On Skepticism Surrounding the Asian Way of Peace

Knowing peace as a concept is no less difficult that knowing peace as a human being. Throughout various historical, cultural, and analytical contexts, the concept of “peace” has accumulated many different definitions, often measured against the antithetical concept of “conflict.” In order to make sense of the so-called “Asian Peace,” let us first attempt to make sense of peace from the perspective of Eastern philosophical tradition, before differentiating peace into “positive” or “negative” varieties. 

In the Asian context, a profound cultural emphasis on peace endures. Soft imagery such as that of wind and water are prevalent through Eastern philosophical canon. The Daodejing of Laozi, the ancient classic that serves as the foundational text of Daoism, is rife with water metaphors, helping to popularize the practice of Daoism as The Watercourse Way. The Way of Laozi is one where virtue lies in peaceful means, not through strength of arms. The ways of life preached by Confucius and Mo Zi likewise emphasize that peace is mankind’s ultimate mission (Barash and Webel 6). Confucianism upholds harmony through stable hierarchy as the means of achieving lasting peace, whereas Mohism preaches a universal love for all (6). While Eastern philosophy also holds bravery in battle and strength in encounters with violence as virtues in high regard, the way of peace remains a commanding narrative in Asian culture. In the modern day, the People’s Republic of China has sought to characterize its regime as one that follows the way of peace, hence favoring messaging that portrays a “peaceful rise” to power. Chairman Xi Jinping insisted that, “The love of peace is in the DNA of the Chinese people.” These attitudes attempt to paint a picture wherein Asia simply has an ingrained affinity for peace, a commitment formed by thousands of years of philosophical meditation. Under this narrative, the recent decades' absence of war in the region of East Asia seems like the fruits of an exceptional way of peace. 

The so-called Asian Peace, marked by a rapid decline in battle-related deaths and the absence of new interstate wars since 1979, is far more complicated than the imagined monolith of a peace-loving Asia finally realizing its philosophical principles. While the shortcomings of the Asian Peace rightfully deserve to undergo scrutiny, this article will also examine whether the onslaught of criticism directed at the Asian Peace is wholly fair, or if skeptics are overzealous in pursuit of defending U.S. hegemony at the expense of dismissing positive effects on human security. That said, the limitations of the Asian Way of Peace are manifold. For one, the Asian Peace only really encompasses East Asia, excluding India, for example, due to the Kargil War with Pakistan. Some have even called it the ASEAN Way, narrowing down the geography further to Southeast Asia. Many remain critical of peace in East Asia as founded upon political and civil repression in order to achieve economic growth. This argument often upholds positive peace, where human freedoms flourish, as the kind worth celebrating, whereas negative peace merely refers to the absence of war.  Coined by 20th century French philosopher Raymond Aron, the term negative peace mostly operates as the complement to conflict; one well-known example of a robust negative peace is the Pax Romana, which the Roman empire maintained through force and subjugation of enemies (Barash and Webel 7). On the other hand, positive peace, most fully explored by Johan Galtung’s writings on structural violence, refers to the absence of barriers to human well-being and potential to succeed (7). With the exceptions of Mongolia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, most modern East Asian countries fail to earn a “free” score according to Freedom House’s most recent data set. Lack of access to political representation and denial of civil liberties are clear examples of structural barriers to free participation in society. Still, even without the distinction between positive and negative peace, East Asia has not been without tumult and conflict. The Senkaku or Diaoyu islands remain in dispute between Japan and China, the South China Sea experiences periodic disturbances, and Taiwan maintains de facto independence to the PRC’s great displeasure. The Korean Peninsula is locked in a frozen armistice. The Rohingya minority in Myanmar faces genocide amidst the ongoing civil war. The Philippines continues to grapple with insurgencies, separatist movements, and religious strife. The Asian Peace is not all that peaceful, and yet, in both relative and absolute terms, the region has far and away defied the predictions made under realism in the post-Cold War order. 

Rather than devolving into violent conflict to settle an uncertain balance of power, East Asian states have chosen cooperation with one another in the majority of cases, which has resulted in relative restraint when conflicting interests do arise. One explanation is that the great power contest between China and the U.S-Japan alliance replaced Cold War bipolarity, while other realist explanations emphasize the importance of ASEAN and its partners as a type of security arrangement. Increasingly, research around Asian Peace has revolved around the question of U.S. global hegemony and China’s rise to the position of regional hegemon. However, this focus does not align with the view that ASEAN is the epicenter of the Asian Peace. In fact, some research suggests that U.S. hegemony is not at all correlated with regional East Asian security, and is even negatively correlated with the security of U.S. allies. The ASEAN Way of Peace viewpoint relegates China to a more minor role in the community of nations committed to no war, conflict avoidance, and face-saving measures. The ASEAN Way also finds favor in liberal thinking, the school of thought that believes economic interdependence between ASEAN members and dialogue partners allows them to prioritize business pursuits above territorial ones. This explanation more fully accounts for the northeast region managing to get along, which tends to have chillier relations than the warmer community in the southeast. China and Japan, for example, have relations commonly described as “hot economics, cold politics.” Most scholars, including those that call for a constructivist assessment of the Asian Peace, conclude that the phenomenon cannot be attributed to any one cause. Over time, attention from both researchers and policy makers has become more focused on the interactions China has with the “neighborly community” it currently finds itself enmeshed in. 

A constructivist reading of the security structures and liberal economic interests is also an important lens through which to consider the ramifications of cultural violence in the region. Cultural violence refers to the norms and attitudes about violence reinforced by the dominant societal discourses (Barash and Webel 7). Cultural violence normalizes, legitimizes, and may even celebrate the use of force. Structural and cultural violence are intimately entwined and usually reinforce one another. Together they can result in a negative peace, whereby people may suffer from censorship, limits on assembly, lack of representation, and stifled economic opportunity, but have come to accept the narratives that there are no ways to change the system for the better. Cultural violence in Asia contrasts with the culture of peace that seems evident with a cursory glance at Asian philosophy. However, it is important to note that “structural” and “cultural” violence are not wholly uncontested concepts, and this may contribute to philosophical discrepancies. For example, peace and conflict literature is unclear whether all forms of hierarchy commit some form of structural violence, and whether norms particular to one culture or another can be considered violence (Barash and Webel 8). For understanding the Asian Peace this presents particular problems, especially given the great importance afforded to hierarchy as the mechanism for social harmony under Confucianism. It is therefore important to keep in mind that these peace and conflict concepts were largely formulated with Western philosophical traditions in mind, and that grafting them onto the Asian context is not uncontroversial. 

At the same time, given the rather slow development of political and civil freedoms in East Asia, there is some valid anxiety about democratic backsliding undoing any progress at all. Economic disruptions are a key source of vulnerability to autocracy. Between the fallout from COVID-19, supply chain disruptions exacerbated by conflict elsewhere, and trade wars between the U.S. and China, should economic conditions worsen in the region, there is a limited likelihood of a positive sort of peace ever emerging. There is even some speculation about the possibility of an “East Asian Spring,” echoing the emergence of violent protests in the Middle East as a response to repression in the early 2010s. From this point of view, it is only a matter of time before the Asian Peace erupts into violent dissatisfaction. In the U.S., this kind of discourse supports the prediction that China is bound to spoil the seeming calm on the surface. The popular consensus reached in Washington is often peace through deterrence and domination. The U.S. likes to take a lot of credit for the peace in East Asia, and while it's true that alliances in the region and normalization of relations with China have helped to stabilize the situation, there is also an argument to be made that the U.S. is the most likely party to be the spoiler, not China. This is connected to the argument that world domination by the U.S., a Pax Americana, is not a path to sustainable peace, much less a positive one. For example, many U.S.-based policy makers assume it is a foregone conclusion that China is bound to invade Taiwan and therefore call for heightened security measures, whereas the Taiwanese themselves do not see a military response as a viable solution. The U.S. attempts to enforce a worldview where peace can only be maintained by fear of American military might, even though fear is neither an ingredient in positive peace nor a sustainable foundation for peaceful communities. The U.S. has grown more defensive over Taiwan in proclaiming its love for democracy. For all the U.S. maintains a poor track record in installing democratic polities, it is true of both Taiwan and South Korea that they managed to transition from authoritarian regimes under martial law to societies that enjoy high levels of political and civil freedom. These transformations took place with relatively limited bloodshed, and they happened in spite of the U.S. originally backing the authoritarian governments it had helped bring to power. Although, some might insist that seeking U.S. approval eventually helped create the conditions for democratization. If we take democracy as a prerequisite for anything resembling a positive peace, then it is important to note that these transformations took place in the context of an emerging regional norm of negative peace. Negative peace is an unskippable step towards the loftier goals of positive peace and should not be treated as a failure in and of itself. 

So why is there so little hope for the rest of East Asia to democratize and work towards a more positive peace? Fears about China’s rise typically play a role, but so too does American antagonism. Washington tends to focus on China as a threat meant to be contained rather than focusing on how to create conditions favorable to continuing the peace in East Asia. East Asian countries are under pressure from the U.S. to choose sides, but choosing sides is something that’s done in anticipation of a conflict context, not in a community committed to peace. The U.S.’s affinity for a conflict-oriented approach is unsurprising, given the culture of war that permeates American society. A look at U.S. history reveals that war is the mechanism of community-building in the American context; the Civil War was the trigger point for the disjointed states to become the singular United States. The creation of the American identity came to hinge on violent contexts throughout the 20th century wars as well. Addressing American cultural violence does not detract from the fact that China today inherently commits structural violence against its people by virtue of being an authoritarian dictatorship. There is a real risk of the East Asian peace disappearing under the stressors of this rivalry, but assuming the worst outcomes is defeatist. Peace is worth fighting to maintain, and the examples of South Korea and Taiwan suggest that there is precedent in the Asian context for positive peace to emerge without devastating revolution or protracted armed conflict. 

Maybe China really could adhere to the principles of a peaceful Asia and make a peaceful rise up the global hierarchy. As it stands, realism is the most common lens applied to make predictions about the fate of Asian security, which imbues a deep cynicism about great power rivalry between the U.S. and China. Without a doubt, China’s rhetoric about peace needs to be taken with a grain of salt, but so too do the narratives discounting the power of peace, negative though it may be. For one, critics often characterize Chinese messaging about regional harmony and cooperation as evidence that, like the U.S., the PRC has decided it is time to ask their neighbors to choose sides, that they are dissuading other countries from seeking recourse in international law for grievances, and that they are creating the conditions for regionalism with themselves at the helm. China’s peace rhetoric is dismissed as a means of weeding out U.S. influence, both as a regional player and as the de facto leader of global institutions such as the International Court and the World Bank. Moreover, ASEAN’s preference for informal approaches to security rather than formal arrangements is taken as evidence that East Asia is distancing itself from the global security framework that the U.S. commands. Proponents of realism frame these situations in narratives that envision inevitable conflict between the rising power and the waning one. This worldview draws sides in a conflict that has yet to fully manifest, if it ever will. From this perspective, China’s rise carries the implicit threat of America’s downfall. The peaceful or potentially violent means of China’s choosing are relatively irrelevant to these fears of a shifting world order. 

Some might say that the U.S. has a greater interest in maintaining its own hegemony than it does in promoting sustainable peace around the globe. A more charitable reading is one that suggests the U.S. simply has not learned yet that its primacy is no longer a guarantor of peace in the long term. The U.S. has a habit of equating its own brand of democracy with peace, and any alternative to that formula is a clear threat. On balance, however, the U.S model of positive peace is less than exemplary. Setting aside the various oversea projects that have exacerbated conflict, America itself is a violent place: mass incarceration, poverty, high maternal death rates, systemic racism, mass shootings, and barriers to healthcare and education are only a few examples of ways America exhibits both direct and structural violence within its own borders. In fairness, China does not lose out to its seeming rival in the realm of rampant violence; in addition to the political repression mentioned earlier, domestic and sexual abuse remains widespread, as does restriction of LGBTQ+ rights. Moreover, crackdowns in Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang are worryingly restrictive and violent. Perhaps there’s something to be said, to the credit of the realist point of view, that those at the top of the global hierarchy do not become hegemon through pacifism and a righteous commitment to positive peace. However, skepticism should be more-even handed; dismissing the prospect of an enduring Asian Peace out of fear of China runs the risk of turning a blind eye to the damage done by the United States in its tenure at the top. Worse, this runs the risk of refusing to believe better, more peaceful outcomes are possible. Positive peace is an ideal, much like the concept of a more perfect union, but when we start to imagine a more perfect world order, it cannot begin by accepting the inevitability of conflict. 

Barash, David P., and Charles Webel. Peace and Conflict Studies. SAGE Publications, Inc., 2022. 

Propagate By Poison: The Landscape of China's Rural-Urban Dichotomy

noemamag.com

For thousands of years, the agrarian heartlands were the very heartbeat of Chinese civilization. Writing years before the establishment of the first imperial dynasty and long before the industrialization of China, reformer Shang Yang deduced that harnessing the plow was the path to harnessing power in the context of the tumultuous Warring States era. His recommendation of “emphasizing agriculture and restraining business” to the Qin state passed down through the subsequent dynasties. Though Shang Yang’s reforms were a boon to Qin productivity, state wealth, and facilitated the establishment of the first Chinese empire, modern China has chosen to address its current challenges with a different approach. While the contrast between agriculture and business remains intact, the growing chasm between the rural and urban worlds may have more negative political ramifications than positive ones in the current Chinese political economy. 

Today, the People’s Republic of China’s wealth and power can be found concentrated on the coasts, which have rapidly developed since the 1978 implementation of an “open door policy” ushered in a frenzy of technology absorption and economic entwinement with the world market, marked especially by special economic zone development. Around this time, prevailing perceptions in China conceived the rural sector and the developed, urbanized one as rather disjointed, with economists and policymakers at the forefront of the Coastal Development Strategy envisioning an increased interdependence between the two spheres. The last phase within this roughly 20 to 30 year plan prescribed a leveraging of the wealth derived from industry to develop the agricultural inland areas. 

More than 30 years have gone by since this framework was first introduced, and the integration of urban and rural prosperity leaves much to be desired. Income inequality, disparity in education opportunities, and stark differences in market participation show the huge gaps that persist between the urban and rural worlds of the same nation. This sharp contrast is due largely in part to the Hukou system, a policy set by the central government under Mao in 1958, which local governments possess the authority to enforce today. Under this system, citizens must register their birthplace as their permanent residence and can only change this registration by obtaining a special permit. Local governments set numerous bureaucratic hurdles for would-be migrants to jump over in order to control demographics and human capital. Given that the typical direction of migration in China is from poorer, rural areas to wealthier, urban ones, newcomers to the metropolises have an especially onerous time obtaining permits, and therefore frequently find themselves barred from accessing public social support services and stalled in their quest for upward mobility. As a result, the polarization between urbanites and country-dwellers persists. 

Sowing Division Under Maoist Socialism 

Mao Zedong, a so-called son of the soil, led his army of peasants to victory against the Chinese Nationalist Party and ushered in an age of “Socialist Serfdom.” On an ideological level, Maoism is grounded in the quest for equality, in the destruction of the hierarchical feudal ways and days of old. In reality, the disenfranchisement of Chinese rustics is in many cases firmly rooted in Mao-era policies. As with many other facets of modern Chinese society, stepping out of the shadow cast by Chairman Mao’s legacy poses a serious challenge to untangling the political, economic, and social aggravations of this fissure. 

From the very beginning of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) rule, cities have been an exceptional pressure point on regime stability. For most of the Chinese Civil War, cities stayed loyal to the Chinese Nationalist Party, and before that, were largely beholden to foreign interests and exploitation. The CCP desperately needed to grab the reins of these hotspots of crime and dissension, and they perceived the influx of post-civil war migration as a key source of destabilization. Hence, while the immediate aftermath of the war saw the pattern of urban migration that one might expect in the wake of major upheaval, the CCP began to devote serious time and effort to taming both the urban and rural populations- typically by offering the former a carrot and the latter a stick. For example, the countryside was negatively affected by the implementation of the Unified Purchase and Unified Sale system in 1953 by the state setting the price at which it would buy the mandated quota of crops, which naturally came under market value. The government then distributed the purchased food in urban centers, lowering the cost of living there and thereby necessitating more stringent migration policies. Consequently, the hukou system came into effect in 1958, granting governments the power to control people’s movements. 

 The government promptly began to exercise its newfound powers by recruiting millions to work in the factories meant to fuel the Great Leap Forward. This leap landed with a faceplant, and tens of millions of workers were deported back to the countryside, where tens of millions of people subsequently starved to death. The consequences of this were not only that migration to cities became even more difficult, but also that rural areas were increasingly left to fend for themselves. Depressed by unemployment and all the social ills that entails, rural regions were mandated by Mao to dust themselves off and get to building infrastructure that would boost agricultural production. That surplus, of course, would be handed over to the government at cheap prices to then be exported overseas in order to fund industrial development. The Mao era undoubtedly exhibited urban bias, a bias which persists today. Back then, as is largely the case now, urbanites enjoyed many more public goods and social services than their rural counterparts, such as education, maternity leave, pensions, medical care, and housing assistance. Moreover, the welfare provided to urban residents was in no small part funded by the labor of farmworkers, as by some estimates, the practice of buying agricultural goods at low prices resulted in the government transferring around 534 billion yuan away from the rural sector between 1955 and 1985. 

It might be curious that for all the CCP is anxious about discontentment breeding regime instability and achieving social harmony, their long-held practice of neglecting the well-being of the rustics continues to drive a wedge in between the urban and rural populaces. But this is not without consequences; dissatisfaction on both sides has long driven protests and government insecurity, perhaps hinting at an overall pattern of poison from within. 

Seedlings of Social Unrest

So what about the reform era? Surely, the government after Mao’s death saw some improvement in the lives of farmers. And indeed, while fiscal policy did raise the price at which the government purchased agricultural goods, thereby benefiting rural areas, the government quickly caved to pressure from urbanites, who sought to maintain their relative advantages. As was the case under Mao, the CCP feared the political repercussions of disgruntled city-dwellers and thus resumed the pattern whereby urban citizens cowed the government into maintaining their higher standards of living. 

Even when the government chose to respond to political unrest with military action, such as in 1989 when inflation racked the urban cost of living to the point of protest, the follow-up included amendments to the economic policies in order to quell urban discontent. Furthermore, although the reform period is known for walking back the controlled economy model, pressure for urban protections led to fund transfers to subsidize struggling state-owned enterprises. 

For all that the reform period championed economic growth, the government considered it worthwhile to sacrifice economic efficiency in order to ensure regime stability. At the same time, the CCP greatly relies on its ability to deliver on economic outcomes in order to keep the peace. By centering the economic heart of China in urban centers, and devoting significant resources to keeping that heart beating, even at the expense of rural reforms, the government has trapped itself in an unsustainable cycle. With every turn of this cycle, the second-class status of rural citizens becomes more entrenched.

To better compare, consider the CCP response to rural outcry. In the 2000s, the government continued to take over land for urban development with an explicit lack of regard for local input, and these protests were punctuated with a 2010 demand to end the Hukou system. At the time, Premier Wen Jiabao had alluded to the possibility of dismantling the system, but when the government had to respond to the clamor by suppressing circulation of these sentiments, he quickly changed his messaging to suggest more moderate changes. 

Herein lies the tension between social stability and economic improvements. To some degree, the economy is an ever-growing vine attached to the tree of Chinese societal harmony. The vine enhances the outward vibrancy of the tree, bestowing a majestic weight, and to remove the vine would peel off the protective bark with it. And yet, cultivating the vine has allowed it to grow beyond the tree’s control, consuming the life force of its host. 

This Season’s Harvest 

While the economic risks the CCP continues to run by not addressing the growing gulf between rural and urban residents are surely troubling, it is important to acknowledge that the divisions Hukou creates have a human impact on real people’s hopes and dreams and happiness. Where someone lives and what industry they work in is part of a much greater story about what they call home. 

The families of those migrants who attempt to make it in the metropolises despite their rural Hukou status are left behind on one side of the river while their loved ones desperately try to swim across. This has led to the phenomena of “left behind children,” a vulnerable group of youths who are emotionally, mentally, and academically delayed while their parents attempt to escape rural poverty. As an earlier section mentioned Socialist Serfdom, whereby Chinese society under Mao saw the systematic treatment of rural residents as the underclass, it appears this lowest class has split off into an additional caste, made up of migrants. While they do not have the same privileges as urban Hukou holders, they do have access to the amenities of city living and in general enjoy higher standards of living compared to the countryside. This comes at the cost of the families they leave behind, as Hukou restrictions limit access to both childcare and quality education. It is estimated that 1 in 5 children in China are “Left Behind,” unable to see one or more of their parents for most of the year.  

