and France has about 5,000 soldiers in the region. For years, France has been trying to halt militant attacks from extremists by sending in troops and working with the groups in power, but after the events of January, the country is in a tough place. After the takeover of Burkina Faso, President Emmanuel Macron said, "I would remind you that our priority in the region is to fight against Islamist terrorism,” but it should be noted that Macron has an upcoming election to think about. While he has already been reducing the number of troops in the area, if France takes any drastic measures, those actions would reflect on him.

Russia is also worth discussing, for reasons beyond the invasion of Ukraine. In Mali, the junta has relied on security from the Wagner Group, a paramilitary organization backed by the Russian government, and this group has been deployed in Libya and the Central African Republic as well. Reportedly, the leader of the coup in Burkina Faso was regularly in communication with the military leaders of Mali and Guinea, and twice, Damiba tried to convince Kaboré to use Russian paramilitaries. Kaboré refused, but with Damiba in power, the situation has shifted. 

Examining France and Russia’s current role in the region, counterterrorism and tension between the West and Russia were at the forefront of the conversation—but there is more at play. Some have said that “core political problems” are being ignored while foreign powers use West Africa to compete among themselves. In terms of Burkina Faso, the International Crisis Group surfaced the importance of addressing the social crisis in the north and the development deficit, as well as the pre-existing spread of corruption in the administration judicial system. Not every coup in the region can be solely blamed on violent extremism (although it is certainly a large factor in this situation) because the acceptance of democracy underlies the pattern.

The Need for Nuance

The chairman of ECOWAS and president of Ghana, Nana Akufo-Addo, called the coup in Mali “contagious” during the summit following Burkina Faso’s takeover. This implies that the coups are having a domino effect, or that they are modeled after each other. Notably, however, not every coup in West Africa stemmed from the violent extremists, but rather the interruption or prevention of democratic trajectories. Some, including Vice President of the US Institute of Peace’s Africa Center Joseph Sany, believe that conveying the idea of a coup contagion is problematic because it “absolves the world community” from assisting West African countries in creating democratic institutions. Fully attributing these coups to violent extremism could greatly affect the viability of international response.

On the other hand, Akufo-Addo did address the observed controversy over democracy, and he called for a collective response to the trend of coups in the region. Perhaps “contagious” is a fitting way to describe the pattern in West Africa, not because extremism is the overarching factor, but rather concerns about democracy. Panic generated from violence inevitably leads to critique of the present format and exploration of government systems, but while root causes are important to address, there does seem to be a connecting factor beyond violent extremism. 

Moving forward, those discussing coups in the West African region should be conscious of nuance while noting that there are major similarities. Talking as though each country is struggling for the same reason and attributing all of this to religious extremism interrupts how the international community responds to military takeovers in West Africa, and that way of thinking draws attention away from social issues, government/judicial corruption, poverty, and more. Particularly in terms of strategizing foreign aid, countries need to pay attention to both the situations of individual countries and the region as a whole.

Replacing Foreign Intervention for Regional Intervention: The African Union’s Critical Role in Mediating the Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon

Cameroon’s Anglophone community, which makes up 20% of the population has felt marginalized and excluded from the national government’s agenda since the country’s independence from France in 1961. These fundamental grievances have only grown during the past 50 years due to the blatant disregard of the Anglophone problem by President Paul Biya, the six-month internet shutdown in English-speaking regions back in 2017, and human rights violations by national security forces. These separate events have all contributed to the current surge of protests and sporadic violence. While the government attempted to appease the Anglophone minority, efforts proved inadequate and failed to radically dismantle the systematic inequalities and prejudice faced by the Anglophone population. Consequently, a secessionist group emerged in January 2017, under the name The Republic of Ambazonia, with goals to mobilize the Anglophone population in support of a separate ethnostate.  Cameroon’s key foreign partners, the U.S., France, and China, overlook the violence and hostilities in Cameroon’s Anglophone regions due to their ties with the national government and the protection of their interests by Biya in exchange for support. Thus, it is vital that a regional body such as the African Union (AU) intervene immediately in order to deter the possibility of armed conflict and the subsequent destabilization of West and Central Africa.

