North Korea’s Illicit Money Machine

Background: Brief History of North Korea

Following World War II, the international order was divided over the ideological governance styles and practices of democratic capitalism and communism. Particularly, the U.S. a capitalist state wanted to promote democracy and capitalism globally, whereas the Soviet Union sought a communist world order. Although the U.S. and USSR were in a strategic competition for global dominance, they never once formally engaged in a hot or live war with one another. However, throughout the Cold War, the U.S. and the USSR fought combatively via proxy conflicts. Among the very first of these proxy engagements was the Korean War. After WWII, the Korean Peninsula, which was once a unified nation, had been divided into a communist northern state known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and a democratic, capitalist, southern state, the Republic of Korea (ROK). During the war, China sent two million soldiers along with the Soviet Union’s logistical support to aid the DPRK, whereas the ROK was primarily reinforced by the U.S. In June of 1950, due in part to the influence of the PRC and the USSR, the DPRK crossed the border and invaded its southern neighbor, intending to establish a unified communist Korean nation. The Korean War, which lasted three years, saw horrific casualties and fatalities on all sides. Ultimately, upon the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement, the war concluded, and a demilitarized zone was established between the North and South along the 38th Parallel. After the war, North Korea followed a far different trajectory than the Republic of Korea. Whereas the South experienced significant economic growth, the North was beginning to shield itself from the outside world, creating a “hermit kingdom” according to professor Mitchell Lerner of The Ohio State University, among many other experts.

 North Koreas Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons:

Beginning in the 1950s, Kim Il-Sung repeatedly emphasized the imperativeness of a ballistic and nuclear weapons program for the DPRK, as it would prevent North Korea from lagging too far behind the South. However, since 1950, the DPRK has been significantly impacted by severe U.S. and international sanctions for human rights abuses and failures to comply with international laws. Furthermore, the U.S. in addition to many Western countries has recently levied strict sanctions against the DPRK for cyber-crime offenses. Under the harsh leadership of North Korea’s first ruler, Kim Il-Sung, the DPRK actively sought methods of securing funding for a ballistic and nuclear missile program. Specifically, the DPRK frequently employs various illicit methods to circumvent the tight sanctions placed by the international community. Ultimately, the DPRK, according to many experts, wants nothing more than to ensure its continued existence and that of the Kim dynasty. Fast forward to 1984, and under Kim Il-Sung, North Korea test-fired its very first missile. Undoubtedly the employment of nuclear and conventional weapons was championed by not only Kim Il-Sung but his son Kim Jung-Il and grandson, Kim Jung-Un (KJU). However, of the three DPRK leaders, none have taken a greater interest in advancing the DPRK’s missile program than its current leader, KJU. Specifically, KJU has placed a great deal of emphasis on science, technology, engineering, and math as well as emerging technologies to advance the DPRK’s national agenda. The U.S. and the international community writ-large have condemned the DPRK’s military, scientific, and technological advancements and have issued strong sanctions against the North Korean government. 

North Korea’s Illicit Financing of its Missiles Program:

While the PRC, in violation of international sanctions, provides North Korea aid through cargo shipments, along with other measures, these means don’t outright provide the DPRK with enough capital to fully fund its desired missile program. Therefore, the DPRK utilizes several illicit activities to finance and grow its missile program. Particularly, the DPRK engages in the manufacturing and distribution of illegal narcotics manufacturing and the sale of counterfeit goods, trafficking arms globally, and producing and selling counterfeit currency. Yet, among the DPRK’s most recent lucrative financing activities for its missile program, has been its global hacking and malware campaign. Last year it was reported that the DPRK had stolen nearly $400 million worth of digitized assets from seven different attacks on various cryptocurrency platforms.  This is a significant development and should raise serious concern among states globally. According to some North Korean and national security experts, the DPRK likely goes after cryptocurrency as it is far less regulated than other forms of hard-copy currency, and thus it is easier to manipulate and bypass foreign sanctions. A recent United Nations investigation also determined that North Korea has stolen and continues to steal cryptocurrency to further finance its missile program. Yet, this all goes without stating the obvious, the DPRK is strictly prohibited by the UN from testing ballistic and nuclear missiles, let alone developing them. To be clear, it is not as if, the international community is “out to get the DPRK”, and therefore is prohibiting their acquiring of ballistic and nuclear missiles. Thus, it is inconsequential if the DPRK finances its missile program through legal or illicit means, simply financing it, to begin with, is in violation of sanctions. The DPRK both through its rhetoric and actions has proven its desire and capability to use asymmetric weapons systems against the U.S., RoK, and U.S. interests globally. Although the western media frequently discusses the DPRK missile threat and covers each test closely, there is a legitimate reason for concern. 

The employment of sophisticated offensive cyber measures by the DPRK is hardly a new tactic. Most notably, upon the release of the Sony Pictures film “The Interview”, DPRK launched an intrusive cyber operation against the Sony Corporation, leaking highly sensitive personally identifiable information. As I mentioned previously, the DPRK is extremely isolated from the rest of the world, and its citizens do not have access to the internet. Thus, this begs the question of how the DPRK can launch successful cyber-operations against the rest of the world? According to some experts, while the DPRK has limited internet access in its capital of Pyongyang, the PRC is complicit in allowing DPRK cyber military operators to come across the border and utilize China to launch attacks on its various targets. As with assisting the DPRK in evading sanctions, the PRC is highly culpable in its assistance efforts with the DPRK in cyberspace. However, the PRC has its reservations, as it greatly fears that an unstable DPRK could flood millions of North Korean refugees into China, which China lacks the resources or infrastructure to support. Beyond hacking operations, the DPRK has long employed ransomware attacks to assist in funding its missile program. Specifically, the WannaCry attack in which the DPRK targeted computers and servers running Windows operating systems, ultimately demanding ransom payments in Bitcoin. For the DPRK its global cyber ransomware operations are highly lucrative. According to the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) between 2015-and, 2019 DPRK ransomware hackers attempted to steal roughly $1.2 million from banks in Vietnam, Bangladesh, Taiwan, Mexico, Malta, and Africa. Moreover, according to the WIRED, DPRK secured $80 million by “tricking” a network into re-routing funds. Additionally, the FBI recently reported that North Korea stole more than $600 million in cryptocurrency, from a single hacking operation. This is a critical development as it demonstrates that the DPRK is continuing to use hack and steal operations to generate significant revenue.

Recommendations

While the international community has levied strict sanctions against North Korea, the DPRK has consistently demonstrated its formidability in cyberspace as one of the preeminent state cyber threats that the U.S. faces. However, given the nature of where cyber operations occur, there is a strong likelihood that the U.S. has been effectively thwarting the DPRK in cyberspace, though the public will never know. Thus, it is difficult to evaluate how the U.S. is doing countering North Korea’s cyber threats and illicit financing campaigns. For example, when a bomb is dropped on a target, reporters can verify that. However, due to cyber operations taking place, mostly, outside of public view, little if any substantial reporting exists to confirm such activity. Yet, after the Sony hack, it has been reported that DPRK’s internet was cut, seemingly by the U.S. and its partners. Therefore, I would suggest that the DoJ, “name and shame”, the DPRK attackers, publicly indicting them on charges. Particularly, the process of openly outing hackers is critical as many enjoy life in the shadows and will stop once they have been caught red-handed and put in the public eye. Furthermore, I recommend that the Five Eye intelligence allies actively degrade and disrupt the operating networks and information systems affiliated with the DPRK attacks. Although such an aggressive maneuver may complicate relations with the PRC, the West must take greater action against the DPRK. Furthermore, Lastly, I would advise that the U.S. financial crimes enforcement network utilize targeted sanctions to freeze the DPRK’s financial assets and that of Worker’s Party members and high-ranking North Korean military officials. While the threat from the DPRK will not dissipate any time soon, the U.S. government, international partners, along with the private sector must continue to publicly discuss DPRK’s illicit financing, while actively thwarting such activities.

Drafted Into Abuse: The Experiences of Female Soldiers in North Korea’s Military

Notice: This paper includes discussions of sexual and gender-based violence.

