Revisiting the Genocide Convention

The concept of genocide, as outlined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, is no longer useful and detracts attention and resources from other instances of systematic mass violence. In fact, the concept of genocide as we know it today, was not what Raphael Lemkin had originally conceived when he coined the term. Only four groups are protected under the convention: racial, ethnic, national, and religious groups. Other groups are excluded from protection including political groups. There are also no explicit prevention provisions within the Genocide Convention. The definition and conception of genocide as it currently exists allows us to pick and choose which acts of mass violence deserve the recognition that comes with labeling something a genocide.

There is a tendency to downplay instances of mass violence if they do not conform to the strict definition of genocide outlined in the convention. Taking away attention from mass atrocities because the victim pool is not homogenous or does not neatly fit into one of the four categories is cruel and dehumanizing. 

The Original Conception of Genocide

It would be neglectful to not begin this paper with a brief overview of Raphael Lemkin’s original conception of genocide. This is to honor his role in coining the term but to also demonstrate how different the current definition is from what he imagined and how that limits our understanding of genocide today. Lemkin coined the term genocide in 1942, but the bones of the concept were there as early as 1933. Lemkin’s report titled “Acts Constituting a General (Transnational) Danger Considered as Offences Against the Law of Nations” developed the precursor to genocide which he called “barbarity.” Barbarity was “acts of extermination directed against the ethnic, religious, or social collectivities whatever the motive (political, religious, etc.). Barbarity was unique in that the attacks were “carried out against an individual as a member of a collectivity” with the goal being to damage the collectivity. A second type of attack on a collectivity was known as “vandalism,” or cultural and artistic destruction. Lemkin saw individual cultures as contributing to a wider world culture that all humans were part of. His argument was that destroying a particular culture inflicted a loss on world culture. These two acts, barbarity and vandalism, violated the law of nations and therefore a multilateral convention criminalizing these acts was necessary. 

Lemkin coined the term ‘genocide’ in 1942, but it first appeared in print in his 1944 book Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. In Chapter 9, Lemkin defines genocide as “the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group.” The word is 

intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be the disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups.

Lemkin identifies two phases of genocide: destroying the “national pattern” of the oppressed group and then imposing the “national pattern” of the oppressor.

Lemkin’s definition highlighted different techniques of genocide in various areas. He identified eight techniques of genocide. The first was political, which included the destruction of local institutions of self-government and the imposition of the oppressing government. The second was social, which meant the overhauling of social structure through the forced deportation of intellectual leaders and the clergy. The third was cultural, which included prohibitions on speaking and printing in local languages, as well as strict control over cultural activities and artistic expression. The fourth was economic, which included lowering the standard of living, expelling groups from certain industries, seizing private property, and controlling the banking system. The fifth was biological, which was taking measures to prevent the group from reproducing like separating men and women, and also taking steps to actively reproduce the oppressing group. The sixth was physical, which Lemkin outlines in the following ways: “racial discrimination in feeding;” “endangering of health;” and “mass killing.” The seventh was religious, which included forcing people to renounce their religious affiliations and persecuting clergy. The last was moral, which meant creating an atmosphere of moral debasement by forcing oppressed groups to watch pornographic movies, to overconsume alcohol, and to gamble. In the end, the concept of genocide officially adopted in the convention only focuses on biological and physical techniques of genocide. 

It is important to note that Lemkin understood genocide as a process, not a singular event. Genocide was an attempt to destroy a nation, with ‘attempt’ meaning an “active social, political, or historical process set in motion intentionally” rather than a single act. Lemkin made sure to emphasize the role of the state in developing a genocidal policy over time through various laws, decrees, and administrative institutions that worked together to commit genocide. In this way, the apparatus of the state becomes a vehicle for genocide. 

Lemkin lobbied heavily for a UN convention outlawing genocide and in 1947, along with Vespasian Pella and Henri Donnedieu de Vabres, he created the first draft of such a convention, now known as the secretariat draft. I want to highlight two notable provisions in this draft that are not included in the final version. First, the protected groups are not just racial, religious, and national, but also linguistic, cultural, and political. Second, genocide can be biological, physical, and cultural. Cultural genocide included “forced and systematic exile of individuals representing the culture of a group;” “prohibition of the use of the national language even in private intercourse;” “systematic destruction of books printed in the national language or of religious works or prohibition of new publications;” and “systematic destruction of historical or religious monuments or their diversion to alien uses, destruction or dispersion of documents and objects of historical, artistic, or religious value and of objects used in religious worship.” Lemkin’s original conception of genocide was lost throughout the drafting process. Each draft after the secretariat draft looked less and less like his original vision and he was forced to decide what his priority was: definitions or prosecuting genocide. Ultimately, he chose to fight for the provisions that would establish an international criminal tribunal for genocide. In the end, the work Lemkin put into preserving his original conception of genocide would not produce tangible results until the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were created in the early 1990s.  

