War By Another Name: The Failure of Economic Statecraft

As the Trump Administration prepares to depart office and give way to that of Democratic President-Elect Joe Biden, its foreign policy legacy is intimately tied to the policy of sanctioning foreign governments for perceived misbehavior. President Donald Trump’s displeasure with the Obama Administration’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a landmark nonproliferation treaty that all but eliminated Iran’s capacity to develop nuclear weapons, led him and a cadre of Iran hawks from Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to former National Security Advisor John Bolton to level various sanctions against Iran. The so-called “maximum pressure” campaign has crippled Iranians’ standard of living while doing preciously little to limit Iran’s nuclear capabilities or its various destabilizing efforts in the Middle East. In total, the Trump Administration has also either strengthened existing sanctions or levied new ones on thousands of people, countries, or entities. Furthermore, President Trump has revelled in his capacity to deploy sanctions against adversaries of his “America First” foreign policy, threatening to “totally destroy and obliterate the Economy of Turkey (I’ve done before!)” in October 2019 in response to Turkish aggression against Syrian Kurds.

Like never before, Washington has adopted sanctions as its foreign policy tool of choice. Given America’s financial dominance, place in the international system, and numerous allies, this is perhaps natural. But in the age of the novel coronavirus, it is well to ask whether the immense humanitarian costs of sanctions coupled with the existing crises of climate change and pandemics are justifiable or even tolerable in the pursuit of American foreign policy objectives.

The Purposes of Sanctions

Traditionally, economic sanctions are best understood as efforts by governments or multilateral bodies to shape the strategic decisions made by state or non-state actors in the international system. In their practical application, sanctions may take numerous forms ranging from travel bans and asset freezes to arms embargoes and foreign aid reductions. Targets of sanctions can range from terrorist networks such as al-Qaeda to states. States and multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (UN) may impose sanctions for a variety of reasons. In the statist context, a state may impose sanctions on another nation or actor that undermines their interests whereas both states and multilateral institutions may deploy sanctions in response to perceived or recognized violations of international law or norms. For example, the UN sanctioned North Korea after its first nuclear test in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the U.S.’s Global Magnitsky Act freezes the assets of Russian officials alleged to have committed grave human rights violations and bans them from entering the U.S.

Sanctions are valued by their supporters because, as Benjamin Coates of Wake Forest University writes, “Sanctions have served as both the idealist’s dream and the realist’s cudgel. They have promised to the powerless a world free of war and discrimination while giving the powerful tools for domination.” Coates also notes, however, “The legitimacy and appeal of sanctions rest on blurring the lines between these two outcomes; the more Washington turns to unilateral sanctions, the less legitimacy the practice may have,” which will be explored more later in this piece.

In more recent times, there has been a debate over the efficacy of so-called targeted sanctions compared to broader economic sanctions. The Global Magnitsky Act is an example of targeted sanctions, which apply only toward certain individuals so as to minimize the suffering of innocent civilians. Human rights advocates argue that targeted sanctions address what they view as the fundamental problem with the international sanctions regime- that they are poorly conceived to change state behavior and instead subject civilians to needless suffering even as oligarchs and dictators evade their impact.

Do Sanctions Work? If So, Are They Worth It?

The practice of economic statecraft more or less emerged not when the U.S. became the undisputed leader of the global economy or during the Cold War, but rather is likely as old as economics and statecraft in their own right. The early 20th century, however, is as close as one can get to the genesis of international sanctions, defined neatly by Coates as “a collective denial of economic access designed to enforce global order.” An increasingly interdependent world during and after World War I served to illustrate the intersection between military and economic warfare. After all, the British Empire was constructed around British financial and commercial dominance reinforced by the world’s preeminent navy. During World War I, Britain put this to work in a crippling blockade of Germany that led to malnourishment that would ultimately take the lives of hundreds of thousands of civilians. 

The establishment of the ill-fated League of Nations after the war included in its covenant a provision mandating that any nation that started a war of aggression be punished with an embargo. Facing complete isolation from the global economy, the theory as supported by President Woodrow Wilson went, nations would be deterred from invading their neighbors. This provision enshrined into international norm sanctions as the preeminent multilateral tool of enforcement for world peace.

League of Nations sanctions ultimately failed to deter Italy from invading Ethiopia, a League member-state, and from subsequently falling into the orbit of the Nazis. Though the U.S. government would enact the Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA) during WWI barring trade with Germany, TWEA would ultimately prove unsuccessful in deterring the Nazis from territorial conquest. In 1941, after Japan invaded Indonesia, President Franklin Roosevelt invoked TWEA to seize all Japanese assets held in the U.S. Britain followed suit and the sanctions cost Japan access to 75 percent of its total foreign trade and 88 percent of its imported oil. Japanese hardliners then used the sanctions as justification for the bombing of Pearl Harbor. Instead of coercing Japan to renounce its territorial conquests as Roosevelt had hoped, the sanctions emboldened Japanese hardliners aghast at an aggressive use of American economic power to the point of deploying military force.

Following Harry Truman’s invocation of national emergency powers during the Korean War to activate TWEA, the emergency remained in power for decades to follow, leading to the imposition by future presidents of sanctions on Cuba, Cambodia, and others. Then in the 1990s, the use of sanctions really began to take off, The UN Security Council, now bereft of the Soviet veto power, imposed sanctions some 12 times during the decade compared to only twice (against Rhodesia and South Africa) in the previous four decades. Human rights abusers in Yugoslavia and Rwanda and state sponsors of terror like Sudan and Libya were some of the notable targets, and the efficacy of the sanctions remains suspect.