Founded in 1948, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, better known as North Korea, is considered to be the last true Stalinist regime. Similar to other communist nations, such as the Soviet Union and China, North Korea prides itself on gender equality and freeing women from the responsibilities and social roles that held them back from fully supporting their country. In 1946, North Korea passed the Sex Equality Law, followed by a stipulation in Article 22 of the 1948 Constitution that “women in the D.P.R.K. are accorded equal rights with men in all spheres of government, political, economic, social and cultural activity. The state protects especially mothers and children.” Articles in the 1972 and 1990 Constitutions continued the trend with the statements that “women hold equal social status and rights with men” and of the country’s contribution to the creation of “various conditions for the advancement of women”, respectfully. For most of its existence, the North Korean government, and the Kim regime - Kim Il-Sung, Kim Jong-Il, and Kim Jong-Un - maintained a relatively stable society, with work requirements, food rations, and set salaries for all citizens. However, in the 1990s, North Korea fell into an economic crash and famine following the fall of the Soviet Union and subsequent loss of aid support. The hardships, better known as the Arduous March, went on to drastically change the role of women in North Korean society. During the famine, the government required citizens to continue working despite a lack of salary. Women were in a unique position in the labor force, as, unlike other communist nations, North Korea emphasized the role of mothers and recognized the role of the housewife as a valid alternative to state employment. The country began this acknowledgment of housewives and mothers near its founding, with the 1946 Labour Law prohibiting women and children from “toilsome or harmful labour”. As the nation continued to grow, the North Korean government never officially denounced the traditional Confucian hierarchies, particularly in reference to gender roles, providing many women the leeway to leave their state jobs to be housewives after marriage. The amount of women leaving the workforce after marriage had grown to over 60 percent by the mid-1980s. This supplied them with the freedom and time flexibility to pursue other opportunities to provide for their families as they were no longer expected to perform jobs in the traditional labor force. As more women pursued informal methods of income generation, a market economy known as the “jangmadang” was created and women quickly gained a unique social status as the primary breadwinners and caregivers of their households. Yet, this was not the case for all women in North Korea. Women in the military were denied the same status and opportunities, and while their responsibilities and roles have changed over the past thirty years, the change has not occurred parallel to the overall status change of women in the general population. While the economic and social positions of women in North Korea have changed over the past three decades through greater financial and social independence, those changes have not been mirrored within the military as enlisted women remain subjected to grueling and unequal tasks, poor sanitary conditions, and a mass culture of abuse and discrimination. 

Understanding the background of the issue is essential when approaching the roles of women in North Korea’s military. The relationship between women and the military can be broken into two major time periods; 1) prior to a reported mandatory service requirement in 2015 and 2) post the requirement. South Korea and internationally based news agencies first began reporting on the mandatory service requirement in January of 2015, however, the details of the exact policy remain ambiguous. One article, published by Daily North Korea, stated that the directive establishes military service as “mandatory for eligible women between the ages of 17 and 20,” with enlistment length lasting up to five or six years.  It must be noted, however, that reports surrounding the mandatory service requirement may not be entirely accurate due to the lack of clear sources or data, and it is possible that it is instead a highly encouraged enlisted policy, similar to what men in North Korea experienced throughout most of the country’s history. For the purposes of this analysis, attention will be paid to the policy in 2015 as a marker in shifting attitudes and expectations surrounding the military service of women. Prior to 2015, primary accounts - mostly from defectors - present that joining the military was viewed by women not as a duty to the country but as a way to rise up in social rank, as many of those in higher military positions were in a higher class or members of the Korean Workers’ Party. One defector, Lee So-Yeon, served in the military for about a decade and served as a signals specialist along the Demilitarized Zone. During an interview with The World, she stated her reason for joining was to “become a low-ranking member of the ruling party.” Even as women gained social and economic status due to the market economy, the country’s strict hierarchical order made it difficult to move between class levels. Additionally, during the famine in the 1990s, many who enlisted did so due to the appeal of a daily meal. For many, especially women, who had less pressure to enlist, joining the military could create a path to a better future. 

Following the reported mandatory service requirement in 2015, the number of women in the military unsurprisingly grew from an estimated 2.38% of the country’s total population in 2015 to an estimated 2.62% in 2018. According to South Korean news sources, women were now expected to serve from the age of eighteen or nineteen until they were twenty-three. This five-year service expectation is half of what is set for men, who are typically in the service for ten years. The change can be explained in part by the reported population decline in North Korea, which has contributed to a similar decline in military size. Enlisting in the military was now no longer a tool for increasing social status. Rather, it is now a responsibility. While women who care for family members or children face less pressure to join, many do not marry or have children until their late-20’s, due to the preexisting service expectations for men. As a result, there is less ability for women to pursue market opportunities or keep themselves out of the pressure of contributing to North Korea’s workforce and military.

Central to the experience of any soldier is the expected tasks and duties. For the women in North Korea’s military, these expectations varied heavily from that of male soldiers. After joining, women undergo training similar to that of their male counterparts. They reportedly have slightly shorter physical training regimens during the day. However, the overall daily schedule is relatively the same. In addition to the physical training demands, many women soldiers are also expected to perform the cooking and cleaning for their units. They are viewed as “ttukong unjeongsu” according to author Juliette Morillot, a term that directly translates to “cooking pot lid drivers” and references the traditional attitudes around the gender roles and responsibilities of women. The requirements end up being overwhelming to the soldiers, who have to juggle their training, position tasks, and domestic duties simultaneously. 

North Korea’s government has presented itself as a beacon of gender equality, the military being no exception. However, under that phrase is a culture of Confucian values creating social hierarchies. Women in the country are subject to inadequate sanitation and hygiene, an issue that is worse for those serving in the military. Primary to this is the issue of menstruation. North Korea’s society shuns the idea of periods, considering them impure and taboo to discuss, making it difficult for women to receive the care they need. Women outside of the military have access to jangmadang where they can purchase makeshift sanitary products. For example, some defectors described how women would oftentimes buy medical gauze to use as pads, cloths that could be washed and reused, old used clothing, or socks to use as pads. Those in the military, however, are cut off from the jangmadang and are forced instead to use military gauze or reused sanitary pads that could only be cleaned and reused during the night, when male soldiers were sleeping. As discussed, female soldiers are subject to the same intense physical regimens as their male counterparts, a requirement that limits their ability to swap out dirty hygiene products and stresses their body’s limits. Some recounts by defectors claim the complete loss of periods due to the physical training, stress, and inadequate nutrition - most troops, male and female, are reportedly provided bowls of rice and corn for meals, with meat and candies reserved for special occasions. Following the 2015 policy change, the Kim Regime announced it would start providing sanitary products to its female soldiers, however, little is known about the follow-through or the amount that was distributed.

The tasks of women in the military went beyond physical training, cooking, and cleaning. For a majority of North Korea’s history, one of the most prominent images of women in the military was of the Kippumjo, a “pleasure squad” of approximately 2,000 women and girls that provided entertainment for the Kim regime, high-ranking officials of the Workers’ Party of Korea, and distinguished guests. The squad was formed under Kim Il-Sung sometime in the 1970s and was reported to be disbanded in 2011 by Kim Jong-Un. It is also important to note that in 2015, news agencies began publishing articles that Kim Jong-Un was reestablishing the Kippumjo. During its active period, teenage girls, typically between the ages of 15 and 19 would be recruited by officers based on their height and appearance. One defector by the name of Mi Hyang claimed to have been a member of the Kippumjo. She recounted being conscripted while in high school when officers visited her school and was then trained for six months before beginning her service. Members of the special force received greater benefits than other women in military service. They were reportedly provided with new appliances and a stipend. Reported duties for the members of the Kippumjo varied from dancing and singing to massages to sexual favors. While the Kippumjo has reportedly been disbanded, the culture of gender discrimination within North Korea’s military has not.

Despite the lack of attention to female bodily autonomy and needs, North Korea maintains a hyper-feminized image of how women should appear and behave. This is highlighted by the intense beauty standards faced by women both within and outside of the military. For the general female population, the rise of the market economy and greater economic freedom has allowed for more expression in fashion. Since the 1990s, women’s fashion has evolved to embrace clothing reflective of the nation’s first lady, Ri Sol-Ju, with brighter colors, lace and sequins, and feminine cuts. It could be expected that this hyper feminization would not occur within the military, as women there would be expected to be equals to their male counterparts and focus on their tasks and position. Yet, women in the military are still expected to maintain appearances.  While the pleasure squadron, the Kippumjo, has been disbanded, female soldiers are expected to maintain basic aspects of their feminine image. In fact, when the Kim Regime released the state-sponsored cosmetics brand “Pyongyang Cosmetics Industry,” it distributed products to many female aviation units. In short, the country expected women to be capable of maintaining their feminine qualities despite their intense training, lack of sanitation, and domestic duties.

