Grieving the Victims of US Sanctions

Sanctions are defined as the “withdrawal of customary trade and financial relations for foreign- and security-policy purposes.” The use of sanctions against countries perceived to be a threat to American interests began soaring in popularity in the 1990s, which was known as the “sanctions decade.” Since 9/11,  sanctions have become more precise in their targeting of individuals and entities, as a way to supposedly minimize the impact on civilians. They are utilized by both major political parties in the US and are painted as a more peaceful alternative to war; physical violence is not inflicted upon these target countries and American citizens can’t even feel their reverberations. The US currently has country-wide sanctions against Iran, North Korea, Syria, Sudan, Cuba, and Venezuela; more narrowly framed sanctions against individuals and entities have also been implemented, affecting an additional 27 countries. They are seen as the ultimate tool for enacting American interest and putting pressure on regimes the US would like to see ousted, while still being able to claim that the US cares about “peace” and foreign civilians- it’s a win-win for politicians and their polling numbers. 

However, while sanctions are painted as an ideal alternative to war, as it does not produce immediate physical violence, the damage that they create cannot be understated. Former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali has described economic sanctions as a “blunt instrument” that very much harms civilians and causes long-term damage to a country’s ability to function. This article’s intention is to elaborate upon this claim and analyze sanctions and their effects on various countries through the lens of Judith Butler’s grievability. This ethical position argues that every life should be worthy of grief and that this recognition serves to create a more equal society. As Butler says in The Force of Nonviolence: “To be grievable is to be interpellated in such a way that you know your life matters; that the loss of your life would matter; that your body is treated as one that should be able to live and thrive, whose precarity should be minimized, for which provisions for flourishing should be available.” Sanctions are in direct violation of this principle; their implementation suggests that the lives of certain people, i.e. foreign civilians, especially those of target countries, are not of a particular value, and therefore not worthy of grief. Additionally, sanctions maintain a certain power dynamic that produces and exacerbates the precarity of the target country’s situation. As I will attempt to demonstrate, the impact of sanctions is extremely damaging which suggests that violence does not just manifest in physical acts of war, but also in the economic, political, and social institutions of a country. 

Iraq in the 1990s

In the 1990s, the United States imposed a number of country-wide sanctions in order to pressure certain regimes- this included Iraq. The United States used the UN Security Council to implement multilateral sanctions on Ba’athist Iraq, led by Saddam Hussein. These sanctions, coupled with unilateral sanctions from the US, created the most “comprehenseive embargo of a country since at least World War II.” Though the reported intent of these sanctions was to pressure Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and to disclose the presence of any weapons of mass destruction, the results were disproportionately felt by civilians. Instead of ahcieving the desired results, these robust sanctions decimated Iraqi society and infrastructure. Prior to the sanctions, Iraq had one of the highest standards of living in the Middle East and boasted modern infrastructure. Contrary to what one may believe about 20th-century Iraq, it had an extensive healthcare system, water treatment facilities, and a school and university system. Additionally, Iraq had a significant reliance on imported food and technology. This meant that the all-encompassing trade sanctions decimated both the Iraqi economy and basic access to necessary goods. 

The sanctions made Iraqi civilians susceptible to food and water shortages, which were accompanied by the total collapse of the healthcare system. These food shortages were a direct result of UN sanctions, as Iraq heavily relied on imports of food which were subsequently cut off by the international community. Approximately 70 percent of calories in Iraq were imported thus meaning that the sanctions severely impacted the nutrition of Iraqis. While reports of malnourishment, especially among children, conflict with one another, it can be agreed that the sanctions had a very real impact on food access which subsequently led to health problems. Water has also been in short supply; the Gulf War damaged the general infrastructure of Iraq, including water pumping and treatement facilities. The country was unable to access the technology and engineering resources needed to fix these facilities as they no longer had access to the imported technology. This made water access extremely unreliable as well as unsafe due to the fact that water could no longer be properly treated. 

Furthermore, the decline in both quality and quantity of water sources reportedly led to the spread of infectious diseases such as cholera. However, the health problems that were produced by the food and water shortages could not be treated as the health-care system collapsed during this period. Firstly, the physical hospitals and medical centers can no longer be attended to as the financial resources to fix them are simply not there; access to the technology that could have once fixed medical infrastructure was no longer present. Secondly, the sanctions completely stopped the import of medical equipment and materials which resulted in a shortage- things such as stethoscopes were in extremely limited supply. Perhaps most damning is the fact that Iraqi doctors were also operating on outdated knowledge; within the ten years of sanctions, no new medical literature entered the country as it was specifically prohibited by the sanctions. 

While the Iraqi sanctions were eventually lifted in 2003, the damage was done. Iraq’s infrastructure and economy were in ruins. Furthermore, it is up for debate as to whether the sanctions even achieved their goal. However, that point is arguably irrelevant- what matters is the very real toll these sanctions took on Iraqi civilians. The impact of these sanctions on Iraqi society demonstrates the ways in which violence can manifest. While the US and the UN didn’t drop bombs on Iraq, at least not until the invasion of Iraq in 2003, they were still inflicting great violence- the tools for doing so just simply took on another shape. How is it not violent to cut off a country’s food supply? Or their access to clean water? Or medical supplies? Oftentimes, violence is only viewed through a lens of war, when in reality it has implications that transcend this purely physical understanding. Ignoring these implications is deliberate as it allows the US, as well as the UN, to continue pursuing foreign policy interests, which are quite frankly imperialist in nature, without facing legitimate consequences. The actions of the US and the UN prove that they assigned a lesser value to the lives of Iraqis. Taking Judith Butler’s grievability into account, it is important to understand that Iraq’s civilians are worthy of grief; to acknowledge their grievability is to acknowledge their value as humans. 

