UNESCO and the destruction of Afghan cultural heritage: How the Taliban’s return to power threatens the legitimacy of western-led international organizations

Earlier this year when the Taliban regained power for the first time in Afghanistan since the US-led military invasion of 2001, all attention was immediately centered on the fall of Kabul and Afghan government, as well as the devastating effects and tragedy that the Taliban’s reprise of power would have on the Afghan people. The outside world watched in horror the scenes at Kabul airport and the heartbreaking interviews with citizens fearing for their lives and the future of Afghanistan. Adding to this discourse at the time was the anger and frustration expressed towards the American government and other western governments at their inaction and inability to prevent the return of the Taliban. The twenty year long US military presence disappeared as did their supposed ‘success’ at quelling the Taliban’s dangerous presence. 

Now, as the world is starting to sadly adjust to the reality of the Taliban regime, greater analysis can be done to recognize the true levels of destruction that Afghanistan is experiencing, particularly the loss of their rich cultural heritage. Adding to the failure of the US military presence in Afghanistan is the failure of international institutions, such as UNESCO, to protect the country’s cultural heritage. 

The history of Afghanistan’s cultural heritage 

Afghanistan is home to a diverse and rich cultural heritage, thanks in large part to its history which includes a strong religious legacy of a variety of religions including Buddhism, Islam, and Christian and Jewish sects. Unlike other parts of the world, humans have inhabited Afghanistan for at least 50,000 years, living primarily in farming communities. Early records of human interaction in Afghanistan in the ancient world reveal the presence of the Persian Empire, Alexander the Great, and a wide variety of kingdoms that would be defined by both Buddhism and Islam. Modern day Afghanistan represents a land that is home to thousands of years of human interaction, leaving it with an impressive cultural heritage. Historical monuments in Afghanistan include the Bamiyan Valley that once held the great Buddha statues and the Minaret of Jam, the famous tower built by the Ghurid sultan. Yet now, Afghanistan risks losing its precious cultural heritage due to the Taliban, and their desire to rewrite the narrative of Afghanistan's history. 

Afghanistan has already lost much of its most important and oldest forms of cultural heritage. When the Taliban first took power in 1996 they horrified the outside world by destroying the Buddhist Bamiyan statues of the 6th century. The statues were regarded as examples of the oldest forms of religious monuments worldwide and were part of UNESCO’s many world heritage sites. The Taliban's decision to destroy these sacred, 600 foot tall monuments revealed their intense desire to rid Afghanistan of its Buddhist influence and anything that went against the terrorist organization’s strict rules and image. The Taliban did not only destroy ancient sites, they also attacked more recent forms of cultural heritage as well as Afghanistan’s contemporary art and culture. Museums, libraries, and music were all forms of culture that fell victim to the Taliban. Author and academic, Ahmad Rashid Salim describes the danger of cultural heritage destruction: “When you kill history, when you kill language, when you kill leaders, when you kill intellectuals, when you kill the religious and spiritual leaders of a society, you can do whatever you want with the people who no longer have a past.”

Now, the Taliban’s return to power threatens the few remaining ancient cultural heritage sites as well as the renaissance of culture that the Afghan people have worked so hard to protect and promote in recent decades. Indeed, it appears as though our worst fears are being realized. Following the Taliban’s initial return to power back in August of this year little was known of their intentions regarding the country’s cultural heritage. A Taliban spokesperson was quoted in February of 2021 on the subject of Afghanistan’s cultural heritage: “As Afghanistan is a country replete with ancient artifacts and antiquity, and that such relics form a part of our country’s history, identity and rich culture, therefore all have an obligation to robustly protect, monitor and preserve these artifacts...All Mujahideen must prevent excavation of antiquities and preserve all historic sites like old fortresses, minarets, towers and other similar sites...to safeguard them from damage, destruction and decay.” Officials within the Taliban promised to protect the country’s cultural heritage, including Kabul’s National Museum of Afghanistan; yet suspicions and distrust lingered given the events of previous decades. Tragically, it appears as though our worst fears are being realized: a recent video from early November shows the Taliban conducting a target practice at the limited remains of the Bamiyan Buddhas, despite their supposed promise to protect the cultural heritage site. This blatant disrespect for the cultural heritage site and disregard of their promise reveals the level of destruction that the Taliban is capable of. Afghanistan risks losing all of its influential cultural heritage, a tragedy that will be deeply devastating not just for the country, but for the world. 

UNESCO and the protection of world heritage sites 

Afghanistan is not the first country worldwide that risks losing its history and heritage due to a change in government and desire to redefine a national identity. The destruction of cultural heritage is a tragic part of every culture's history. However, the 20th century saw the first large-scale attempt to recognize the importance of cultural heritage worldwide and implement efforts to protect cultural heritage in all of its forms. 

UNESCO, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, was established with the goal of protecting and promoting peace and cooperation, specifically through cultural work. The UNESCO World Heritage Sites are one of the defining roles of the international organization. Founded thanks to the 1972 Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, the World Heritage List seeks to protect cultural heritage all across the world in the forms of monuments, buildings, geographical landscapes, and other forms of cultural sites. The UNESCO World Heritage List also labels sites that are in danger and must be protected. Heritage sites in danger can be labeled for a variety of reasons including environmental threats, political threats, or economic threats. Afghanistan is home to several cultural heritage sites on the World Heritage List, of which some, such as the Bamiyan Buddhas, have tragically been destroyed. The remaining cultural heritage sites in Afghanistan are high on the list of those in danger. 

