Worlds Collide: The Significance of the Abraham Accord and the Future of the Middle East

Introduction

On September 9th, Christian Tybring-Gjedde—member of the Norwegian parliament and populist Progress Party—nominated US president Donald Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize. Tybring-Gjedde was shortly followed by Swedish MP Magnus Jacobsson, and most recently four Australian law professors led by Dr. David Flint. All of these come ahead of the recent peace deals between Israel and the Persian Gulf states of the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Bahrain. These three parties have issued their support for Trump on grounds of their personal appreciation for his sentiments regarding the corruption of Western governments and unfettered immigration. This is not even the first time Tybring-Gjedde has espoused his support for Donald Trump, with the MP formally nominating Trump in 2018. The peace deal in the Middle East instead serves to underline how these individuals have interpreted the success of Donald Trump’s administration at home and abroad. Understandably, a fair deal of press has begun to circulate over this issue. Not only has partisan debate arisen concerning the nature of the deals themselves, but additionally over whether the President is deserving of these nominations. 

In regards to the Abraham Accord (the Israeli-Emirati treaty), the Director for the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic & International Studies Zbigniew Brzezinski has stated: “This will radically change the way Arab states will deal with each other and their problems.” Not only is this a win for Israel and its people, it is telling of a marketed shift away from the hegemonic control of Saudi Arabia and more autonomy in how the Gulf States—and the Arab World as a whole—deal with interstate issues. However, other commentators are less impressed. In mid-August, Steven A. Cook of the Center on Foreign Relations (CFR) correctly predicted Bahrain’s deal, but noted silence from Saudi Arabia and opposition from Qatar, Turkey, and most notably Iran. 

Similarly, Trump’s nomination has received an apparent partisan reaction. For Republicans, these peace deals have provided an easy point of praise for the Trump administration in the foreign policy realm. Jared Kushner—who was heavily involved with the deal—took the opportunity to praise Donald Trump for his “historic peace effort”. Alabama 2nd District candidate Barry Moore similarly expressed that the UAE-Bahrain-Israel peace deal was “truly a historic moment”. Opponents to Trump have conversely flipped his praise to contrast it with his failings in the foreign policy arena. Some have claimed that Trump has destroyed the US reputation for foreign policy entirely, and that this is only a drop in the bucket in a history of failures. This is the same debate which has prompted whether the successful Middle East summit is truly a landmark win.

Aside from partisan divides in Congress, negative reactions to the Abraham Accord have gained traction mostly out of their comparative analyses. Though some journalists praise the work of Trump’s Emirati-Bahraini delegation in securing the treaty, they report that this success follows a similar trend of foreign policy in the Trump Administration. Rather than nurturing friendships and maintaining alliances, critics of the “Trump Doctrine” laude it for comprising of diplomatic stunts; policies made to impress and awe rather than inspire change. For instance, Trump’s talks with North Korea are lauded as an act of grand-standing. They do more to inflate the ego of the administration than do anything productive.

Still, supporters and opponents alike argue the possible historic weight of these talks. Rather than looking to the past to influence policy in the Middle East, the Abraham Accords have attempted to “look forward”. Where treaties with other countries have been mostly done out of a means to discontinue armed conflict and align interests with the US, the Abraham Accords have been signed purely out of the interest of opening new roads for discussion with Israel and paving the road to increased measures of diplomacy in the region. The ramifications of the Abraham Accords are far-reaching, and it’s necessary to grasp them fully before judging the weight of them completely.

Before the Abraham Accord

It is no secret that Middle Eastern politics are complicated, but they become near unnavigable when the debate over Israel is thrown into the mix. The origin of this issue has to do with the creation of Israel post-World War II to give a homeland for displaced Jews. This decision fell in line with proposals from Zionists since the dawn of the 20th century, who were eager to escape persecution in the West by having their own ethnic homeland. Unfortunately, regardless of historical claims to the region, over the millennia, the region had become home to a significant Muslim Arab population. In a textbook example of decolonization, the British Mandate of Palestine was partitioned to arbitrarily grant land to the new Jewish population. As history suggests, the outcome of this plan led to a bloody civil war. Although this civil war is long over, its outcome has culminated in a micro-level cold war between Israel and Palestine. 

