Fixing an International Dilemma in an Unstable Region: U.S. Mitigation of the Turkish-Kurdish Conflict

The Dilemma

The long-standing relationship between the United States and Turkey continues to deteriorate due to the intensifying armed conflict between the Turkish military and Kurdish insurgent groups in Syria, Iraq and Iran who desire an independent Kurdistan that would give them greater political and cultural rights.

To combat the Islamic State (IS), the United States supports the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union (PYD) and relies on the PYD’s military wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG). Yet the main reason for the ongoing U.S.-Turkey military conflict lies in US support of the PYD. Because Turkey is battling the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), a listed terrorist group that President Erdoğan believes is an offset of the PYD, Turkey sees American support for these Kurdish organizations as undermining their interests and regional power.

It is imperative that the United States act immediately to de-escalate the tensions between Turkey and various Kurdish insurgent groups while continuing the fight against the Islamic State, who, despite recently losing territory and influence in the region, continues to pose a threat to nearby countries and the US. The United States in particular is one of the leading actors in this issue, and must continue to be a primary fighting force, because national interests are at stake. As long-term NATO allies, the US and Turkey not only share an allyship, but Turkey is in a key geopolitical position, serving as a central point between Asia, Europe, and Africa. By mending their relationship with Turkey, the US will continue to be able to rely on Turkey as the only Muslim NATO member to serve as a bridge between the Western and Muslim worlds, which can help stabilize the volatile Middle East. Furthermore, Turkey similarly relies on the United States and its Western forces to battle the IS, a group that continues to engage in violent terrorist attacks within the country.

Failure to immediately rectify the situation may result in the degradation of the US-Turkey alliance and the growth of the Islamic State. Should the US side with the Kurds, they run the risk of Turkey strengthening their political and economic relationship with Russia, and it could push Turkey to further retaliate against the YPG and ultimately the US. Yet, the United States relies heavily on Kurdish insurgency groups, such as the PYD, as the main fighting forces against the IS on the ground, especially in aiding local Arab militias in Syria. Therefore, if the United States sides with Turkey, they may lose critical Kurdish trust and military support in the fight against the IS due to the tension between the Turks and the Kurds. Nevertheless, fixing the rising tensions is possible and can be done three ways: by revising the current Turkish Constitution, continuing to supply Kurdish fighters with American weapons, and utilizing the US-Turkey relationship as NATO allies to begin talks of a ceasefire.

First Recommendation: Modify the Turkish Constitution

The United States should encourage Turkey to make changes to its 1982 Constitution to grant basic rights back to the ethnic minority groups that reside in Turkey. Successfully updating the constitution should be a priority in solving the Turkish-Kurdish dispute. The conflict’s origins and subsequent intensification stems from the lack of rights attributed to the Kurds in the country’s constitution. The Turkish government historically oppressed Kurdish cultural identity and language through impediments in the process of assimilating them into society. After declaring itself a republic in 1923, Turkey’s capital of Ankara adopted an ideology with the goal of eliminating non-Turkish elements within Turkey, all of which were primarily Kurdish. The country’s efforts to “Turkify” individuals by relying on Turkish ethnicity to define citizenship resulted in the mass persecution of the Kurdish population, which is one of the driving forces behind the desire for an independent Kurdistan today.

As of now, the Turkish Constitution is authoritarian and alienating to those who aren’t of Turkish ethnicity, but unfortunately the discussion and possibility of revising the constitution has decreased. The lack of an inclusive constitution with rights and protections that extend to minority groups has been a factor in causing social unrest among the Kurdish population and furthering the mission of the PKK. This, again, contributed greatly to the Kurds’ desire to create an independent Kurdistan that would allow them to have greater political and cultural autonomy. Therefore, the Turkish Constitution should be revised immediately. Significant changes would make it more democratic and establish that all differences, such as ethnicity or language, are protected under the constitution. With this, the improvement in the view and treatment of the Kurds may lay the foundation for peace talks in the future.

Second Recommendation: Return to Supplying Arms

The United States should return to supplying weapons to Kurdish fighters in Syria who are combating the Islamic State. As of late 2017, President Trump announced that the US will no longer provide arms to the Kurds. However, the supply of weapons by the US is vital in creating a strongly armed group of Kurdish fighters that can successfully defend themselves as they counteract the IS. For example, in May 2017 President Trump approved a plan to arm the Kurds, and therefore the YPG, directly to prepare for their assault and capture of Raqqa, which was the IS’ de facto capital of the caliphate. Subsequently, after arming them with machine guns and other warfare weapons, the American-backed YPG successfully seized Raqqa in October of 2017 in what was a major blow to the legitimacy and control of the IS.