Venezuela

The US has a total embargo on Venezuela, which is coupled with sanctions from the EU. The goal of these sanctions is to oust President Nicolas Maduro, which has been a bipartisan effort in the US. The sanctions were announced in 2015 by President Barack Obama; as a result, foreign companies stopped doing business and Venezuela’s foreign accounts were closed. In 2017, President Trump then imposed an oil embargo that prevented the purchase of petroleum from the state oil company, PDVSA; this came alongside the confiscation of the US subsidiary CITGO. This has had a huge impact on Venezuela’s economy and the government’s capacity to function as it gets the majority of its revenue from oil.

Once again, the very real, and violent, impact of sanctions has been felt across Venezuelan society. One report estimates that 40,000 people may have died as a result of sanctions limiting access to food and medicine. In a similar vein as Iraq in the 1990s, the sanctions on Venezuela has destabilized the country’s economy and prevented access to basic necessities. It should be noted that US sanctions don’t explicitly prevent the import of food or medicine. However, Venezuela is very much dependent on oil revenue as a source of hard currency that private and public businesses can use to import goods. Once again, the specific undermining of Venezuela’s oil industry has led to a sharp decrease in imports; the average monthly public import dropped to $500 million in 2019 and subsequently dropped to $250 million in 2020. There are approximately 300,000 people who are at risk as there is a lack of access to medicines or treatment as a result of sanctions. The health-care sector has taken a major blow mainly due to the fact that the government has reduced its expenditure for the public health-care system; this is arguably a result of the fact that the government can no longer raise the necessary revenue due to the US’s oil embargo.

The Grievability of Those Impacted

“Peace” advocate Gene Sharp defines nonviolent action as “a sanction and a technique of struggle involving the use of social, economic, and political power, and the matching forces in conflict.” However, as previously demonstrated, there is a significant issue with this definition of nonviolent action and the way the concept of sanctions is perceived. The idea that sanctions can be qualified as “nonviolent” ignores the very real history of their use. While Iraq and Venezuela are only two examples of the impact of sanctions, the fact that both countries have experienced extreme shortages in basic necessities, thus causing thousands of deaths, is not “nonviolent action.” It is very real and very violent. Violence is not just acts of warfare, but it also manifests in the way economic, social, and political power is wielded. The fact that sanctions are perceived as nonviolent allows the US to engage in imperialism without facing legitimate criticism or consequences. And it should be noted that sanctions are an example of modern-day imperialism- the US has made it clear on many occasions that they utilize sanctions in an effort to oust regimes that they deem a threat to US interests. While these regimes are certainly flawed, the idea that the US has the right to dictate the internal affairs of a country, and use the deaths of civilians to do so, is imperialism. 

Furthermore, the use of sanctions allows the US to deny their responsibility for the deaths of thousands. These deaths go ungrieved in the international community which is precisely the point. As Judith Butler says: “After all, if a life, from the start, is regarded as grievable, then every precaution will be taken to preserve and to safeguard that life against harm and destruction.” Grievability essentially assigns worth to lives that have been historically marginalized, both in domestic and international terms. The fact that lives in the Global South, especially in countries deemed enemies of the US, are not seen as worthy of grief allows the US to impose these sanctions without care for their impact. If the US did start to care about these lives and respect their inherent value, they would have to stop their use of sanctions and seek out solutions that would actively protect their lives against “harm and destruction.” That would mean that US foreign policy would have to be completely reformed. Grievability is not in the interest of the US; to embrace such an ethical position would be anithetical to the US’s commitment to safeguarding American interests, which are often rooted in imperialism. However, this makes grievability of the utmost urgency. To embrace this position would be an embrace of an entirely different world, where those in the Global South are deemed valuable and therefore worthy of protection. This would challenge pre-existing power dynamics and create the incentive for solutions that prioritize legitimate self-determination and basic human rights.

War By Another Name: The Failure of Economic Statecraft

As the Trump Administration prepares to depart office and give way to that of Democratic President-Elect Joe Biden, its foreign policy legacy is intimately tied to the policy of sanctioning foreign governments for perceived misbehavior. President Donald Trump’s displeasure with the Obama Administration’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a landmark nonproliferation treaty that all but eliminated Iran’s capacity to develop nuclear weapons, led him and a cadre of Iran hawks from Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to former National Security Advisor John Bolton to level various sanctions against Iran. The so-called “maximum pressure” campaign has crippled Iranians’ standard of living while doing preciously little to limit Iran’s nuclear capabilities or its various destabilizing efforts in the Middle East. In total, the Trump Administration has also either strengthened existing sanctions or levied new ones on thousands of people, countries, or entities. Furthermore, President Trump has revelled in his capacity to deploy sanctions against adversaries of his “America First” foreign policy, threatening to “totally destroy and obliterate the Economy of Turkey (I’ve done before!)” in October 2019 in response to Turkish aggression against Syrian Kurds.