The Arab World has had mixed approaches to the Israel-Palestine conflict. Historically, Arab leaders of Sunni and Shi’ite stripes opposed the state’s very creation, and went out of their way to avoid interaction with it. While more moderate clerics and liberal politicians have been open to acknowledging Israel’s existence and opening talks, few countries have been willing to open diplomatic relations. Prior to the Abraham Accord, the only Arab nations to have recognized Israel were Turkey (1949), Egypt (1979), and Jordan (1994). In spite of their recognition of Israel, there remain complications to their relationships.

Turkey’s recognition of the state of Israel was certainly important for the era, yet primarily derived from Western influence on Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War. Egypt’s relations similarly came out of the involvement of the United States with the Camp David Accords. Anwar Sadat, president of Egypt, was seeking a closer alliance with the US and thus acted to service the broader interests of his own country. The treaty between Jordan and Israel was most deliberately influenced by the Westwith US president Bill Clinton politically pressuring and promising to forgive Jordanian debts for a peace deal with Israel after years of conflict. None of the countries who signed peace deals possess a significant amount of kindness toward Israel in their populace. According to an opinion poll from Vox, as of 2013, Turkey and Egypt held a favorability rating of Israel amounting to 8% and 1% respectively. Much of Jordan’s population is descendent from Palestinian refugees, who near-universally view Israel and its Jewish population with animosity.

The source of this animosity between Arabs and Israelis is at once simple and complicated. According to the Anti-Defamation League, well over 74% of the Middle East harbors anti-semitic views. For everyday Arabs in the Middle East—specifically those of the Muslim faith—Israel is an extension of Western imperialism and Jewish conspiracy. Thus, Zionism (the ideology advocating for the establishment of a Jewish state, specifically in the historic area of Palestine), its advocates, and Israel itself must be eradicated. Although more liberal elements of the Middle East have tried to claim that they are simple anti-Israel rather than anti-Jewish, it is clear that this is merely a dog-whistle to justify anti-semitic policies in the Middle East.

However, the more complex part of this equation is that there are social and political barriers to peace between Israel and Arab states as well. While individuals in the region value their religion greatly—the very name of the Abraham Accord is an eponymous reference to Jews and Muslims being children of Abraham—support of Palestine remains a key issue for Arab officials. Bolder countries like Qatar have directly supported Palestinian paramilitary groups, but for a majority of the Middle East, the question of supporting Israel cannot even be approached because it effectively abandons their support for Palestine. Thus, not only are Israelis left with little hope due to cultural divides, but for political and social obstacles as well.

On a geopolitical scale, the Middle East’s concentration of power has gravitated toward Saudi Arabia in recent years, primarily in response to the growing threat of an Iranian superpower. The reasons for this are varied. There is certainly something to be found in the rivalry toward Sunni and Shi’a sects of Islam for which the Saudi and Iranian governments serve to respectively represent. In the absence of a modern caliph, modern Sunnis have the House of Saud to look to in the containment of the Shi’ite threat of the Ayatollah Khamenei. For modern Shi’a Muslims, the revolutionary theocracy of the Ayatollah is a necessity to spread a Pan-Islamic revolution outside of the bounds of Iran.

It is because of this divide between Muslims then that Middle Eastern states act mostly in allegiance to Saudi Arabia. For instance, it is the means for the Saudis (and to an extent the Qataris) to justify their intervention in the Yemeni Civil War in providing arms to fight against perceived Iranian influence and the growth of Shi’ite Islam. Thus, the common foe of Iran has served to unite the Gulf and Levant states around Saudi Arabia, just as the problem of Israel has served to divide them.

Impact of the Abraham Accord

Through the Abraham Accord, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates have broken away from the common consensus among the Saudi-led coalition that Israel should be disavowed and Palestine should be supported. While the duo are far from the first countries in the Middle East to normalize relations with Israel, they do follow a common trend in the quest for closer relations with the United States by extension. These treaties represent more of a political move by the elite than a rising consensus among the populace. Whether the rest of the Arab World is to follow remains unclear, and highlights a discrepancy in the allegiance of these ambitious Gulf States to their counterparts as well as their hegemon: Saudi Arabia. 

