Strong Together: Why Europe’s Security Crises Invite Opportunities for Cooperation

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen delivered this year’s State of the Union address in Strasbourg, France, like every other year. But events still occurring in another location far to her east dominated her thoughts and remarks. Though she waxed poetic about Europe’s united and swift response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine this February, von der Leyen did not mince her words about the dangers remaining for Europe: “this is a war on our energy, a war on our economy, a war on our values and a war on our future.”

Ukrainians bear the biggest brunt of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war against their nation, but its ramifications extend across the European continent. The conflict presents a security dilemma with immediate and lasting dimensions, as well as domestic and external implications. In particular, Europe has recognized the necessity of indigenous military capacity, prompting renewed focus on defense spending. More abrupt, perhaps, is the challenge of securing energy supply as winter approaches and many countries can no longer look to Russia. A significant rethink is accordingly underway in most capitals about how much to trust Moscow as long as it is led by Putin or someone likeminded, rewriting the playbook of currying a cooperative relationship through security pacts and economic exchange.

Although some European Union (EU) member-states face more daunting threats than others, this new security environment imperils the entire bloc. It also presents overwhelming incentive for enhanced cooperation across national borders. Several member-states, however, from those friendly with Moscow to those skeptical of deeper alignment to those whose political landscape skews nationalistic, may not be as keen on “more Europe” in these times. As the Euractiv Green Brief newsletter suggests, von der Leyen likely aimed her comments at “national governments who tend to pursue national interests when confronted with crises on a European scale.” 

Unilateralism would squander this opportunity. The impetus to pool resources is not simply for European integration’s sake, but because multilateral action could deliver better results. Not only would joint development, purchasing, and planning of military capabilities yield a more formidable Europe, but current energy insecurity endangers the European market and threatens to leave citizens literally out in the cold. Though von der Leyen’s address was promising, the present challenge is to translate her sentiment into attitude and action.

Toward a Geopolitical Europe

February 24, the day Putin launched his most recent invasion of Ukraine, is seen as a turning point for Europe. With Washington’s support, Brussels quickly marshaled numerous sanctions packages that have eroded Russia’s post-Cold War economic progress and upended its relationship with Moscow. Since then, the European Commission has adopted a more “geopolitical” approach, embracing candidate status for Ukraine and Moldova, and becoming more deeply involved in Europe’s foreign policy toward Russia. At the core of these developments is a recognition that efforts to build a constructive relationship with Russia since 1991 have failed. 

Germany’s recent history with Russia underscores these challenges. Berlin pursued Russian energy resources, even after Putin’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, through natural gas pipelines like Nord Stream 2, believing sustained commerce might incentivize Russia to temper its foreign policy so as to sustain such lucrative arrangements. Europe hoped Putin was truly “rational,” or, as writes Nathalie Tocci of Italian think-tank Istituto Affari Internazionali, subscribing to “a rationality that puts material interests above ideology.” But despite the threat of losing Germany’s business, Putin launched his attack on Ukraine and cut supply to European countries as retribution for supporting Kyiv. Reflecting on the unfolding war, then-recently elected German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock acknowledged that Europeans should have diversified their energy imports to rely less on Russia years ago, as “energy policy is always power policy… always security policy.” Because Putin has used energy as a political tool since the invasion, and indeed in other moments in the past two decades, this ideal relationship based on sanctity of contract, interdependence, and trade is unlikely.

Putin’s behavior seeks to anchor Ukraine in Moscow’s mir, or world, consistent with the Russian president’s conception of upholding Russian civilization and great power status. That Kyiv could opt to “join the West” through pursuit of EU or NATO membership was thus an unacceptable prospect, especially considering Putin’s view that the Western world is incompatible with Russia’s. This sense of historical right, if taken to its conclusions, is a different mode of thinking than that which underpins the European project, which in theory rejects sphere of influence politics and embraces the sort of peace through common progress that makes the EU’s promise so special. Because this undertaking does not interest Putin, the EU should adapt and fortify itself, not in the pursuit of war but of internal security. This pertains especially to the two most glaring areas: defense capabilities and energy.

Building European Defense Capability

In recent years, an increasingly complex security situation has imperiled Europe’s defense. The continent relies on U.S. capabilities, including military aid, troops, and large-scale sophisticated firepower, to guarantee its security. Though EU member-states’ military budgets have increased since Putin’s incursion in Crimea in 2014, Donald Trump’s presidency sparked unique concern over American commitment to Europe, given his questioning of NATO commitments and transactional approach to foreign policy. Most rank-and-file Republican lawmakers still support NATO, but a growing, vocal wing of the party shares Trump’s antipathy toward Europe. 

Perhaps the most durable shift in U.S. politics, however, is a bipartisan prioritization of great-power competition with China, auguring a strategic shift toward the Indo-Pacific. Though war in Ukraine returned considerable focus to Europe, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan reaffirmed the Biden administration’s view of China as “the most consequential geopolitical challenge,” a belief echoed by the most recent U.S. national security strategy. Realizing these trends will persist, Europeans – notably French President Emmanuel Macron – have emphasized a need for “strategic autonomy,” or development of continental defense apart from Washington. So long as these efforts do not replace NATO or entirely reject the United States, but instead enhance existing systems, Europe will better insure itself against U.S. domestic volatility and strategic shifts as well as external threats by adopting this path.

The Ukraine crisis has introduced new urgency by demonstrating that war is still possible on the continent and that lack of preparation will prove costly. Europe’s dilemma thus remains improving capabilities in a productive manner, fearing that a lack of coordination and planning will limit the benefit of any additional spending. In EU High Representative Josep Borrell’s words, “after the Cold War, we shrunk our forces to bonsai armies. If each European state just increases its military capabilities… the result will be a big waste of resources. We’ll just have 27 bigger bonsais.” The EU has little competence over military strategy and, like NATO, does not have its own independent armed forces separate from the member-states. Its initiatives instead rely on the contributions of national forces.

Building the necessary technology will prove daunting. Ian Bond and Luigi Scazzieri of the Centre for European Reform write that, given current spending promises, it will still take years to procure necessary equipment and higher inflation rates will erode the value of new spending. And because the EU does not have a unified defense industrial base from which to draw, capacity development between member-states is limited and procurement processes remain biased toward national companies. This leaves European countries vulnerable to duplication and financial or practical obstacles. For example, two fighter aircraft programs in progress – one between Britain, Italy, and Sweden and another between France, Germany, and Spain – may both take longer and cost far more than might occur with greater cooperation, as both struggle to achieve economies of scale. Further, without common agreement on standardization and interoperability, EU member-states could find collaboration difficult in times of crisis. 

For its part, Brussels seeks to facilitate this process through initiatives like Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) aimed at easing integration of member-states’ armed forces. The European Commission is also preparing proposals to incentivize joint procurement of weapons through VAT waivers and update the European Defense Fund (EDF) accordingly. Such steps toward greater multilateral planning could help maximize the defense of the European project and, in turn, each individual member.

