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The Sochi Dialogue; A Pathway for Russian Neo-Revisionism in the Levant

Executive Editor Caroline Rose examines the growth of Russian revisionist action in Syria, reflected in the Sochi Dialogue.

“Victors do not investigate their own crimes, so that little is known about them…”― Noam Chomsky

On the eve before the Syrian Congress of National Dialogue on January 30th, 2018, representatives of the Assad regime’s main opposition group, the Syrian Negotiation Commission (SNC), arrived to their terminal at the Sochi International Airport. As the group’s representatives met with their Russian hosts and prepared to be escorted to the conference, they sighted promotional billboards mounted atop the baggage claim caravels displaying the Syrian Arab Republic’s flag—the primary symbol of the Assad regime. The offended SNC representatives refused to step outside the airport and denied their invitation on spot, citing the conference’s disingenuity to any resistant forces in the way of Assad. Within an hour, the most important opposition delegation invited to Sochi was booked on the next flight to Ankara.

Two days prior, a Turkish mission—ironically coined “Operation Olive Branch”—invaded the Kurdish northern province in Afrin, Syria. The Turkish government issued a statement citing the Sochi Conference’s deference; the inclusion of Syrian Kurds in diplomatic dialogue without consent from the Erdogan government, was a red line for Turkey. Turkish intervention in Afrin was strategically designed to blockade Syrian Kurdish Peoples’ Protection Units (YPG) representatives from attending the dialogue, crippling the Kurds with reconnaissance airstrikes and ground force invasion.  Turkey’s sortie triumphed. The YPG’s spokesman, Fawza al-Yussef announced that Turkey—one of the conference’s hosts—violated the talks’ principle of political dialogue and that no YPG official, under any circumstances, would attend the talks. 

While the conference was quick to invite several local leaders of the ethnic Kurdish community and hosted the regime’s ‘Loyal Opposition’ delegation, Sochi was barren of any contrariety or deliberation. The television screens in the conference lobby—purposed to broadcast the delegates’ speeches and statements—were turned off at the start of the opening ceremonies. Journalists present at the dialogue grew concerned of the lack of interaction with the conference’s host, the Russian government, and lack of access to what little dialogue took place. Many within the international community regarded Sochi as an emblematic failure—a diplomatic disaster that began before the conference commenced, rooted in a conflict far more complex than its proponents realize. Yet, within the contextual framework of Russian neo-revisionism in the Levant, the conference brought unparalleled success. 

The Neo-Revisionsist Vision

While Sochi proved to be a diplomatic failure from its start, it still achieved a number of Russian objectives that, in the long-term, seek to revise the regional order and political expectations in the Levant. While Russian forces initially sought to ‘fill’ the political vacuum in the dawn of the Syrian civil war, they recognized immense capital if Russia were to become a major proponent in the region, eclipsing the United States. Russia’s objective aligns with what Richard Sakwa deems “neo-revisionsim.” Vladimir Putin’s government does not seek to unilaterally challenge or undermine current embedded frameworks of the regional order; rather, Moscow has made its mission to alter decades of Western dominance in the Middle East and ensure Russian strategic interests are equally recognized. 

Shrouded Objectives

The Syrian Congress of National Dialogue at Sochi was designed by the Russian, Turkish, and Iranian governments to serve as a complimentary step—possibly a diplomatic alternative—to ongoing reconstructive talks in Geneva, serving as the eighth round of the Astana negotiations. The talks were originally hailed among members in the international community for its diverse guest list; Sochi called on not only the twenty-member SNC delegation, but also upon participation from the Syrian Kurds, a force that had been absent in diplomatic talks despite their integral role in the civil war. The inclusion of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) in the dialogue was a watershed in reconstruction efforts, sowing seeds of optimism among many negotiators and lending confidence to Russia’s emerging role as a diplomatic heavyweight in the Levant. 

In advance of Sochi, experts and policymakers overlooked the dialogue’s ulterior intent to manipulate the lack of “strategic incoherence” embedded in the policies, agendas, and objectives of Syria’s actors. Dr. Aaron Stein of the Atlantic Council introduced the concept of strategic incoherence in the wake of Operation Olive Branch, pointing to the tunnel-visioned policies of the Syrian crisis’ most valuable players, unengaged in adequate multilateral coordination. Syria’s disaster has yielded local actors the latitude to pursue diverging aims: while the United States’ regional strategy has primarily focused on driving out the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) through cooperation with YPG and Peshmerga militias, Turkey has made its mission to stave Kurdish territorial influence, no matter the cost. While Iran and Russia have dually empowered the Assad regime to keep its reins on power in Damascus, with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps’ (IRGC) and Russian ground forces assisting pro-government Shabiha factions and Shi’a paramilitaries, they contradict an international community that insists upon Assad’s removal. Disorder has reigned supreme in Syria since 2012, and the Russian government has capitalized upon elements of discontinuity and strategic incoherence to pave its own path to a new Levantine order. 