To understand why the UAE and Bahrain agreed to normalize relations, a quick recap of recent events between the US and these countries is needed. The Abraham Accords point out that its signatories are “Recalling the reception held on January 28, 2020, at which President Trump presented his Vision for Peace.” The direct reference of this quote comes from the ambitions of the Trump administration to solve the Israel-Palestine conflict. Critics of the plan—while noting its complexity and adherence to a two-state solution—have lambasted it for being too one-sided and giving preference to Israel over Palestine.

However, whether the Vision for Peace is possible is a digression. The point is that the involvement of the United States in this agreement is salient even in the wording. Mention of the United States are only made three times, but it is where they count: in outlining the US’ future involvement in a “Strategic Agenda for the Middle East” and in “Expressing deep appreciation to the United States for its profound contribution to this historic achievement”. Just as with the Camp David Accords, there is a reason that Donald Trump is an official signatory of this treaty: because it is part of a larger goal to divert states in the Middle East toward recognizing and opening ties with Israel.

Interestingly, just as with Egypt, Turkey, and Jordan, neither the UAE nor Bahrain have particularly favorable views of Israel or its people. In the former, the lead-up to the Abraham Accord was one of skepticism and outrage toward the government. The phrase “Normalisation is Treason” trended among Emirati citizens, though particularly among ethnic Saudi youth. A petition—the Palestine Charter—opposing normalization reached more than one million signers from the Emirates. Only because of fear of government crackdown and the desire for a closer relationship with the US did Bahraini citizens quiet their dissent against the treaty. While the elites of these countries have signed the deal, its people are not so sure.

In addition, there are definitely ramifications for the greater Muslim World at stake, especially in the Gulf. Although Oman—and, surprisingly, Sudan—have agreed to seek relations with Israel, other states like Kuwait have condemned the treaty and Saudi Arabia has specifically demanded the condition of Palestine incorporating the Israeli-controlled Jerusalem as its capital for peace. Iran more ardently opposed the treaty alongside Turkey and the people of Palestine. These actors claimed that the peace deal of the UAE and Bahrain with Palestine was not only wrong, but a violation of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative which had been reaffirmed by both signing parties in 2017.

The future of the Middle East is an uncertainty. It is clear now that we will not be seeing a universal recognition in the Middle East of Israel any time soon—there is simply far too much ground to cover. But there is more to this peace deal than the outcome of Israeli sovereignty. For one: the Abraham Accord denotes a marked shift in the power dynamics of the Middle East. Where the UAE and Bahrain might have gone along with the indifference of the Saudis toward Israel—perhaps even outwardly supporting Palestinian revolutionaries—just a few years ago, this move has revealed a weak link in the armor of the Saudi coalition. Not only are the two Gulf states now more isolated from their Sunni brethren, but the alliance itself is now more unstable than it was previously.
Ultimately, what will be the final result of the Abraham Accord is hard to say. Brzezinski of the CSIS who I referenced earlier acknowledges: “The biggest losers are probably the Palestinians.” The heaviest role of the Middle East in refusing to acknowledge Israel was a sense of pan-Arab solidarity. Sans the influence of outliers, it was part and parcel of Middle Eastern policy since the Bush administration that Israel was in an underdog battle with the US in its ring against the rest of the Arab World. Now, it has put that dynamic into flux. While we will have to wait and see what the future holds, one can only hope that the redefinition of Middle Eastern policy will follow a more peaceful, more cooperative path in the wake of the Abraham Accord.

What's Next? A Recap of Israel's Elections and What Lies Ahead

 It is unlikely, but not impossible, that Israel will return for the third round of elections this year, with the most likely outcome being a unity government with power-sharing between Blue and White and Likud, with Yisrael Beytenu leader Avigdor Liberman maintaining a senior cabinet position. It remains to be seen whether Blue and White leader Benny Gantz will give up his opposition to splitting the premiership while Likud Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is under indictment, or whether Likud will buck Netanyahu as the head of their party in order to form a government.  