On the flipside of this, the fallout from the Covid pandemic and the subsequent rise in youth unemployment saw numerous remarks made in the spring of this year regarding a push to return China’s youths to the countryside. Are we seeing the start of a new wave of “rustication”? President Xi has recently encouraged young professionals to focus on reenergizing rural areas, to convert their urban-bred talents into countryside innovation. The idea seems to have had a decent reception, with reports by the Chinese government of increased migration to rural parts leading to improved agricultural production and higher quality rural tourism. Social media has likely played a role in idealizing farm life, an Asian counterpart to the popular cottagecore aesthetic. However, the idyllic pastoral life is not at all like influencers portray, which the young rusticated urbanites soon discover. The comforts and economic opportunities of the city still hold considerable sway over someone’s choice of where to live, especially if that person is born with an urban Hukou and thus has greater options available. These accounts make it difficult to believe at face value CCP messaging about the great enthusiasm the youth supposedly have for rural life and reads more like an attempt to preempt social turmoil brought on by idle, disillusioned young people. The government’s decision to stop reporting the rate of youth unemployment altogether makes the whole narrative even more suspect. 

This sense of disillusionment is growing stronger especially in the housing market, which like many aspects of the Chinese economy is an incoming crisis of the government’s own making. The housing market remains a sector under immense government oversight if not outright control, and the current issues it poses is in no small part linked to the Hukou system. Hukou is an instrument with which the government can control demand, and this leads to neglect of the supply side. Moreover, poor property tax systems render them an inadequate means of adjusting housing prices. And of course, in spite of the difficulties the government sets in citizens’ ways, the advantages of living in a city are still much greater in many cases than the difficulties. Decades of urban bias have built myriad social services, and even for those migrants who do not have the urban Hukou status to take full advantage of welfare, having some benefits is better than none. Although, because of the aforementioned informal caste system, migrants tend to be relegated to renting, which comes with significantly fewer benefits than home ownership. Home ownership is made even more valuable by the fact that it often dictates who gets priority to send their children to the best schools. Sometimes, even the length of time a person has resided in a school district can give them the upper hand in admissions. 

In essence, the urban populace has been pitted against one another to fight for limited housing, but the government has made housing so necessary to access the full benefits of being an urban resident that demand climbs even as the fight becomes more fatiguing. The Hukou system ostensibly seeks to curb the demand, but in fact it only aggravates these various points of contention.

The housing crisis is a symptom of the Hukou system failing both Chinese citizens and the Chinese government. But while the former would likely be better off with the abolition of the system, the latter clings to any means of controlling its people. Some have suggested that the government simply does not know how to bring Hukou to an end without sparking an upheaval that would threaten the very stability it is trying to maintain, while others speculate that this is a sign of local governments flouting central government recommendations. Perhaps it is instead correct, if radical, to say that the system of Chinese government itself is unsustainable, constantly locked in desperate need to bolster prosperity and keep a leash on the beast it scrambles to feed.   

  With this understanding, the urban-rural divide is clearly antithetical to the themes of social harmony and cohesion that the CCP supposedly desires. And yet, to stay in power the CCP has had to exacerbate this divide time and again or risk its grip on power. It seems that this contrast is useful neither for economic efficiency nor for stability, and yet without it those goals could not stay afloat. There is a Chinese saying that warns not to drink poison to slake one’s thirst. The poison here is the polarization between the urban and rural worlds, while the Chinese government thirsts for authority and economic strength. 

Heavy Metal Harvest: Impacts of Heavy Metal Soil Contamination on the Food and Health in China

nytimes.com

In ancient Chinese literature, one of the oldest and most influential pieces of divination text is the I Ching, or Book of Changes. It features the story of Shennong, the first Yan Emperor and the “Divine Husbandman”, who taught the Chinese people agriculture:

“When Pao Hsi’s clan was gone, there sprang up the clan of the Divine Husbandman. He split a piece of wood for a plowshare and bent a piece of wood for the plow handle, and taught the whole world the advantage of laying open the earth with a plow.”

- I Ching, Book II: The Material

It is likely the Divine Husbandman believed China would continue to use his knowledge to cultivate the land indefinitely. Thousands of years later, however, it is beginning to look like this will not be the case. Heavy metal soil contamination, caused mostly by industrial activity, means that the percentage of arable land in China is decreasing. This is increasing health risks of consuming crops grown in this poisonous soil and threatening the stability of the food chain as 

The origins of soil contamination

Before the 20th century, China was a completely agrarian society. However, the creation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) spurred a new age of industrialization within the country. Development of the country came in several phases. Communist leader Mao Zedong ushered in the first phase with the first Five Year Plan (1953-57), the goal of which was to increase industrial production and output. The subsequent phase, called the Great Leap Forward (1958-1950), intended to continue advancement of industry within China. However, due to imbalances between industrial and agricultural growth and inflexibility of leadership, this plan was largely a failure. In fact, it caused the largest man made famine in history, killing an estimated 45 million people. 

In the 1960s the second Five-Year Plan was able to recover some of the devastation of the preceding years, but it wasn’t until Mao Zedong’s death and new leadership was assumed within the CCP that the country completely made up for their losses. Beginning in 1978, the Chinese Communist Party reformed their economic policy. The CCP targeted deficiencies and imbalances in production, with the goal of growing exports. Unlike previously, however, this time was met with success. For about the next 30 years, China’s economy would grow about 10% each year, bringing with it a whole slew of environmental issues. 

The uninterrupted expansion of China’s economy has since winded down, but the environmental impacts of that period of unchecked growth have not. One of the most pressing consequences of this has been heavy metal contamination of soil. Heavy metals are naturally present in soil in small quantities, however, certain human activities can introduce higher than normal levels into the soil. In 2013, the Ministry of Environmental Protection produced a book stating that one-sixth of China’s arable land - nearly 50 million acres - was polluted with dangerous metals like arsenic, cadmium, and nickel. This caused nationwide panic as the government had always kept information on the state of the environment tightly under wraps, leaving most people unaware of the true scale of pollution. But these “state secrets” were finally starting to reveal themselves and the true extent of heavy metal contamination was beginning to be uncovered.

Food chain dilemmas

China’s per capita land area is less than half of the world average, meaning that it cannot afford to lose any of that valuable property to pollution. So far, China has been able to utilize this small fraction of the world’ arable land to feed nearly 20% of the world’s population. The country produces ¼ of the world’s grain, reaching a 686.53 million ton output in 2022. In addition, it is the top global producer of cereals, fruit, vegetables, fishery products, meat, poultry, and eggs.  However, over the last two decades, China has begun to rely more and more on food imports, indicating that they are no longer able to produce a sufficient harvest to support their population. 

Heavy metal soil contamination is known to decrease productivity of cropland. Excess heavy metal in the soil is taken up into plants through their roots, accumulating and causing damage. They decrease seed germination, root elongation, plant biomass, and chlorophyll biosynthesis. 

In 2000, China’s food self-sufficiency ratio was at 93.6 percent. In 2022, it was 65.8 percent. The ratio is predicted to decrease about 10% more by 2030, largely in part to reduction of safely cultivable land. Still in the shadow of the famine caused by the Great Leap Forward, China cannot afford another food security crisis. Recent events have already begun to unveil how sensitive China is to food distribution disruptions. Supply chain disruptions during the COVID-19 pandemic caused food shortages and frantic appeals from people starving under lockdown. More recently, the Russian war on Ukraine has again demonstrated China’s food instability. Ukraine is one of the largest corn exporting countries, and China is its biggest buyer. Ukrainian grain production suffered a heavy blow due to the Russia-Ukraine, and China was not left undisturbed by this. 

Health risks and “cancer villages”

A 2022 study found the main sources of soil heavy metal pollution in China to be metal mining and smelting, industrial activities, power generation, agricultural activities (e.g. utilization of fertilizer and animal manure), waste disposal, urban development, and transportation. Certain areas of the country constitute heavy metal contamination levels greater than others. Hunan Province in central China, for example, has some of the worst soil in the nation. This is mainly due to the area being a top provider of nonferrous metals. Byproducts associated with production of these metals, including industrial and mining wastewater, as well as dust released during mining and smelting, lead to toxic levels of heavy metals into the soil. This has severe implications as nonferrous metals are not the only major contribution of the region. Hunan Province also makes up around 15% of China’s rice production. In 2021, the region produced 26.83 million metric tons of rice. Grain samples collected and tested for heavy metals from various locations around China revealed that rice originating in Hunan Province contained the highest levels of cadmium and lead. In addition, several other provinces were discovered to have grain samples that contained greater than acceptable levels of multiple heavy metals. 

One could imagine the implications of crops being grown in such poisonous soil. Crop production does decrease from heavy metal contamination, but the plants that do survive will contain a dangerous accumulation to toxins. Humans who then consume these plants are exposed to their effects. For example, cadmium is a probable human carcinogen that also causes kidney disease and weakened bone structure after long periods of exposure. When ingested, it causes stomach irritation, vomiting, and diarrhea. Another example, lead, is a probable human carcinogen and that can accumulate over time, wreaking havoc on the body. It is especially detrimental to young children, causing brain and nervous system damage, learning disabilities, delayed growth and development, and hearing and speech problems. For both lead and cadmium poisoning, there are no cures, with the only available option being to manage symptoms as they arise. Other heavy metals cause similarly disastrous effects. 

Many studies done in China have suggested higher health risks associated with heavy metal soil pollution in China. Some of the most pressing evidence comes from the so-called “cancer villages”. Various sources claim that there are around 400-500 different cancer villages in China, which are locations in which an unusually high level of cancer cases are recorded, most likely having to do with environmental problems. These villages first started appearing in the 1980s, which coincides with the time when the Chinese Communist Party revamped their economic policy and industrialization really began to take off. The Chinese government has admitted to the existence of these villages, but has continued to keep information about them shielded from the public. A 2015 study attempted to use the limited available data on these villages to create a map of their locations. They concluded that cancer villages tended to cluster around major rivers and their tributaries, almost always densely populated and near industry facilities. In addition, the researchers noted that the highest levels of cancer morbidity came from grain producing regions in China. Hunan Province was one such region where the densest locations of cancer villages were found. 

Current efforts and future actions

In February of 2015, the documentary “Under the Dome” went viral in China, revealing shocking portrayals of soil contamination, as well as air and water pollution, within the country. Within one month the Chinese government blocked access to the film. This extreme censorship makes it very difficult to gauge the levels of heavy metal soil contamination in China, let alone solve it. Despite this, it seems like the government is beginning to understand the severity of soil contamination within the country. In 2019, the Chinese government declared a “farmland redline” policy stating that China’s total arable land should never fall below 120 million hectares. In February of 2022, the government announced the first national soil survey in 40 years. The survey will take more than four years to complete, but when finished it should give the country a better understanding of what they are dealing with.

The future of China’s soil in the face of heavy metal soil contamination is largely unknown. We do not know for sure whether the country will fully commit to their pledge of reversing the damage caused by industrialization and heavy agriculture. It remains to be seen whether Shennong, the Father of Agriculture’s, legacy will remain within the soils of China.

The United States and China: A Cyclical Relationship, Both Backwards and Beyond

nytimes.com

The relationship between China and the United States is akin to a circle. Tensions rise, are broken, and rise again. It is a pattern that has continued for decades; the divide between the countries is palpable. But the United States and China are more alike than reported. The countries are fundamentally similar in economic and military policies; China’s problems are ours. Examining U.S.-China relationship history and investigating and addressing these issues is the key to mending the U.S.-China relationship and fixing cardinal issues in the modern United States.

When asked about China, Americans report undoubtedly strong opinions. A poll concerning the global superpower found that 67% of Americans have negative opinions of China. Even more striking, 89% of Americans now classify China as a competitor or an enemy. When asked, “What’s the first thing you think about when you think of China?”, responses overwhelmingly leaned towards human rights and the economy (each issue making up 20% and 19% of responses, respectively). With only 15% of U.S. citizens viewing it favorably, it is time to re-examine U.S.-China tensions to repair future relations.

These numbers do not manifest from thin air. They are a cumulation of decades of nervous tension between the United States and China, leading to prominent unease among U.S. citizens. The two countries have endured a rocky relationship since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Soon after, hostility rose during North Korea’s 1950 invasion of South Korea, when U.S. troops aiding South Korea approached the Chinese border. Although the United Nations, China, and North Korea signed an armistice agreement in 1953, this strain initiated a long pattern of U.S.-China tension. 

By 1964, the stress went nuclear. In October of that year, China conducted its first atomic bomb test. The test exacerbated the already tense U.S.-Sino relationship amid conflict in Vietnam. Relationships improved after China and Russia’s Sino-Soviet split, with Beijing mending connections and cordiality with the United States. President Richard Nixon visited China in 1972, signing the Shanghai Communiqué, a document representing the first official diplomatic communications between the countries. Presidents Carter and Reagan continued the pattern of diplomacy through the 1980’s, maintaining a cooperative relationship with China. For almost twenty years, the U.S.-China relationship thrived. 

Unfortunately, peace was not enduring. In 1989, after military troops killed hundreds of student protestors during Beijing’s Tiananmen Square Massacre, the United States immediately froze relations with China, suspending the only recently approved sale of U.S. military equipment to Beijing. It was not until 1993, when President Bill Clinton propelled a policy of “constructive engagement” with China, that unease began to lift. By 1996, the capitals agreed to exchange diplomatic officials again, and in 2001, President Clinton signed the U.S.-China Relations Act that gave Beijing permanent trade relations with the United States. Once again, peace fractured in 2005. An American reconnaissance plane made an emergency landing on Chinese territory after colliding with a Chinese fighter. The U.S. crew members were detained on Hainan Island for twelve days. Only after a tense standoff did Chinese authorities release the American detainees. China experienced a significant leadership turnover in 2012, with approximately 70% of leadership body members replaced after the new election. It was also the year Xi Jinping assumed power as President, delivering speeches promising a “rejuvenation” of China. This turnover was shortly followed by President Obama’s 2013 effort to ease U.S.-China relations. He hosted President Xi for a California summit where the executives established a “new model” of relations. This presidential friendliness stuck around after the 2016 election. In 2017, President Trump hosted President Xi for a meeting to build relations and promised “tremendous progress.” Progress, however, did not last.

Throughout 2018 and 2019, tariffs on Chinese imports enforced by the Trump administration hit China hard. The Chinese government fights back with tariffs of its own, fanning the flames of a U.S.-China trade war. Although tensions eased after President Trump and Chinese Vice Premier Liu He signed the “Phase One” trade deal in January 2020, they quickly seized again several months later during the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Both administrations blamed the other for their mishandling of the disaster. For the remainder of the Trump administration, this anger remains. Shortly after he took office, President Biden stressed the need for U.S. infrastructure to compete with China, maintaining Trump-era ideologies. After Russian-related disagreements sparked further tension, Presidents Biden and Xi eventually sought relationship repair in November of 2022. Speaking at the Bali G20 summit, the leaders expressed their wishes to alleviate hostility.

When this history is analyzed, a pattern emerges: China and the United States butt heads over an infraction on the part of the other. A new U.S. President is elected, who tries to ease tensions and foster a healthy diplomatic relationship with China. An inciting incident (i.e., the expulsion of American journalists or the spotting of a potential spy balloon) severs that friendliness, and tensions rise again. Each country demonstrates power and influence by implementing trade tariffs and making threats. And the cycle repeats itself. 

Documenting a clear pattern of behavior allows everyday citizens and politicians alike to analyze relations and make predictions accordingly. However, it makes for an easy trap to fall into, time and time again. If conflict is viewed as inevitable, that defeatist attitude will permeate international relations and allow tension to be viewed as the natural outcome. In recent headlines, an alleged “spy balloon” originating from China was shot down in U.S. airspace in February of 2023. It contained what U.S. officials defined as intel-gathering equipment, which the Chinese government vehemently denied, describing as a civilian meteorological airship. Regardless of the specifics, this incident indicates newfound strain, with more to come. Once again, we see the pattern emerge. In order for the pattern to be broken, the cycle needs to be stopped in its tracks. 

The key to stopping the cycle is analyzing the United States and China differently. We must ditch the old analysis model and replace it with a novel system: parallels. Instead of focusing on the rise and fall of strained relations, key similarities must be examined. Unsurprisingly, U.S.-China differences are highlighted more predominantly than their likenesses. After almost eight decades of frosty relations, the United States and China seem like separate entities. But maintaining that distinction only worsens the long-standing tension. Simultaneously, it will only exacerbate problems within the United States in the long run. Relationship difficulties should not be an “us vs. them” approach. It hasn’t worked in all these decades; there’s no reason to believe it will work in the future. The focus needs to be on collaboration after matching problems are identified.

 In 2007, China announced a military budget increase of 18%, continuing China’s increasing military expenditures and bringing their total spending allowance to 62.14 billion USD. This aligned with the United State’s budget increase at the time. By 2007, the U.S.’s military budget had expanded to 589.59 billion dollars, a 269.5 billion increase from 2000. In 2023, the United States' military budget sits at 800.67 billion USD, while China boasts one the largest military budgets worldwide at 224 billion USD. In addition to military spending, the economies of the United States and China share a prominent global role. As of 2023, they hold the top two spots by gross domestic product (GDP). These economies, primarily centered around military spending, hold significant weight worldwide. China and the United States are uniquely positioned in that they hold major international influence. They reflect each other’s values, but this reflective relationship is not represented in United States media despite these crucial similarities. Additionally, on September 28th, 2023, The Seattle Times posted an article detailing China’s recent property crisis. It outlines how developers are hurting as apartment sales dwindle. Real estate stocks are plummeting, and house hunting is difficult. Conditions are similar in the United States. Real estate prices are skyrocketing, and becoming a homeowner is less feasible than ever. These economic problems in each country mirror each other. Acknowledging similarities such as these breaks the cycle that builds and protracts the us-them mentality. When the problems are examined, it becomes a matter of “us vs. them” problems.

There is a fear, however, surrounding that acknowledgment. A fear of the countries being “alike.” This fear is built off of the “us vs. them” mentality that, to this day, dominates United States coverage of China. Decades of U.S. communism placed into historical context explain this. Communism is a hot-button topic in the United States. Post World War 2, a “Red Scare,” or fear of a communist threat, plagued the United States, aligning with the ongoing Cold War with the then Soviet Union. As hysteria over a USSR takeover grew, communism became synonymous with “un-American.” Communist fear has been hammered into U.S. culture for over a century. Now consider the fact that the People’s Republic of China has been a communist regime since its founding in 1949. It makes sense that to Americans, acknowledging that the United States and China share fundamental problems is akin to anti-patriotism. To admit the countries share those issues is to admit they are fundamentally similar. And when China is identified with communism, that threatens the American paradigm. 

This fear exacerbates the cyclical relationship and will kill any hope for future long-term civility. Right now, relations between the United States and China seem uncertain. On October 10th, Newsweek reported that Chinese vessels entered territorial waters surrounding Japanese-controlled islands. Any attack on these islands (or any Japanese government assets) would require the United States to respond and aid Japan, launching troops against China. Where is there to go from here? Perhaps the cycle of tear and repair will continue. But perhaps not. It is up to everyone, from politicians to the layman alike, to make this change. Acknowledging the similar plights the countries face is the key to creating a long-term, sustainable relationship that works for all parties. But that is, ultimately, up to each country’s leadership. Let’s hope they make the right choice.

Indonesian Democracy Under Threat

journalofdemocracy.org

Indonesia represents one of the few functioning democracies in Southeast Asia. While its neighbors have languished under military rule, with little representation in government, Indonesia has built a sturdy democratic system that serves its citizens better than it hurts them. According to Freedom House, elections are free and fair, with alleged irregularities in the recent 2019 election being dismissed by the country’s top court. The elections themselves are competitive, with multiple parties representing a variety of interests running in elections and receiving votes in the national parliament. A free and independent press has flourished under a relaxed set of regulations, allowing proper scrutiny of the government and access to high-quality information. While there have been reports of intimidation of journalists, the country has largely allowed for a free press, much to the benefit of the country’s democracy. Peaceful protests have been allowed, albeit with limited outbreaks of violence leading to the use of force by security forces. This was exemplified in 2019, as protesters rallied against new government policy.  Simultaneously, the country faces several challenges, including rampant corruption from businesses, an underrepresentation of minorities in government, excess military involvement in politics, and a judiciary too prone to making decisions informed by religious beliefs.

However, as this paper will argue, the biggest challenge facing Indonesian democracy is that of its reckless President Joko Widodo. While initially a marker of continuous democratic elections with his election in 2014 and reelection in 2019, he has shown himself to be incredibly power hungry, pushing for electoral reform that would allow him to seek a third term as President. This is specifically barred by the constitution and would represent a massive setback in the country’s democracy.  As such This paper will argue that Joko Widodo represents the biggest threat to Indonesian democracy and should be barred from seeking a third term. Though he has been a monumental force for the country, pushing through massive investment in infrastructure, serving to bolster the country’s economy and making it a regional power, his power-craven ambitions have stained his legacy, and more concerningly, threaten to upend a flawed, yet massive democracy.