Sochi, while a diplomatic breakdown, was an invaluable diplomatic measure of distraction for the Russian government. While Moscow’s chief diplomats arranged Sochi’s diverse guest list—to great fanfare—pro-Assad’s militant factions prepared dropped mortar shells and rockets on the besieged enclave of East Ghouta, displacing an estimated 30,000 civilians and isolating individuals from international aid convoy trucks and supplies. While Russians forces present in Syria have offered the city’s residents a safe passage out from the bombardment in what it calls a “humanitarian corridor,” Moscow has not ceased its assistance to retake eastern Ghouta, deploying warplanes in a series of bombing and ground assaults. 

An Impossible Order

While many experts have lamented the retracted international role in Syria, enabling Russia to capitalize upon its goal empowering its geopolitical stature in the region. Alina Polyakova of the Brookings Institution defined Moscow’s chief objective as one that transcends ISIS’s defeat and securing Assad’s grip on power; “preserving Assad’s rule was always less about Assad, and more about safeguarding what Putin saw as another domino in a series of U.S.-orchestrated revolutions in Russia’s backyard.” Russian President Vladimir Putin was reportedly agitated by U.S. interventionist strategies in Libya and Iraq during the Bush and Obama administrations, and recognized the strategic value in hybridized, low-cost, asymmetric proxy war. The lack of political coherence is attractive to Putin’s foreign policy agenda; Syria’s geostrategic position between East and West, as well as their warm-water ports, satisfy Russia’s overarching political and economic interests. Securing Assad in Moscow’s corner will retain Russia as a major influencer in the regional order.

While the Russian government has flexed its ability to redefine the Levant under its own terms, there is no certainty that this political order can survive. Moscow has pursued shuttle diplomacy with Israel and Iran, constructed alternative diplomatic dialogues outside of the Geneva Conference, and has established multiple frameworks for a new Syrian constitution and federal elections. It has proven its ability to serve as a power broker in a time of crisis. Yet these reforms cannot remain permanently in place; while the Assad government has maximized its territorial control, opposition still remains in tact and the regime’s repeated use of chemical weapons—facilitated by Moscow—will remain sealed in the memories of the conflict’s survivors.

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The Astana Peace Talks: A Looking Glass into the New Levantine Experiment

Staff Writer Caroline Rose analyzes the impact of recent peace talks held in Kazakhstan.

Astana, Kazakhstan buzzed with diplomatic ambition on the morning of March 15th. Delegations arrived, with legal advisors and security teams in tow, with the hopes of concluding arguably the most intractable conflict of our generation: the Syrian war. It was the fourth time a conference convened to address Syria’s tragedy; Geneva, Switzerland hosted talks in 2012, 2014, and 2016, all of which yielded little concrete action. Yet, Astana seemed different. The conference was the first to involve a diplomatic coalition wholly comprised of rebel faction leaders, bringing crucial narratives of on-the-ground combat experience to mediation. The negotiating table had narrowed, as Astana proved selective to only the key players in Iraq and Syria: The Syrian Government, Iran, Russia, Turkey, Free Syrian Army, and the Army of Islam. But most importantly, as top diplomats stepped out of their black SUV’s and into the hallowed halls of conflict negotiation, the cameras could not follow. Astana was established to alleviate six years of Syria’s nightmare, delegates asserted, and was not as image-conscious as conferences of the past.

While the talks defied many established norms and bureaucratic conferences of the past six years, Astana proved to be no exception. The talks concluded March 17th with little resolved — a trilateral talk between Russia, Iran, and Turkey, scheduled in May. One of the most paramount militant factions on the ground, the Free Syrian Army, publicly retracted their invitation out of discouragement with Russian and Iranian ceasefire violations and the powers’ compliance with the Assad government in disrupting the Wadi Barada water supply. While Astana was envisioned as an exclusive launching pad towards peace in the Levant — striking the ‘right’ balance between integral actors, short-term objectives, and discussion of strategic ambitions — the inclusivity of the talks proved artificial. Militant leaders had a seat at the table, but their voices muted in the face of a trilateral monopoly; a stake in the game did not equate to political influence in the eyes of Russia, Iran, and Turkey. With the conclusion of Syria’s civil struggle will come a very new geopolitical landscape in the Levant — one domineered by a growing sense of Russian influence and a question of waning American regional presence.