On October 24, 2019, it was announced that Netanyahu and Gantz will meet in the near future to discuss the possibility of forming a unity government. After Netanyahu’s failure to form a coalition, President Reuven Rivlin has tasked Gantz with doing so. Blue and White has said that Gantz has spoken with each of the leaders of the various factions elected to the Knesset. Likud confirmed there would be a meeting between Gantz and Netanyahu, but Netanyahu would be negotiating on behalf of the bloc of right-wing and religious parties loyal to him and stressed he would not enter a coalition without those 55 members behind him. Blue and White previously rejected this negotiation. 

The Knesset is Israel’s unicameral parliament which is made up of 120 lawmakers. The prime minister is the coalition leader of the Knesset, generally the head of the party with the greatest number of seats. In an election, voters vote for a party rather than individual candidates, with seats in the Knesset apportioned according to the percentage of votes each party receives in the election. After the election, a coalition government must be formed by the elected representatives in the Knesset. A ruling coalition generally must have at least 61 members to ensure a majority of the 120 seats, though it is possible to form a “minority government” with less than 61 seats, provided opposition parties approve the coalition from the outside. 

The president of Israel formally asks whichever party leader he or she feels is most likely to be successful in forming a government to attempt to form a governing coalition. Since no party has ever achieved a 61-vote majority on its own, they have always relied on other parties to join the coalition. Following the September 17th election, President Rivlin gave Netanyahu the first mandate to form a government, which lasted 28 days and ended on October 21st when Netanyahu returned the mandate, having failed to form a coalition. 

The 22nd Knesset was elected on September 17th, 2019 and features nine political parties, represented by 120 members of Parliament. There are three main political groupings: Blue and White, Likud, and Orthodox parties. Blue and White, with 33 seats, is a newly formed party led by formed Israel Defense Force (IDF) Chief of Staff Benny Gantz, a political neophyte who ran on a centrist platform primarily against perceived corruption by Netanyahu and his government. Gantz pledged on the campaign trail that he would not form a government with Netanyahu, who will soon face indictment on several alleged corruption cases. Next is Likud with 31 seats. Likud is Prime Minister Netanyahu’s party and is the largest right-wing party in Israel. The party remains committed to keeping Netanyahu in office despite the pending indictments. Finally, there are 17 seats held by two primary Orthodox parties: Shas and United Torah Judaism (UTJ). Shas has previously joined coalitions led by Likud, supporting Netanyahu in the elections. The party has no stance on a two-state solution, and they lean right on other social issues. On the other hand, UTJ is a non-Zionist faction which does not endorse the creation of a secular Jewish state, but which supported Netanyahu in the elections.

Additionally, there are also other factions playing a role in the elections. Joint List, with 13 seats, is a unified ticket of four major Israeli Arab parties that have become the third-largest faction of the Knesset. There is the communist party Hadash, the secular Arab interest party Ta’al, the conservative Islamist United Arab List, and the nationalist Balad party. Then there are Left-wing Zionist parties with 11 total seats. The Israeli political left is represented by the Labor-Gesher and the Democratic Camp, two smaller parties who adhere to leftist domestic and foreign policies but also embrace Zionism as opposed to the Joint List which is generally anti-Zionist and made up of majority Arab-Israeli parties. There is also Yamina with seven seats, which is a united list of right-wing parties who are in support of Netanyahu, and Yisrael Beiteinu with 8 seats. Yisrael Beiteinu is the right-wing political party led by Liberman that was founded to represent the concern of Israel’s million-plus Russian-speaking immigrant community. The party is a proponent of Lieberman’s plan to achieve a two-state solution, which calls for Israel to annex large parts of the West Bank in Israel that are predominantly Arab.

To summarize all of the competing parties, the Israel Policy Forum groups them into three blocs. The first is the pro-Netanyahu bloc, which is a united front of right-wing and ultra-Orthodox parties that has 55 total seats. The second bloc is comprised of a group of centrist, left-wing Zionist and Arab political parties that oppose Netanyahu with a total of 57 seats. The last bloc is Yisrael Beiteinu who controls eight seats and whose secularist leader Liberman has pledged not to sit in a coalition that includes either the religious parties or the Arab ones. In all, there are four potential outcomes to the elections: a unity government (Gantz, Netanyahu, Liberman); a unity government minus Netanyahu (with Gantz, Gideon Saar, Liberman); a Minority government with Gantz, Liberman, and Arab parties in minority, or a bloc of the left and religious parties. 