Powering a New Energy Security

The more immediate concern for most EU member-states, however, is energy insecurity and economic havoc, especially with the downgrading of EU-Russia energy trade. As Jason Bordoff and Meghan L. O’Sullivan caution in Foreign Affairs, Moscow is “the dominant supplier of natural gas to Europe and a major exporter of coal and the low-enriched uranium used to power nuclear plants.” Some member-states like Lithuania or France rely less on Russia for energy to varying degrees, but before war broke out, others like Germany and several Central European counterparts counted on supplies from the east. Even before the EU’s ban on Russian oil imports, the European Commission and member-states like Italy resorted to a diplomatic blitz in preparation for a harsh winter without a key source. 

Russia progressively sealed the spigots to several countries over the course of the summer, weaponizing energy trade. With commodity prices so high, persistent supply disruptions threaten to worsen inflation and usher in a recession with global ramifications. Europe has turned to alternatives in lieu of Russia, between bilateral agreements and large-scale deals with partners like Norway, Algeria, Qatar, and Azerbaijan, to compensate for vulnerability. The United States has been supplying more liquified natural gas (LNG) than expected, resulting from the European Commission’s energy diplomacy early on in the crisis. These efforts have hardly been for naught; EU gas storages are 90% full and von der Leyen has expressed confidence ahead of winter. Among the most vulnerable are Central and Eastern European countries lacking the infrastructure to diversify quickly. However, bilateral deals like the one Greece and Bulgaria have reached on a long-delayed gas pipeline, providing the latter with an affordable alternative to its usual Russian flow, are promising. 

European countries’ collective efforts have evidently already yielded dividends. However, continued consensus may be necessary to deal with two additional challenges: weathering price fluctuations and ensuring future supply, especially ahead of the winter of 2023. Member-states have increasingly been engaging Brussels given the implications of energy policy in the European market. Discussion of price caps has dominated, alongside Germany’s announcement of a relief package worth 200 billion euros for households and businesses, which has attracted widespread criticism for undermining a level playing field in the single market. Whatever the result of these debates, divergent national measures threaten to unsettle markets and fracture an integrated approach to energy, which is why continued bloc-wide solutions to additional challenges like decreasing consumer demand are of paramount importance.

On the supply front, Ben McWilliams, Simone Tagliapietra, and Georg Zachmann write that the EU stands the best chance if member-states pool their resources with an eye to securing supply for the entire bloc if necessary. Just as with national defense capacities, having 27 different energy strategies makes the pursuit of EU-wide supply more costly and risks leaving some countries out in the cold. If breakthroughs on other fronts arrive, such as on the stalled pipeline between Spain and France, Europe would further be equipped to supply all of its members, especially with future winters in mind.

“Forged in Crisis”

As new obstacles confront the EU, a united front presents the greatest chance of success at handling them. Countries like Hungary – whose prime minister, Viktor Orban, maintains close ties with Putin – within the bloc are cumbersome realities that must be managed. Further, governments must stand firm in their support of Ukraine through sanctions on Russia when the temperature drops. Brussels has been quite active in and recognizing a new geopolitical imperative and seeking a uniform policy since February. However, not all authority needs to be centralized in Brussels for member-states to communicate with each other. This is significant, considering governments skeptical of greater European integration but seemingly likely to support Ukraine and improved European defense, like the one likely to form in Italy following September’s elections, can still engage productively in building European capacity.

It has long been said that the EU is forged in crisis. Russia’s behavior has granted EU member-states even more reason to mold a new security architecture, from heating homes this winter to deterring future aggression for years to come. Though Putin continues to wreak havoc on Ukraine, the EU can emerge a more capable ally by fortifying its own security. The chilling scenes emanating from Europe’s east this year are stark warnings of a new geopolitical relationship to come, but also reason to take action. If member-states maintain their momentum and unify behind this common motivation, they can realize von der Leyen’s goal of “a union that stands strong together,” and turn platitude into prophecy.

France and the Presidency of the Council of the European Union

On January 1st, 2022, France took over the Presidency of the Council of the European Union. During difficult times, the country has been preparing for the presidency since 2017, but its agenda has had to be revised as the world continues to face ongoing challenges. France will be presiding for six months, until July 1st  2022. But with the French elections right around the corner, the future of the Council of the European Union remains unknown. Current French President Emmanuel Macron waited until the last day to become a formal candidate for the election, which will be held in April, just weeks from now. 

The last country to preside over the Council of the European Union was Slovenia. The country’s six months’ program was based around one common theme: resilience. Faced with the pandemic and a prolonged economic crisis throughout Europe, Slovenia developed a plan called “Next Generation EU”. This recovery plan was and still is an opportunity for countries that have suffered from the pandemic to emerge stronger, to transform their economies, to create jobs and opportunities. One of the main goals of Slovenia's Presidency was to ensure safety and stability in neighboring countries of the European Union, especially the Balkans. 

The Council of the European Union represents the interests of the 27 member states in respect to the European Commission and Parliament. Emmanuel Macron, French president since 2017, spoke on January 19 in a speech for the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union. The French president presented his objectives for the presidency of the Council of European Union to the European Parliament in Strasbourg, mentioning a reform of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, a new alliance between the European Union and Africa, the future of the Balkans or the relationship with Russia or the United Kingdom. 

The country is taking the presidency in difficult times, with the ongoing pandemic and challenges that nations across the European Union have been facing over the last two years. Additionally, the French elections are right around the corner, and Macron only recently became an official candidate for these elections, seeking a second term. However, the outcome of these elections remains a mystery, which leaves the future of both France and the Council of the European Union unknown. 

France has prepared its six-month program detailing the priorities and guidelines for the presidency of the Council of the European Union. The program for the French Presidency has three ambitions: a more sovereign Europe, a new European model for growth, and a humane Europe. The guidelines of the Presidency are in line with the work carried out by the Slovenian Presidency, as well as the broader framework of the Trio Presidency programme prepared with the future Czech and Swedish Presidencies.

Emmanuel Macron has expressed strong ambitions for this mandate, but his objectives and his detailed agenda could be disrupted by the Covid-19 crisis, the presidential election, and different global issues such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Indeed, the sanitary crisis in France is only now getting better, still hundreds of thousands of new cases appear every day. Vaccines being mandatory, the situation has improved and the country will soon be lifting the mask mandate, but citizens have expressed their discontent with the rules that were set up to mitigate the effects of the virus on individuals. Additionally, the elections, like any other elections, have created a tense situation in the country, as the future of France remains unknown. Many current candidates, such as Marine Le Pen and Eric Zemmour have created a lot of divide in the country, as their ideologies are very different from the ones of other candidates such as Valérie Pécresse, or the current French president, Emmanuel Macron. 

The first ambition of the program of the French Presidency is a more sovereign Europe. In a tweet, Macron shares “A sovereign Europe is first and foremost a Europe capable of controlling its borders.” The programme calls for a reform of the Schengen area, the aim is to strengthen this area and to “create a political steering of border control and an emergency support mechanism in case of crisis” as Emmanuel Macron stated in his tweet on December 9th, 2021. 

