The Pandemic's Effects on Educational Disparities Between Mongolia's Rural and Urban Students

COVID-19 has resculpted the global landscape of education, resulting in devastating learning loss that widened the gap between disadvantaged students and their peers. By exacerbating inequities around the world, the pandemic has spurred teachers and policymakers everywhere to rethink education. While various organizations attempt to make collective statements about the pandemic’s effects on the international education as a whole, invaluable information can be gained by using a more singular lens to approach the issue of COVID-19’s impact as it relates to a particular country’s education system. As the world’s most sparsely populated independent country and one whose pandemic response has been largely successful, Mongolia makes for an interesting focus point upon which the pandemic’s effects on education can be examined. Surprisingly, there are few reports exploring the ways in which Mongolian schools have been challenged by and interacted with the pandemic. In this report, I aim to explore how the pandemic affected Mongolia and what inferences can be made regarding the pandemic’s effects on Mongolian education.

Mongolia and the Pandemic

March 9, 2022 marks two years since Mongolia first came in contact with the coronavirus through a French national working in the country. From this moment on, the nation has been grappling with serious questions regarding how to best shape government policy to combat the pandemic and keep people safe. Even before the virus found its way into Mongolia, the government had been on high alert. This trend can be seen as early as January 10, 2020, when the Mongolian government issued its first public advisory, aimed at urging all Mongolians to wear a mask. This was soon followed by the closing of borders to its neighbor China with whom Mongolia shares the longest land border. The transportation restriction meant no Chinese citizen or person traveling from China could enter Mongolia. Through the implementation of its early response to the pandemic, Mongolia had managed to entirely evade any COVID-19 deaths until December 30, 2020. The Mongolian government’s determination to rapidly implement high-impact COVID-19 prevention policies stemmed not only from concerns over its shared border with China, but also from insecurity regarding the country’s health infrastructure. “Here’s the thing: we don’t actually have a great public health system,” explained Davaadorj Rendoo, an epidemiologist at the National Center for Public Health in Mongolia’s capital and largest city Ulaanbaatar. “That’s why our administrators were so afraid of COVID-19.”

As of April 2022, the number of active COVID-19 cases in Mongolia has dropped below 1,000 for the first time since late 2020. With the number of daily infections declining and the percentage of fully vaccinated people exceeding 65%, things seem to be looking up for the Mongolian people. However, while pandemic-related policies in Mongolia seem to have enabled the country to evade overwhelming fatalities, the pandemic has inflicted serious damage to the Mongolian education system. Since all schools were closed on January 27, 2020 to combat the spread of COVID-19 among students, the education system has been forced to undergo significant, unprecedented changes. These changes disproportionately affected Mongolia’s most vulnerable students living in remote areas with limited internet access and electricity. Even in Mongolia’s most populous cities like Ulaanbaatar, the immediate switch to remote learning has left no student unscathed. While UNICEF estimates that schoolchildren across the globe have lost over 1.8 trillion hours of in-person learning due to the pandemic, it is difficult to precisely conclude how much learning loss the students of Mongolia have experienced. Data is still being collected, and the pandemic has not yet been eradicated. 

Mongolian Education: Pre-Pandemic

In order to gain a better understanding of the pandemic’s effects on education in Mongolia, it is important to be acquainted with the pre-pandemic state of Mongolian schools. Mongolia’s 2018 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey provides valuable insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the Mongolian education system before the pandemic. Developed by UNICEF, the Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) program is the largest household survey on women and children worldwide. Its purpose has been “to assist countries in filling data gaps on children’s and women’s health statuses.” Mongolia’s 2018 MICS fortifies the argument that rural/urban educational inequity has existed in Mongolia before the pandemic, opening the doors to explore how the pandemic has interacted with that inequity. According to the report, 58.2% of rural children aged 36-59 months were attending early childhood education institutes. Compared to the 81.4% of urban children, it is evident that living in urban Mongolia comes with a higher likelihood of obtaining access to early childhood education, which has been proven to lower risks of school dropout and contribute to higher learning and employment outcomes later in life. Additionally, having access to early childhood education means that a child’s caregiver can participate in the workforce, which is key to “breaking stubborn cycles of intergenerational poverty.” Early childhood education inequity explains why higher education inequity also exists in Mongolia. According to UNESCO’s Global Education Monitoring Report, 53% of 18-22 year olds living in urban Mongolia attend higher education institutes. Compared to the 15% in rural Mongolia, it goes without saying that Mongolia’s “regional variation in poverty” contributes to wealth disparities between rural and urban regions of the country.

Turning back to the 2018 MICS, it can be observed that 4.3% of male urban schoolchildren of lower secondary school age were out of school in 2018 compared to the 8.1% of male rural schoolchildren. However, there are still some nuances to be explored, considering more female urban schoolchildren are out of school than rural female schoolchildren. This is a point upon which I would advise further research to identify what causes female urban schoolchildren to leave school and what incentivizes female rural schoolchildren to remain in school much longer than their male peers. Despite women in Mongolia being better educated than men, a gendered hierarchy still exists in which men are likely to be paid more than women in Mongolia. 