A unity government between Kachol Lavan (33 seats), Likud (32 seats), and Yisrael Beiteinu (eight seats) would total 73 seats. This would require compromises from both Likud and Kachol Lavan. Netanyahu and Likud would be required to cede control over the right-wing “bloc,” the smaller parties the prime minister is currently negotiating on behalf of. There is also President Rivlin’s proposal, which calls for a rotating premiership, something Kachol Lavan adamantly opposed on the campaign trail. Mr. Netanyahu would serve as prime minister first, but if charged, he would declare himself incapacitated while he sorted out his legal troubles. Mr. Gantz would then serve as acting prime minister with full powers. Finally, there is Liberman’s plan, which is somewhat like Rivlin's proposal. Like Rivlin, Liberman calls for a rotating premiership between Netanyahu and Gantz. However, Liberman’s plan would also require Netanyahu to back out of an agreement with the religious right-wing bloc. These parties (Shas, United Torah Judaism, and the Ayelet Shaked-led Yamina alliance) could only join the government later based on agreements that the three parties will have to reach amongst themselves. As a part of his plan, Liberman also hopes for this unity government to focus on two key issues. First, he wishes to reach an agreement with Likud and Kahol Lavan to pass a law that would force ultra-Orthodox yeshiva students to draft into the military and nix a law that would keep supermarkets close on Shabbat. Second, Lieberman wants the parties to discuss minimizing budgets, raising taxes and finding a permanent solution for the situation in the Gaza Strip. 

For a unity government without Netanyahu, there would be Gantz, Gideon Saar, and Liberman. Theoretically, Likud could have joined a unity government without Netanyahu and with Kachol Lavan.  However, the party supported the prime minister’s push for new elections instead. Likud MKs like Gideon Saar and Michal Shir, perceived as critical of Netanyahu, ultimately voted in favor of dissolving the Knesset and moving to new elections. 

Gantz could form a minority government with Liberman and Arab parties in the minority. Likud said in its campaign that both Liberman and Joint List chairman Ayman Odeh had spoken about recommending Gantz as prime minister. However, a government that includes both those parties, which despise each other, seems impossible. Liberman has said he won’t join a coalition with the Arab parties, and most factions within the Joint List reacted with outrage to Odeh’s comment about possible political cooperation with Gantz. Gantz has the option of forming a minority government with outside support from the Arab parties — a course advocated by Democratic Camp’s Ehud Barak — but neither side would be thrilled with that arrangement and the resulting government would be on extremely shaky ground. 

A coalition government between the Left and Religious blocs is unlikely, but at this point could very well be possible. The question remains what would it take to get the left-wing bloc without the Arab parties, but concessions to get the orthodox parties onboard? One option could be for the ultra-Orthodox parties to join Gantz, Labor-Gesher and the Democratic Camp. Similar center-left governments with the Haredi parties existed in Israel decades ago, but Shas and United Torah Judaism (UTJ) have in recent decades become automatic supporters of Likud. UTJ already declared it stood by Likud “all the way.” Another problem is that as it stands, those parties seem to add up to a very narrow majority — not a recipe for a stable coalition.  

Israel is returning for the third round of elections, signaling a second failure by Netanyahu to form a government, as well as a failure by Gantz in his first test as a political leader. The responsibility to form a unity government shifted to Gantz and he had 28 days to do so. The 28 days passed and no coalition was formed, so a third election is the last resort. If Gantz couldn’t form a government within his allotted time, the president also had the option to hand the task to Parliament, giving lawmakers an additional 21 days to come up with a candidate who can command a majority. Many thought this was the more likely option, as no one desired another election. Netanyahu was also reliant on the fact that the public and political pressure to avoid a third election would have persuaded the half-dozen additional lawmakers, whose support he needed, to come to his side. 

Israel could have avoided the third round of elections if any of the major parties dropped their necessary conditions for an agreement: Likud’s retention of Netanyahu as head of the party, Gantz’s refusal to share the premiership with Netanyahu under indictment, and Liberman’s refusal to serve with the Arab parties. As a dual kingmaker and spoiler, Lieberman will likely prevail with his demands.  