Protecting European borders will also allow for a greater control of the migratory crisis, and improve the asylum policy for the many refugees who seek safety in countries of the European Union. France also has the goal to strengthen relations with Africa, as it is one of Macron’s priorities since the beginning of this mandate. Additionally, this first ambition of France has the aim to build a stronger Europe, by its action for the prosperity and stability of its neighbors, in particular by its commitment to the Western Balkans, which follows the goal of Slovenia's presidency. 

The second ambition of the program of the French Presidency is a new European model for growth. Most countries in Europe have been greatly affected by the Covid-19 pandemic, which has created economic issues throughout countries in the European Union. France has set the goal to make Europe a land of production, to create jobs and opportunities for European citizens. This growth model aims to help countries get out of the current economic crisis that they may be facing or have faced over the last two years, helping them in their growth and development, to make Europe a land of prosperity and endless opportunities. 

The third and last ambition of the program of the French Presidency is a more humane Europe. Emmanuel Macron emphasized in its agenda the importance of having a Europe that works with one another, and that listens to the concerns expressed by its citizens through the Conference on the Future of Europe. Over the last few years, a variety of domestic and international affairs such as the economic crisis, the pandemic, or the migrant crisis have divided not only France, but Europe. For this Presidency, French President Emmanuel Macron set the goal of a humane Europe, that is committed to fighting discrimination and securing a future for the next generation.

While the program for the French Presidency has three ambitions, it also has a variety of priorities that the country would like to address throughout its Presidency. Its three priorities are: the introduction of a minimum wage throughout the European Union, the regulation of digital giants and the creation of a carbon tax on products imported into Europe according to their environmental impact.

President Emmanuel Macron said he's in favor of legislation on a minimum wage for all EU nations. Fair wages that ensure a decent standard of living are one of the principles of the European Social Charter. For France, the introduction of minimum wage is aimed at increasing living standards throughout Europe. The introduction of minimum wage will also enhance working conditions in Europe. Having a set minimum wage across European countries would also allow for more fairness, as every worker has the right to a fair wage that guarantees them a decent standard of living. 

The regulation of digital giants is another one of the priorities of France’s Presidency. Their priority will be economic regulation and accountability of digital platforms, especially in the face of hate speech, with legislation on digital services and markets. Economy Minister Bruno Le Maire said that “digital giants are not just nice companies with whom we need to cooperate, they are rivals, rivals of the states that do not respect our economic rules, which must therefore be regulated.” Regulating these digital giants will allow for terrorist threats, and hate speech to be limited, and regulated.

The last priority of the French’s Presidency is in regard to the environment. Their priority will be the creation of a carbon price at the borders of the European Union on imported products. The environmental crisis is an issue that every country is facing, it is a team effort to combat climate change. Through the creation of a carbon price, France hopes to help the environment in the long-run. 

Emmanuel Macron's relationship with the Council of the European Union is important now more than ever. The European Union is facing difficult challenges ever since Russia invaded Ukraine on Thursday February 24th. It has been the duty of Macron to take the role of a mediator in this conflict. He has talked with both Putin, Russia’s president, and Zelenskyy, Ukraine’s president. Over the last few weeks, Macron has demonstrated a great sense of diplomacy, as he attempts to initiate a dialogue on NATO’s role in Europe and Ukraine. Many have said that Emmanuel Macron may benefit from the situation in Eastern Ukraine. His diplomacy has benefitted him politically, he appears to have shown great strength as he and other world leaders are attempting to solve this conflict.

Emmanuel Macron’s agenda advocates for subjects that will be at the heart of the French presidential campaign, that is just a few weeks from now. As France is set to preside the Council of the European Union until July 1st 2022, the French elections are at the center of the attention, as they have divided the country now more than ever. With many candidates with differing viewpoints and the future of France remains unknown, and so does the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, that the country is presiding until July 2022, way after the elections have taken place. 

French president Emmanuel Macron is well aware of the challenges that he will encounter and has encountered while presiding the Council of the European Union. Three months is a very short amount of time to make a meaningful change, considering that we are unaware of what will happen with the presidency of the Council of the European Union  after the elections. 

The question of postponing the French elections by six months had arisen, as a means to not disrupt the presidency of the Council of the European Union, but Emmanuel Macron finally decided against it. A way to show his commitment to Europe in the middle of a presidential campaign. According to many, the French agenda is more than ambitious, but many wonder what will happen with the elections, if Macron is not reelected, it could change a lot of things, lead to new discussions, and affect the future presidencies of the Council of the European Union.

Like any other elections, the French elections have been tense, the final list of candidates was only recently finalized with a total of 12 candidates, the future of France and of Europe remains a mystery. Many fear that the next president will want to change things for the future, having opposing views with Macron, meaning that everything that France will have done until the elections will go to waste, especially future plans that Macron will have set up for future presidencies. 

French citizens are currently divided, as elections are just a few weeks away. As of March 4th 2022, 12 candidates have reached the 500 sponsorships needed to become an official candidate at the French presidential elections. President Macron had already reached the 500 sponsorships needed before he even became an official candidate. But many other official candidates had struggled to reach the 500 sponsorships needed. Indeed, Marine Le Pen, Eric Zemmour and Christiane Taubira were worried about not obtaining the 500 sponsorships. 

The 12 candidates for these french elections are: Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, Yannick Jadot, Marine Le Pen, Jean-Luc Melanchon, Philippe Poutou, Eric Zemmour, Valérie Pécresse, Emmanuel Macron, Anne Hidalgo, Nathalie Arthaud, Fabien Roussel and Jean Lassalle. These candidates are from different parties, but their ideologies have not divided France as much as Eric Zemmour or Marine Le Pen’s ideals have.  

Eric Zemmour and Marine Le Pen are two candidates from the far right. Marine Le Pen party called National Rally is a party that since its creation, is above all an anti-immigration party, which advocates a significant reduction in legal immigration and the protection of French identity, as well as stricter control of illegal immigration. Eric Zemmour, candidate from the far right party is called Reconquête. Both Eric Zemmour and Marine Le Pen have divided France by their ideologies that are very different from the ones of current French President, Emmanuel Macron. 

Marine Le Pen ran against President Macron during the elections in 2017. These two candidates have struggled to reach their 500 sponsorships, and many fear that there is a chance that they will be elected. This will not only divide France but also Europe, as their goals are very different from the ones set by the current agenda that has been set up for the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union. For example, one of the main priorities of the French agenda is to protect European borders and create stability in the European Union; however, Zemmour wishes to build EU border wall to fight undocumented migration. Many are opposed to this idea, as it could potentially create instability and further divide in the European Union. 

The elections will occur right in the middle of France’s Presidency of the Council of the European Union, with ministers and a president who will have to campaign at some point, an effective French presidency of less than 3 months is expected. If there is a changeover in May, the new President and its ministers will have to take over the current files on the fly, but this may lead to conflicts with the current agenda, other members of the Council of the European Union, and other nations.