Despite the global impact of UNESCO and worldwide recognition of the importance of protecting cultural heritage sites, UNESCO has been helpless in the face of Taliban destruction. While the international organization could evidently not prevent the return of the Taliban in power, their blatant failure to succeed in any form of protection towards Afghanistan’s cultural heritage sites threatens the legitimacy and future of the organization. In the face of the Taliban’s takeover, UNESCO was only able to call for the preservation of the historical sites, despite their implementation of a safeguard protection program with the Afghan Interior Ministry in 2004. Yet, even this protection program appears worthless now.  How can the world guarantee the protection of its cultural heritage when the one organization tasked with promoting and protecting cultural heritage cannot live up to its own goals?  The Taliban’s return to power and their decision to blatantly target Afghanistan’s cultural heritage sites reveals a far larger issue than the blatant destruction seen on the surface: The inability of international organizations to live up to their roles.

The recent failure of international organizations 

UNESCO is not the first international institution that has been unable to live up to its original promise and mission statement, many other prominent international organizations have been unable to meet their promises to the world for a variety of factors. Examples of failure within other international organizations include the European Union’s recent failure to implement western-European influence in Bosnia following the UN’s security council’s vote to end the EU’s peacekeeping mission there. Other more infamous failures include the UN’s tragic inaction throughout the Rwandan genocide, in which UN blue helemt troops evacuated foreigners, but failed the protect the horrifying mass murder of the Tutsi people. Despite UN recognition of their own blatant failure, the organization’s peacekeeping missions in recent decades reveal a clear and obvious struggle of the organization to live up to its goals, following its creation after World War II. 

The liberal international order in conflict

The destruction in Afghanistan and UNESCO inability to protect the country’s cultural heritage sites reveal another larger issue: the failure of the liberal international order. Following the devastating destruction caused by the Second World War, dozens of international institutions and organizations were established with the hope of promoting global cooperation and thus preventing war and mass conflict. Aimed with the goal of spreading liberal, western democracy throughout the world, the victors of World War II believed that through western-led international organization and western influence world wide, nation states would become democracies over time. Therefore making the world a safer place through nation states’ attempts to evolve into the traits encouraged by the western powers. 

The liberal international order is defined by its norms of multilateralism and its promotion of international institutions. The liberal international order has been a central theory that has defined world politics following the second of World War II. The theory was seen as the future of democracy and peace; it promised a more connected world of western-led power and economic, political, and cultural cooperation. However, recent decades have seen the failing of the liberal international order, as the theory could not account for the recent developments of bipolarity between China and the United States, or its failure in its countries of origin, caused by populist movements seen in the United Kingdom and United States. The rise of non-state actors and the rejection of Western values and traditional concepts of nation state sovereignty have also been central to the liberal international order’s decline. The threat of the Taliban stems not just from their capacity to cause mass violence, but also their rejection of the pillars of liberalism. 

International institutions were once established to be the defining pillars of the liberal international order. The establishment of the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, or the World Health Organization all reveal how following their creation, western powers intended for the organizations to engage in multilateral cooperation worldwide, while being largely dominated and funded by the western powers themselves. However, the recent failures of many international institutions reflect the larger failure of liberalism as the defining theory of world order. 

UNESCO’s inability to act in Afghanistan does not just threaten their own stability and legitimacy as an organization designed in part to protect world heritage, but reveals the broader trend of failure within international institutions and the change in world order. The stability and protection once promised by these western led international institutions can no longer be guaranteed; the Taliban’s destruction of Afghanistan’s cultural heritage simply proves it.

Should the UN Deploy to Afghanistan?

In the immediate aftermath of the fall of Kabul and the Taliban’s takeover of the government, Afghanistan is facing several pressing crises. The delivery of vital humanitarian aid is in a state of logistical limbo, threatening the food security of millions. Furthermore, the human rights of women and members of the old government are under threat. In light of this crisis, several commentators have endorsed the idea of deploying a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation (or PKO) to the country. While noble, these efforts are misguided. Any PKO in Afghanistan would lack the ability to complete its objectives if the Taliban opposed them, and the resources required for such an operation would be better allocated elsewhere. 

The most prominent proposal for a PKO in Afghanistan comes from Georgetown professor Lise Howard, who laid out the case in an op-ed for the L.A. Times. In it, she proposes a PKO lead by China and Muslim nations with the objective of monitoring the situation and to“help the Taliban consolidate less radical control.” Another consistent source of advocacy has been from UMass Amherst professor Charli Carpenter, who argued in favor of a full-scale UN peace enforcement operation aimed at preventing a total Taliban takeover. 

Other proposals have supported the establishment of a PKO with the objective of preventing a possible civil war. Carpenter and Howard argue in Foreign Policy that “the Taliban have only a tenuous hold over the country” which has the potential to become a “multisided conflict that, unless checked, could metastasize and spread across borders, similar to the conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and Libya.” In their view, a small (5,000 strong) mission from Muslim countries could prevent the outbreak of conflict. US Army Major Ryan van Wie of West Point proposed a new type of peace operation, aimed at boosting Taliban legitimacy and moderating its human rights problems. He has also developed several different options, each with its own capabilities and price tag. 

In response to these arguments, GWU professor Paul D. Williams outlined several potential flaws in any such operation. He notes that no UN forces would be able to arrive for at least 60 days, as well as an inability to find willing troop contributors. He also highlights how the Taliban’s consolidation of control over the Afghan government contrasts with the situations in which peacekeepers excel, such as when “there’s a viable peace process to help implement and a host government to support.” Adam Day of the United Nations University highlights how much of this discourse ignores both the reality on the ground and the opinion of the Afghan people 

In response to this critique, Carpenter argues that much of the opposition to a PKO in Afghanistan comes from a sense of fatalism, the idea that the inability to deploy to Afghanistan is set in stone, so there is no real sense in debating over it. While I wouldn’t describe this attitude as fatalism, I believe this perspective is valid. The UN will not and should not deploy to Afghanistan, even if there are some potential benefits to doing so. The political will and financial resources allocated to any such operation would be better utilized elsewhere. Before we address if such a deployment would be viable, we must address whether such a deployment is likely. Will the UN go? 

At this point in time, it is highly unlikely that the UN Security Council will authorize a deployment to Afghanistan. The UNSC hasn’t debated the proposal and none of its recent resolutions or statements on the crisis in Afghanistan have mentioned the possibility of deployment. 