The early polls for the third Israeli election in the span of a year, scheduled for March 2, 2020, predict another inconclusive result: that is, neither the Center-Left-Arab bloc (to the extent that such a thing actually exists) nor the Right-Religious bloc, minus Avigdor Liberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu party, are expected to win a majority in the Knesset. Likud and Kachol Lavan are still in a horse race with the latter having a slight edge. There will be nearly three months of campaigning, which can always make a difference, but if the election were held today the needle would barely move.

Israeli politics should not be where it is today. The second election was an unnecessary embarrassment, brought on by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s refusal to play by the same rules applied to his immediate predecessor, Ehud Olmert, and the prospect of a third vote is out-and-out shameful for the very same reason: think what you will of Kachol Lavan’s inconsistent and muddled negotiating strategy, it is Netanyahu’s insistence on serving as prime minister through at least the early stages of an indictment while requesting the Knesset grant him immunity, that has prevented a new coalition from being formed. Gantz has a slight advantage in the blame game, but the anger that may erupt with the dissolution of the twenty-second Knesset (perhaps exacerbated by President Reuven Rivlin’s intervention, in which he blamed both sides equally) can turn on anyone in a volatile news cycle.

Understanding The Bellicosity of Israel’s Defense Policy

Israel is a state that inspires passionate debate, particularly surrounding its use of force, or, more specifically, its willingness to use violent force as a first option, as they perhaps most controversially did at the start of the Six-Day War. In early June of 1967, Israel responded to Arab troop build-ups with an effective pre-emptive strike against Egyptian airfields, launching what is now known as the “Six-Day War.” International law, however, is murky on whether or not pre-emptive strikes are legal.

What could explain this bellicose military policy? Israel is far from a universally-accepted state, and thus has little political capital to spare on controversial military endeavors. This article proposes that the most fruitful way to comprehend the military policies of Israel is to utilize the theory of Constructivism. When using the lens of Constructivism, outsiders can peer into the Israeli, and Jewish, zeitgeist. The roots of Israeli military policy are found in the ways in which Jews, and thus the Israeli military establishment, understand certain threats. Due to the threat perception of the Israeli military establishment, the international system is viewed as a Realist one, suggesting that existential threats can only be circumvented through the accumulation of power, and the willingness to use it. While it is beyond the scope of this article to either defend or criticize Israeli bellicosity, reaching a peaceful solution to the cleavages plaguing the Israel versus Palestine paradigm is dependent upon understanding the zeitgeists of all involved factions.

Constructivism: Understanding Israel’s View Of Threats Through Stories, Violence, and Oppression

Constructivism is a theory of international relations positing that international actors “construct” their own identities and realities. The experiences, stories, and history of a people create a shared identity and a perceived context around different situations. In the political sphere, these constructed identities and perceptions synthesize to generate policies. To a nation, such as Israel, that possesses a history and identity imbued with persecution, less severe threats, such as a one-off stabbing, are viewed existentially, demanding decisive and oftentimes, destructive, action.

One example of Constructivism’s usefulness as an explanatory tool concerns the different attitudes toward intra-European war during the 1900s. Prior to World War II, war in Europe was the product of intense nationalism, realpolitik and imperial ambitions. After the horror of World War II shocked European society, new initiatives to integrate European states ensued because Europeans realized that they could not continue on such a destructive and divisive path. The constructed realities of nationalism and the subsequent warmongering gave way to the new realities of a fully-integrated community of European nations with the establishment of the European Union, forming a new body politic. The change from frequent wars to a genuine attempt at perpetual peace in Europe is best understood through Constructivism. An appreciation of different viewpoints and zeitgeists provides us with an explanatory model of an actor’s actions.