Looking beyond lower secondary school students and onto upper secondary school students, the urban/rural gap in school attendance expands. While only 7.5% of urban upper secondary students were out of school during the year of 2018, the percentage jumps to 25.9% for Mongolia’s rural upper secondary students. This can be explained by the disproportionate lack of support faced by rural students; urban students exceeded rural students in every “Support for Child Learning at School” category in the 2018 MICS— “percentage of children attending school,” “percentage of children for whom an adult household member in the last year received a report card for the child,” “school has a governing body open to parents,” “an adult household member attended a meeting called by governing body,” “a school meeting discussed key education/financial issues,” “an adult household member attended a school celebration or sports event,” and “an adult household member met with teachers to discuss child’s progress.” In the context of the social determinants of learning framework, these factors have the potential to contribute highly to student achievement but are disproportionately denied to rural students. It is important to remember that this is not due to an inferiority on behalf of rural Mongolian parents or a superiority on behalf of urban Mongolian parents. Considering that they are more likely to face poverty than their urban counterparts, rural families are more likely to work more frequently in order to support their children. This means that there is not always time for rural parents and caretakers to meet with teachers and attend school meetings or events. Additionally, schools increase parent involvement—and thus student success—by building community. While developments like Mongolia’s Rural Education and Development program have contributed significantly to tightening the gap between rural and urban schools, the inequity still remains, likely posing the reason as to why rural schools may lack the resources to engage rural families living in poverty. 

The Pandemic and Mongolian Schools

Mongolia’s 2020 MICS offers insight into how the pandemic has interacted with the increasingly urbanized country and its schools. The report’s information on early childhood education offers interesting doors through which more research could be conducted, specifically on the disparity between children of Khalkh ethnicity and children of Kazakh ethnicity. The report also found interesting data on rural school children outperforming city students in foundational numeracy skills in 2020. However, when it comes to information and communications technology (ICT) skills, urban students outperform rural students overwhelmingly. An observation is made in the report that ICT skill acquisition is “hugely influenced” by wealth quintiles. The ICT skills examined in this report include but are not limited to sending an email with an attached file, transferring a file between a computer and another device, creating an electronic presentation using presentation software, connecting and installing a new device, and using a copy and paste tool within a document. In our increasingly digitized world, the importance of ICT skills for students cannot be underestimated. Considering this, it is evident that rural students have faced more barriers throughout online learning than urban students. This is supported by Sodnomdarjaa Munkhbat’s comment to Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung Mongolia. As the Director of the Science and Technology Department at the Mongolian Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, she said, “School children were taught through classes broadcasted on TV and universities used remote learning technology. Both had to be developed and implanted on extremely short notice which put a lot of stress on teachers, professors, and students. TV classes were especially challenging.” 

The 2020 MICS also found that parents’ engagement in ger districts of Ulaanbaatar was 10 percentage points lower than those living in apartments. The study concluded that “the low rate of engagement is also common in rural area[s] and especially in [the] Western region.” When looking at the data on parental homework help, the report found parents with certain qualities were more likely to offer their child homework assistance; these qualities include having obtained a higher education, not having migrated within the last 5 years, and having attended a public school. This offers an explanation as to why in the 2018 MICS, similar findings on lack of support for rural students were identified. This information lends itself to the acknowledgement that, in order to achieve educational equity between rural and urban students, the Mongolian education system must work to enhance resources for students whose parents have not obtained a higher education.

Although the 2020 MICS offers little insight into the pandemic itself, popular Mongolian news sources like Зууны мэдээ (Zuunii medee) supplement this deficit with their article on textbook availability. “The education sector has collapsed due to the pandemic,” journalist Ch. Gantulga wrote mournfully. Gantulga points to a lack of textbook availability as a huge problem facing Mongolia during the pandemic. D. Delgermaa, a middle school teacher, told Gantulga, “I am in charge of the seventh grade. Our class has 31 children. Due to the small number of textbooks distributed by the school, only one book is used by three children. In particular, there are not enough books on Mongolian language and social sciences. Some potential families buy textbooks for their children…Some students have problems with not being able to read e-books because they do not have smartphones. If these children have enough textbooks, there will be no problem.” Put in the context of the wealth disparities between rural and urban students previously established, it is evident that more needs to be done by the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Science to repair the learning losses exacerbated not only by the pandemic but also by lack of school resources. This sentiment does not seem to have been lost on Munkhbat, who said to FES Mongolia, “The pandemic made it very clear that the education system must be ready and responsive to high risk situations. What happened this year can happen any time again. Our way forward will be to enhance online education particularly for the higher education sector. This will be embedded in the government’s strategy of a ‘digital transformation.’” While a digital transformation is likely highly anticipated by students in Mongolia, the data leaves us with an understanding that, in addition to education as a whole, digital literacy instruction is not equitably distributed to all students in Mongolia. It will be important, moving forward, for Mongolia to put adequate resources toward building all students’ ICT skills, paying special attention to rural students.