In this piece, I envision the motives and strategic ambitions behind Russia’s prowess in Syria, and analyze the possible political consequences of a Russian-led solution to U.S. foreign policy. Two questions must first be asked regarding the trilateral dynamic, survival of the Assad regime, and role of a retracted United States. First, is the war in Syria a crucible of the relationship between Moscow, Tehran, and Ankara, and one that will define external transactions? It’s crucial for both scholarly and policy communities to assess the delicacy of the relationship, using Astana as a looking glass into future trilateral decisions. Secondly, the Trump administration declined their Astana invitation, refraining from sending any formal delegation. The U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan occupied a seat at the table, but a ceremonial one at best, leaving the primary decision-making to Russia, Iran, Turkey, Syrian government, and rebel factions. Is this decision a product of an isolationist administration, or the acknowledgment that the United States has prolonged large-scale involvement to where all stakes have been lost? A lack of American participation in the largest conflict of the 21st century marks a new era — a new regional order — that U.S. Foreign policy will have to navigate.

Trilateral Fragility

Ties held between Moscow, Tehran, and Astana age beyond the start of Syria’s violence in 2011, and all three powers share a history of foundational relations through extensive trade of oil, practice of joint-military exercises, and mutual geopolitical threats. However, such close collaboration in the Syrian conflict is somewhat of a phenomenon in the region; the trilateral relationship is an odd coupling of the international liberal order’s largest ‘wild cards.’ Their heavy presence in the region has yielded them seats at the negotiating table, but their vast resources and established statehood statuses have given them the capability to mold and regulate the conversation at Astana.

Ellie Geranmayeh and Kadri Liik argue in “The New Power Couple” that the relationship between Iran and Russia is not solely grounded in opportunity, but also in commonalities. Tehran not only provides an airbase out of which Russian aerial reconnaissance forces operate out of in Syria, but both powers share a distinctive outlook on the Levant — a perspective not shared by Turkey, Assad, or even pro-Shiite and regime rebels in the region. With Syria as a “crucible of cooperation,” Putin and Rouhani wish to prop the despot, avoiding the democracy-building escapades of the past. On the first day of the talks, the Russian delegation proposed that a constitutional tribune be established to begin governmental reforms, all while cushioning Assad and his regime. Russia first introduced this draft constitution in January, 2017 at the intra-Syrian Astana Talks, where they established a framework for governance to then be approved by the Syrian people. While this approach was denied by many at Astana, the proposition sheds light on a premature Russian objective to rebuild Syria in its image, far beyond any cessation of violence. This approach still, technically, delivers regional stabilization, but at the sacrifice of many of the values and principles the international liberal order has prided itself upon. The Astana Talks reflected this pivot; the prioritization of maintaining the status quo reflects an ethical experiment, with Russia, Iran, and Turkey at the helm.

This experiment has constructed a smaller diplomatic environment for the three powers to maneuver. While a war of words was exchanged between the rebel delegation and the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad, the focus of the talks remained primarily on maintaining the December 29th ceasefire agreement as a first step towards temporary stabilization. Constructed by Turkey and Russia and exclusionary to many jihadist and rebel forces, such as the Kurdish YPG and former al-Nusra front Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, the ceasefire served as the foundation for January and March Astana peace talks, but on the condition that the truce would hold. The nature and conditions of the ceasefire explain the trilateral monopoly at Astana; Russia and Turkey were able to regulate the participants, conditions of peace negotiations, and framework of discussion by design. Just as in December, 2016, the trilateral dynamic has found it successful to operate in a more intimate environment, and will continue this strategy with a May 2017 meeting. While this was the only concrete solution produced by the Astana Talks, it demonstrates that the talks’ inclusionary aspect was a mirage; the fate of Syria has and will be determined by the trilateral powers.

U.S. Vulnerability

A week after Kazakhstan was abuzz with talks of ceasefire and proposed amnesty deals, the United States’ Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, was familiarizing himself with the ropes of diplomacy at the first session of the ‘Anti-ISIS Coalition.’ Convened in Washington, Tillerson served as the face of a new, revamped effort to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in all existing strongholds. The day was a reflection of the new Trump administration’s adamant vow to eradicate the terrorist faction, in the interest of national security, from the face of the Levant. While a week apart, the two conferences reflected a deep contrast the strategies towards the Levant — a side encompassed in restructuring Syria’s institutional makeup, and another side centered around new approaches to counterterrorism, protecting national borders instead of transcending them. While separate thematic issues, the war against extremism and the alleviation of Syria’s civil conflict should become an intertwined strategy for Astana’s powers and U.S. foreign policy.

The United States did not send a formal delegation to the Astana Talks, despite receiving an invitation. They cited the “demands of the transition” as to why a negotiating team was not assembled, sending the American ambassador to Kazakhstan, George A. Krol, to the conference. This decision marks an interesting pivot in the normative and institutional structure of Middle Eastern diplomacy; the United States has spoken softly, but has carried a large stick in the region over the last half-century — particularly since the 2003 Iraq intervention. It is important for scholars and policymakers to analyze exactly why the new administration withheld participation from Astana, as it was seen as an open door for American foreign policy to enter, after six years of tentative activism in the region through funding and supplying Sunni rebels against the Assad regime. However, the White House would have deemed Astana a failure for U.S. interests from the start, as they did not prioritize counterterrorism through their dialogue — in fact, they invited many of the individuals that the Trump administration deems ‘terrorist’ factions.’ Astana was a conference rooted in the survivability of a ceasefire the United States was not included in, and therefore there was no national interest in active participation.