France’s agenda for the presidency of the Council of the European Union is very ambitious and progressive. However, the uncertainty around the French presidential elections may give rise to more challenges, and discussions after the presidency is over. As of right now, the fate of France and the Council is in the hands of the French voters.

Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité...et “Un Passe Sanitaire?” How COVID-19 Vaccine Requirements Forced France to Reconcile its Values

The ongoing nature of the COVID-19 pandemic has forced nations across the world to examine their societal failings, as governments worldwide struggle to balance the need to protect their citizens with the need for personal freedom and a strong economy. While the United States experienced the ravages of the pandemic and the anger of its citizens early on, many European countries succeeded in holding the pandemic, and their citizens' tempers, at bay. France proves to be the perfect example of this phenomenon; the implementation of a strict lockdown policy, the “confinement” which closed businesses and schools, but also limited the periods in which individuals could be outside of their homes throughout the day, all succeeded in lessening the death toll compared with the United States and United Kingdom. 

However, the French government’s recent decision to implement vaccine requirements and vaccination proof has brought about tension and protest towards the government, previously unseen throughout the pandemic. For the first time, the French must question if their beloved national values align with the government’s actions. 

The “passe sanitaire” or French health pass is a compulsory health statement that proves the vaccinated status of an individual, or a negative COVID-19 test, within the past seventy two hours. The passe sanitaire also resembles similar “vaccine passports” seen across the world as both local and national governments attempt to achieve higher vaccination rates and protect their citizens. The passe sanitaire works in conjunction with France’s reopening plan for its economy and as part of the greater European Union’s border health control, a collaborative effort between EU member states to ensure that citizens are not bringing COVID-19 with them to various countries .  

Implemented for several reasons, the passe sanitaire has worked to increase the vaccination rates in France, through the establishment of the passe sanitaire as a ticket into everyday French life. A passe sanitaire is required for entry into restaurants, movie theaters, train and airplane travel, and the majority of public indoor spaces. French president, Emmanuel Macron, promised French citizens that vaccines would never become obligatory, with the exception of individuals in certain industries, however the pass sanitaire can feel obligatory since it serves as an entryway into French society. 

The French government’s decision to implement the pass sanitaire resembles other government’s decisions to create legislation that does not necessarily require vaccination, but “nudges” the population to receive the vaccine. Known as the Nudge Theory, this term describes how a population can be swayed to make decisions that are in their best interest through minor government reforms and policies that encourage citizens to make the choice that is in their best interest. By requiring a passe sanitaire to freely go about the activities of everyday life, the French government is nudging their population towards vaccination. 

The passe sanitaire can easily be described as a success. Since its implementation on July 12th 2021, vaccinations have increased dramatically, with over one million French citizens registering for vaccine appointments the day the passe sanitaire was announced. Vaccination rates rose dramatically in groups that were previously less likely to be vaccinated, such as adolescents and young adults. However despite the passe sanitaire’s success at achieving higher vaccination rates and imposing COVID-19 safety restrictions, the outlash and anger towards the government reveals that a deeper issue is lurking within French society. 

France’s famous revolutionary motto: Liberté, Égalité, et Fraternité (liberty, equality, and brotherhood) is a well known staple of French culture, so much so that evoking the phrase can appear cliché. However, the French mindset surrounding these three key pillars of society has shaped French values. Therefore, the implementation of the pass sanitaire can be viewed as a direct affront to this motto and the purpose it serves. 

Created in 1793 during the first French Revolution, the motto signified the end of the monarchy, the creation of French unity, and the establishment of democracy. The establishment of ‘Liberté’ drew from older notions of liberties, or the exemptions from rules or regulations certain groups within society could experience. Therefore liberty did not just signify freedom, but freedom from the choice to engage or not. Liberty did not just mean personal freedom, but also the right to exist in one's own space, away from the world at large, the acknowledgement of a separation between the individual and society. Maintaining this concept of liberty has been crucial to the French identity. Liberty is a dearly prized concept in French society, but according to a significant portion of the population the passe sanitaire is threatening to destroy French liberty and personal choice. Although the passe sanitaire does not make COVID-19 vaccinations a requirement, it does limit the participation of the unvaccinated in everyday life. Despite the obvious health benefits of the vaccine, at both an individual and national level, critics of the passe sanitaire believe that it threatens individual liberty and suggests the signs of a tyrannical government at work, which leaves the French with one obvious option: protest. 

Following the requirement of the passe sanitaire, hundreds of protests have sprung up around France, in all regions of the country as citizens gather in the streets from all sides of the political spectrum. The protests have remained largely peaceful, however they have revealed specific issues within French society and feelings toward President Macron that suggest a likely change in national interest towards the government.Widespread protests are not a new concept in France, and have played a role in the national identity since the original French Revolution, when the Bastille Prison was liberated by French citizens in 1789. The legacy of the event shaped French society for centuries to come, with monumental shifts in society and culture often happening as a direct result of protests. The protests and uprisings of 1968 turned into a cultural battle between Charles De Gaulle’s traditional French government and the anger of university students in Paris; these protests then transformed into national rallies, and the events of that year would witness a dramatic change in all levels of life, with government reforms, societal norms, and workers rights all undergoing massive development. The 1990’s saw successful results at the hands of French protesters when then prime minister, Alain Juppé, attempted to reform the French social security system, only to quickly back down after three weeks of protests.  More recently, the Yellow Vest movement in France has sparked strikes and protests against Macron’s pension reform and tax breaks for the wealthy, as rural pockets of France and poorer regions express outrage over what they believe are unfair benefits to urban elites. 

Unlike many other western countries, the French frequently achieve tremendous success when protesting, at both a cultural and legislative level. The French government has routinely been brought to its knees by the outrage of the French citizens, which has allowed protesting to become a key part of national identity. Taking to the streets is a way to ensure societal change and to prevent the government from becoming an authoritative, tyrannical regime; protesting is not solely a way to demonstrate outrage, as is frequently the case in allied countries like the United States and United Kingdom, but to shape policy and norms. However, the statistics of the protests would suggest that the majority of French citizens either tolerate or support the implementation of the passe sanitaire. In a country that is known for protesting, the large crowds do not suggest the same national anger as would be the case in other countries. Instead, it appears that there is a growing understanding of the importance of the passe sanitaire as a necessity for daily life and to protect others from COVID-19.

Each protestor has their own reasons for protesting, however there are common shared sentiments. The overlying feeling of the protesters is worry and fear that the passe sanitaire will take away from the personal liberty awarded to each French citizen by ultimately forcing them to get vaccinated. The concept of forced vaccination goes against both the nature of an individual’s right to choose and the right to privacy when it comes to the government’s knowledge of their citizens' health. France is a notoriously private country, and this national value is witnessed in everyday aspects of French culture and law. The simple tradition of closing one's shutters or the government’s refusal to collect data on the racial breakdown of their citizens both reflect an immense desire for privacy. However, issues over personal liberty and privacy are not the only reason driving the French to protest.