At a time where smaller budgets have already led to cuts in UN Peacekeeping missions (such as the end of UNAMID in Sudan), the idea of paying for another large-scale operation seems unlikely to attract much interest on the Security Council. Neither is the idea of deploying to such a politically charged situation. UN peacekeepers have traditionally stayed out of countries (such as Libya and Syria) where there is discord between the Permanent Members. Afghanistan is one such case. While some Permanent Members, such as China, have displayed a willingness to recognize and work with the Taliban other Permanent Members, namely the USA, have displayed far less willingness. 

Even if the Security Council were to authorize a mission to Afghanistan like the ones proposed, a mission would take time to deploy. The UNs rapid reaction force is the Vanguard Brigade units of several member states. It would take 60 days from when the Secretary-General requests deployment to when the first forces would arrive in Afghanistan if the member states consent to deployment. The arrival of additional specialized forces-such as trained observers, helicopter units, and permanent command staff-would take even longer. The Secretary-General can’t begin the 60-day countdown until authorized to do by the Security Council and the long debate and process for such authorization have yet to be considered. 

This means that, should a PKO be deployed, it won’t be effective for several months. By that time the full-scale civil war that proponents hope the PKO could prevent may have already begun. UN Peacekeepers have never worked well as a rapid reaction crisis response force, even though efforts have been made to improve that capability. PKOs work best when they deploy to deadlocked conflict areas with a solid framework for peacebuilding. For example, missions in Namibia, Liberia, and East Timor were all able to bring peace but only after there was an outlined peace agreement. In contrast, there is no such peace agreement between the Taliban and any of its potential opponents (such as ISIS-K). Thus, we must examine the several potential obstacles to mission effectiveness.

Is the Mission Viable? 

Even if the UNSC were to authorize deployment, and even if such a force could deploy in time to make a difference, the entire operation hinges on Taliban consent. While UN PKOs are military units, they are not capable of sustained counterinsurgent or offensive military operations. This is because they are drawn from dozens of different countries, each with its own language, equipment, procedures, and wartime doctrines. It also lacks unity of command or the idea that military units should be subordinate to a single commander because UN Peacekeepers take orders from both their national capitals and the UN Force Commander. Peacekeepers have traditionally overcome this military deficiency by operating with the consent of the (major) parties to the conflict. While Peacekeepers can undertake offensive operations against spoilers (smaller combatants who hope to disrupt the peace process), such as in the DRC, they lack the ability to fight major parties like the Taliban. 

Even ignoring the Taliban, other armed groups in the region would present a significant problem for any UN PKO. ISIS-K, for example, is highly unlikely to cooperate with any form of foreign intervention force. As the Kabul airport bombing tragically showed, ISIS-K has the ability to inflict significant casualties on any such force. Any large number of casualties would imperil the viability of the operation, as troop-contributing countries have been unwilling to contribute troops after taking casualties. The only way the threat of ISIS-K and other spoilers could be minimized is through potential military and intelligence cooperation with the Taliban. 

That means the Taliban must consent to the mission, which they have shown no indication of doing. The Taliban have spent twenty years fighting against a foreign military presence in Afghanistan, it’s unlikely they would consent to another. It also means that the prospective mission would have relatively few ways to reform the Taliban’s human rights abuses

if the Taliban refuse to cooperate. Many of the levers that the UNSC can use to effect Taliban behavior on human rights (such as humanitarian aid, sanctions, and diplomatic recognition) can be effected without the presence of a PKO. Which raises the question: what specific problems in Afghanistan would a PKO address? 

Is the Mission Needed? 

Besides improving the Taliban’s respect for human rights, proponents have identified two other major purposes for a PKO. They are first to Prevent the outbreak of civil war and second to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian aid. At this point in time, it appears that both of these objectives are being met without the presence of a PKO. The last remaining resistance to the Taliban was in the northwestern Panjshir Province, which fell to the Taliban in early September. While the threat of civil war is still looming over Afghanistan, no armed groups have taken advantage of the uncertainty and chaos to directly challenge the Taliban. 

Furthermore, the Taliban have pledged to uphold the safety of humanitarian aid providers on the ground and have requested even more humanitarian aid from the UN. The Taliban realize that they need humanitarian aid to prevent starvation (and thus opposition to their rule) among the Afghan people. Furthermore, they realize that they need Western recognition for their long-term survival, and harming aid workers would complicate that effort. 

Finally, we must consider not just the feasibility of success when considering an action, we must also consider the opportunity cost of undertaking such an action. Under Van Wie’s proposed options, the annual cost of a PKO in Afghanistan would be between $500 million and $2 billion, which would be between 8 to 31% of Peacekeeping’s current $6.47 billion budget. That is a substantial amount of resources either being raised by member states or taken from

other operations. Despite the large amount of money being allocated to peacekeeping, there are still several unmet budgetary requests in current peacekeeping operations. Many large-scale operations, such as the ones in South Sudan, Mali, the Central African Republic, and the DRC, lack the needed personnel to fully fulfill their mandate and lack a sufficient number of high-cost assets. As an April 2020 UN report notes, peacekeeping missions in Mali and the Central African Republic face “critical gaps” in their inventory of helicopters, UAVS, and medical units. These missions have already been established and have already proven capable of effecting meaningful change in their countries of operation. A 2019 Norwegian Institute of International Affairs report, for example, highlights how without the PKO in Mali “the security situation in Mali … would likely deteriorate significantly,” and could accomplish much more if additional capabilities are funded. It would be more prudent to allocate funds and assets to these existing missions instead of an unproven and possibly unnecessary mission in Afghanistan. 