Specific Problems with the Genocide Convention

1. The Exclusion of Political Groups

The exclusion of political groups is one of the critical flaws of the Genocide Convention. The primary justification for the exclusion of political groups from the Genocide Convention is that people choose their political affiliation, but people cannot choose their race or ethnicity. This argument hinges on the idea that genocide is the targeting of a specific group solely because of some innate characteristic, but that is rarely ever the case. It is important to note, however, that nationality, religion, even ethnicity are not innate characteristics. While you are born into a nationality or religion, it is a choice to remain part of a national or religious group and we know that ethnicity is not an entirely biological phenomenon, but also socially constructed and ever-changing. “Groups formed on the basis of ‘religion’ or ‘nationality’ are in reality no more stable or permanent than groups formed on the basis of political affiliation” and “ethnicity can be shaped by political and economic factors as much as ancestry and inherited culture.” Extensive research has been done into why political groups were excluded from the initial drafting of the Convention (states wanted to be able to suppress political opposition, among other things), but as Beth Van Schaack explains, the exclusion of political groups is fundamentally at odds with the international human rights apparatus. 

Discarding political groups from the Genocide Convention created an internally inconsistent human rights regime, because other major international agreements include the category. The prohibition of crimes against humanity prohibits persecutions on ‘political, racial, or religious grounds.’ Likewise, the provisions of the Refugee Convention protect individuals from persecution on account of ‘race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.’ 

To solidify this point further, political persecution is a valid reason to seek asylum, which shows that political affiliation and expression, while not innate, is something worth protecting. Additionally, before the Genocide Convention was adopted, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution affirming that genocide is a crime under international law “whether the crime is committed on religious, racial, political, or any other grounds.” In sum, there is a history of political affiliation being a protected status under the international human rights regime that cannot be ignored. 

1. The Exclusion of Cultural Genocide

Culture is a fundamental part of identity, and its destruction not only harms that culture, but humanity as well. But the Genocide Convention does not reflect this. The first two drafts of the Genocide Convention explicitly stated that cultural destruction is a form of genocide. In the Secretariat Draft, the definition of genocide included provisions such as “forced and systematic exile of individuals representing the culture of a group;” “prohibition of the use of the national language even in private intercourse;” “systematic destruction of books printed in the national language or of religious works or prohibition of new publications;” and “systematic destruction of historical or religious monuments or their diversion to alien uses, destruction or dispersion of documents and objects of historical, artistic, or religious value and of objects used in religious worship.” The Ad hoc Committee Draft succinctly reiterated these provisions, defining cultural genocide as “any deliberate act committed with the intent to destroy the language, religion, or culture of a national, racial, or religious group on grounds of the national or racial origin or the religious beliefs of its members…” As mentioned in the previous section, fifteen years before the creation of the Genocide Convention, Lemkin explained how vandalism, defined as the “destruction of culture and works of art,” constituted an attack on a collectivity. “The contribution of any particular collectivity to world culture as a whole, forms the wealth of all humanity…Thus, the destruction of a work of art of any nation must be regarded as acts of vandalism directed against world culture.” The definition of cultural genocide in the first two drafts of the Genocide Convention is simply a generalization of the examples Lemkin used to describe the cultural genocide committed by the Nazis in France and Poland. 

Humanity clearly understands the importance of cultural preservation and appreciation. If we did not, UNESCO World Heritage sites would not exist, and museums would have nothing to exhibit. Culture gives life meaning and to destroy the culture of a particular group is to destroy the “social vitality” of that group, as identified by Claudia Card. She writes, “Social vitality is destroyed when the social relations—organizations, practices, institutions—of the members of a group are irreparably damaged or demolished.” Because culture gives groups social vitality, “When a group with its own cultural identity is destroyed, its survivors lose their cultural heritage and may even lose their intergenerational connections.” If people cannot participate in their culture because it was destroyed, life becomes devoid of meaning, leading to social death akin to physical death. “By limiting genocide to its physical and biological manifestations, a group can be kept physically and biologically intact even as its collective identity suffers in a fundamental and irremediable manner…the present understanding of genocide preserves the body of the group but allows its very soul to be destroyed.”