Having analyzed the state of Mongolian education before and after the pandemic, it is evident that the pre-pandemic challenges faced by rural students have been exacerbated by COVID-19. These challenges are an extension of the poverty faced disproportionately by rural Mongolians. The disparity in school attendance between rural and urban students highlights the presence of class barriers in Mongolia. These inequities may stem from disproportionate access to early education, which has been proven to result in higher learning and employment outcomes later in life. The ways in which the pandemic has exacerbated educational inequity in Mongolia is important to analyze, considering its impact may materialize as a generation divided unequally by their level of access to education. This may be seen in the construction and perpetuation of intergenerational poverty for Mongolians who were in school during the COVID-19 pandemic. Mongolia’s Ministry of Education, Culture, and Science has the ability to change this by financing high-quality schools in rural regions of the country, implementing poverty-reduction policies for rural families so that students are not incentivized to choose work over school, ensuring school resources are equitably distributed, implementing educational policies that focus on honing the digital literacy skills of rural youth, and further analyzing the ways in which the pandemic has differently shaped educational outcomes for rural and urban students.

China’s COVID Vaccine Diplomacy

Ever since January 2020 when the first cases of COVID were discovered in Hubei Province, China has had a significant role to play in the development and distribution of COVID vaccine doses. The public-private partnerships which joined the resources of the Chinese government with the manufacturing capabilities of the country’s pharmaceutical companies have allowed them to make speedy progress, and that has opened opportunities for providing global assistance during the pandemic. Indeed, China has made offers to a number of countries in a move that could be seen as a public service, a strategic play, or a combination of the two. The Chinese government has pushed one narrative, of course, but there is no denying that China has extensive room for growth in terms of soft power. China’s capabilities have increased its competitiveness with the West and opened doors to its expansion on the national market. Though, much of China’s COVID vaccine operations remain ambiguous. Firstly, there is uncertainty about the safety and efficacy of the country’s three vaccines. There is also confusion and a lack of transparency surrounding the vaccine research. There is skepticism about China’s follow through and what they may ask for in return. There are also the Chinese people who need to be cared for. China is acting on the center stage during this COVID pandemic, and there is no unified expectation from its spectators.

Global Assistance from China

Last May, Chinese President Xi Jinping allocated large sums of money to about 17 vaccine projects and gathered 22 firms and research institutes to get to work. With this devotion to overcoming the pandemic that killed so many and initially tarnished China’s reputation, China has committed to delivering about half a billion doses of vaccine to over 45 countries. These countries are low and middle income, and they are struggling to meet their demand due to the costs and requirements of Pfizer, Moderna, and the like. One difference between these Western vaccines and China’s, for example, is that the latter do not require ultracold storage; standard refrigerators are sufficient. This alleviates the problem of transporting mass amounts of vaccines to areas without substantive infrastructure. Many low and middle income countries see China’s offer as more cost-effective and distributable than the other vaccines. 

Although the Chinese government rejects the phrase due to its negative connotations, this global assistance has been called “vaccine diplomacy.” Many suspect that China’s actions are less of a public service than they are a political move, and the Associated Press relayed “concerns about what China might want in return for deliveries.” It is not yet clear what China expects from the countries they have pledged to help, but no matter the intention, China has a lot to gain from this circumstance. 

China’s Competition with the West

China’s primary gains from assisting low and middle income countries are in regard to competing with the West. Assisting Serbia and Hungary, for example, is a “geopolitical victory in Central Europe and the Balkans.” This will give China greater economic influence in the region. This diplomacy is also about showing China’s advancements and proving that they can keep up with the United States. Foreign Affairs quoted a Chinese virologist who said that China is “not lagging behind the United States as far as the technology is concerned,” and the research is being conducted in public-private partnerships. President Emmanuel Macron of France said that China’s vaccine diplomacy was “a little bit humiliating” for the West, and to top it all off, the Chinese government is pushing rhetoric and theories about how COVID did not originate in the country and American vaccines are unsafe. China is attempting to establish itself as the world leader in COVID response.

Additionally, China’s involvement in COVAX (COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access) compels the World Health Organization (WHO)to approve vaccines that were developed in China. This is because China has committed to buying a certain amount of vaccines, and they have the option to choose Chinese brands. If the WHO permits the use of China’s COVID vaccines, COVAX may order these vaccines for developing countries, therefore expanding China’s market share. Some estimates predict that COVID vaccines may bring more than 10 billion dollars in sales. COVID vaccine diplomacy is a way for China’s pharmaceutical companies to broaden their scope. 

Joining COVAX is also a way that China is leading in comparison to the United States because former President Donald Trump chose to give up the opportunity for soft power that China has been pursuing. He refused to join COVAX, and he refused to offer vaccine aid to any country — including allies of the U.S. Foreign Affairs viewed the United States’s action — or inaction — as a nationalist path, yet they also pointed out that this play only bolstered China’s benefits from vaccine diplomacy. While the Biden administration has since joined COVAX, China has already been able to make major strides in distribution pledges and gain influence. If former President Trump had just joined COVAX from the beginning, it is possible that the low and middle income countries that China has been collaborating with would have had a more difficult decision. Instead, the concerns about the safety and efficacy of China’s COVID vaccines have been overlooked by these countries due to their major lack of options.