Understanding Israel’s actions in 1967 is predicated on acknowledging the recent and painful history of Jews and how it informs the state’s military policies. The modern Israeli state is an ideological project, one created to provide a safe space for the Jewish people to prosper away from the existential threats that have historically tended to plague them. One of the fathers of Zionism, Theodore Herzl, promulgates in his famous pamphlet, Der Judenstaat (translated literally: The State of The Jews), notions of anti-Semitism as hatred of the Jews as a nation, not a religion or culture. In other words, to the wave of 1800s anti-Semites, Judaism was a biological race, not simply a religion. This new wave of hatred peaked with the Holocaust, in which the Nazis systematically murdered approximately six million Jews (as well as millions of others).

Yet, the Holocaust was not the only instance or type of recent anti-Semitism Jews experienced. Consider the Kishinev Pogrom of 1903, in which drunken rioters murdered 49 Jews and destroyed the Jewish quarter. In 1905, rioters killed or wounded 66 Jews and looted 125 Jewish owned homes and businesses in the Dnepropetrovsk Pogrom. The Dreyfus Affair in 1894 highlighted a less violent form of anti-Semitism, in which implicit biases against Jews forced the perception that they were inherently treasonous criminals. Jewish-French army captain Alfred Dreyfus was falsely accused and punished for revealing sensitive information to Germany. In 1893, Karl Leuger founded the anti-Semitic “Christian Social Party,” and became the mayor of Vienna. Leuger and the Christian Social Party’s political success brought anti-Semitism into the mainstream of political thought, normalizing extreme individuals such as Georg Ritter von Schonerer, who held a young Adolf Hitler as an ardent follower. The synthesis of anti-Semitic politics with the encouraged violence of the pogroms created a seriously inhospitable atmosphere for Jews. Yet, Jews were not altogether unaccustomed to such antagonism and, in many ways, the stories created in the time preceding this new race based anti-Semitism helped to inform the ways in which Jews, and eventually Israelis, perceived threats.

Several Jewish holidays either commemorate or mourn Jews who overcame or succumbed to genocide, diaspora, and enslavement. Purim, Passover, Sukkot, Hannukah, and Yom HaShoah are all concerned with different, and violent, events in Jewish history. The synthesis of the stories with the all-too-recent memories of oppression and genocide in the 1800s and 1900s facilitates the view that any threat is an existential threat to either the Jewish identity or Jewish lives.

Purim is a holiday that celebrates the defeat of Persian Prime Minister Haman. Haman had ordered all of the component nations living in the Persian Empire to bow to him, and when the leader of the Jews, Mordechai, refused, Haman sentenced all Jews to death. The emperor of Persia, however, was married to a Jew (unbeknownst to him), and when this information came to light, Haman was executed. According to this story, ancient Jews had successfully circumvented their genocide through strategic planning and clever manipulation of court politics.

Passover concerns the escape of Jewish slaves from Egypt. As the story goes, Egypt had enslaved Jews for many years, forcing them to build pyramids and lavish palaces for the Pharaohs while living in squalor. Moses, who eventually became one of the Jewish leaders, brought a message to the Pharaoh from God. When the Pharaoh refused to emancipate his Jewish slaves, God sent ten plagues, culminating in the deaths of Egyptian first-born sons. After the Pharaoh’s son died, he freed the Jewish slaves (only to chase them through the desert immediately after). Jewish slaves were able obtain freedom through the use of overwhelming force in the form of plagues. In the aftermath of Jewish emancipation from Egypt, the former slaves wandered the Sinai desert for 40 years, living as nomads. This diaspora is remembered through the holiday Sukkot, in which Jews are encouraged to sleep and eat in huts covered in branches in remembrance of their stateless history, placing further emphasis on the need for a home in which Jews may permanently and safely live.

Hanukkah commemorates the success of a violent guerrilla movement, called The Maccabees, over the Syrian-Greek Seleucid Dynasty, who ruled the land that became Israel. The Seleucids attempted to Hellenize the Jews, converting them to their religion and destroying Jewish holy places, especially the Grand Temple in Jerusalem. Antiochus, the leader of The Seleucids, was wary of an indigenous guerrilla movement and sent a general named Apolonius, along with (roughly) 40,000 soldiers, to eliminate the threat. Judah, the leader of the Maccabees, responded defiantly, stating “Let us fight to the death in defense of our souls and our Temple!” Eventually, and against all odds, the Maccabees won, restoring the Temple to its original glory. In this case, the desire to preserve the Jewish identity against either overwhelming odds or the threat of forced assimilation called for a fierce and incredibly brutal defense.