1. Forgets Prevention

The Genocide Convention as it currently exists fails to provide sufficient guidance on how states should prevent genocide, diminishing the utility of the convention as a legal instrument. For a crime like genocide, who implementation and methodology are constantly evolving, there simply needs to be more substantive explanation and guidelines for its prevention. Prevention is currently based on deterrence and the threat of punishment. But it is unclear how effective a deterrent punishment is. Preventing a genocide is a difficult task because the term tends to be retroactively applied via courts or independent fact-finding missions. The international community cannot prevent a genocide if it refuses to acknowledge one is happening and only do so after the violence has ended. Genocides can be prevented by understanding and mitigating the factors that are most likely to lead to genocide, a significant one being war. Prevention must be proactive and cannot be solely based on threat of punishment. 

Moving Forward

After highlighting a few problems with the concept of genocide, I want to offer a few alternatives. In terms of Genocide convention, changes are possible. Article XVI of the convention states “A request for the revision of the present Convention may be made at any time by any Contracting Party by means of a notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-General. The General Assembly shall decide upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such request.” All it takes is one state to request that the Genocide Convention be revised, and the General Assembly can decide where to go from there. Given that this convention is 75 years old, it is worth reevaluating its provisions given that the world has changed tremendously since 1948. Revisions to the convention can mean including cultural genocide and expanding the protection status to include political groups. Revisions can also make the prevention aspect clearer. While convincing states to make changes might be difficult, proposing revisions does no harm and can even bring greater attention to the issues with the convention. 

One of the problems highlighted earlier in this paper is the exclusion of political groups from the Genocide Convention. Beth Van Schaack offers a new way of thinking of the protection of political groups from genocide and that is through the norms of jus cogens. Jus cogens is the idea that there are certain peremptory norms in international law, norms that cannot be violated no matter the circumstances. According to Article 50 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 

a treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.

Examples of peremptory norms are the prohibitions on genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, torture, human trafficking, slavery, apartheid, etc. Van Schaack makes the case for applying the norm of jus cogens to protect political groups from genocide. “When faced with mass killings evidencing the intent to eradicate political groups in whole or in part, domestic and international adjudicatory bodies should apply the jus cogens prohibition of genocide and invoke the Genocide Convention vis-à-vis signatories only insofar as it provides practical procedures for enforcement and ratification.” Enforcement and ratification can be found in Article IX which says the International Court of Justice has jurisdiction over disputes between states about the interpretation, fulfilment, and application of the Convention (although there are several reservations to this article). Article VIII says that any party can call upon “the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action…as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide” or any enumerated acts.  

Conclusion 

There is a tendency to call instances of mass violence ‘genocide’ to garner attention and action from the international community because imbedded in the word is a certain gravity that necessitates action. The obsession with genocide makes equally grave crimes like crimes against humanity and war crimes secondary and something to settle for. This directs attention away from mass violence that is not genocide, leading to inaction and indifference. 

There are changes that can be made to reduce our obsession with genocide. Contracting parties can propose revisions to the Genocide Convention; the norm of jus cogens can be the legal framework by which we view genocides and mass violence in order to include historically excluded groups from the convention; and we can think diligently about the language we use to describe instances of genocide and mass violence and use the more inclusive phrase of ‘crimes against humanity.’ 

To be reiterate once again, this is not an argument for genocide denial or even the concept as a whole. Rather, it is an argument against the concept of genocide as it currently exists. The concept of genocide can be strengthened by the inclusion of other groups, cultural genocide, and more prevention provisions. 

“Subhuman:” An Intersection Between Nationalism and Genocide

At the end of 2019, there were approximately 80 million forcibly displaced persons. This incredibly high number is the culmination of a decade marked by political and social unrest. While cases of forcible displacement can be found in virtually every region of the world, Myanmar produced one of the highest volumes of refugees. This is due to the ongoing genocide of the Rohingya people, a Muslim minority group who have historically resided in the northwest state of Rakhine.  In August 2017, security forces launched a campaign of extreme violence specifically targeting the Rohingya; close to a million people were forced to flee to Bangladesh which is currently home to Kutupalong, the world’s largest refugee camp. While a cursory examination of the crisis may pinpoint the 2017 attacks as a catalyst, the persecution of the Rohingya, and subsequent displacement, spans decades. The Rohingya’s vulnerable status within Myanmar is deeply intertwined with a story of citizenship, identity, and nationalism. In order to fully understand the root causes of the genocide, it is necessary to understand how the rise of Buddhist nationalism has shaped Myanmar’s perception of citizenship and their relationship to the Rohingya. 