Arguably the harshest part of the experiences of women in North Korea’s military is the expansive sexual assault and rape culture. Despite a lack of exact numbers, reports from defectors have shown that rape and sexual assault are part of the norm for many female soldiers. Defectors would report that even if they themselves were not assaulted during their time in the army, they knew of many others who were. While Pyongyang claims that it does not tolerate any form of sexual assault towards its soldiers, cases are seldom pursued. Cases that are pursued are rarely found in favor of the victim, and many more are shunned into silence by a culture of shame. Some women are frightened into silence through threats to “block their chances of joining the party if they refuse or attempt to report the abuse.” Rhetoric is presented to blame victims and put the focus on women’s actions rather than on the violations by men. This creates a system of victim-blaming, one which takes the blame away from perpetrators and puts it on the female victims. Female soldiers are unable to receive care, on top of the already lacking menstrual hygiene and the pressure to keep quiet. Instead, they are forced to suffer in silence.

Despite sexual assault and harassment being common knowledge for women in the military, they are still forced to struggle on their own. In the case of sexual assault, victims are oftentimes on their own, as a culture of shame and victim-blaming is prevalent even among other female soldiers. Sexual assault is viewed as something to be expected and is normalized to the point that the country has established the idea that women must act in a certain way to avoid violence. The issue is so expansive that in order to avoid social blame, women are willing to undergo dangerous abortions. Especially in the military, where a pregnancy could ruin one’s social status and career, some soldiers use anthelmintic medicine, tighten their belts, or roll down hills to force miscarriages. If able to, some pursue illegal surgical abortions, with potentially life-threatening consequences. Sexual assault and rape also put them at risk for injury, sexual-transmitted illnesses, or post-traumatic stress disorder. Enlisted women are especially vulnerable to sexual violence due to the male-centric hierarchal nature of the military, with social values and limitations cutting them off from seeking comfort, medical care, or legal recourse, leaving them on their own to cope. 

Not only is the mental and physical health of the women in the military impacted by the tasks and discrimination that they face during their service, but their social roles and the country’s economy as a whole are also affected. Women outside of the traditional workforce were able to participate in the market economy during the 1990s, including women who were not tied up in the military operations that came as a response to natural disasters and flooding. As North Korea continues to work towards increasing its military capabilities despite a dwindling population, its focus on pressuring enlistment among women limits their ability to provide food for themselves and their families as well as to participate in the country’s now semi-legal and quasi-capitalist markets. Taking women out of the markets will eliminate the primary organizers and parties involved, potentially decreasing the strength of the country’s overall economy. Additionally, as women are pushed into the military, they will potentially lose the social statuses that they gained as a result of the jangmadang. Following the Arduous March, women had become the primary “breadwinners” for their households and also gained greater freedoms as divorce rates rose and extramarital affairs became less taboo. This status is inherently linked to the market economy, and if women are taken out of the equation, it is likely that both will reverse. 

As North Korea gains increased attention on the international stage, many look to its growing military capability and unique economic structure. North Korea’s military growth has involved technological developments in cyber, missile, and nuclear capabilities. Simultaneously, the country developed its market economy through the jangmadang. However, both of these involve one specific group, the women of North Korea. As the country attempts to balance its ambitions, declining population growth - from 1.54 percent in the 1980s to 0.49 percent in the 2010s - and diminishing military size - from an estimated 6.6 percent of the population in the 1980s to 5.2 percent -, it turned to women as the solution. Women had been part of the solution to famine and economic decline thirty years ago, as their unique social status allowed them to become the primary breadwinners and base of a new market economy during the Arduous March in the 1990s. Women currently make up an estimated 51.5 percent of the country’s population, yet, as previously stated, only 2.62 percent of women currently serve in the country’s military. As a result, the female population remains a largely untapped resource for military growth. From the 1990s onward, women managed to gain a higher social status and earn greater freedoms, even if those freedoms are not comparable to those of other nations. Despite these changes, the status of women within the North Korean military saw little movement. While the country’s campaign to increase female military enlisted, domestic responsibilities, lack of sanitary products, beauty standards, and sexual assault have continued to dominate their experiences. As North Korea pushes forward on its current path, it puts its economy at risk, as well as the status of its female population. The removal from the market economy and the cultural shame around traumatic gender-based experiences in favor of the stagnant military status threatens to dominate the experiences of women and force their social advances to regress.

It’s Okay to See the ICBM Program Go

Introduction

The Biden-Harris Administration comes into office facing a myriad of unprecedented domestic and international challenges. None of these challenges, however, can be resolved or mitigated by more nuclear weapons. Though the national security establishment continues to argue that a modernization of a previously critical component of the nuclear triad is essential, that position remains highly questionable.

The United States is set to construct a new weapon of mass destruction able to travel several thousand miles and carry a warhead more than 20 times more powerful than the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. In September of last year, the Air Force gave Northrop Grumman an initial contract of over $13 billion to begin engineering and manufacturing 600 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as part of a nuclear triad modernization program supported by both the Obama and Trump Administrations. In total, the construction project could add up to $100 billion for the weapon, which will become ready for use by 2029. Operation and support costs could include another $164 billion. The plan is to replace the 450 Minutemen III ICBMs in active service or reserve with 600 Ground-Base Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) missiles, a more modern ICBM.

ICBMs are strategic weapons systems dispersed in hardened silos throughout the American Great Plains and Southwest to protect against attack. They are connected to an underground launch control center and typically have a minimum range of 5,000 kilometers (hence intercontinental). U.S. nuclear-armed ICBMS are on high alert, meaning they can be launched within mere minutes of a president’s command. The Air Force currently has 400 ICBMs deployed in the American West. Along with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and nuclear bomber planes, ICBMs are one of the components of the nuclear triad. According to the Trump Administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, “The triad’ s synergy and overlapping attributes help ensure the enduring survivability of our deterrence capabilities against attack and our capacity to hold at risk a range of adversary targets throughout a crisis or conflict. Eliminating any leg of the triad would greatly ease adversary attack planning and allow an adversary to concentrate resources and attention on defeating the remaining two legs.” President Obama’s Secretary of Defense Ash Carter called the triad “a bedrock of our security” and “foundational” to U.S. policy. Is it really though?

Has the Triad Outlived its Necessity?

Traditionally, the ICBM has been understood as the most responsive element of the triad. It is a byproduct of the Cold War and the assumption that the U.S. would need to deter a surprise attack through the promise of rapid, overwhelming force and destruction. During the Cold War, ICBMs provided accuracy that was not achievable at the time from the other components of the triad. Furthermore, ICBMs served as an insurance policy in the event that the U.S.’s nuclear submarines were disabled. The basis underlying all of this was the strategic doctrine of deterrence as elucidated by Bernard Brodie in “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” who noted the paradox of deterrence: “We are...expecting the system to be constantly perfected while going permanently unused.”

This logic no longer holds. First, America’s ICBMs provide no unique nuclear strike capability not already provided by the other legs and the absence of any immediate threat to U.S. nuclear submarines means no adversary can “preempt massive retaliation” by the U.S. According to President Bill Clinton’s Secretary of Defense William Perry, “Today, the United States’ submarine and bomber forces are highly accurate, and we have enough confidence in their security that we do not need an additional insurance policy — especially one that is so expensive and open to error.” 

Furthermore, being on high alert, ICBMs pose a unique risk of accidentally starting a nuclear war. If American sensors determine that an adversary’s missiles are en route to the U.S., the president would be forced to make a decision on whether to launch ICBMs before the enemy missile would destroy them, a period as short as a few dozen minutes. Once launched, the decision is final and they cannot be recalled.