More importantly, Cameroon’s stability and security is of critical importance to the AU as Cameroon’s military is actively fighting Boko Haram in the far North of Cameroon and militias from the Central African Republic (CAR) in the East of Cameroon. Thus, from a strategic point of view, the AU has high incentives to implement peacekeeping measures in Cameroon in order to guarantee its stability. The AU can play a key role in assisting the Cameroonian government enact sustainable and inclusive reforms that benefit the whole country. Proactive series of actions include establishing an AU mediation intervention that facilitates dialogue between the Anglophone regions and the ruling regime; deploying an extensive peacekeeping operation in Cameroon to closely observe the situation and maintain peace; and urging the Cameroonian government to make immediate social and political reforms that include the voices of Cameroonians from English-speaking regions.

Historical Background & Context

The Anglophone problem dates back to the colonial era when the German colony Kamerun was passed down to Britain and France under a joint administration. Through the 1919 Simon-Milner agreement, both colonial powers unevenly divided the territory along the Picot Provisional Partition Line, with the French having a greater sphere of influence. This resulted in the regions developing separately with “legal, educational, monetary and political agreements being significantly different”. For instance, while the British territory was administered from Nigeria, with a fair amount of autonomy due to Britain’s indirect rule policy, the French applied a centralized form of governance. Once French Cameroun received its independence in 1960, the people of British Southern Cameroon chose to join the already independent Republic of Cameroun without the consent of British Northern Cameroonians who wanted to join independent Nigeria. Eventually, a constitution was drafted and implemented in 1961 for a federal state of Cameroon which united two regions with completely different political cultures. The dissolution of the federal state in 1972 by President Ahmadou Ahidjo into a unitary centralized state was the advent of a gradual effort to belittle Anglophones’ cultural history, customs and socio-political systems by the francophone majority in power. The Anglophone problem has four different dimensions, including:  the 1972 referendum which eliminated the principal idea of federalism from the 1961 constitution; the deliberate and systematic erosion of the Anglophone cultural identity from the union; the dissolution of prevalent Anglophone political parties and imprisonment of their leaders; and the continuous repression of all actions designed to improve the status of Anglophone Cameroonians in the Union. Most importantly, “the lack of proper management seems to be what has aggravated the problem” as noted by the Roman Catholic Bishops of Cameroon in their 2017 memorandum to President Biya. Thus, one can argue that the contemporary conflicts that divide Cameroonians are the result of an inimical relationship between competing European colonial powers (France and Britain), which has had far-reaching consequences due to the two different forms of colonial administration.

The Anglophone Problem: What is the Current Situation Today?

Today Anglophones in Cameroon face various cases of abject marginalization including: under representation in strategic government positions and complete exclusion from others. For instance, out of the 33 appointed ministries, only three Anglophones occupy high-level cabinet positions. In the judicial system, out of the 1,542 active magistrates, 1,265 are francophone and 277 are Anglophone. As for judicial officers, there are 514 in total, 499 Francophone and 15 Anglophones. Anglophone student unions have repeatedly complained about the institutional nepotism and the exclusion of qualified Anglophones in admissions into state professional schools, particularly schools of administration, medicine, and higher teacher training---even in the Anglophone regions. In the educational sector, there are various instances of discrimination where the francophone-majority government disproportionately appoints francophone trained teachers to Anglophone educational institutions. This is problematic because Anglophone teachers are further robbed of employment opportunities within their own native regions. Additionally, francophone teachers don’t bother to follow the English Educational Subsystem (which reflects British educational models) depriving students of a full English education that they pay for.

