Defender tu derecho: The Rise of Maduro’s Dictatorship

“A people that loves freedom will in the end be free.” – Simon Bolivar

The Bolivarian Revolution 

On December 6, 1998, over 3.5 million Venezuelans showed up to polls across the country to elect Hugo Chávez of the Movimiento Quinta República Party (MVR) as the 45th President of Venezuela. With the message of taking from the rich and giving to the poor, Chávez quickly enacted socialist policies and programs which became known as the Bolivarian Revolution. This ideology created a keen focus on encouraging both nationalism and government control over the country’s economy. In the early stages, Chávez’s vision proved fruitful for the average Venezuelan; his social welfare policies subsidized food, improved the educational system, and built an enviable healthcare system. According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Carribean (ECLAC), Chávez's policies cut Venezuela’s poverty rates in half. 

Nicolás Maduro’s Impact on Venezuela

When Nicolás Maduro was elected as the 46th President of Venezuela in 2013, he echoed the sentiments of the late Hugo Chávez and promised the continuation of those same policies. Yet, in just six years, we have seen the meteoric rise of Venezuela crumble to the ground, evident by a widespread lack of food and medical supplies, constant riots, and the nosedive of both its economy and democratic institutions. Between 2013 and 2017, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reports that Venezuela’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has fallen by over 35 percent. To put that into perspective, it’s a sharper drop than the one seen during the Great Depression in the United States. So what went wrong?  

PDVSA’s Role in the Venezuelan Crisis

For a country in crisis, it’s interesting to note that Venezuela is home to the largest oil reserves in the world, specifically in the Orinoco Belt. The Orinoco oil reserves, however, consists of extra-heavy crude oil that is challenging to produce. This dilemma incentivized the Venezuelan government to reach out to international companies such as ExxonMobil, BP, Chevron, and ConocoPhillips for help with extracting the oil. But when oil prices started to skyrocket, the Venezuelan government under the Chávez administration began expropriating assets from these companies (usually illegally). With near control of all oil exports, Venezuela consolidated their assets into Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), the state-owned oil and natural gas company. This flood of revenue is what allowed Hugo Chávez to invest heavily in his socialist policies. The problem was that with Chávez’s unwavering ability to scale back on Venezuela’s dependence towards oil meant that these programs would come tumbling down if oil prices began to fall.

Hyperinflation and Mismanagement

Shortly a year after Maduro was elected as President, this concern became a reality; oil prices rapidly fell in 2014, and Maduro failed to adjust. With his mismanagement of the PDVSA and acts of cronyism that left his close friends in charge of the company, hyperinflation rocked Venezuela. The IMF notes that inflation has hit a shocking 800,000 percent in 2019 compared to just 19 percent before Nicolás Maduro took office. With food and medical supplies that were once subsidized and offered to the poorest of the Venezuelans now gone, most of the population suffered, creating a massive human rights crisis. In 2017, the Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida Venezuela  (National Survey of Living Conditions of Venezuelan Life) noted that nine out of 10 Venezuelans can’t afford to buy food and over 60 percent of the country reported going to bed hungry.

First Steps Towards a Dictatorship

So if Maduro is the cause of these major problems, why not just wait out his term limit and then vote in someone else? In fact, many local polls in 2016 showed that around 80 percent of Venezuelans want him removed from office. However, Maduro has taken numerous steps in the past few years to consolidate his power. Maduro’s political ambitions became apparent in December of 2015 after the Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD) won a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly which put Maduro’s rule at risk. With the Supreme Court and the National Assembly as the two biggest checks against his power, Maduro quickly began amalgamating his rule; he forced out Supreme Court justices and replaced them with governmental loyalists and political allies.

The Creation of a National Constituent Assembly

In July of 2017, Maduro took another major controversial step by invoking Article 347 of the Venezuelan Constitution which allowed him to hold a vote to create what is now known as the National Constituent Assembly; a body that would have the power to rewrite the Venezuelan constitution, subsequently replacing the current National Assembly. This action would leave virtually no opposition to Maduro’s rule. July 30, 2017 was set as the date of the vote but Venezuelans were only given the choice to vote for its members, not whether there should be a National Constituent Assembly in the first place. All opposition groups boycotted the vote calling it illegitimate which lead to the National Constituent Assembly consisting of a pro-Maduro majority being elected. One of the first moves it took as an Assembly was to remove Luis Ortega, leader of the opposition, from his position as Attorney General.

