The Plight of Saudi Human Rights Activists

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has frequently been in the news for human rights violations, marring the image crown prince Mohammad bin Salman (often referred to as MBS) has attempted to craft for himself as a progressive ruler who is ushering in a new golden age for Saudi Arabia. Chief among his efforts to portray himself as a departure from the regressive policies of his predecessors was lifting the ban on women driving in the kingdom - almost ironically, one of the most damning incidents in the past couple of years has been the arrest, detainment, and alleged torture of activist Loujain al-Hathloul. A graduate of the University of British Columbia, al-Hathloul was arrested in March 2018 when attempting to drive into Saudi Arabia from the United Arab Emirates where no restrictions on women driving exist. Since then, she has been detained in a prison, where her family has alleged on several occasions that she has been electrocuted, sexually assaulted, threatened with rape and murder, and put into solitary confinement for long periods of time. al-Hathloul, who is currently on a hunger strike, has become a symbol for the continued mistreatment of human rights activists in Saudi Arabia, with multiple diplomatic envoys, world governments, and human rights organizations attempting to intervene on her behalf. 

Beyond Loujain al-Hathloul, Saudi Arabia has perhaps inadvertently built a reputation for being one of the most repressive regimes in the world. In 2019, they held the second highest numbers of writers and public intellectuals in prison globally (PEN America), they were ranked the 170th worst country for press freedom in the world out of 180 (Reporters Without Borders), they ranked 146th out of 153 countries in the Global Gender Gap Index (World Economic Forum), and overall, were the the world’s seventh least free country (Freedom House). Political parties, trade unions, independent human rights groups are banned altogether with the kingdom denying access to foreign organizations such as Amnesty International, while protests and public demonstrations were prohibited by the Saudi Ministry of Interior in 2011. Particular attention was called to Saudi Arabia’s human rights record after the assassination of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi, who was dismembered and killed in the Saudi consultate in Istanbul on October 2, 2018. Khashoggi had been extremely critical of MBS in particular, and had fled Saudi Arabia in 2017, expressing concern for his life. 

While these statistics and incidents leave most with no doubt about Saudi Arabia’s utter disregard - some may say contempt - for human rights, the kingdom remains committed to rebranding themselves as a progressive beacon of the region. In what Human Rights Watch has called “a deliberate strategy to deflect from the country’s image as a pervasive human rights violator,” MBS has undertaken a spending plan dubbed “Vision 2030,” which aims to attract tourists - and foreign investment - while restructuring Saudi’s economy. A sweeping set of reforms was announced in July 2020, when the Council of Ministers implemented amendments to three landmark laws, all of which dealt with the kingdom’s highly controversial and discriminatory male guardianship system. Firstly, a change made to the Labor Law clarified that a “worker” - until then widely understood as being synonymous with a man - could be female as well, and introduced new protections against discrimination in employment on the basis of sex, disability, of age. This is particularly significant in that it is now illegal for private employers to insist that potential female employees provide proof of approval of their male guardian. Secondly, these reforms included changes to civil status issues, as women can now register their children’s births with the civil status office in addition to informing the office of death, marriage, or divorce. Women can also now be considered a “head of household,” granting them significantly more rights where their children are concerned. Finally, for the first time, Saudi women over the age of 21 can obtain their own passports without being forced to seek permission from their male guardian - in mid-August, this was expanded by a change in regulation allowing women over 21 to travel abroad without required permission from their male guardian. In addition to these legislative changes, sports games and music concerts have been opened up to women, allowing them to participate in civil society in a way not seen before. Major reforms, to be sure - however, women operating outside the scope of these reforms remain in jail, subjected to horrific treatment, and on a lesser scale, severe social stigma. As Walid al-Hathloul put it in the Guardian, “How can we claim we are opening up to the world when we don’t even respect basic human rights?” Saudi women still need a male guardian’s approval to get married, male guardians can still file cases for “disobedience” against their female charges (daughters, wives, or relatives), which can lead either to forcible return to their male guardian’s house or in extreme cases, imprisonment. 