Another glaring inequality is the unequal disbursement of funds in the country and quality of infrastructural development in Anglophone regions versus Francophone regions. Due to the lack of an influential voice in political spaces, it is harder for Anglophone Cameroonians to advocate against the neglect of infrastructure development in the Northwest and Southwest regions of Cameroon. It is also harder for them to advocate for the relocation of top business plants to their regions that contribute to local economies. The consequence of this is Anglophone regions are under-resourced and struggle to meet annual development goals because of inadequate attention.

The issue that is really at the core of the Anglophone crisis and recent protests is public belief in the systematic erosion and disrespect of the Anglophone identity. Specific examples include national entrance exams into professional schools only being in French and state institutions only producing documents and public notes in French. While tensions have always existed between Anglophones and Francophones, they have never been as acute as they are now. The vast majority of Anglophones are frustrated with the systematic targeting of their culture and continuous attempts to absorb them into the francophone language, education and governance system.  Such grievances are what led to the most recent October 2016 peaceful protests by Anglophone lawyers followed by major teacher unions’ strikes. The government responded through repressive measures with the arrests and murders of prominent Anglophone elites suspected of fueling the resistance. While war crimes are being committed on both sides, it is important to note that the movement was originally peaceful. However, it has fallen into the hands of Anglophone extremists and separatists who responded with violence after the Cameroonian military directed attacks towards civilians.  

Since the crisis escalated in 2017, the humanitarian situation has spiraled. According to reports from International Crisis Group, at least 500 civilians have been killed during clashes between armed secessionist groups (Red Dragons, Tigers and Ambazonia Defense Forces) and national military forces. Based on a Human Rights Watch report, an estimated 32,600 Cameroonians have taken refuge in Nigeria’s Cross River state, with 244,000 civilians displaced in the Far North and 437,500 in the Anglophone North West and South West regions. Students in Anglophone (North West and South West) have been the most affected by this crisis. This is because they have been deprived of an education with schools shutting down for security concerns. According to UN Office for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), an estimated 42,500 children were still out of school as of May 2018 and most schools did not open in 2018.

What Can Be Done by the African Union?

The African Union has the potential to serve as a credible and vital mediator in mitigating the Anglophone crisis. The AU’s  mission is to help create an “integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in a global arena”. While the organization strives to resolve and establish peace in several conflicts throughout the continent, the emphasis on post-conflict resolution rather than the implementation of peacekeeping and preventive measures has left room for several countries to slip into armed conflicts. A similar situation prevails with the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon. Failure to act quickly by engaging with key Anglophone leaders and the current government to mediate inclusive, safe, and open dialogue could lead to an armed conflict which would destabilize Cameroon and ultimately undermine the AU’s security goals in the region. Aside from the prominence and influence that the organization carries in Africa, the AU has more familiarity and common ground with the Cameroonian government due to the shared African context than international organizations such as the United Nations. Thus, instead of solely relying on international assistance, as a respected continental organization, the AU should be able to approach this delicate situation with more depth and understanding of cultural context. This could increase receptivity from the local Cameroonian government and Anglophone populations.

The sporadic violence in Anglophone regions has left the vast majority of Anglophone Cameroonians mistrustful of their government, making the idea of secession even more attractive. A special envoy needs to be appointed by the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Hon.Moussa Faki, and deployed to Cameroon. A group of representatives and mediators need to be strategically positioned in the Northwest and Southwest regions as well as in the capital city (Yaoundé) to engage in both high-level and local mediation or conflict-prevention. In order to deter the possibility of armed conflict, this special envoy would have to ground their actions in the principles of confidence-building mediation. This means that their prime responsibility would be to transform the political and psychological dynamics of the parties involved.  Anglophone Cameroonians would be willing to dialogue in the presence of an honest broker that creates a calm and safe place for them to articulate their concerns to the central government.