An Introduction: Who Are the Rohingya?

The Rohingya have often been treated as a stateless people with no country willing to claim them. In Violent Borders: Refugees and the Right to Move, Reece Jones asserts that Myanmar’s government has long perpetuated the notion that they are immigrants who illegally crossed over from Bangladesh thus denying them citizenship and the rights associated with it; Bangladesh, of course, denies being an origin point. While Myanmar’s government has labeled the Rohinyga as undocumented immigrants, the ethnic group, which practices a Sufi variation of Sunni Islam, can trace their origins to the 15th century kingdom of Arakan. Other Rohingya arrived in the region throughout the 19th and 20th century during British colonial rule. Since independence, Myanmar has refuted the Rohingya’s historical claims and has severely diminished their legal status to virtually nothing. Furthermore, the Rohingya are no strangers to large-scale attacks against them. In 1978, the military displaced 200,000 people in a campaign of killings and rape that mirrors the 2017 attacks. Another campaign in 1991 to 1992 drove an even larger number to Bangladesh.

In 1982, the military government passed the Citizenship Law which is seen as a violation of fundamental principles under international law as it discriminates on the basis of a hierarchical, “ethnic-based” concept of citizenship. Under this controversial law, there are three categories of citizens: full citizens, associate, and naturalized. Full citizens are recognized as one of the main ethnic groups of Myanmar; naturalized citizens, on the other hand, can only achieve citizenship if they can prove they entered and resided in Myanmar prior to 1948, the year of independence.  This effectively shut out the Rohingya whose historical claims in the region were denied and there was no feasible way for most of them to prove their presence prior to 1948- they were stateless. 

The Citizenship Law was just one example of Myanmar reinforcing and exacerbating the Rohingya’s ambiguous legal existence. In 1995, the government began to issue temporary registration cards that afforded the Rohingya the right to vote as “temporary citizens”- these were later nullified in 2015. Current identification cards label them as foreigners. Additionally, Rohingya could only register in the 2014 census if they identified as Bengali; any attempt to label themselves as Rohingya was rejected. The government has used any legal means necessary to ensure that the Rohingya are left with no power. This serves multiple purposes. For the government it is practical to deny Rohingya citizenship due to the fact that under the 1982 Citizenship Law, if the Muslims in Rakhine are formally recognized as Rohingya then they would be technically allowed an autonomous area; this would not only force the government to give up land, but the military also fears that an autonomous area could be grounds for a possible breeding ground for terrorist groups. However, while the government and military may perceive the dehumanization of the Rohingya to be a strategic matter, it also undeniably serves to further reinforce a particularly potent phenomenon: Buddhist nationalism. 

The Rise of Buddhist Nationalism 

Following the passage of the Citizenship Law in 1982, a book titled Fear of Extinction was anonymously published; it cautioned the Buddhist majority of Myanmar to keep their distance from Muslims. This anti-Muslim sentiment would lay the groundwork for years to come, including the attacks that would take place in the 2010s. By October 2012, mobs, that consisted of Buddhist villagers, police, and soldiers, targeted the Rohingya, attacking them with machetes, spears, and petroleum bombs. Property was destroyed and looted. These attacks not only displaced 140,000 people, they would also lay the foundation for the 2017 campaign that would formally kickstart what we know to be a genocide. 

Sri Lanka and Myanmar, both of whom have majority Buddhist populations, have both experienced a rising movement that has fused together Buddhism and nationalism. While the religion is not typically associated with violence, there are those within the Theravada strain who perceive an existential threat posed by the presence of Islam. In Myanmar, extremist monks paint a picture of a potential Islamic invasion- despite the fact that if anything there has been an exodus, not an invasion. Furthermore, at the forefront of the many campaigns of violence against the Rohingya, Buddhist mobs have been leading the way. A monk known as Ashin Wirathu is the perfect embodiment of this extremism. Once jailed for hate speech, Wirathu has rejected the peaceful teachings of Buddhism to embrace militarism in the face of a nonexistent threat. Wirathu, along with many other clergy members, have referred to Muslims as “subhuman.” 