Iraq

But the most noteworthy target of the 1990s sanctions boom was Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Just four days after Iraq invaded neighboring Kuwait in 1990, the UN passed Security Council Resolution 661, imposing the strictest sanctions up to that point in history on Iraq. Interestingly enough, even as the U.S. led the Gulf War coalition and the effort to sanction Iraq, it had supported Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War just a decade earlier and just two years earlier had refused to sanction Hussein for his use of chemical weapons against the Kurds.

The Gulf War sanctions, which imposed a nearly complete arms, trade, and aid embargo, absolutely crippled every sector of the Iraqi economy while exacting an unfathomable humanitarian toll. When partnered with the U.S. aerial bombardment of the country’s energy and sanitation facilities, the sanctions brought about a public health crisis. The arms embargo was so broad so as to include anything that could conceivably be weaponized, including computers and tractors, goods with a clear civilian need in a nation whose electrical grid was destroyed and whose access to food was inhibited. Limitations on Iraqi exports (namely oil before the OIl for Food Programme was introduced) made it more difficult to fund humanitarian aid, while the ban on the importation of chlorine effectively made water purification impossible. 

In total, according to the World Health Organization (WHO)  the average Iraqi’s caloric intake dropped to a low of just 1,093 per day by 1995, with “the vast majority of the country’s population...on a semi-starvation diet for years.” Food rationing enacted in the mid-1990s by the Iraqi government in response to the sanctions left Iraqis deficient in nutrients critical to fetal development, leading to sharp increases in stillbirths and congenital heart disease during the decade. Mortality rates for children under five years old increased fivefold between just 1991 and 1995. The public health system lost 90 percent of its funding, overturning half a century of progress.

By any measure, the Iraq sanctions, to say nothing of more than thirty more or less consecutive years of war, completely destroyed the standard of living and physical health of multiple generations of Iraqis, all as Saddam Hussein remained in power into the 2000s and long after Iraq had ceased its WMD programs. The only change spurred by this act of economic coercion was that the Iraqi people who had suffered for decades under a dictator now found themselves suffering under the twin terrors of both that dictator and the full weight of  international economic punishment.

Cuba

The Iraq sanctions program was a multilateral, decade-long endeavor. On the other hand, America’s ongoing sanctions war with Cuba is the exact opposite: a six decade, all-encompassing campaign of economic warfare imposed unilaterally. Initiated by President John F. Kennedy in 1962, the program of economic and political isolation of Cuba is now the longest-enduring trade embargo in world history. The Cuban sanctions program is the byproduct of five major statutes and a hodgepodge of executive actions. The 1962 Foreign Assistance Act was cited by President Kennedy when he enacted a complete trade embargo between the U.S. and Cuba and amendments that same year to TWEA allowed for Kennedy to expand the embargo to cut off travel to Cuba. George H.W. Bush and a bipartisan majority in Congress expanded the embargo in 1992 with the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA), preventing foreign subsidiaries of the American government from trading with Cuba and preventing vessels from loading and unloading freight in America if they had conducted trade with Cuba within the preceding 180 days.

The Clinton and Bush administrations further sanctioned Cuba via the Helms-Burton Act and the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act, which codified the embargo into law, prevented the embargo from being lifted without congressional approval and confirmation that Cuba had sufficiently democratized, and effectively prohibited private financing for exports to Cuba and restricted tourist travel to Cuba. Despite the Obama Administration’s “Cuba thaw” that re-established diplomatic relations, relaxed trade and travel sanctions, and removed Cuba from the state sponsor of terrorism (SST) list, the Trump Administration ratcheted the trade and travel sanctions right back up and they threatened to add Cuba back to the SST list. 

Six decades after Cuba traded an American-friendly corrupt dictator with no regard for human rights (Fulgencio Batista) for a brutal dictator allied closer to Moscow in Fidel Castro, the sanctions have made Cuba no more democratic and the people of Cuba have been made much poorer. The UN estimates that sanctions have cost the Cuban economy $130 billion in total and U.S. sanctions force Cuba to source medicines and medical devices outside the U.S., inducing additional transportation costs on Cuba’s most precious export. Even the American economy is hurt by the embargo and other Cuba sanctions. A 2017 economic analysis performed by Engage Cuba, a pro-engagement group, concluded that the Trump sanctions and diplomatic rollbacks could adversely affect more than 12,000 American jobs in manufacturing, tourism, and shipping, and that the embargo costs U.S. businesses and farmers almost $6 billion a year in lost export revenue.

Moreover, the head of the office that handled SST issues during the Obama Administration justified Cuba’s removal from the SST list in the fact that, “it was legally determined that Cuba was not actively engaged in violence that could be defined as terrorism under any credible definition of the word.” And when President Obama sought to have Cuba removed from the list, he invited Congress to review the decision during a 45-day period, and they could have stopped the removal with a joint resolution, but even the completely Republican-controlled House and Senate of the time refused to take action.

Within the context of the coronavirus, Cuba’s pandemic response has been hindered by the embargo, which has obstructed the delivery of ventilators, facemasks, diagnostic kits, and other vital medical supplies. As President Obama declared “It is clear that decades of U.S. isolation of Cuba have failed to accomplish our enduring objective of promoting the emergence of a democratic, prosperous, and stable Cuba. At times, longstanding U.S. policy towards Cuba has isolated the United States from regional and international partners, constrained our ability to influence outcomes throughout the Western Hemisphere, and impaired the use of the full range of tools available to the United States to promote positive change in Cuba.  Though this policy has been rooted in the best of intentions, it has had little effect…[W]e should not allow U.S. sanctions to add to the burden of Cuban citizens we seek to help.”