Human rights organizations such as Amnesty International, Freedom House, and Human Rights Watch have widely reported on the atrocious conditions women rights activists in particular face in prison. Amnesty International’s Middle East research director, Lynn Maalouf, has released a statement saying “We are extremely concerned about the wellbeing of these activists, who have been in arbitrary detention for around nine months simply for standing up for human rights… we are calling on the Saudi Arabian authorities to immediately and unconditionally release all human rights defenders who are being detained solely for their peaceful human rights work.” Saudi authorities have dismissed these torture allegations as baseless, claiming that “The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s judiciary system does not condone, promote, or allow the use of torture. Anyone… being investigated is going through the standard judiciary process led by the public prosecution while being held for questioning, which does not in any way rely on torture either physical, sexual, or psychological.'' Reports by Amnesty International say otherwise, providing evidence that a total of 10 activists were tortured and sexually abused during their first three months of detention alone. One activist was wrongly told her family members had died, and was kept under this pretension for a full month, while others alleged being tortured with electric shocks. In addition to discrediting the progressive image the kingdom is attempting to craft for itself, the treatment of women violates social norms commonly held in both Saudi Arabia and Islam itself, according to Loujain al-Hathloul’s sister, Alia al-Hathloul.

Among those who have been subjected to the harshest treatment are womens rights activists who have protested the ban on driving, prior to its lifting in 2016. While Loujain al-Hathloul is possibly the most well-known, Aziza al-Yousef, Eman al-Nafjan, and Hatoon Al-Fassi have also attracted media attention for protesting both the female driving ban and male guardianship system. Yousef, in 2016, started a petition to have the male guardianship system dissolved - and in 2013, both Nafjan and and Yousef participated in a protest demanding the government end the driving ban for women. Beyond the troubling allegations of torture, Saudi Arabia has attracted criticism for the secrecy with which these trials have been conducted, beginning with the charges themselves. According to the International Federation for Human Rights, these activists (as of 2019) had yet to be publicly presented with any charges from the authorities. Vague accusations have been leveled against them by local media, including “financial support to enemies overseas”, and “suspicious contacts with foreign entities.” Perhaps most concerning, their hearings have been closed to reporters and diplomats, preventing any third parties from seeing if there have been any legitimate claims leveled against them.

Beyond the continued outcry from human rights groups, diplomatic and supranational organizations have condemned Saudi violations of human rights. In 2019, Australia delivered a joint statement at the UN in Geneva on behalf of Member States, a cross-regional group, expressing “serious concerns over the persecution and intimidation of activists, including women human rights defenders, involving reports of torture, extrajudicial killing, enforced disappearances, unfair trials, arbitrary detention, and impunity for perpetrators.” ISHR’s Human Rights Council advocate Salma El Hosseiny added, “A cross-regional group of States led by Australia have stood up today for human rights despite the political and economic costs… The international communty sent a strong and clear message to the government of Saudi Arabia that its crimes won’t go unanswered and that as a Council member, it will be held to heightened scrutiny.” In the United States, forty-five members of Congress have formally and publicly expressed concern over Saudi Arabia hosting the 2020 G20 summit. Similarly, the European Parliament voted to downgrade its representation at the summit in response to Saudi Arabia’s human rights abuses.

It remains to be seen whether a combination of following through on reforms, a return to the type of equitable and humanitarian treatment Islam demands, and pressure from the international community will push Saudi Arabia to change its despicable track record on human rights abuses.

Yemen: A Path to Reconstruction

Yemen has undergone a brutal civil war officially beginning in 2015. The war has furthered Yemen's underdevelopment and ultimately turned it into a failed state from dilapidated infrastructure, insufficient healthcare, food and water insecurity, and an unstable government and economy. The Yemen Civil war began because of marginalization of a religious minority, the government's failure to provide economic opportunity for citizens and exploiting certain areas for its own gain, and a lack of representation of religious and regional groups. To resolve the war for the long-term future, there must be inclusive peacebuilding and assistance from the United Nations to facilitate peace conversations. To begin the first steps of state-building, Yemen must establish a decentralized government, strengthen the role of local governance, and forgo economic diversification.