Like never before, Washington has adopted sanctions as its foreign policy tool of choice. Given America’s financial dominance, place in the international system, and numerous allies, this is perhaps natural. But in the age of the novel coronavirus, it is well to ask whether the immense humanitarian costs of sanctions coupled with the existing crises of climate change and pandemics are justifiable or even tolerable in the pursuit of American foreign policy objectives.

The Purposes of Sanctions

Traditionally, economic sanctions are best understood as efforts by governments or multilateral bodies to shape the strategic decisions made by state or non-state actors in the international system. In their practical application, sanctions may take numerous forms ranging from travel bans and asset freezes to arms embargoes and foreign aid reductions. Targets of sanctions can range from terrorist networks such as al-Qaeda to states. States and multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (UN) may impose sanctions for a variety of reasons. In the statist context, a state may impose sanctions on another nation or actor that undermines their interests whereas both states and multilateral institutions may deploy sanctions in response to perceived or recognized violations of international law or norms. For example, the UN sanctioned North Korea after its first nuclear test in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the U.S.’s Global Magnitsky Act freezes the assets of Russian officials alleged to have committed grave human rights violations and bans them from entering the U.S.

Sanctions are valued by their supporters because, as Benjamin Coates of Wake Forest University writes, “Sanctions have served as both the idealist’s dream and the realist’s cudgel. They have promised to the powerless a world free of war and discrimination while giving the powerful tools for domination.” Coates also notes, however, “The legitimacy and appeal of sanctions rest on blurring the lines between these two outcomes; the more Washington turns to unilateral sanctions, the less legitimacy the practice may have,” which will be explored more later in this piece.

In more recent times, there has been a debate over the efficacy of so-called targeted sanctions compared to broader economic sanctions. The Global Magnitsky Act is an example of targeted sanctions, which apply only toward certain individuals so as to minimize the suffering of innocent civilians. Human rights advocates argue that targeted sanctions address what they view as the fundamental problem with the international sanctions regime- that they are poorly conceived to change state behavior and instead subject civilians to needless suffering even as oligarchs and dictators evade their impact.

Do Sanctions Work? If So, Are They Worth It?

The practice of economic statecraft more or less emerged not when the U.S. became the undisputed leader of the global economy or during the Cold War, but rather is likely as old as economics and statecraft in their own right. The early 20th century, however, is as close as one can get to the genesis of international sanctions, defined neatly by Coates as “a collective denial of economic access designed to enforce global order.” An increasingly interdependent world during and after World War I served to illustrate the intersection between military and economic warfare. After all, the British Empire was constructed around British financial and commercial dominance reinforced by the world’s preeminent navy. During World War I, Britain put this to work in a crippling blockade of Germany that led to malnourishment that would ultimately take the lives of hundreds of thousands of civilians. 

The establishment of the ill-fated League of Nations after the war included in its covenant a provision mandating that any nation that started a war of aggression be punished with an embargo. Facing complete isolation from the global economy, the theory as supported by President Woodrow Wilson went, nations would be deterred from invading their neighbors. This provision enshrined into international norm sanctions as the preeminent multilateral tool of enforcement for world peace.

League of Nations sanctions ultimately failed to deter Italy from invading Ethiopia, a League member-state, and from subsequently falling into the orbit of the Nazis. Though the U.S. government would enact the Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA) during WWI barring trade with Germany, TWEA would ultimately prove unsuccessful in deterring the Nazis from territorial conquest. In 1941, after Japan invaded Indonesia, President Franklin Roosevelt invoked TWEA to seize all Japanese assets held in the U.S. Britain followed suit and the sanctions cost Japan access to 75 percent of its total foreign trade and 88 percent of its imported oil. Japanese hardliners then used the sanctions as justification for the bombing of Pearl Harbor. Instead of coercing Japan to renounce its territorial conquests as Roosevelt had hoped, the sanctions emboldened Japanese hardliners aghast at an aggressive use of American economic power to the point of deploying military force.

Following Harry Truman’s invocation of national emergency powers during the Korean War to activate TWEA, the emergency remained in power for decades to follow, leading to the imposition by future presidents of sanctions on Cuba, Cambodia, and others. Then in the 1990s, the use of sanctions really began to take off, The UN Security Council, now bereft of the Soviet veto power, imposed sanctions some 12 times during the decade compared to only twice (against Rhodesia and South Africa) in the previous four decades. Human rights abusers in Yugoslavia and Rwanda and state sponsors of terror like Sudan and Libya were some of the notable targets, and the efficacy of the sanctions remains suspect.

Iraq

But the most noteworthy target of the 1990s sanctions boom was Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Just four days after Iraq invaded neighboring Kuwait in 1990, the UN passed Security Council Resolution 661, imposing the strictest sanctions up to that point in history on Iraq. Interestingly enough, even as the U.S. led the Gulf War coalition and the effort to sanction Iraq, it had supported Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War just a decade earlier and just two years earlier had refused to sanction Hussein for his use of chemical weapons against the Kurds.