After Myanmar's military junta dissolved in 2011 and the country began a process of political liberalization, extremists established the group known as MaBaTha which consists of monks, nuns, and lay people dedicated to protecting Buddhism at all costs. The Crisis Group characterizes it as a “broad-based social and religious movement dedicated above all else to the protection and promotion of Buddhism at a time of unparalleled change and uncertainty in a country where historically Buddhism and the state have been inseparable.” While the government has attempted to curtail the group, it has been largely unsuccessful

It all begets the question: why does the Buddhist majority feel threatened by a severely persecuted minority? Like most things it can be traced to colonialism where the British forcibly removed Buddhism from the system of state governance and brought in Hindu and Muslim moneylenders and landholders. This not only angered local elites, it also sowed the seeds for later resentment. However, while colonization plays a foundational role, there are contemporary drivers behind the resurgence of Buddhist nationalism. For starters, the liberalization of the country has led to people being able to express their fears and hatred in a way not previously seen. There are also demographic and economic anxieties that groups like MaBaTha play into. The economic model that was instituted by the British has led to the development of a “business class of traders with strong cross-border ties;” these networks are seen as exclusionary to the Buddhist majority thus reinforcing a deep-seated resentment. 

It is believed that “to be Burmese is to be Buddhist.” The questions of national identity and citizenship are inextricably linked with Buddhist nationalism which is fundamentally anti-Muslim. From the very beginning of Myanmar’s independence, the Rohingya were never given a chance to be citizens as their very existence defied what was considered to be ‘Burmese.’ Furthermore, the persecution and violence that the Rohingya have been subjected to throughout the decades has been a mechanism to fortify the central tenets of Buddhist nationalism. 

Refugees In Their Own Country 

While attention is paid to the Rohingya refugees who currently reside in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, it is important to also consider the conditions in which the Rohingya who are still in Myanmar are living. If anything, these conditions are another product of Buddhist nationalism as they serve to bolster the exclusion of the Rohingya from mainstream society and further dehumanize them. After the violence of 2012, the Rakhine state government segregated displaced Muslims and ethnic Rakhine in a supposed attempt to resolve the situation; Muslims have been forced to stay within these camps which are now viewed as open-air detention facilities. Living conditions are “squalid” and severe limitations on access to various resources have led to dire social and economic consequences. Lack of healthcare has led to an increase in morbidity and mortality. Additionally, lack of economic resources has produced an atmosphere of dire frustration that has forced occupants to seek out dangerous modes of escape. 

The conditions in which Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), who are virtually all Muslim, are forced to reside are just another example of the way Buddhist nationalism operates. As Muslims are deemed “subhuman” so too are the conditions in which the government forces them to live. These camps not only serve the military’s purpose in curbing potential “threats” by keeping the remaining Rohingya physically segregated, it also serves to legitimize the rhetoric of Buddhist nationalists. The conditions of these camps are an embodiment of the idea that the Rohingya are interlopers who are not deserving of basic human rights as a consequence. These camps, alongside the campaigns of terror, are useful tools of nationalists to protect a society they believe is being encroached upon by Islam; it maintains that so-called threat and keeps Muslims in their “rightful” place. 

One of Many Policy Recommendations

There are many policy initiatives that must be implemented by Myanmar’s government to end the genocide and create a safe environment for the Rohingya’s return. However, one of the most crucial initiatives will be to end the 1982 Citizenship Law which is fundamentally exclusionary and cannot exist in its current form. Not only does it serve to legitimize the rhetoric that degrades the Rohingya population, it also creates the necessary conditions to exclude the Rohingya and subject them to abuse. The fact that it does not recognize the Rohingya as an ethnic group deserving of citizenship, and does not provide any feasible means for them to prove their existence prior to 1948, marginalizes them as a community and strips them of any political and social power they may utilize to protect themselves. Not only would the repealing of such an inherently discriminatory law help restore rights associated with citizenship to the Rohingya, it would also counter Buddhist nationalism’s claim that the Rohingya are an encroachment. By stripping nationalistic elements away from laws having to do with citizenship, Myanmar can begin to create a genuinely pluralistic society that protects minority rights. 

Combating Catastrophe: The American Response to Genocide in Cambodia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Without memory, there is no culture. Without memory, there would be no civilization,

no society, no future.