The risk of an accidental launch may seem trivial, but mistakes can always occur as long as the program exists. In 1979, computer errors at North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), Strategic Air Command’s command post, the Pentagon, and the Alternative National Military Command Center led U.S. defense officials to believe the Soviet Union had launched more than 2,000 missiles at the U.S. Nuclear bombers were prepared to take off when, a few minutes later, it was declared to be a false alarm. It turned out that according to an investigation by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), a training video had accidentally been loaded into an operational computer at the Cheyenne Mountain Complex in Colorado Springs, home to NORAD.

In September 1983, a Soviet early warning system warned that an American ICBM was incoming before the report was altered to five missiles. Soviet Air Defence Forces Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov refused to report the incoming ICBMs to his superiors, dismissing it as a false alarm (he thought that if the U.S. was going to launch a strike, it would have included more missiles). Ultimately, Petrov’s intuition was confirmed by ground radar, as the alarm was caused by a rare sunlight alignment on high-altitude clouds. 

The world historical and world-ending stakes of a launch combined with the preciously little time afforded to make that monumental decision makes an accidental nuclear ICBM launch a serious possibility no matter the odds. This is where deterrence theory falls apart, in its assumption of rational actors in control of their situation.

Will Ending the Modernization Put the U.S. at a Strategic Disadvantage?

Supporters of ICBM modernization would argue that abandoning the ICBM program will leave the U.S. exposed to nuclear adversaries. Air Force Major Shane Praiswater, a visiting military analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, argues that Russia and China’s ambitious nuclear modernization programs seek to “equal, if not surpass” U.S. nuclear capabilities, and a U.S. failure to modernize its ICBMs would leave the U.S. at a comparative strategic disadvantage. Again, however, with U.S. ICBMs on high alert, the U.S. instead runs the risk of accidentally igniting a nuclear war, which is statistically speaking much more likely to happen than a state deciding consciously to strike the U.S. Secondly, despite hawkish fearmongering about China’s nuclear arsenal, there are currently more nuclear weapons stored in Albuquerque, New Mexico than in China- by a factor of seven and a half.

Instead of an ill-defined, open-ended nuclear competition with Russia and China bound to increase the odds of an accidental nuclear holocaust, the U.S. could help prevent a global arms race simply by renouncing the ICBM, the least accurate and easiest component of the nuclear triad for adversaries to target. Moscow pursues its modernization out of the pursuit for nuclear parity with the U.S. and views the U.S. modernization as threatening, fomenting a security dilemma. 

And this is for good reason. As Brent J. Talbot, a professor of military and security studies at the Air Force Academy, notes, the Minuteman force and the proposed GBSD force ICBMs would have to fly over Russia to strike any other emerging nuclear power (like North Korea) because they are based in the northern part of the U.S. When launched from that region, “The ballistic trajectories of the missiles require polar flight paths to reach most destinations around the globe. Thus, if the United States were to retaliate against a North Korean or Iranian attack, use of ICBMs would require overflight of Russian airspace en route to their targets, perhaps causing the Russians to think that the United States had initiated an attack against them.” In Talbot’s words, “Preserving 400 of 700 launchers to strike only one adversary is, once again, evidence of Cold War logic.” Because the ICBM can only plausibly be used against Russia, it does preciously little to deter potentially rogue actors, as North Korea is often characterized by some of these same hawks. In short, it does not even do the one thing its most ardent proponents believe it does.

America’s alliances, international institutions, and arms control agreements like New START and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, Iran Deal) work perfectly fine to deter its competitors from obtaining nuclear weapons, much less using them. The idea that only more spending on nuclear weapons will provide deterrence assumes fatalism in diplomacy when in reality diplomacy is what has prevented the world from descending into President John F. Kennedy’s prediction of a world awash in nuclear weapons (he feared famously in 1963 that by 1975 there would be 20 nations with nuclear weapons; today there are nine). Rather than the outdated Cold War mindset that America must match Moscow missile for missile, American nuclear policy ought to be decided on the basis of how many nuclear weapons America actually needs.

Cost Savings

Finally, ending the ICBM modernization will save the U.S. billions, if not hundreds of billions of dollars that are urgently needed at home and in the diplomatic sphere. The coronavirus pandemic and the climate crisis have laid bare that the most severe and serious national security threats to the U.S. are transnational and non-military. National security, in other words, has to start with human security. Ending the ICBM program, along with concurrent defense spending cuts, could save the country enough money to put a down payment on a Green New Deal, foreign aid to vulnerable populations like the Palestinians or people in Central America and the Caribbean beset by natural disasters and human rights abusing governments, or a universal coronavirus vaccine, as the bills introduced by Senator Ed Markey (D-MA) and Representative Ro Khanna (D-CA) call for. The stakes of such a decision are clear: we can either destroy the world three and a half to four times over in a fit of hubristic superpower rage or we can save it once and for all. 

Conclusion

The world survived one arms race, but barely and not without numerous close calls. Modernizing the ICBM program and swearing undying, unconditional fealty to the nuclear triad long after it has served its purpose risks igniting another one. What we have today is a policy-procurement gap, whereby contractors like Northrop Grumman’s interests are served instead of the national interest. As Joe Cirincione, the former head of the Ploughshares Fund writes, “Contracts race ahead of policy…[Continuing the triad] will lock us into building weapons we do not need at a price we cannot afford.” Nuclear weapons could not possibly be more irrelevant or ill-suited for the primary security threats the U.S. faces today in the form of the pandemic and climate change. The Biden Administration has to blow up this modernization plan before it blows everyone up.

Fake News in North Korea: Censorship, Propaganda, and the Rewriting of History

In the era of the Trump administration, ‘fake news’ has arisen as a significant concern. What is true? What is fake? These are questions that many Americans now ask of their government and media platforms. In the first amendment of the Constitution, free speech is guaranteed for all Americans. That right is expertly exercised by American citizens and often taken for granted.

On the other side of the matter lies North Korea, where free speech is outlawed and the state tightly controls all forms of media. Citizens of North Korea have virtually no freedom of speech: internet is only accessible by a select number of powerful individuals in Pyongyang, television and radios can only access North Korean-operated stations, and accessing foreign media is illegal and punishable by death or by imprisonment in political prison camps.

Beyond harsh media censorship, North Korea also engages in a constant rewriting of history, dictated by the Kim family and executed by government officials. The foundation for extreme censorship lies in the core North Korean ideology of Juche (“self-reliance”). Juche encourages complete national independence from the outside world, which includes the disregard of foreign media and the creation of a uniquely North Korean history. Ultimately, the intense censorship serves as a protection for the Kim family and their continued survival as dictators.

Article 3 of the North Korean Constitution defines Juche and the purpose it serves:

“The DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] is guided in its activities by the Juche idea, a world outlook centered on people, a revolutionary ideology for achieving the independence of the masses of people.”

To achieve said independence of the masses, censorship and propaganda begin at a young age. North Korean children learn the history of the three Kim leaders - Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un - starting in preschool. Songs and theater performances tell the stories of the Kim family’s brilliance and  describe the Kims as higher beings who have devoted their lives to serving their country.

In Jang Jin Sung’s memoir of his defection from North Korea, Jang tells a well-known North Korean fable of a man whose house was burning down. This man had just enough time to save either his children or the portraits of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. He saved the portraits and was regarded a hero.

Censorship and propaganda continues into adult life with the monitoring by neighborhood supervisors. The Inminban are networks of North Korean women who patrol their neighborhoods for criminal activity, which includes any questioning and disparaging of the Kims or of the North Korean state. While cellphones are allowed, they are heavily surveilled by the state.

Within North Korea, there are two main news sources: the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) and Rodong Sinmun. Since these news sources exist online, they are difficult to access for the North Korean people. These newspapers primarily are written for foreign onlookers and detail the daily activities of the Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un. Articles contain heavy propaganda and report a “straightforward reflection of Pyongyang’s policy stance”, leaving no room for personal opinions.

Censorship, state-run media, propaganda in schools and in the arts, and surveillance all serve the purpose of controlling the North Korean people, to achieve the desired ‘independence of the masses’ from outside influences. The most startling effort; however, is the rewriting of history.

Historical reshaping became a talking point of international media in the early 2010s, following the release of the memoir Dear Leader by Jang Jin-Sung. Jang worked in Pyongyang as a propaganda poet and assisted with the rewriting of Kim Jong Il’s biography.