The Safety and Efficacy of China’s COVID Vaccines

China has developed several vaccines, but there are concerns about how safe and effective they are. One of the vaccines, Sinopharm, is reportedly 79 percent effective. CanSino is reportedly 65 percent effective. There is a significant amount of variation in research about the Sinovac vaccine, and it could be anywhere from 50 percent to 91 percent effective. Although the Sinopharm, CanSino, and Sinovac vaccines seem to have their benefits, this should be put in perspective. Although the three vaccines developed by the Chinese seem to have their benefits, these efficacy rates are significantly lower than the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines that are 95 percent and 94.1 percent effective, respectively. To be fair, while Dr. Anthony Fauci said that he would like a vaccine to be at minimum 75 percent effective, the minimum requirement for a vaccine to be approved by the Federal Drug Administration is only 50 percent. The main issue here is about whether or not these percentages are even on the nose. 

This issue has arisen because information about the Chinese vaccine studies is difficult to come by. None of the three Chinese companies have released their late-stage clinical trial data to the public, and multiple requests to interview have been declined by the vaccine companies. If China cannot deliver, Beijing will not gain much from the pledges it has made. As stated by the Associated Press: “China’s vaccine diplomacy will be only as good as the vaccines it is offering, and it still faces hurdles.” 

Honoring Promises and China’s Own Population

Western vaccine makers are not alone in their struggle to meet production goals; there is widespread concern that China may not be able to follow through with the commitments they have made in a timely manner. As aforementioned, Chinese vaccine makers have not been the most transparent, and the public only knows a bit about how production levels are thus far — but what is known does not paint a good outlook. For example, Sinovac production levels reached only half of its intended manufacturing capacity in January.

It is unclear if China will be able to deliver on its promises, and shipments have already been delayed and fallen short repeatedly. In Southeast Asia, the region which has been promised the most vaccine doses, it is predicted that mass immunization will take until at least 2024. Revealingly, China has promised many countries in Southeast Asia priority access to the Chinese vaccines. Moreover, there is uncertainty about how the Chinese government will proceed with juggling their vaccine diplomacy on top of taking care of their own people. There are 1.4 billion people in China, and its COVID vaccine makers have been consistently coming up short. China has a goal to vaccinate only 40 percent of its population by the end of July, and at the beginning of March, “China had committed more than ten times as many doses overseas as it had administered in China,” according to Foreign Affairs. 

China has been a prevalent actor in the development and distribution of COVID vaccine doses. Although the Chinese government has denied that they are participating in “vaccine diplomacy,” they have made moves to help them restore their reputation, pull ahead of Western competition, and expand China’s share in the international vaccine market. However, while the public-private partnerships in the creation and manufacturing of Chinese vaccines jump-started the country’s scientific and diplomatic successes, their gains have been threatened by their shortfalls on pledges made to low and middle income countries in need of vaccine doses, and there remains uncertainty about the safety and efficacy of each Chinese vaccine. On top of that, China has not yet delivered much for its own citizens. There is significant uncertainty surrounding China’s vaccine diplomacy that will unfold in the coming months.

Police Brutality, Colonialism, and Coronavirus in Kenya

For over eight minutes, police officer Derek Chauvin kept his knee on George Floyd’s neck as Floyd told the officers, “I can’t breathe.” As the video of his murder spread beyond Minneapolis where the incident happened, protests erupted around the world. In Nairobi, Kenya, at least seven of these protests took place, but while the trigger was the murder of George Floyd, hundreds of people were drawn to the protests due to Kenya’s own issue with police brutality. Abuse and murders by police officers in Kenya have been a persistent problem since the British colonial period, and since the near beginning of this year, it has gotten worse. In an attempt to shut down the protests and prevent people from going out during the coronavirus lockdowns, the government has revived a colonial law called the Public Order Act. Since then, acts of police violence have increased to the point where many protesters have backed off due to fear. 

The History of Colonial Policing in Kenya

The British Colony of Kenya was established in 1920 and came to an end in the 1960s. The developments during these years set a major precedent for substandard policing. The police received considerable powers of surveillance, as demonstrated through the Stock and Produce Theft Ordinance which allowed for more abilities in stop and search, and they also extended police presence in order to gather information and show their capabilities in seeking out crime. Additionally, a director was added to the Criminal Investigation Department Special Branch to focus on “political” policing. This created a system that was “arbitrary, unaccountable, and often violent,” and during the Mau Mau Revolt, the efforts toward adequate policing declined even more. 

The Mau Mau Revolt was an armed rebellion initiated by the Kikuyu, a native ethnic group in Kenya. The uprising began because land was taken from the Kikuyu during the colonial period, and about 1.5 million Kikuyu people were thought to have “proclaimed their allegiance” to the Mau Mau campaign by 1952. The British declared a state of emergency that year, and their crackdown on the rebels was unrelenting. The police began a series of mass arrests, and they took Kikuyu suspected of Mau Mau involvement to detention camps. The conflict between police, rebels, and suspects continued, and in 1954, Operation Anvil began. Tens of thousands of Kikuyu were taken from Nairobi to detention camps without being told why. The discriminatory, drastic sweeps continued from there, which set a precedent of allowing police officers what is essentially free rein. 

