Is China a Friend or Foe?
Staff Writer Anastasia Papadimitriou looks closely at the current relationship between the U.S. and China.
China has acquired an increasing amount of power, beginning in the 1950s, allowing it to become a globally recognized economic and militaristic powerhouse. China’s military has become increasingly aggressive in East and Southeast Asia while simultaneously promoting economic growth to accomplish the widespread acceptance of their global influence. Increased militarization in the South China Sea and Taiwan will induce a rivalry between China and the United States (U.S.) as China maintains their position as a competitor for global influence with the expansion of their Belt and Road Initiative.
After World War II, as tensions increased between China, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia, China began seeking the opportunity to occupy islands and define maritime boundaries. The dispute over territory became increasingly complicated because the introduction of the U.S. as a presence in the area challenged China as a regional power. China used the nine-dash line as a justification for claiming a large section of the South China Sea. The long-practiced presence of Chinese fishing in this area resulted in the self-asserted assumption that this section of the South China Sea was Chinese territory. China has a historical claim over the islands and the sea, stating that it was established before the implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), even though they ratified the convention. The nine-dash-line largely overlapped with claims by Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei. Not only has China expanded their naval capabilities, but they also dumped sand and cement on numerous reefs to create man-made islands that would house military bases. China did so with the intent to counter other nation’s claims to territorial control in the South China Sea and take advantage of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which states that 200 nautical miles off the shoreline is the exclusive area for a country's economic use. Countries in their exclusive economic zones have "sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources." China's main interests in the sea include accessing oil and gas deposits, as the seabed is a potential energy supply corridor.
China's aggression in the South China Sea is influenced by their history and current narrative regarding western involvement. Throughout the Century of Humiliation, China was exploited and overpowered by western nations. In an effort to overcome a period of history that, to China, symbolized their weakness, the nation became more assertive in places with territorial disputes such as the South China Sea. China's narrative consists of the idea that the U.S. is seeking to contain China as a rising power. China firmly believes that third parties, including the U.S., should not be involved in the dispute because it is not their direct concern.
The U.S. perspective on the dispute promotes the defense of Southeast Asian nations, benefits of trading, and promotion of international law. The Obama Administration demonstrated this perspective by strengthening allyship and security ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and promoting Freedom of Navigation Operations patrols. The United States continues to reject China's nine-dash line and its claims over the island, stating that it will defend the Philippines if China attacks them militarily. To ensure that China abides by the law, the U.S. additionally patrols the sea to defend international law and the rights to sail freely within international waters. The South China Sea is an important commercial trading route for the U.S., who is struggling between the desire to leave China unprovoked and prevent them from bullying their allies. Generally, the American public does not view China favorably either. In 2019, 60 percent of Americans viewed China negatively, while 24 percent believed that China is an increasing threat, and 81 percent believed that China's increasing military power is negative for the U.S. The U.S. must act with a clear strategy in mind because the South China Sea dispute has the potential to turn into a full-fledged war. If the U.S. does not have a military presence in the South China Sea, China could be further encouraged to increase aggression in other territorial disputes such as Tibet and India.
Increased patrolling of the sea, however, can make the U.S. look like an aggressor, legitimizing Chinese militarization. The U.S. must recognize the economic risks, considering China is in a trade war and also one of their significant trade partners. The U.S. should aim to maintain stability within the region and promote negotiation, communication, and cooperation without causing interference that demonstrates aggression and western dominance. One recommendation is for the U.S. to continue its support for Southeast Asian allies by providing equipment, sea surveillance and coast guard infrastructure to build their maritime capacity. To counter China’s overwhelming presence in the region, the U.S. must increase defense cooperation with India by jointly conducting military exercises. Helping allies, especially the Philippines and Vietnam, allows these countries to defend themselves from China's aggression and balances power in the region. By doing so, the U.S. would increase security in the South China Sea, preventing military conflict and balancing power between Southeast Asian countries and China.
