North Korea’s Illicit Money Machine

Background: Brief History of North Korea

Following World War II, the international order was divided over the ideological governance styles and practices of democratic capitalism and communism. Particularly, the U.S. a capitalist state wanted to promote democracy and capitalism globally, whereas the Soviet Union sought a communist world order. Although the U.S. and USSR were in a strategic competition for global dominance, they never once formally engaged in a hot or live war with one another. However, throughout the Cold War, the U.S. and the USSR fought combatively via proxy conflicts. Among the very first of these proxy engagements was the Korean War. After WWII, the Korean Peninsula, which was once a unified nation, had been divided into a communist northern state known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and a democratic, capitalist, southern state, the Republic of Korea (ROK). During the war, China sent two million soldiers along with the Soviet Union’s logistical support to aid the DPRK, whereas the ROK was primarily reinforced by the U.S. In June of 1950, due in part to the influence of the PRC and the USSR, the DPRK crossed the border and invaded its southern neighbor, intending to establish a unified communist Korean nation. The Korean War, which lasted three years, saw horrific casualties and fatalities on all sides. Ultimately, upon the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement, the war concluded, and a demilitarized zone was established between the North and South along the 38th Parallel. After the war, North Korea followed a far different trajectory than the Republic of Korea. Whereas the South experienced significant economic growth, the North was beginning to shield itself from the outside world, creating a “hermit kingdom” according to professor Mitchell Lerner of The Ohio State University, among many other experts.

 North Koreas Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons:

Beginning in the 1950s, Kim Il-Sung repeatedly emphasized the imperativeness of a ballistic and nuclear weapons program for the DPRK, as it would prevent North Korea from lagging too far behind the South. However, since 1950, the DPRK has been significantly impacted by severe U.S. and international sanctions for human rights abuses and failures to comply with international laws. Furthermore, the U.S. in addition to many Western countries has recently levied strict sanctions against the DPRK for cyber-crime offenses. Under the harsh leadership of North Korea’s first ruler, Kim Il-Sung, the DPRK actively sought methods of securing funding for a ballistic and nuclear missile program. Specifically, the DPRK frequently employs various illicit methods to circumvent the tight sanctions placed by the international community. Ultimately, the DPRK, according to many experts, wants nothing more than to ensure its continued existence and that of the Kim dynasty. Fast forward to 1984, and under Kim Il-Sung, North Korea test-fired its very first missile. Undoubtedly the employment of nuclear and conventional weapons was championed by not only Kim Il-Sung but his son Kim Jung-Il and grandson, Kim Jung-Un (KJU). However, of the three DPRK leaders, none have taken a greater interest in advancing the DPRK’s missile program than its current leader, KJU. Specifically, KJU has placed a great deal of emphasis on science, technology, engineering, and math as well as emerging technologies to advance the DPRK’s national agenda. The U.S. and the international community writ-large have condemned the DPRK’s military, scientific, and technological advancements and have issued strong sanctions against the North Korean government. 

North Korea’s Illicit Financing of its Missiles Program:

While the PRC, in violation of international sanctions, provides North Korea aid through cargo shipments, along with other measures, these means don’t outright provide the DPRK with enough capital to fully fund its desired missile program. Therefore, the DPRK utilizes several illicit activities to finance and grow its missile program. Particularly, the DPRK engages in the manufacturing and distribution of illegal narcotics manufacturing and the sale of counterfeit goods, trafficking arms globally, and producing and selling counterfeit currency. Yet, among the DPRK’s most recent lucrative financing activities for its missile program, has been its global hacking and malware campaign. Last year it was reported that the DPRK had stolen nearly $400 million worth of digitized assets from seven different attacks on various cryptocurrency platforms.  This is a significant development and should raise serious concern among states globally. According to some North Korean and national security experts, the DPRK likely goes after cryptocurrency as it is far less regulated than other forms of hard-copy currency, and thus it is easier to manipulate and bypass foreign sanctions. A recent United Nations investigation also determined that North Korea has stolen and continues to steal cryptocurrency to further finance its missile program. Yet, this all goes without stating the obvious, the DPRK is strictly prohibited by the UN from testing ballistic and nuclear missiles, let alone developing them. To be clear, it is not as if, the international community is “out to get the DPRK”, and therefore is prohibiting their acquiring of ballistic and nuclear missiles. Thus, it is inconsequential if the DPRK finances its missile program through legal or illicit means, simply financing it, to begin with, is in violation of sanctions. The DPRK both through its rhetoric and actions has proven its desire and capability to use asymmetric weapons systems against the U.S., RoK, and U.S. interests globally. Although the western media frequently discusses the DPRK missile threat and covers each test closely, there is a legitimate reason for concern. 