Controlling the Currency

The final step that Maduro took was to ensure that close military allies would remain loyal to him and not attempt a coup d’état. To do this, Maduro used a convoluted currency system that he carried over from the Chávez regime. He exploited the system by setting the official exchange rate of 10 bolivars to 1 US dollar which he only gave access to his friends and military allies. With the mismanagement of the economy, hyperinflation had rapidly devalued the currency, making the exchange rate 12,163 bolivars to 1 US dollar which is what the rest of the Venezuelan people were given access to. Moreover, Maduro gave full access of the food supply in Venezuela to military officials. This action allowed them to import food at the 10:1 exchange rate and then sell it on the black market at the 12,163:1 exchange rate wielding major profits and keeping them loyal to the Maduro administration.

Food for Vote Schemes

With the military on his side and all other opposition nearly gone, Nicolás Maduro took the final step to maintain his rule in May of 2018 in which he was re-elected as President of Venezuela in what many call a massively fraudulent election. Venezuela’s National Election Council, unsurprisingly run by pro-Maduro sympathizers, reported that over 67 percent of the nine million people that went to the polls that day voted for Nicolás Maduro. The result of the 2018 election came as a shock to none as the pro-Maduro National Election Council barred many of Maduro’s opponents from running. Maduro himself enacted an “I Give and You Give” voting strategy in which he dangled food boxes for votes. With more than 5 million Venezuelans undernourished, according to the United Nations, Maduro wielded food as a political tool to either buy votes or intimidate hungry people. After Venezuelans voted, they were promptly brought to a so-called Red Spot. At these locations, they presented their special identity cards, that they had to use to vote for the election, which was used to receive their food. Maduro had figured out how to manipulate the local people into doing his bidding.

The Rise of Juan Guaidó

It wasn’t until the start of 2019 that any sort of opposition to Maduro began to make its presence felt on the streets of Caracas. On January 5 of 2019, a little known lawmaker by the name of Juan Guaidó was appointed the head of the National Assembly (not to be confused with the pro-Maduro National Constituent Assembly). After just 18 days as head of the National Assembly, sparked by the nation-wide riots and protests, Juan Guaidó proclaimed himself Venezuela’s interim president, dismissing the 2018 Presidential Election as illegitimate. In the next few months, many countries began showing their support for either Nicolás Maduro or Juan Guaidó. More than 50 countries including the United States, Canada, Brazil, Colombia and almost all the countries in Latin America expressed their support for Juan Guaidó and currently recognize him as Venezuela’s President. On the other hand, left-wing governments like Cuba and Bolivia, as well as Turkey and Iran, refused to recognize Guaidó. The most notable backer of Maduro is Russia, a country that always enjoys supporting anti-US allies.

Operacion Libertad: The Fight for a Free Future

The most recent action by Juan Guaidó was called Operacion Libertad (Operation Freedom) in which he called upon the military to switch sides and fight with him. Seen as those most crucial in breaking the impasse, Guaidó has promised amnesty if these military officials break away from Nicolás Maduro. With the murder rate in Venezuela surpassing that of the most dangerous cities in the world, swift action must be taken. Whether Maduro postpones the next presidential election or re-writes the entire constitution remains to be seen. For now, he has unprecedented power over a country that continues to spiral out of control. 

Replacing Foreign Intervention for Regional Intervention: The African Union’s Critical Role in Mediating the Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon

Cameroon’s Anglophone community, which makes up 20% of the population has felt marginalized and excluded from the national government’s agenda since the country’s independence from France in 1961. These fundamental grievances have only grown during the past 50 years due to the blatant disregard of the Anglophone problem by President Paul Biya, the six-month internet shutdown in English-speaking regions back in 2017, and human rights violations by national security forces. These separate events have all contributed to the current surge of protests and sporadic violence. While the government attempted to appease the Anglophone minority, efforts proved inadequate and failed to radically dismantle the systematic inequalities and prejudice faced by the Anglophone population. Consequently, a secessionist group emerged in January 2017, under the name The Republic of Ambazonia, with goals to mobilize the Anglophone population in support of a separate ethnostate.  Cameroon’s key foreign partners, the U.S., France, and China, overlook the violence and hostilities in Cameroon’s Anglophone regions due to their ties with the national government and the protection of their interests by Biya in exchange for support. Thus, it is vital that a regional body such as the African Union (AU) intervene immediately in order to deter the possibility of armed conflict and the subsequent destabilization of West and Central Africa.