Venezuela and Iran: The Failure of Maximum Pressure

“Maximum pressure” has been the Trump Administration’s policy of choice for both Iran and Venezuela. In the case of Iran, the approach of an inundation of sanctions was meant to be a sharp contrast from the Obama Administration’s detente centered around the landmark Iran nuclear deal. Iran had been in full compliance with the nuclear deal and remained in compliance for more than a year and a half of American sanctions after the U.S. withdrawal, and those sanctions have proved to accomplish precisely none of their goals, be they regime change, bringing Iran back to the negotiating table for a “better deal,” or Iran abandoning its nuclear program. Instead, Iran has increased its stockpile of enriched uranium eightfold and exported a significant amount of its petroleum despite the sanctions, all as Iran’s hardliners have seen their credibility at home increase thanks to the sanctions campaign. 

Rather than succumbing to American pressure, Iranian hardliners found it a useful talking point to rally against, finding themselves in common cause with human rights activists who noted that the sanctions denied many Iranians access to life-saving medical treatment. All of the failures of the maximum pressure campaign can be summed up in the words of a statement made by Iranian womens’ rights activists, “While sanctions proponents claim to care for the Iranian people, their policies have left an entire nation weary, depressed and hopeless. Sanctions, and economic pressure, target the fabric of society.” 

In Venezuela, maximum pressure took the form of a more explicit regime change effort against the dictator Nicolas Maduro. But while before 2019 U.S. sanctions against Venezuela targeted Maduro, Trump’s newest sanctions focused on the state-owned oil and natural gas company PdVSA, which provides the country with thousands of jobs and billions of dollars in revenue, as well as other major sectors of the economy. The economy-wide suffering brought on by these sanctions (in distracting from his corruption and domestic crackdowns) gave Maduro greater credibility when he claimed that the U.S. was a foreign power seeking to destroy Venezuela and its people. All the while, Maduro has tightened his grip over the country, his opposition has been weakened, and Venezuela has drawn closer to American adversaries like Iran, Russia, and North Korea.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

These cases are indicative of a broader problem in U.S. foreign policy. Too often, sanctions have become Washington’s default foreign policy weapon of choice, as it slaps sanction after sanction on governments with which it disagrees without the slightest concern whether American objectives would actually be achieved by them and whether humanitarian suffering would be exacerbated. While targeted sanctions and arms embargoes occasionally serve American interests well in combating global human rights violations and war crimes, more generalized economic sanctions “are too often designed to inflict maximum pain on civilians, not empower them,” in the words of Rep. Ilhan Omar (D-MN). This reliance on sanctions has undermined Washington’s ability to pursue diplomatic solutions to global problems, undermined international solidarity with its foreign policy objectives, and far too often ends up hurting the very people Washington claims to be supporting.

The overwhelming majority of academic studies have concluded that sanctions rarely achieve their stated goal, with one paper estimating odds of only even partial success as low as 34 percent. Moreover, the longer sanctions last, the less effective they tend to be, as fatigue sets in for the imposing party while the target becomes more adept at evading sanctions.The pain of sanctions is widely dispersed and deeply felt by the people in sanctioned countries even as they bear no responsibility for the actions of their governments. Similarly, even in cases where sanctions are meant to combat tangible and concrete human rights abuses, such as in the cases of Cuba, Myanmar, Zimbabwe, and North Korea, research suggests that even more human rights abuses occur when widespread (non-targeted) economic sanctions are in place than without them. As strongmen face foreign economic pressure campaigns that threaten to topple them, they try to cling to power by any means necessary, including by doubling down on repression of critics.

While there remains a future for targeted sanctions and arms embargoes to more effectively promote human rights and de-escalate conflicts, the constant reliance on harsh, generalized economic sanctions ought to be reconsidered and questioned. Any strategy to promote human rights and democracy that far too often augments the positions of strongmen and incites famine is inherently counterproductive and unnecessarily cruel. If this lesson cannot be understood now, in the midst of a global pandemic as the humanitarian impacts of sanctions prevent citizens of foreign governments from accessing food and vital medical care, then Washington’s obsession with sanctions will never be broken. For those advocating for a foreign policy that emphasizes diplomacy and puts human security at the center of global initiatives, there can be no path forward that prioritizes warfare- military or economic.

Nationwide Internet Blackout Showcases Iran’s Increasing Digital Authoritarianism, Inefficacy of Trump’s ‘Maximum Pressure’ Campaign

In what has become an increasingly common theme across the world, citizens took to the streets last month to protest price hikes ordered by a conservative national government, in this case, that of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Just like their counterparts in Chile and Lebanon, Iranians demonstrated principally in response to economic austerity measures, but they also indicated broader distrust toward government rule; “We will reclaim our rights but not be oppressed,” Iranians chanted in Ahwaz, a city of over one million near the Iraqi border. Dissimilar to manifestations elsewhere, however, was the manner in which the Iranian regime responded; on November 17th, just two days after the protests had begun, Iran’s central government shut down internet access for virtually all of its 80 million inhabitants.

The nationwide blackout marked a substantial development in Iranian domestic cyber suppression technology, as well as its willingness to use it. Iran’s development and heightened aggression forms part of worldwide trend toward ‘digital authoritarianism,’ a loosely defined term that refers to the censorship and surveillance of a population by a government via its cyber capabilities as a means of political control. From Africa to Asia, several states have harnessed the power of budding technology–not to advance the interests of their people, but to dominate them. With its unprecedented attack on its own citizens, Iran joins these ranks.