The employment of sophisticated offensive cyber measures by the DPRK is hardly a new tactic. Most notably, upon the release of the Sony Pictures film “The Interview”, DPRK launched an intrusive cyber operation against the Sony Corporation, leaking highly sensitive personally identifiable information. As I mentioned previously, the DPRK is extremely isolated from the rest of the world, and its citizens do not have access to the internet. Thus, this begs the question of how the DPRK can launch successful cyber-operations against the rest of the world? According to some experts, while the DPRK has limited internet access in its capital of Pyongyang, the PRC is complicit in allowing DPRK cyber military operators to come across the border and utilize China to launch attacks on its various targets. As with assisting the DPRK in evading sanctions, the PRC is highly culpable in its assistance efforts with the DPRK in cyberspace. However, the PRC has its reservations, as it greatly fears that an unstable DPRK could flood millions of North Korean refugees into China, which China lacks the resources or infrastructure to support. Beyond hacking operations, the DPRK has long employed ransomware attacks to assist in funding its missile program. Specifically, the WannaCry attack in which the DPRK targeted computers and servers running Windows operating systems, ultimately demanding ransom payments in Bitcoin. For the DPRK its global cyber ransomware operations are highly lucrative. According to the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) between 2015-and, 2019 DPRK ransomware hackers attempted to steal roughly $1.2 million from banks in Vietnam, Bangladesh, Taiwan, Mexico, Malta, and Africa. Moreover, according to the WIRED, DPRK secured $80 million by “tricking” a network into re-routing funds. Additionally, the FBI recently reported that North Korea stole more than $600 million in cryptocurrency, from a single hacking operation. This is a critical development as it demonstrates that the DPRK is continuing to use hack and steal operations to generate significant revenue.

Recommendations

While the international community has levied strict sanctions against North Korea, the DPRK has consistently demonstrated its formidability in cyberspace as one of the preeminent state cyber threats that the U.S. faces. However, given the nature of where cyber operations occur, there is a strong likelihood that the U.S. has been effectively thwarting the DPRK in cyberspace, though the public will never know. Thus, it is difficult to evaluate how the U.S. is doing countering North Korea’s cyber threats and illicit financing campaigns. For example, when a bomb is dropped on a target, reporters can verify that. However, due to cyber operations taking place, mostly, outside of public view, little if any substantial reporting exists to confirm such activity. Yet, after the Sony hack, it has been reported that DPRK’s internet was cut, seemingly by the U.S. and its partners. Therefore, I would suggest that the DoJ, “name and shame”, the DPRK attackers, publicly indicting them on charges. Particularly, the process of openly outing hackers is critical as many enjoy life in the shadows and will stop once they have been caught red-handed and put in the public eye. Furthermore, I recommend that the Five Eye intelligence allies actively degrade and disrupt the operating networks and information systems affiliated with the DPRK attacks. Although such an aggressive maneuver may complicate relations with the PRC, the West must take greater action against the DPRK. Furthermore, Lastly, I would advise that the U.S. financial crimes enforcement network utilize targeted sanctions to freeze the DPRK’s financial assets and that of Worker’s Party members and high-ranking North Korean military officials. While the threat from the DPRK will not dissipate any time soon, the U.S. government, international partners, along with the private sector must continue to publicly discuss DPRK’s illicit financing, while actively thwarting such activities.