A Looming Question

On the morning of April 4th, President Bashar al-Assad’s forces deployed chemical weapons on Khan Sheikhoun, a small town in the Idlib province, killing85 civilians. The chemical used appeared to be an active nerve agent, similar to Sarin gas. Men, women, and children were strewn across the streets, gasping for air and shaking uncontrollably. Hospitals were flooded with victims, utilizing the scarce resources they had. The day was immensely reminiscent of August 21, 2013, when nearly 1,400 were gassed in the Ghouta agricultural belt just outside of Damascus, and met with a ‘red line’ ultimatum by the Obama administration, that later proved incredulous. President Donald Trump’s White House reinforced this red line through authorizing the launch 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles from US warships, targeting a Syrian government air base. where the chemical agents were deployed. This decision has been widely accepted by the scholarly and policy community as one of the largest moments in his presidency — the first use of a hard power tool by an isolationist president that has repeatedly chanted ‘America first’ as his doctrine in foreign policy.

The decision is accompanied by a series of serious questions. The first question that policymakers and scholars should examine, is what preconditions led Assad to perceive the opportunity to use chemical weapons without consequence. Brookings Institution fellow, Dr. Thomas Wright, has stated that the new administration’s uncertain objective in the Levant and receding participation in the conflict signaled a green light to President Bashar al-Assad. It was, in many ways, a test to the credibility of the ‘red line’ Trump’s predecessor had drawn, as well as the new president’s prowess in his first crisis situation. While the missile strikes signal greater commitment to preserving the human rights of the Syrian people and exercising an anti-Assad agenda, the exact role of the United States in the conflict is still a looming uncertainty. The first use of hard power in Syria by the Trump administration is not equivalent to a new White House strategy in the Levant — ‘America first’ still reigns as the chief doctrine, ruling the chance of intervention and active military presence unlikely. While the cruise missiles have preserved the credibility of U.S. policies, they serve as merely a slap on the wrist; President Bashar al-Assad’s regime is still largely uncontested by American militarized action and its survivability cushioned by the Iran-Russia alliance.

Conclusion

In May of 2017, Russia, Iran, and Turkey will exclusively convene around the negotiating table, behind closed doors. While the continuation of December’s ceasefire is still in a delicate state, much evidence points to a keener focus on Syria’s future political order. The intimacy of these talks demonstrates the artificiality of the Astana Talks’ democratic inclusivity; rebel voices and non-state narratives are welcome, but muffled under the resources and capability of the trilateral powers in the region. The future of Syria is still unclear, and will continue to be. The state of Turkey still opposes the durability of an Assad presidency and opposes any inclusion of Kurdish participation at the table, such as the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) at Astana. Rebel factions and extremist forces still characterize much of the conflict, and their refusal in many proposed ceasefires and political propositions stand as a powerful bulwark against cooperation in the region’s political order. Most importantly, the exact role that the United States will play in Syria is not certain; ‘America first’ will continue to indoctrinate the level of engagement U.S. forces will have in Syria — but for the time being, the American seat at the table remains ceremonial.

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The Don’s Clash: The Huntingtonian Narrative in a Tumultuous Levant

Staff Writer Caroline Rose illuminates the flaws of the Trump administration’s foreign policy perspective on the Levant.

“A unilateral decision made to draw lines in the sand, to undertake crusades, to oppose their evil with our good, to extirpate terrorism and, in Paul Wolfowitz’s nihilistic vocabulary, to end nations entirely, doesn’t make the supposed entities any easier to see; rather, it speaks to how much simpler it is to make bellicose statements for the purpose of mobilizing collective passions than to reflect, examine, sort out what it is we are dealing with in reality, the interconnectedness of innumerable lives, ‘ours’ as well as ‘theirs’.” -- Edward Said

The presidency of Donald J. Trump marks an arrival of initial uncertainty in American foreign policy towards the Middle East. While his campaign promises and inaugural address were clearly imprinted with ‘America First,’ the President’s nebulous worldview and policy contradictions have rendered his Middle East strategy ‘incalculable’ by many. Yet, if analyzed closely, Trump has expressed objectives in the region that give insight to the future of strategy in the Middle East and North Africa. The President’s policymaking will not be shaped by party affiliation or ideology, but rather an unorthodox perception of what defines a foreign policy ‘win.’  