– Elie Wiesel

Elie Wiesel shares insight into the collective idea of what genocide is and the impact genocide has on the world. Wiesel gives testament that the genocide is devastating not only in mass killings, but also the through the outgrowth of genocide results in the loss of culture, histories, languages, memories and subsequent generations that would have existed had it not have been for the death of millions. Often when the term genocide is used, it is connected to the Holocaust; however, genocides have occurred throughout history and continue to occur today. In order to better understand how to grasp the power and extent of mass killings, the Cambodian genocide and the Bosnia-Herzegovina genocide will be used as case studies to understand genocide, the international politics at play, and the lasting devastation.

The power in labeling a mass atrocity a genocide is the invoking of an international obligation to respond. The genocides in Cambodia committed by the Khmer Rouge and the systematic ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Muslims by Bosnian Serb Forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, were both defined by the international community as genocide, while simultaneously having very complicated and political international responses. Both the Cambodian Genocide and the Bosnian Genocide are complicated by United States ideology and politics, and, by comparing the two, it will be possible to provide a better understanding and insight into the two conflicts.

For comparative purposes, genocide will be defined as “gross and systematic and severe human rights violations involving extensive political killings, or in response to humanitarian crises such as famines or massive refugee flows”  Much of the discourse on genocide came from the aftermath of Nazi concentration camps post World War II and the Nuremberg Military Tribunal following the end of the war in 1995. In 1948, the United Nations adopted The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, directly before the Universal Declaration of Human Right or the International Human Rights Covenants. The Genocide Convention defined genocide as a crime and created standards and obligations for the international response or degree of intervention in addressing the genocide. The creation of the United Nations came in the aftermath of the Allied victory in World War II – making the Allied Powers: United States, Russia/Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and China all permanent members of the UN Security Council. The UN Security Council holds significant power via controlling discourse as well as international humanitarian norms. States such as the United States, Russia, and China, who are all non-members of the International Criminal Court (ICC), are also prominent members and have a significant influence in international politics. Thus, the power of a country, such as the United States, labeling something a genocide, or not, holds significant leverage and sway over the response because of the influence of the United States. An example of this is the U.S. in Indonesia, and how the “mass killings” of people of Indonesia based on political identity are at best labeled a tragedy,  but are not labeled a genocide even though it meets the various criteria.

The Genocide Convention defines genocide as “the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group… calculated to bring about its destruction”. Major ideas coming out of the Genocide Convention include the idea that states have an obligation to prevent genocide and to punish the perpetrators, often in the form of international trials/court. Many wars and conflicts that were considered forms of genocide during the Cold War were from internal conflict rather than between two sovereign states: Cambodia and Bosnia-Herzegovina being both examples of genocides committed between the government and its people.

Cambodia (1975-1978)

The Khmer Rouge was the political party in power that committed the systematic extermination of Cambodians. Saloth Sar or famously known as Pol Pot was the leader of the Khmer Rouge.  Pol Pot was raised in a farm community in Cambodia and then later received a Western education in Paris, France, where he first heard of the communist ideology that would later lead to genocide. While radical thought was, for most of Pol Pot’s peers, theoretical at best, Pol Pot was able to implement these political ideas into Cambodia when he returned home. With the help and influence of the Vietnamese Communist party and with the support of communist countries such as China and North Korea, support existed within the region that allowed for communism to grow in Cambodia. The party moved to foundational changes within Cambodian society, moving close to 2 million people from the cities, mostly the capital, Phnom Penh, to the countryside for re-education programs. Those who showed any defiance,  were unable to be re-educated, or had ties to capitalist ideology, were seen as threats to the society and the political party. Often times many women and children whose husband or father had been sent to confinement were later executed as well. This genocide only lasted about two years but killed an estimated two million people.

Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-1995)

The start of the Bosnia-Herzegovina genocide was based on the aftermath of World War I. Yugoslavia was the conglomeration of Serbia, Montenegro, Slovenia, Istria, Dalmatia, Croatia-Slavonia, Vojvodina, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. The dominant group within the conglomeration was Serbs, and while they discriminated against other groups, before World War II, the collective lived in toleration of each other. After World War II, Yugoslavia was reorganized into six designated republics and two autonomous regions united under a federal system. The rise of power of Jusip Broz Tito allowed for Yugoslavia to remain a state even though it had groups of people contending for power over the area. Over time, tension among the different groups in Yugoslavia grew and with the death of Tito, and the emergence of economic and political problems, chaos emerged. The use of nationalism by Slobodan Milosevic, that began during his rise to power in 1987, brought forth the very conditions, stereotypes and alienation tactics that fostered genocide. Milosevic depicted Muslims who lived in Serbia as the largest threat to the Serbian national society. A foundational aspect that played into the genocide was the use of religion and mythology in demonizing Muslims as “Christkillers” within Christian Serbian teachings and understandings. On April 5, 1992, Bosnia declared independence from Yugoslavia and conflict erupted, which lead to a civil war between the Bosniak majority was opposed by Bosnian Serbs. From 1992 to 1995,  the use of these teachings and ideologies turned into the “daily rituals of ethnoreligious purification” which was acted out through means of genocide.  The Bosnian Serbs sought to purify through mass killings of Bosnian Muslims. By the end of the war, 100,000 Bosniak and Croatian civilians were killed; it was considered the largest massacre since the end of World War II in Europe.

Extended Power - The Influence of the US both in Cambodia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina

The historical contexts in Cambodia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, are what laid the groundwork and conditions that allowed for genocide to occur. The Cold War politics at this time played a part in the continued violence in both Cambodia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, rather than a more immediate response to these conflicts. The Cold War politics throughout US foreign policy is essential in understanding how both these genocides were addressed, viewed and then acted upon by the United States. The United States was one of the most powerful countries emerging post World War II. The United States was also extremely influential in the creation of the United Nations. The UN Responsibility to Protect is a cornerstone in international humanitarian law and intervention. The United Nations defines mass killings as a genocide, and generally requires some sort of response. Thus, to use the label genocide is to then invoke UN peacekeeping forces and the establishment of courts if the conflict ends.

The international law that was, in essence, created post World War II in Nuremberg and Tokyo. In these trials it proved to have a fatal flaw of being unclear regarding the terms of how to go about international humanitarian intervention, through military action, in states where mass genocide was occurring, and where intervention was not considered legal. The point of Nuremberg and the UN Security Council sanctioned trials was to hold those individuals at high levels of power, as the most accountable for the atrocities and mass extermination that occurred. However, in the case of Cambodia and Bosnia, the intervention that millions needed came too late.

The intervention that did occur was highly geopolitical for countries involved. It was only through the framework of the United Nations Security Council that could deem, “that genocide represented a threat to international peace and security. In practice, though, it never exercised that authority. The standard pattern, right through the end of the Cold War, was for the international community to wring its hands in anguish as genocide played itself out”.  Within the Security Council, you had the US, UK, and France on one ideological side and Russia/Soviet Union and China on the other, causing tension and gridlock amongst the very people who could end the genocide.

A foundational difference between the two trials was who sponsored and supported what, and the different levels of intervention that the international community had in Cambodia versus Bosnia-Herzegovina. The international response was collective and enacted thorough UN peacekeeping forces in Bosnia were sanctioned by the Security Council. At this time it is important to note the changes that occurred within the Cold War – most notably the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The ideological battle and gridlock within the international community and the United Nations was significantly diminished which in turn, allowed for action.

Whereas in the case of Cambodia, the timing of the genocide itself played a key role in the redress that was expected at the time. In Asia and Southeast Asia, you have the United States in two major wars, among various other military action. Most notably the Korean War began shortly after World War II beginning in 1950 and lasting till 1953, and then the Vietnam War started in 1955 and finally concluded in 1975, the same year the Cambodian Genocide began. The United States and China, two countries who were once allies found themselves on opposite sides of an ideological battle that was being played out in proxy wars from Korea to Cambodia, to other areas around the world. A devastating consequence of the Vietnam War was the millions of bombs that the United States dropped in Laos and Cambodia. In 1975, you have domestic turmoil in the U.S. surrounding the Vietnam War, that going back to Southeast Asia with any form of U.S. military to address the Cambodian Genocide was not a feasible option. The Khmer Rouge even held the Cambodian seat in the UN till 1982. Most of those remain unaccountable for their actions, most notably the leader Pol Pot. Pol Pot died in 1998 before any trials began.

Genocide is a difficult and horrific act to comprehend. How a society gets to that point of action is often muddled with politics, power, and self-interest. By using Cambodia and  Bosnia-Herzegovina as two key examples, one can better understand how the atrocities occurred through the historical circumstances, international politics and the very institutions and means of addressing mass violence.