Conclusion 

While the arguments in favor of deploying a UN PKO to Afghanistan have some validity, it would be unwise to deploy to such a mission. UN PKOs are largely effective at certain tasks, such as protecting civilians in active combat zones and implementing peace agreements. The current environment in Afghanistan, however, is not one where UN PKOs thrive. There is no large-scale active conflict to protect civilians in, or a peace agreement to help implement. Furthermore, The UN lacks the rapid reaction ability to prevent the outbreak of a new war, and it lacks either the Taliban consent or military power needed to improve the Taliban’s human rights situation.

It’s unclear if a PKO is even needed to prevent the outbreak of civil war or ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid. As it stands, without a PKO, a civil war has failed to materialize and humanitarian aid deliveries have continued undisrupted. Thus, any mission to Afghanistan would be costly, risky, and with limited upside. In the age of COVID and great power rivalry, the budget for peacekeeping is currently shrinking. Thus, the substantial resources needed for a potential Afghan mission would be better served by further funding other existing PKOs.

How Local Governments Help Afghan Refugees

Anti-immigration sentiment rings loudly throughout the American political scene. However, with a recent influx of refugees from Afghanistan, the United States has to pool together depleted resources in order to help those escaping the Taliban. Citizens of Afghanistan continue to face human rights abuses at the hands of the Taliban, exemplified by a deadly attack on a school in Kabul. Not only are civilians facing this terror, but so are thousands of Afghan citizens who assisted the United States military during the two decades of military occupation.

Immigration is a multilateral issue and pools resources from every level of the government, including local government. Municipal governments play an intricate role in integrating refugees with the communities they arrive in, and their role is often overlooked and under-funded.

What is Happening in Afghanistan?

After 20 years of United States military presence in Afghanistan, the United States pulled almost 60,000 troops out of the country in the summer of 2021. The aftermath left the nation of Afghanistan in shambles and vulnerable to the Taliban. The terrorist organization rapidly gained power, causing thousands to flee the nation. Over 122,000 people have evacuated Afghanistan including Afghan citizens, Afghan interpreters, and United States citizens. Those fleeing Afghanistan qualify for a Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) under U.S. law; however, the process of obtaining a SIV takes 14 steps over the span of months—keeping 65,000 applicants stuck in Afghanistan. The Biden administration is working to expand access to visas through means of work or humanitarian parole to allow more refugees into the United States in as swift a fashion as possible.

Refugee Resettlement in America

Whether an SIV is required, or a refugee is on humanitarian parole, those who come to America are sent to one of seven military bases for health screenings and work authorization. This process can take longer than one week, and as of October 3, 2021, there are 53,000 refugees waiting across the seven military bases. When the initial screenings are completed, refugees are placed with resettlement organizations, which help them obtain housing, utilities, furniture, food, work, and English literacy training. Marisol Girela, the Associate Vice President of social programs at RAICES in San Antonio, Texas, stated that their organization alone has seen a dramatic increase in refugees arriving over the summer. Many resettlement organizations, such as RAICES, work closely with local governments, but federal barriers block effective partnerships.

Federal Barriers to Effective Resettlement

The Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS) sued the Trump administration in November of 2020 over an executive order passed by President Trump. The goal of the executive order was to require municipal governments to obtain approval for refugee resettlement programs on the city, state, and federal level. This order put up more bureaucratic barriers when it comes to refugee resettlement, and HIAS, along with Church World Services and the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Services, sued the administration on the basis of the undue burden that the executive order placed on resettlement agencies who are legally required to obtain formal city and state approval for their work.

The Trump administration’s anti-immigrant ideology strained refugee resettlement organizations, who do crucial work on the local level. Reuters acknowledged that the decrease in immigration caused resettlement groups to downsize, as they operate as nonprofits. With the current increase in refugees from Afghanistan, these groups are too under-funded and under-staffed to provide the best quality assistance to the refugees. They are left scrambling for resources, due to the quick and urgent demand for safety in America. As of September 2021, President Biden’s administration requested funding from Congress to resettle 65,000 Afghan refugees this fall and eventually 95,000 refugees by September 2022. The administration told state governors and refugee resettlement coordinators to prepare themselves for a sharp increase in demand, as refugees are coming to America whether Congress grants the administration funding or not.

Local Government’s Role in Resettling Afghan Refugees

The bulk of refugee resettlement is done at the local level with resettlement organizations. Cities across America such as Rochester, NY,  Buffalo, NY, Cleveland, OH,  Pittsburgh, PA, and Elizabeth, NJ have committed to welcoming refugees and actively push back against anti-immigrant rhetoric. Support for resettlement comes from all levels, from the U.N. to private citizens’ donations, but it is a city or town’s local government that gets into the intricacies of resettlement. Yet, due to aforementioned federal barriers, local authorities are isolated from policymaking on the topic of resettlement, but still placed with the majority of the responsibilities. Additionally, issues that face local governments in the wake of COVID-19 impact refugees particularly hard. Cities are currently struggling with a housing boom which makes finding a larger, family home increasingly difficult. These are the kinds of homes refugee families are in need of. Furthermore, there is a shortage of rental properties in cities across America, and landlords are hesitant to rent to those without credit as they are already losing out due to the economic impacts of COVID-19. Difficulties that municipal governments face are exacerbated when those strained resources are needed to help incoming refugees.

According to the German Marshall Fund of the United States, local governments play an essential role in coordinating medical appointments, English literacy courses, and job training. Community leaders know what resources are needed to effectively resettle in their unique location in terms of cost of living and neighborhood engagement. The federal government’s Afghan Placement and Assistance Program, while effectively expanding refugee assistance, does not take diverse housing costs across America into account which can lead to further fiscal difficulties. By processing a deep understanding of the municipality, local officials and organizations are equipped to know the intricacies of resettlement in their particular community. Additionally, people in a community tend to trust their local leaders, so when their mayor, town supervisor, or city council shows active support for refugees, it puts pressure on federal legislators to do the same by continuing to expand access to America.