The political anger expressed at the Yellow Vest protests towards President Macron and the French government has only grown, and now anger at the implementation of the passe sanitaire is directly targeted towards the government. There is a great distrust and suspicion over the government’s decision to implement the passe sanitaire, with protestors feeling as though the French government is using the passe sanitaire as a means of control, as democracy threatens to be replaced by tyranny. Frustration over the passe sanitaire has manifested itself into different formats, as witnessed in the many protests. The use of symbols from history as a tactic to shock and inspire onlookers is not new, but recent instances reveal that protesters in France are frequently linking the implementation of the passe sanitaire and Macron with Hitler. Images of President Macron’s face embossed with a Hitler-esque moustache or the pinning of a yellow star onto one's shirt suggest a deliberate attempt to connect modern events with historical ones. Despite the blatant offensiveness of these actions, as well as the lack of similarity between the COVID-19 pandemic and the Nazi Regime, the overall effect is haunting and upsetting, suggesting a deep anger towards the French political establishment. 

A quick analysis of the multitude of opinions held reveals the true complexity of feelings surrounding the passe sanitaire. The protestors at these events come from all sides of the political spectrum, from the far left to the far right, a sharp contrast from protests in the United States which are often strictly bipartisan. Interviews with protestors from all sides reveal one shared fear: the threat of authoritarian government policy and the loss of ‘liberté’. One protester, who defines herself as a libertarian and anti-fascist activist, expressed outrage over seeing fellow passe sanitaire protesters associate the vaccination requirements with anti-semitic symbols and carrying the flags of the far-right in support. However despite the shared anger over the health pass and the decision to take to the streets together, there is little unity between the two groups. A far left protester described the separation of the two groups, saying: “We already knew it, but it confirms that my enemy's enemy is not necessarily my friend…” The primary motivations of the far-left protesters appear to be fear over the threat of a tyrannical government, and fear that the far-right will dominate this movement and turn issues of vaccination into a political issue that will serve to benefit them in the upcoming presidential election. The motivations of the far-right also reveal issues with the threat of a tyrannical government, but these protesters are also critiquing the French government’s response to COVID-19 in general, and their frustration at Macron’s Centrist policies. Emmanuel Hirsch, a medical ethics professor lamented over the government’s issue with implementing the passe santiare in an interview with Le Monde. Hirsch claims that Macron did not properly reflect upon the implementation of the passe sanitaire, claiming that this initiative could have been used to create a larger conversation about rebuilding trust in the government and in science. Instead, the passe sanitaire has only served to deepen the tensions between powerful institutions and French citizens. 

The lack of unity at these protests reveal that the French protestors have yet to establish a clear position on the passe sanitaire, simply using it as a symbol to fight against their own personal complaints against the government. The passe sanitaire may indeed be limiting France’s concept of liberté, but the greater issue is one of distrust and fear towards the government, something a vaccine cannot fix. 

Post Covid World: What Happens to the Eurozone?

After the shocking results of the United Kingdom’s referendum to withdraw from the European Union (EU) in 2017, Euroscepticism has spread throughout EU member countries outside of the United Kingdom. Pew research center concluded that the amount of Europeans who are no longer confident in the EU is on the steady rise.

Despite the rise of Euroscepticism across the general region of members in the European Union, Europeans have different opinions regarding the eurozone and the European Central Bank (ECB). A survey conducted by European Parliament in 2018, concludes that the ECB has gained increasing public support since 2013. Although recent polls show the positive support for a single monetary policy, COVID-19 places this sentiment into question. COVID-19 has economically damaged many nations in the European region and arguably more so nations that have the Euro as their national currency. 

The future of the EU as a whole was unknown when Great Britain formally left the Union and is a deeper mystery with COVID-19 added to the mix. Although a different institution, the Eurozone faced challenges and obstacles that needed solutions. The Eurozone addressed issues that came before and after the pandemic.

A History of European Monetary Cooperation

Before the ECB was created and adopted by its initial members, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was established in 1990 by the central bank governors of European countries to promote coordination among central banks and economic convergence between nations in the region. The implications behind regional integration and economic convergence were both economic and political. 

Economically, regional integration alleviates any challenges that stem from the flow of commodities, services, capital and/or labor. Economic convergence of developing European countries combined with their connectedness to European superpowers like France and German would increase the economic growth of the region by increasing the opportunities of trade and investments. Additionally, coordinating macroeconomic policies reduces the probability of countries falling into economic recessions but also the capability to recover quickly from a crisis in the likelihood that one occurs.

Politically, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and Soviet Union occurring less than ten years prior, regional integration was a large step towards strengthening liberal ideologies in the international order. Economic regional integration was also a political move that attempted to deter the re-emergence of communist powers by not only connecting small developing countries with powerful liberal countries but also helping in their development. At the time when the EMU was first created, it was vital that the implementation of a singular currency and monetary policy for a group of nations was done through a slow transition thus easing countries into high levels of integration rather than abrupt quick transitions that are short lived. 

The work of the Economic and Monetary Union is primarily categorized under three stages that laid the foundation for the euro currency to be used across states The policies or measures implemented at each stage brought member countries one step closer to regional integration which is reflected in the final stage of the EMU by fixing the exchange rate and creating a singular monetary policy for all member states  to follow. These policies that are still seen in the main objectives of the ECB are known as quantitative easing which result in a more open economy that makes borrowing money from banks easier. In theory, if the lasting effects of quantitative easing stimulates a national economy, expanding quantitative easing policies to a group of member states within the same region should stimulate economic growth on a larger scale. Given the hypothetical benefits of easy business exchanges over a group of several states, coordination of monetary policies needed to be done at every stage to ensure the success of the ECB.

Different measures implemented within each stage center around the theme of coordination. For the eurozone, coordination is the most significant form of diplomacy that determines the functionality of the institution. Without the coordination of monetary policies as well as other policies such as labor and capital movement, the eurozone would not operate as smoothly as it has so far. This form of coordination seen in the region produces a level of regional integration that stretches.

The Functions of the ECB

Despite having a singular monetary policy, the ECB can maintain cooperation and coordination through different frameworks which either consult or decide what is the optimal monetary policy for the region at a given time. More specifically, monetary policies which are under the responsibility of the ECB are establishing the value of the currency and interest rates. Overall these policies affect the supply of money, foreign exchange rate as well as the rate of different forms of investments. As a collective of national central banks, there are three primary bodies which are each delegated the responsibility to make some form of decision. The governing council is recognized as the highest body within the ECB that analyzes recent economic and monetary developments to determine if interest rates or lending rates need to be changed. In total there are 25 members in the Governing Council which include the 19 central bank governors of the eurozone as well as six members which make up the second governing body which is known as the Executive Board. The primary responsibility of the Executive board is to handle the daily operation of the ECB. The last operating body of the ECB is known as the general council which is composed of the central bank governors of all central banks in EU countries. As this position is made up of governors of non-eurozone banks, this council acts as more of an advisory council to the other two governing bodies. At different points in time, these three governing bodies have come together to properly address economic crises both on a national and global level.