The AUKUS Deal, China, and Nuclear Non-proliferation

The AUKUS deal is a security partnership involving Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It was announced in September, and its first project will be to provide Australia with a nuclear-powered submarine fleet. Although diesel-fueled submarines are useful, nuclear submarines can “remain submerged almost indefinitely” without a snorkel, and many suspect that one of the main purposes of this partnership is to offset the power of the Indo-Pacific region. However, while trying to get the upper hand, Australia would “have to become the first non-nuclear-weapon state to exercise a loophole that allows it to remove nuclear material from the inspection system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).” China’s perspective is that this will negatively interfere with the arms race, and other influential people involved in non-proliferation efforts worldwide have denounced the agreement. However, 60 percent of US residents do support the AUKUS deal due to national security, and the deed is done. The pact has been made, and Australia’s previous partnership with France for diesel-fueled submarines has ended. The only remaining steps are to prepare for the implications of actually delivering the fleet and be mindful about how other agreements may be compromised by this action.

Interests in the Indo-Pacific Region and Conflict with China

The European Union has strategized over the Indo-Pacific region for a long time. After the United Kingdom left the European Union, however, the U.K. reportedly did not consult with the EU about the AUKUS deal, and foreign policy has become alarmingly less unified. At the same time, it is obvious that the EU would oppose it with the U.K. having left because the agreement caused Australia to cancel a $40 billion submarine deal with France—the country that actually initiated European engagement in the Indo-Pacific. Regardless of opinion on the efficacy of the deal, however, this development also shows the increasing lack of coordination among the European Union, the United States, and allies. Gone are the days of a united front, despite there being an overall goal of non-proliferation.

Meanwhile, it has been four years since Australia’s then-prime minister Malcolm Turnbull declared they would “stand up” to China, the country that actually remains to this day their biggest trading partner. The relationship between China and Australia has also worsened since then, particularly due to the fact that the latter called for a global inquiry surrounding the initial outbreak of COVID-19 and China’s handling of the situation. While their trade relationship is still well, China has responded to Australia’s declarations with bans and restrictions on its goods. In the context of these tense relations, it only makes sense for Australia to be bracing itself in regard to China. 

In reviewing this analysis, it makes sense that the components of the AUKUS deal would be a priority for all parties. Yet, China has argued that those involved in the AUKUS agreement have a “Cold War mentality.” While the White House has disputed the idea that the AUKUS deal has anything to do with the Indo-Pacific region, China’s claims are not entirely unfounded, and there is no denying the substantial difficulties between countries—particularly in the aftermath of the Trump administration. Additionally, many have noted that specifically in regard to China, deterrence has worked relatively well with nuclear activity, and hanging onto mediocre agreements could be the best move as of current.

A Double Standard in United States Nuclear Foreign Policy

To zoom in on the United States, the country has a clear double standard in terms of nuclear technology and foreign policy. For a quick reality check, the U.S. has more nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines than China, and in terms of submarines as a whole, the United States has 68 while China has 12. In fact, the total number of submarines belonging to the United States is more than that of China, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and India combined. To top it off, in terms of use, “the United States and Russia each have deployed five times more nuclear warheads than Beijing possesses”—and it is known that the threat of China is one of the main reasons for this deal. Although power cannot be boiled down to submarines or even military resources in general, the importance of focusing on gaining an upper hand with nuclear technology versus focusing on non-proliferation is debatable, particularly in the following context. While boasting a strong fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, the United States has emphasized non-proliferation efforts yet also come into conflict with countries not considered to be allies over their refusal to cooperate with the United States’ wishes. 

Critics have been pointing out Washington’s hypocrisy over nuclear weapons for years. In 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry visited Seoul and said that “North Korea will not be accepted as a nuclear power.” President Barack Obama said the same year that Iran possessing a nuclear weapon at all is “a red line for us.” At the same time, the Obama administration was planning “to spend billions on upgrading nuclear bombs stored in Europe to make the weapons more reliable and accurate.” The United States has also tried to impose a number of sanctions on other countries for nuclear weapons over the years while it expands its own powers. Additionally, the Iran nuclear deal, or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was made official in 2015, but in 2018, President Donald Trump left the deal, furthering United States hypocrisy surrounding nuclear weapons. 