Refugee Resettlement in the District of Columbia

Due to the sudden nature of increased violence in Afghanistan, those who flee are coming to America with incomplete documentation, a single bag of possessions, and barely any support system. Dire needs for necessities such as clothing, housing, and food prove the local government’s vital role in directly assisting refugees. The nation’s capital can serve as an example for how local governments aid in refugee resettlement, especially for those coming to America with little to no resources. The D.C. Office of Refugee Resettlement (DCORR) provides “temporary assistance for needy families, medical assistance and screenings, employment services, case management services, English language training, education assistance, and foster care placement.” Children accompanied by parents and unaccompanied children are eligible for the Children’s Health Insurance Program and Refugee Cash Assistance. Aside from gaining access to medical assistance and screenings, refugees settling in the District of Columbia also are eligible to receive health literacy in physical and emotional wellness services through the D.C. Department of Human Services. Refugees that come to the District of Columbia are commonly moved to the city from the military base for refugees in Fort Lee, Virginia and then, through the DCORR, placed with Catholic Charities Refugee Services or Lutheran Immigrant and Refugee Services—who are a part of the aforementioned lawsuit with HIAS. Nonprofits serve as the liaison between both federal and local governments and the refugees themselves, ensuring that the services offered by the city governments make it to the refugees. This can include coordinating housing arrangements, picking up families and individuals from military bases, and assistance with benefit applications for social security and Medicaid. Both Catholic Charities Refugee Services and Lutheran Immigrant and Refugee Services in the District of Columbia provide these services to the refugee community. Their role is important to ensure direct connections are made with the refugees who arrive from Afghanistan.

The Community’s Role

Local governments and nonprofits play a critical role in refugee resettlement, but so do members of the community. In the District of Columbia, local businesses and charities are accepting donations. Items that are in demand include household items, utensils and cookware, furniture, clothes, food, and toiletries. Along with accepting donations, the same organizations are putting out Amazon wish lists for those resettling in America from Afghanistan. Organizations are also coordinating volunteers to help set up refugees with apartments, and rides from the airport. Support for Afghan refugees starts from the top and trickles down to individual volunteers and donors. HIAS has set up resources and instructions to contact federal representatives to advocate for greater support for refugees. 

The increase in refugees coming to America is sudden, but urgent. Those coming from Afghanistan are vulnerable to the Taliban and are relying on American organizations to provide safety and stability. Local governments are not often thought of in this process, but they are immensely important to it. However, years of depleting resources from refugee resettlement at the federal level has trickled down to hit local governments, as they carry the bulk of resettlement responsibilities for vulnerable populations with the least number of resources.

Better the Neville You Know: Understanding the Strategy of Appeasement And the Lesson of Munich

Among the most denigrated policies in international relations, few can deny the infamy of appeasement: a strategy entailing the reduction of tension between states through conceding points of contention at the root of the conflict. This reputation among scholars is largely attributed to the 1938 Munich Conference, during which British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain negotiated territorial concessions in Czechoslovakia to Nazi Germany in exchange for peace, which failed to prevent the Third Reich from ceasing their expansion. Indeed, the powerful imagery of Chamberlain proclaiming “peace in our time” in 1938 contrasting to the violent outbreak of the Second World War with an emboldened Germany merely a year later has served to invoke aversion around the strategy. So significant was this particular failure that appeasement as a strategy has continued to be dismissed as a tool of the meek even in the United States’ contemporary foreign policy. Explaining in 2001 that the US has “learned from Munich that there is no isolation from evil. . . . the wicked must be opposed early…before they threaten us all”, George W. Bush was able to use the perceived meekness of Chamberlain’s policy as a justification for the War on Terror. With the refusal of any negotiations in favor of perpetuating one of the United States’ most costly conflicts having been legitimized by the assumption that appeasement is meritless, it is apparent that that further examination is warranted toward the strategy and its context in Munich, 1938.

Historical Background

Before one may develop an understanding of the motivations behind the Munich Conference and its subsequent condemnation, an overview of the events surrounding it is necessary. The Munich Conference and Chamberlain’s permittance of German expansionism was not an isolated incident and was one of numerous instances in which he had publicly expressed ambivalence towards the growing power of the Third Reich. During the Anschluss, an event preceding Munich by a matter of months in which Germany coerced the Austrian government into annexation, Chamberlain had expressed a refusal to intervene due to his doubt in the United Kingdom’s capacity to wage war, noting “that nothing could have arrested what has actually happened [in Austria] unless [the U.K.] ...had been prepared to use force”. Likewise, Germany’s coerced annexation of Lithuania's lucrative Memel territory was also met with a similar doubt, with Chamberlain having been willing “to give Hitler political and economic hegemony over [Memel] so long as it was accomplished peacefully”. With these sequential concessions having been repeatedly met with further German demands, there soon began to form a stigma surrounding appeasers as being “cunning but ignorant [in contrast to] the ‘anti-appeasers’, men of… principle and historical precedent”, a conflict that would only further divide British politics upon the outbreak of war. Winston Churchill, having been an outspoken opponent to appeasement during Chamberlain’s tenure, was also known to have openly condemned the cession of Austria, Memel, and the Sudetenland as “[giving] away the keys to Europe” to Germany. This denouncement of appeasement would entrench itself during the future PM’s meteoric rise to fame, following his succession of Chamberlain during WWII.

Chamberlain’s Motives and the True Purpose of Appeasement

Although this understanding of the Munich Conference might further heighten one’s sentiment that Chamberlain’s use of appeasement was cowardly, contemporary discourse has started to use this devotion of Chamberlain towards appeasement to reassess his true motives. Noting that Britain’s ability to wage a war of intervention against Germany was lacking in the years leading up to the Second World War, neoclassical realist academics Norrin M. Ripsman and Jack S. Levy argue in their seminal work Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? that Chamberlain’s appeasement intended not to prevent conflict but rather hinder German expansion and allow the UK time to mobilize. Indeed, Chamberlain’s own words prior to the Munich Conference substantiate this, having stated that appeasement would not just be pursued to “remove the causes which are delaying the return of confidence in Europe” as per our current notions of appeasement, but also to "continue [the U.K.’s] program of the reestablishment of [their] defence forces”. In light of the “air-raid phobia” phenomena exhibited by the British people during the early 1930s, referring to the common “[perception] that the German Air Force clearly overwhelmed the British Air Force in the number and quality of its machines” and fear of German land invasion, it is unsurprising that Chamberlain would have chosen to repeatedly make concessions in exchange for the opportunity to restore faith in Britain’s military capabilities. While there have been critics  who have argued that “[appeasement] also gave Germany just as much time to arm”, it was this restoration not just in Britain’s military capabilities, but also their own confidence in their ability to fight another war, that gave the nation the relative advantage it needed.