More importantly, Cameroon’s stability and security is of critical importance to the AU as Cameroon’s military is actively fighting Boko Haram in the far North of Cameroon and militias from the Central African Republic (CAR) in the East of Cameroon. Thus, from a strategic point of view, the AU has high incentives to implement peacekeeping measures in Cameroon in order to guarantee its stability. The AU can play a key role in assisting the Cameroonian government enact sustainable and inclusive reforms that benefit the whole country. Proactive series of actions include establishing an AU mediation intervention that facilitates dialogue between the Anglophone regions and the ruling regime; deploying an extensive peacekeeping operation in Cameroon to closely observe the situation and maintain peace; and urging the Cameroonian government to make immediate social and political reforms that include the voices of Cameroonians from English-speaking regions.

Historical Background & Context

The Anglophone problem dates back to the colonial era when the German colony Kamerun was passed down to Britain and France under a joint administration. Through the 1919 Simon-Milner agreement, both colonial powers unevenly divided the territory along the Picot Provisional Partition Line, with the French having a greater sphere of influence. This resulted in the regions developing separately with “legal, educational, monetary and political agreements being significantly different”. For instance, while the British territory was administered from Nigeria, with a fair amount of autonomy due to Britain’s indirect rule policy, the French applied a centralized form of governance. Once French Cameroun received its independence in 1960, the people of British Southern Cameroon chose to join the already independent Republic of Cameroun without the consent of British Northern Cameroonians who wanted to join independent Nigeria. Eventually, a constitution was drafted and implemented in 1961 for a federal state of Cameroon which united two regions with completely different political cultures. The dissolution of the federal state in 1972 by President Ahmadou Ahidjo into a unitary centralized state was the advent of a gradual effort to belittle Anglophones’ cultural history, customs and socio-political systems by the francophone majority in power. The Anglophone problem has four different dimensions, including:  the 1972 referendum which eliminated the principal idea of federalism from the 1961 constitution; the deliberate and systematic erosion of the Anglophone cultural identity from the union; the dissolution of prevalent Anglophone political parties and imprisonment of their leaders; and the continuous repression of all actions designed to improve the status of Anglophone Cameroonians in the Union. Most importantly, “the lack of proper management seems to be what has aggravated the problem” as noted by the Roman Catholic Bishops of Cameroon in their 2017 memorandum to President Biya. Thus, one can argue that the contemporary conflicts that divide Cameroonians are the result of an inimical relationship between competing European colonial powers (France and Britain), which has had far-reaching consequences due to the two different forms of colonial administration.

The Anglophone Problem: What is the Current Situation Today?

Today Anglophones in Cameroon face various cases of abject marginalization including: under representation in strategic government positions and complete exclusion from others. For instance, out of the 33 appointed ministries, only three Anglophones occupy high-level cabinet positions. In the judicial system, out of the 1,542 active magistrates, 1,265 are francophone and 277 are Anglophone. As for judicial officers, there are 514 in total, 499 Francophone and 15 Anglophones. Anglophone student unions have repeatedly complained about the institutional nepotism and the exclusion of qualified Anglophones in admissions into state professional schools, particularly schools of administration, medicine, and higher teacher training---even in the Anglophone regions. In the educational sector, there are various instances of discrimination where the francophone-majority government disproportionately appoints francophone trained teachers to Anglophone educational institutions. This is problematic because Anglophone teachers are further robbed of employment opportunities within their own native regions. Additionally, francophone teachers don’t bother to follow the English Educational Subsystem (which reflects British educational models) depriving students of a full English education that they pay for.

Another glaring inequality is the unequal disbursement of funds in the country and quality of infrastructural development in Anglophone regions versus Francophone regions. Due to the lack of an influential voice in political spaces, it is harder for Anglophone Cameroonians to advocate against the neglect of infrastructure development in the Northwest and Southwest regions of Cameroon. It is also harder for them to advocate for the relocation of top business plants to their regions that contribute to local economies. The consequence of this is Anglophone regions are under-resourced and struggle to meet annual development goals because of inadequate attention.