The Rise of Digital Authoritarianism

Digital authoritarianism is loosely defined as the censorship and surveillance of a population by a government via its cyber capabilities as a means of political control. A 2011 study, among the earliest on the subject, observes that the global rise of information technology (IT) over the latter half of the 20th century sparked hope that liberal democracies would flourish; the logic goes that authoritarian regimes, rendered incapable of suppressing dissent, would go extinct. Clearly, this has not been the case; not unlike interstate cyberwarfare, the IT revolution only offered a new theater of competition in which intrastate opponents –the state and its dissidents– engage.

Unlike interstate cyberwarfare –in which sabotage of financial and government institutions provides perpetrators with diplomatic leverage– censorship plays a central role, as dissent alone can jeopardize a state’s grasp on society. In the absence of robust government cyber capabilities, domestic-based dissidents can communicate freely, allowing them to plan rebellious-natured activity; by blocking messaging apps like Telegram and WhatsApp, states stifle protests and coordinated attacks on security targets. Furthermore, censorship is among the least offensive weapons in the repertoire of state oppression, so states choose it to avoid condemnation from trading partners and other members of the international community relevant to their interests. Fredrik Erixon and Hosuk Lee-Makiyama, the authors of the 2011 study, also make note of the “wide net” authoritarian regimes cast when they perceive a viable threat to their power; targets of censorship may “range from telecommunication and broadcasting networks to infrastructure and simpler conveyors of information.” In short, censorship in cyberspace can be a low-cost, high-efficacy means for authoritarian regimes to maintain political control.

China as the Digitally Authoritarian Superpower

Cyber specialists and political analysts widely agree that the first and most egregious perpetrator of digital authoritarianism was China. Erixon and Lee-Makiyama posit that China is “increasingly reshaping” the internet’s “usage, regulation, and role in society,” underscoring its influence on other authoritarian states’ domestic cyber policy. In 2013, researchers analyzed Chinese online censorship practices, concluding that the state allows “even vitriolic” criticism of the state but snuffs out any move toward social mobilization, evidence of the state’s sinister desire to maintain a semblance of freedom while safeguarding its centralized political structure. Adrian Zenz, whose research centers primarily on China's ongoing ethnic cleansing of the Uyghurs, more recently warned of Chinese facial recognition technology and identification scanners outside of mosques and churches, in addition to an algorithmic “social credit system” that “could result in a nationwide apartheid-like system.” 

China’s domestic cyber policy has far-reaching effects; some have argued that depreciating costs for cyber censorship and surveillance as a result of rapid advances in artificial intelligence will only make digital authoritarianism more appealing for anocratic states, and those already headed down the autocratic path –like Iran– will be extremely difficult to influence for the better.

Origins of Iran’s ‘Halal’ Internet

Iran’s 2009 ‘Green Movement,’ which saw thousands of citizens take to the streets of Tehran in defiance of the government, is not only significant in itself –demonstrations were among the largest since the 1979 revolution– but in relation to the development of Iranian domestic cyber policy as well. The flurry of protest videos and photographs posted to social media prompted Western observers to refer to the movement as the “Twitter revolution,” and although the impact of networking sites on the protests’ proliferation is contested, the international media hubbub induced the Iranian government to ban Twitter and Facebook. A decided shift toward cyber authoritarianism soon followed.

Writing for Wired, Lily Hay Newman notes that historically autocratic countries like China and Russia “architected their internet infrastructure from the start with government control in mind.” Iran did not, but since the Green Revolution a decade ago, it has sought to centralize its national internet by “retrofitting traditional private and decentralized networks with cooperation agreements, technical implants, or a combination.” The result is an increasingly closed, easy-to-police network known as SHOMA. Jon Gambrell, the Associated Press’ lead reporter on Iran, refers to SHOMA as ‘halal’ internet, a reference to Islamic law. “It is essentially a net neutrality supporter’s nightmare: The network has some 500 government-approved national websites that stream content far faster than those based abroad, which are intentionally slow,” Gambrell reported in 2018. “Search results also are gamed within the network, allowing the government to censor what users find.”

What’s Next? The U.S. ‘Maximum Pressure’ Campaign and Iranian Domestic Repression

SHOMA’s highly-centralized structure enabled November’s nationwide blackout, which then served as a shroud for the arrests of thousands and murders of at least 200. Previously, the Iranian state had been either unwilling or incapable of disabling internet access for its 80 million people; protests at the start of 2018 resulted in the blocking of popular mobile messaging applications, but nothing occurred on the scale of a countrywide blackout.

Iran’s move toward digital authoritarianism may have been inevitable, as the country has long shown little compunction in cracking down on its citizens. President Donald Trump’s ‘maximum pressure’ campaign, however, has only accelerated this trend; in its 2018 withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Trump Administration reinstated crippling economic sanctions on the Iranian government, which eventually led to the recent fuel hikes and widespread civil unrest.

President Trump would probably tell you his plan is working –indeed, he tweeted solidarity with the protestors in early December and lamented the Iranian government’s violent response– but in actuality, the demonstrations are unlikely to unseat the present regime or influence it toward more responsible behavior. The administration’s aggressive policy only serves to score political points at home by creating a self-fulfilling prophecy; in other words, the crackdowns serve as justification for current policy, not a consequence of them. President Trump can present himself as a defender of human rights and a courageous commander-in-chief – all the while, common Iranian citizens suffer heavy-handed oppression, on the streets as much as in cyberspace.