The Gulf War sanctions, which imposed a nearly complete arms, trade, and aid embargo, absolutely crippled every sector of the Iraqi economy while exacting an unfathomable humanitarian toll. When partnered with the U.S. aerial bombardment of the country’s energy and sanitation facilities, the sanctions brought about a public health crisis. The arms embargo was so broad so as to include anything that could conceivably be weaponized, including computers and tractors, goods with a clear civilian need in a nation whose electrical grid was destroyed and whose access to food was inhibited. Limitations on Iraqi exports (namely oil before the OIl for Food Programme was introduced) made it more difficult to fund humanitarian aid, while the ban on the importation of chlorine effectively made water purification impossible. 

In total, according to the World Health Organization (WHO)  the average Iraqi’s caloric intake dropped to a low of just 1,093 per day by 1995, with “the vast majority of the country’s population...on a semi-starvation diet for years.” Food rationing enacted in the mid-1990s by the Iraqi government in response to the sanctions left Iraqis deficient in nutrients critical to fetal development, leading to sharp increases in stillbirths and congenital heart disease during the decade. Mortality rates for children under five years old increased fivefold between just 1991 and 1995. The public health system lost 90 percent of its funding, overturning half a century of progress.

By any measure, the Iraq sanctions, to say nothing of more than thirty more or less consecutive years of war, completely destroyed the standard of living and physical health of multiple generations of Iraqis, all as Saddam Hussein remained in power into the 2000s and long after Iraq had ceased its WMD programs. The only change spurred by this act of economic coercion was that the Iraqi people who had suffered for decades under a dictator now found themselves suffering under the twin terrors of both that dictator and the full weight of  international economic punishment.

Cuba

The Iraq sanctions program was a multilateral, decade-long endeavor. On the other hand, America’s ongoing sanctions war with Cuba is the exact opposite: a six decade, all-encompassing campaign of economic warfare imposed unilaterally. Initiated by President John F. Kennedy in 1962, the program of economic and political isolation of Cuba is now the longest-enduring trade embargo in world history. The Cuban sanctions program is the byproduct of five major statutes and a hodgepodge of executive actions. The 1962 Foreign Assistance Act was cited by President Kennedy when he enacted a complete trade embargo between the U.S. and Cuba and amendments that same year to TWEA allowed for Kennedy to expand the embargo to cut off travel to Cuba. George H.W. Bush and a bipartisan majority in Congress expanded the embargo in 1992 with the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA), preventing foreign subsidiaries of the American government from trading with Cuba and preventing vessels from loading and unloading freight in America if they had conducted trade with Cuba within the preceding 180 days.

The Clinton and Bush administrations further sanctioned Cuba via the Helms-Burton Act and the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act, which codified the embargo into law, prevented the embargo from being lifted without congressional approval and confirmation that Cuba had sufficiently democratized, and effectively prohibited private financing for exports to Cuba and restricted tourist travel to Cuba. Despite the Obama Administration’s “Cuba thaw” that re-established diplomatic relations, relaxed trade and travel sanctions, and removed Cuba from the state sponsor of terrorism (SST) list, the Trump Administration ratcheted the trade and travel sanctions right back up and they threatened to add Cuba back to the SST list. 

Six decades after Cuba traded an American-friendly corrupt dictator with no regard for human rights (Fulgencio Batista) for a brutal dictator allied closer to Moscow in Fidel Castro, the sanctions have made Cuba no more democratic and the people of Cuba have been made much poorer. The UN estimates that sanctions have cost the Cuban economy $130 billion in total and U.S. sanctions force Cuba to source medicines and medical devices outside the U.S., inducing additional transportation costs on Cuba’s most precious export. Even the American economy is hurt by the embargo and other Cuba sanctions. A 2017 economic analysis performed by Engage Cuba, a pro-engagement group, concluded that the Trump sanctions and diplomatic rollbacks could adversely affect more than 12,000 American jobs in manufacturing, tourism, and shipping, and that the embargo costs U.S. businesses and farmers almost $6 billion a year in lost export revenue.

Moreover, the head of the office that handled SST issues during the Obama Administration justified Cuba’s removal from the SST list in the fact that, “it was legally determined that Cuba was not actively engaged in violence that could be defined as terrorism under any credible definition of the word.” And when President Obama sought to have Cuba removed from the list, he invited Congress to review the decision during a 45-day period, and they could have stopped the removal with a joint resolution, but even the completely Republican-controlled House and Senate of the time refused to take action.

Within the context of the coronavirus, Cuba’s pandemic response has been hindered by the embargo, which has obstructed the delivery of ventilators, facemasks, diagnostic kits, and other vital medical supplies. As President Obama declared “It is clear that decades of U.S. isolation of Cuba have failed to accomplish our enduring objective of promoting the emergence of a democratic, prosperous, and stable Cuba. At times, longstanding U.S. policy towards Cuba has isolated the United States from regional and international partners, constrained our ability to influence outcomes throughout the Western Hemisphere, and impaired the use of the full range of tools available to the United States to promote positive change in Cuba.  Though this policy has been rooted in the best of intentions, it has had little effect…[W]e should not allow U.S. sanctions to add to the burden of Cuban citizens we seek to help.”