As a trusted third party, the AU would play a critical role in stabilizing the current crisis in Cameron and ensuring that a constructive roadmap exists between the government and Anglophone minority. While sending a special envoy to Cameroon to mediate dialogue between the affected parties is important, that would only address a facet of this complex issue. In addition to the institutional measures taken by the AU, Hon. Moussa Faki should urge the Peace and Security Council (PSC) to authorize a peace support mission. This would help to bring an end to human rights abuses by military officials and secessionist groups. This peacekeeping mission could be between 2,000 and 3,000 civilian police and technical personnel to promote greater respect for human rights and serve as a buffer between the two opposing parties.

In response to grievances and political demands made by the Anglophone population, Biya’s regime has implemented quick bandage solutions that have not targeted the root causes of Anglophone frustrations. Reforms have not only been deemed inadequate but have been criticized among Anglophone leaders as being “a little too late. The AU should strongly urge the Cameroonian government to cease the continuous denial of the Anglophone problem. Instead, by recognizing that there is an issue and implementing viable solutions could go a long way in de-escalating the current crisis. An equal percentage of Anglophones and Francophones not only need to be appointed to high levels of government in order to reflect the diverse nature of the Cameroonian society, but Anglophones need to be politically empowered. This means providing equal access and real opportunities to resolve the socioeconomic and political inequalities faced by the Anglophone population in the country.

The vast majority Anglophones have lost hope in the current social contract because it curtails their freedoms and fails to hold the government accountable. The most obvious recommendation that could be made to the Biya regime by the AU would be to decentralize the government. While this is enshrined in the 1996 Constitution of Cameroon, it was never implemented.  The promotion of local governance would empower Anglophone communities in the North and Southwest regions. Returning to a federal system where Anglophones and Francophones can practice self-determination would allow different provinces to implement comprehensive policies, create impactful changes in the lives of their constituents and foster sustainable economic development. Furthermore, the devolution of power would enhance accountability and transparency in the management of state affairs, while lessening the rampant corruption in government. The prolonged crisis will further divide the country along linguistic and geographic lines. Thus, the support of these recommendations by the AU would provide viable solutions to instilling greater national cohesion amongst Cameroonians and ensuring the security and stability of the country.

Limitations & Alternatives

When considering possible gridlocks to implementing these recommendations, there are high chances that Biya’s regime will not only resist the AU mediation and conflict prevention intervention, but will also dismiss the recommended reforms. While questions of sovereignty and intervening in affairs within the domestic jurisdiction of Cameroon arise, the AU has a duty to fight crimes against humanity and the responsibility to protect (R2P) innocent African lives. The AU cannot and must not sit back and watch as the Cameroonian government marginalizes and violates the human rights of its citizens. The Cameroonian government should not be given a free pass to repress the fundamental rights of its citizens. The AU’s Peace and Security Council could also argue that compared to other African countries where the AU is involved, the situation in Cameroon has not reached a level where it deserves an intervention. This mindset is the fundamental problem with the AU:  the organization is so actively involved in post conflict reconstruction and fails to take the necessary precautionary measures for conflict prevention and peacekeeping in several African countries that are on the brink of war.

Failure to dedicate attention to Cameroon now when the situation is still semi-manageable could escalate the crisis to a point of no return. The destabilization of Cameroon would only make the AU’s job harder, as containing transnational crime and terrorists’ organizations without the help of the Cameroonian army would pose a greater challenge. In the event that the proposed measures fail, Honorable. Moussa Faki should urge the Assembly of the AU to impose targeted sanctions on the Cameroonian government and those undermining the stability of the country. Targeted economic sanctions backed by the U.S, France, China and the ECCAS regional community should be swiftly implemented. Since Cameroon has already been stripped of the right to host the African Cup of Nations, the threat of shocking Biya into action that Julius Amin proposes is currently powerless. Thus, economic sanctions will hopefully push the Cameroonian government to be more responsive to the needs of its citizens.