Reshaping began after the Korean War in the 1950s when North Korea was established as its own state. Kim Il Sung, the first leader of North Korea, had his biography rewritten by state officials. Kim Il Sung’s birth conveniently fell on April 15, 1912, the same day the Titanic sunk. His biography opens with the telling of how the world began to change from the moment he was born, starting with Titanic’s demise. The biography served to “solidify a narrative of his [KIS] own unblemished record” from the Korean War and into his time as Great Leader of North Korea.

Following in his father’s footsteps, Kim Jong Il had his past similarly rewritten once he took over as Dear Leader of North Korea in 1994. This process began with the location of his birth. Despite reports that he was born in the Soviet Union, the North Korean state claims that Kim Jong Il was born in a military camp in on Mount Paektu. Given the claims that all three North Korean leaders were born on this mountain, they are referred to as the “Mount Paektu Bloodline”.

Despite being merely a child during the Korean War, his biography tells the story of a young boy at the front lines of battle, learning to conduct military operations with his father. After the fall of the Soviet Union, stories about North Korea’s relationship with the Soviet Union were modified to give the impression that North Korea had been skeptical about the survival of the Soviet state since the very beginning. Along with the rewriting process, Kim Jong Il ordered a “massive purge of libraries” to destroy any unflattering stories of North Korea’s past.

After Kim Jong Il’s death in 2011, Kim Jong Un began his reign as Supreme Leader with a purge of over 400 high-level government officials. Unlike his father, who had years of experience in the government before assuming the role of head of state, Kim Jong Il’s death took North Korea by surprise. This forced Kim Jong Un to step up as Supreme Leader having had little experience dealing with his father’s officials. His purging of most of his father’s government was with the intention of proving himself as a strong and legitimate leader.

The most well-known executed official was Jang Song Thaek, Kim Jong Un’s uncle. Jang and Kim worked together for two years without much issue until late 2013. After constantly disagreeing with the Supreme Leader, Kim decided he had enough. Jang was arrested at a meeting, stood for trial a few days later, and was executed. Rumors said he was “stripped naked and fed to 120 dogs”; however there is no factual basis for this claim. In media coverage of the event, Jang was referred to as “despicable human scum” and after the execution, Rodong Sinmun erased tens of thousands of articles referring to Jang from their online databases, as if he had never existed.

The intense controls on the North Korean media lead one to ask whether North Koreans are convinced of their altered history and of the propaganda. Coverage of North Korea in popular media sources presents the people as being brainwashed by Kim Jong Un. For example, the film The Interview perpetuates some stereotypes of the North Korean people, despite being written as a comedy. The following quote is Jang Jin Sung’s take on this issue:

“North Koreans are people, and they aren’t stupid. In the North Korean system, you have to praise Kim and sing hymns about him and take it seriously, even if you think it’s only a shit narrative. That’s the block, you see? It’s not that people are brainwashed and think he’s god. These are the things that people know, but they don’t dare to challenge.”

There are likely people who believe in the North Korean state and trust the stories they are told. However, there are also likely people who have zero faith in the state. With the rising number of defectors each year, it is clear that more and more North Koreans are aware of the situation they are in and are actively trying to escape.

The severe punishment waiting for North Koreans who attempt escaping is enough to scare someone into staying put. After three failed escape attempts, the defector will be executed along with three generations of their family. The state does not stop with one execution, but they continue to execute the entire close bloodline. This way the state can deter any future attempts by this family to escape from North Korea.

Unfortunately, there is not much that can be done about this issue. North Korea has no incentive to stop their censorship, propaganda, or rewriting of history. It is in their best interest to continue these practices to maintain the intense cult of personality surrounding the Kim family.

Given the outcome of the recent Hanoi summit between North Korea and the United States, the US is in no position to interfere in Kim’s affairs. Relations between North Korea and the US have returned to being hostile and do not show any signs of improving. International actors, like the United Nations, have also used up all their cards in recent attempts to shame North Korea into addressing human rights violations.

The state with the most leverage regarding North Korea is South Korea. President Moon Jae-In ran for president on the platform of reunification as his primary goal. He is positioned well to work bilaterally with North Korea, especially since their recent summit at Panmunjom in April of 2018 was successful. It is up to President Moon to determine the future of inter-peninsula relations. Ultimately, South Korea is the sole government that could potentially improve the freedom of speech in North Korea. However, change is not likely. North Korea has no incentive to loosen their censorship. It will take expert level negotiations and agreements in order for Kim Jong Un to relinquish some control. It is likely that fake news will continue to prevail in North Korea for some time to come.

In looking ahead to a future where the United States, South Korea, and North Korea are working together, the most practical way to go about remedying this situation would be a gradual rollback of censorship. North Koreans have been raised to believe that Americans are their ultimate enemy and that South Koreans are poorer than they are. If either the US or South Korea enter North Korea and immediately expose citizens to the whole truth, North Koreans would not be likely to believe them. Incremental exposure to their true history and contemporary affairs would be the best method of reintegration into an uncensored state.

Evolution of Contemporary Responses to Human Rights Abuses in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

North Korea, also known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), has become increasingly responsive to human rights criticism since early 2010. The DPRK has recently begun to respond to United Nations human rights investigations, and in 2018 they  participated in bilateral meetings with South Korea and the United States to discuss their foreign relations. As a result of these historic developments, the following question is proposed: how have responses to North Korean human rights abuses evolved in the twenty-first century? The international community has attempted two different methods of addressing North Korea’s human rights abuses: The early 2010s were characterized by shaming Kim Jong Un’s regime; and the late 2010s have been characterized by international collaboration with North Korea, notably with South Korea and the United States. These distinct periods are reflected in two diverse responses from the Kim regime regarding allegations of their human rights violations.

Human Rights Abuses

North Korea has been known for its terrible human rights violations since the informal end to the Korean War in 1953. When the two Koreas split, North Korea spiraled into an inhumane dictatorship run by the Kim family. As evidence of this, North Korea placed third-to-last out of 195 countries on Freedom House’s 2018 ranking of free countries, preceded only by Syria and South Sudan.

It is well known that the Kim regime strictly dictates the lives of the North Korean people. As the executive director of Human Rights Watch, Kenneth Roth, puts it, the DPRK engages in “unprecedented crimes against humanity.” The country’s isolation and prioritization of defense and military spending presents a confounding image of both nuclear armament and extreme poverty and starvation. The strict control of food rations also poses major issues for the North Korean population and the country is again at risk of falling into a famine. In a 2017 report, it was estimated that at least forty percent of the North Korean population is suffering from severe food insecurity, with only the capital city of Pyongyang exempted from this issue.

Censorship, travel bans, public executions, and political prison camps are also major human rights violations of the North Korean people. In a December 2017 report on North Korean political prisons, the DPRK was found guilty of ten crimes against humanity. These include enslavement, torture, persecution, and enforced disappearances. It is clear that the North Korean government violates the human rights of the majority of its citizens. As a recent defector explained, “if you don’t have money or power, you die in a ditch.” The international community is aware of these violations and has been increasingly addressing these issues over the past decade.

The First Wave of Responses

The first wave of responses to the human rights abuses committed by North Korea began in 2013 with the establishment of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The United Nations created this commission to investigate the widespread violations of human rights. In doing so, they called for North Korean compliance with the investigation and humanitarian assistance if deemed necessary. The Commission released their report to the public in February 2014, finding that the North Korean government was guilty of “systematic, widespread, and gross human rights violations.” The report also includes a letter sent by Michael Kirby, chair of the commission, to Supreme Leader Kim, in which Kirby expressed his disappointment for not being granted access to travel to Pyongyang. Kirby further explains that he had been hoping to speak with the Supreme Leader and his top government officials in order to better understand the North Korean perspective on their own human rights.

North Korea’s noncompliance in the commission and their refusal to respond to various correspondences was of high concern to the United Nations. Kim, however, saw no problem with remaining silent when faced by these claims. Having just taken over power from his father Kim Jong Il in 2011, acknowledging the human rights abuses would have undermined his authority and ability to lead. Therefore, it was a rational decision of the DPRK not to respond to shaming tactics imposed by the international community.