Indonesian sovereignty, like much of the developing world, was born out of a long history of colonial rule and exploitation. The British and Dutch arrived in the 16th century, establishing trading ports, and representing colonial expansion into Southeast Asia. The Dutch then obtained full control over the region, suppressing the local population, often brutally. Fraught relations between the colonizers and colonized people of Indonesia sparked frequent rebellion throughout the course of Dutch rule, particularly on the island of Java. The outbreak of World War II served to upend Dutch control of the region. While initially falling under the occupation of the Japanese as they moved to conquer Asia, their loss in the war prompted calls for formal independence from the Dutch. The rich ethnic diversity of Indonesia that had long divided the island along ethnic lines united in their opposition to colonial control and advocated for their freedom. Under mounting international pressure, the Dutch chose to relinquish control of the island, giving the island it’s freedom for the first time in nearly 400 years.  

In the aftermath of World War II, Sukarno emerged as the country’s leader, inciting nationalist rhetoric that inspired the islands people to resist Dutch attempts to reestablish their control. As such, he was proclaimed President in 1945. Democratic aspirations were strengthened when the constitution was drafted that same year, establishing a formal separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. This mirrored other major democracies and inspired hope for a free Indonesia. However, this hope dwindled as the years progressed. Sukrarno, a once democrat that united the various ethnic groups of Indonesia, slowly evolved into an authoritarian, working to consolidate power in the executive branch and aligned himself with Islamist forces as well as the military. Despite term limits being imposed by a Constitution Sukarno helped to draft, he held office for more than 22 years. Sukrarno resisted calls for parliamentary elections until 10 years after the country’s constitution had been written. In 1955, when election finally occurred, split results amongst voters for the parliament gave way for Sukarno to dissolve parliament, further concentrating the power of the Presidency. This furthered popular disapproval of Sukrano’s rule, and delegitimized the democracy he had promised to his people. However, his main challenge came from an alliance he had bounded between a host of opposing forces. The main two factions he had aligned himself with were the Communist Party of Indonesia, or PKI, and the military, both of whom felt threatened by the other. Increasing Sukarno allegiances with the PKI threatened the military’s power, causing an attempted coup in 1965. With Sukarno’s power weakened, he ceded power to General Suharto, who let the armed forces. Under his rule, he undertook an anti-communist purge, which was aimed at rooting out all communist presence in Indonesia. 

During the purge, it’s estimated that between 500,000 and 1,000,000 people were killed, in a horribly brutal display of authoritarian force. Under Suharto’s rule, opposition parties were delegitimized in elections, with the army playing a pivotal role in all forms of government. Backed by the United States, Suharto made Indonesia a hub for foreign direct investment, which led to increased urbanization and modernization of the country’s economy. While political representation was stifled and limited, Indonesians remained supportive of Suharto because of the economic prosperity that occurred over the course of his rule. However, his tenure was indeed marred by the brutality of opposition parties and figures, as well as increased military involvement in the political system, as well as heavy corruption from outside business interests. The 1997 Asian financial crisis brought Indonesia’s spiraling economic growth to a halt, and forced Suharto to leave power after 32 years as President.  In the aftermath of the Suharto presidency, a number of Constitutional reforms were undertaken, aimed at increasing the separations of power between the three branches of government. It cemented regular elections with term limited presidents into the constitution. It also increased regional autonomy throughout the country, which was virtually non-existent under the dictatorships of the 20th century. Following the 1998 reforms, regular elections commenced in 2004, and have occurred every 5 years since then. Though the system has been critiqued for a lack of representation of minorities and persistent corruption from outside forces, the system has guaranteed electoral rights to hundreds of millions and have facilitated regular competitive elections, both of which are informed by a free press. Economic prosperity over the same democratic period has flourished, serving to further legitimize the political system.

In 2014, the country elected Joko Widodo, who has been the country’s longest serving President in the democratic period. He ran for and won re-election in 2019, with his fresh five-year term due to be up in 2024. However, Widodo has expressed interest in extended his term past the constitutionally mandated period of two five-year terms, culminating in a 10-year term in office if fulfilled, as Widodo is likely to do. There has been discussion amongst political leaders of either delaying the scheduled 2024 election or removing the two-year term limit in the constitution. Either scenario is equally as dangerous for Indonesian democracy. What is more concerning is that the idea is being propagated by political leaders other than Widodo and has tentative support from the Indonesian population given Widodo’s popularity. The rationale given for such a dramatic move is economic – the country wanned under the COVID-19 pandemic and Widodo is viewed as the best person to lead the recovery effort. Democracy has already stagnated under Widodo – the military has increased their role in politics, reminiscent of past dictatorial trends, and individual freedoms have been limited via legislation he has signed into law, such as giving the military more power in his government and drastically limiting the freedoms of the LGBTQIA+ community. Allowing Widodo to seek a third term in office sets a dangerous precedent in a country with a deep authoritarian past. Increasing their dependency on Widodo only furthers his grip on the political system, and could legitimize him to seek further years of the Presidency. Others in his circle have also raised the idea of having the legislature elect the President in the future, rolling back a key tenant of the 1998 reforms that allowed the populace to directly vote for the executive. Widodo has overseen a country that has backslid massively and has the chance to further erode its democracy should he try to extend his term.

In conclusion, Widodo’s efforts to lengthen his stay in office follow a string of actions that have weakened Indonesian democracy. He must be barred from seeking a third term if the country is to stay free.

North Korea’s Illicit Money Machine

Background: Brief History of North Korea

Following World War II, the international order was divided over the ideological governance styles and practices of democratic capitalism and communism. Particularly, the U.S. a capitalist state wanted to promote democracy and capitalism globally, whereas the Soviet Union sought a communist world order. Although the U.S. and USSR were in a strategic competition for global dominance, they never once formally engaged in a hot or live war with one another. However, throughout the Cold War, the U.S. and the USSR fought combatively via proxy conflicts. Among the very first of these proxy engagements was the Korean War. After WWII, the Korean Peninsula, which was once a unified nation, had been divided into a communist northern state known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and a democratic, capitalist, southern state, the Republic of Korea (ROK). During the war, China sent two million soldiers along with the Soviet Union’s logistical support to aid the DPRK, whereas the ROK was primarily reinforced by the U.S. In June of 1950, due in part to the influence of the PRC and the USSR, the DPRK crossed the border and invaded its southern neighbor, intending to establish a unified communist Korean nation. The Korean War, which lasted three years, saw horrific casualties and fatalities on all sides. Ultimately, upon the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement, the war concluded, and a demilitarized zone was established between the North and South along the 38th Parallel. After the war, North Korea followed a far different trajectory than the Republic of Korea. Whereas the South experienced significant economic growth, the North was beginning to shield itself from the outside world, creating a “hermit kingdom” according to professor Mitchell Lerner of The Ohio State University, among many other experts.

 North Koreas Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons:

Beginning in the 1950s, Kim Il-Sung repeatedly emphasized the imperativeness of a ballistic and nuclear weapons program for the DPRK, as it would prevent North Korea from lagging too far behind the South. However, since 1950, the DPRK has been significantly impacted by severe U.S. and international sanctions for human rights abuses and failures to comply with international laws. Furthermore, the U.S. in addition to many Western countries has recently levied strict sanctions against the DPRK for cyber-crime offenses. Under the harsh leadership of North Korea’s first ruler, Kim Il-Sung, the DPRK actively sought methods of securing funding for a ballistic and nuclear missile program. Specifically, the DPRK frequently employs various illicit methods to circumvent the tight sanctions placed by the international community. Ultimately, the DPRK, according to many experts, wants nothing more than to ensure its continued existence and that of the Kim dynasty. Fast forward to 1984, and under Kim Il-Sung, North Korea test-fired its very first missile. Undoubtedly the employment of nuclear and conventional weapons was championed by not only Kim Il-Sung but his son Kim Jung-Il and grandson, Kim Jung-Un (KJU). However, of the three DPRK leaders, none have taken a greater interest in advancing the DPRK’s missile program than its current leader, KJU. Specifically, KJU has placed a great deal of emphasis on science, technology, engineering, and math as well as emerging technologies to advance the DPRK’s national agenda. The U.S. and the international community writ-large have condemned the DPRK’s military, scientific, and technological advancements and have issued strong sanctions against the North Korean government. 

North Korea’s Illicit Financing of its Missiles Program:

While the PRC, in violation of international sanctions, provides North Korea aid through cargo shipments, along with other measures, these means don’t outright provide the DPRK with enough capital to fully fund its desired missile program. Therefore, the DPRK utilizes several illicit activities to finance and grow its missile program. Particularly, the DPRK engages in the manufacturing and distribution of illegal narcotics manufacturing and the sale of counterfeit goods, trafficking arms globally, and producing and selling counterfeit currency. Yet, among the DPRK’s most recent lucrative financing activities for its missile program, has been its global hacking and malware campaign. Last year it was reported that the DPRK had stolen nearly $400 million worth of digitized assets from seven different attacks on various cryptocurrency platforms.  This is a significant development and should raise serious concern among states globally. According to some North Korean and national security experts, the DPRK likely goes after cryptocurrency as it is far less regulated than other forms of hard-copy currency, and thus it is easier to manipulate and bypass foreign sanctions. A recent United Nations investigation also determined that North Korea has stolen and continues to steal cryptocurrency to further finance its missile program. Yet, this all goes without stating the obvious, the DPRK is strictly prohibited by the UN from testing ballistic and nuclear missiles, let alone developing them. To be clear, it is not as if, the international community is “out to get the DPRK”, and therefore is prohibiting their acquiring of ballistic and nuclear missiles. Thus, it is inconsequential if the DPRK finances its missile program through legal or illicit means, simply financing it, to begin with, is in violation of sanctions. The DPRK both through its rhetoric and actions has proven its desire and capability to use asymmetric weapons systems against the U.S., RoK, and U.S. interests globally. Although the western media frequently discusses the DPRK missile threat and covers each test closely, there is a legitimate reason for concern. 

The employment of sophisticated offensive cyber measures by the DPRK is hardly a new tactic. Most notably, upon the release of the Sony Pictures film “The Interview”, DPRK launched an intrusive cyber operation against the Sony Corporation, leaking highly sensitive personally identifiable information. As I mentioned previously, the DPRK is extremely isolated from the rest of the world, and its citizens do not have access to the internet. Thus, this begs the question of how the DPRK can launch successful cyber-operations against the rest of the world? According to some experts, while the DPRK has limited internet access in its capital of Pyongyang, the PRC is complicit in allowing DPRK cyber military operators to come across the border and utilize China to launch attacks on its various targets. As with assisting the DPRK in evading sanctions, the PRC is highly culpable in its assistance efforts with the DPRK in cyberspace. However, the PRC has its reservations, as it greatly fears that an unstable DPRK could flood millions of North Korean refugees into China, which China lacks the resources or infrastructure to support. Beyond hacking operations, the DPRK has long employed ransomware attacks to assist in funding its missile program. Specifically, the WannaCry attack in which the DPRK targeted computers and servers running Windows operating systems, ultimately demanding ransom payments in Bitcoin. For the DPRK its global cyber ransomware operations are highly lucrative. According to the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) between 2015-and, 2019 DPRK ransomware hackers attempted to steal roughly $1.2 million from banks in Vietnam, Bangladesh, Taiwan, Mexico, Malta, and Africa. Moreover, according to the WIRED, DPRK secured $80 million by “tricking” a network into re-routing funds. Additionally, the FBI recently reported that North Korea stole more than $600 million in cryptocurrency, from a single hacking operation. This is a critical development as it demonstrates that the DPRK is continuing to use hack and steal operations to generate significant revenue.

Recommendations

While the international community has levied strict sanctions against North Korea, the DPRK has consistently demonstrated its formidability in cyberspace as one of the preeminent state cyber threats that the U.S. faces. However, given the nature of where cyber operations occur, there is a strong likelihood that the U.S. has been effectively thwarting the DPRK in cyberspace, though the public will never know. Thus, it is difficult to evaluate how the U.S. is doing countering North Korea’s cyber threats and illicit financing campaigns. For example, when a bomb is dropped on a target, reporters can verify that. However, due to cyber operations taking place, mostly, outside of public view, little if any substantial reporting exists to confirm such activity. Yet, after the Sony hack, it has been reported that DPRK’s internet was cut, seemingly by the U.S. and its partners. Therefore, I would suggest that the DoJ, “name and shame”, the DPRK attackers, publicly indicting them on charges. Particularly, the process of openly outing hackers is critical as many enjoy life in the shadows and will stop once they have been caught red-handed and put in the public eye. Furthermore, I recommend that the Five Eye intelligence allies actively degrade and disrupt the operating networks and information systems affiliated with the DPRK attacks. Although such an aggressive maneuver may complicate relations with the PRC, the West must take greater action against the DPRK. Furthermore, Lastly, I would advise that the U.S. financial crimes enforcement network utilize targeted sanctions to freeze the DPRK’s financial assets and that of Worker’s Party members and high-ranking North Korean military officials. While the threat from the DPRK will not dissipate any time soon, the U.S. government, international partners, along with the private sector must continue to publicly discuss DPRK’s illicit financing, while actively thwarting such activities.

Drafted Into Abuse: The Experiences of Female Soldiers in North Korea’s Military

Notice: This paper includes discussions of sexual and gender-based violence.

Founded in 1948, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, better known as North Korea, is considered to be the last true Stalinist regime. Similar to other communist nations, such as the Soviet Union and China, North Korea prides itself on gender equality and freeing women from the responsibilities and social roles that held them back from fully supporting their country. In 1946, North Korea passed the Sex Equality Law, followed by a stipulation in Article 22 of the 1948 Constitution that “women in the D.P.R.K. are accorded equal rights with men in all spheres of government, political, economic, social and cultural activity. The state protects especially mothers and children.” Articles in the 1972 and 1990 Constitutions continued the trend with the statements that “women hold equal social status and rights with men” and of the country’s contribution to the creation of “various conditions for the advancement of women”, respectfully. For most of its existence, the North Korean government, and the Kim regime - Kim Il-Sung, Kim Jong-Il, and Kim Jong-Un - maintained a relatively stable society, with work requirements, food rations, and set salaries for all citizens. However, in the 1990s, North Korea fell into an economic crash and famine following the fall of the Soviet Union and subsequent loss of aid support. The hardships, better known as the Arduous March, went on to drastically change the role of women in North Korean society. During the famine, the government required citizens to continue working despite a lack of salary. Women were in a unique position in the labor force, as, unlike other communist nations, North Korea emphasized the role of mothers and recognized the role of the housewife as a valid alternative to state employment. The country began this acknowledgment of housewives and mothers near its founding, with the 1946 Labour Law prohibiting women and children from “toilsome or harmful labour”. As the nation continued to grow, the North Korean government never officially denounced the traditional Confucian hierarchies, particularly in reference to gender roles, providing many women the leeway to leave their state jobs to be housewives after marriage. The amount of women leaving the workforce after marriage had grown to over 60 percent by the mid-1980s. This supplied them with the freedom and time flexibility to pursue other opportunities to provide for their families as they were no longer expected to perform jobs in the traditional labor force. As more women pursued informal methods of income generation, a market economy known as the “jangmadang” was created and women quickly gained a unique social status as the primary breadwinners and caregivers of their households. Yet, this was not the case for all women in North Korea. Women in the military were denied the same status and opportunities, and while their responsibilities and roles have changed over the past thirty years, the change has not occurred parallel to the overall status change of women in the general population. While the economic and social positions of women in North Korea have changed over the past three decades through greater financial and social independence, those changes have not been mirrored within the military as enlisted women remain subjected to grueling and unequal tasks, poor sanitary conditions, and a mass culture of abuse and discrimination. 

Understanding the background of the issue is essential when approaching the roles of women in North Korea’s military. The relationship between women and the military can be broken into two major time periods; 1) prior to a reported mandatory service requirement in 2015 and 2) post the requirement. South Korea and internationally based news agencies first began reporting on the mandatory service requirement in January of 2015, however, the details of the exact policy remain ambiguous. One article, published by Daily North Korea, stated that the directive establishes military service as “mandatory for eligible women between the ages of 17 and 20,” with enlistment length lasting up to five or six years.  It must be noted, however, that reports surrounding the mandatory service requirement may not be entirely accurate due to the lack of clear sources or data, and it is possible that it is instead a highly encouraged enlisted policy, similar to what men in North Korea experienced throughout most of the country’s history. For the purposes of this analysis, attention will be paid to the policy in 2015 as a marker in shifting attitudes and expectations surrounding the military service of women. Prior to 2015, primary accounts - mostly from defectors - present that joining the military was viewed by women not as a duty to the country but as a way to rise up in social rank, as many of those in higher military positions were in a higher class or members of the Korean Workers’ Party. One defector, Lee So-Yeon, served in the military for about a decade and served as a signals specialist along the Demilitarized Zone. During an interview with The World, she stated her reason for joining was to “become a low-ranking member of the ruling party.” Even as women gained social and economic status due to the market economy, the country’s strict hierarchical order made it difficult to move between class levels. Additionally, during the famine in the 1990s, many who enlisted did so due to the appeal of a daily meal. For many, especially women, who had less pressure to enlist, joining the military could create a path to a better future. 

Following the reported mandatory service requirement in 2015, the number of women in the military unsurprisingly grew from an estimated 2.38% of the country’s total population in 2015 to an estimated 2.62% in 2018. According to South Korean news sources, women were now expected to serve from the age of eighteen or nineteen until they were twenty-three. This five-year service expectation is half of what is set for men, who are typically in the service for ten years. The change can be explained in part by the reported population decline in North Korea, which has contributed to a similar decline in military size. Enlisting in the military was now no longer a tool for increasing social status. Rather, it is now a responsibility. While women who care for family members or children face less pressure to join, many do not marry or have children until their late-20’s, due to the preexisting service expectations for men. As a result, there is less ability for women to pursue market opportunities or keep themselves out of the pressure of contributing to North Korea’s workforce and military.

Central to the experience of any soldier is the expected tasks and duties. For the women in North Korea’s military, these expectations varied heavily from that of male soldiers. After joining, women undergo training similar to that of their male counterparts. They reportedly have slightly shorter physical training regimens during the day. However, the overall daily schedule is relatively the same. In addition to the physical training demands, many women soldiers are also expected to perform the cooking and cleaning for their units. They are viewed as “ttukong unjeongsu” according to author Juliette Morillot, a term that directly translates to “cooking pot lid drivers” and references the traditional attitudes around the gender roles and responsibilities of women. The requirements end up being overwhelming to the soldiers, who have to juggle their training, position tasks, and domestic duties simultaneously. 

North Korea’s government has presented itself as a beacon of gender equality, the military being no exception. However, under that phrase is a culture of Confucian values creating social hierarchies. Women in the country are subject to inadequate sanitation and hygiene, an issue that is worse for those serving in the military. Primary to this is the issue of menstruation. North Korea’s society shuns the idea of periods, considering them impure and taboo to discuss, making it difficult for women to receive the care they need. Women outside of the military have access to jangmadang where they can purchase makeshift sanitary products. For example, some defectors described how women would oftentimes buy medical gauze to use as pads, cloths that could be washed and reused, old used clothing, or socks to use as pads. Those in the military, however, are cut off from the jangmadang and are forced instead to use military gauze or reused sanitary pads that could only be cleaned and reused during the night, when male soldiers were sleeping. As discussed, female soldiers are subject to the same intense physical regimens as their male counterparts, a requirement that limits their ability to swap out dirty hygiene products and stresses their body’s limits. Some recounts by defectors claim the complete loss of periods due to the physical training, stress, and inadequate nutrition - most troops, male and female, are reportedly provided bowls of rice and corn for meals, with meat and candies reserved for special occasions. Following the 2015 policy change, the Kim Regime announced it would start providing sanitary products to its female soldiers, however, little is known about the follow-through or the amount that was distributed.

The tasks of women in the military went beyond physical training, cooking, and cleaning. For a majority of North Korea’s history, one of the most prominent images of women in the military was of the Kippumjo, a “pleasure squad” of approximately 2,000 women and girls that provided entertainment for the Kim regime, high-ranking officials of the Workers’ Party of Korea, and distinguished guests. The squad was formed under Kim Il-Sung sometime in the 1970s and was reported to be disbanded in 2011 by Kim Jong-Un. It is also important to note that in 2015, news agencies began publishing articles that Kim Jong-Un was reestablishing the Kippumjo. During its active period, teenage girls, typically between the ages of 15 and 19 would be recruited by officers based on their height and appearance. One defector by the name of Mi Hyang claimed to have been a member of the Kippumjo. She recounted being conscripted while in high school when officers visited her school and was then trained for six months before beginning her service. Members of the special force received greater benefits than other women in military service. They were reportedly provided with new appliances and a stipend. Reported duties for the members of the Kippumjo varied from dancing and singing to massages to sexual favors. While the Kippumjo has reportedly been disbanded, the culture of gender discrimination within North Korea’s military has not.