Although Kenya achieved independence 57 years ago, remnants of colonial laws are still intact. Even after the rewrites of the Constitution, the most recent being in 2010, archaic laws which criminalize making noise on the street, allow police to arrest people without warrants, and overall intimidate Kenyans remain. It shows. For instance, the 2017 Human Rights Report by Amnesty International placed Kenya in the top slot for police shootings and killings of civilians. Taking into account police brutality as a whole, 3,200 incidents were recorded in 2019. Incidents of police violence have been prevalent within the nation for many years, and 2020 has been even more brutal. In February, there were eight documented police killings in Kenya, and March was the beginning of a downward spiral.

Two Public Health Issues: Coronavirus and Police Brutality

On March 12 of this year, the first case of coronavirus was reported in Kenya. By that point, there were fourteen countries in Africa with coronavirus cases, and Kenya’s government implemented certain flight restrictions. It soon became apparent that more restrictions were needed to protect Kenyans, and in an effort to halt the spread of coronavirus, the government invoked the Public Order Act — another law that had been on the books since the colonial era. However, this action bred a different type of danger. As with many colonial laws, it gives a significant amount of power to the government in the name of keeping the peace. As Foreign Affairs described, the overall aim of the Public Order Act is to criminalize poverty, and it allows police to “round up pretty much anyone they choose, anywhere they choose.” Many have used it to justify police violence.

While getting people off of the streets is certainly a public health issue, the route which the Kenyan government took in order to achieve that mission created an entirely separate public health issue. As explained by Dr. Maybank, chief health equity officer and director of the Center for Health Equity, “People are dying. That’s our business, whether they are dying through a slow violence, such as structural racism, or COVID-19 or direct violence, like police brutality.” While attempting to stop the spread of one public health issue, the Kenyan government cultivated an environment for another one. A dawn-to-dusk curfew was imposed on March 27, and at least six people died from police violence within the following ten days.

Yassin Hussein Moyo was shot in the stomach while he was standing on his own balcony alongside his siblings, watching the police crackdown from three stories up. Moyo was just a 13-year-old boy, and he bled out while at home with his family. A motorcycle taxi driver named Hamisi Juma Mbega was another person lost to police violence. Mbega was among those who broke curfew, but he only did so in order to take a pregnant woman who was in labor to the hospital. He was beaten by the police and subsequently died from his injuries. The unfortunate irony of this is that Mbega was a former police officer himself. Calvin Omondi was also a motorcycle taxi driver who died from police beatings. He was on his way home at the beginning of curfew, and he lost control of his motorcycle when a group of officers attacked him. Idris Mukolwe was hit by a teargas canister and was laughed at by officers when he tried to stand up. Moments later, he collapsed and died. Yusuf Ramadhan Juma had a mental disability and was found in the hospital after being beaten. Eric Ng’ethe Waithugi decided to lock himself into the pub that he worked at along with a few others because curfew was approaching. Police officers broke down the door and shot teargas into the pub before hitting him and eleven others in the pub with wooden clubs. Waithugi died from being beaten by more than 20 officers.

According to Human Rights Watch, abusive behavior from the police began even before the start of curfew. They broke into shops, took food, and extorted money from civilians. Notably, the police also used tear gas, chased after people and then beat them with batons, and fired live rounds all before dusk. It got so bad that the President of Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta, made a statement: “I want to apologize to all Kenyans for some … excesses that were conducted.” Kenya’s health ministry also condemned the police abuses. However, those statements did not create any tangible change. Since President Kenyatta’s apology, police officers have continued to whip, kick, and herd people together — something counterintuitive to the purpose of a coronavirus lockdown. 

Protests Against Police Violence Stomped on by Police Violence

When George Floyd was murdered by police officers back in May, and protests were ignited all around the world, it made sense for Kenyan people to take part. As a resident of Kenya named Lilly Bekele-Piper said, “People came out because they can recognize that violence in their own communities.” Furthermore, many Kenyans recognize that their police forces stem from racism and colonialism, and police brutality is an institutional issue that needs attention. However, it is that very issue that conflicts with the ability of Kenyan people to protest. With the combination of coronavirus restrictions and the aforementioned colonial laws like the Public Order Act heightening police violence, a lot of Kenyans are terrified to be out on the streets. The police chief of Nairobi, Philip Ndolo, explicitly said that protests are not allowed: “It is outlawed, it is not legal, and no permit has been given.” With that statement in mind, it is difficult for people with a strong concern about police brutality to protest against it when large gatherings are remarkable breeding grounds for police brutality. 

Now that violence, and even death, are so conspicuously placed on the table, protests have become increasingly scattered, causing many of the people who are working toward an end to police violence in Kenya to feel alone in the fight. As the problem of police brutality has become worse, the conditions for combating the problem have become worse. Organizations are struggling to gain the momentum necessary in order to have a fighting chance against police violence, and coronavirus brings yet another significant challenge to those who are working to stop police brutality, diminish the dangerous precedents of policing, and get rid of detrimental colonial laws. The stain of colonialism on Kenya’s government, laws, and police force combined with the effects of the international coronavirus pandemic have led to the worsening degree and frequency of police brutality, as well as the silencing of the public. 

COVID-19 Increases Human Trafficking Risk in Latin America and the Caribbean Region

For the past decade, the Latin America and Caribbean region (LAC) has consistently ranked among the regions in the world with the highest rates of human trafficking, whether for purposes of forced labor, sex, or domestic servitude. The region as a whole therefore faces immense challenges in identifying cases of Trafficking in Persons (TIP), prosecuting offenders, and aiding victims. 