However, it is important to note that while looking at current statistics about the U.S. military versus the militaries of other world powers, projections for the future are concerning. Reportedly, the nuclear arsenal of China could triple by the year 2030, meaning 1,000 nuclear warheads would be in its possession. Beyond that, the Pentagon is troubled by the prospect of new technology, specifically how nuclear strategists in China are approaching “nontraditional arms,” and the launch of a hypersonic missile in July showed a design that was meant to “evade the United States’ primary missile interceptors, which can operate only in outer space.” While there is a clear double standard in terms of United States nuclear foreign policy, that does not mean that the U.S. should ignore or underestimate the chance of greater threats to come.

Overall Implications of the AUKUS Deal

The AUKUS deal is arguably counterintuitive to rhetoric flowing from the United States about non-proliferation. While the U.S. has sanctioned other countries, particularly ones in the Middle East, for working with nuclear materials, this new agreement will actively help close allies gain nuclear technology. Other countries may perceive the U.S. as hypocritical when observing through that lens. Additionally, although maintaining a strong military is critical in the context of current concerns, including China, a glimpse at U.S. resources indicates that pursuing more may be excessive. Moreover, focusing on the military when it comes to China may actually threaten the security of the United States. Defense analyst William Hartung who focuses on the economics of Pentagon spending argued, “Focusing on China is a good way to pump up the Pentagon’s already bloated budget—which is currently higher than the peaks of the Korean or Vietnam wars or the Reagan buildup of the 1980s—but it will not make us safer.” Consistently bolstering the resources of the United States military is not the way to deal with the flawed U.S.-China relationship. Putting such an emphasis on war can fuel the flames of a conflict.

Furthermore, the whole idea of the AUKUS agreement is debatable, but the most imminent worrisome situation is how the new Australian fleet will set a precedent. If Australia does end up with the nuclear fleet, it will end up becoming the first country without nuclear weapons to utilize a loophole allowing for them to take nuclear material from the International Atomic Energy Agency’s inspection system. As stated by James Acton from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “In the future, would-be proliferators could use naval reactor programs as cover for the development of nuclear weapons—with the reasonable expectation that, because of the Australia precedent, they would not face intolerable costs for doing so.” Since a major part of nuclear non-proliferation efforts is about enforcement decisions, as in, many policies currently in place are subjective to an extent, this sets a dangerous example for the future. 

Moving Forward With Strategic Stability Talks

While the AUKUS agreement is a questionable move, it is important to acknowledge that President Joe Biden has recently indicated after the virtual summit that the White House would like to hold “strategic stability talks,” and China’s President Xi Jinping expressed a willingness to participate in these talks. Concededly, the relationship between countries may not be strong enough to profit from formal negotiations, but alternative options have been explored; for example, the meeting of nongovernmental experts from each country has been put on the table. Although the particular method of discussion has not yet been clarified, the recent summit has opened the door to security measures that do not fully revolve around the military. The AUKUS deal may have thrown a wrench in non-proliferation progress by setting a dangerous precedent for nuclear possession, but the heightened tensions exacerbated by the agreement have been met with a response of cooperation.

It’s Okay to See the ICBM Program Go

Introduction

The Biden-Harris Administration comes into office facing a myriad of unprecedented domestic and international challenges. None of these challenges, however, can be resolved or mitigated by more nuclear weapons. Though the national security establishment continues to argue that a modernization of a previously critical component of the nuclear triad is essential, that position remains highly questionable.

The United States is set to construct a new weapon of mass destruction able to travel several thousand miles and carry a warhead more than 20 times more powerful than the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. In September of last year, the Air Force gave Northrop Grumman an initial contract of over $13 billion to begin engineering and manufacturing 600 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as part of a nuclear triad modernization program supported by both the Obama and Trump Administrations. In total, the construction project could add up to $100 billion for the weapon, which will become ready for use by 2029. Operation and support costs could include another $164 billion. The plan is to replace the 450 Minutemen III ICBMs in active service or reserve with 600 Ground-Base Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) missiles, a more modern ICBM.