Three targeted solutions that would tackle the Anglophone crisis holistically include: the AU engaging with key Anglophone leaders and the current government to mediate inclusive and open dialogues amongst both parties; the AU preserving human rights through the deployment of a peace mission to Cameroon; and the AU demanding that the current Biya regime make reforms that lead to the gradual decentralization of government and the devolution of power. The potential impediments to implementing these recommendations include the resistance by the Cameroonian government to AU intervention or to implement proposed changes and the refusal of the Peace and Security Council to authorize a peace operation to Cameroon. However, the AU must play its role in promoting African security and step up to the challenge. Instead of continuously relying on foreign intervention and waiting for the U.S., France, or China to meddle in regional affairs, the AU should seek support from African countries such as Chad, Nigeria, Niger, and Ghana in order to ensure the stability of Cameroon. Cameroon, is a vital security partner in the fight against terrorism in the West and Central Africa. Thus, ensuring its stability should be one of the African Union’s primary concerns in order to deter the possibilities of a violent armed conflict, that would have serious consequences for the entire region.

The Fate of AGOA

On May 18th, the US and 39 sub-Saharan African countries will celebrate the 17th anniversary of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the “cornerstone of the trade and investment relationship between the United States and sub-Saharan Africa”. This act has been subject to debate over the years. Is it effective? Should the requirements for African nations be more stringent? Does it invite too much investment in oil exports? This year, a new question has surfaced: Will it be favorable to the Trump administration? President Trump’s recent rejection of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and broader platform favoring bilateral agreements have created uncertainty for existing partnerships, including AGOA.

Overview of AGOA  

AGOA was signed by President Clinton in 2000, with the objective of bolstering trade between the U.S. and sub-Saharan Africa. Since then it has been considered the “cornerstone of trade policy” between the U.S. and Africa. There are currently 38 beneficiaries of AGOA, which are able to import 6,500 different products into the U.S. duty-free. Each country benefits differently. Nigeria alone accounted for 32% of AGOA trade in 2013, but other smaller nations and industries are scaling up to tap into U.S. markets. Throughout its implementation, there have been multiple reviews of the program. A performance overview was completed by the US Trade Representative in 2014, before President Obama led the U.S.-Africa Business Summit. Overall, they report that both the U.S. and Africa (as an aggregation of all beneficiaries) have benefitted from the partnership. The highest years for trade were 2008 and 2009, before the global slowdown resulting from the 2008 recession. Over time, a trade deficit (for the U.S.) has resulted, as more African industries tap into the benefits of duty-free exports. This report, and subsequent statements by African leaders, also highlight the existing challenges in the agreement. Most prominent among these are the rules of origin and product list.

Existing Challenges of AGOA

The existing Rules of Origin for AGOA state that a country must add 35 percent value to a good in the benefitting country for that good to enter U.S. markets tariff-free. This is a very high standard for smaller countries that may be producing one item in a large, global supply chain. As a result, one of the major criticisms of AGOA is the indirect manner that it incentivizes petroleum exports. Petroleum products, unlike manufactures, easily qualify under the Rules of Origin. Policymakers in the U.S. and Africa have been developing methods to mitigate this issue. The African Union’s “AGOA Forum” began in 2002, for nations to share ideas and strategies to bolster their industries and benefit from more duty-free products. Some countries have developed individual-country strategies, and favor industries—like textiles—that could qualify for AGOA with the construction of factories.

The U.S. has been partnering on diversification projects to diminish the rules of origin barrier.  USAID’s “Trade and Investment Hubs” were created to assist countries in Africa to organize themselves around AGOA. In certain countries, such as Kenya, AGOA has inspired the development of “Export Processing Zones” (EPZ) that build-up infant industries. Richard Kamajugo of TradeMark East Africa underlines the importance of these endeavors: “Repealing the Act would wipe out the EPZ sub-sector that employs about 40,000 Kenyans, and greatly reduce trade as textile and apparel products account for about 80 per cent of Kenya’s total exports to the US.” When renewal was being discussed, scholars suggested the rules of origin be adapted to encourage regional integration. For example, by stating that products could benefit from duty-free entry if a region—like East Africa—contributed 35 percent value to a good collectively, private companies and governments in the region would direct supply chains to include regional counterparts. This suggestion was never operationalized, but remains a leading idea for the 2025 renewal.  