Despite the lack of attention to female bodily autonomy and needs, North Korea maintains a hyper-feminized image of how women should appear and behave. This is highlighted by the intense beauty standards faced by women both within and outside of the military. For the general female population, the rise of the market economy and greater economic freedom has allowed for more expression in fashion. Since the 1990s, women’s fashion has evolved to embrace clothing reflective of the nation’s first lady, Ri Sol-Ju, with brighter colors, lace and sequins, and feminine cuts. It could be expected that this hyper feminization would not occur within the military, as women there would be expected to be equals to their male counterparts and focus on their tasks and position. Yet, women in the military are still expected to maintain appearances.  While the pleasure squadron, the Kippumjo, has been disbanded, female soldiers are expected to maintain basic aspects of their feminine image. In fact, when the Kim Regime released the state-sponsored cosmetics brand “Pyongyang Cosmetics Industry,” it distributed products to many female aviation units. In short, the country expected women to be capable of maintaining their feminine qualities despite their intense training, lack of sanitation, and domestic duties.

Arguably the harshest part of the experiences of women in North Korea’s military is the expansive sexual assault and rape culture. Despite a lack of exact numbers, reports from defectors have shown that rape and sexual assault are part of the norm for many female soldiers. Defectors would report that even if they themselves were not assaulted during their time in the army, they knew of many others who were. While Pyongyang claims that it does not tolerate any form of sexual assault towards its soldiers, cases are seldom pursued. Cases that are pursued are rarely found in favor of the victim, and many more are shunned into silence by a culture of shame. Some women are frightened into silence through threats to “block their chances of joining the party if they refuse or attempt to report the abuse.” Rhetoric is presented to blame victims and put the focus on women’s actions rather than on the violations by men. This creates a system of victim-blaming, one which takes the blame away from perpetrators and puts it on the female victims. Female soldiers are unable to receive care, on top of the already lacking menstrual hygiene and the pressure to keep quiet. Instead, they are forced to suffer in silence.

Despite sexual assault and harassment being common knowledge for women in the military, they are still forced to struggle on their own. In the case of sexual assault, victims are oftentimes on their own, as a culture of shame and victim-blaming is prevalent even among other female soldiers. Sexual assault is viewed as something to be expected and is normalized to the point that the country has established the idea that women must act in a certain way to avoid violence. The issue is so expansive that in order to avoid social blame, women are willing to undergo dangerous abortions. Especially in the military, where a pregnancy could ruin one’s social status and career, some soldiers use anthelmintic medicine, tighten their belts, or roll down hills to force miscarriages. If able to, some pursue illegal surgical abortions, with potentially life-threatening consequences. Sexual assault and rape also put them at risk for injury, sexual-transmitted illnesses, or post-traumatic stress disorder. Enlisted women are especially vulnerable to sexual violence due to the male-centric hierarchal nature of the military, with social values and limitations cutting them off from seeking comfort, medical care, or legal recourse, leaving them on their own to cope. 

Not only is the mental and physical health of the women in the military impacted by the tasks and discrimination that they face during their service, but their social roles and the country’s economy as a whole are also affected. Women outside of the traditional workforce were able to participate in the market economy during the 1990s, including women who were not tied up in the military operations that came as a response to natural disasters and flooding. As North Korea continues to work towards increasing its military capabilities despite a dwindling population, its focus on pressuring enlistment among women limits their ability to provide food for themselves and their families as well as to participate in the country’s now semi-legal and quasi-capitalist markets. Taking women out of the markets will eliminate the primary organizers and parties involved, potentially decreasing the strength of the country’s overall economy. Additionally, as women are pushed into the military, they will potentially lose the social statuses that they gained as a result of the jangmadang. Following the Arduous March, women had become the primary “breadwinners” for their households and also gained greater freedoms as divorce rates rose and extramarital affairs became less taboo. This status is inherently linked to the market economy, and if women are taken out of the equation, it is likely that both will reverse. 

As North Korea gains increased attention on the international stage, many look to its growing military capability and unique economic structure. North Korea’s military growth has involved technological developments in cyber, missile, and nuclear capabilities. Simultaneously, the country developed its market economy through the jangmadang. However, both of these involve one specific group, the women of North Korea. As the country attempts to balance its ambitions, declining population growth - from 1.54 percent in the 1980s to 0.49 percent in the 2010s - and diminishing military size - from an estimated 6.6 percent of the population in the 1980s to 5.2 percent -, it turned to women as the solution. Women had been part of the solution to famine and economic decline thirty years ago, as their unique social status allowed them to become the primary breadwinners and base of a new market economy during the Arduous March in the 1990s. Women currently make up an estimated 51.5 percent of the country’s population, yet, as previously stated, only 2.62 percent of women currently serve in the country’s military. As a result, the female population remains a largely untapped resource for military growth. From the 1990s onward, women managed to gain a higher social status and earn greater freedoms, even if those freedoms are not comparable to those of other nations. Despite these changes, the status of women within the North Korean military saw little movement. While the country’s campaign to increase female military enlisted, domestic responsibilities, lack of sanitary products, beauty standards, and sexual assault have continued to dominate their experiences. As North Korea pushes forward on its current path, it puts its economy at risk, as well as the status of its female population. The removal from the market economy and the cultural shame around traumatic gender-based experiences in favor of the stagnant military status threatens to dominate the experiences of women and force their social advances to regress.

How Should the U.S. React to the South China Sea Dispute?

What is the South China Sea Dispute?

The South China Sea dispute is one of the most significant and intense territorial disputes in the world today. It first emerged after World War II when China, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia seeked to occupy islands in the South China Sea. As decades passed, the dispute became increasingly complicated as more nations, including the U.S., and various complicated factors came into play.

There are two forms of disputes occurring in the South China Sea. The first dispute is over territory. Nations including China, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam have territorial claims over various islands, rocks, and reefs around the South China Sea. The second dispute involves maritime boundaries. This dispute includes all territorial actors and Indonesia. The argument between these actors pertains to how to divide the sea itself. Each nation has different claims over different areas, and the major issue of the dispute is that these claims largely overlap with each other.

The South China Sea is seen as a valuable provider of a variety of resources. In 2015, the South China Sea has been accounted for 12% of the global fish catch, and home to more than half of the world's fishing vessels. These fisheries officially employ about 3.7 million people and many more unofficially. The South China Sea is estimated to be rich in oil and gas deposits as well, though there is no clear data on the matter. The area beneath the sea is potentially valuable, as it is an important energy supply corridor.

There are numerous territorial claims in the South China Sea. China and Vietnam have previously made and continue to make claims over the islands (including Scarborough, Paracels, and Spratly Islands) within the South China Sea, while Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Brunei have claims over the water surrounding the islands. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) does not abide by claims that violate the limits of a state's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The EEZ states that 200 nautical miles from the shoreline is exclusive area for a country's economic utilization. Countries in their exclusive economic zones have "sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources." Vietnam claims it has actively ruled over the Paracels and  Spratly Islands since the 17th Century. The Philippines claim sovereignty in the Scarborough Shoal (or Huangyan Island in China), which is located 100 miles from the Philippines and 500 miles from China. Malaysia and Brunei claim territory that falls within their EEZs, as defined by UNCLOS. Malaysia additionally claims a small number of islands in the Spratlys.

One of the most important things to keep in mind about the South China Sea dispute is that much of the argument is over rocks and reefs rather than legally defined islands under international law. If a rock or reef legally becomes an island, it means that it would have its own EEZ. In order for a rock to be classified as an island, it must be able to sustain human life on it to engage in economic activity. A reef does not belong to anyone because it belongs to the sea bed. However, if a state has rights to a seabed, it is able to manipulate the reefs. Since 2015, China has been dumping sand and cement on numerous reefs to create man-made military bases on islands, in order to expand their sovereignty further into the South China Sea. China uses the "cabbage" strategy to layer on "civilian, paramilitary, and military protection" amongst the islands. The "salami-slicing" tactic additionally pertains to China slowly gaining control over land, sea, and air space in the East and South China Seas.

In the past, there have been many incidents where fishing boats and ships of opposing nations have sunk each other. Most recently, a Chinese maritime surveillance vessel sank a Vietnamese fishing boat in March 2019. The fishing boat was sailing near the Paracel islands, which China has most control over, before the Chinese vessel pursued the fishing boat and shot at it with a water cannon. The fishing boat hit a rock and sank but the five fishermen were rescued by another Vietnamese fishing boat. The area in which the fishing boat sank is currently being disputed between China, Vietnam, and Taiwan, with each claiming that their sovereignty over the islands were violated by this incident. The cause of the incident is still not clear, with Vietnam claiming that the Chinese vessel rammed the boat.  

China Perspective

China's claims in the South China Sea are largely historical. China has created the nine dash line, which was taken from a 1947 map. The nine dash line represents what China believes should be the boundary of its territory, which essentially encompasses most of the South China Sea. The nine dash line largely overlaps with the claims of Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei. China's reasoning for the nine-dash line is that Chinese fishermen have been active in that area for centuries. China believes that its historical claim over the islands and sea was established before the implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), despite having ratified it. Therefore, China has been exerting "constant diplomatic pressure to either revise international law or gain a special exception to it, where China's ancestral claims would be recognized by all."

The Century of Humiliation, lasting from 1842 to 1949, was a time in China's history when the country was exploited and overpowered by western nations. The strive to overcome a period of history that, to China, symbolizes their weakness, has made the nation more assertive in the South China Sea. This includes expanding naval capabilities and using the man-made islands to build military bases on as an strategic advantage.

China's narratives say that the US is seeking to contain China as a rising power. It opposes the U.S.'s naval presence in the area, one of the reasons being that it is encouraging the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to stand its ground on their claims and their opposition of China. China firmly believes that third parties, including the U.S., should not be involved in the dispute because it does not directly concern them.

U.S. Perspective

The Obama Administration has previously stated that the U.S. has interest in the South China Sea and that nations should make claims on it as long as they abide by UNCLOS standards. The Obama Administration additionally made a commitment to "pivot" to Asia and strengthen allyship and security ties with ASEAN. It is an important "test of American leadership" to try to defend allies in the region amongst the growing aggression of China. The U.S. has stated that it will defend the Philippines in a potential clash against China; however, at the same time, the Philippines does not want to get dragged into a potential war between the U.S. and China. The U.S. rejects China's nine-dash line and its claims over the island, but because it does not have any interest in the islands, rocks, and reefs in the area, the U.S has verbally stood in a neutral position over the dispute. Currently, the Trump Administration doesn't seem to have a long-term strategy for the issue like Beijing does. Recent policies have tended to contradict each other, turning to isolationism because being the "policeman" of the world is too costly while simultaneously wanting a stronger military presence in the sea. As of now, there is no sense of direction due to conflicting statements.

On the other hand, the U.S. still seeks to patrol the sea because of its commitment to defending international law and the rights to sail freely within international waters. The South China Sea is also an important commercial trading route for the U.S. One of the US's strategies has been to promote Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOP's) to reiterate the international law of the sea. This strategy, however, has been ineffective because it has intensely harshened China's salami-slicing or cabbage strategies instead of reducing them. The U.S. is in a tight spot because it doesn't want to further provoke China but at the same time does not want China to bully its allies. Because of this, the U.S. continues to patrol in the area.

What Should the U.S. Do?

The U.S. needs to act with a clear strategy in mind, because the South China Sea dispute will only evolve as time goes on. If the cards aren't played right, this dispute has the potential to turn into a full-fledged war. The U.S. needs to keep in mind that if it doesn't have a military presence in the South China Sea, then China will take advantage of it. If the U.S. shows that it is okay for China to make claims in an aggressive manner, China could be more likely to be aggressive in other territorial disputes such as Tibet.

On the other hand, how can the U.S's military presence in the region truly be justified? The U.S is not a direct player in the game, so increased patrolling of the sea (such as FONOPs) can make them look like an aggressor and will only allow for China to legitimize its militarization in the islands. The main mission of a FONOP is for the US to assert its power when it believes that other nations are restricting freedom of navigation and dismissing international law and norms. FONOPs are questionable because they have no real, detailed justification and sometimes are conducted by U.S. warships and bombers, which can make the operation look aggressive. There are also economic risks to consider, being that China is a significant trade partner to the U.S and the two states are currently engaged in a trade war. The U.S. can hold Beijing accountable by placing economic sanctions on trade and creating tighter restrictions on business between the two states, but this could also further provoke China.

In my opinion, it is in the best interest of the United States to keep its commitment to its partners and allies, such as the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia. The U.S. must build up its maritime capacity building by providing equipment and support in sea surveillance and infrastructure support to coast guards. Additionally, the US should continue selling more military weapons to Taiwan or increase defense cooperation with India as an indirect way of helping. Helping allies in the region benefits nations to defend themselves against China's aggressiveness and helps balance the power rivalry. It is essential that the U.S. commits to multilateral institutions like ASEAN in the region to prevent a potential war with China. Whichever way the U.S. reacts, the aim should be to maintain peace within the region and promote negotiation, communication, and cooperation without interfering in a way that demonstrates aggression and western dominance.

Fake News in North Korea: Censorship, Propaganda, and the Rewriting of History

In the era of the Trump administration, ‘fake news’ has arisen as a significant concern. What is true? What is fake? These are questions that many Americans now ask of their government and media platforms. In the first amendment of the Constitution, free speech is guaranteed for all Americans. That right is expertly exercised by American citizens and often taken for granted.

On the other side of the matter lies North Korea, where free speech is outlawed and the state tightly controls all forms of media. Citizens of North Korea have virtually no freedom of speech: internet is only accessible by a select number of powerful individuals in Pyongyang, television and radios can only access North Korean-operated stations, and accessing foreign media is illegal and punishable by death or by imprisonment in political prison camps.

Beyond harsh media censorship, North Korea also engages in a constant rewriting of history, dictated by the Kim family and executed by government officials. The foundation for extreme censorship lies in the core North Korean ideology of Juche (“self-reliance”). Juche encourages complete national independence from the outside world, which includes the disregard of foreign media and the creation of a uniquely North Korean history. Ultimately, the intense censorship serves as a protection for the Kim family and their continued survival as dictators.

Article 3 of the North Korean Constitution defines Juche and the purpose it serves:

“The DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] is guided in its activities by the Juche idea, a world outlook centered on people, a revolutionary ideology for achieving the independence of the masses of people.”

To achieve said independence of the masses, censorship and propaganda begin at a young age. North Korean children learn the history of the three Kim leaders - Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un - starting in preschool. Songs and theater performances tell the stories of the Kim family’s brilliance and  describe the Kims as higher beings who have devoted their lives to serving their country.

In Jang Jin Sung’s memoir of his defection from North Korea, Jang tells a well-known North Korean fable of a man whose house was burning down. This man had just enough time to save either his children or the portraits of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. He saved the portraits and was regarded a hero.

Censorship and propaganda continues into adult life with the monitoring by neighborhood supervisors. The Inminban are networks of North Korean women who patrol their neighborhoods for criminal activity, which includes any questioning and disparaging of the Kims or of the North Korean state. While cellphones are allowed, they are heavily surveilled by the state.

Within North Korea, there are two main news sources: the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) and Rodong Sinmun. Since these news sources exist online, they are difficult to access for the North Korean people. These newspapers primarily are written for foreign onlookers and detail the daily activities of the Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un. Articles contain heavy propaganda and report a “straightforward reflection of Pyongyang’s policy stance”, leaving no room for personal opinions.

Censorship, state-run media, propaganda in schools and in the arts, and surveillance all serve the purpose of controlling the North Korean people, to achieve the desired ‘independence of the masses’ from outside influences. The most startling effort; however, is the rewriting of history.

Historical reshaping became a talking point of international media in the early 2010s, following the release of the memoir Dear Leader by Jang Jin-Sung. Jang worked in Pyongyang as a propaganda poet and assisted with the rewriting of Kim Jong Il’s biography.

Reshaping began after the Korean War in the 1950s when North Korea was established as its own state. Kim Il Sung, the first leader of North Korea, had his biography rewritten by state officials. Kim Il Sung’s birth conveniently fell on April 15, 1912, the same day the Titanic sunk. His biography opens with the telling of how the world began to change from the moment he was born, starting with Titanic’s demise. The biography served to “solidify a narrative of his [KIS] own unblemished record” from the Korean War and into his time as Great Leader of North Korea.

Following in his father’s footsteps, Kim Jong Il had his past similarly rewritten once he took over as Dear Leader of North Korea in 1994. This process began with the location of his birth. Despite reports that he was born in the Soviet Union, the North Korean state claims that Kim Jong Il was born in a military camp in on Mount Paektu. Given the claims that all three North Korean leaders were born on this mountain, they are referred to as the “Mount Paektu Bloodline”.

Despite being merely a child during the Korean War, his biography tells the story of a young boy at the front lines of battle, learning to conduct military operations with his father. After the fall of the Soviet Union, stories about North Korea’s relationship with the Soviet Union were modified to give the impression that North Korea had been skeptical about the survival of the Soviet state since the very beginning. Along with the rewriting process, Kim Jong Il ordered a “massive purge of libraries” to destroy any unflattering stories of North Korea’s past.

After Kim Jong Il’s death in 2011, Kim Jong Un began his reign as Supreme Leader with a purge of over 400 high-level government officials. Unlike his father, who had years of experience in the government before assuming the role of head of state, Kim Jong Il’s death took North Korea by surprise. This forced Kim Jong Un to step up as Supreme Leader having had little experience dealing with his father’s officials. His purging of most of his father’s government was with the intention of proving himself as a strong and legitimate leader.

The most well-known executed official was Jang Song Thaek, Kim Jong Un’s uncle. Jang and Kim worked together for two years without much issue until late 2013. After constantly disagreeing with the Supreme Leader, Kim decided he had enough. Jang was arrested at a meeting, stood for trial a few days later, and was executed. Rumors said he was “stripped naked and fed to 120 dogs”; however there is no factual basis for this claim. In media coverage of the event, Jang was referred to as “despicable human scum” and after the execution, Rodong Sinmun erased tens of thousands of articles referring to Jang from their online databases, as if he had never existed.

The intense controls on the North Korean media lead one to ask whether North Koreans are convinced of their altered history and of the propaganda. Coverage of North Korea in popular media sources presents the people as being brainwashed by Kim Jong Un. For example, the film The Interview perpetuates some stereotypes of the North Korean people, despite being written as a comedy. The following quote is Jang Jin Sung’s take on this issue:

“North Koreans are people, and they aren’t stupid. In the North Korean system, you have to praise Kim and sing hymns about him and take it seriously, even if you think it’s only a shit narrative. That’s the block, you see? It’s not that people are brainwashed and think he’s god. These are the things that people know, but they don’t dare to challenge.”

There are likely people who believe in the North Korean state and trust the stories they are told. However, there are also likely people who have zero faith in the state. With the rising number of defectors each year, it is clear that more and more North Koreans are aware of the situation they are in and are actively trying to escape.

The severe punishment waiting for North Koreans who attempt escaping is enough to scare someone into staying put. After three failed escape attempts, the defector will be executed along with three generations of their family. The state does not stop with one execution, but they continue to execute the entire close bloodline. This way the state can deter any future attempts by this family to escape from North Korea.

Unfortunately, there is not much that can be done about this issue. North Korea has no incentive to stop their censorship, propaganda, or rewriting of history. It is in their best interest to continue these practices to maintain the intense cult of personality surrounding the Kim family.

Given the outcome of the recent Hanoi summit between North Korea and the United States, the US is in no position to interfere in Kim’s affairs. Relations between North Korea and the US have returned to being hostile and do not show any signs of improving. International actors, like the United Nations, have also used up all their cards in recent attempts to shame North Korea into addressing human rights violations.

The state with the most leverage regarding North Korea is South Korea. President Moon Jae-In ran for president on the platform of reunification as his primary goal. He is positioned well to work bilaterally with North Korea, especially since their recent summit at Panmunjom in April of 2018 was successful. It is up to President Moon to determine the future of inter-peninsula relations. Ultimately, South Korea is the sole government that could potentially improve the freedom of speech in North Korea. However, change is not likely. North Korea has no incentive to loosen their censorship. It will take expert level negotiations and agreements in order for Kim Jong Un to relinquish some control. It is likely that fake news will continue to prevail in North Korea for some time to come.

In looking ahead to a future where the United States, South Korea, and North Korea are working together, the most practical way to go about remedying this situation would be a gradual rollback of censorship. North Koreans have been raised to believe that Americans are their ultimate enemy and that South Koreans are poorer than they are. If either the US or South Korea enter North Korea and immediately expose citizens to the whole truth, North Koreans would not be likely to believe them. Incremental exposure to their true history and contemporary affairs would be the best method of reintegration into an uncensored state.