Structurally, one way the ECB has responded to national and global economic shocks has been through the creation of resolution mechanisms that are to further aid and supervise the central banks of ECB member states in central bank operations and also oversight to macroeconomic policies. These mechanisms were created with the hopes for member states to equitably benefit from being in the eurozone.

The First Decade of the ECB

Positive results can be seen within the first decade of the ECB. With much action from the ECB being inspired by the work of the German Federal Bank, the ECB was able to maintain an inflation rate at a maximum of 2%. Policies that drew upon the unorthodox approach of economic and monetary policy, caused for the economy of the region to grow at an especially high rate. The low inflation rate that was maintained throughout the first decade mitigated the risk of increasing prices that were affected by high global oil prices. Even during global economic shocks, consistently low interest rates increased countries’ capabilities to lend more from other countries. Smaller economic shocks which occurred in the early 2000s, pushed the Executive and Governing Council to create forms of buffers that would act as safety nets in case of different shocks. 

While in the short run, increased borrowing could be beneficial and finance different projects and programs, but this rate of borrowing is sustained for an extended period, specific monetary policies could make national economies vulnerable to financial crises. Tight and regulated fiscal policy is an optimal strategy for countries to upside the possible risks towards financial crises. Even in the early years of the ECB, the need for a disciplined fiscal policy was acknowledged but the global financial crisis placed extra significance on the notion of the regulated fiscal policies. In total, member states in the ECB saw positive benefits within the first decade but the global financial crisis ultimately determined the success of the European Central Bank for the second decade of its existence. 

ECB’s Shortcomings: a Case Study of the Greek Financial Crisis

It is worth noting that the European Central Bank only requires monetary policy to be uniform through member states. The creation of fiscal policies, on the other hand, is left to the discretion of national governments. Among member states, there is minimal to no coordination between fiscal policies which raises issues that challenge the efficiency of the ECB. Due to fiscal and monetary policy in combination affecting overall economic activity of the economy, the lack of coordination for fiscal policies can cause some countries to be restricted in the event of an economic shock. The Grecian financial crisis which began in the late 2000s was so severe due to the restrictive ability to change monetary policy and the lack of discipline for fiscal policy. Although fiscal policies could help member states recover to some extent, intense policy intervention is needed for economies to sustainably recover from shocks. National financial crises like the Greek financial crisis emphasized the significance of fiscal policy coordination between the member states of the ECB. 

The origins of the Greek financial crisis can be dated back to the 1980s when Grecian fiscal policies surrounded the expansion of increasing government spending and borrowing. When Greece entered the eurozone and ECB, implementing ECB quantitative easing policy combined with their own fiscal policy made Greece a country that was perceived to be a safe place to invest in and could easily borrow money from other countries. Greece’s membership in the ECB increased competition for German goods and deepened their inability to pay off their debt. Since Greece maintained their fiscal policy up until the global financial crisis, the low inflation rate established by the ECB restricted Greece from changing monetary policies that would better alleviate some of the crisis they are placed in. 

As mentioned earlier, the ECB was structurally inspired by the German Federal Bank given that they were the most powerful bank at the time. As a result of their power, much of the monetary policies created were influenced by the state of Germany’s economy. In the context of the Greek financial crisis, ECB monetary policies based on the state of Germany’s policies created tensions between Greece, the ECB and Germany who were divided on how the ECB should respond to the financial crisis. Greek believed that the ECB should forgive some of their debts while Germany was hesitant in debt forgiveness and changing monetary policy for Germany. The tensions between these three actors extended to the point where Greek almost left the eurozone and ECB due to the lack of sympathy from the ECB and large eurozone lenders like Germany.

In total, there are three major critiques that affect the effectiveness of the ECB. The first critique of the ECB was previously mentioned was the lack of fiscal policy coordination among member states. The lack of fiscal policy coordination partially makes fiscal policy coordination less effective. The second major critique of the ECB is the large role Germany has influence over the monetary policy of the ECB. As a result of this, it places states at different economic levels than Germany to be subjected to monetary policies that Germany would benefit the most from. The third critique is the confidence in quantitative easing. Since its inception, the ECB has placed great confidence in quantitative easing monetary policy. The ideology behind having constant quantitative easing monetary policy does not necessarily benefit the regional economy in the long run.

Policy Recommendations

Given the three large critiques that impede upon the efficiency of the ECB, reforms which would focus on a significant theme of coordination. Better coordination across different policies that within and outside of the responsibilities of the ECB will not only promote the founding theme of regional integration, but will also evenly distribute the benefits of a single currency across different member states. Proposed recommendations are catered towards the two significant bodies of the ECB seeing as they make much of the significant decisions for the eurozone.

Aren’t We Forgetting Something? Brexit’s Impact on International Development

On June 23, 2016, a referendum was held to decide the United Kingdom’s (U.K.) membership to the European Union (E.U.). This resulted in 51.9 percent of voters opting to withdraw from one of the largest political unions in the world. Since then, news headlines, politicians, and analysts alike have vacillated endlessly, existing in a vacuum of uncertainty and doubt as the intricate relationship between the E.U. and U.K. unravels.

Among the countless documents and political statements considering the implications of Brexit, perhaps most notable is the relegated status of international development policy as a priority in Brexit negotiations. While it’s easy to become lost in the widening sea of proposals and policies, we should look beyond the reductionist analysis of the E.U.-U.K. relationship and focus instead on its ramifications for global development.

Forget Article 50: U.K.-E.U. Relations Before Brexit

Before delving into a complete analysis of E.U.-U.K. dynamics, it’s important to examine their past relationship to inform current and future implications of collaboration in the development sphere.

The U.K. is legally obligated to spend at least 0.7 percent of its gross national income in foreign aid. It has done so for the past 5 years, becoming one of the largest major donors in Official Development Assistance* (ODA) terms. In the 2018 U.K. Government report examining the U.K.’s contribution to the E.U., it was estimated that the U.K. channeled $1.9 billion of ODA through E.U. institutions. This amounts to approximately 11 percent of all U.K. aid. These institutions included instruments such as the European Development Fund (EDF), an extrabudgetary apparatus designed to provide development aid to African, Caribbean, Pacific countries (ACP) and additional overseas countries and territories. The U.K. was the third-largest donor to the EDF, making up about 15 percent of the fund. The two main sources of E.U. ODA funding are the E.U. budget and the EDF. Approximately 12 percent of the E.U. ODA budget was from the U.K. 

The E.U. and U.K. have been what Mikaela Gavas, Senior Policy Fellow at the Center for Global Development, called “multipliers for each other’s development policies.” A symbiotic relationship predicated on sharing closely aligned development priorities, the E.U. offered the U.K. access to its extensive global presence—such as in fragile states—while the U.K. created an E.U. “development surplus” through its financial contributions, technical expertise, and experience.