The issue that is really at the core of the Anglophone crisis and recent protests is public belief in the systematic erosion and disrespect of the Anglophone identity. Specific examples include national entrance exams into professional schools only being in French and state institutions only producing documents and public notes in French. While tensions have always existed between Anglophones and Francophones, they have never been as acute as they are now. The vast majority of Anglophones are frustrated with the systematic targeting of their culture and continuous attempts to absorb them into the francophone language, education and governance system.  Such grievances are what led to the most recent October 2016 peaceful protests by Anglophone lawyers followed by major teacher unions’ strikes. The government responded through repressive measures with the arrests and murders of prominent Anglophone elites suspected of fueling the resistance. While war crimes are being committed on both sides, it is important to note that the movement was originally peaceful. However, it has fallen into the hands of Anglophone extremists and separatists who responded with violence after the Cameroonian military directed attacks towards civilians.  

Since the crisis escalated in 2017, the humanitarian situation has spiraled. According to reports from International Crisis Group, at least 500 civilians have been killed during clashes between armed secessionist groups (Red Dragons, Tigers and Ambazonia Defense Forces) and national military forces. Based on a Human Rights Watch report, an estimated 32,600 Cameroonians have taken refuge in Nigeria’s Cross River state, with 244,000 civilians displaced in the Far North and 437,500 in the Anglophone North West and South West regions. Students in Anglophone (North West and South West) have been the most affected by this crisis. This is because they have been deprived of an education with schools shutting down for security concerns. According to UN Office for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), an estimated 42,500 children were still out of school as of May 2018 and most schools did not open in 2018.

What Can Be Done by the African Union?

The African Union has the potential to serve as a credible and vital mediator in mitigating the Anglophone crisis. The AU’s  mission is to help create an “integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in a global arena”. While the organization strives to resolve and establish peace in several conflicts throughout the continent, the emphasis on post-conflict resolution rather than the implementation of peacekeeping and preventive measures has left room for several countries to slip into armed conflicts. A similar situation prevails with the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon. Failure to act quickly by engaging with key Anglophone leaders and the current government to mediate inclusive, safe, and open dialogue could lead to an armed conflict which would destabilize Cameroon and ultimately undermine the AU’s security goals in the region. Aside from the prominence and influence that the organization carries in Africa, the AU has more familiarity and common ground with the Cameroonian government due to the shared African context than international organizations such as the United Nations. Thus, instead of solely relying on international assistance, as a respected continental organization, the AU should be able to approach this delicate situation with more depth and understanding of cultural context. This could increase receptivity from the local Cameroonian government and Anglophone populations.

The sporadic violence in Anglophone regions has left the vast majority of Anglophone Cameroonians mistrustful of their government, making the idea of secession even more attractive. A special envoy needs to be appointed by the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Hon.Moussa Faki, and deployed to Cameroon. A group of representatives and mediators need to be strategically positioned in the Northwest and Southwest regions as well as in the capital city (Yaoundé) to engage in both high-level and local mediation or conflict-prevention. In order to deter the possibility of armed conflict, this special envoy would have to ground their actions in the principles of confidence-building mediation. This means that their prime responsibility would be to transform the political and psychological dynamics of the parties involved.  Anglophone Cameroonians would be willing to dialogue in the presence of an honest broker that creates a calm and safe place for them to articulate their concerns to the central government.

As a trusted third party, the AU would play a critical role in stabilizing the current crisis in Cameron and ensuring that a constructive roadmap exists between the government and Anglophone minority. While sending a special envoy to Cameroon to mediate dialogue between the affected parties is important, that would only address a facet of this complex issue. In addition to the institutional measures taken by the AU, Hon. Moussa Faki should urge the Peace and Security Council (PSC) to authorize a peace support mission. This would help to bring an end to human rights abuses by military officials and secessionist groups. This peacekeeping mission could be between 2,000 and 3,000 civilian police and technical personnel to promote greater respect for human rights and serve as a buffer between the two opposing parties.