Brookings Institution Senior Fellow, Thomas Wright, has deciphered Trumpian principles of policymaking. He has argued that the mystique surrounding Trump’s presidential policy is a false illusion; scholars, policymakers, and constituents should take him both literally and seriously. Wright asserted that the President’s views are “alien to the Foreign Policy tradition,” whereas instead of channeling a hawkish, conservative agenda, Trump harkens back to the 19th century with a strong commitment to mercantilism and isolationism. As in business, Trump will perceive the Middle East not through lenses of conflict alleviation or humanitarian work, but rather a treasure trove of financial ‘wins’ for the United States. This mentality can be explained with Trump’s detest of the international liberal order; despite the United States benefiting from post-war institutions and multilateral treaties in sectors of national security and diplomacy, these are invisible victories to which the United States carries much financial burden. If there is no immediate material or financial gain, American interest pivots. The President’s recent address to the Central Intelligence Agency proves such prioritization; Trump affirmed his devotion to the phrase, “to the victors belong the spoils,” and claimed American troops should have seized the Iraqi state’s oil supply before departing in 2011.

Yet, while deals and foreign policy ‘wins’ will guide the objectives of foreign policy, it will be the narrative of Samuel P. Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” theory that will embolden future crises. Under President Trump’s stewardship, the Middle East will undergo a drastic rhetorical transformation. Traditional power dynamics will remain — Syria will continue to confront an uncertain future, the Iranian-Saudi Arabian rivalry in the Gulf will continue to haunt sectarian division, many post-Arab Spring governments will continue to reconcile tumultuous political realities. However, a revived use of Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” theory will pour salt in the wounds of bleeding conflicts, aggravating terrorism’s fault-lines of Orientalism and interventionism.

The Tool of the ‘Clash’

In 1992, Samuel P. Huntington gave a lecture at the American Enterprise Institute, where he introduced the basis for one of the largest academic discourses in Middle Eastern studies: the “Clash of Civilizations.” The proposition culminated in a 1993 Foreign Affairs Magazinefeature, and a 1996 book: “The Clash of Civilizations? The Debate.” Huntington’s proposition that the future of the international system would not feature the “end of history” as Francis Fukuyama theorized, but rather a confrontation between the West — a troupe of ‘civilized’, Christian states — and Islam, a colossal religion he saw inimical towards non-Islamic cultures. Conflict, Huntington theorized from his armchair, was inherently cultural. War would transpire across the fault lines of civilizations, rooted in 20th century globalization. In the eyes of Mr. Huntington, The Cold War days of ideological tussles and nationalist fervor were well behind us, as it was now cultural peripheries that would characterize the slippery slope of international affairs.

While the scholarly community was quick to correct Huntington on the mischaracterization and generalization of a colossal religion juxtaposed with ambiguous ‘Western values,’ hawkish policymakers were just as eager to adopt Huntington’s thesis. After all, in a post-9/11 international order, the idea was easy to incorporate in the Bush administration’s foreign policy; the ‘clash’ was a convenient explanation of the sudden rise of extremist organizations claiming a jihadist battle against the imperial West. It is easy to dismiss the sectarian, demographic, and political complexity of the region with such a simple theory — categorizing a colossal, peaceful religion in opposition to the ‘West,’ whatever the West is.

But the ‘clash’ is only true if it is rhetorically made to be believed; mischaracterization is only reality when society makes it so. The danger of Huntington’s theory is not its context, but its capability to transform into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Those that yield power and influence can create an environment of either co-existing cultural peripheries, or civilizations caught in collision. The Trump administration will capitalize on the latter.

President Trump will not only use the Huntingtonian narrative as a framework in foreign policy, but as a tool. Juxtaposing the ‘West’ against a religion deemed a security threat dehumanizes and materializes the region, ripening the Middle East for harsher counterterrorism measures and cooperation with Russia in Syria. If Trump wishes to disassemble the pillars of the current liberal international order — multilateral organizations, such as the European Union and the United Nations, and free-trade deals, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership — Huntington’s theory will serve as a key mechanism in undermining globalism and putting America first. In the Middle East, this mentality will prioritize the West’s war with Islam above endeavors in democracy-promotion, human rights campaigns, gender equality, conflict alleviation, and even the Gulf oil trade.

A New Middle East

North Africa, the Levant, and the Gulf all remain in extremely precarious conditions. Many of their postcolonial lesions still bleed with conflict, political and institutional instability, and civil disunity. The failed democratic demands of Arab Spring protestors still linger in Tahrir Square, Avenue Habib Bourguiba, and Baniyas, with little chance of immediate re-emergence. Most notably, a once-isolated conflict in Syria has globalized into one of the largest refugee outpours since the Second World War, as well as a gargantuan power vacuum that has welcomed both forces of extremism and proponents of peace. To say President Trump is inheriting great disarray in the Middle East is an understatement — however, the president will prove selective in the crises he deems ‘winnable,’ using Huntingtonian logic to materialize gains and dehumanize conflicts.