A Tale of Two Governments: How American Politics Affects Iranian Politics

On November 8th 2016, millions of Americans will flock to their local polling places. Voters will be faced with choices for the senate, house, local elections, and of course, the presidency. While the conversations dominating the American political sphere are largely focused on the economy, healthcare, immigration, and ISIS, the party who gains control of American politics will also be well placed to craft a foreign policy that will have an immense effect on the political, economic, and cultural path of another country, Iran.

The main cleavage separating the democratic and republican parties regarding Iran is whether America, and the world, should open up or to continue imposed isolation. The lack of political consensus regarding Iran is reflected by the American population, which also holds a mixed view on the debate. The Iran nuclear deal further intensified the argument about the two possible paths, and will likely serve as a hot button issue in the general election. A democratic win in November means continued support for the agreement. Continued support for the agreement will empower both moderating voices and loud reformers in Iran, while a return to forced isolation due to a Republican win will continue to empower the hardline conservatives and radicals. Iran’s politics, economy and culture, oddly enough, is quite dependent on American politics.

The Iranian Political Context

Following former Iranian Supreme Leader Khomeini’s consolidation of power after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, three main factions eventually emerged. Reformers, conservatives (who can also be split into two factions, neo-conservative and pragmatic), and the hardliners constitute the political identities in the officially party-less state. The current state of the balance of power between the three main factions can best be explained by policies implemented immediately following the 1979 revolution regarding families. Iranian hardliners, as well as many conservatives have a demographics problem, called the youth bulge.

The youth bulge was brought on by calls for young and large families during the brutal Iraq-Iran war. Large families would contribute more soldiers and material benefits to the war effort. The residual effect of this policy, however, was an ever-growing youth population, and a shrinking middle aged and elderly population. The youth were required to make sacrifices during and after the war, often being compelled to join Basij groups or to join the Iranian paramilitary force, the Revolutionary Guard. In turn for this sacrifice, young Iranians were promised jobs, security, healthcare, and education. This “Iranian dream” can be seen as analogous to the American dream, if a person works hard, they should expect to see success.

The internal reaction to the Islamic Revolution, however, can largely be blamed for the Iranian government’s inability to provide this reality to young Iranians. Sanctions levied by America or by other countries with America’s backing placed severe burdens on the Iranian economy, environment, and general ability to function as a member of the world community. Because of this, Iranians looked inwards, either blaming their own government, or outwards, blaming America and other countries viewed to be antagonistic.

The Rafsanjani and Khatami presidencies highlight one response to outwards pressure. Both presidencies are marked by moves to somewhat liberalize society (resolving a major grievance of many Iranian youth), open economically, and to engage in discussion with both foreign countries as well as to resolve issues internally through discussion. Rafsanjani, who was much more the pragmatic conservative than the fervent reformer, re-engaged in diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, economic privatization and development was encouraged in a Five Year Plan, and lifted some cultural restrictions, such as allowing fraternization between unrelated men and women. Khatami, who was Rafsanjani’s cultural minister, continued many of Rafsanjani’s policies, as well as emphasizing civil law, the importance of civil society, introducing language to legitimize Israel’s claim to existence and to call for an open dialogue between Iran and America.

This pragmatic conservative and reformist response to outwards political pressure, however, was swiftly undone with the election of Ahmadinejad in 2005. After allowing for some foreign and cultural détente and economic liberalization, the hardliners quickly realized that their place in Iranian society would be endangered with a continuation of these policies. Hardliners in Iran faced the decay of their core cultural and political tenants, and thus moved to return to the pre-reform Iran. After ostensibly moving to help the youth and disenfranchised, why would this pro-reform momentum stop?

To put it bluntly, the reforms failed to reach their full effect. The main cause for this can be directed to two problems: the conditions produced by outward sanctions; and an internal backlash at a changing Iran by the clerical and hardline establishment. Although the Iranian economy is actually quite diversified , sanctions prevented full integration into the world economy, which meant that exports were kept to a minimum. The Iranian economy may have been internally diverse, but the inability to export goods and services to some of the worlds largest markets, such as America and Europe, meant that Iran would never quite exceed a certain level of economic success. This meant that jobs and resources would be scarce, dampening the enthusiasm for reformist politics.

Secondly, an internal backlash facilitated by Iranian hardliners and conservatives meant that even with popular support, the tenability of reformist politics may not have actually been as robust as some would believe. After Khatami’s success in 2000, pro-reform publications were closed, intellectuals and journalists were jailed, security forces and members of the Basij assaulted students at the University of Tehran, and political and judiciary oversight organizations were banned by the constitutional watchdog the Guardian Council. Khatami never put up much of an effort to stop the backlash, demonstrating his inability to direct Iran towards a major change.

After the enthusiasm for reform was significantly dampened, President Ahmadinejad came to power in 2005. Ahmadinejad was the immensely popular former mayor of Tehran. Furthermore, Ahmadinejad came from a certain background that made him more appealing to the culturally conservative poor, as well as to certain military institutions. Ahmadinejad was a commander in the Revolutionary Guard, Iran’s major paramilitary force. Framing the reformist politicians as morally bankrupt and economically self-interested, Ahmadinejad easily came to power. In the aftermath of the election, however, Ahmadinejad began to appoint former Revolutionary Guard officials to important political posts, highlighting his view that politics should be one in the same with the standard bearers of the Islamic Revolution.