In response to grievances and political demands made by the Anglophone population, Biya’s regime has implemented quick bandage solutions that have not targeted the root causes of Anglophone frustrations. Reforms have not only been deemed inadequate but have been criticized among Anglophone leaders as being “a little too late. The AU should strongly urge the Cameroonian government to cease the continuous denial of the Anglophone problem. Instead, by recognizing that there is an issue and implementing viable solutions could go a long way in de-escalating the current crisis. An equal percentage of Anglophones and Francophones not only need to be appointed to high levels of government in order to reflect the diverse nature of the Cameroonian society, but Anglophones need to be politically empowered. This means providing equal access and real opportunities to resolve the socioeconomic and political inequalities faced by the Anglophone population in the country.

The vast majority Anglophones have lost hope in the current social contract because it curtails their freedoms and fails to hold the government accountable. The most obvious recommendation that could be made to the Biya regime by the AU would be to decentralize the government. While this is enshrined in the 1996 Constitution of Cameroon, it was never implemented.  The promotion of local governance would empower Anglophone communities in the North and Southwest regions. Returning to a federal system where Anglophones and Francophones can practice self-determination would allow different provinces to implement comprehensive policies, create impactful changes in the lives of their constituents and foster sustainable economic development. Furthermore, the devolution of power would enhance accountability and transparency in the management of state affairs, while lessening the rampant corruption in government. The prolonged crisis will further divide the country along linguistic and geographic lines. Thus, the support of these recommendations by the AU would provide viable solutions to instilling greater national cohesion amongst Cameroonians and ensuring the security and stability of the country.

Limitations & Alternatives

When considering possible gridlocks to implementing these recommendations, there are high chances that Biya’s regime will not only resist the AU mediation and conflict prevention intervention, but will also dismiss the recommended reforms. While questions of sovereignty and intervening in affairs within the domestic jurisdiction of Cameroon arise, the AU has a duty to fight crimes against humanity and the responsibility to protect (R2P) innocent African lives. The AU cannot and must not sit back and watch as the Cameroonian government marginalizes and violates the human rights of its citizens. The Cameroonian government should not be given a free pass to repress the fundamental rights of its citizens. The AU’s Peace and Security Council could also argue that compared to other African countries where the AU is involved, the situation in Cameroon has not reached a level where it deserves an intervention. This mindset is the fundamental problem with the AU:  the organization is so actively involved in post conflict reconstruction and fails to take the necessary precautionary measures for conflict prevention and peacekeeping in several African countries that are on the brink of war.

Failure to dedicate attention to Cameroon now when the situation is still semi-manageable could escalate the crisis to a point of no return. The destabilization of Cameroon would only make the AU’s job harder, as containing transnational crime and terrorists’ organizations without the help of the Cameroonian army would pose a greater challenge. In the event that the proposed measures fail, Honorable. Moussa Faki should urge the Assembly of the AU to impose targeted sanctions on the Cameroonian government and those undermining the stability of the country. Targeted economic sanctions backed by the U.S, France, China and the ECCAS regional community should be swiftly implemented. Since Cameroon has already been stripped of the right to host the African Cup of Nations, the threat of shocking Biya into action that Julius Amin proposes is currently powerless. Thus, economic sanctions will hopefully push the Cameroonian government to be more responsive to the needs of its citizens.

Three targeted solutions that would tackle the Anglophone crisis holistically include: the AU engaging with key Anglophone leaders and the current government to mediate inclusive and open dialogues amongst both parties; the AU preserving human rights through the deployment of a peace mission to Cameroon; and the AU demanding that the current Biya regime make reforms that lead to the gradual decentralization of government and the devolution of power. The potential impediments to implementing these recommendations include the resistance by the Cameroonian government to AU intervention or to implement proposed changes and the refusal of the Peace and Security Council to authorize a peace operation to Cameroon. However, the AU must play its role in promoting African security and step up to the challenge. Instead of continuously relying on foreign intervention and waiting for the U.S., France, or China to meddle in regional affairs, the AU should seek support from African countries such as Chad, Nigeria, Niger, and Ghana in order to ensure the stability of Cameroon. Cameroon, is a vital security partner in the fight against terrorism in the West and Central Africa. Thus, ensuring its stability should be one of the African Union’s primary concerns in order to deter the possibilities of a violent armed conflict, that would have serious consequences for the entire region.