ICBMs are strategic weapons systems dispersed in hardened silos throughout the American Great Plains and Southwest to protect against attack. They are connected to an underground launch control center and typically have a minimum range of 5,000 kilometers (hence intercontinental). U.S. nuclear-armed ICBMS are on high alert, meaning they can be launched within mere minutes of a president’s command. The Air Force currently has 400 ICBMs deployed in the American West. Along with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and nuclear bomber planes, ICBMs are one of the components of the nuclear triad. According to the Trump Administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, “The triad’ s synergy and overlapping attributes help ensure the enduring survivability of our deterrence capabilities against attack and our capacity to hold at risk a range of adversary targets throughout a crisis or conflict. Eliminating any leg of the triad would greatly ease adversary attack planning and allow an adversary to concentrate resources and attention on defeating the remaining two legs.” President Obama’s Secretary of Defense Ash Carter called the triad “a bedrock of our security” and “foundational” to U.S. policy. Is it really though?

Has the Triad Outlived its Necessity?

Traditionally, the ICBM has been understood as the most responsive element of the triad. It is a byproduct of the Cold War and the assumption that the U.S. would need to deter a surprise attack through the promise of rapid, overwhelming force and destruction. During the Cold War, ICBMs provided accuracy that was not achievable at the time from the other components of the triad. Furthermore, ICBMs served as an insurance policy in the event that the U.S.’s nuclear submarines were disabled. The basis underlying all of this was the strategic doctrine of deterrence as elucidated by Bernard Brodie in “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” who noted the paradox of deterrence: “We are...expecting the system to be constantly perfected while going permanently unused.”

This logic no longer holds. First, America’s ICBMs provide no unique nuclear strike capability not already provided by the other legs and the absence of any immediate threat to U.S. nuclear submarines means no adversary can “preempt massive retaliation” by the U.S. According to President Bill Clinton’s Secretary of Defense William Perry, “Today, the United States’ submarine and bomber forces are highly accurate, and we have enough confidence in their security that we do not need an additional insurance policy — especially one that is so expensive and open to error.” 

Furthermore, being on high alert, ICBMs pose a unique risk of accidentally starting a nuclear war. If American sensors determine that an adversary’s missiles are en route to the U.S., the president would be forced to make a decision on whether to launch ICBMs before the enemy missile would destroy them, a period as short as a few dozen minutes. Once launched, the decision is final and they cannot be recalled.

The risk of an accidental launch may seem trivial, but mistakes can always occur as long as the program exists. In 1979, computer errors at North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), Strategic Air Command’s command post, the Pentagon, and the Alternative National Military Command Center led U.S. defense officials to believe the Soviet Union had launched more than 2,000 missiles at the U.S. Nuclear bombers were prepared to take off when, a few minutes later, it was declared to be a false alarm. It turned out that according to an investigation by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), a training video had accidentally been loaded into an operational computer at the Cheyenne Mountain Complex in Colorado Springs, home to NORAD.

In September 1983, a Soviet early warning system warned that an American ICBM was incoming before the report was altered to five missiles. Soviet Air Defence Forces Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov refused to report the incoming ICBMs to his superiors, dismissing it as a false alarm (he thought that if the U.S. was going to launch a strike, it would have included more missiles). Ultimately, Petrov’s intuition was confirmed by ground radar, as the alarm was caused by a rare sunlight alignment on high-altitude clouds. 

The world historical and world-ending stakes of a launch combined with the preciously little time afforded to make that monumental decision makes an accidental nuclear ICBM launch a serious possibility no matter the odds. This is where deterrence theory falls apart, in its assumption of rational actors in control of their situation.

Will Ending the Modernization Put the U.S. at a Strategic Disadvantage?

Supporters of ICBM modernization would argue that abandoning the ICBM program will leave the U.S. exposed to nuclear adversaries. Air Force Major Shane Praiswater, a visiting military analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, argues that Russia and China’s ambitious nuclear modernization programs seek to “equal, if not surpass” U.S. nuclear capabilities, and a U.S. failure to modernize its ICBMs would leave the U.S. at a comparative strategic disadvantage. Again, however, with U.S. ICBMs on high alert, the U.S. instead runs the risk of accidentally igniting a nuclear war, which is statistically speaking much more likely to happen than a state deciding consciously to strike the U.S. Secondly, despite hawkish fearmongering about China’s nuclear arsenal, there are currently more nuclear weapons stored in Albuquerque, New Mexico than in China- by a factor of seven and a half.