In 2009, Ahmadinejad retained power in a widely disputed election, in which he was accused of voter fraud by several different important figures in the reform movement. Despite the large protests plaguing urban centers throughout Iran, Ahmadinejad retained power. Following reelection, Ahmadinejad would hurt relations with Arab states by endorsing the Arab Spring uprisings, hurt relations with the West through inflammatory comments about Israel and the Holocaust, and mismanaged the Iranian economy and political system, often arguing with his advisors and superiors as well as undertaking pet projects and needless reforms that distracted from improving the failing Iranian economy.

The constitution of the Islamic Republic requires that presidents cannot serve more than two consecutive terms. After Ahmadinejad served his second term, a new zeitgeist swept the country, demanding a return to competent and moderate rule. Hassan Rouhani, an establishment yet pragmatic member of the conservative faction, won the election with a promise to return Iran back to its pre-Ahmadinejad path. Perhaps the most significant of all of Rouhani’s accomplishments is the hotly debated Iran Nuclear Deal. As in America, Iranians too have a mixed reaction to the agreement, with some seeing it as a capitulation to the West and others seeing it as a fair trade off in order to secure Iran’s economic security. Nonetheless, the deal is still present, signaling Iran’s intent to join the world community and to secure its future.

We can see, then, that there are two main discourses on what Iran’s purpose should be. Some in Iran believe that Iran should be the standard bearer of the Islamic world, while others hold a less parochial view, recognizing the importance of existing as a member within the inter-country community. When one faction gains too much power, a reactionary current takes hold of the Iranian zeitgeist. Too much liberalization and integration results in a rapid snapback to the revolutionary fervor of politicians like Ahmadinejad and groups like the Basij and Revolutionary Guard. On the other hand, the Iranian youth are highly educated and underemployed, which is a recipe for political change if they are not satiated. A pattern has emerged, and the budding détente between Iran and the West might tip the balance of which political current maintains its power.

Democrats, Republicans, and Iran’s Future

Republican presidential front runner believes that the Iran Nuclear Deal is so bad, it is almost like it was constituted that way on purpose. On the other side of the aisle, Democratic front-runner Hilary Clinton claimed that it was unrealistic to get a better deal, arguing that it was the best possible compromise for both parties. Within those two instances, the different American paths towards Iran are demonstrated; one towards a gradual opening of relations, and another towards an immediate return to the last several decades, which, ironically, parallel the Iranian approach.

The Republican plan is to “undo” the agreement, returning to the previous sanction regime and to continue America’s forced isolation on Iran. Who would this help? And who would this hurt? By forcing Iran to return to its previous internalized nature, it is likely that groups such as the Revolutionary Guard and the hardline clerics will be empowered. A common theme in authoritarian regimes is to paint an outside actor as an enemy of the state. Iran has long been a pawn in a greater geo-political tool by outside powers, which is reflected by an important theory accepted by the Iranian polity called Gharbzadegi, which translates to a “Westoxification,” essentially meaning that Iran (and, indeed, the Muslim world) has been corrupted by the West through its imperial pursuits. Continued forced isolation will push Iranian politics down this path, increasing internal and external tensions, and empowering the extreme elements within the country.

The Democratic plan, on the other hand, will have the opposite effect. Through easing the path towards economic integration, the highly educated yet underemployed youth will see new economic opportunities, facilitated by an influx of foreign investment, which will provide new avenues for employment. The Iranian reformist movement, along with the pragmatic conservatives, could see a new wave of enthusiasm as the quality of life within Iran slowly improves. Furthermore, integration between countries tends to have a moderating effect. Foreign investment would be hard to come by if a corporation owned by the Revolutionary Guard would likely embezzle it. Efforts to improve the infrastructure and accountability of Iran’s economy would increase, as new opportunities to seek outward investment present themselves.

For two countries ostensibly at odds, it is a humorous irony that the politics of one can have such a large effect on the politics of another. When Americans go to the polls this November, they should remember that they are likely not only choosing who they want to lead their country, but also, the path that Iran will follow. A vote for a continuation of the long held policy of sanctions and forced isolation could mean a strengthening of the hardliners and a suppression of the moderators and reformers. A vote for a change in policy and the beginnings of a real détente could mean the reformers and moderating voices could finally get the break they have long needed. The future of Iran stands at a crossroads, much like that of America, a vote for one party over the other will have a wide range of effects, and could push Iran towards true reform or towards a consolidation of extremist politics. 

Saudi and Iranian Manipulation of Sectarian Violence as an Incubator for an Emerging Balance of Power

The history of man is the history of crimes, and history can repeat. So information is a defense. Through this we can build, we must build, a defense against repetition.

—Simon Wiesenthal

The theory that history repeats itself has never been truer than in the Middle East. In a region that has always been what strategist George Friedman calls a “geopolitical flashpoint,” 2016 has started to become reminiscent of 1979. This past January, the House of Saud beheaded a Shi’a Sheikh, Nimr al Nimr, prompting Iranians to take to the streets and torch the Saudi Arabian embassy. Saudi Arabia, just like in 1988, has strangled relations with their Iranian neighbor; and both states have embarked on a power-grab. Iran has incited the Kingdom’s Gulf neighbors with Shi’a minorities – most notably, the Houthis in Yemen – to liberate themselves from their Sunni leaders. Across the Levant, North Africa, and the Gulf, the gloves have come off and the two powerhouses have conducted interventionist strategies, funded terrorist organizations, propped up dictatorships, and manipulated religious fervor – all to fuel a sectarian conflict in this winner-takes-all game.