The Rhetorical Battle Against ISIS

Aside from ‘America first’, Trump’s most notable campaign pledge to the American people was the eradication of Daesh, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. The Islamic State has proven its parasitic existence in Syria and Iraq’s power vacuum and potent in its ideological appeal across the globe. The organization’s notability is derived from its eccentricity; the Islamic State sets itself apart from traditionalist terrorist organizations, as their social media adeptness, territorial conquest, and recruiting techniques truly deem it a 21st century phenomenon. Trump is right to perceive the terrorist organization as a national security threat; the organization has killed nearly 1,400 people in over 90 attacksacross the world with frequent direct threats upon the United States, while operating a $2 billion war effort in the Levant.

However, the mechanism Trump has chosen to confront ISIS has been through rhetorical strategy rather than one of pure policy, using the “Clash of Civilizations” narrative by creating a social construct that blurs the lines between religious affiliation and terrorist fervor. The president has made a point in deviating from the Obama administration’s rhetoric, opting to use the phrase, “radical Islamic terrorism,” instead of “acts of terror.” The implicit choice to implement the word “Islam,” confirms Trump’s commitment to associate terrorist organizations with the a religion they misinterpret — a tactic to pose counterterrorism as a larger battle not between a government and non-state actor, but a duel between civilizations.

Such language is counterproductive in the battle against radicalized organizations in the Middle East. Characterizing the enemy as a cultural, incompatible entity is a cyclical tactic, as the same rhetoric is used in terrorist propaganda and recruiting mechanisms. Emile Nakleh, a former senior intelligence service officer and director of the Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program from the Central Intelligence Agency, has argued the avoidance of using “Islamic terrorism” is a strategic choice, as distortion of religious identity isolates necessary allies integral in the fight against terrorism.

Strategizing a New Syria

Trump’s navigation of Syria’s political vacuum will be increasingly transactional, isolating much of the humanitarian, political, and ethical entanglements that contributed to the conflict’s intractability. It has been made clear — through campaign rhetoric and the selection of cabinet members — that Donald Trump’s paramount objective in Syria is not ousting the Assad government, opposing Iran, nor rivaling Russia, but eradicating the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria from the Levant. In fact, Donald Trump perceives Iran and Russia as key partners in ousting the terrorist organization; he has erroneously stated that the Assad regime, Iran, and Russia were actively and effectively fighting ISIS in the region, when really, the forces were brutally striking separatist and moderate Sunni rebels, such as the Free Syrian Army and the Kurdish Peshmerga forces in attempt to secure the survival of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. In the process, an estimated death toll of 470,000 individuals have been counted in Aleppo under Russian-Syrian army bombings and series of chemical weapons attacks. The possibility that American policy will sacrifice deposing a regime guilty of innumerable war crimes in exchange for regional support in the fight against terrorism signals a pivot from the multi-faceted framework of the previous administration, to one that is purely politically strategic in its Huntingtonian campaign.

By framing the Islamic world as a civilization in and of itself, Trump isolates the humanitarian strife that the previous presidential administration and liberal institutions sought to recognize. Such a tactic was exemplified in the administration’s controversial executive order, “Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States.” The intentional ambiguity of the order’s language enabled the ‘clash’ to emerge in airports across the United States — refugees and visa-holders from seven predominantly Muslim countries were barred from entry, with the exception to persecuted Christians. While the order did not specifically reference Muslims, it still employed Huntington’s theory through intentional interpretation of Islam as a threatening ‘civilization,’ rather than religious identity. Uniformly casting Muslim refugees and immigrants under the broader guise of national security threats, Trump masterfully succeeded in using the ‘clash’ to his advantage.

Conclusion

The year 2017 presents many questions to both American constituents and the international community. The rise of right-wing populism in the West, the acceleration of kleptocracy in receding democratic governments, the transformation of Syria’s civil conflict into a globalized quandary, and the impending collapse of post-war, liberal institutions have begun to deconstruct what we know as the international liberal order. The largest phenomenon of last year was the presidential success of Donald J. Trump, who now occupies the most precious, precarious office in the world. Trump’s American presidency will create great reverberations around the international community, but will particularly shape and embolden a new Middle East. The contemporary Middle East will continue to confront its disarray; postcolonial recovery from imperial exploitation, manipulation of indigenous resources and identities, tension between nationalism and fallacious Sykes-Picot borders, and violent extremism. Just as in the past, American foreign policy will continue to struggle with the weighty complexity the Middle East presents them, but the adoption of Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” will only exacerbate the region’s conflicts, not alleviate them.

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Will Doves or Hawks Fly? An Analysis of Democratic Policies in the Levant

Staff Writer Caroline Rose compares the democratic candidates foreign policy approaches to the Middle East.