However, a drawback of this recommendation is that it could cause even more tension between the US and Turkey. Due to US support of the YPG, a group Turkey believes to be an extension of the PKK, Turkey’s President Erdoğan could see the supply of arms to the YPG as a threat to the country because those weapons could end up in the hands of the PKK. Yet, a benefit of this recommendation is that it aligns with America’s desire to decrease the number of troops deployed in Syria. By providing the Kurds with more weapons, the US can rely more on local forces and slowly begin to withdraw American troops from the conflict zone.

Third Recommendation: Negotiate a Ceasefire

Lastly, the United States should take advantage of its relationship with Turkey as NATO allies to lead a political peace process that negotiates a ceasefire between Turkish military forces and the Kurdish YPG in Syria. The YPG are instrumental in fighting the IS on the ground, yet they are suffering immense losses due to air and land attacks by Turkey’s military force.

However, a downside of this recommendation lies in the fact that Turkey views the YPG’s presence in Syria as a security threat to the country. Turkey’s President Erdoğan also considers the US’s support of the YPG militia to be a betrayal as he sees the YPG as an offset of the terrorist group PKK. Furthermore, the ceasefire would only provide a temporary solution to the complicated conflict so that the two sides could focus on defeating the IS.

An upside of this recommendation is that previous ceasefires between the Turkish government and the PKK succeeded for many years before they were eventually broken. While a ceasefire may be temporary, it would help centralize the fight around the IS and provide the foundation for more comprehensive peace talks and a long-term ceasefire in the future between the two groups.

Looking to the Future

The Turkish-Kurdish conflict began the moment Turkey failed to make a provision for a Kurdish state, thereby leaving the Kurds, a population of around 15 million in the country, with a minority status and a lack of both representation and rights. The tension between the two sides has been ongoing ever since, and as an ally to the United States politically and militarily, as they are instrumental in fighting the Islamic State, the US is heavily interested and involved in the conflict as well. As a result, all three recommendations for ways in which the United States can mitigate the Turkish-Kurdish conflict are presented with the following goals in mind: first, by successfully mitigating the conflict between the two groups, the US can begin to minimize the threat that the IS poses to them, as combating the IS would be easier when the two sides are working together with the same goal in mind; second, the US can start to decrease the volatility of the Middle East, as there will be one less pair of warring groups, and consequently states, to add to the mix.

The conflict continues in 2018, thirty-four years after the insurgency began, with little change. Since President Trump took office and called for a halt on the provision of arms to the Kurds, the Islamic State has lost territory, but still remains a threat, and tensions between the Turks and the Kurds remain high. Not much progress has been made between the two groups to de-escalate the situation, and the United States has failed to enact any significant changes. Unless these recommendations are made, the future for these two warring groups and the prospect of an independent Kurdistan looks to be the same as it currently is now: bleak.

The Kurdish Predicament; A Policy Prescription for a Fractured KRG

Introduction

For nearly a century, Turkish government officials and Erdogan nationalists have been overwhelmed by “Sevres syndrome” — a nationalist paranoia that ethnic Kurds, inspired by miscalculated borders and ethnic nationalism, would pursue separatism. The short-lived Treaty of Sevres and the central powers that signed the agreement laid the foundation for future treaties, such as the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Treaty of Lausanne, to determine the fate of the regional order. Yet, unlike Sykes-Picot’s British and French zones of imperial ‘influence’, Sevres was much more self-deterministic; the treaty’s Section III, Articles 62-64, offered ethnic Kurds to conduct a referendum to chart their own course as a nation.

In 2017, the Kurdish nation is fragmented across Turkish, Syrian, and Iraqi state lines. While the Kurds have created a transnational identity, their statehood objectives differ across Syrian, Iraqi, and Turkish governmental constraints. A year ago I remarked how a unified Kurdistan in the Levant was nearly impossible — how the Syrian, Iraqi, and Turkish identities intercepted any uniform statehood strategy among the Kurds, and in many ways, complicated the chances for Iraqi independence. This is a truth that still stands. A year ago, Kurdish statehood, of any kind, was a near-impossible phenomenon — even with international recognition, thriving oil exports, and an Islamic State exterminated from Northern Iraq. Kurdistan’s geopolitical position— straddled between the crossfire of Syria’s civil war, Iraq’s battle against Daesh, and Turkey’s illiberal presidential republic — seemed too costly to pursue separatism.