In addition to its facilitation of Britain’s spiritual and logistical rearmament, Chamberlain’s use of appeasement was also effective in that it appeared to ultimately hamper Germany’s ability to expand in a timely manner before the eventual outbreak of war. Through taking the initiative to establish treaties such as the Munich Agreement, the United Kingdom had effectively taken control of the rate in which German expansion would take place. This was due to the fact that, if Germany “misbehaved and abrogated [such pacts] the world would witness [its] duplicity”, effectively forcing them to accept the stipulations of such a deal to maintain some semblance of legitimacy before choosing to expand once more. The irony of Munich being the most infamous instance of appeasement is that it was, in reality, the most effective of Chamberlain’s appeasement to these ends. The leader of Germany at the time, Adolf Hitler himself, is known to have confessed to Nazi Party minister Martin Bormann in 1945 that they “ought to have attacked [Czechoslovakia] in 1938” due to it offering Germany “the last chance [it] had of localizing the war”, believing that the prolongation of his territorial ambitions through lengthy negotiations and justifications had cheated him out of “a short war”.

Lessons In Modern Appeasement

With ample evidence to argue that the most infamous instance of appeasement— Chamberlain’s concessions at Munich—was in fact justified, it is apparent that there are instances where appeasement is far from a fruitless strategy for the meek. That being said, it is apparent that appeasement has its time and place, as Chamberlain’s strategy of appeasement hinged both on the assumption that conflict was an eventuality and that the United Kingdom possessed a latent military superiority that could be fulfilled in a timely manner. The United States, however, would have most definitely stood to gain from contemplating appeasement as a valid strategy following the 9/11 attacks as opposed to Bush’s denigration of the strategy in favor of launching the War on Terror immediately. It was apparent that the Afghan War was doomed to fail due to a lack of foresight, with Deputy National Security Advisor Doug Lute having infamously admitted in the leaked Afghanistan Papers that the U.S. was “devoid of a fundamental understanding of Afghanistan [and] didn’t know what [they] were doing”. In this regard, it is apparent that the United States would have greatly benefited from appeasing Al-Qaeda through their lack of retaliation until the U.S. reached a point in which it possessed a thorough understanding of its goals in Afghanistan in a manner that could best utilize its military capabilities with minimal losses. There is little doubt that the US did not have the necessary expertise to develop such a doctrine in a timely manner, with the publication of a dedicated counterinsurgency field manual, FM 3-24, having overtaken the conflict-focused “shock and awe” doctrine only 5 years following the initial outbreak of the War on Terror. Though the prospect of appeasing insurgents might initially seem counterintuitive due to the framing of global insurgency and terrorism as an existential threat to the free world, if there exists any lesson to be taught from Munich it is that one needs to know when to forgo smaller victories when better terms exist on the horizon, even when faced with one of the greatest threats to democracy the world has ever known.

Opium, Stability, and Conflict in Afghanistan

Now it is well known that when there are many of these flowers together their odor is so powerful that anyone who breathes it falls asleep, and if the sleeper is not carried away from the scent of the flowers, he sleeps on and on forever. But Dorothy did not know this, nor could she get away from the bright red flowers that were everywhere about; so presently her eyes grew heavy and she felt she must sit down to rest and to sleep. . . . "If we leave her here she will die," said the Lion. “The smell of the flowers is killing us all.
— The Wonderful Wizard of Oz

Opium, in addition to being the milky white liquid found inside the capsule of the opium poppy flowering plant papaver somniferum, is also the lubricant for the Afghan war economy, which fuels a four decade long conflict that has killed over two million people. Over the last three decades, poppy has become a pillar of the national economy, an adhesive binding the insurgent Taliban to their rural support base, a cancer hobbling the Afghan government’s legitimacy, and a representation of a failed NATO counterinsurgency campaign. As long as top-down policies seeking to curb poppy cultivation fail to interact with the highly localized political economy of the opium market, Afghanistan will continue to face significant threats to national and human security.

Despite its highly local origin as a subsistence crop, opium underpins a vast transnational market steeped in geopolitics and economic globalization. Opium is harvested across rural Afghanistan, namely in the provinces of Helmand and Kandahar, where farmers use small curved blades to ‘mine’ the liquid, which then solidifies to be sold in bulk to local trafficking networks. During the second stage of production, traffickers transport raw opium to laboratories in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia for refinement. These supply networks grew out of the Soviet-Afghan war (1979-1989) when the American and Pakistani intelligence agencies identified the cross-border opium trade as a channel to deliver funds and arms to the anti-Soviet mujahideen. At the peak of the conflict, Pakistan accounted for 70% of the world’s heroin supply. However, the resulting corruption, instability, and public health crisis prompted a government crackdown in the 1990s. Widespread law enforcement action generated the ‘balloon effect,’ a widely observed phenomenon whereby efforts to disrupt supply while keeping demand constant simply ends up exporting illicit markets to neighboring regions with lower production costs. Refinement shifted to Afghanistan and the Former Soviet Union (FSU), where the Russian mafia proved to be an eager partner. Today, chemical firms based in India, China, and the European Union (EU) export the necessary precursors to these labs, such as acetic anhydride, to convert raw opium into opium base, white heroin, and varying degrees of brown heroin. From there, the refined product moves overland towards the Pakistani coast and Turkey, or by air to Abu Dhabi and Sharjah, before reaching cities like London and New York.