The product list has also been a point of contention, and alternative strategies are not as flexible. While AGOA offers 6,500 products, many agricultural products that are essential to countries such as Tanzania—whose agricultural sector accounts for 80 percent of GDP— do not qualify. Sugar and groundnuts are at the top of this list, and remained excluded even after the renewal of the act. U.S. agricultural subsidies are rumored to be the underlying cause for exclusion of “import sensitive products,” defined as U.S. products that are “susceptible to competition from imports from other country suppliers”. Trade ministers of many AGOA beneficiary countries have lamented the exclusion of these products, but the US has not conceded.

Politics of AGOA

U.S.-African economic policy has been uncharacteristically bipartisan. President Bush quadrupled aid to Africa during his administration, and Obama has introduced specific initiatives such as PEPFAR, Power Africa, and Trade Africa throughout his two terms. When the AGOA renewal act passed Congress, it was attached to a larger act– the Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015–which included Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) to mitigate the costs to workers affected by trade policies. Democrats had initially disputed the TAA on a stand-alone act, but with AGOA included, the Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015 passed in the House of Representatives, 387-32 and Senate, 97-1.

With its highly bipartisan nature and remaining 8-year lifespan before renewal, policy analysts had minimal apprehension that AGOA would be questioned by the new Administration. However The New York Times recently obtained a list of “Africa-related questions” that were sent to experts at the State Department. One of the many inquiries included AGOA. The Administration asked: “Most of AGOA imports are petroleum products, with the benefits going to national oil companies, why do we support that massive benefit to corrupt regimes?” Analysts, such as Witney Schneidman of Brookings Institute, are now apprehensive about AGOA’s future. Schneidman contends “AGOA could easily be the first [trade] casualty under Trump.” Analysts, investors, policy-makers, and trade ministers alike are conspiring—what would the U.S.-Africa trade partnership look like without AGOA?

Impact if Ended

The impact of AGOA has exceeded the statistics of trade balances. Many government programs, private initiatives, and factories have been constructed around AGOA’s existence, since it creates demand for African imports in the U.S.  One of the largest socio-economic contributions has been the inclusion of women. Women have been employed in regions where they had minimal involvement in the formalized economy. The existence of AGOA also increased investor confidence in Africa, which has led to both public-private partnerships with government enterprises and greater amounts of foreign-direct investment (FDI).

If tariffs toward AGOA-qualifying products are re-instated, these smaller-scale industries like clothing factories will not be able to compete with large corporations. Some analysts believe that investors, who have observed the market potential in Africa through AGOA programming, will fill in the gap. Others contend that China or the European Union will offer trade promotion programs in the absence of AGOA. Regardless of this speculation, the objective evaluations of AGOA have demonstrated the positive effects of its implementation. Economies in Africa would survive in the absence of AGOA, but trust between the benefitting nations and the U.S. would undoubtedly deteriorate.

Conclusion

Policy-makers and representatives on both sides of the political aisle should vocalize their support for AGOA preemptively, before the fears of AGOA revocation materialize. Those benefiting from AGOA in Africa and supporting its implementation in the US should specify the unique qualities of this U.S-African partnership, so it will be evaluated alone. Lumping AGOA together with other seemingly ineffective trade policies would be a mistake. While AGOA may not be the long-term policy prescription that underlines all U.S.-African trade policy, its benefits have incited the creation of many industries across the continent.  The U.S. has undoubtedly benefitted from this multilateral partnership, especially in terms of economic growth and strengthened relationships with African governments. As we look forward to a more fair, growing global economy, Africa must be included; AGOA has facilitated the beginning of what could be a mutually prosperous future for the U.S. and sub-Saharan Africa alike.