The Kurdish President Masoud Barzani shocked the international community when he announced Iraqi Kurdistan would conduct an independence referendum on September 25, 2017. The announcement was met with rhetorical caution, derision, and even interventionist threats from Kurdish neighbors, Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, while the United States encouraged a delay so that war-torn Iraq would first be unified. Even though the referendum was non-binding and implicated no blueprint for negotiations, the international community perceived statehood as Barzani’s absolute objective. This is not the case; President Barzani recognizes Kurdistan’s internal setbacks and has crafted the referendum to achieve autonomy within the Iraqi government, not secession. Even if the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) can achieve greater leverage with the Iraqi government, the referendum has caused a schism in Kurdish theaters of trade, politics, and civil society. The very act of conducting the referendum has resurfaced many tensions, inequities, and setbacks that the Kurdish nation must face before pursuing concrete separatism. 

Photo: A worker in an oil field in Kirkuk

Obstacles in the Oil Sector

Despite the strides Kurdistan has made towards democratization and de facto control of disputed territories, there remain many signs of political immaturity and economic stagnation. While Kurdistan has operated a bustling crude oil industry and expansive network of international oil companies (IOCs), it’s economic output has been reliant on what Denise Natali deemed“political limbo.” The KRG has been able to operate under the Iraqi government’s radar through leaving trade agreements, territorial boundaries, and revenues ambiguous — leaving ample leverage for a bustling oil trade. The Kurdish government has been able to sell nearly half their crude oil in 2017 to Israeli private firms— recipients that cannot be legally targeted by the Iraqi government for violating trade agreements. The ambiguity that has surrounded the oil-abundant province of Kirkuk, Nineveh, and Diyala, has enabled the Kurds to produce as much medium-grade crude oil necessary for economic independence. Yet, these blurred lines of legal uncertainty and the anagram of the ‘correct’ territorial perimeter with Iraq, are only temporary fixes. Post-secession, an independent Kurdistan may find it challenging to retain many of its valuable trade partners, no longer free-riding on Iraqi revenues and unable to offer attractive rates per barrel. Furthermore, while the KRG regards Kirkuk as an incredible geopolitical and economic asset to their road to independence, the province is aligned with the ruling party’s rival, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and is deeply fragmented along sectarian and ethnic lines. It is challenging for the KRG to even negotiate with Baghdad while the ruling party, the KDP, struggles to retain political control in Kirkuk. Kurdistan, while economically independent, is geo-economically splintered; the KRG should craft policy to appease the PUK in the Kirkuk province and confer with key trade partners — well before approaching the negotiating table in Baghdad.

Disappearing Political Unity

The Iraqi Kurdish government has been hailed as one of the most pro-democratic forces in the Levant, a stark contrast to Kurdish neighbors Iran and Turkey. The Kurdish parliament houses a plurality of factions, with the ruling Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), opposed by the PUK, the Movement for Change (Gorran), and Kurdistan Islamic Group (KIG), and have pursued a special experiment in direct democracy.

While a large majority of elected officials support the objective of independence, the Kurdish parliament clash’s over the timing, process, and prerequisites are a reflection of the deep schism in Kurdish political unity. The very idea of the referendum was met with disdain by many parties that opposed the PUK, encouraging the Kurdish government to focus on democratic reform at home before pursuing a controversial road to separatism. Even a bi-partisan negotiation to determine the referendum’s date and conditions was boycottedby major elected officials in the Gorran party and the KIG, leaving KDP and PUK majorities to mitigate some of the most important conditions for Kurdistan’s fate. The Kurdish Parliament has not met as a body since

PHOTO: The entryway of the Iraqi Kurdish Parliament

October 2015, nor does the nation have a constitution to guide it. In 2009, the KRG’s parliament drafted a national constitution, yet did not ratify, rendering any referendum laws, parliamentary rules, and legislative procedures nonexistent in Kurdistan.