Instead of an ill-defined, open-ended nuclear competition with Russia and China bound to increase the odds of an accidental nuclear holocaust, the U.S. could help prevent a global arms race simply by renouncing the ICBM, the least accurate and easiest component of the nuclear triad for adversaries to target. Moscow pursues its modernization out of the pursuit for nuclear parity with the U.S. and views the U.S. modernization as threatening, fomenting a security dilemma. 

And this is for good reason. As Brent J. Talbot, a professor of military and security studies at the Air Force Academy, notes, the Minuteman force and the proposed GBSD force ICBMs would have to fly over Russia to strike any other emerging nuclear power (like North Korea) because they are based in the northern part of the U.S. When launched from that region, “The ballistic trajectories of the missiles require polar flight paths to reach most destinations around the globe. Thus, if the United States were to retaliate against a North Korean or Iranian attack, use of ICBMs would require overflight of Russian airspace en route to their targets, perhaps causing the Russians to think that the United States had initiated an attack against them.” In Talbot’s words, “Preserving 400 of 700 launchers to strike only one adversary is, once again, evidence of Cold War logic.” Because the ICBM can only plausibly be used against Russia, it does preciously little to deter potentially rogue actors, as North Korea is often characterized by some of these same hawks. In short, it does not even do the one thing its most ardent proponents believe it does.

America’s alliances, international institutions, and arms control agreements like New START and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, Iran Deal) work perfectly fine to deter its competitors from obtaining nuclear weapons, much less using them. The idea that only more spending on nuclear weapons will provide deterrence assumes fatalism in diplomacy when in reality diplomacy is what has prevented the world from descending into President John F. Kennedy’s prediction of a world awash in nuclear weapons (he feared famously in 1963 that by 1975 there would be 20 nations with nuclear weapons; today there are nine). Rather than the outdated Cold War mindset that America must match Moscow missile for missile, American nuclear policy ought to be decided on the basis of how many nuclear weapons America actually needs.

Cost Savings

Finally, ending the ICBM modernization will save the U.S. billions, if not hundreds of billions of dollars that are urgently needed at home and in the diplomatic sphere. The coronavirus pandemic and the climate crisis have laid bare that the most severe and serious national security threats to the U.S. are transnational and non-military. National security, in other words, has to start with human security. Ending the ICBM program, along with concurrent defense spending cuts, could save the country enough money to put a down payment on a Green New Deal, foreign aid to vulnerable populations like the Palestinians or people in Central America and the Caribbean beset by natural disasters and human rights abusing governments, or a universal coronavirus vaccine, as the bills introduced by Senator Ed Markey (D-MA) and Representative Ro Khanna (D-CA) call for. The stakes of such a decision are clear: we can either destroy the world three and a half to four times over in a fit of hubristic superpower rage or we can save it once and for all. 

Conclusion

The world survived one arms race, but barely and not without numerous close calls. Modernizing the ICBM program and swearing undying, unconditional fealty to the nuclear triad long after it has served its purpose risks igniting another one. What we have today is a policy-procurement gap, whereby contractors like Northrop Grumman’s interests are served instead of the national interest. As Joe Cirincione, the former head of the Ploughshares Fund writes, “Contracts race ahead of policy…[Continuing the triad] will lock us into building weapons we do not need at a price we cannot afford.” Nuclear weapons could not possibly be more irrelevant or ill-suited for the primary security threats the U.S. faces today in the form of the pandemic and climate change. The Biden Administration has to blow up this modernization plan before it blows everyone up.

The New Nuclear Question(s)

Serious discussions of nuclear weapons and their use have not left the international stage since the 1940s. This year has seen significant developments in nonproliferation and disarmament efforts – but also more uncertainty and divisiveness regarding nuclear policies in general. From the international community seeing both progress and setbacks regarding legal intervention in nonproliferation; to the US elections, which have caused a frantic reorganizing of academic projections for future US foreign policies and actions; to, of course, the fact that North Korea is inching ever closer to full nuclear launch capability, this is a time of increasing unpredictability regarding the global response to the threat of nuclear weapons, arguably unlike any time since the Cold War. It’s 3 minutes to midnight, but that clock was set almost a year ago – and since then, nuclear tensions have only risen.