Despite these existing challenges, the region has also become the world’s epicenter for the COVID-19 pandemic. The economic, social, and welfare conditions that have accompanied COVID-19 have therefore dramatically increased the risks for current and potential TIP victims, leading thousands more people, and especially women and children, to fall victim to the internationally-recognized crime. 

According to a Sept. 23 BBC news article, as of Sept. 22 8.8 million cases of COVID-19 and 350,000 deaths had been reported in the LAC region. Brazil and Mexico, with the highest populations in the region, also lead with the highest numbers of reported deaths. In fact, Mexico and Ecuador occupy the number one and two spots for the highest COVID-19 mortality rates in the world, and 50% of the top ten countries with the highest mortality rates are LAC countries. 

In a region that was already lacking adequate social welfare nets and sufficient healthcare systems, COVID-19 outbreaks and their subsequent shutdowns have shocked the regional economy in an unprecedented manner. 

According to a July 2020 United Nations (UN) Policy Brief, prior to the pandemic, economic development in the LAC region faced severe structural limitations, including high income inequality, high levels of informality, and vulnerability to climate change. The crisis has resulted in the worst recession that the LAC region has seen in over a century, causing a 9.1% contraction in regional Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 

The UN brief also states that these conditions could push the number of people living in poverty in the region up by 45 million, to a total of 230 million, and the number of people living in extreme poverty by 28 million, putting many at risk of undernutrition. 

As more people are pushed into poverty, many are forced to find additional sources of income to survive. This leaves many more people, and especially women and children, more vulnerable to TIP, which the region struggled to address even before the pandemic. 

Since 2000, the U.S. Department of State’s (DOS) Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons has released a yearly report which analyzes the state of TIP around the world by country and region, including the LAC. This report classifies countries into tiers based on their ability to combat human trafficking in accordance with the UN Palermo Protocol to Prevent, Supress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children. These rankings are identified based on the prevalence of trafficking in a country as well as domestic governments’ ability to identify and prosecute cases. 

Within the 2020 report’s country narratives, each country is classified among one of four tiers, depending on the extent of governmental efforts to meet the minimum standards of the U.S. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA). 

A country ranked at Tier 1 fully meets the TVPA’s minimum standards. If it ranks in Tier 2, the country does not meet the TVPA’s minimum standards, but is making significant efforts to comply with them. The Tier 2 Watch List signifies that the TVPA’s minimum standards are not fully met, and while the country is making efforts, trafficking is rising. Finally, if a country ranks in Tier 3, its government does not fully meet the minimum standards and is not making significant efforts to do so.

This year, the report’s regional analysis indicates that a majority of the Western Hemisphere, or 19 out of 31 countries (61%), rank within Tier 2 (Yellow). Comparatively, 19% of countries rank within Tier 1 (Green), 10% on the Tier 2 Watch List (Orange), and another 10% in Tier 3 (Red).

Even when the 2020 report analyzed 2019 trends pre COVID-19, the region was already struggling immensely to combat TIP. Adding the conditions of poverty and inadequate social welfare conditions into the mix, early evidence is already showing that the health and economic crises are leading to drastic increases in human trafficking throughout the LAC region. 

According to an August 19 America Magazine article, female sex trafficking, in particular, has largely increased in the region as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. Poverty, as well as confinement which has often led to amplified domestic violence, has led many young women in the region to leave home and struggle to find other sources of income. Many women are also forced into prostitution by their husbands, as well. Reporting cases of TIP has also become increasingly more difficult, given that police and courts have become much more inaccessible due to social distancing measures. 

In addition, the article emphasizes that though traffickers are more restricted in terms of movement across national borders, this can also make it more difficult to identify trafficking victims because they are not made as visible as they are no longer transported. The demand for webcam pornography has also increased by 30 percent with the pandemic, meaning that traffickers are now given virtual avenues for coercion and recruitment. Venezuelan refugees and migrants, in particular, are most vulnerable to forced prostitution and subsequently human trafficking. 

A recent UN Office on Drugs and Crime article also addresses a further challenge facing TIP  victims: support services for TIP victims across the region have been greatly reduced, and in some cases halted. In Colombia, however, authorities have attempted to move these counselling services online. 

Nevertheless, physical spaces for victims to take refuge and psychologically and physically recover are essential in ensuring that victims are not vulnerable to go back into trafficking. This is especially important when legal and criminal justice systems across the region were identified by the mentioned DOS report to be severely lacking in their ability to convict and prosecute traffickers. This means that while many victims may be removed from their situations, their assailants may still be at large continuing their crimes. 

Furthermore, labor trafficking and domestic servitude, especially among children, is expected to increase in the region as well. According to the June 15, 2020 ILO and UNICEF report “COVID-19 and Child Labour: A Time of Crisis, a Time to Act”, the global number of people in extreme poverty is projected to rise by at least 20% in 2020, largely as a result of COVID-19. With poverty comes increased rates of child labor, as households use every available means to survive. On a global basis, a one percentage point rise in global poverty levels tends to correlate with a 0.7 percentage point increase in child labor. 