In the 1970s, China began to embrace globalization, international trade, and foreign direct investment. In 2013, President Xi Jinping announced the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) during a visit to Kazakhstan, which allowed China to expand its regional influence and locations outside of the region, such as Africa, Central Asia, and parts of Europe. This multi-trillion dollar infrastructure project intends to create an economic belt and maritime "silk road" that connects China to over sixty countries in Eurasia and Africa. The BRI aims to fund infrastructure projects such as highways, railways, sea ports, airports, and oil refineries.
Though the BRI will help underdeveloped countries, it also contains negative aspects that can simultaneously hurt the countries by ensuring their inability to repay their debts, which would prolong China’s control of their projects. Since its launch, China has been accused of putting countries into "debt traps.” The BRI has made project deals with numerous smaller economies; the most prominent and controversial one is Sri Lanka's. From 2009 to 2014, China financed almost five billion U.S. dollars on projects in Sri Lanka, including ports, roads, bridges, railways, an international airport, and a coal-fired power station. This loan, however, came at an interest rate of 6 percent and 8.8 percent, respectively. Other multilateral banks and national banks, such as Japan's, typically offered interest rates of 2-3 percent. The project was suspended due to legal issues over land, the project's financing, and environmental effects. Ravi Karunanayake, Sri Lanka's Minister of Finance, stated "'We mean business when we say we want clean, transparent, good governance... perhaps Chinese companies had to be corrupt in the past, but if they do that now they will be disqualified," showing China’s corrupt practices throughout the implementation of the BRI. The Hambantota Port project has sparked controversy within Sri Lanka because of China's "debt trap," along with the fear of China using the port for military purposes. Hambantota was historically a Sri Lankan naval base, but was built into a port and is now controlled by China. The port is under a 99-year lease to China Merchants Port Holdings for $1.12 billion, causing Sri Lankan citizens to rally against the BRI, fearing that China would use the port for military purposes to gain more influence on Sri Lanka as well as get closer to India, China's rival.
The BRI benefits countries with poor infrastructure and does not necessarily make China a "foe" of the U.S., but because China’s spread of regional and global influence challenges that of the U.S., they are still competitors. In terms of the U.S., one such policy recommendation is to increase foreign direct investment in regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa where the BRI has a strong presence. United States government agencies such as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) must continue to encourage and assist U.S. private businesses to invest in high-risk countries through its political risk insurance. OPIC has launched a “Connect Africa" investment initiative, which encourages "forging deeper ties with Africa and the world, through investing in physical infrastructure, technology, and value chains," and helps stimulate economic growth of developing countries, all while competing with the BRI. Having OPIC, a private U.S. business, invest in undeveloped countries may foster trust between the two. The U.S. would not directly invest or give loans to the country's government, which would block the potential opportunity for the U.S. to entrap such countries, as China has done with the BRI.
Free trade agreements encourage economic growth in underdeveloped countries by allowing them to increase their trade opportunities. For example, if the textile industry in Sub-Saharan Africa was not limited by trade restrictions, the U.S. could promote economic growth in African countries while simultaneously benefiting themselves. The U.S. could additionally establish a free trade agreement with India, China’s rival in the region, who they have a positive relationship with. The Better Investments Utilization Leading to Development Act, established in 2018 by the Trump Administration, seeks to join OPIC with the newly established USIDFC. USIDFC aims to bring private capital to underdeveloped countries, make the U.S. a more "competitive leader on the global development stage,” and benefit underdeveloped countries without getting the state directly involved, which could negatively affect the countries.
China's increasing aggression toward Taiwan directly interferes with the unofficial ties that the U.S. has with Taiwan, creating tensions between the U.S. and China. The U.S. has recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) since 1979, but the U.S. still has unofficial relations with Taiwan through the Taiwan Relations Act, which outlines the commitment of the U.S. to protect Taiwan from the PRC if they were to attack militarily. In 2019, the U.S. sold $2 billion worth of Abram tanks to Taiwan, a move to which China has responded negatively by threatening sanctions and stating that the U.S. should remove military involvement in Taiwan. In 2018, China approved delivery of the Russian S-400 surface-to-air missile system with the capacity to reach Taiwan. The PRC has additionally deployed approximately 1,600 missiles on the Taiwan Strait and practiced military exercises near Taiwan. One such policy recommendation in this case has to do with the continued sale of arms to Taiwan from the United States. If China ultimately attempts to forcefully overpower Taiwan, Taiwan must be militarily prepared and receive support from the U.S., who can increase Taiwan’s defense research and development in order to compete with that of China’s.