Opium is a high value-added industry. According to the UNDP, farmers harvesting poppy receive less than 1% of the profits, with the remaining divided between 2.5% to local dealers, 5% spread across transshipment routes, and more than 90% to established criminal networks in the global north. While the selling price for heroin in a city like Washington, D.C. is fifty times greater than the value received by Afghan farmers, the revenue still represents a crucial lifeline for Afghanistan’s rural poor. In 2000, around one million Afghans generated US$100 million by cultivating poppies. In fact, poppy generates between one third to one half of total GDP, with benefits accruing to both the rural poor who harvest the crop and urban traders who are involved in transshipment. Poppy is much more than a simple economic industry. It stems from a weak formal market, poor post-conflict infrastructure and irrigation (the Soviets devastated agricultural infrastructure during their counterinsurgency operations to deny the mujahideen a sustainable rural support network), weak value-added chains, and an absence of micro-credit strategies. To this day, informal money lenders in rural areas, who provide much needed credit to the agricultural sector, demand guarantees in the form of opium stocks, and many rural households keep their savings in raw opium. Therefore, the Afghan poppy economy represents a complex socioeconomic phenomenon with far-ranging political impacts.

As an important symbol of socio economic issues in Afghanistan, the opium economy was bound to become involved in the country’s many conflicts. In his seminal work, On Guerilla Warfare (论游击战), Mao Tse-Tung defines revolutionary warfare as the combination of guerilla tactics and political ideology, with broad popular support underpinning both. While the Taliban have not always operated as a purely guerilla force, they have used classic insurgent tactics for most of their existence and therefore maintain a complex but deep relationship with their rural Pashtun support base. Despite their conservative zeal and hardline form of governance, the Taliban are major proponents of the opium economy. While the production and use of hashish is strictly forbidden and punished harshly, opium production is justified since heroin is allegedly only “consumed by kafirs [unbelievers] in the West and not by Muslims or Afghans,” according to Abdul Rashid, former head of the Taliban’s anti-drug force in Kandahar province. A cursory glance at heroin addiction rates in Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan dispels this claim, and the true reason for the Taliban’s embrace of the poppy industry is likely a strategic necessity rather than an ideological choice.

When the Taliban first emerged in Kandahar and Helmand provinces in 1994, they opposed poppy cultivation on ideological grounds and banned the activity, resulting in a significant drop in local production. However, the resulting backlash threatened the nascent insurgent group as alienated Pashtun farmers increasingly turned to the powerful Akhundzada power-brokers for protection. The Taliban, fearing the loss of their support base, reversed course and began offering security to farmers in return for zakat, or religious taxes, of up to 20%. During the following years, they became deeply involved in the opium economy, raising revenues of between US$50-200 million annually. Their participation extended across the supply chain. Many fighters provided labor, working part-time as farmers before returning to fight after the spring harvest. Local commanders levied taxes in return for assurances of protection and transnational criminal groups paid a flat rate toll to ensure safe shipment.

The Taliban’s early embrace of the opium economy led to rapid market growth. Licit and illicit markets are fairly similar, and both require stability to operate, which the Taliban provided through harsh yet predictable rule. As they expanded across the country, the risk of predation by capricious warlords fell, encouraging farmers to invest in long term poppy cultivation and traffickers to develop new transshipment routes. This significantly affected the global opium market. From 1992 to 1997, poppy cultivation per hectare in Afghanistan grew by 25% annually. By 1997, Afghanistan surpassed Myanmar as the world’s largest opium producer, accounting for more than 50% of the global supply of heroin at a market value of US$3 billion. However, the Taliban abruptly reversed course in 2000. In a unsuccessful bid to receive international recognition from Western states, Mullah Omar declared a nationwide ban on poppy cultivation, resulting in a dramatic 75% drop in the global supply of heroin. While deeply unpopular, the long-term effects of this policy on Taliban control were interrupted by the 2001 U.S. invasion and removal of the Taliban government.

In post-American invasion Afghanistan, the Taliban, having returned to classic insurgent tactics, use the opium economy to financially and politically sustain their campaign of violence. Opium is their largest revenue stream, accounting for 40-60% of total funds. Beyond direct revenue, the political economy of opium provides them with crucial political capital. Using the same narratives adopted to delegitimize the abusive mujahideen warlords during the 1990s, the Taliban now contrasts itself against the highly corrupt and extractive ruling Afghan government and the overly harsh counternarcotics policies adopted by NATO forces. The Taliban’s shift between banning poppy, supporting it, re-banning it, and supporting it once more appears to be a response to varying degrees of their control over the country. When the Taliban wages insurgent warfare against dominant forces and lacks a comparative advantage in physical resources, it taps into local grievances to win popular support, which in the case of rural Afghanistan, is rooted in the poppy fields. However, once it maintains a monopoly on force and lacks immediate foes, it can afford to take controversial stances like poppy cultivation to achieve external benefits. Therefore, the Taliban’s stance on opium should be seen neither as a function of ideology nor profit seeking behavior, but rather a rational response to structural constraints. Simply put, if the Taliban needs resources and cracking down on the poppy economy is costly, the Taliban will embrace opium.

While the Taliban were quick to realize the importance of cooperating with the opium economy, NATO faced a far steeper learning curve. Early on, they correctly identified economic security as one of the two pillars needed to legitimize Hamid Karzai’s Western-backed transitional government. The opium economy threatened this due to its deleterious effects on good governance and its tradeoff with formal market activity. However, the resulting counternarcotics policies failed to address the importance of poppy cultivation to rural Afghans who as a result, would once again become a crucial support base for the Taliban.