These figures are exacerbated in the LAC region, in particular, as social protection nets are less widespread and lack proper implementation. Across the region, locked international remittances and an inability to migrate for work have led families into states of economic desperation. These circumstances promote a transition from formal employment sectors to informal ones, where children may be exploited for their labor. For those who are still able to work, they risk exposing themselves to COVID-19 and bringing the virus home to their families. 

All of these conditions leave children vulnerable to many types of TIP, including trafficking for the purposes of forced labor or domestic servitude. According to the mentioned DOS report, in Paraguay, for example, criadazgo is a form of child labor and trafficking in which rural families in desperate economic situations send their children to work for wealthy urban families. As  more families suffer to make ends meet, these forms of child trafficking are expected to become even more prominent. 

Exact figures on the extent of the impacts that the virus will have on TIP have not yet been released, and only anecdotal evidence exists from NGOs to show that these trends indeed exist. In the meantime, it is clear that COVID-19 has put possible and current TIP victims in the LAC region at great risk. 

Now more than ever, it will therefore be the responsibility of domestic governments to increase their mechanisms for identification of TIP victims, enforcement of laws against TIP, and prosecution and sentencing of traffickers. It will also be up to international organizations and NGOs to put pressure on these governments, as well as assist them in building their capacities to combat TIP in the age of COVID-19. While much of this work is already taking place, these institutions have a long road ahead of them in not only reversing the effects of COVID-19 on TIP, but working to eliminate TIP  in its entirety throughout the region.

Post Covid World: What Happens to the Eurozone?

After the shocking results of the United Kingdom’s referendum to withdraw from the European Union (EU) in 2017, Euroscepticism has spread throughout EU member countries outside of the United Kingdom. Pew research center concluded that the amount of Europeans who are no longer confident in the EU is on the steady rise.

Despite the rise of Euroscepticism across the general region of members in the European Union, Europeans have different opinions regarding the eurozone and the European Central Bank (ECB). A survey conducted by European Parliament in 2018, concludes that the ECB has gained increasing public support since 2013. Although recent polls show the positive support for a single monetary policy, COVID-19 places this sentiment into question. COVID-19 has economically damaged many nations in the European region and arguably more so nations that have the Euro as their national currency. 

The future of the EU as a whole was unknown when Great Britain formally left the Union and is a deeper mystery with COVID-19 added to the mix. Although a different institution, the Eurozone faced challenges and obstacles that needed solutions. The Eurozone addressed issues that came before and after the pandemic.

A History of European Monetary Cooperation

Before the ECB was created and adopted by its initial members, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was established in 1990 by the central bank governors of European countries to promote coordination among central banks and economic convergence between nations in the region. The implications behind regional integration and economic convergence were both economic and political. 

Economically, regional integration alleviates any challenges that stem from the flow of commodities, services, capital and/or labor. Economic convergence of developing European countries combined with their connectedness to European superpowers like France and German would increase the economic growth of the region by increasing the opportunities of trade and investments. Additionally, coordinating macroeconomic policies reduces the probability of countries falling into economic recessions but also the capability to recover quickly from a crisis in the likelihood that one occurs.

Politically, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and Soviet Union occurring less than ten years prior, regional integration was a large step towards strengthening liberal ideologies in the international order. Economic regional integration was also a political move that attempted to deter the re-emergence of communist powers by not only connecting small developing countries with powerful liberal countries but also helping in their development. At the time when the EMU was first created, it was vital that the implementation of a singular currency and monetary policy for a group of nations was done through a slow transition thus easing countries into high levels of integration rather than abrupt quick transitions that are short lived. 

The work of the Economic and Monetary Union is primarily categorized under three stages that laid the foundation for the euro currency to be used across states The policies or measures implemented at each stage brought member countries one step closer to regional integration which is reflected in the final stage of the EMU by fixing the exchange rate and creating a singular monetary policy for all member states  to follow. These policies that are still seen in the main objectives of the ECB are known as quantitative easing which result in a more open economy that makes borrowing money from banks easier. In theory, if the lasting effects of quantitative easing stimulates a national economy, expanding quantitative easing policies to a group of member states within the same region should stimulate economic growth on a larger scale. Given the hypothetical benefits of easy business exchanges over a group of several states, coordination of monetary policies needed to be done at every stage to ensure the success of the ECB.

Different measures implemented within each stage center around the theme of coordination. For the eurozone, coordination is the most significant form of diplomacy that determines the functionality of the institution. Without the coordination of monetary policies as well as other policies such as labor and capital movement, the eurozone would not operate as smoothly as it has so far. This form of coordination seen in the region produces a level of regional integration that stretches.

The Functions of the ECB

Despite having a singular monetary policy, the ECB can maintain cooperation and coordination through different frameworks which either consult or decide what is the optimal monetary policy for the region at a given time. More specifically, monetary policies which are under the responsibility of the ECB are establishing the value of the currency and interest rates. Overall these policies affect the supply of money, foreign exchange rate as well as the rate of different forms of investments. As a collective of national central banks, there are three primary bodies which are each delegated the responsibility to make some form of decision. The governing council is recognized as the highest body within the ECB that analyzes recent economic and monetary developments to determine if interest rates or lending rates need to be changed. In total there are 25 members in the Governing Council which include the 19 central bank governors of the eurozone as well as six members which make up the second governing body which is known as the Executive Board. The primary responsibility of the Executive board is to handle the daily operation of the ECB. The last operating body of the ECB is known as the general council which is composed of the central bank governors of all central banks in EU countries. As this position is made up of governors of non-eurozone banks, this council acts as more of an advisory council to the other two governing bodies. At different points in time, these three governing bodies have come together to properly address economic crises both on a national and global level.