Later in 2014, the United Nations made two more similar attempts at responding to North Korea’s human right abuses:

1. The United Nations formally added North Korea’s human rights abuses to the Security Council’s agenda as a “threat to international peace and security.”

2. The UN General Assembly passed Resolution 69/188 addressing human rights in the DPRK. The 7-page document condemns the actions of North Korea, expresses serious concern based on the commission’s findings, and strongly urges the DPRK to respect all of its citizens’ human rights.

Given the heightened importance placed on human rights in the DPRK and constant shaming tactics, North Korea responded to the United Nations by publishing their own report from the DPRK Association for Human Rights Studies. In this document, the regime explains how human rights are respected by their government and, contrary to the world’s belief, North Koreans are thriving. This report described the United States and the European Union as the main obstacles to promoting human rights in North Korea and labels the United Nations reports as vicious propaganda.  

This first wave of responses to human rights abuses in the DPRK can be characterized by multiple attempts from the United Nations at shaming North Korea and by North Korea’s persistent denial of any human rights abuses. North Korean foreign relations thawed during this time, however, there was no positive impact made on the human rights of the North Korean people, nor were human rights abuses acknowledged.   

Second Wave of Responses

The second notable wave of responses to human rights abuses began in 2017. After remaining dormant for a few years and observing the UN’s failure at diplomatically engaging with North Korea, the international community shifted its focus back to North Korea’s human rights abuses. This interest was likely sparked in part by the imprisonment of American college student Otto Warmbier, who was arrested for stealing state propaganda. His case drew attention to the treatment of political prisoners in North Korea when he died three weeks after his release to the United States in June of 2017. Despite their previous lack of success, the United Nations continued to use the shaming method in an attempt to embarrass North Korea into action. The UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in North Korea released a report, as has been done every year since 2004, stating the UN’s increasing concern for the worsening of living conditions in North Korea. However, Kim merely continued his tradition of ignoring recommended regime changes.

Two states, South Korea and the United States, diverged from the UN and turned towards collaboration tactics in an effort to engage in dialogue with the DPRK. This was an attempt to move towards a period of tactical concessions, which would eventually move North Korea away from denial of their human rights abuses. In April, May, and September of 2018, South Korean president Moon Jae In met with Supreme Leader Kim to discuss ending the Korean War and the future of Korean relations. These historic meetings were the first time North and South Korean leaders have met in person since 1953. Kim agreed to denuclearize the peninsula before 2019 and a declaration was signed to officially end the Korean War. Plans to remove weapons and guard posts from the Demilitarized Zone were established and a united bid to host the Olympics in Korea was submitted to the Olympics Committee.

These three meetings between North and South Korea shared a key characteristic: they focused on nuclear capabilities and foreign relations, but not human rights. In order to get North Korea to open communication with the rest of the world, South Korea had to shift the dialogue to national security and improving relations. This is reflected in the Panmunjom Declaration, the resolution that came out of the first inter-Korean meeting. While the declaration was highly symbolic of a new era of peace on the Korean peninsula, it was lacking in realistic steps by which to denuclearize North Korea and improve their human rights.

The second key meeting was the US-North Korean summit in June 2018. This meeting, like the Inter-Korean summits, was highly symbolic. After the meeting, United States President Trump tweeted that “There is no longer a nuclear threat from North Korea.” However this declaration has been undermined by recent satellite evidence from CSIS, finding that the DPRK is in fact increasing their nuclear power. This does not come as a surprise, given that the declaration signed at this meeting was lacking in realistic measures by which the DPRK would move towards denuclearization.

In summary, the second wave of responses to North Korean human rights abuses was more successful than the first in bringing about dialogue with the DPRK, especially in regards to denuclearization. However, this increased interaction with the international community will make very few improvements on the human rights of North Koreans. As North Korean defector Jang Jin-Sung says in his autobiography: “North Korea uses dialogue as a tool of deception rather than negotiation.” The DPRK is likely engaging in dialogue with the intention of manipulating hopeful South Korean and American governments into weakening sanctions and de-escalating military threats. Pyongyang is feigning interest in cooperation while continuing to ignore its people’s human rights.

The heightened global attention to North Korea and their human rights abuses, as well as the Kim regime’s recent participation in bilateral summits, offers a promising view of the future of human rights in the DPRK. The United Nations Commission of Inquiry, Resolution, and Special Rapporteur have been effective in highlighting the human rights abuses in the DPRK, but ineffective in dialogue with North Korea and in presenting realistic steps to solve problems. Ultimately, the second wave of responses was far more effective in engaging North Korea in discussion, seen through diplomacy efforts from North Korea unprecedented in contemporary years. Although the summits focused on national security, minor concessions on human rights were made by North Korea. The Kaesong Industrial Region, a South Korean-owned North Korean-operated development complex is set to reopen, which will employ thousands of North Koreans and provide the North Korean state with significant economic assistance.

While human rights were not a particular focus of the second wave, the improved foreign relations brought about by all three summits will be key in long-term eradication of human rights violations. Once the issue of denuclearization has been somewhat mediated, the focus of diplomatic efforts should shift to human rights abuses. Positive progress in the human rights of North Koreans will come about very slowly, just as diplomatic relations with North Korea have been improving slowly. More than seventy years of tension cannot easily be remedied; however, states committed to progress will eventually bring about change. Therefore, further collaboration with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is in the best interest of the United States, South Korea, and the broader international community, including the United Nations. Continuing to host summits and strengthen diplomatic ties with Kim Jong Un will bring about gradual positive progress towards recognition of human rights violations by North Korea.

The North Korea Question; U.S. Strategy in the Korean Peninsula

For decades, the United States’ foreign policies toward North Korea have centered on non-proliferation, with the objective of preventing North Korea from developing nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of hitting the United States. Unfortunately, these policies have failed. Considering that change, it is time to transition into a new era of policies focused on another goal; preventing catastrophic war between the United States and North Korea. The United States has two options; the first, to use the U.S. military to either bring about regime change in North Korea, or to conduct surgical strikes on North Korean missile test sites or storage facilities; or the second, to de-escalate tensions and to adopt a policy of deterrence. The military option is no option—It likely would lead to retaliation by North Korea against the United States, or U.S. allies, and even then it might not succeed, which leaves only the second option. Sadly, both the United States and North Korea have adopted a policy of brinkmanship and threats, which does not de-escalate tension. Neither country wants nuclear war to occur, but it is quite possible that the continuation of these policies of brinkmanship will cause the U.S. or North Korea to bumble into a war with unimaginable consequences. This needs to be avoided at all costs. If the United States is going to have to learn to live with a nuclearized North Korea, which they are going to have to whether they like it or not, is necessary that a policy of de-escalation is pursued immediately.

A Slow Moving Cuban Missile Crisis? 

Robert Litwak, a scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, has described the current standoff between the United States and North Korean as “the Cuban missile crisis in slow motion.” However, one could argue that the current crisis between the United State and North Korea is actually more dangerous than the crisis President Kennedy handled so skillfully in October of 1962. For one, the Cuban missile crisis was not between the United States and newly emerging nuclear state. For another, the current standoff is between two leaders who do not have advisors who can effectively speak the truth if it differs from what their leader wants to hear. Kim Jong Un has had his own family members killed, and it has become clear during his presidency that Donald Trump does not suffer advisers who disagree with him, going as far as to call Lt. General McMaster a “pain” for correcting him in a meeting. This combination of factors means that the situation the U.S. and North Korea find themselves is even more dangerous than what the United States, the U.S.S.R, and Cuba were in in 1962.

The Military Option is No Option

When faced with options like the United States has with North Korea, it is easy to make the mistake of overestimating the United States’ chances of success, and underestimating the costs of an attack. Arguments for using preventative military options against North Korea severely overestimate the likelihood that the United States would succeed in their objectives. The history of attempted decapitation strikes by the United States is rife with failure, as is the history of surgical strikes. Given North Korea’s fears of U.S. infringement on their sovereignty, any sort of strike would need to have a 100 percent success rate. If the strikes were not completely successful in decapitating the Kim regime or in removing North Korea’s ability to retaliate, it is highly unlikely that North Korea would do nothing. If they retaliated, untold death and destruction would envelop the Korean peninsula, and potentially targets outside of the peninsula which are in range of attack.