During the initial years following the 2001 invasion, the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) initiated a massive poppy eradication campaign undertaken by DynCorp-trained Afghan security forces. Despite an initial 21% decrease in cultivation by hectare, total opium output only fell by 2%. Success was largely limited to Nangarhar province, while the rest of the country saw widespread unrest in response. In Kandahar province, local backlash put a halt to eradication efforts after only 217 hectares of poppy were destroyed. This pattern continued throughout the duration of the Bush presidency, generating alienation among rural Afghans. Under President Obama, counternarcotics policies were tailored to avoid this backlash by selectively focusing efforts on high-level, Taliban-linked trafficking instead of more widespread, subsistence poppy cultivation. Extremely high levels of corruption in local government doomed the policy from the start. Local power brokers who were assigned by ISAF to implement these strategies were often deeply involved in the opium market themselves and used their newfound power to target their competitors. As a result, the Afghan drug market vertically integrated as local elites consolidated their control over the market and increased their profits. Meanwhile, poor farmers, unable to pay bribes, watched their yearly production and household savings wiped out by eradication efforts.

NATO planners have yet to find a sustainable counternarcotics policy. While poppy cultivation grew significantly under the Taliban government, it boomed following the U.S. invasion. Rare successes occurred when popular local leaders credibly partnered with outside support to suppress poppy cultivation. In Nangarhar province, Governor Haji Din Muhammad and Police Chief Hazrat Ali credibly threatened farmers with jail time to ensure large-scale eradication of poppy fields, resulting in a 96% drop in cultivation. However, coercion is only one side of successful eradication, as provinces with the highest reductions in cultivation, including Nangarhar and Badakhshan, also received the highest amounts of alternative development funds. Even within the development side of counternarcotics, major problems remain. Alternative livelihoods programs, designed to replace poppy cultivation with legal crops, are extremely limited and give little relief to farmers who can see their incomes drop by up to 80%. These programs are designed to start out as quick-impact, cash-for-work projects before evolving into long-term development, but rarely pass the first stage due to insecurity and local corruption. Since many Taliban fighters are part-time laborers, the (overwhelmingly male) workers recruited are no less likely to lay down their arms permanently. High levels of local corruption worsen this trend, since spending on alternative development programs increased in response to upcoming elections, with few incentives to see the projects to completion.  Under NATO administration, a lack of engagement with local political economy and power structures resulted in failed counternarcotics policies across rural Afghanistan with opium production growing steadily as Kabul’s legitimacy plummeted.

At the heart of these problems is government corruption, as Afghan officials are deeply involved in the opium economy. Corruption goes all the way to the top. Until his assassination in 2011, Ahmed Wali Karzai, brother of former President Hamid Karzai, was widely seen by the U.S. government as the key facilitator of the Afghan heroin trade. Government bodies designed to fight drug trafficking, like the Ministry of the Interior, are fully compromised, with one police commander in eastern Afghanistan receiving US$400,000 monthly from heroin smuggling. This widespread graft explains how locally tailored eradication campaigns become tools for criminal expansion. While criminality and corruption can be sources of stability in some parts of the world, as power brokers use their profits to fund public goods, Afghan warlords and government officials are extremely abusive, even by international standards. Afghan elites use the resulting instability for personal benefit. Foreign actors operating in insecure provinces are more dependent on local power brokers while local instability provides a convenient cover for violent criminal expansion. Before his death, Ahmed Wali Karzai and then Governor of Nangarhar province, Gul Agha Sherzai, blamed the Taliban for the wave of assassinations targeting local officials and businessmen, creating a front for the bloody power struggle between them for control over provincial-level illicit networks. Massive government corruption, bolstered by drug trafficking, seriously undermines conflict stabilization efforts by weakening government legitimacy, hobbling the emergent legal system, and leeching off development funds. Worryingly, Afghan populations that report the highest levels of local and national government corruption also exhibit significantly higher support for the Taliban. In fact, the Taliban have recalibrated their messaging in post-invasion rural Afghanistan with a focus on government corruption, promising justice and proper governance in return for support.

Without successful alternative development programs, the security implications of eradication are extremely worrying. Alienated farmers halt intelligence sharing with NATO forces and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). With their economic base eroded, rural communities witness increased competition and conflict over land, water, and humanitarian assistance. When security forces destroy opium stores, representing household savings, deeply indebted farmers resort to selling their daughters as child brides for income or fleeing to Pakistan. Economic refugees fleeing deep rural poverty often end up in camps near the Pakistani border where young men are easily recruited to local madrassas, which serve as crucial recruitment hubs for the Taliban. Therefore, poorly planned eradication campaigns undermine both state and human security.

The international communities’ misfires on counternarcotics policy sacrificed an important opportunity to promote economic development, engage with rural Afghans, and bolster Kabul’s credibility. If the Taliban and the Afghan government reach an agreement under current peace talks, and NATO forces withdraw, the international community has a vested interested in promoting human security in Afghanistan. Even if elites agree to a political compromise, the recent history of the opium economy shows that successful transitions away from poppy require stability at the local level and a broader understanding of local corruption. Colombia’s peace process provides some lessons for how peace agreements can positively transform illicit economies. The international community must walk a fine line between substantial support for rural development and avoid exacerbating corruption at the local level. Here, working on a community-level to engage in visible development could help test models of alternative livelihoods that are gender-inclusive and sustainable before being reproduced at the provincial or national level. Crop substitution must be voluntary and provide ample time for farmers to fully transition. Given the role of local corruption in preventing such policy solutions, the international community must prioritize anti-corruption as part of any development initiatives. All of these require careful considerations of local dynamics, as past initiatives highlighted the perils of well-intentioned national campaigns that backfired spectacularly at the local level. The most important steps to take may begin at home, with Western governments working on reducing heroin demand to drive down profits for trafficking networks and increasing the attractiveness of legal crops. The international community has a strong interest in addressing the severe security and public health threats posed by the global heroin trade. In doing so, security and development experts must keep in mind the overused but relevant adage by Rep. Tip O’Neill, that “all politics is local,” and ensure that efforts to eradicate Afghan poppy cultivation be rooted in broader development and anti-corruption initiatives.