Hope, Fear and the Unknown in Thailand’s Upcoming Elections

This March, Thailand is scheduled to have their first elections since the military coup of 2014. As the election date approaches, there is hesitation on the legitimacy of the voting process that will occur in the coming weeks. Thailand has experienced multiple coups, this one being the twelfth successful instance  since 1932. The most notable ones occured in 1991, 2006, and with the most recent coup occuring in 2014. Since the 2014 military coup, norms and expected behaviors have not followed the previous pattern of the other military takeovers. The typical script being: coup takes over power, control over broadcasting and media entities, a parade of military power, and then the drafting of a new constitution with promises of elections within a year. However, the transitional government established after the 2014 coup was unprepared, taking five years before scheduled elections - which are officially scheduled for Sunday, March 24, 2019.

The history of Thailand’s government and civil society is one still trying to figure itself out – constantly tilting from dictatorial conservatism and democratic rule. Thailand has brought forth the vibrant democratic values seen in the 1997 Constitution. However much civil progress has receded in the past 20 years with Thailand now shifting more towards authoritarianism.

A key player in Thai politics is Thaksin Shinawatra, the influential leader of the Pheu Thai Party and former prime minister. Thaksin was elected as prime minister in 2001 and represented an unprecedented victory in elections. Thaksin came into power by optimizing elector support, a seeming obvious in politics, however a tool that went unused and propelled him to the highest office. After the victory in 2001, the Pheu Thai party has won the past five elections only to be forcibly removed by courts or Thai military in 2006 and 2014. The Pheu Thai Party is known for authoritarian practices, dismissal of checks and balances, and human rights violations. The 2006 coup, also known as the ‘good coup’ was an attempt to re-democratize Thailand, however, the 2011 election of Thaksin’s sister, Yingluck Shinawatra brought back the authoritarian practices that lead to the 2014 coup. Both Thaksin and Yingluck are in self-imposed exile, however, Thaksin’s influence in Thai politics is still seen today. The newest Constitution, a product of the 2014 coup, has attempted to remove the influence of elected officials and place more power into the hands of the military.

It is important mentioning that other motivations for this upcoming election might have, in part, to do with Thailand hosting the 2019 Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit this June. Placing Thailand on an international stage will invite international attention and scrutiny if these upcoming elections go poorly.

The Political Parties and Presidential Candidates:

The belief that this election will be any different from the past is hopeful yet hesitant. The political map of Thailand is currently being contested by three key parties as the elections will be held on March 24th. The suffrage age is 18 in Thailand and it is a compulsory system.

Palang Pracharat Party is the current political party in power, led by current Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha and backed by the military. This party was established in 2018. Along with Mr. Prayuth, deputy prime minister Somkid Jatusripitak and party leader Uttama Savanayana will have their names on the ballot in the general election.  Leaders of this party lead the 2014 coup and have been pushing the election date farther back in order to ensure fair elections as well as for their own benefit as they gain political support.

Pheu Thai Party’s The political ties to the controversial former of prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra is both damaging and attracting depending on the point of view. The party, however, picked Viroj Pao-in as the representative for the general election.

Thai Raksa Chart party has connections to the Pheu Thai party as well as to former exiled prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra. The Raksa party is preparing to nominate Princess Ubolratana, the older sister of King Vajiralongkorn. She was stripped of her royal title when she married an American, so notions against speaking ill of Thai royalty/sacred monarchy no longer apply to the princess. King Vajiralongkorn decreed that her bid was ‘inappropriate.’ The combination of her royal past and her connection to Thaksin made her an unpredictable candidate both in intention and popularity in turning the election in her favor. Ubolratana was disqualified from the elections by the election commission and the Thai Raksa Chart party is now in process of termination via the election commission requesting the constitutional court to officially dissolve the party. The Court is expected to rule against Thai Raksa Chart.

Democrat Party is currently being lead by former prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva who served from 2008 to 2011. Unique to Vejjajiva was that he was born in the United Kingdom and Western educated. He is known for being outspoken on corruption and authoritarian rule. It is believed that the Democrat party is the least popular among the key players and compromised/concessions would have to be made in order for the party to rise to power.

Assuming, free and fair elections, it is hard to say who will win the majority in the elections. With the current actions of the Thai government, even the legitimacy of elections is in question. The incumbent power and revised constitution give the military or Palang Pracharat Party more of an advantage, especially if the Thai Raksa party is officially dissolved and ineligible to enter new candidates in the election. The nomination of Princess Ubolratana of the Thai Raksa party and her connection with Thaksin and Pheu Thai party made her an unpredictable candidate and inherent threat to the Palang Pracharat Party. With Ubolratana now not a contending candidate, the influence of the military in current government and media outlets, the likelihood of current prime minister, Prayuth Chan-ocha of the Palang Pracharat Party to remain in power is shaping up to be the result. Which begs the question - is this democracy?

Conclusion

The Thai people have experienced constant frustration in the lack of true representation as well as corruption within Thai politics. Elections are not going smoothly. Since the beginning of 2019, protests have sprung up in an attempt to raise awareness on constant delaying of elections; Thai military has suspended a TV station critical of the military and the expected dissolution of a major contending political party. Free and fair elections are critical in developing a true democracy. At the core of this is the dismissal and denial of civil rights given to the Thai people under a ‘democratic rule’. In a Democracy, the citizens are the most important political actors in the state. In Thailand, citizens are becoming increasingly irrelevant and disregarded as political actors. As these power politics play out, hope, fear and the unknown remain as Thailand heads to the polls.

Evolution of Contemporary Responses to Human Rights Abuses in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

North Korea, also known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), has become increasingly responsive to human rights criticism since early 2010. The DPRK has recently begun to respond to United Nations human rights investigations, and in 2018 they  participated in bilateral meetings with South Korea and the United States to discuss their foreign relations. As a result of these historic developments, the following question is proposed: how have responses to North Korean human rights abuses evolved in the twenty-first century? The international community has attempted two different methods of addressing North Korea’s human rights abuses: The early 2010s were characterized by shaming Kim Jong Un’s regime; and the late 2010s have been characterized by international collaboration with North Korea, notably with South Korea and the United States. These distinct periods are reflected in two diverse responses from the Kim regime regarding allegations of their human rights violations.

Human Rights Abuses

North Korea has been known for its terrible human rights violations since the informal end to the Korean War in 1953. When the two Koreas split, North Korea spiraled into an inhumane dictatorship run by the Kim family. As evidence of this, North Korea placed third-to-last out of 195 countries on Freedom House’s 2018 ranking of free countries, preceded only by Syria and South Sudan.

It is well known that the Kim regime strictly dictates the lives of the North Korean people. As the executive director of Human Rights Watch, Kenneth Roth, puts it, the DPRK engages in “unprecedented crimes against humanity.” The country’s isolation and prioritization of defense and military spending presents a confounding image of both nuclear armament and extreme poverty and starvation. The strict control of food rations also poses major issues for the North Korean population and the country is again at risk of falling into a famine. In a 2017 report, it was estimated that at least forty percent of the North Korean population is suffering from severe food insecurity, with only the capital city of Pyongyang exempted from this issue.

Censorship, travel bans, public executions, and political prison camps are also major human rights violations of the North Korean people. In a December 2017 report on North Korean political prisons, the DPRK was found guilty of ten crimes against humanity. These include enslavement, torture, persecution, and enforced disappearances. It is clear that the North Korean government violates the human rights of the majority of its citizens. As a recent defector explained, “if you don’t have money or power, you die in a ditch.” The international community is aware of these violations and has been increasingly addressing these issues over the past decade.

The First Wave of Responses

The first wave of responses to the human rights abuses committed by North Korea began in 2013 with the establishment of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The United Nations created this commission to investigate the widespread violations of human rights. In doing so, they called for North Korean compliance with the investigation and humanitarian assistance if deemed necessary. The Commission released their report to the public in February 2014, finding that the North Korean government was guilty of “systematic, widespread, and gross human rights violations.” The report also includes a letter sent by Michael Kirby, chair of the commission, to Supreme Leader Kim, in which Kirby expressed his disappointment for not being granted access to travel to Pyongyang. Kirby further explains that he had been hoping to speak with the Supreme Leader and his top government officials in order to better understand the North Korean perspective on their own human rights.

North Korea’s noncompliance in the commission and their refusal to respond to various correspondences was of high concern to the United Nations. Kim, however, saw no problem with remaining silent when faced by these claims. Having just taken over power from his father Kim Jong Il in 2011, acknowledging the human rights abuses would have undermined his authority and ability to lead. Therefore, it was a rational decision of the DPRK not to respond to shaming tactics imposed by the international community.

Later in 2014, the United Nations made two more similar attempts at responding to North Korea’s human right abuses:

1. The United Nations formally added North Korea’s human rights abuses to the Security Council’s agenda as a “threat to international peace and security.”

2. The UN General Assembly passed Resolution 69/188 addressing human rights in the DPRK. The 7-page document condemns the actions of North Korea, expresses serious concern based on the commission’s findings, and strongly urges the DPRK to respect all of its citizens’ human rights.

Given the heightened importance placed on human rights in the DPRK and constant shaming tactics, North Korea responded to the United Nations by publishing their own report from the DPRK Association for Human Rights Studies. In this document, the regime explains how human rights are respected by their government and, contrary to the world’s belief, North Koreans are thriving. This report described the United States and the European Union as the main obstacles to promoting human rights in North Korea and labels the United Nations reports as vicious propaganda.  

This first wave of responses to human rights abuses in the DPRK can be characterized by multiple attempts from the United Nations at shaming North Korea and by North Korea’s persistent denial of any human rights abuses. North Korean foreign relations thawed during this time, however, there was no positive impact made on the human rights of the North Korean people, nor were human rights abuses acknowledged.   

Second Wave of Responses

The second notable wave of responses to human rights abuses began in 2017. After remaining dormant for a few years and observing the UN’s failure at diplomatically engaging with North Korea, the international community shifted its focus back to North Korea’s human rights abuses. This interest was likely sparked in part by the imprisonment of American college student Otto Warmbier, who was arrested for stealing state propaganda. His case drew attention to the treatment of political prisoners in North Korea when he died three weeks after his release to the United States in June of 2017. Despite their previous lack of success, the United Nations continued to use the shaming method in an attempt to embarrass North Korea into action. The UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in North Korea released a report, as has been done every year since 2004, stating the UN’s increasing concern for the worsening of living conditions in North Korea. However, Kim merely continued his tradition of ignoring recommended regime changes.

Two states, South Korea and the United States, diverged from the UN and turned towards collaboration tactics in an effort to engage in dialogue with the DPRK. This was an attempt to move towards a period of tactical concessions, which would eventually move North Korea away from denial of their human rights abuses. In April, May, and September of 2018, South Korean president Moon Jae In met with Supreme Leader Kim to discuss ending the Korean War and the future of Korean relations. These historic meetings were the first time North and South Korean leaders have met in person since 1953. Kim agreed to denuclearize the peninsula before 2019 and a declaration was signed to officially end the Korean War. Plans to remove weapons and guard posts from the Demilitarized Zone were established and a united bid to host the Olympics in Korea was submitted to the Olympics Committee.

These three meetings between North and South Korea shared a key characteristic: they focused on nuclear capabilities and foreign relations, but not human rights. In order to get North Korea to open communication with the rest of the world, South Korea had to shift the dialogue to national security and improving relations. This is reflected in the Panmunjom Declaration, the resolution that came out of the first inter-Korean meeting. While the declaration was highly symbolic of a new era of peace on the Korean peninsula, it was lacking in realistic steps by which to denuclearize North Korea and improve their human rights.

The second key meeting was the US-North Korean summit in June 2018. This meeting, like the Inter-Korean summits, was highly symbolic. After the meeting, United States President Trump tweeted that “There is no longer a nuclear threat from North Korea.” However this declaration has been undermined by recent satellite evidence from CSIS, finding that the DPRK is in fact increasing their nuclear power. This does not come as a surprise, given that the declaration signed at this meeting was lacking in realistic measures by which the DPRK would move towards denuclearization.

In summary, the second wave of responses to North Korean human rights abuses was more successful than the first in bringing about dialogue with the DPRK, especially in regards to denuclearization. However, this increased interaction with the international community will make very few improvements on the human rights of North Koreans. As North Korean defector Jang Jin-Sung says in his autobiography: “North Korea uses dialogue as a tool of deception rather than negotiation.” The DPRK is likely engaging in dialogue with the intention of manipulating hopeful South Korean and American governments into weakening sanctions and de-escalating military threats. Pyongyang is feigning interest in cooperation while continuing to ignore its people’s human rights.

The heightened global attention to North Korea and their human rights abuses, as well as the Kim regime’s recent participation in bilateral summits, offers a promising view of the future of human rights in the DPRK. The United Nations Commission of Inquiry, Resolution, and Special Rapporteur have been effective in highlighting the human rights abuses in the DPRK, but ineffective in dialogue with North Korea and in presenting realistic steps to solve problems. Ultimately, the second wave of responses was far more effective in engaging North Korea in discussion, seen through diplomacy efforts from North Korea unprecedented in contemporary years. Although the summits focused on national security, minor concessions on human rights were made by North Korea. The Kaesong Industrial Region, a South Korean-owned North Korean-operated development complex is set to reopen, which will employ thousands of North Koreans and provide the North Korean state with significant economic assistance.

While human rights were not a particular focus of the second wave, the improved foreign relations brought about by all three summits will be key in long-term eradication of human rights violations. Once the issue of denuclearization has been somewhat mediated, the focus of diplomatic efforts should shift to human rights abuses. Positive progress in the human rights of North Koreans will come about very slowly, just as diplomatic relations with North Korea have been improving slowly. More than seventy years of tension cannot easily be remedied; however, states committed to progress will eventually bring about change. Therefore, further collaboration with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is in the best interest of the United States, South Korea, and the broader international community, including the United Nations. Continuing to host summits and strengthen diplomatic ties with Kim Jong Un will bring about gradual positive progress towards recognition of human rights violations by North Korea.

The North Korea Question; U.S. Strategy in the Korean Peninsula

For decades, the United States’ foreign policies toward North Korea have centered on non-proliferation, with the objective of preventing North Korea from developing nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of hitting the United States. Unfortunately, these policies have failed. Considering that change, it is time to transition into a new era of policies focused on another goal; preventing catastrophic war between the United States and North Korea. The United States has two options; the first, to use the U.S. military to either bring about regime change in North Korea, or to conduct surgical strikes on North Korean missile test sites or storage facilities; or the second, to de-escalate tensions and to adopt a policy of deterrence. The military option is no option—It likely would lead to retaliation by North Korea against the United States, or U.S. allies, and even then it might not succeed, which leaves only the second option. Sadly, both the United States and North Korea have adopted a policy of brinkmanship and threats, which does not de-escalate tension. Neither country wants nuclear war to occur, but it is quite possible that the continuation of these policies of brinkmanship will cause the U.S. or North Korea to bumble into a war with unimaginable consequences. This needs to be avoided at all costs. If the United States is going to have to learn to live with a nuclearized North Korea, which they are going to have to whether they like it or not, is necessary that a policy of de-escalation is pursued immediately.

A Slow Moving Cuban Missile Crisis? 

Robert Litwak, a scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, has described the current standoff between the United States and North Korean as “the Cuban missile crisis in slow motion.” However, one could argue that the current crisis between the United State and North Korea is actually more dangerous than the crisis President Kennedy handled so skillfully in October of 1962. For one, the Cuban missile crisis was not between the United States and newly emerging nuclear state. For another, the current standoff is between two leaders who do not have advisors who can effectively speak the truth if it differs from what their leader wants to hear. Kim Jong Un has had his own family members killed, and it has become clear during his presidency that Donald Trump does not suffer advisers who disagree with him, going as far as to call Lt. General McMaster a “pain” for correcting him in a meeting. This combination of factors means that the situation the U.S. and North Korea find themselves is even more dangerous than what the United States, the U.S.S.R, and Cuba were in in 1962.

The Military Option is No Option

When faced with options like the United States has with North Korea, it is easy to make the mistake of overestimating the United States’ chances of success, and underestimating the costs of an attack. Arguments for using preventative military options against North Korea severely overestimate the likelihood that the United States would succeed in their objectives. The history of attempted decapitation strikes by the United States is rife with failure, as is the history of surgical strikes. Given North Korea’s fears of U.S. infringement on their sovereignty, any sort of strike would need to have a 100 percent success rate. If the strikes were not completely successful in decapitating the Kim regime or in removing North Korea’s ability to retaliate, it is highly unlikely that North Korea would do nothing. If they retaliated, untold death and destruction would envelop the Korean peninsula, and potentially targets outside of the peninsula which are in range of attack.

If it were to retaliate, it is possible that North Korea would use a nuclear weapon. It is challenging to estimate the fatalities of a nuclear strike by the North Koreans, but all attempts to do so have indicate that the impact would be catastrophic. According to NUKEMAP, a modelling tool that allows users to estimate the impact of a nuclear weapon on a map, a 100 kiloton (the estimated explosive yield capability of North Korean nuclear weapons based on their tests) nuclear weapon detonated over Busan, South Korea, would kill 440,000 people immediately. A similar-sized bomb over Hagåtña, Guam would kill 14,360 people instantly, and in Tokyo around 191,820 would be killed in the first few minutes after the blast. These estimates only account for the impact of the initial blast, not the impact of the ensuing fallout, which would increase that number drastically. No matter their target, if North Korea were to detonate a nuclear weapon it would be catastrophic.

Even if the North Koreans chose not to use their nuclear weapons to retaliate and instead employed their conventional weapons, the results would also be catastrophic. The Nautilus Institute published a study in 2012 entitle “Mind the Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality,” in which they found that North Korea has thousands of pieces of artillery along the demilitarized zone which could inflict around 64,000 fatalities in Seoul alone on the first day of war. This study did not account for North Korea’s five thousand metric tons of chemical weapons, which would drastically increase the number of fatalities if they were employed against South Korea. Whether chemical weapons would be employed or not, even if the retaliation was to remain localized to the Korean peninsula, the results would be horrific. In such an event, the South Koreans would likely retaliate as well, completely enveloping the peninsula in destruction. The costs of not engaging in preventative military options are far smaller than the costs of engaging and triggering retaliation. Despite what has been said by the Trump administration and previous administrations, there is no military option.

Brinkmanship and Threats

When the United States’ goal was to prevent North Korea from obtaining nuclear weapons, utilizing threats was a viable option. In the strategic environment that exists now, this strategy is ineffective and dangerous. Brinkmanship is a strategy employed by nuclear states when attempting to convince another nuclear state to do or not do something, in which one state exerts pressure on the other state by taking steps that raise the risk that events will spiral out of control. The United States and North Korea are both employing this strategy, North Korea by repeatedly testing missiles and making threats, such as the one directed at Guam, and the United States by repeatedly threatening military action against North Korea. In situations in which brinkmanship is practiced, there is a real risk of events culminating in a catastrophic exchange. At each stage, a state is faced with the choice of acquiescing, or holding on a little longer—increasing the risk of a catastrophic event in hopes the other state will bow out. If no state backs down, the crisis continues to escalate until a state does out or events spiral out of control. In brinkmanship games, the state that has the higher resolve will prevail, unless a catastrophic event occurs in which case both states lose. According to a game theoretic model of brinkmanship designed by Robert Powell, in cases where a larger state is engaged in brinkmanship with a rogue state, the rogue state will usually prevail—the cost of an attack on the larger state is far worse than the consequences of not intervening in the rogue state. The United States will not prevail in a game of chicken with North Korea because North Korea the risk of their regime is at stake, their resolve is clearly higher than the United States’.

The Kim regime has made it clear since the outset of their nuclear program that the impetus behind the program is to prevent the United States and other states from infringing on their sovereignty. They theorize that the United States will not risk nuclear war by trying to bring about regime change in North Korea. The logic behind this has been confirmed by the actions of the United States in the past in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya, and the North Korean government knows that and has issued a number of statements in which they argue that if those states had had nuclear weapons, the United States would not have attacked them. North Korea will not follow in South Africa’s footsteps, they won’t voluntarily end their nuclear program, and they certainly won’t do so in the face of threats from the United States that just further qualify their fear of the United States. Actions by the United States to increase tensions between the United States and North Korea will not induce North Korea to give up their weapons, it will just increase the risk that a catastrophic event occurs.

De-escalation and Deterrence 

The past three U.S. administrations have stressed that “all options are on the table.” This statement sounds less threatening than the alternative threats of “fire and fury,” but it still increases tensions between the United States and North Korea in an irresponsible fashion. The longer these increased tensions exists, the more likely it is that some sort of catastrophic event will occur. To effectively navigate out of this crisis, the United States needs to convince the Kim regime that an attack on the U.S. or its allies will automatically lead to the to end of their regime, but the United States also needs to acknowledge that the United States is not interested starting a war. North Korea will not take these types of statements at face value, so it also will be necessary to stop offering a preventative strike as an option. In addition to its legally dubious status, a preventative attack on North Korea will all but guarantee the deaths of millions. The U.S. has serious qualms with North Korea, but as long as there is not an actionable threat by the North Koreans, the cost of failure is far higher than the cost of not interfering with the regime.