U.K. collaboration with the E.U. considerably reduced transaction costs in implementing aid for the U.K. Department of International Development’s (DFID). Instead of expending resources to develop and administer aid, the U.K. could use the E.U. and its mechanisms to reduce costs and enter regions not always accessible for non-Member States. For example, according to a Bond report by Simon Lightfoot et al., the E.U. is present in all 43 fragile states while DFID only has projects in 11. 

Acting as “economies of scale,” E.U. institutions acted as an effective channel for U.K. aid to influence and achieve development policy objectives. One instance of this is the U.K.’s involvement with the E.U.’s European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO).

ECHO, the European Commission’s (EC) department for overseeing humanitarian aid and civil protection, is the world’s third-largest humanitarian aid donor. Its global reach includes more than 40 countries, including countries in which DFID has limited field presence in as well as U.K. priority countries, such as Somalia. U.K. financial contributions composed approximately a fifth of ECHO’s budget, enabling the U.K. to wield significant power and influence on one of the world’s leading humanitarian donors.

In examining the relationship in the converse, in which the E.U. funds the U.K., a 2017 Bond report found that the U.K. was the second-largest recipient of E.U. aid to Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). CSOs are organized civil groups that can include entities such as non-government organizations or faith-based organizations. Between 2012 and 2016, E.U. development and humanitarian aid contributions to U.K. CSOs averaged approximately €300 million each year. In 2017, British NGOs received the equivalent of $258.4 million in new grants from ECHO, amounting to about 28 percent of all NGO funding allocations by the E.U. In the wake of Brexit, CSOs will likely face considerable financial shortfalls, limited access to programs in the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs), and a diminished ability to influence development policy and participate in partnerships across the 140 countries the E.U. is present in.

The E.U. is the world’s largest donor, providing about half of all global aid, and is a leader in international development. Because of its collaboration with E.U. development institutions, the U.K. had extensive access to the E.U.’s financial instruments and the opportunity to affect E.U. development policy, programming, and direction. On this, Dr. Sophia Price, Head of Politics and International Relations at Leeds Beckett University, argued that U.K. membership in the E.U. “allowed the U.K. to magnify the impact of its aid and influence E.U. development policy to align with its objectives.” However, despite the mutually beneficial nature of E.U.-U.K. cooperation, the prospects of current or future collaboration remain decidedly undecipherable.

How’s Brexit Going? The E.U.-U.K. Relationship Currently

The deadline for Brexit is currently October 31, 2019. While the E.U. has granted the U.K. a six-month extension, leaders have insisted that the U.K. must choose to ratify the exit treaty, opt for a no-deal Brexit, or cancel its departure. 

Throughout the chaos, the U.K. Government has indicated a continued willingness to collaborate with E.U. aid, whether by a cautious “case-by-case basis” or by partnering with E.U. development and external programs and instruments. According to remarks made to the House of Commons by former Secretary of State for International Development (SSID) Penny Mordaunt MP, the U.K. will continue to contribute funds towards the outstanding E.U. budget for 2020. However, she stated that the U.K. “will stop funding in the way [they] currently do in 2020.” In the most recent publication on a future relationship between the U.K. and the E.U., the U.K. Government proposed a cooperative accord allowing for U.K. participation, including allowing U.K. CSOs access to deliver E.U. programs and apply for funding.

Despite DFID’s keenness to continue collaborating with the E.U., many fear the same fate for U.K. CSOs that happened for Swiss NGOs: being no longer eligible for funding since the U.K. is a non-Member State. With a Brexit deadline approaching and little additional information about their status, NGOs have either stopped or scaled back their bids. In response, DFID has committed to underwriting U.K. NGOs if there’s a no-deal Brexit. This promise applies only to ECHO bids and does not apply to funding through the Development and Cooperation Directorate General (DEVCO), which is responsible for creating international cooperation, development policy, and delivering aid. 

The U.K. has suggested that the E.U. offer flexible aid instruments that are open to non-Member States. However, the E.U. has not indicated a willingness to design such mechanisms. Instead, it has proposed an extensive structural reform of its development instruments and funds for its long-term budget (2012-2017). It has also called for a reconsideration of its partnership with the ACP countries--typically funded by the EDF--as enumerated under the Cotonou  Agreement. The proposed Neighborhood, Development, and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) would merge at least nine separate development instruments included in the current budget and incorporate components of the EDF. Proponents argue that this reform would create a more efficient development instrument, avoid the complex tangle of hybrid programs, and replace values-driven development with needs-based policies.

However, critics of the proposal, such as Oxfam, believe the new instrument was designed to “promote the E.U.’s short-term domestic interests in mind…[and] risk[s] undermining long term sustainable development” and collaboration with non-E.U. actors. Countries that usually receive aid from the EDF may experience decreased funding or a change in relations with the E.U. It’s important to note that the NCIDI proposal does include the caveat that various actors from within or outside of the E.U. may have access to the NDICI’s funds and programs. However, there is no reference made to arrangements for non-E.U. countries in the management of those programs.

The current status of U.K. development policy and E.U.-U.K. cooperation remains uncertain. Additionally, the political landscape of the U.K. has drastically changed since the referendum, creating even more confusion. 

Boris Johnson was recently elected as Prime Minister (PM) following the resignation of Theresa May. Though there is doubt regarding the longevity of PM Johnson’s tenure, his appointment makes it likely that ODA spending is likely to be diverted from DFID. Johnson has been an outspoken aid skeptic and critic of U.K. development efforts, espousing that aid should “do more to serve the political and commercial interests of the country.” While using the foreign aid system as a vehicle for geopolitical interests is certainly not a novel concept, Johnson’s statement signals a marked departure from previous positions.

PM Johnson recently named Alok Sharma as the U.K.’s latest Secretary of State for International Development, alleviating concerns that DFID would have been incorporated under the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Sharma opposed Brexit and is a newcomer to the development world; little is known about his ideological position on U.K. aid beyond his support for the U.K.’s 0.7 percent of GNI commitment.

What are the Alternatives?

Many have suggested proposals for post-Brexit cooperation that seek to limit the losses on both sides. One of these is the notion of joint programming, which is when the E.U. works with external development partners to create and implement programs. This would allow the U.K. to leverage the expertise of the E.U. and Member-States while also effectively mitigating the financial and technical expertise shortfalls the E.U. would be experiencing. However, this would increase the U.K.’s cost of administering bilateral funds and the U.K. would only have status as a third-party country, wielding a significantly lower degree of influence.

Another option is for the U.K. to pursue the E.U. aid delivery mechanism called delegated cooperation. This is a process in which the E.U. entrusts funds to a Member-State or third-party donor that has special geographical or technical expertise. They would be then allowed to lead and implement a project. Again, this would increase the U.K.’s administrative and implementation costs and diminish its influence on overall E.U. development policy.

Some have supported the Norway or Swiss model of cooperation with the E.U. Both are non-Member States but are part of the European Economic Area (EEA) and benefit from structural funding. However, a caveat that withers in the face of political realities makes this an almost impossible option: the U.K. would be required to be a member of the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA). Alternatively, it must negotiate an amalgam of complex agreements with the E.U. similar to Switzerland.