President Barzani’s KDP party shares a strained relationship with many of its rivals. Barzani and his supporters are perceived as opportunists, conducting a swift referendum for political support and re-election while gambling with the Kurdish nation’s fate. Furthermore, Barzani has presided the executive office for more than four years and has delayed the next election, stating the nation needs political consistency during their fight against the Islamic State (ISIS). Despite the 2005 decision to limit the presidency to two terms and require the speaker of parliament to succeed, the KRG extended Barzani’s term by two years in 2013. It will be increasingly difficult for any KRG delegation to represent the national interest with no blueprint, conditions, or terms approved by parliament, and will undoubtedly increase frustration among Kurdish officials and civil society.

Projections

As Kurdistan strategizes to contend with Baghdad across the negotiating table, the KRG should first establish definitive plans for the presidential election and a possible referendum for the 2009 constitution. Parliamentary elections are scheduled to take place on November 1, 2017, however, Barzani’s seat of power continues to be unrivaled. The KRG should also first assess their most paramount trade partners, such as Israel and Italy, to establish newfound conditions under different commercial routes, national taxation and revenue systems, and state alliances. Kurdistan is in dire need of economic diversification, and only its trade partners and few regional allies can aid such an endeavor. The political schism in Kurdistan is detrimental, but can only be remedied if the KRG reverses its autocratic tendencies, revives a dormant constitution, and re-calls parliament into session to discuss the conditions of separatism.

Reckoning Kurdistan: The Question of Kurdish Autonomy and the Challenging Road to Statehood

Introduction

After nearly five years of fighting, Syria still bleeds instability. The death toll of the crisis has been estimated to surpass 470,000, and still climbs as President Bashar al-Assad wars with moderate and radicalized rebels. The once-isolated civil war has transformed into a globalized quandary, impacting the social and political fabric of the Middle East, Europe, and liberal international order through the largest refugee population in history. But the conflict has also emerged as a battleground of immense opportunity – for foreign powers pursuing regional hegemony, extremist groups seeking global prepotency, and autonomous peoples preparing for statehood.

The Kurdish population dispersed across northern Syria, Iraq, and southern Turkey, has capitalized upon the political labyrinth in the Levant. The United States has famously backed Kurdish brigades, the Peshmerga forces, defending crucial territories against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). They have become a popular alternative to placing American boots on the ground in the Washington policy arena, as well as a geopolitical asset in the region. Such reinforcement has skyrocketed the Kurdish population into the international limelight as a key contender for statehood once strife subsides. However, it is the American mischaracterization of the Kurdish people and the fragmented nature of their politics that will be the Achilles’ heel in any statehood objective. Unless the Kurdish people overcome the obstacles of nationalist fragmentation, recognition will remain a distant reality.

Deconstructing the Kurdish Objective

Kurdistan has become a subject of recent western fascination, however, has been a resilient force in the region for centuries. Before the construction of national identities and contemporary borders, the Kurds existed as an ethnic population of the Mesopotamian Plains. After generations under foreign and imperialist rule, Kurdistan received its first omen of statehood with the arrival of ethnonationalism in the demise of the First World War. The Treaty of Sevres fuelled their declaration of independence in 1927 in the Republic of Ararat — yet was short-lived. Despite attempts by the United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and other foreign entities to install a Kurdish autonomous state, post-war waves of pan-Arabism and nationalism stood in the way of complete secession. Only were the Kurdish populace able to achieve a degree of political autonomy when under the guise of existing states, as Kingdoms, regions of limited self-rule, or autonomous zones. This power struggle is still very much alive today. The war between self-determination and the existing statehood landscape has transcended the 20th century; the fourth-largest stateless population has become of of the most significant flashpoints of the contemporary international order.

Despite challenging political circumstance, the Kurdish people have thrived. The robust city of Erbil has become an oasis within northern Iraq – oil rich, democratized, and a destination for many refugees. Exxon Mobil even announced an oil deal with the Kurdish regional government for resource development – a signal of rising Kurdish prominence in the political and economic realm. The city has its own parliament, police force, and even a license plate system. The inclusion of women in police system and fighter brigades, lack of heavied political Islam, and overall positive inclination towards the West has been welcomed by policymakers and Washington. The most impressive feat of the Kurds, however, has been their ability to dodge the seemingly inevitable power vacuum of the region. The Kurds were wise to mobilize militant forces not only to protect their own autonomous zones, but to ally with the weakened Iraqi forces and make a case for foreign assistance.