Venezuela and Iran: The Failure of Maximum Pressure

“Maximum pressure” has been the Trump Administration’s policy of choice for both Iran and Venezuela. In the case of Iran, the approach of an inundation of sanctions was meant to be a sharp contrast from the Obama Administration’s detente centered around the landmark Iran nuclear deal. Iran had been in full compliance with the nuclear deal and remained in compliance for more than a year and a half of American sanctions after the U.S. withdrawal, and those sanctions have proved to accomplish precisely none of their goals, be they regime change, bringing Iran back to the negotiating table for a “better deal,” or Iran abandoning its nuclear program. Instead, Iran has increased its stockpile of enriched uranium eightfold and exported a significant amount of its petroleum despite the sanctions, all as Iran’s hardliners have seen their credibility at home increase thanks to the sanctions campaign. 

Rather than succumbing to American pressure, Iranian hardliners found it a useful talking point to rally against, finding themselves in common cause with human rights activists who noted that the sanctions denied many Iranians access to life-saving medical treatment. All of the failures of the maximum pressure campaign can be summed up in the words of a statement made by Iranian womens’ rights activists, “While sanctions proponents claim to care for the Iranian people, their policies have left an entire nation weary, depressed and hopeless. Sanctions, and economic pressure, target the fabric of society.” 

In Venezuela, maximum pressure took the form of a more explicit regime change effort against the dictator Nicolas Maduro. But while before 2019 U.S. sanctions against Venezuela targeted Maduro, Trump’s newest sanctions focused on the state-owned oil and natural gas company PdVSA, which provides the country with thousands of jobs and billions of dollars in revenue, as well as other major sectors of the economy. The economy-wide suffering brought on by these sanctions (in distracting from his corruption and domestic crackdowns) gave Maduro greater credibility when he claimed that the U.S. was a foreign power seeking to destroy Venezuela and its people. All the while, Maduro has tightened his grip over the country, his opposition has been weakened, and Venezuela has drawn closer to American adversaries like Iran, Russia, and North Korea.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

These cases are indicative of a broader problem in U.S. foreign policy. Too often, sanctions have become Washington’s default foreign policy weapon of choice, as it slaps sanction after sanction on governments with which it disagrees without the slightest concern whether American objectives would actually be achieved by them and whether humanitarian suffering would be exacerbated. While targeted sanctions and arms embargoes occasionally serve American interests well in combating global human rights violations and war crimes, more generalized economic sanctions “are too often designed to inflict maximum pain on civilians, not empower them,” in the words of Rep. Ilhan Omar (D-MN). This reliance on sanctions has undermined Washington’s ability to pursue diplomatic solutions to global problems, undermined international solidarity with its foreign policy objectives, and far too often ends up hurting the very people Washington claims to be supporting.

The overwhelming majority of academic studies have concluded that sanctions rarely achieve their stated goal, with one paper estimating odds of only even partial success as low as 34 percent. Moreover, the longer sanctions last, the less effective they tend to be, as fatigue sets in for the imposing party while the target becomes more adept at evading sanctions.The pain of sanctions is widely dispersed and deeply felt by the people in sanctioned countries even as they bear no responsibility for the actions of their governments. Similarly, even in cases where sanctions are meant to combat tangible and concrete human rights abuses, such as in the cases of Cuba, Myanmar, Zimbabwe, and North Korea, research suggests that even more human rights abuses occur when widespread (non-targeted) economic sanctions are in place than without them. As strongmen face foreign economic pressure campaigns that threaten to topple them, they try to cling to power by any means necessary, including by doubling down on repression of critics.

While there remains a future for targeted sanctions and arms embargoes to more effectively promote human rights and de-escalate conflicts, the constant reliance on harsh, generalized economic sanctions ought to be reconsidered and questioned. Any strategy to promote human rights and democracy that far too often augments the positions of strongmen and incites famine is inherently counterproductive and unnecessarily cruel. If this lesson cannot be understood now, in the midst of a global pandemic as the humanitarian impacts of sanctions prevent citizens of foreign governments from accessing food and vital medical care, then Washington’s obsession with sanctions will never be broken. For those advocating for a foreign policy that emphasizes diplomacy and puts human security at the center of global initiatives, there can be no path forward that prioritizes warfare- military or economic.

The United States & Venezuela: Economic Influence, Despair, and One Last Chance

Venezuela, once a booming oil economy, seems to be falling into despair and no one knows when it will end. Many have deliberated about the roots of Venezuela's economic troubles, and journalists such as Patricia Sabga of Aljazeera believe that they are the result of poor economic and political policies, culminating in what could become a total economic meltdown. According to Francisco Rodriguez and Jeffrey Sachs of the New York Times, the Venezuelan economy may be seeing the light at the end of the tunnel as socialist President Nicolas Maduro, largely blamed for current economic woes, is no longer recognized by influential countries like the United States and Britain. Maduro is charged with illegitimately claiming the presidency through staged elections and laws that prevent his removal. Due to this, the United States recognizes the leader of the opposing party, the National Assembly’s Juan Guaido. While this action could alleviate some of the suffering of the Venezuelan people, the same cannot be said for other recent US actions. The essay aims to examine the different recent economic policies that the United States has taken towards Venezuela, their potential ramifications, and positive steps that should be taken.