Yom HaShoah is both the day of remembrance for Jewish victims of the Holocaust, as well as a celebration of Jewish resistance to the genocide. On Yom HaShoah, all activities in Israel are centered on spreading knowledge about the Holocaust. Entertainment programs are canceled in favor of interviews with survivors, businesses are closed, and two sirens, one at 11 am and one at sundown, calls for complete silence throughout Israel. The Israeli educational system, perhaps wishing to assign a more hopeful message to the holiday, discusses two forms of Jewish resistance against the Nazis: Passive resistance insofar as many Jews retained their Jewish identity throughout the Nazi’s rule; and active resistance such as the Warsaw Uprising (which shares the same date as Yom HaShoah). The dual focus on the preservation of Jewish identity as well as active resistance highlights the ultimate goal and primary method through which Israel intends to survive as a state: preservation of its Jewish character and a fiercely resilient and resolute defense.

The recent cases of anti-Semitism, such as the pogroms, Holocaust, and legal discrimination, mixed with the stories told every year during holiday gatherings promotes the perception that unless Jews take matters into their own hands, they will be at the mercy of those that wish to do them harm. The product of these experiences promotes three beliefs, first: threats are everywhere; second: most, if not all, threats are existential; and third: the only way to survive in the face of these threats is through the strength and military power of the Israeli state. Famous Israeli general Ehud Barak stated, “Until the wolf shall lay with the lamb, we’d better be wolves”, providing a key insight into how Israeli’s view and understand threats.

Israel, as a state founded by Jews, views the international system in a way that is largely informed by the experiences and realities Jews faced throughout history. As Barak stated, Israel views itself as a lamb, neither inherently violent nor bellicose, but surrounded by threatening wolves nonetheless, suggesting that Israel should become more wolf like, willing to strike decisively to continue as a state.

This understanding explains the events of the Six-Day War, in which Israel attacked Egypt first. Although this might ostensibly make Israel the aggressor, consider Israel’s viewpoint of the situation. Egypt announced hostility to Israel; set its military to its highest alertness level; expelled UN emergency forces from the shared Sinai Border; strengthened its forces on the same border; closed the important Straits of Tiran to Israeli ships; and fomented a more favorable balance of power by signing alliances with Iraq, Jordan, and Syria. To a state created by people with the shared history of subjugation and near destruction, this seemed to be a serious threat for the continued existence of Israel. The response to these threats was a swift and decisive attack, in which 90% of Egypt’s air force was suddenly destroyed without warning. A similar attack was also conducted in Syria. The aftermath of the surprise attacks provided Israel with a prodigious air advantage, and allowed them to capture the Gaza Strip and West Bank in three days. What was perhaps the most powerful and overwhelming alliance in the history of the Arab world was completely defeated in six days as a direct result of Israel’s threat perception and military policies.

The Israeli perception of threats promotes a view that the international system is a Realist one. Realists believe first that the international system is anarchic, in that there is no real central authority to regulate the actions of the state. Second, Realists believe states cannot be entirely sure of the actions of other states, which creates uncertainty and requires significant strategic planning. Finally, the way to ensure continued existence against such uncertainty is through power. States strive to be more powerful than other states because that is deemed the only way to deter unpredictable threats. Israel’s Realist understanding of the international system mandates an assertive defense policy.

Conclusion

Israel is a state mainly populated by Jews, who through stories and myths as well as all too recent memories of anti-Semitism and genocide, perceive the world as an inherently threatening and dangerous place. This zeitgeist is translated to the Israeli defense policy, which continually focuses on a twofold strategy centered on accruing and developing the newest technology and assertive and decisive responses to threats. While bellicosity certainly has its drawbacks, international condemnation, civilian casualties and accusations of warmongering chief among them, Israel feels the need to assert itself in such a way as to ensure its survival. The policies of the Israeli military are directly informed by the Jewish reality. The synthesis of these experiences and stories creates a hypersensitive threat perception, explaining the decisive actions and refusal to be bullied we saw enumerated in Israel’s pre-emptive strikes in 1967.