If it were to retaliate, it is possible that North Korea would use a nuclear weapon. It is challenging to estimate the fatalities of a nuclear strike by the North Koreans, but all attempts to do so have indicate that the impact would be catastrophic. According to NUKEMAP, a modelling tool that allows users to estimate the impact of a nuclear weapon on a map, a 100 kiloton (the estimated explosive yield capability of North Korean nuclear weapons based on their tests) nuclear weapon detonated over Busan, South Korea, would kill 440,000 people immediately. A similar-sized bomb over Hagåtña, Guam would kill 14,360 people instantly, and in Tokyo around 191,820 would be killed in the first few minutes after the blast. These estimates only account for the impact of the initial blast, not the impact of the ensuing fallout, which would increase that number drastically. No matter their target, if North Korea were to detonate a nuclear weapon it would be catastrophic.

Even if the North Koreans chose not to use their nuclear weapons to retaliate and instead employed their conventional weapons, the results would also be catastrophic. The Nautilus Institute published a study in 2012 entitle “Mind the Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality,” in which they found that North Korea has thousands of pieces of artillery along the demilitarized zone which could inflict around 64,000 fatalities in Seoul alone on the first day of war. This study did not account for North Korea’s five thousand metric tons of chemical weapons, which would drastically increase the number of fatalities if they were employed against South Korea. Whether chemical weapons would be employed or not, even if the retaliation was to remain localized to the Korean peninsula, the results would be horrific. In such an event, the South Koreans would likely retaliate as well, completely enveloping the peninsula in destruction. The costs of not engaging in preventative military options are far smaller than the costs of engaging and triggering retaliation. Despite what has been said by the Trump administration and previous administrations, there is no military option.

Brinkmanship and Threats

When the United States’ goal was to prevent North Korea from obtaining nuclear weapons, utilizing threats was a viable option. In the strategic environment that exists now, this strategy is ineffective and dangerous. Brinkmanship is a strategy employed by nuclear states when attempting to convince another nuclear state to do or not do something, in which one state exerts pressure on the other state by taking steps that raise the risk that events will spiral out of control. The United States and North Korea are both employing this strategy, North Korea by repeatedly testing missiles and making threats, such as the one directed at Guam, and the United States by repeatedly threatening military action against North Korea. In situations in which brinkmanship is practiced, there is a real risk of events culminating in a catastrophic exchange. At each stage, a state is faced with the choice of acquiescing, or holding on a little longer—increasing the risk of a catastrophic event in hopes the other state will bow out. If no state backs down, the crisis continues to escalate until a state does out or events spiral out of control. In brinkmanship games, the state that has the higher resolve will prevail, unless a catastrophic event occurs in which case both states lose. According to a game theoretic model of brinkmanship designed by Robert Powell, in cases where a larger state is engaged in brinkmanship with a rogue state, the rogue state will usually prevail—the cost of an attack on the larger state is far worse than the consequences of not intervening in the rogue state. The United States will not prevail in a game of chicken with North Korea because North Korea the risk of their regime is at stake, their resolve is clearly higher than the United States’.

The Kim regime has made it clear since the outset of their nuclear program that the impetus behind the program is to prevent the United States and other states from infringing on their sovereignty. They theorize that the United States will not risk nuclear war by trying to bring about regime change in North Korea. The logic behind this has been confirmed by the actions of the United States in the past in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya, and the North Korean government knows that and has issued a number of statements in which they argue that if those states had had nuclear weapons, the United States would not have attacked them. North Korea will not follow in South Africa’s footsteps, they won’t voluntarily end their nuclear program, and they certainly won’t do so in the face of threats from the United States that just further qualify their fear of the United States. Actions by the United States to increase tensions between the United States and North Korea will not induce North Korea to give up their weapons, it will just increase the risk that a catastrophic event occurs.

De-escalation and Deterrence 

The past three U.S. administrations have stressed that “all options are on the table.” This statement sounds less threatening than the alternative threats of “fire and fury,” but it still increases tensions between the United States and North Korea in an irresponsible fashion. The longer these increased tensions exists, the more likely it is that some sort of catastrophic event will occur. To effectively navigate out of this crisis, the United States needs to convince the Kim regime that an attack on the U.S. or its allies will automatically lead to the to end of their regime, but the United States also needs to acknowledge that the United States is not interested starting a war. North Korea will not take these types of statements at face value, so it also will be necessary to stop offering a preventative strike as an option. In addition to its legally dubious status, a preventative attack on North Korea will all but guarantee the deaths of millions. The U.S. has serious qualms with North Korea, but as long as there is not an actionable threat by the North Koreans, the cost of failure is far higher than the cost of not interfering with the regime.

In 1947, George Kennan, already famous for the “Long Telegram,” published an article in Foreign Affairs under the pseudonym “Mr. X,” in which he argued that a strategy of “patient but firm and vigilant containment,” would eventually lead to “the break up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.” Kennan’s argument was based upon the idea that if the U.S.S.R. could be contained and deterred, the structural issues within the country would eventually bring about its down fall. While there are immutable differences between the U.S.S.R. and North Korea, there are many similarities, the largest being the structural problems in both of their economies. Eventually, the ineffectiveness of the North Korean economy will lead to its downfall, just as it did for the U.S.S.R. Until that point, the United States just needs to ensure that nuclear war doesn’t occur.

“Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb” 

This type of policy change runs contrary to much of the rhetoric espoused by past U.S. administrations, and it particularly runs contrary to President Trump’s “tough-talking” mantra. It also ignores the human rights abuses that are occurring within North Korea, which is a challenging pill to swallow for anyone who cares about humanitarian issues. Strategies for addressing North Korea are often referred to as the “least bad option,” and this instance is no different. The U.S. administrations don’t need to “love” the bomb, but they need to realize that the opportunity to prevent North Korea from obtaining nuclear weapons has long past. It is time to move into a new era of policies that aren’t centered around threats of military action, and instead use other methods of addressing individual crises with North Korea. Even rational actors can make mistakes, and the longer the United States and North Korea embrace brinkmanship, the higher the likelihood of something terrible happening is. The impact of such an event is unimaginable, thus everything possible needs to be done to prevent it from occurring. The United States should strategize to play the long game.

The Economics of Sanctions: Half Measures, Tit-for-Tat Strategies, and Why North Korea is Not Iran

On September 9th, 2016, North Korea conducted what South Korean and Japanese estimates called its biggest nuclear test to date, with a nuclear yield equivalent to approximately 10 kilotons of TNT (the bomb dropped by the U.S. on Hiroshima had a yield of about 15 kilotons). The international community, including the United States, was quick to condemn the test, and calls for new rounds of sanctions came immediately, almost reflexively, and as if it was understood exactly what these calls were requesting. The actual mechanics of sanctions, however, are often hidden behind catchphrases such as “snap back,” “tough,” “tightening,”or “loosening.” While these phrases give one a general idea as to what a sanction is and how it works, an explanation of the actual workings of any given set of sanctions would certainly go further in explaining their severity and meaning.

The term “economic sanctions” refers to the deliberate withdrawal of economic activity that, in the absence of the sanctions, would have probably occurred. The intent, essentially, is to change policy via the punishment of an individual or group. However, the effectiveness of sanctions in achieving their goals has not received unanimous support following the Second World War, and it is not clear whether their success rate should be considered anything beyond marginal.

However, despite their dubious track record, one should not expect the use of sanctions to cease for the foreseeable future, as the enforcement of economic sanctions carries political benefits for powerful world leaders. Retaliating against a perceived wrong with sanctions offers displeased leaders an option that is more coercive than a one-off statement of protest, but less antagonistic than direct military action. Playing this middle ground is domestically popular, and allows a country to convincingly declare its displeasure with a given government or set of individuals without getting their military’s boots dirty.

As a way of modeling the process of sanctions, one can think of the threat of sanctions as a game played between two countries; the sender and the target. Consider the following, where the numbers to the left of each comma refer to the payoffs realized by the sending country at a given outcome, and numbers on the right refer to the payoffs of the target country at the same outcome. For example, at the outcome in the top left where each country cooperates (C,C), the sending country receives a payoff of 5, and the target country a payoff of 1. Of course, the exact numbers of 5 and 1 are not tied to any specific real world measurement, but rather just show that both parties prefer to be in the cooperative stage than in, say, the punishment stage (C,D) in the bottom right.