New international legislation: one step forward, one step back, one step sideways

The United Nations (UN) has always stood for peace and responsibility in regards to nuclear weapons, and has facilitated key treaties like the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT, the most important nuclear legislation to this day, asserts member states’ commitments to disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful use of nuclear energy, and reinforces a continued commitment to the treaty through periodic conferences. Just last year at the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the P5 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) issued a statement praising the three pillars of the NPT, vowing to “pursue practical steps towards nuclear disarmament,” and committing to bring into full force another key piece of legislation: the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

2015 also saw efforts by the UN General Assembly (GA) to work towards disarmament with the passage of Resolution 70/33, which created a working group to advise on steps forward regarding multilateral disarmament negotiations. This working group’s report, published September 2016, is revealing because it shows the underlying divides between states regarding the legality of disarmament, the limits to legal prevention, and the different understandings of the importance of nuclear weapons to collective security. The report also emphasized a focus on stigmatizing nukes and otherwise reinforcing an anti-nuclear weapon international community through other types of norm reinforcement. This report recommended convening in an official conference about disarmament, and from this suggestion spawned Resolution L.41 which attempts to take “forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations,” and was adopted by the GA on October 27th. L.41 became the catalyst in highlighting the divides within the international community’s debate on nuclear disarmament and caused a major shift in US policy: namely, the reversal of the Obama administration’s anti-nuclear position, which meant the US, instead of supporting L.41, actively campaigned against it alongside other P5 members.

To put this shift in context, compare the US’s campaign against L.41 with Obama’s 2009 speech in Prague in which he became the first US president to express support for full disarmament. Even in June of 2016 when Obama visited Hiroshima, his speech focused on changing the nature of war itself to eliminate nuclear weapons from the conversation – a very normative approach, as was suggested by the GA working group report. In regards to the 2017 conference proposed by L.41, the US agreed with the rest of the P5, who all reiterated their nonparticipation in the voluntary conference, citing the current security climate and the lack of concrete solutions expected from the conference. The US even pressured NATO countries to vote against the resolution, arguing NATO was fundamentally incompatible with full disarmament.

So the new vote to, as one international anti-nuke campaign headlined triumphantly, “outlaw nuclear weapons in 2017” is actually not a very sure sign of progress. The resolution did pass and enjoyed a great deal of support within the GA, especially from Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific. What remains to be seen is how these states, especially rising regional powers who supported the resolution such as Brazil and South Africa, can use the conference as a platform in the favor of disarmament. While the conference will be a gathering of states that do not have nuclear weapons, and therefore might seem useless, there is also the potential to both reinforce anti-nuclear norms within the broad international community. This may include working to put into force the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, as well as possibly putting diplomatic pressure on the P5 to at least come to the table on nuclear disarmament.

Addressing the DPRK-shaped crisis in the room

As much as the international security community works to regulate existing nuclear arsenals and frets about the massive destruction possible if a non-state actor like IS somehow got access to a nuclear weapon, there is a real and rapidly evolving threat of enormous importance in North Korea. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is an authoritarian regime that, since the Korean War, has called for the destruction of the Republic of Korea (ROK), the US, and all of the US’s allies. Following the successful development of its nuclear program, the DPRK is relentlessly pursuing nuclear strike capability. In the past four years alone the DPRK has conducted over 25 missile and nuclear tests, detonating a 10-kiloton bomb in September and conducting one of the most powerful rocket launches the same month. Heightened DPRK aggression prompted one of the largest military drills conducted yet between South Koreans and Americans, which for the first time included training on the “Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation” plan (KMPR). KMPR is a military response to be used in the event of a North Korean nuclear attack; the fact that the ROK and US have now felt the need to include it during the drill is a clear indicator that the US and its allies are increasingly concerned about the developing situation in the DPRK.

Due to the lack of diplomatic contact between the DPRK and much of the international community, the US and allies have so far relied on exacting pressure through sanctions, mostly on luxury goods. China and the US worked together to increase sanctions last March in response to North Korean aggression. Due to recent tensions, however, some argue that sanctions should be increased to include non-luxury or resource goods. Increased economic sanctions on non-luxury goods, however, is neither a simple nor necessarily ethical solution, and the international community must keep in mind the effect of increased sanctions on the North Korean people. The human rights situation in the DPRK is, in a word, abysmal, as the UN continuously points out. The international community must make sure that a resource ban would not interfere with the North Korean people’s ability to survive. This might mean relying even more on the Chinese to put more diplomatic pressure on the DPRK, a solution which would require delicate and probably difficult negotiations between the US, regional allies, and China, and which, due to the new uncertainty of the future of US foreign policy, might prove un-obtainable.