First, it’s important to recognize the precarity of Venezuela’s situation. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, Venezuela is a petrostate, listed alongside nations like Saudi Arabia and Algeria. Petrostates are characterized by weak political institutions, highly concentrated minority power, and economic reliance on exportation of oil and natural gas. Venezuela first struck oil in 1922 and foreign investors flooded in, prompting the government to put more resources into their growing energy economy, including capital and land investments. This move, while creating the groundwork for a successful oil industry, prevented Venezuela from developing other aspects of their economy, such as agriculture. Oil is highly affected by boom and bust cycles. With no other markets to rely on, when the oil market began experiencing economic problems, such as oil companies in other nations entering and exiting the market, the downward spiral became hard to prevent and the economic situation slowly grew more precarious. Furthermore, poor political decisions designed to maintain government power by helping oil industries meant that when oil prices fell in 2014, Venezuela had no money to subsidize the oil industry or invest in other areas of the economy. The Index of Economic Freedom describes the results, including ever increasing hyperinflation (according to Steve Hank of Forbes magazine, a whopping 80,000% in 2018 that is only expected to increase), food and dollar shortages, and political turmoil.  

According to the Department of State, Venezuela and the United States have a long and evolving relationship that officially began in 1835. Their relationship was previously diplomatic, but since the rise of socialist leader Hugo Chavez and his successor Nicolas Maduro, tensions have risen. Venezuela regularly criticizes American policies and Maduro calls the Venezuelan crisis a Western creation. While the relationship has slowly deteriorated, the United States remains the largest importer of Venezuelan products, importing approximately US $10.9 billion of crude and petroleum oil in 2016. As US dollars become largely unavailable to Venezuelans, US imports continue to decrease drastically, decreasing by 36% between 2015 and 2016, as prices of products become too expensive for Venezuelans to buy. The US continues attempts to give aid during food shortages, but Maduro has rejected every offer. After the United States recognized Guaido as president, Maduro called for a break in diplomatic ties, but the United States refused to recognize his authority by removing American diplomats from Venezuela. The culmination of worsening US-Venezuela relations, the devastated Venezuelan economy and a volatile political situation have led to the current crisis.

President Trump has taken a much more hard-lined approach than President Obama, who was criticized for not doing enough to prevent Venezuela’s economic downfall. Obama’s policies towards Venezuela began with a very soft-lined approach. According to Antonio Delgado of the Miami Herald, the Department of State was hesitant to put sanctions on Venezuela and instead hoped to stabilize the region by creating open dialogue between the two countries. While this was a move designed to maintain peaceful relations, the lack of action likely led to further deterioration. According to Teresa Welsh of U.S. News, when Obama finally issued sanctions against Venezuela for human rights abuses, it widely backfired due to contestation by Latin American nations and Venezuela’s increasing economic precarity. Despite their controversy, Obama’s sanctions only limited visas and froze assets of officials, ultimately having no real impact on the economic situation of Venezuelans. By 2016, it was too late for Obama to help end the Venezuelan crisis, but according to the Washington Post in 2017, there is still hope for Trump.

Trump’s policies put an increasingly tight leash on the Venezuelan economy, with the hope of pushing Maduro to concede the presidency to Guaido. According to Public Radio International Trump’s sanctions began similarly to those of Obama,  targeting high-ranking officials. Slowly, sanctions have also begun targeting Venezuelan oil, with the goal of using economic pressure to push Maduro to allow a peaceful transition. These economic policies have only made Maduro angrier, and with support from the Kremlin, it’s clear that these policies will fail to make a substantial difference in the crisis. PRI continues that on January 28th, 2019, the Trump Administration imposed the harshest sanctions to date, which could potentially cripple the Venezuelan economy for good. These sanctions are aimed at Venezuela’s national oil firm, Petroleo De Venezuela SA (PDVSA) and will currently freeze exchanges and block imports. Furthermore, according to Kenneth Rapoza from Forbes magazine, if Maduro refuses to relinquish control by April 28th, 2019, there will be a complete ban on PDVSA and any oil company that the Venezuelan government owns 50% or more of.

According to Frida Ghitis of CNN news, Trump’s policies could be the solution, but he must proceed with caution. The direction of his policy actions are clear; he won’t stop until the Maduro regime is destroyed, but the outcome of his actions are risky. His policies rely on an assumption that Venezuela’s allies, such as China and Cuba, will not have the means or interest to support Venezuela. It also rests on the assumption the causing such significant damage to the Venezuelan people will be enough to finally overthrow the illegitimate government. If Trump’s plan fails, Venezuelans will likely be left starving in a totally destroyed economy. Only time will tell if Trump’s policies will be successful, but one thing is true: it’s one of the only options outside of direct military action that has not yet been exhausted.   

With a failing economy, Venezuelans are desperately in need of solutions, and since the soft-lined approach failed, Trump’s plan, while viewed by many as rash, may be necessary. The United States’ policies towards Venezuela have yet to be successful, and relations are quickly deteriorating. Oil sanctions are therefore the last peaceful tool the United States can utilize to bring democracy and peace to Venezuela. While there could be significant downfalls if Trump’s proposal fails, it seems to be the only option left which is why Venezuelans and the United States government should cautiously support it.  