If this were a one shot game, we would expect a result akin to the prisoner’s dilemma, as the target of sanctions would benefit more by defecting, regardless of the strategy of the sender. Knowing this, the sender will choose a punitive strategy to receive a payoff of 0 instead of cooperating for a payoff of -1. However, assuming multiple iterations of the game, both the sender and target country would seek to maximize their payout over an indefinite time horizon, rather than just grabbing as much as they can in one shot. This requires both players to consider the effect that their actions today have on payouts in the future when evaluating the costs and benefits of a given action.

If the sender’s threat of indefinite punitive action in response to deviation is credible (and in this case it is, as the payout of punitive action is preferable to continued cooperation, so long as the target country continues to defect), and the costs that this punitive action inflicts upon the target country will be greater over an indefinite time horizon than the benefits from deviating once, then it is not in the interest of the target country to defect. Given the payoffs in the game above, so long as the game is played more than 3 times after the target country’s deviation, it is not in the interest of the target country to deviate.

This strategy of cooperating until the other player defects is referred to as a “tit-for-tat” strategy, named after the sender’s strategy of only punishing the target when they deviate from the status quo. Economic sanctions are a “tit-for-tat” game between a (usually more powerful) sender country and a target country, where the sender threatens to punish the target via two principal methods: upsetting the target’s trade balance and impeding the target’s financial infrastructure. Upsetting the target’s trade balance is perhaps the more straightforward example, given that this strategy simply aims to either limit the target’s exports or impede its ability to import certain resources. In so doing, the sender attempts to deny the target either the raw materials or tax revenue that it otherwise would have received, thus raising the costs of the target’s disliked policy. In theory, trade sanctions will work if these costs outweigh the benefits of the target’s disliked policy.

However, this type of sanction requires a limited market for the goods that the sender wishes to restrict. If other countries are willing to buy the target’s exports, or if the sender does not own a significant market share of the good that it wishes to keep the target from importing, then the effectiveness of these sanctions will be limited. Additionally, the coercive power of trade sanctions is inversely related to the price of the good the sender is restricting. If the price falls by half its original value six months after the sender country begins sanctions, the target may replenish their original supply at half cost, severely limiting the coercive influence of the sanction. Similarly, if the price of the target’s export rises significantly during sanctions, the target will better be able to accommodate the sanctions.

Impeding the target’s financial infrastructure however, presents a more flexible sanctioning strategy. Financial sanctions generally involve either the freezing of assets of particular individuals involved in the sanction-triggering activity, or the termination of subsidies from the sender previously sent to the target country. Financial sanctions are more difficult for the target to evade, particularly if the target country is embroiled in political or economic instability, or for some other reason may find it difficult to establish new lines of credit. Additionally, deploying financial sanctions allows the sender to better target particular individuals who are either involved in the action that triggered the sanctions or who have a direct ability to address the action, such as politicians and business elites.

Sanctions enforced as a punitive response to the development of nuclear weapons function the same way, as the sanctions aim to raise the overall costs of pursuing the development of nuclear weapons above the overall benefits that that country would receive if they did develop nuclear weapons, all while minimizing the effect of those sanctions on third parties and the economy of the sender country. In game theoretic terms, the target deviates by pursuing nuclear weapons, and the sender country looks to punish this deviation harshly enough to keep the target from choosing the deviation strategy now or in the future. It is important to note that there are certainly non-economic benefits at play in these scenarios such political prestige or regional hegemony, but the punishment strategy of economic sanctions looks to raise the economic costs of the deviation high enough to override whatever benefits might come from an active pursual of nuclear weapons.

Contemporary U.S.-Iranian relations represent a high profile, and tentatively successful example of economic sanctions being used to punish the pursual of nuclear technology. The United States assumed the role of the sender country after then-President Ahmadinejad chose a strategy of deviation by lifting the suspension of Iran’s uranium enrichment program. The U.S. punishment came in two waves, one in 2005 with Executive Order 13382, which froze the assets of individuals connected with Iran’s nuclear program that were held in the U.S., and one in 2010 with the passage of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act (CISADA), which further targeted individuals connected with the nuclear program, but also limited US reception of some of Iran’s key exports. After 2010, the U.S.’s sanctions targeted both the financial and trade sectors, draining the pockets of Iranian elite, and seeking to diminish Iranian exports of goods like oil, pistachios, and rugs. While effective due to the close ties the Iranian economy had to the sanctioned goods, the newly limited access to the U.S. market hurt third-party Iranians as well as those involved with the uranium enrichment program.

Nevertheless, despite the collateral damage of CISADA’s trade sanctions, it would be difficult to argue that they did not help to bring about the correction that the U.S. demanded, as the current President Rouhani’s victory in 2013 and positive reception to news of the lifting of sanctions in 2015 indicate a displeasure with the Ahmadinejad administration’s continued pursual of nuclear weapons in spite of the effects of the sanctions. Though perhaps imperfect, the U.S. eventually got the deal they were looking for. For its part, Iran has begun to reintroduce itself to world markets to the tune of a forecasted 5 percent overall GDP growth in 2016, despite the low worldwide price of oil. In game theoretic terms, the game has returned to an equilibrium of cooperation, with both players are receiving nonzero payoffs greater than in the punishment equilibrium.

However, all is not well with the rest of the world. Like Iran, the U.S. (along with much of the international community) has targeted North Korea with both financial and trade-focused sanctions. The assets of North Korean elites held abroad have been frozen over again and again, and the “direct or indirect” importation into the United States of any North Korean goods is prohibited as of President Obama’s Executive Order 13570 in 2011. However, while the U.S. and the international community have found new financial holdings to freeze and trade restrictions to impose time after time, North Korean officials have not shown any sign of relenting.

Of course, major differences exist between the domestic atmospheres of Iran and North Korea that may play a role in the international community’s inability to correct the deviation of the latter in the same way they have the former. Most importantly, Iran holds presidential elections every 4 years, where the public may voice their displeasure at the current government’s nuclear ambitions and remove them from office, replacing them with someone who opposes nuclear capabilities in favor of economic growth and a better reputation among its peers. North Korea, of course, does not have this luxury, and, short of a coup, Kim Jong-Un and his nuclear ambitions are here to stay so long as he wants them to. Additionally, the Iranian government is hurt more by trade-based sanctions than North Korea, as the Iranian government cannot function via black and grey markets as efficiently as Kim Jong-Un’s regime has proven to be able to.

A key difference, however, is that Iran can feasibly become a world player at some point down the road. As of right now, Iran controls the 4th largest reserve of oil in the world, is located in an enviable geopolitical location, and has taken advantage of the chaos of the region since the fall of Saddam Hussein to extend its influence. For many, a far-reaching imagination is not necessary to see Iran’s future as a serious player on the global stage at some point in the foreseeable future. By continuing its nuclear program, Iran jeopardized this capability by becoming a target for sanctions from the international community, contributing to miniscule or negative economic growth. In the end, the overall benefits of a return to the cooperative equilibrium were obvious, as this equilibrium better suited an Iran who wished to realize its international potential.

Given its limited land area, limited natural resources, and its lack of technological development compared to its peers, North Korea does not have a realistic chance to realize a similar level of global or regional influence. In fact, given the permanent nature of the regime and its apparent willingness to operate on the periphery of the world stage, financial or trade-based sanctions may offer very little additional costs for the North Korean government. In fact, fostering a scenario in which the whole world works against North Korea may serve Kim Jong-Un’s agenda quite well, substantiating his claimsthat the Western world is conspiring against North Korea. While it is tempting to simply “impose sanctions” on North Korea as punishment for their nuclear ambitions and play the middle ground between a statement of protest and military action, a closer look into what those sanctions would actually entail offers a bleak picture of their effectiveness. Granted, dealing with Pyongyang is a difficult task with no obvious answers, but instead of reflexively calling for another round of sanctions in response to the next successful nuclear test, one should offer a clear and comprehensive understanding of the truly unique situation that one finds in North Korea, and an explanation as to how exactly the next round of sanctions will stop or slow the development of a nuclear North Korea.