In 1947, George Kennan, already famous for the “Long Telegram,” published an article in Foreign Affairs under the pseudonym “Mr. X,” in which he argued that a strategy of “patient but firm and vigilant containment,” would eventually lead to “the break up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.” Kennan’s argument was based upon the idea that if the U.S.S.R. could be contained and deterred, the structural issues within the country would eventually bring about its down fall. While there are immutable differences between the U.S.S.R. and North Korea, there are many similarities, the largest being the structural problems in both of their economies. Eventually, the ineffectiveness of the North Korean economy will lead to its downfall, just as it did for the U.S.S.R. Until that point, the United States just needs to ensure that nuclear war doesn’t occur.

“Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb” 

This type of policy change runs contrary to much of the rhetoric espoused by past U.S. administrations, and it particularly runs contrary to President Trump’s “tough-talking” mantra. It also ignores the human rights abuses that are occurring within North Korea, which is a challenging pill to swallow for anyone who cares about humanitarian issues. Strategies for addressing North Korea are often referred to as the “least bad option,” and this instance is no different. The U.S. administrations don’t need to “love” the bomb, but they need to realize that the opportunity to prevent North Korea from obtaining nuclear weapons has long past. It is time to move into a new era of policies that aren’t centered around threats of military action, and instead use other methods of addressing individual crises with North Korea. Even rational actors can make mistakes, and the longer the United States and North Korea embrace brinkmanship, the higher the likelihood of something terrible happening is. The impact of such an event is unimaginable, thus everything possible needs to be done to prevent it from occurring. The United States should strategize to play the long game.

Building Influence: Chinese Infrastructure Investment in Latin America

As China’s economic power grows, the Asian giant is extending its reach around the globe. While the country has maintained strong economic ties with Africa since the early 2000s, it has also recently ramped up trade and investment in Latin America. Chinese president Xi Jinping has agreed to double bilateral trade with the region to $500 billion and increase investment to $250 billion over the next decade, according to various deals signed with Latin American countries in 2015. Currently, China is the largest trade partner of three of the leading economies in the region: Brazil, Chile, and Peru. These countries, along with the rest of Latin America, mostly export primary goods and natural resources; copper, iron, oil, and soybeans account for 75 percent of the region’s exports to China. In addition to trade and investment, Chinese loans to the region have also increased from $7 billion in 2012 to $29 billion in 2015.

This investment in Latin America often comes in the form of large infrastructure projects aimed at improving transportation and better connecting the region to lower costs for Chinese imports. As the U.S. is turning its back on relations and trade with Latin America, most prominently exemplified by protectionist calls to end NAFTA and thus free trade with Mexico, China has recognized an opportunity to supplant the U.S. as the extra-regional hegemon. However, this is not due to China’s goodwill and altruism towards the region, but rather an opportunity to control global trade flows through Chinese owned transportation links, and reduce costs of trade to Asia. This is an ambitious goal, and although China has made promises of increased investment and signed deals for large infrastructure projects, it is uncertain if the plans will actually come to fruition.

Considering China’s own domestic politics, it is no surprise that the country favors trade and investment with left-leaning Latin American nations. The former Kirchner administration in Argentina had several deals with China, including plans for a nuclear plant, a satellite tracking station, and a $1 billioncontract to buy Chinese fighter jets and maritime patrol vessels. When current center-right president Macri came into office, he said the deals made under Kirchner would be reviewed and may face rejection, however after five months of internal review, the Argentine government successfully ratified the contracts. China has also loaned $65 billion to Venezuela since 2007, more than any other country in the region. China has a growing need for energy, and Venezuela mainly pays back the loans with oil. However, the current economic crisis in Venezuela could mean that the country may not be able to supply enough oil to China or pay back the loans, and so China announced in late 2016 that it would no longer issue new loans to Venezuela.

Chinese loans and investment are particularly appealing to Latin American countries since they rarely come with political and economic conditions or other requirements, such as implementing austerity of structural adjustment programs. Unlike loans from Western international institutions such as the IMF, Chinese loans have no (apparent) strings attached. Following the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, countries that sought relief from the IMF were required to implement structural adjustment policies that imposed austerity measures as a condition of the loans. This resulted in a “lost decade”of economic growth for the region, during which living standards and growth both plummeted. Considering this history with lenders from Western-dominated international organizations, China has found the ideal opportunity to shape Latin America for itself by investing in infrastructure, and, in return, gaining cheap access to the primary and natural resources needed for its booming population and industry sector. Two examples of the largest infrastructure projects currently proposed in Latin America are the Nicaraguan Canal and the Twin Ocean Railway.

Nicaraguan Canal

The Nicaraguan Canal, approved by the government in 2014 with a goal date of completion in 2020, is China’s alternative to the historically U.S.-controlled Panama Canal. The proposed design would stretch 178 miles between the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans, running across the southern portion of the country, through Lake Nicaragua. It is estimated to cost $50 billion, and Chinese businessman Wang Jing (who owns HKND, the company responsible for developing and building the Nicaraguan Canal) is the only known investor in the project.

Photo: The Guardian

It remains unclear whether or not the Chinese government is directly involved in the planning or implementation of the project. Further complicating matters is Nicaragua’s diplomatic recognition of Taiwanese independence. Every Central American country, excluding Costa Rica, is politically aligned with Taiwan. However, China refuses formal diplomatic ties with any country that recognizes the island as a separate nation. But Taiwan has little to offer Central America, and as China’s economic and political power grows, Nicaragua and its neighbors are likely to shift diplomatic ties to the mainland.

Regardless of the Chinese government’s involvement, the current project is facing setbacks due to Wang’s reported loss of 85 percent of his personal wealth in a stock market crash, which he was using to fund the canal. Additionally, the construction of the canal has faced scrutiny and backlash for its effects on the communities in the surrounding area. It is estimated that about 30,000 people will be displaced due to construction of the canal. HKND has a compensation budget of $300-$400 million, or up to $13,300 for each displaced person. This has not stopped opposition from affected communities, however, and the last two years have seen more than 80 protests against the Nicaraguan government and HKND. These demonstrations have occasionally turned violent, and there have also been reports of arbitrary detainment of protesters. Additionally, concerns have been raised over the environmental impact of the project, including the pollution of Lake Nicaragua, the largest source of fresh water in Central America, which currently supplies water to over 80,000 Nicaraguans.  

The construction of a Nicaraguan Canal would give China access to a shipping route across the geopolitically strategic isthmus without having to pass through the Panama Canal. This would lower costs dramatically for Chinese imports, since tariffs and fees for trade through the Panama Canal have tripled over the past five years. It would also give China unprecedented access to the region, with control over how both their imports and exports are traded. Like the revenue the U.S. gained from the Panama Canal, China, or at least the overseeing company HKND, could also profit from other nations paying fees to ship goods through the canal. Nicaragua, too, would benefit economically from increased trade in the region and probable shared profits with China.

While the canal is likely to be economically advantageous for both countries, its environmental and social impact could prove insurmountable. The construction has already faced setbacks due to environmental concerns, and, amid questions about funding, the Nicaraguan canal seems increasingly unlikely, at least in the near future. There has not been much additional construction since ceremoniously breaking ground in 2014.

Twin Ocean Railway

Another ambitious project proposed by China is a transcontinental railway stretching from Brazil’s Atlantic coast to Peru’s Pacific coast. As with the Nicaraguan canal, this railway would facilitate movement of goods and greatly reduce trading costs for China. There are two possible routes for the railroad: one running directly from Brazil to Peru along a northern corridor, and one that passes through Bolivia further to the south. The latter, dubbed the Twin Ocean Railway, follows a more direct route and would cost about $13.5 billion to build, stretching over about 3,700km. The former is estimated at an untenable $60 billion, and would be over 1,000km longer, measuring 5,000km from start to finish. If the project moves forward, it is likely to be built along the more feasible Twin Ocean Railway corridor.

Photo from: Inter American Dialogue

This marks a win for Bolivia, who has been in discussions with China, Peru, and Brazil about being included along the route since 2014, following the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding creating a trilateral working group on the railway that did not include Bolivia. The landlocked country of Bolivia, which has the lowest GDP per capita in South America, has been looking for a way to access the sea since Chile annexed part of its territory on the Pacific coast in a war during the 1870s. The opportunity for Bolivia to once again be connected to seaports via a major trade-based railway could provide a much-needed boost to the economy.

Like the Nicaraguan Canal, the railway project has also been met with criticisms of possible environmental degradation and threats to local communities. Some of the route passes through delicate Amazon ecosystems, and it is projected to expose up to 600 remote indigenous communities that have never previously had contact with other societies. Current Peruvian president Pedro Pablo Kuzynski has also raised concerns that the railroad will be too environmentally harmful to build.

Looking Ahead

The Nicaraguan Canal and the Twin Ocean Railway are two impressive megaprojects, which, if completed, would underscore China’s economic influence abroad, and help to further cement its role as a global economic power. However, both projects are far from completion. In addition to their environmental and community impact concerns—which could halt the projects in and of themselves—many questions have been raised about their economic feasibility and long-term success, especially given China’s track record with similar endeavors in the region.

The Twin Ocean Railway’s aims are very similar to those of the InterOceanicatranscontinental highway, which also incorporated Brazil. The project began in 2006, however it was never fully completed, and the parts that were finished are not entirely structurally sound. Today, it remains a collection of unfinished, damaged, or impassable sections of highway, with no further construction or completion date in sight. Another Chinese company signed a contract with Brazil in 2011 to build a soy processing plant valued at $2 billion; however the proposed project site remains an empty field. Plans for a different railroad to be built by a Chinese company in Colombia in 2011 never materialized, along with another train project that failed in Venezuela. Given China’s history with these other infrastructure projects, it is entirely possible that the Nicaraguan Canal and the Twin Ocean Railway could end up in a similar situation – never completed or, at best, only partially built and then abandoned.

In addition to the projects that were never finished, other contracts have been pulled due to allegations of corruption between host governments and China. A rail project worth $3.7 billion slated for Mexico in 2014 was terminated after a public outcry due to evidence that the deal benefitted allies of Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto. Additionally, a recent scandal in Bolivia revealed that the government awarded almost $500 million in no-bid contracts to a single Chinese company, raising concerns about unlawful special privileges. China’s record of not completing projects or engaging in shady contracts could sour relations with the region and foment public skepticism about foreign infrastructure investment, deterring future opportunities for China to grow its economic influence and for Latin America to develop valuable infrastructure and trade links.

Investment in large infrastructure projects in Latin America could be monumental for China’s economic influence and ever-expanding soft power, while at the same time offering sizeable benefits to many Latin American economies. However, Chinese firms must overcome their previous shortcomings and actually make progress on constructing these projects in a socially and environmentally responsible manner. Transcontinental trade and transportation links are largely missing from the region, and these proposed projects would provide much needed connections not only among neighbors, but also to Asia and the rest of the world.

The Economics of Sanctions: Half Measures, Tit-for-Tat Strategies, and Why North Korea is Not Iran

On September 9th, 2016, North Korea conducted what South Korean and Japanese estimates called its biggest nuclear test to date, with a nuclear yield equivalent to approximately 10 kilotons of TNT (the bomb dropped by the U.S. on Hiroshima had a yield of about 15 kilotons). The international community, including the United States, was quick to condemn the test, and calls for new rounds of sanctions came immediately, almost reflexively, and as if it was understood exactly what these calls were requesting. The actual mechanics of sanctions, however, are often hidden behind catchphrases such as “snap back,” “tough,” “tightening,”or “loosening.” While these phrases give one a general idea as to what a sanction is and how it works, an explanation of the actual workings of any given set of sanctions would certainly go further in explaining their severity and meaning.

The term “economic sanctions” refers to the deliberate withdrawal of economic activity that, in the absence of the sanctions, would have probably occurred. The intent, essentially, is to change policy via the punishment of an individual or group. However, the effectiveness of sanctions in achieving their goals has not received unanimous support following the Second World War, and it is not clear whether their success rate should be considered anything beyond marginal.

However, despite their dubious track record, one should not expect the use of sanctions to cease for the foreseeable future, as the enforcement of economic sanctions carries political benefits for powerful world leaders. Retaliating against a perceived wrong with sanctions offers displeased leaders an option that is more coercive than a one-off statement of protest, but less antagonistic than direct military action. Playing this middle ground is domestically popular, and allows a country to convincingly declare its displeasure with a given government or set of individuals without getting their military’s boots dirty.

As a way of modeling the process of sanctions, one can think of the threat of sanctions as a game played between two countries; the sender and the target. Consider the following, where the numbers to the left of each comma refer to the payoffs realized by the sending country at a given outcome, and numbers on the right refer to the payoffs of the target country at the same outcome. For example, at the outcome in the top left where each country cooperates (C,C), the sending country receives a payoff of 5, and the target country a payoff of 1. Of course, the exact numbers of 5 and 1 are not tied to any specific real world measurement, but rather just show that both parties prefer to be in the cooperative stage than in, say, the punishment stage (C,D) in the bottom right.

If this were a one shot game, we would expect a result akin to the prisoner’s dilemma, as the target of sanctions would benefit more by defecting, regardless of the strategy of the sender. Knowing this, the sender will choose a punitive strategy to receive a payoff of 0 instead of cooperating for a payoff of -1. However, assuming multiple iterations of the game, both the sender and target country would seek to maximize their payout over an indefinite time horizon, rather than just grabbing as much as they can in one shot. This requires both players to consider the effect that their actions today have on payouts in the future when evaluating the costs and benefits of a given action.

If the sender’s threat of indefinite punitive action in response to deviation is credible (and in this case it is, as the payout of punitive action is preferable to continued cooperation, so long as the target country continues to defect), and the costs that this punitive action inflicts upon the target country will be greater over an indefinite time horizon than the benefits from deviating once, then it is not in the interest of the target country to defect. Given the payoffs in the game above, so long as the game is played more than 3 times after the target country’s deviation, it is not in the interest of the target country to deviate.

This strategy of cooperating until the other player defects is referred to as a “tit-for-tat” strategy, named after the sender’s strategy of only punishing the target when they deviate from the status quo. Economic sanctions are a “tit-for-tat” game between a (usually more powerful) sender country and a target country, where the sender threatens to punish the target via two principal methods: upsetting the target’s trade balance and impeding the target’s financial infrastructure. Upsetting the target’s trade balance is perhaps the more straightforward example, given that this strategy simply aims to either limit the target’s exports or impede its ability to import certain resources. In so doing, the sender attempts to deny the target either the raw materials or tax revenue that it otherwise would have received, thus raising the costs of the target’s disliked policy. In theory, trade sanctions will work if these costs outweigh the benefits of the target’s disliked policy.

However, this type of sanction requires a limited market for the goods that the sender wishes to restrict. If other countries are willing to buy the target’s exports, or if the sender does not own a significant market share of the good that it wishes to keep the target from importing, then the effectiveness of these sanctions will be limited. Additionally, the coercive power of trade sanctions is inversely related to the price of the good the sender is restricting. If the price falls by half its original value six months after the sender country begins sanctions, the target may replenish their original supply at half cost, severely limiting the coercive influence of the sanction. Similarly, if the price of the target’s export rises significantly during sanctions, the target will better be able to accommodate the sanctions.

Impeding the target’s financial infrastructure however, presents a more flexible sanctioning strategy. Financial sanctions generally involve either the freezing of assets of particular individuals involved in the sanction-triggering activity, or the termination of subsidies from the sender previously sent to the target country. Financial sanctions are more difficult for the target to evade, particularly if the target country is embroiled in political or economic instability, or for some other reason may find it difficult to establish new lines of credit. Additionally, deploying financial sanctions allows the sender to better target particular individuals who are either involved in the action that triggered the sanctions or who have a direct ability to address the action, such as politicians and business elites.

Sanctions enforced as a punitive response to the development of nuclear weapons function the same way, as the sanctions aim to raise the overall costs of pursuing the development of nuclear weapons above the overall benefits that that country would receive if they did develop nuclear weapons, all while minimizing the effect of those sanctions on third parties and the economy of the sender country. In game theoretic terms, the target deviates by pursuing nuclear weapons, and the sender country looks to punish this deviation harshly enough to keep the target from choosing the deviation strategy now or in the future. It is important to note that there are certainly non-economic benefits at play in these scenarios such political prestige or regional hegemony, but the punishment strategy of economic sanctions looks to raise the economic costs of the deviation high enough to override whatever benefits might come from an active pursual of nuclear weapons.

Contemporary U.S.-Iranian relations represent a high profile, and tentatively successful example of economic sanctions being used to punish the pursual of nuclear technology. The United States assumed the role of the sender country after then-President Ahmadinejad chose a strategy of deviation by lifting the suspension of Iran’s uranium enrichment program. The U.S. punishment came in two waves, one in 2005 with Executive Order 13382, which froze the assets of individuals connected with Iran’s nuclear program that were held in the U.S., and one in 2010 with the passage of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act (CISADA), which further targeted individuals connected with the nuclear program, but also limited US reception of some of Iran’s key exports. After 2010, the U.S.’s sanctions targeted both the financial and trade sectors, draining the pockets of Iranian elite, and seeking to diminish Iranian exports of goods like oil, pistachios, and rugs. While effective due to the close ties the Iranian economy had to the sanctioned goods, the newly limited access to the U.S. market hurt third-party Iranians as well as those involved with the uranium enrichment program.

Nevertheless, despite the collateral damage of CISADA’s trade sanctions, it would be difficult to argue that they did not help to bring about the correction that the U.S. demanded, as the current President Rouhani’s victory in 2013 and positive reception to news of the lifting of sanctions in 2015 indicate a displeasure with the Ahmadinejad administration’s continued pursual of nuclear weapons in spite of the effects of the sanctions. Though perhaps imperfect, the U.S. eventually got the deal they were looking for. For its part, Iran has begun to reintroduce itself to world markets to the tune of a forecasted 5 percent overall GDP growth in 2016, despite the low worldwide price of oil. In game theoretic terms, the game has returned to an equilibrium of cooperation, with both players are receiving nonzero payoffs greater than in the punishment equilibrium.

However, all is not well with the rest of the world. Like Iran, the U.S. (along with much of the international community) has targeted North Korea with both financial and trade-focused sanctions. The assets of North Korean elites held abroad have been frozen over again and again, and the “direct or indirect” importation into the United States of any North Korean goods is prohibited as of President Obama’s Executive Order 13570 in 2011. However, while the U.S. and the international community have found new financial holdings to freeze and trade restrictions to impose time after time, North Korean officials have not shown any sign of relenting.

Of course, major differences exist between the domestic atmospheres of Iran and North Korea that may play a role in the international community’s inability to correct the deviation of the latter in the same way they have the former. Most importantly, Iran holds presidential elections every 4 years, where the public may voice their displeasure at the current government’s nuclear ambitions and remove them from office, replacing them with someone who opposes nuclear capabilities in favor of economic growth and a better reputation among its peers. North Korea, of course, does not have this luxury, and, short of a coup, Kim Jong-Un and his nuclear ambitions are here to stay so long as he wants them to. Additionally, the Iranian government is hurt more by trade-based sanctions than North Korea, as the Iranian government cannot function via black and grey markets as efficiently as Kim Jong-Un’s regime has proven to be able to.

A key difference, however, is that Iran can feasibly become a world player at some point down the road. As of right now, Iran controls the 4th largest reserve of oil in the world, is located in an enviable geopolitical location, and has taken advantage of the chaos of the region since the fall of Saddam Hussein to extend its influence. For many, a far-reaching imagination is not necessary to see Iran’s future as a serious player on the global stage at some point in the foreseeable future. By continuing its nuclear program, Iran jeopardized this capability by becoming a target for sanctions from the international community, contributing to miniscule or negative economic growth. In the end, the overall benefits of a return to the cooperative equilibrium were obvious, as this equilibrium better suited an Iran who wished to realize its international potential.

Given its limited land area, limited natural resources, and its lack of technological development compared to its peers, North Korea does not have a realistic chance to realize a similar level of global or regional influence. In fact, given the permanent nature of the regime and its apparent willingness to operate on the periphery of the world stage, financial or trade-based sanctions may offer very little additional costs for the North Korean government. In fact, fostering a scenario in which the whole world works against North Korea may serve Kim Jong-Un’s agenda quite well, substantiating his claimsthat the Western world is conspiring against North Korea. While it is tempting to simply “impose sanctions” on North Korea as punishment for their nuclear ambitions and play the middle ground between a statement of protest and military action, a closer look into what those sanctions would actually entail offers a bleak picture of their effectiveness. Granted, dealing with Pyongyang is a difficult task with no obvious answers, but instead of reflexively calling for another round of sanctions in response to the next successful nuclear test, one should offer a clear and comprehensive understanding of the truly unique situation that one finds in North Korea, and an explanation as to how exactly the next round of sanctions will stop or slow the development of a nuclear North Korea.