Structurally, one way the ECB has responded to national and global economic shocks has been through the creation of resolution mechanisms that are to further aid and supervise the central banks of ECB member states in central bank operations and also oversight to macroeconomic policies. These mechanisms were created with the hopes for member states to equitably benefit from being in the eurozone.

The First Decade of the ECB

Positive results can be seen within the first decade of the ECB. With much action from the ECB being inspired by the work of the German Federal Bank, the ECB was able to maintain an inflation rate at a maximum of 2%. Policies that drew upon the unorthodox approach of economic and monetary policy, caused for the economy of the region to grow at an especially high rate. The low inflation rate that was maintained throughout the first decade mitigated the risk of increasing prices that were affected by high global oil prices. Even during global economic shocks, consistently low interest rates increased countries’ capabilities to lend more from other countries. Smaller economic shocks which occurred in the early 2000s, pushed the Executive and Governing Council to create forms of buffers that would act as safety nets in case of different shocks. 

While in the short run, increased borrowing could be beneficial and finance different projects and programs, but this rate of borrowing is sustained for an extended period, specific monetary policies could make national economies vulnerable to financial crises. Tight and regulated fiscal policy is an optimal strategy for countries to upside the possible risks towards financial crises. Even in the early years of the ECB, the need for a disciplined fiscal policy was acknowledged but the global financial crisis placed extra significance on the notion of the regulated fiscal policies. In total, member states in the ECB saw positive benefits within the first decade but the global financial crisis ultimately determined the success of the European Central Bank for the second decade of its existence. 

ECB’s Shortcomings: a Case Study of the Greek Financial Crisis

It is worth noting that the European Central Bank only requires monetary policy to be uniform through member states. The creation of fiscal policies, on the other hand, is left to the discretion of national governments. Among member states, there is minimal to no coordination between fiscal policies which raises issues that challenge the efficiency of the ECB. Due to fiscal and monetary policy in combination affecting overall economic activity of the economy, the lack of coordination for fiscal policies can cause some countries to be restricted in the event of an economic shock. The Grecian financial crisis which began in the late 2000s was so severe due to the restrictive ability to change monetary policy and the lack of discipline for fiscal policy. Although fiscal policies could help member states recover to some extent, intense policy intervention is needed for economies to sustainably recover from shocks. National financial crises like the Greek financial crisis emphasized the significance of fiscal policy coordination between the member states of the ECB. 

The origins of the Greek financial crisis can be dated back to the 1980s when Grecian fiscal policies surrounded the expansion of increasing government spending and borrowing. When Greece entered the eurozone and ECB, implementing ECB quantitative easing policy combined with their own fiscal policy made Greece a country that was perceived to be a safe place to invest in and could easily borrow money from other countries. Greece’s membership in the ECB increased competition for German goods and deepened their inability to pay off their debt. Since Greece maintained their fiscal policy up until the global financial crisis, the low inflation rate established by the ECB restricted Greece from changing monetary policies that would better alleviate some of the crisis they are placed in. 

As mentioned earlier, the ECB was structurally inspired by the German Federal Bank given that they were the most powerful bank at the time. As a result of their power, much of the monetary policies created were influenced by the state of Germany’s economy. In the context of the Greek financial crisis, ECB monetary policies based on the state of Germany’s policies created tensions between Greece, the ECB and Germany who were divided on how the ECB should respond to the financial crisis. Greek believed that the ECB should forgive some of their debts while Germany was hesitant in debt forgiveness and changing monetary policy for Germany. The tensions between these three actors extended to the point where Greek almost left the eurozone and ECB due to the lack of sympathy from the ECB and large eurozone lenders like Germany.

In total, there are three major critiques that affect the effectiveness of the ECB. The first critique of the ECB was previously mentioned was the lack of fiscal policy coordination among member states. The lack of fiscal policy coordination partially makes fiscal policy coordination less effective. The second major critique of the ECB is the large role Germany has influence over the monetary policy of the ECB. As a result of this, it places states at different economic levels than Germany to be subjected to monetary policies that Germany would benefit the most from. The third critique is the confidence in quantitative easing. Since its inception, the ECB has placed great confidence in quantitative easing monetary policy. The ideology behind having constant quantitative easing monetary policy does not necessarily benefit the regional economy in the long run.

Policy Recommendations

Given the three large critiques that impede upon the efficiency of the ECB, reforms which would focus on a significant theme of coordination. Better coordination across different policies that within and outside of the responsibilities of the ECB will not only promote the founding theme of regional integration, but will also evenly distribute the benefits of a single currency across different member states. Proposed recommendations are catered towards the two significant bodies of the ECB seeing as they make much of the significant decisions for the eurozone.