The Economics of Sanctions: Half Measures, Tit-for-Tat Strategies, and Why North Korea is Not Iran

On September 9th, 2016, North Korea conducted what South Korean and Japanese estimates called its biggest nuclear test to date, with a nuclear yield equivalent to approximately 10 kilotons of TNT (the bomb dropped by the U.S. on Hiroshima had a yield of about 15 kilotons). The international community, including the United States, was quick to condemn the test, and calls for new rounds of sanctions came immediately, almost reflexively, and as if it was understood exactly what these calls were requesting. The actual mechanics of sanctions, however, are often hidden behind catchphrases such as “snap back,” “tough,” “tightening,”or “loosening.” While these phrases give one a general idea as to what a sanction is and how it works, an explanation of the actual workings of any given set of sanctions would certainly go further in explaining their severity and meaning.

The term “economic sanctions” refers to the deliberate withdrawal of economic activity that, in the absence of the sanctions, would have probably occurred. The intent, essentially, is to change policy via the punishment of an individual or group. However, the effectiveness of sanctions in achieving their goals has not received unanimous support following the Second World War, and it is not clear whether their success rate should be considered anything beyond marginal.

However, despite their dubious track record, one should not expect the use of sanctions to cease for the foreseeable future, as the enforcement of economic sanctions carries political benefits for powerful world leaders. Retaliating against a perceived wrong with sanctions offers displeased leaders an option that is more coercive than a one-off statement of protest, but less antagonistic than direct military action. Playing this middle ground is domestically popular, and allows a country to convincingly declare its displeasure with a given government or set of individuals without getting their military’s boots dirty.

As a way of modeling the process of sanctions, one can think of the threat of sanctions as a game played between two countries; the sender and the target. Consider the following, where the numbers to the left of each comma refer to the payoffs realized by the sending country at a given outcome, and numbers on the right refer to the payoffs of the target country at the same outcome. For example, at the outcome in the top left where each country cooperates (C,C), the sending country receives a payoff of 5, and the target country a payoff of 1. Of course, the exact numbers of 5 and 1 are not tied to any specific real world measurement, but rather just show that both parties prefer to be in the cooperative stage than in, say, the punishment stage (C,D) in the bottom right.

If this were a one shot game, we would expect a result akin to the prisoner’s dilemma, as the target of sanctions would benefit more by defecting, regardless of the strategy of the sender. Knowing this, the sender will choose a punitive strategy to receive a payoff of 0 instead of cooperating for a payoff of -1. However, assuming multiple iterations of the game, both the sender and target country would seek to maximize their payout over an indefinite time horizon, rather than just grabbing as much as they can in one shot. This requires both players to consider the effect that their actions today have on payouts in the future when evaluating the costs and benefits of a given action.

If the sender’s threat of indefinite punitive action in response to deviation is credible (and in this case it is, as the payout of punitive action is preferable to continued cooperation, so long as the target country continues to defect), and the costs that this punitive action inflicts upon the target country will be greater over an indefinite time horizon than the benefits from deviating once, then it is not in the interest of the target country to defect. Given the payoffs in the game above, so long as the game is played more than 3 times after the target country’s deviation, it is not in the interest of the target country to deviate.

This strategy of cooperating until the other player defects is referred to as a “tit-for-tat” strategy, named after the sender’s strategy of only punishing the target when they deviate from the status quo. Economic sanctions are a “tit-for-tat” game between a (usually more powerful) sender country and a target country, where the sender threatens to punish the target via two principal methods: upsetting the target’s trade balance and impeding the target’s financial infrastructure. Upsetting the target’s trade balance is perhaps the more straightforward example, given that this strategy simply aims to either limit the target’s exports or impede its ability to import certain resources. In so doing, the sender attempts to deny the target either the raw materials or tax revenue that it otherwise would have received, thus raising the costs of the target’s disliked policy. In theory, trade sanctions will work if these costs outweigh the benefits of the target’s disliked policy.

However, this type of sanction requires a limited market for the goods that the sender wishes to restrict. If other countries are willing to buy the target’s exports, or if the sender does not own a significant market share of the good that it wishes to keep the target from importing, then the effectiveness of these sanctions will be limited. Additionally, the coercive power of trade sanctions is inversely related to the price of the good the sender is restricting. If the price falls by half its original value six months after the sender country begins sanctions, the target may replenish their original supply at half cost, severely limiting the coercive influence of the sanction. Similarly, if the price of the target’s export rises significantly during sanctions, the target will better be able to accommodate the sanctions.

Impeding the target’s financial infrastructure however, presents a more flexible sanctioning strategy. Financial sanctions generally involve either the freezing of assets of particular individuals involved in the sanction-triggering activity, or the termination of subsidies from the sender previously sent to the target country. Financial sanctions are more difficult for the target to evade, particularly if the target country is embroiled in political or economic instability, or for some other reason may find it difficult to establish new lines of credit. Additionally, deploying financial sanctions allows the sender to better target particular individuals who are either involved in the action that triggered the sanctions or who have a direct ability to address the action, such as politicians and business elites.