An EEA membership means that the U.K. would be able to make substantial contributions to the E.U. budget. However, it would be required to follow certain E.U. rules and laws, such as the essential “four freedoms”: unrestricted movement of individuals, goods, services, and capital. This is likely not politically maneuverable in the U.K., as distaste for such commitments contributed to Brexit in the first place.

The Future for Development Under Brexit 

In examining Brexit’s implications for DFID, former SSID Rory Stewart suggested that there would have to be careful consideration of what to do with the 11 percent of U.K. ODA—“Brexit dividends”—that was previously allocated through European mechanisms. As Lightfoot et al. anticipates, aid allocation could follow an alternative pattern, moving through the private sector and to organizations with less experience in the development field. As predicted by a study commissioned by the European Parliament, U.K. aid previously channeled through E.U. institutions would likely only be dedicated to British bilateral programs and economic infrastructures, negatively affecting social infrastructure and humanitarian development. Both predictions would follow a pattern paralleling Johnson’s statements.

Depending on the political landscape, U.K. development policies could either be completely internalized to promote more domestic-oriented goals or follow a “European-like” pattern, in which aid follows the same distribution methods pre-Brexit. The latter is unlikely, as Johnson’s new cabinet houses numerous outspoken critics of aid, such as new foreign secretary Dominic Raab and new House leader Jacob Rees-Mogg.

On the challenges of Brexit, the European Parliament found that it’s likely that the secession could either force the E.U. to wield more localized regional influence or hinder its path in becoming a global leader. Unless the E.U. compensates—both quantitatively and qualitatively—for the loss of Britain’s contribution to E.U. aid, it risks cutting 1 percent to 4 percent of ODA in countries throughout Eastern Europe and Northern Africa. Perhaps most importantly, global aid may decrease by up to 3 percent as both the E.U. and U.K. experience considerable reductions in funding and expertise.

Simon Maxwell, chair of the European Think Tanks Group, observed that E.U. development policy is likely to be “less poverty-focused” post-Brexit. A majority of the E.U. budget is spent addressing the needs of middle-income countries (MICs) while lower-income countries (LICs) are typically funded by the EDF. If the 2021-2027 budget incorporates parts of the EDF while pivoting to geographical development instruments over thematic ones, more aid money will likely be spent in MICs instead without the U.K.’s voice in policy decisions.  

Recommendations

U.K. aid and influence in the development sphere would have been most effective in the context of the E.U. Because reentering the E.U. is unlikely, recommendations must instead focus on the best strategies for U.K. development efforts post-Brexit.  

The U.K. should not withdraw from the E.U. without an agreement in place.

With the current political climate swirling around empty statements and puzzled MPs, it’s in the U.K.’s best interest to establish new economic and political alliances beyond Europe. While it’s important to maintain financial commitments to E.U. aid programs and instruments, the U.K. should focus on alternative multilateral institutions to channel their ODA, such as through the World Bank. The U.K. has signed several continuity agreements attempting to replicate preferential access in the case of a no-deal Brexit. Countries such as Ghana and Cote D’Ivoire, however, have not signed agreements. The U.K. should continue these efforts to mitigate the costs Brexit will entail for the U.K. and other countries.  

A no-deal Brexit could cause a weakened U.K. general import regime, devaluation in the British pound, and a decrease in GDP compared to current levels. Uncertainty in the economic system already endangers key development initiatives in LICs and will crystallize if a no-deal Brexit occurs. The government should revise its recently announced temporary tariff schedule in the event of a no-deal Brexit. The current schedule will lower tariffs for a larger pool of countries, injecting competition in developing markets and endangering the preferential access that some countries enjoyed.

E.U. funds for Asia, Northern Africa, Eastern Europe, and Latin America are what is at stake in Brexit negotiations. DFID should work to ensure that U.K. CSOs are eligible as direct contractors and can participate in the creation and administration of E.U. development programs beyond LDCs and HIPCs. DFID should strengthen its promise to underwrite contracts for both ECHO and DEVCO in the event of a no-deal Brexit. If unable to do so, the inability for CSOs to continue to bid or participate in development programs endangers global humanitarian efforts.

There remains uncertainty regarding ACP-E.U. relations and the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), which would create the NCIDI. Because of what the E.U. has categorized as  “institutional evolution and a continuous shift in the balance of powers,” simple renewal of ACP-E.U. relations is not an option. The E.U. is seeking to shift focus away from the ACP and EDF, creating a significant opportunity the U.K. should take advantage of. The U.K. should circumvent ACP-E.U. collaboration and instead reform its relationship with African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries and other overseas countries and territories.

Boris Johnson’s shift towards bilateral aid programs narrowly framed under commercial agreements that focus only on economic sectors and infrastructure is a poor policy decision. It’s a position that endangers current and future initiatives that attempt to address the diversity of global issues inherent in international development. This policy approach should not be adopted nor should it guide U.K. development objectives. 

Perhaps most significantly, the U.K. should not relinquish its influence in determining the trajectory of the E.U. for the next several years. Instead of abstaining from important policy decisions, the U.K. should increase its presence. While domestic and international political realities limit the U.K., it should work to insulate itself from the instability that Brexit poses. Instead of adopting a diminished role in the debate on the E.U.’s MFF and renegotiations for the ACP-E.U. partnership, the U.K. should leverage its influence to create an environment conducive to its development objectives post-Brexit. If they are unable to do so—or refuse to do so—they risk finding themselves to be what former Chair of the European Parliament Development Committee Linda McAvan characterized as “outsiders and another kind of lobbyist out here.”

Conclusion

Brexit poses substantial ramifications for international development—ones that have been largely ignored in debates. Besides working outside of E.U. mechanisms to mitigate the costs of Brexit in development terms, it’s important to recognize that the E.U. is the largest major donor in the world. Even if there was an option to circumvent the organization, doing so would be incredibly detrimental to the U.K.’s impact in development, whether through programming, expertise, or influence.

When considering cooperation with the E.U. in international development, the U.K. should attempt to foster the softest Brexit deal, adopting strategies mentioned previously. This should include a series of agreements between the E.U.-U.K. that will perhaps be more complicated than its present relationship already is. Simply put, when it comes to international development, there is no alternative.

*The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development defines Official Development Assistance as financial flows that are undertaken by the official sector (state and local governments, including their agencies). These efforts must have the main objective of promoting economic development and welfare. The financing terms must be concessional, such as the World Bank providing a loan below market financial terms or incorporating a grant element.

Note: This article only examines the dynamics of the E.U.-U.K. in the development sphere and the best ways to mitigate the costs of Brexit. As such, it does not seek to analyze the impact and nuances of development practices or policy. It consequently does not comment on the ethical or political considerations of international development and aid. For example, some criticize foreign aid regimes as an extension of neoliberal policies (see Margaret Thatcher’s infamous quote referred to in this article: “There is no alternative”) that lead to the crystallization of inequality while maintaining neocolonialist tendencies. That is a subject in and of itself and one that cannot fully be addressed in the context of this article.