Overall, China must be viewed by the U.S. as a "foe" because its use of force in territorial disputes creates instability in the nearby region and tension with the United States. China certainly must be viewed as a competitor in the field of global economic influence and as a "foe" pertaining to military aggression. China is spreading its influence internationally through the use of force in territorial disputes and by taking advantage of underdeveloped countries through the BRI. China is challenging the current international order by competing with the U.S. for global dominance, showing a complete lack of compromise and assertive attitude, and earning their title as a competitor.
The Role of the Law of the Sea in the East and South China Sea Arbitration
Guest Writer Oksana Ryjouk analyzes the intersection between international legal precedents and maritime security in the South China Sea.
For years, many of the most disputed debates within the international world have included water. Many people have even questioned whether the next world war will be about water and the shortages humans face, as a whole. To this regard, many international disputes regarding water have surfaced to greater importance, especially with the realization that climate change is impacting the world far greater than was once believed. This climate change trend has sparked what can be considered more drastic measures taken by the neighboring states in the Asian-Pacific region. Japan, China, Taiwan, the Philippines, and the Korean Peninsula are all major states impacted by adverse political and economic effects in the area, and all have disputed their contested areas for centuries. These disputes can be traced back to a time of imperialism and expansion of empires, spanning the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, World War II defeats and Cold War geopolitics, adding complexity to claims over the islands. Whether Japan is losing its fisheries and access to sustainable diet, or to China creating new islands, the coastal states in this region are starting to lack the cooperation they had when economic zones were created. Likewise, sovereignty has also been placated within this economic zones. Thus, the modern day disputes that have risen, especially with the United States pivot towards the region, have concluded a more complex understanding than just legal components of international law, climate change, and economic territorial zones.
A way to solve territorial disputes, linked to political and economic crisis, is to arbitrate between the parties, and in this context, it usually involves an international organization as a mediator. To understand how the arbitration occurs in the Asian-Pacific region, the specific outlines of the Law of the Sea need to be primarily understood within the context of the South China Sea. Most recently, in the Permanent Court of Arbitral Tribunal in The Hague between China and the Philippines, the court clarified many historic rights that have been claimed, that set a precedent for the rest of the South China Sea. The Tribunal stated that under UNCLOS (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: “there is no legal basis for any Chinese historic rights within the nine-dash line.” This is important because this dashed line (which has also been known as the ten-dash and eleven-dash line), has been claimed by the Republic of China (Taiwan), and thus the People’s Republic of China (China), which was claimed to allow a majority controlled portion of the South China Sea. The difference between this space and another geographic location are based in three factors. First, China has begun to build artificial islands with military-ready landing strips… in an area where there is still legal deliberation occurring for contested area, and claims to land that they do not have. Second, there are four other countries and the territory of Taiwan that are also claiming contested territorial claims to the area, which would definitely lead to more disputes between surrounding fishing, environmental impact and blames, military strategy placement, and more. Third, there are major ecological, environmental, and physical changes that have occurred in the area due to rising populations, state demands to sustain these populations, and unchanging demands per population metric.
The situation in the South China Sea has unduly caused stress on the environment in the area and thus, has created a major problem for the populations of animals, plants, insects, and others in the area. Non-state actors, such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), have researched and issued statements regarding the environmental impacts of these arbitrations. They claim that “total fish stocks in the South China Sea have been depleted by 70-95 percent since the 1950s and catch rates have declined by 66-75 percent over the last 20 years [even though] The South China Sea is one of the world’s top five most productive fishing zones, accounting for about 12 percent of global fish catch in 2015 [with] more than half of the fishing vessels in the world operat[ing] in these waters, employing around 3.7 million people, and likely many more engaged in illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing.” This poses an enormous problem for the sustainability of the area, both for the populations of the countries surrounding these waters, and also for the environment.