Yet, the West misses the mark in properly characterizing the Kurdish people, their plight, and their chance for future statehood autonomy. While the Kurds are often conglomerated as one movement, autonomous efforts could not be more fragmented. Many have analogized the Syrian conflict as a phenomenon where nationalism gives way to ethnic, religious, and sectarian identity – breaking down the barriers of the artificial 1917 Sykes-Picot borders. However, Kurdistan is severely splintered across Turkish, Syrian, and Iraqi nationalist lines. In Iraq, the Kurds live in an autonomous zone established after the Gulf War. In Syria, the Kurdish Democratic Party (PYD) rules in its autonomous zone, protecting the zone from rebels and ISIS fighters with their Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (People’s Protection Units or YPG) forces. In southeast Turkey, the Kurdish population lives under constant suppression, despite a recent peace deal between the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (the Kurdish Workers Party or PKK) and Erdogan’s government.

While many predict Kurdistan to become a recognized, autonomous state after the crisis in the Levant, there are many obstacles in its wake. The fragmented nature of Kurdistan across Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, is the largest challenge; different national “experiences” have transformed different Kurdish agendas. In Turkey, the PKK is more leftist, critical of the United States, and less inclinedtowards total independence, instead promoting an autonomous region within Ankara’s political arena. In Syria and Iraq, the Kurdish population is more pro-west and has proven a greater interest in establishing a recognized Kurdistan. Another Kurdish handicap is the lack of diversified economic opportunity in southeast Turkey and northern Iraq and Syria. While the oil sector has brought immense wealth to the region – luring foreign investment and relative stability – any official statehood venture would require intense diversification of the Kurdish economy. The Iraqi Kurds have instituted relative independence of their oil sector from the Iraqi government, however have experienced back-and-forth battles over shares of revenue and economic reintegration. In 2015, Iraqi Kurdistan was able to increase oil production from 2011 figures by 600%, however was still gravely $18 million in debt. Like any oil-dependent country in the region, economic diversification will enable Kurdistan to transform from a de facto nation to a de jure statehood system. Recent Turkish dependence upon Iraqi Kurdish oil – all while relations sour with Turkish Kurdish peoples over the failed PKK peacetime deal – has complicated smooth relations between the PKK and PYD, something necessary for any future, unified Kurdistan. All regions will have to face these structural inefficiencies, objectives, and political fragmentation before the dream of an independent Kurdistan can become reality.

The United States’ use of the Kurdish forces and population as a bulwark against regional terrorism has also perplexed chances of Kurdish statehood. A $400 million aid package has enabled the Kurdish Peshmerga to join the Mosul offensive and drive the Islamic State from occupying one-third of Iraqi territory. Yet, limits will emerge in the United States’ agenda against the Islamic State — while the U.S. wishes to utilize the Kurds against radicalized factions, the Kurds hold a divergent objective of securing existing Kurdish-held territory in Iraq. In what many attribute as a “marriage of convenience,” fragments of the Kurdish leadership — such as the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) — are convinced statehood is within their grasp with such American reliance. Using the Kurdish population as a mechanism and convenient alternative has gifted Kurdish leaders false hopes of independence. The Kurdish people are, to an extent, used to empty promises; successive governments have continually presented the Kurds with unfulfilled offers of independence or autonomy. Yet, the turbulent and ungovernable landscape of neighboring countries have illustrated a mirage of opportunity for an independent Kurdistan. The United States’ strategic interests in the region walk across a narrow tightrope between Turkey, Iran, Gulf powers, and Russian intervention in Syria. Full support of Kurdish statehood should be expected to further exacerbate regional complications, as well as the objective of halting the civil war.

Conclusion

The conflict in the Levant is far from its culmination. Sectarian factions, radicalism, religious and ethnic identities, and foreign powers all collectively seek influence in the region. The Kurds have proven to be reliable force on both defensive and offensive fronts in a climate of complete discord. Through Kurdish assistance, the United States has become seemingly reliant on the Kurds in their fight against the Islamic State and other extremist factions and has considered the luxury a pro-American Kurdish buffer state would offer their foreign agenda in the region.

The public mischaracterization of the Kurdish population themselves increases chances of miscalculation, and can prove costly in what will be the most challenging foreign policy dilemma of the next administration. While Kurdistan has been an instrument played in American de facto presence, policymakers should realize the precarious Kurdish state of affairs, and understand the limits that accompany a fragmented, but resilient, nation.