Many scholars and critics have deemed the violence in Syria as a turbulent power vacuum. They are correct; a witch’s brew of dictatorial greed, decades of religious persecution, cultural and religious landscape at odds, and vulnerable economic conditions have produced one of the largest conflicts since the conclusion of the Second World War. We have come to know this conflict as an open invitation for foreign intervention. But many perceive Syria and Iraq as the second chapter of the Cold War, a stage for Russia and the United States to carry out countering strategic interests through proxy warfare. I will argue that this perception is clouded. The regional sectarian violence is really a theatrical showdown between two regional rising stars: Iran and Saudi Arabia, who puppeteer such violence to incubate a new balance of power in the Middle East, where Iran's rising power unhinges Saudi hegemony.

Questioning a Balance

In international relations, balance of power theory endures, yet is seldom experimented upon. If Kenneth Waltz saw the Middle East today, he might consider it a picturesque representation of anarchy. The competitors view themselves as custodians of Islam, vying for control in a region that has lacked a consistent multipolar power dynamic. Hans Morgenthau deems that the balance of power is a “perennial element” in international relations, regardless of the “contemporary conditions” of the international system. Many scholars are looking to the Middle East as a hub that places traditional realpolitik back in business -- and see that play out between the power plays between Tehran and Riyadh.

In the balance of power, states use various mechanisms to balance. There is equilibrium of power that mandates states adjust accordingly; when one makes gains, the other must outmaneuver to re-balance the scales. In the Middle East, however, the mechanisms of balance of power differ from those in the West. States do not necessarily focus on power plays amongst one another, but rather on what scholar Stacie Goddard calls the “dynamics of collective mobilization” and struggles for influence among political communities. To manipulate the balance of power in the Middle East, states must first establish one – something both Tehran and Riyadh have done through decades of military, economic, and religious expansion. States’ mechanisms to achieve regional power are not as simple as the West’s, and concentrate primarily on the nationalization and expansion of crude oil industries, leveraging their control of regional institutions (like the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the United Arab League) tapping into the anger of the Sunni-Shi’a divide, feeding nationalist fires, vying for huge arms deals with Western countries, and competing for great powers’ good graces. Saudi Arabia and Iran have been at odds over the region’s balance of power, moving levers to advance their position and hollow out a decaying power structure.

Exploring Historical Ramifications

Is some of this sectarian violence a motive that truly reflects the interests of both states, or a sway of rhetoric?  Before looking forward to understand these possibilities, we must reflect on the history between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Regional supremacy in the Arab World has been a strategic goal of Iran since the days of the Shah and since the al-Saud family’s rise to power. While these objectives are not new, the opportunities to achieve them are. The weakened governments in Iraq and Syria, the dormant Shi’a minority populations under Saudi-supporting leaders, and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action under the International Atomic Energy Agency all bolster Iran’s hopes to spread its influence in the Arab World, and incentivize Saudi Arabia to halt them in their steps.

Since the rule of the House of Saud, Sunni Wahhabism has thrived in Saudi society today and dictates the shape of its foreign policy. When the Crown Prince Saud came to power in 1953, he seized the opportunity to enhance the state’s presence in international trade. The years that followed introduced OPEC in 1960, the OIC in 1969, ownership of Aramco in 1980, and founded the GCC in 1981. Throughout this period, the Saudis learned the importance of dollar diplomacy and economic mastery. The 1990’s saw the al Sauds using the American relationship to advance their position and maintain stability in neighboring states by, for example, requesting American intervention in Kuwait in 1990. But it was in 2011 when the state of the union began to evolve for Saudi Arabia. The Arab Spring struck a chord with the al Sauds, prompting the government to ban public protests by Shi’a minorities in the East, to crack down in neighboring Bahrain, and to violate several international human rights obligations. Post Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia has sighed relief in maintaining regional control, yet looks upon their neighbors with caution.

Shi’a Islam has always been a key fixture in Persian society in Iran, and for centuries. But it was in 1979 when the Shah was exiled and the Islamic fundamentalist, Ayatollah Khomeini rose to power, spreading messages of anti-Americanism, call for the Shah’s extradition, the infamous Hostage Crisis at the United States Embassy in Tehran, and attempting to thread Shi’a Islam and nationalism together. It was during the 1980’s when Iran closely aligned itself with Russia, pushing the United States in the direction of the Saudis -- establishing a dynamic that served as the ‘status quo’ until the twenty-first century. The United States introduced the first round of sanctions against Iran in the 1990s, with oil and trade sanctions justified by an alleged support of terrorist organizations. The second wave began in the early 2000s, with the IAEA suspicious of uranium enrichment programs and a United Nations investigation, continued with the 2005 discovery of Iran’s violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Just in 2015, the international community has reached a long-awaited Joint-Comprehensive Plan of Action with the Iranian government on limiting the state’s nuclear production facilities through inspections.

The Middle East’s balance of power crucially shifted in 1979. The Iranian Revolution exacerbated Western-Iranian tensions and swung the United States to the side of the Saudis. The decades that followed saw the rivals compete for foreign alliances and play their animosity out through calculated measures, such as attacking embassies in 1988, cutting diplomatic relations in 1989, and carrying out small proxy wars in neighboring conflicts, such as Bahrain, Yemen, Iraq, and of course, Syria.