The populations of the coastal areas in the region have already begun to complain, citing shortages of food, limited diversity of species, and increased water temperatures. A well-known indicator of ocean climates, stress, and temperatures are coral systems. Corals are large bodies of cellular organisms that build on each other, and specifically, in the Asian-Pacific corridor, are known as the ‘Coral Triangle.’ This Triangle is located within the main dispute of the South and East China Sea areas. Already, major coral systems, valued at up to $100 million annually, have begun to die off. Without corals, and consistent monitoring of these systems, which is difficult to conduct with off-shore welling, building of islands, and general overfishing, the economic and sustainable benefits of these creatures will diminish. Coral ecosystem impacts are only the beginning of biological degradation that have impacted the legal system and the people, and is incredibly important to focus on.
Lastly, on the South China Sea relations, the Tribunal, which had previously ruled against Chinese historical rights also created other legal thresholds and jurisprudence. Although young and being developed, the jurisprudence of international courts is moving swiftly in the actions taken by Asian nations. Specifically and most recently, the Tribunal issued a ruling on what qualifies as an island for the first time in its history, saying “To qualify as an island, a geographical feature in its natural condition needs to be able to sustain ‘a stable community of people’ and economic life.” Since the claims made by China in the China-Philippines area were deemed not islands, the Tribunal deemed them rocks, and rocks are incapable of ‘generating their own exclusive economic zone (EEZ).’ Which means, there is no legal basis for any entitlement by China, and by governing maritime law, the long-disputed Spratly Islands chain, or Scarborough Shoal, rather “rocks,” are under Philippine-bound EEZ territory. By declaring the Spratly Islands to be rocks, the Tribunal was able to validate the Philippines’ EEZ territory without delimiting any boundaries, which the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction, and thus, any interferences violates the Philippines’ sovereignty as a nation. These major statements in the maritime law community have ‘made waves’ in terms of understanding what an island is, what a rock is, how geographical settlements can be disputed, and what kind of jurisprudence is created for future Tribunal arbitrations.
Now, understanding the maritime law situation in the South China Sea allows for an understanding in the East China Sea. The East China Sea has a very similar occurrence. This large fishery-dispute within Asian waters have spanned Chinese intervention and claims. Understanding both of these Seas arbitrations is understanding that China is the second-largest economy, and the fastest-growing economy, that needs to support its populations, its economic and military might, and its political power. With 5.3 trillion USD trade dollars annually passing through the South China Sea and East China Sea, 11 billion barrels of oil, 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and with 90% of Middle Eastern fossil fuel exports projected to go to Asia by 2035, it is evident why the trading strengths and force of the East China Sea are imperative not only to China, but Japan and Korea. The economic powerhouses of the region have a lot to lose if international courts do not rule in their favor, and if their military strength is not strong enough to counter their opponents. The power projection from building islands, to increasing fortification, to possible losses in trade deals is monumental. At the moment, the East China Sea legal arbitrations are developing and in dispute; however, further policy actions can be found throughout various non-state organizations and international legal institutions.
The larger impact of the Asian-Pacific region from a non-national security standpoint is imperative in understanding why the situation affects the rest of the world. In a recent Congressional Research Service report, it was strictly defined that “claims of territorial waters and EEZs should be consistent with customary international law of the sea and must therefore, among other things, derive from land features. Claims in the [South China Sea] that are not derived from land features are fundamentally flawed.” This specific report further develops how the legality, or rather illegality, of many nations within the region, not just China, may be found at fault for their actions. The tragedy of the commons incurring due to climate change issues, overfishing, and environmental degradation has caused an even larger concern, and a push towards legal arbitration. Overall, this corridor in the world, which is only a small example of the many regions that are experiencing similar water issues, is of high importance, and one that should not be about competing claims; rather, the South China Sea and the East China Sea arbitration disputes are a larger example about peace and stability in the region.