Sanctions enforced as a punitive response to the development of nuclear weapons function the same way, as the sanctions aim to raise the overall costs of pursuing the development of nuclear weapons above the overall benefits that that country would receive if they did develop nuclear weapons, all while minimizing the effect of those sanctions on third parties and the economy of the sender country. In game theoretic terms, the target deviates by pursuing nuclear weapons, and the sender country looks to punish this deviation harshly enough to keep the target from choosing the deviation strategy now or in the future. It is important to note that there are certainly non-economic benefits at play in these scenarios such political prestige or regional hegemony, but the punishment strategy of economic sanctions looks to raise the economic costs of the deviation high enough to override whatever benefits might come from an active pursual of nuclear weapons.

Contemporary U.S.-Iranian relations represent a high profile, and tentatively successful example of economic sanctions being used to punish the pursual of nuclear technology. The United States assumed the role of the sender country after then-President Ahmadinejad chose a strategy of deviation by lifting the suspension of Iran’s uranium enrichment program. The U.S. punishment came in two waves, one in 2005 with Executive Order 13382, which froze the assets of individuals connected with Iran’s nuclear program that were held in the U.S., and one in 2010 with the passage of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act (CISADA), which further targeted individuals connected with the nuclear program, but also limited US reception of some of Iran’s key exports. After 2010, the U.S.’s sanctions targeted both the financial and trade sectors, draining the pockets of Iranian elite, and seeking to diminish Iranian exports of goods like oil, pistachios, and rugs. While effective due to the close ties the Iranian economy had to the sanctioned goods, the newly limited access to the U.S. market hurt third-party Iranians as well as those involved with the uranium enrichment program.

Nevertheless, despite the collateral damage of CISADA’s trade sanctions, it would be difficult to argue that they did not help to bring about the correction that the U.S. demanded, as the current President Rouhani’s victory in 2013 and positive reception to news of the lifting of sanctions in 2015 indicate a displeasure with the Ahmadinejad administration’s continued pursual of nuclear weapons in spite of the effects of the sanctions. Though perhaps imperfect, the U.S. eventually got the deal they were looking for. For its part, Iran has begun to reintroduce itself to world markets to the tune of a forecasted 5 percent overall GDP growth in 2016, despite the low worldwide price of oil. In game theoretic terms, the game has returned to an equilibrium of cooperation, with both players are receiving nonzero payoffs greater than in the punishment equilibrium.

However, all is not well with the rest of the world. Like Iran, the U.S. (along with much of the international community) has targeted North Korea with both financial and trade-focused sanctions. The assets of North Korean elites held abroad have been frozen over again and again, and the “direct or indirect” importation into the United States of any North Korean goods is prohibited as of President Obama’s Executive Order 13570 in 2011. However, while the U.S. and the international community have found new financial holdings to freeze and trade restrictions to impose time after time, North Korean officials have not shown any sign of relenting.

Of course, major differences exist between the domestic atmospheres of Iran and North Korea that may play a role in the international community’s inability to correct the deviation of the latter in the same way they have the former. Most importantly, Iran holds presidential elections every 4 years, where the public may voice their displeasure at the current government’s nuclear ambitions and remove them from office, replacing them with someone who opposes nuclear capabilities in favor of economic growth and a better reputation among its peers. North Korea, of course, does not have this luxury, and, short of a coup, Kim Jong-Un and his nuclear ambitions are here to stay so long as he wants them to. Additionally, the Iranian government is hurt more by trade-based sanctions than North Korea, as the Iranian government cannot function via black and grey markets as efficiently as Kim Jong-Un’s regime has proven to be able to.

A key difference, however, is that Iran can feasibly become a world player at some point down the road. As of right now, Iran controls the 4th largest reserve of oil in the world, is located in an enviable geopolitical location, and has taken advantage of the chaos of the region since the fall of Saddam Hussein to extend its influence. For many, a far-reaching imagination is not necessary to see Iran’s future as a serious player on the global stage at some point in the foreseeable future. By continuing its nuclear program, Iran jeopardized this capability by becoming a target for sanctions from the international community, contributing to miniscule or negative economic growth. In the end, the overall benefits of a return to the cooperative equilibrium were obvious, as this equilibrium better suited an Iran who wished to realize its international potential.

Given its limited land area, limited natural resources, and its lack of technological development compared to its peers, North Korea does not have a realistic chance to realize a similar level of global or regional influence. In fact, given the permanent nature of the regime and its apparent willingness to operate on the periphery of the world stage, financial or trade-based sanctions may offer very little additional costs for the North Korean government. In fact, fostering a scenario in which the whole world works against North Korea may serve Kim Jong-Un’s agenda quite well, substantiating his claimsthat the Western world is conspiring against North Korea. While it is tempting to simply “impose sanctions” on North Korea as punishment for their nuclear ambitions and play the middle ground between a statement of protest and military action, a closer look into what those sanctions would actually entail offers a bleak picture of their effectiveness. Granted, dealing with Pyongyang is a difficult task with no obvious answers, but instead of reflexively calling for another round of sanctions in response to the next successful nuclear test, one should offer a clear and comprehensive understanding of the truly unique situation that one finds in North Korea, and an explanation as to how exactly the next round of sanctions will stop or slow the development of a nuclear North Korea.