Sectarianism as a Political Sheath

Today we are witnessing the second phase of this tense relationship come to fruition. This has been accomplished through both states’ angering sectarian factions. Farea al Muslimi, an analyst, states, “All the sectarian rhetoric is becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy for these regimes who love to play the sectarian card.” In 1991, Iran and Saudi Arabia resumed diplomatic relations, and both nations experienced a relatively friendly period until the American intervention in Iraq in 2003, where Saudi Arabia perceived Iran manipulating Shi’a militants with the defeat of the Ba’athist Regime. Scholar Brendan O’Neill claims that “much of the bloodshed in Syria is an expression of the Saudi-Iranian battle for the vacuum created by the post-Cold War,” and this rings true when applying balance of power theory.

When the Arab Spring was alive and well, Iran perceived these uprisings as precious opportunities to support Shi’a minorities in neighboring Gulf States, while Saudi Arabia saw it necessary to defend them. I say this because in 2011, Bahrain experienced attempted revolution with the return of Shi’a activist Hassan Mushaima – believed collaborate with Iran – and popular demand for a republic. Days later, Saudi Arabia and the GCC sent military-transport vehicles into Bahrain to stop the uprising in its path. But this is a two-way street. One can see Iranian attempts for influence across the region through the funding of terrorism and revolutionary missions. In Lebanon, Iran has funded the Shi’a terrorist organization, Hezbollah. In Palestine, Iran has been linked with Hamas. In Bahrain – a 61.3% majority Shi’a country under Sunni leadership – it has been hinted Iran encouraged Shi’a citizens to protest al Khalifa’s leadership. In Yemen, Iran funded the Zaidi Shi’a rebels, called Houthis, in a successful attack upon the Yemeni government and President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, forcing him to flee in February 2015. Saudi Arabia followed up with aggressive airstrikes to defend their custodianship of Sunni Islam and purview of their southern neighbors. In Syria, both powers vie for influence among the sectarian divide, with Iran deploying their elite Revolutionary Guards to defend the Alawite Assad Regime and allegedly pour $9 billion into the war effort. This cat and mouse game has molded Iran into of a regional risk-taker and Saudi Arabia into a vulnerable monarchy, cornered and cautious of its neighbors, yet ready to defend those loyal to Sunni religiosity.

Yet, if one singular event turned this cold war between Tehran and Riyadh hot, it has been the Iranian nuclear deal. The inclusion of Iran in the international community is a fundamental threat to Saudi Arabia’s status quo, a status quo backed by a series of American administrations and supplemented through an expensive oil trade that ensured Saudi Arabia a strategic advantage over Tehran. The relationship with the United States has been integral in striking a truly unipolar balance of power in the region, and both states understand that. Saudi Arabia, along with the rest of Gulf countries, knows too well the historical lesson that a weakened relationship with the United States leaves them at the doorstep of their foes. A long-standing ally of the United States, Saudi Arabia feels “betrayed, and now they feel like they must do something, even if it’s the wrong thing.” Riyadh sees the Iran nuclear deal in zero-sum terms and has calculated a more aggressive strategy against Iranian presence in the Gulf, further enhancing this rivalry. To mask this insecurity, Saudi Arabia has been buffering its defense systems. Riyadh has established a 34-member military campaign against terrorism, with states such as Qatar and Pakistan, an alliance that alienates Iran, Syria, and Iraq, despite sharing a common enemy: ISIS. Saudi Arabia’s aggressive foreign policy leaves it vulnerable in the region. Its friends in the Gulf have prompted questioning, its reliable allies in the Levant have frayed under the spark of revolution, and Iran has broken the status quo.

Manipulating the Threads of Sectarianism

For these two regional powers, the logic of driving such a hard-lined sectarian agenda lies in maintaining domestic stability. Escalating sectarian tensions does not only establish a state as a custodian of its religious sect, but also attempts to promote nationalism among citizens.  As has been the case of stirring nationalism at home, foreign threats have also assisted in this pursuit. ISIS – while a threat to national security – has furthered nationalism, especially within Iran. ISIS has deemed itself the true representation of Sunni Islam and has persecuted Shi’a militants, governments, and civilians as a result. While ISIS brands itself as Sunni, it has been a clear-cut national security threat in Saudi Arabia. Yet, Saudi Arabia has tried to catapult itself into the role of commander in an Arab operation against the Islamic State. While it has shared success in isolating Iran, it has garnered several problems in its organization. First of all, Saudi Arabia has named the mission, “The Islamic Coalition,” yet has isolated important Muslim-majority states in the region, such as Syria and Iraq.

When the Kingdom executed al Nimr and ceased diplomatic relations with Iran – a calculated public relations strategy – it expected GCC states to follow their lead. Thus far, only Bahrain and Sudan have cut relations with Tehran, and the United Arab Emirates has promised to “downgrade” their relations with the Persian state. Yet the remaining series of the Saud family’s allies have remained – an unflinching demonstration of shifting confidence between traditional alliances.

Theorizing for the Future

Saudi Arabia and Iran’s rivalry in the region will certainly not alter the global power balance, but it will establish a new dynamic in a region. Looking forward, there are many reasons for Saudi Arabia to be cautious, as there many opportunities and bellicose maneuvers for Iran to seize.

When applying balance of power theory to Middle Eastern sectarian violence, one will realize that two powerhouses are not only tapping into existing ancient Islamic lesions, but also adopting a religious persona that compromises any political exhaustion of the Arab Spring and a fraying political system of dictators. Moving forward, government officials and citizens should be concerned that a rivalry between the two giants will give the Islamic State more leeway to operate and execute their objectives. In addition, the deteriorating relations will deter the momentum of the Syrian Peace Process, and establish an undercurrent of tension that will undercut whatever diplomatic resolution comes to fruition.

Through this we can build, we must build, a defense against repetition.