The future of US commitments to nuclear disarmament

The Obama administration’s back-and-forth on full nuclear disarmament has certainly set the US on track to ignore the upcoming 2017 conference and maintain that nuclear weapons are a fundamental part of current international security doctrines, but the US’s position could shift in the very near future. In a few months, of course, the Obama administration will exit and the uncertainty of the Trump administration will begin. The foreign policy platform Trump ran on is an ill-defined mixture of realism, isolationism, and American exceptionalism that seems to hinge on moving towards a more ‘transactional’ approach to US diplomatic relations, rather than continuing the tradition of broad alliance networks and participation in liberal institutions. Trump’s remarks on the campaign trail ignited a combination of fury and fear regarding his nuclear and defense policies in Asia: not only did he suggest more countries should have nuclear weapons, he also suggested pulling back US support for security alliances and defense treaties (including with Japan and South Korea) since he believes the US disproportionately holds up these agreements. And, while his campaign was mostly consistent with its anti-nuclear and anti-proliferation rhetoric, Trump has been critical of the state of the US stockpile and additionally refused to “rule out anything” in regards to whether he would ever actually deploy them.

This rhetoric has changed somewhat with his election, though. Trump deniesthat he ever meant Tokyo and Seoul should go nuclear, and senior foreign policy advisor Michael Flynn insists the Trump administration considers nuclear non-proliferation one of two top foreign policy concerns (the other being terrorism) and remains committed to US military presence and support. What remains to be seen is what specific actions the US will take in regards to Obama’s ‘pivot’ in support and attention to Asian allies, and whether a potential regression of US presence in the region will open a power vacuum for others. While nothing is clear in terms of concrete policy, it is incredibly likely that the US will remain firmly against banning nuclear weapons. Additionally, the US is likely to remain aloof, and perhaps will become more harshly against, binding international legal solutions to situations especially regarding security. The legitimacy of international courts in the US has little traction as is today, and Trump’s “America First” viewpoint also means he’s unlikely to compromise on American security in favor of what some countries would argue is better collective security through nonproliferation.

Going Forward

During the Cold War, it likely seemed unfathomable to most that one day, the world would look back to the simple bilateral principle of Mutually Assured Destruction with anything resembling wistfulness. Yet the years of two main bilateral security blocs have obviously passed, and instead states must now attempt to find a solution to the most pressing nuclear development, the DPRK’s increasing capability, even though they are fiercely divided on the legal, ethical, and practical merits of full disarmament.

Despite the P5’s dismissal of the GA’s disarmament discussions, there is significant merit in having those debates, and the GA should reflect on the working group report and continue to apply pressure to reinforce and tighten restrictions on nuclear stockpiles. Arguably, the most effective way the conference could change the nuclear security situation for the better is by figuring out how to get the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force, and looking to that and other legal precedents to work towards more long-term solutions.

In terms of the DPRK, too much depends on unknown factors: communication with the DPRK, and with China, could change because of US politics. The security alliances in Asia, while stable for now, are also a little uncertain post-election. Acknowledging the DPRK from an official, diplomatic standpoint is not an option for the US and many other states, and the DPRK is similarly unwilling to increase participation in the international community, so multilateral negotiations or mediations is unlikely. Instead, the states most vulnerable and most active in preparing for a theoretical DPRK nuclear strike – the ROK, US, Japan, and other South Asian and Pacific states – must rely on the little diplomatic contact provided mostly by China and on economic and political sanctions to influence the DPRK as much as possible. Meanwhile, the logical increase in military exercises to prepare for combat is just one more antagonization of the DPRK regime, and their development of nuclear weapons continues. Whether the solution is in stricter sanctions, which is potentially a human rights concern, or working to possibly open more communication between China, the DPRK, and the rest of the P5 and allies, the international community is left with more unanswered questions.