The Maldives and Climate Change: A New Type of Refugee

“If you allow for a two degree rise in temperature, you are actually agreeing to kill us,” argued Maldivian President Nasheed regarding the international community’s attempt to mitigate climate change at the Copenhagen Climate Summit in 2009. This country is comprised of 1,200 tiny islands, only 345,000 people, and a GDP per capita of only $14,000.  This might seem inconsequential, however Maldives is likely to be the first victim of climate change. In the next 100 years the Maldives may be completely uninhabitable by humans, which would make it the first nation to be eradicated by the effects of climate change. The emission of carbon dioxide around the world, but especially from the United States, China, and India cause warming and thus a melting of arctic ice.  The resulting sea level rise could engulf the Maldives, since it is one meter above sea level. The Maldives is a victim of climate change because its vulnerability and minimal contribution to the problem. Due to the continued rising of sea levels, migration will be the best possible option for the Maldivian people. As the Maldivian government has previously states, a new refugee status should be considered because they are being robbed of their national identity, property, and culture by the political decisions of nations that contribute most heavily to carbon emissions.

There are natural and geographical factors that put the Maldives in an extremely vulnerable position to the effects of climate change. As aforementioned, the Maldives is the lowest lying island in the world only a meter above sea level. According to the Environmental Protection Agency, if the ocean rises only one meter, it would be enough to put the island entirely underwater. Even a small rise in sea level would be enough to make the island uninhabitable while other unaffected nations would be reluctant to change their lifestyles or policies. In addition to rising sea levels, the warming sea is bleaching the coral. The coral reefs are becoming “bleached” because they lose their color. 15% of the coral is now white and 50-70% has begun to pale.

Maldives’ perilous future is largely caused by human dilemmas that have had destructive effects on the island. Rising sea levels are a direct effect of the way top emitting nations release exorbitant amounts of carbon dioxide (CO2) into the atmosphere. This carbon dioxide is then trapped, which causes the planet to warm and sea levels to rise. The top six emitters of carbon dioxide (China, the United States, the European Union, India, Russia, and Indonesia in that order) are responsible for over 60% of the Earth's CO2 emissions. The emissions already released into the atmosphere affect the environment gradually. The current situation suggests that even if humans stopped emitting CO2 immediately, there would still be a built up effect of two degrees Celsius of warming.  This amount is enough to rise sea levels over one meter and thus enough to sink the Maldives.

The Maldives was colonized by the Dutch, the Portuguese, and the British consecutively. During this time, its resources were taken advantage of and the country is consequently underdeveloped. The Environmental Kuznets Curve demonstrates how the Maldives as a developing nation is not in an ideal position to fight climate change. The Kuznets Curve states that less developed nations emit more but have fewer resources to combat climate change while developed nations can afford to begin to preserve their environment. The nation primarily runs on diesel. Diesel is a carbon rich energy source which is particularly destructive for the environment, yet the country cannot afford to invest in sustainable energy such as solar energy. This abused island does not have the infrastructure to effectively combat its rising sea levels because of their low GDP, limited resources, and the overwhelming political and economic power that top emitters possess by comparison.

The current trends of climate change, sea levels rising, and the delayed effect of emissions on warming suggests that migration away from the Maldives is an inevitable reality for the Maldivian people. As I discussed previously, it will be difficult to prevent sea levels from rising less than one meter. There have been a lack of sufficient changes in emissions to save the Maldives from an imminent disappearance, paired with past emissions which will still contribute two extra degrees Celsius to the world's temperature. This is enough to rise the sea about one meter and put the Maldives underwater. Research indicates that the Maldives has about 100 years to live and that it has already broken a threshold in allowing the Maldivian people to survive and live on their own island. It seems we may have already hit a tipping point with the Maldives, which would make it uninhabitable. If the Maldivian people cannot inhabit their homeland, they will have no choice but to travel away and find new homes and nations in order to survive.

While environmental science supports that sea levels are rising in the future, this tragedy isn’t the only reason to migrate away. Climate change has negative impact on the Maldives even today. As the atmosphere accumulates carbon, the ocean absorbs more of this carbon.  This process results in ocean acidification, which has a plethora of negative effects, such as decreased numbers of fish able to survive in this area. The Maldives depends heavily on fish as a main source of food and jobs. Those who depend on fishing to make a living or as a food source are going to face a lowered quality of life. Climate change also provokes a heightened degree of natural disasters, thus the area will become more physically dangerous to inhabit. Lastly, the people of the Maldives will have to face the extremely challenging psychological reality that they come from an island that their grandchildren will never be able to live on or fully understand their roots with, and the tombs stones of their grandparents will soon be lost at sea. These damages to the environment, economy, and psychology of the Maldives is enough to make the nation a very unsustainable and unfulfilling place to live.

Although the Maldives contributes minimally to climate change, the nation is investing billions of dollars into going carbon neutral by 2020.  Through this effort, the administration hopes to send a symbolically political message to top emitters who have more resources. The Maldives’ emissions are not enough to change whether or not they will go underwater but they are still investing their capital to reduce the few emissions they produce. The Maldives is an ideal place for solar panels, since it is sunny and flat. The Maldives is also offering individual incentives to help citizens lower their carbon footprints. Other nations have much higher GDPs and thus a much greater access to resources to lower emissions. The Maldives is leading by example in order to make a political statement to other nations and portray that since they can limit emissions, others can as well.

As migration is increasingly necessary for survival, the Maldivian people will need a new type of refugee status that combines political and environmental aspects which respect the loss of the Maldivian people. The current status for political refugees is one that is temporary, individually granted, and catalyzed by the presence of a totalitarian authority. This definition does not apply to the Maldives as their migration from the island would be permanent, would apply to all people on the island, and is not the fault of a totalitarian dictatorship. Another possible status that does not fully encompass the Maldivian experience is that of displaced people because of natural disasters. While the natural world is causing the sea levels to rise, this is not a random arbitrary act of nature as a hurricane or a tsunami might be. The reason for displacement of the Maldivian people is because of the action (and inaction) of nations like the United States, China, and India. These nations emit large amounts of carbon, accounting for about 60% of the world's emissions as a whole. The Maldives contributes only a tiny fraction to this number but is deeply affected by the carbon emissions of other nations. The Maldives is certainly a victim of climate change, and there are many perpetrators. Individual nations need to be held accountable for the effects of climate change, including the tragic destruction of the Maldivian national identity, culture, property, and sense of home. For this reason, Maldivians should be granted a refugee status that is somewhat political as a way to hold others accountable. This is an environmental disaster, but it is not without human apathy, destruction, and slander. In Geneva in 1951, the Maldives asked in a conference to be given a new definition for political refugee, as the description of the time period did not suit their needs or properly explain their circumstance. Over 70 years later, the international community has not pursued status, but Maldivian people have continued to suffer at the hands of greedy international emitters. These nations do not curb their emissions in time to save a nation they are destroying with their lack of concerned action.

The Maldives is arguably the first and most significant victim of climate change, yet they do not have any significant contribution to the problem. In less than 100 years, only a couple generations, they stand little chance of being above water. This “Small Island Developing State” could be the real-life version of the mythical City of Atlantis. Attempting to go carbon neutral by 2020 with a very small GDP and few resources, the Maldives asks the political question: “if we can change to make a sustainable future with so little, why can other nations who have so many more resources not do the same?” Without hope of ever regaining a homeland, the Maldives’ people will migrate as refugees whose status and future location have yet to be determined. This terrible injustice deserves to be met with respect and recompense or reparations. There are several possible solutions that would be respectful of the trauma involved in permanently losing one's nation, and hold major emitters accountable for the damage they have directly caused. One option is requiring large emitter nations to pool money together and buy another island that is bigger and less low lying than the Maldives, allowing the Maldives to maintain their status as a sovereign state, but relocate as a nation. The second, more plausible option is for major emitters to accept refugees from the Maldives into their nations based on the amount they emit. The greater the emissions, the more refugees a nation could accommodate. This scenario would not allow for Maldivian people to continue in their native cultural tradition but it would not require the Maldives people to build a new nation on a recently acquired land as in my first scenario. Both of these options must be paired with a serious commitment to lower carbon emissions, otherwise they would be treating the symptoms of a larger problem. The Maldives is arguably the first nation to be this intensely victimized by climate change, but other nations will undoubtedly face similar dilemmas. The Maldives is a serious warning of the atrocities soon to affect all human life. If we do not change our apathetic ways, the Maldives will be the first in a series of human atrocities that touch the whole world.

Environment-Related Displacement: Climate Change and Environmental Manipulation

Climate change is a growing concern in the international community for good reason. Yet, while several individual states within the international community have made pro-environmental changes, there several serious issues related to climate change remain unaddressed. One such problem concerns international migration resulting directly or indirectly from climate change, which currently plagues certain Southeast Asian countries like Bangladesh. Due to war’s displacement of so many people, environmental migrants trying to escape unlivable conditions are not prioritized and often refused. Of course, climate change is not the only factor behind environment-related displacement; environmental degradation caused by some Asian development projects transcend international borders and force people out of their homes.

Situation in Bangladesh

The climate change situation in Bangladesh remains dire, even as the government’s corrective efforts have been noteworthy. In terms of renewable energy, Bangladesh is a leading world example of steady success, especially in sustainable solar energy development. An initiative to install solar home systems in rural Bangladesh, currently being carried out by the state-run International Development Company Limited (IDCOL) along with 47 partner organizations like the World Bank, has provided 9% of the population with solar-produced electricity, and there are plans to expand “mini solar grids” to provide for irrigation pumps. This clean-energy system is being implemented as the first source of reliable electricity for many in Bangladesh. Despite the prevalence of the clean-energy debate and the progress being made in the country, Bangladeshi citizens are increasingly being displaced due to water shortage issues. The main issue driving climate change migration in Bangladesh is the destruction of the delta region connected to the Bay of Bengal: massive amounts of flooding has led to the salinization and degradation of fertile land from brackish or salty river water, and the massive storms that occur periodically threaten the habitability of the area. Drought, especially in the northwest region of Bangladesh, largely contributes to the displacement of people and often leads to permanent internal or international migration.

Intersections between climate change and environmental manipulation

In Bangladesh alone, there have been serious challenges to the population’s ability to survive and work, especially in agricultural fields. Regions in the center and south are consistently flooded while regions in the northwest may endure months of drought at a time. This has serious implications for Bangladeshi food production capabilities, aside from the documented internal displacement. Urbanization can only account for some of the massive population increases around cities, and in the capital of Dhaka researchers estimate that over 1/5th of the slum population is made up of migrants from the Bengal Bay area in response to flooding.

Broader implications for Bangladesh and its neighbors concern the massive and unavoidable migration that will continue to increase due to environmental conditions. Already, many Bangladeshi have fled to the Assam region of India, putting a strain on both Indian-Bangladeshi relations and the land in the region. Pakistan deals with serious issues concerning migration as a result of climate change, and the extremist influence in the region is worrying many that the destabilizing effect of climate change could not only displace more people, but also cause them to turn to extremist groups promising better living standards. In terms of diplomatic relations, environmental manipulation (such as the damming and political control of rivers by both China and India) causes a great deal of diplomatic tension. The ability to manipulate water flows upstream of India is, some suggest, a legitimate security threat to India; others are, alternatively, unconvinced of the threat to India’s security and insist the two Asian powers would never escalate the situation to actual conflict. Bangladesh has a long history of water-related bilateral negotiations with India, but has little bargaining power when faced with the long-term effects of infrastructure inside their neighbor’s borders. Meanwhile the water crisis in Bangladesh’s northwest regions pushes more agricultural workers to the city or out of the country entirely.

Response of the international community

What, then, could the international community do to counter the negative effects of both climate change and environmental manipulation on vulnerable populations in Bangladesh and other areas? Large-scale environmental change was, of course, discussed on the international level in Paris last year, but while countries made an agreement to combat environmental change, no binding treaties were proposed or signed. Instead, the environment remains a domestic policy issue that can only be affected on a broad scale by pressure from one state or another. Unfortunately, little has been discussed with regard to the implications of migration as a result of worsening environmental conditions. UN Special Envoy for Climate Change Mary Robinson believes there should be more policies and programs designed to support those specifically migrating due to environmental degradation. She also believes, crucially, that these individuals should be treated as refugees, and that the international community is currently not honoring the UN Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. Essentially, the international community should eliminate the “line drawn between refugees fleeing political oppression and migrants seeking better opportunities” due to environmental factors.

The implications of amending the UN Convention on Refugees to include those displaced due to environmental factors are serious. Under the Convention, states are held responsible for both the acceptance and the well-being of individuals; and yet, few states readily or easily accept the economic and security risks of doing so, or severely limit the number of accepted refugees. Additionally, accepting a broader definition for refugee status would greatly increase the already sizeable refugee population, and the current pressure on states especially in the European Union and the US make the topic highly politically controversial. Would this broadening of status affect all those impacted by environmental stress, or just climate change-related environmental conditions? Do we exclude consideration for people living in regions like southern Bangladesh, which naturally experiences cyclone and flood damage, even when global warming has increased the severity of these cycles? It is relatively unlikely that the broadening of the term refugee under UN standards would ever occur, and the failure of the current UN Convention to cover these individuals perhaps indicates the need for a new way to categorize and deal with this kind of necessary migration.

The response of issues like upriver damming and other environmental changes that affect more than one state are delicate issues the international community is not yet effective at dealing with. For starters, the means to resolve disputes that arise from building dams that affect countries downriver have not been effectively institutionalized in Bangladesh’s case, though the government has tried to address the issue in the past. In an international community that is unable to come to a binding agreement on climate change even in high-profile situations, it is extremely unlikely that a greater focus will fall on environmental manipulation which can be labeled as isolated, regional, or simply bilateral in nature. It is more likely that until the ramifications of the population displaced by environmental concerns gains more attention than conflict refugees, the international community will focus on positive, state-based environmental policy, rather than negotiating or considering transnational environmental concerns.

Straight Outta Ulaanbaatar: Class Consciousness and Sinophobia in Mongolia’s Economic Periphery

Ulaanbaatar is a rapidly modernizing city, but some of its residents fear its new development may come at the price of its former uniquely Mongolian face. From the times of Chinggis Khaan, Mongolians have had their own united character as a people – despite all odds. After the collapse of the Mongol Empire, they were conquered and subjugated by the following Chinese dynasties. After being consumed into the Soviet bloc in the 20th century, the Mongolian people were subjected to further decades of anti-Chinese propaganda, when the USSR hoped to use Mongolia as a buffer to the possibility of a Chinese threat on its southern border. In recent years, as economic growth has boomed, new animosities have grown out of the influx of outside Chinese business investment which many Mongolians see as exploitative. Yet one new idea that globalization has brought to Mongolia has truly resonated with the population: hip hop. Mongolia’s crisis of identity, combined with a deep-seeded want to be separate from China, has spawned a new movement of nationalistic rap within the capital city—empowering the youth to feel a sense of pride, creating a commentary on modern Mongolian society, and exemplifying the underlying class tensions present, while also fanning the flames of anti-Chinese sentiments.

A New Nationalist Identity:

Emerging from Soviet colonialism, rappers within Mongolia are using the genre as a new platform to foster a nationalist sentiment within their youthful audience. Some older Mongolians had feared that the young generation would entirely discard their national identity for the glamorized Western way of life, yet Mongolian rappers are doing all they can to prevent such a loss of culture. One prominent rapper, Gee, inspires a powerful sentiment of unity within his audience. He grew up with a single mother in the Ger district of Ulaanbaatar – an extensive and destitute slum which houses nearly two-thirds of the nation’s largest city’s residents. Gee raps that “[i]n the ocean of globalization, Mongolia is like a boat without paddles. You better start to care before we [...] drown.” He is imploring his audience not to lose their Mongolian identity in all of the foreign influences pouring into the growing capital city.

Many Mongolian men are also afraid of losing their national identity by not being able to marry another Mongolian woman. They see their city as becoming overrun with Chinese foreigners who are impure, compared to their Mongolian blood. Yet the problem for these Mongolian men arises when Mongolian sex workers and even local women mix with members of the Chinese expatriate community within Ulaanbaatar. These fearful Mongolian men find comfort in music which promotes and glorifies the culture they are afraid of losing.

Rappers also fight against cultural assimilation within Mongolia, working to keep their own identity separate from all of those which globalization has brought to Ulaanbaatar. A member of the rap group TST says that “[w]e rap in our mother tongue, and we identify and distinguish ourselves from other groups with our own language,” and even their name TST translates roughly to mean “mother tongue.” The group wants to “inspire ethnic pride among their fans,” says reporter Yuan Ye, for more and more young Mongolians are learning Mandarin Chinese in hopes of economic benefits. The early adopter of the rap genre in Mongolia Sukhbaatar Amarmandakh, or Amraa for short, says that “[h]e is an unashamed Mongolian nationalist, hoping to instill young Mongolians with feelings of pride.” The rap culture is helping to rekindle an ethnic identity within the newly globalized population of Ulaanbaatar, and giving them a new way to voice their pride and opinions.

Rapping with a Conscience:

The Mongolian rappers set themselves apart from the hip hop scenes in many other countries by focusing on social issues over pop culture. Rappers use the platform to critique their society in hopes of improving their nation, and by doing so fostering even more national pride among the Mongolian people. The aforementioned rapper Gee says that “[m]ongol hip-hop should be wise and should tell the people what is right to do.” Indeed, there are significant hardships that a modernizing and urbanizing city endures, yet through rap music, Mongolians can create a commentary on these issues in hopes of solving them. The rappers work to combat substance abuse and violence within their city. Mongolian rapper Quiza states that “[t]here are lots of under-age victims who are addicted to alcohol and tobacco. This is because tobacco and alcohol companies are very powerful.” To combat this, both Gee and Quiza reject sponsorships from beer and cigarette companies, because as Quiza puts it, “[w]e have a responsibility to think about how we affect the younger generation.” Al Jazeera was right when they tweeted out that “Mongolian rappers have less bling, more heart,” for the rappers in Ulaanbaatar are really working to make a difference in their city. They are fighting to combat corruption within the government alongside social issues, so that common people can have a larger say in their own lives. The rappers of Mongolia contribute positively to their society in hopes of helping to create a new positive postcolonial identity as the nation reinvents itself socially and economically. As theorist Stuart Hall puts it, “[t]he very notion of an autonomous, self-produced and self-identical cultural identity […] had in fact to be discursively constructed in and through ‘the Other.’” Hall argues that new identities come from making existing influences their own, and through taking the increasing westernization spawning from the Chinese investment in their young capitalist economy and using the new western styles of music the modernization has brought to create positive change, Ulaanbaatar’s rappers are creating a modern Mongolian identity with their music.

Class Consciousness on the Steppes:

Mongolian rappers are well aware that a divide exists between the core and the periphery in Ulaanbaatar, and that much of the core is made up of rich foreigners. The massive mineral deposits beneath the nation’s grasslands draw in Chinese mining companies who invest billions of dollars, but thanks to corrupt officials within the core, 30 percent of the nation still lives below the poverty line. In a studio surrounded by newly-opened upscale western clothing stores one rap group sings that “[a]lthough we grew up in yurts, after years in the city we’re forgetting our culture.” Yet the rappers are speaking out against some of the more seditious aspects of capitalism. The Mongolian rapper MC Bondoo says that “[w]e don’t admire luxury culture. We hate materialism, and the worship of expensive things.” Despite the efforts of Mongolian rappers to empower the periphery of Ulaanbaatar, the divide becomes even more profound when you examine how the core makes their money.

Chinese mining magnates have relatively free reign from a corrupt and cooperative government to strip the nation of all the wealth they can. The government is relocating the nomadic farmers which symbolize the nation on the falsified grounds that they are depleting the grasslands in order to allow mining companies to move in and take the land, sparking further anti-Chinese sentiments and inciting one rapper to sing that “[o]vergrazing is a myth and a lie/ We have grazed animals here thousands of years / Why has the desertification started since only a few decades ago?” Mongolians know that they are being exploited by the Chinese, sparking rapper Gee to become almost violently anti-Chinese, going as far as to say that the Chinese want to take everything from Mongolia. The animosity is exacerbated by the intense connection many Mongolians feel to their land, and the destruction that Chinese mines bring to it. Many Mongolian rappers have songs that revere the beautiful grasslands which are now being turned into a dessert by bulldozers and dump trucks. The rappers see the wealth that the Chinese are siphoning out of their nation’s well of resources juxtaposed against their own people starving for a drop to drink. Rapper Amraa calls for social reform and creates an economic commentary by posing that “[w]e have homeless children, we have poverty, but we also have a very grand history that was inherited from our ancestors. We sing about kids living in sewers, and we ask, 'Where's your kid living?' We want to get a message to the corrupt upper class.” The economic disparities present within Mongolia give fuel for Mongolian rappers to fire up and unite their audiences by calling for greater change.