In 2011, the streets of Cairo were teeming with political, financial, and religious fervor—with Egyptian President Mubarak at the root of discontent. Young protesters led by the Muslim Brotherhood and pro-democratic groups such as the “Tamarod” movement, took to Tahrir Square to oust a dictator representing three decades of Egyptian strife under secular autocracy, a militant ruling party, and economic strain. While uncertainty loomed in Tahrir Square, discord loomed in the White House Situation Room. Obama and his administration were bereft of time—with the choice of opting for “the right side of history” with young, pro-democracy protestors, or with a decades-old status quo embedded in the Mubarak regime. Answering the pleas of his advisors, President Obama chose to support the rebels. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton—the current 2016 Democratic Presidential frontrunner -- unsuccessfully advocated siding with Mubarak based on the rationalization that supporting an unstructured, youthful revolutionary movement would not be any less than naïve. The rebels represented change and renewal, but Mubarak represented years of American investment, relative stability, and guarantee of U.S. access and provision.

Such a decision is congruent with Clinton’s so-called “hawkish” foreign policy agenda—yet scholars, critics, and constituents alike are still scratching heads in regards to Clinton’s strict theoretical framework. Many point to former First Lady, Senator, and Secretary of State as an oscillation between neo-conservatism and liberalism in international affairs. Clinton’s opponent, Vermont Senator Bernard Sanders, staunchly falls within liberalism, yet is misunderstood in his policy projections. In the largest and arguably, most historic presidential election this country will witness, the media machine has detracted voters from dissecting Hilary’s ideological direction or Sander’s exact foreign policy agenda. In this piece, I seek to dissect Clinton’s and Sanders’ theoretical identities and visualize their policies in the most precarious geopolitical hotspot of the 21st century: the Levant region.

 

Neo-con, Realist, or both? Assessing Hillary’s Ideological Conundrum

Advisor Jeffrey Bader once remarked that Clinton is “not an ideological person, she’s a deal-maker.” The ambiguity that surrounds the exact identity of Clinton’s foreign policy has been the subject of widespread speculation in this election. Her extensive record appears to be a conjectural blend of realist, idealist, and neo-conservative policy selections. As a New York Senator, she voted yes for intervention in Iraq. In her “pivot to Asia” as Secretary of State, she sought a role for the United States in territorial disputes in the South China Sea. She has angered Jewish voters when she has remained neutral with Israeli-Iranian tensions, while acknowledging Israel’s pivotal role as an American ally in the Middle East, and even proposing support of Iranian democratic attempts at a 2016 appearance at AIPAC. Public perception has suggested that Clinton reflects all three ideological identities of realism, liberalism, and neo-conservatism. Yet, when we arrange her record comprehensively, we will discover that Clinton is unapologetically neo-con in every crease and corner of the fabric that is her foreign policy agenda. Clintonism will champion hard power over soft, politics of preconditions, shoe-leather diplomacy, and operating from a position of strength. Is Hillary the next Kissinger? No, but expect a hybridized version of Kissinger, Kagan, and Robert Gates. Hillary will exemplify her appreciation of using clout of diplomacy, but realizes militarized strength may be necessary to sit parties at the table in the first place.

 

To compare the Democratic candidates, one must comprehend Clinton’s appreciation for statecraft abroad, while Sanders focuses on the American state itself; external reformation runs divergent to internal reconstruction. Clinton and Sanders both exercise caution when flexing their foreign policy muscle, yet differ in nature. Clinton sees the military as a valuable mechanism, while Sanders sees it as a potential deterrent. Clinton practices caution in the calculation and execution of hard power initiatives, keeping her cards close to her chest. Yet in retrospect, she keeps a maximalist thirst for an American militarized footprint across the world. Secretary of Defense Gates recalls Clinton favored 40,000 boots on the ground when he advised 30. After all, Clinton’s education in the world of foreign policy began not in her tenure as Secretary of State or even as First Lady, but as a freshman New York Senator on the Committee on Armed Services, where she developed a great appreciation for American military capability. Sanders on the other hand, is more cautious in foreign policy. He voted against intervention in Iraq and champions that decision as representative of his strong anti-interventionism. Many have compared Clinton’s foreign policy as a continuation of the Obama Administration, such as non-intervention in Syria, but in fact it is Sanders that would replicate “skeptical restraint” best. While critics have pointed to Sanders as immature in foreign policy and avoidant of the topic altogether, they must explore Sander’s liberal logic of policies he has already presented on debate floors across the country. To understand Sander’s global strategy is to understand his domestic platform. His policies abroad are anchored to his economic strategy to alleviate collegiate debt, combat Wall Street, and improve social welfare programs; the United States cannot pour money into carpet-bombing the Islamic State that drains taxation at home, nor expend resources fighting for democracy in Iran or Egypt when democratic ideals are endangered at the expense of the corporate machine.