The Smoldering Embers of Sinophobia:

Lauren Knapp quotes rapper Gee to say that “I’m not racist toward anybody… except the Chinese. I hate the Chinese.” This sentiment is shared by most Mongolian rappers and much of the local population. Gee even released a new song whose title, “Hujaa,” is a racial slur against the Chinese, and rap group 4 Zug released a song of their own called “Don't Overstep the Limits, You Chinks.” A history of conflict between the nations, alongside modern fears of Chinese economic imperialism, have heightened the racial tensions within Mongolia to a shocking level. It is possible that some of the sinophobia also stems from the sentiment in Mongolia that they are always a step or two behind China. Watching the Chinese mega-companies turn their national resources into huge profits, Mongolians might wish that they were able to do it themselves and see its benefits. On the world stage, China is seen as a key player, while Mongolia sitting immediately next to it has been relegated to backwater country. Thus, it is natural that anti-Chinese sentiments are a negative of the pan-Mongolian nationalism churned out by Mongolian rappers, for they can use universal hatred of the Chinese to further unite their people. A consequence of the postcolonial attempts to reclaim some lost Mongolian identity is a xenophobia. This fear and hatred stems from the pride and chauvinism endemic to any exclusive identity, and unfortunately by promoting the identity, Mongolian rappers are also promoting the animosity.

In Mongolia, rappers have helped to cultivate a new identity as the nation emerges from centuries of subjugation and adjusts to its new role as a part of the periphery within the capitalist global economy. They evoke pride and a new sense of ethnic identity within the youth of Ulaanbaatar, and fight against addiction and political corruption. Yet, they also incidentally feed into ultra-nationalist sentiments which can lead to hatred and racism against the economic core Chinese.

Impuissant Islands: Yakuza Influencing Japanese Sovereignty

Japan has a long history with organized crime, and the recent propagation of corruption has undermined Japanese state security by influencing crime and banking regulations. The Yakuza, Japan’s breed of organized crime, involve themselves in nearly all levels of the economy and society, and have been accused of playing a prominent role in hindering Japan’s economy. To be categorized as a transnational organized crime network, political theorist Phil Williams postulates that a group must have a formal structure, regular illegal activities, and strategies. The Yakuza have bribed and corrupted some politicians into becoming their puppets in order to advance their own illicit political and economic interests. Williams demonstrates the problems that can come from the prevalence of organized crime actions such as those by the Yakuza and the power they command, positing that “[t]ransnational organized crime activities […] fundamentally challenge sovereignty of states.” The Yakuza utilize bribery to create venal politicians, weakening the nation’s law to serve their corrupt interests. That, compounded with operating on such a large and unchecked scale, demonstrates that the activities of the Yakuza in Japan undermine the state’s power by showing it incapable of regulating actions in and across its borders. Thus, Japanese Yakuza fundamentally challenge the sovereignty of the state government in Japan through the use of corruption, manipulating domestic criminal and banking policy, and serving as a surrogate government in some cases.

Corruption demands that members of state government perceive that they can benefit from illegally accepting bribes and shares of the Yakuza’s profits, and such is the case within Japan. Underhanded politicians know that if they create policies favorable to the Yakuza, then the criminals will be more successful and be able to continue to bribe them. The corruption is so ingrained in Japanese political culture that the head of one Yakuza gang had all charges against him dropped when a case was brought against him, and the mayor of Nagasaki was assassinated in 2007 when he attempted to cut ties with the Yakuza. The impact of corruption is not a matter of how prevalent it is, but how effective it is when it occurs; in Japan, as critic Stephanie Nakajima puts forth, “… it is the fact that criminal elements and corruption have infiltrated the very structure of Japanese governance that makes it so dangerous.” Although we typically examine cases of particularly effective transnational criminal organizations in states with weak governments, they can also be effective within states with strong governance. Within Japan, the Yakuza have infiltrated society by procuring significant funds. In order to achieve this affluence, the Yakuza have utilized corruption strategies to bribe politicians into rigging the system in their favor. Thus, if leaders are motivated by personal gain, they will be more susceptible to corruption, allowing for Yakuza in Japan to challenge the sovereignty of the state by buying out politicians, such as in 2007, when the Transportation Minister in Japan admitted to receiving $6,000,000 from a Yakuza organization. This corruption could be motivated by the fact that by cooperating, politicians and Yakuza can mutually achieve greater benefit from their activities, for the Yakuza can operate unhindered and the official can profit more from larger bribes resulting from the policies which allow for criminals’ increased returns. The gaps in government control within Japan allow the Yakuza to influence policy to their advantage and reflect long term failures within the government. The Yakuza have crossed a line from exerting what corruption researcher Eric Messersmith calls “primary corruption” to “secondary corruption,” in which the perpetrators do not fear prosecution and their activities hinder legitimate economic development.

The Yakuza’s political corruption is on such a widespread scale that it challenges Japanese sovereignty.

The Yakuza operate relatively unhampered by government regulation, further challenging state sovereignty by operating in direct opposition of the law, and aided by politicians supposed to be fighting against them. The aforementioned governmental corruption has been utilized by the Yakuza to allow them to create conditions conducive to their illicit activities. In short, the Yakuza are perverting Japan’s government for their own profit. Systemic corruption within Japan has created what Williams would call a “political-criminal nexus.” The Transportation Minister who accepted millions from a Yakuza organization was allowed to retain his position, and even more worryingly, in 2012, the prime minister of Japan sparked outcry when he appointed a heavily Yakuza-affiliated Justice Minister. The Yakuza have achieved what Williams calls a “functional hole” through their use of corruption—directly challenging state authority by rigging the rules in their favor. One lawyer went as far as to say that “[t]here is an institutionalized culture of illicit money-making in the NPA [the Japanese police], and since it has gone on for so long it is now very deep-rooted.” Indeed, the corruption is so endemic that bribery takes place casually and publicly, and politicians are reticent to confront Yakuza because of their reliance on them for campaign funding. The Yakuza have created an environment which allows them to operate outside of the state, which poses a threat to the state’s authority.

One major way in which the Yakuza challenge Japanese sovereignty is by corrupting the police force to allow their actions to take place freely. Sovereignty is composed of having supreme power or authority, and by freely violating laws and changing laws to allow for illicit actions, the Yakuza are putting that authority in question. One police officer came forward as a whistleblower in 2009, explicating how the police even operated outside of the state themselves—this illegal behavior is the result of a corruption-culture exacerbated by Yakuza activities. The Yakuza have even been able to influence criminal policy in their favor, breeding further police corruption, as the newest anti-Yakuza laws are incredibly vague, which allows for the police to interpret the laws as they please. The Yakuza are so free from the jurisdiction of the state that the police will often just entirely overlook their transgressions. By controlling the body which is supposed to control them, the Yakuza operate as an extra-state entity, thereby challenging governmental organs’ autonomy over segments of their population and territory—two of the basic requirements for sovereignty.

The Yakuza further erode Japanese sovereignty by corrupting the banking sector. The lack of an enforced regulatory framework designating who can receive bank loans can not only result in commercial benefits for the criminals, but it can also detract from the economic abilities of the government. In 1991 one Tokyo bank extended a loan of ¥30 billion ($222.2 million) to a well-known Yakuza organization, money that could have been used to develop legitimate businesses which in turn can actually be taxed by the government, unlike the Yakuza. For Japan to reassert its authority, some critics argue that it should extract “the yakuza [sic] from the policy-making areas of the Japanese banking system.” Currently, some of the biggest operations the Yakuza have undertaken involve economic and commercial crimes such as embezzlement and money laundering, due to increased governmental pressures that push them into a more covert role. Yet, these new operations have proven largely ineffective. The Yakuza are able to take out loans from a corrupt banking system with no expectation of ever repaying them, and then invest those sums in their racketeering operations. This has plunged the Japanese banking industry into trouble, negatively impacted the Japanese national economy, and left the government struggling to compete with the Yakuza as a result.

Beyond acting for their own commercial benefit, the Yakuza in Japan have also gone as far to act as a surrogate government when the legitimate one has been unable to do so, further illustrating a breakdown in state authority. When the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami decimated the islands and compromised the Fukushima nuclear power plant, the Yakuza were the among the first to react, providing food and preventing looting, as well as supplying many of the “Fukushima Fifty” who sacrificed their safety to stay behind and work to stabilize the critical plant. This comes after the Yakuza had already previously intervened on behalf of the people in the same way after the 1995 Hanshin earthquake that devastated Kobe, Japan, where the Yakuza provided aid and relief before the government could even respond.  Both of these instances are indicative of the fact that the Japanese government is failing in one of its sovereign obligations: to provide for the welfare of its people. Despite the Yakuza helping the legitimate government take care of its people, the fact that it is the gangsters and not the government doing it erodes the power of the government in the eyes of its people. As Williams forwards, when a government cannot do its job and a crime syndicate steps in and does it in its place, it can only benefit the organization and reflect badly on the government in question.

By utilizing bribery and policy influencing strategies, the Japanese Yakuza have been able to create a functional hole in which they are unhampered by police and economic regulation, and can serve in the government’s place. Their actions demonstrate how the balance of power is shifting away from the state in Japan, allowing for transnational criminal organizations like the Yakuza to play a larger role in Japanese state-making.

As it has been demonstrated, the Yakuza are ingrained deep into the core of Japanese society, yet the nuanced nature of the relationship between the pseudo-benevolent gangsters and the Japanese people they supposedly serve is difficult for someone with a Western perspective to fully understand. They see themselves as the gentlemen protectors of the people, the new-world Robin Hoods looking out for the general welfare of the underrepresented populace. They have formal offices, business cards, and even fan magazines. Especially in rural areas, further removed from direct government contact, the Yakuza command great sway because of the special relationship they have with the Japanese populace. On New Year’s every year the Yakuza would give children cash-stuffed o-toshi-dama envelopes, and at Halloween they would play along and let children rob and extort them before the government banned public Yakuza operations in 2011. It is because of this unique relationship between the criminals and the common people of Japan that the Yakuza’s influence cannot be fought in the traditional ways.

I postulate that if Japan’s government wants to reclaim the power that the Yakuza have eroded away from it, it must do three things: disentangle the government, provide better for its people, and increase transparency. The government has been complacent in combating if not entirely complicit in allowing the Yakuza to be involved in both Japanese society and governance. There exists a culture of corruption that has led politicians to see the Yakuza as an almost necessary part of the lawmaking process. In rural parts of the country the Yakuza act as almost a second municipal government. There are some observers who posit that the new efforts by the government to disinvolve with the Yakuza could turn them violent and end up making Japan less peaceful, such is the extent of the entanglement. Full scale rejection of the corruption-ridden culture is Japan’s only path to success. Secondly, the government needs to take a more active role in providing for its people in disaster relief and work to ensure that they have effective local governments. In a democracy, the power of a government comes from its ability to supply services to its constituents. Only when Japan fails its people do they turn to the Yakuza. Lastly, the next step to move forward after repairing all the damage already done is to increase government and campaign finance transparency so that one as ridden with corruption will never develop again. Japan is being impacted by the illegal activities of the Yakuza almost implicitly intertwined with their politics, and must work even more aggressively than it already is to combat them.

Chinese and Vietnamese Strategies for the South China Sea Dispute

China’s recent infrastructure and military developments in the South China Sea has aggravated tensions between multiple countries for several decades now, especially with neighboring Vietnam, and the issue has grown more important to the south Asian region and its allies in previous months. The recent diplomatic strategies and possible future moves of both China and Vietnam differ in approach: the more aggressive China is unwilling to halt development of an airfield and use of oil rigs in the region, while Vietnam is pursuing primarily legal and defensive measures against what it claims as a Chinese invasion of territory. I will give a brief contextual overview of the South China Sea dispute’s overlapping claims of sovereignty of several island chains. I will then outline the most recent foreign policy and diplomacy decisions made by the Chinese and Vietnamese governments, with a focus on the somewhat nebulous Chinese policies. Finally, I offer several predictions about how China and Vietnam are likely to react in the immediate future regarding the claims over the disputed islands, based on their current diplomatic trajectory.

Context of the South China Sea Dispute

The dispute in the South China Sea began in 1947 when the Chinese released a map updating their territorial claims to include, among others, both the Paracel and Spratly island chains. The Chinese seizure of the Paracel islands from Vietnam followed in 1974, along with a brief conflict between China and Vietnam in 1988 over the Spratly islands which resulted in the deaths of 74 Vietnamese and the loss of 3 Vietnamese ships. Despite anger from Vietnam over these actions, international tensions in the region simmered but did not result in military action. Instead, China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) completed and signed a nonbinding Declaration of Conduct for the area, which was approved by the Chinese government. This did not stop China from claiming sovereignty in the region and pursuing infrastructure development, and in 2012 the creation of Sansha City, an armed government outpost, sparked anti-Chinese protests in Vietnam. Further exacerbating tensions, China installed an oil rig, complete with an armed flotilla, only 120 nautical miles from Vietnam’s coast in 2014, a distance considered far too close for the Vietnamese. More importantly and explained below, this rig is within the Exclusive Economic Zone of Vietnam. Certain aggressive engagements between the two countries, including Chinese boats non-fatally attacking Vietnamese boats, threatened to dissolve into armed conflict; however, the situation deescalated as China agreed to move the oil rig further away.

Most recently, China successfully completed the construction of an airfield on a reef in the Spratly islands, referred to in China as the Nansha islands. On January 9th, the Chinese tested the airfield by landing a civilian plane. As a result, the Vietnamese government issued a protest to the Chinese embassy and the UN, claiming the act violated Vietnamese territorial sovereignty.

Under the resolution adopted by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Part V, articles 55-75, Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) extend a coastal nation’s sovereign rights and duties to a zone no more than 200 nautical miles around the country. A separate Vietnamese declaration specified the EEZ to extend the full 200 nautical miles around the country, with its territorial sea extending 12 nautical miles from the coast. Crucially, the state in control of a given EEZ retains the rights over natural resources, as well as the building and maintaining of any structures or artificially constructed sites, whether for the harvesting of natural resources or not. China, by building oil rigs and airfields within Vietnam’s designated EEZ, and by claiming territories within the EEZs of other countries like Japan and the Philippines, is in direct violation of the UN Law of the Sea. By the time of this declaration, however, China had already asserted the territories were within its sovereign control, making it possible for the Chinese to exploit this loophole in the EEZ boundary regulations.

Recent Chinese Foreign Policy and Diplomacy

Chinese foreign policy in recent years has been a mix of isolationism and interference marked by the steadfast support of their state sovereignty and economic interests. There have been several noticeable shifts in Chinese diplomatic strategy in the past few years, however. Until mid-2015, the Chinese subtly but undeniably claimed the aforementioned territories in the South China Sea. Essentially, the Chinese diplomatic strategy employed towards these issues is one of delay and, if not full, at least superficial willingness to proceed without declaring or engaging in serious aggression. Scholars Shih Chih-yu and Yin Jiwu examine the dichotomy of China’s focus on national interest and belief in a harmonious world order. They conclude that, in regards to the South China Sea conflict, China has given mild concessions (including moving its oil rig further out to sea and agreeing to a non-legally binding declaration of conduct, explained below) in order to avoid diplomatic isolation from Vietnam and other Asian nations, but remains committed to its claims to the disputed territories. In the 2002 Declaration of the Conduct of Parties (DoC) in the South China Sea, which was negotiated in the ASEAN, China conceded that the territory was disputed, rather than entirely within Chinese territorial sovereignty. The declaration also stated the signing parties would not use military force and “exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability.” This may not seem like a victory for Vietnam and other Asian nations contesting China’s territorial claims, but combined with the DoC meant China does, to a certain extent, show willingness to cooperate within the existing international order. The lack of legal formality of the DoC and a failure to translate the declaration into operating policies means China has not stopped developing its airstrip and clashing with various navies in the decade and a half after its signing, and supports Shih and Yin’s “harmonious disciplining” theory of Chinese foreign policy. China’s engagement with fishing boats around the shoals and its expansion of military-capable infrastructure are certainly aggressive; congruently, China’s careful use of non-naval ships in these engagements and its agreement to participate in transnational diplomatic channels like ASEAN are meant to delay outright retaliation. Essentially, China walks the line between blatant aggression and token diplomacy meant to pacify other regional actors. Significantly, Shih and Yin expect China’s agreeable but mildly aggressive diplomatic strategy to continue as long as “global influences are not direct,” highlighting the unwillingness of the Chinese to engage in aggression with powers outside the region on the South China Sea issue. Escalated tensions between China and the US in the region fail so far to incite any real action between the two countries aside from government statements.

Others view recent Chinese foreign policy as softer and more flexible in the previous few years. In Foreign Policy, Robert Manning notes that the Chinese have made legitimate and considerable attempts to repair relationships with Vietnam, the Philippines, and Japan, as well as other neighbors in the region. Manning credits this in part to cooperation on other issues unrelated to the South China Sea, such as Chinese involvement in the Middle East and its Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) project, a new World Bank-scale investment project.  What is important to note is the increasing relevance of the AIIB to China’s domestic and foreign interests. In a recent talk, Professor Erik Berglof noted that the AIIB was both an attempt to provide strong economic support to entire region, but also to counteract and change China’s lack of influence in the International Monetary Fund and the International Development Bank.  Manning also recognizes that China was no doubt carefully monitoring the threat of “global influence” mentioned by Shih and Yin. The US remains in strong ties with many competing countries in the region with notable military defense pacts with Japan and the Philippines in particular.

Recent Vietnamese Foreign Policy and Diplomacy

It is both difficult and unfair to compare the strategies of China to Vietnam, and indeed to those of other countries such as the Philippines, because of the difference in scale of power between the two. Vietnam has less leverage over China due to the weakness of Vietnam’s economy, military, and influence relative to China. Chau Bao Nguyen’s July 2015 article concludes that military aggression towards China is not an option for Vietnam, a reality reflected in Vietnam’s limit to verbal outrage. However, the Vietnamese remain adamant and defensive over the South China Sea islands—in particular the Paracels and Spratlys. Vietnam continues to uphold its original territorial claims that contest with Chinese declarations in 1947 and asserts their national sovereignty over the area through their EEZ mostly through government declarations. Vietnam does, however, have the legal upper hand: Vietnam appealed to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf separately but in conjunction with the Philippines, and more importantly, The Hague agreed to hear an arbitral trial over the dispute. In terms of military alliances, Vietnam has the arguable advantage: China’s foreign policy in the region revolves around the lack of global power interference, especially from the United States, while Vietnam is supported by the US’s military. The Philippines and Japan, also key US allies, back Vietnam’s complaints against China. The South China Sea issue was brought to the table when Vietnam and the US entered further cooperative negotiations following the 2014 oil rig incident. The Philippines, Japan, Malaysia, and other Southeast Asian countries also support Vietnam’s position and have a particular interest in keeping Chinese military capability outside of their own EEZs. A combination of international pressure and Vietnamese anger over the 2014 oil rig incident did result in China moving the oil rig further away from Vietnam’s coastline. While this should not be considered a full victory for Vietnam—China is still inside their legal territory, with no plans to leave—it shows China’s reluctance to fully break diplomatic ties with Vietnam, as well as the power of international leverage, even within the region.

What to Expect Next

The South China Sea dispute is one that is still evolving, though at a very delicate pace. Serious damage could be done should the Chinese move too aggressively against key US allies and it is well within their best interests to not antagonize the US into an actual military conflict. Concessions over cybersecurity in the past two years and the cooperation seen at the COP21 environmental conference are just two pieces of evidence in the case against the Chinese wanting to provoke the US. China is likely unwilling to completely alienate the rest of the countries involved, since President Xi’s diplomatic efforts have been far too great within the countries involved to disregard, and because the success of the AIIB, which would have far-reaching positive consequences for China’s economy and reputation, is a far more important issue. This is not to say that China will agree to back off from the intrusion into whichever islands they claim over Vietnam or the Philippines. China can continue to develop the area in dispute while Vietnam and the Philippines protest through various methodical and soft-handed international organizations. China has already seen that it can get away with slow progress, soft concessions to organizations like ASEAN, and superficial diplomatic efforts in regards to its presence on the disputed islands. More blatant aggressive acts like those against fishing boats has not been enough to garner more than an increased US presence in the region; at this point, China is betting (and relying) on the entire region’s unwillingness to escalate the situation. A truer test of China’s desire for the islands will come if any country in the region is offended or threatened enough to fire upon another. That will almost certainly involve the US and other international powers and cause China to reassess the importance of perceived national sovereignty relative to harmony in the region.

The Vietnamese, on the other hand, have limited options in terms of recapturing the area currently held by the Chinese. Modernizing the navy was not enough to make Vietnam a threat to China, but maintaining US and broad international support on the issue did cause a reaction. The best strategy currently for Vietnam is to petition for change within ASEAN and the UN on proper legal grounds and maintain in close contact with other powers in the area. Potentially, advocating on these broad platforms could give Vietnam the support and international pressure it needs for China to lessen its advances without the use of international military action.