 

Visualizing the Levant

 

The Levantine region of the Middle East has become characterized by regenerative, endless conflicts, ruptures in the ethnic and religious foundations, and proxy interests intersecting in Iraq and Syria. Civil wars are incubated within civil wars—spurred initially by democratic fervor and devolving into foreign manipulation of rebel factions to install puppet leadership. These conflicts are consequential; it is fuddled, it is not simplistic enough to characterize with theory alone. A presidential candidate who claims to contextualize a policy strategy in all corners of this conflict is lying, but a candidate that can produce a doctrine America can commit to, is integral in the Democratic race. Senator Sanders has accomplished this, publicly advocating commitment to non-intervention in the Middle East. Clinton’s stance tethers its “globocop” approach to combatting the swath of violent non-state actors, bloodthirsty dictatorships, proxy interests battling from the Gulf, and militarized “aid” from China and Russia. To Clinton, Putin has no business fighting in Syria. To Bernie, neither does the United States.

Clinton mutually supports an Israeli state and Palestinian forces, yet shies away from the high dive board when pursuing the hunt for a two-state solution like presidential predecessors have done, believing the timing is not ripe in 2016. Senator Sanders additionally will pivot towards the acknowledgement of the right for a Palestinian solution, playing what he called an “even-handed role” in the interaction between Israelis and Palestinians. While Sanders is Jewish, he has shied away from proclaiming himself a Zionist. Sanders has proven to be tactical when approaching the Palestinian question; he wholeheartedly supports the Israeli right to exist, but does visualize an emerging landscape of a new Middle East. Does this make Sanders a realist on Israel? Possibly. It is not clear whether Sanders will pursue a two-state solution, but it’s clear he will not isolate the Palestinians, as have previous administrations. With both candidates, the world will see an American presidency that will re-balance its allegiances in the Gaza Strip.

 

The question of Syria has deeply characterized the foreign policy agenda of the Obama Administration, and will quite possibly plague the remainder of the twenty-first century. The Syrian Civil War is a tumultuous blend of civil war, proxy interests, terrorism, and underlying cultural and religious tensions—remnants of colonialism and the 1917 Sykes-Picot Agreement. Both Sanders and Clinton understand that any future policy decision in Syria should represent the American people’s aversion to intervention, yet nips the humanitarian strife in the bud. Such a policy has posed presidential politics in a state of flux; Senator Ted Cruz advocated carpet-bombing campaigns, Trump called for the elimination of local gas sources, and many other candidates have called for the eradication of ISIS before approaching the Syrian Civil War. To evaluate the stances of the two Democratic frontrunners, one must first question what beast the candidates will encounter first: Assad or ISIS? Clinton has chosen ISIS, opting to place a larger American presence in the region, surpassing Obama’s authorized 50 Special Operation Troops. The former Secretary of State has advocated the preparation and training of Syrian Sunni and Shiite rebels to fight in Syria, believing they would be a “psychological boost to the opposition” that would back American enemies into a dark corner. Mrs. Clinton sees it necessary to unite under a common international enemy, and then seek regime change with the dismantling of Assad in Damascus. Senator Sanders, on the other hand, has chosen to avoid what he calls a “never-ending quagmire” between American boots on the ground and ISIS fighters, and additionally has not supported a no-fly-zone in Syria. Clinton’s threaded short-term strategies starkly contrast with Sander’s isolationist long-term vision of the struggle with ISIS. While Clinton sees it necessary for the American struggle to incorporate international cooperation, Sanders finds it necessary for the fight to be a globalized one. Sanders has called for an international coalition to combat the Islamic State, emulating the Jordanian King Abdullah's plan to build a coalition of Muslim nations on the ground, while remaining international powers carry airstrike campaigns and economic measures to cut off the blood-flow of the Islamic State.

 

Looking Towards The Future

The presidential strategies in Syria best reflect two very contrasting tones set in the Levant region. Clinton’s neo-conservative approach and foreign policy chops will utilize hard and soft power to promote democratic, American ideals in fluctuating political systems. Under a Clinton administration, Hawks will predominately fly over the Levant—a product of the former Secretary of State’s step-by-step strategizing, teaming diplomatic strength with military muscle to accomplish infrastructural stability and political peace in the Levant. Sanders will, by contrast, engage the global arena in coalition building and aversion to on-the-ground intervention. His foreign policy decisions will reflect that of his domestic platform, illustrating the Senator’s long-term vision of a cooperative and welcoming United States in the international community. As Levantine conflicts have begun to pour into the political, economic, and cultural borders of Turkey, the Balkans, and Europe, the world holds its breath as candidates assemble policy projections for such a delicate region. While running within the confines of the Democratic Party, this race is showcasing candidates that will envision two very different faces of the Levant Region in the next four years to come. Doves may fly, but under the shadow of hawks.

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