Following the Arab Spring, where numerous Arab nations were demanding to overthrow dictators, Yemen fought for change too. President Ali Abdullah Saleh was forced to transition his position to Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, but this transition failed. There was massive unemployment, food insecurity, suicide bombings, and a separatist movement in South Yemen. In 2014, the Houthi Shia rebel group, a religious minority, took hold of northern Yemen's capital, Sana'a. Hadi fled to Saudi Arabia, asking for international intervention. Saudi Arabia then created a coalition of Gulf countries implementing air strikes in order for the Houthi rebels to restore Hadi's rule. Saudi Arabia accused the Houthis of having links with Iran, which led to the involvement of regional powers as well as international powers in this war. The Saudi-led coalition was supported with U.S. intelligence, and the U.S., U.K., and several other European countries have sold arms to Saudi Arabia that were used to further the war in Yemen. As the war has gone on, Saudi Arabia and Iran have furthered the Sunni-Shia divide in Yemen. Parts of Yemen are now controlled by the Houthis, Republic of Yemen, Saudi-backed Hadi forces, Al-Qaeda, and the U.A.E.-backed Southern Transition Council.

The core of this issue stems from history. When North and South Yemen unified in 1990, the capital was declared in Sana'a in northern Yemen. The south began to feel marginalized by the north, as they were exploiting the oil and natural resources in the south and using it to mostly invest in Sana'a. South Yemen's Southern Movement for independence rose in 2007; they felt the northern centralized government was corrupted, and they did not have enough authority to manage their abundant resources. As for the Houthis, they had fought six wars with the central government between 2004 and 2010. The Houthis fought because of marginalization of their community and beliefs, not having enough authority in Houthi-majority regions, and longing for a democratic non-sectarian republic.

Upon discussing how to resolve this complicated war, it is essential to recognize the core problem: numerous religious and regional groups feel marginalized, and they want an inclusive governing system that is not corrupted as well as a stronger economy. Considering this, the first step for coming to a solution is an inclusive peacebuilding process, which requires the participation of women, Yemeni youth, and other marginalized groups such as southerners and religious minorities. Civil society organizations and women leaders in Yemen have contributed greatly to peacemaking already. For example, in tribal areas, women have been leading in mediation efforts because they are well respected and trusted in their communities. Yemeni women have previously demanded change and achieved 30 percent representation in the National Dialogue, which was a 2014 Yemeni transitional dialogue discussing peacekeeping. Muna Luqman, a Yemeni woman leader among many, spoke before a UN Security Council meeting, demanding that women be at the forefront of peace talks. She has consulted the only woman in the Government delegation, Rana Ghanem, for peace consultations, who agrees that there must be more seats for women. Luqman has additionally communicated with Houthi women, who have stated that they are ready for peace negotiations. Lastly, the Women Solidarity Network has been filling gaps left by the state, helping displaced people with food and other necessities, diverting the youth from fighting to peacebuilding, arbitrating for the release of detainees, and resolving conflicts over water and land resources. Though Yemeni women bear the brunt of the war, they are the largest hope for peacekeeping because they are trusted among their communities.

In addition to this, the UN must act more firmly to mediate peace negotiations and halt armed violence. The UN must take part in mediating peace negotiations between all parties, not just the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition air bombardment campaign. This especially points to the Southern Transition Council, as they are also actors in the war. To avoid more conflict, it is essential to hear the voices of each group that is involved. The UN must create means to enforce its resolutions, including that of disarmament and demobilization of the Houthis and opening naval, aerial, and land blockades. The UN must also demand the demilitarization of liberated cities and aid in restoring essential government institutions such as the social welfare fund. Additionally, it should bring international actors, such as the Saudi-led coalition, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, the U.S., and the U.K. to hold discussions and to mitigate more violence. Though international actors such as Saudi Arabia claim to be air striking Yemen to place the former government back in Yemen, Saudi Arabia seeks to defeat Iran by defeating the Houthis. This issue must be discussed and addressed in the UN Security Council, and there must be negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis for a cease-fire. It is a crucial time now, as Saudi Arabia wants to back out because of economic downturns and the coronavirus pandemic.

Lastly, the UN must localize the peace process by creating local peace agreements in areas of military conflict, and additionally must get rid of combatants in civilian and city institutions. This has already been proved to help; local communities such as local councils, social leaders, and civil society have arbitrated between armed groups and created local ceasefire agreements. In order for the UN to localize and promote inclusivity in the peace process, each negotiating actor should have 50 percent women in their delegations, and the UN Special envoy and the Chair of Redeployment Coordination Committee must communicate regularly with women and require the inclusion of women, the youth, southerners, and other marginalized social groups in legal texts. Making each actor's voices heard will help cement a long-lasting solution to prevent future uprisings and violence.

If the war comes to a resolution, the next step is to unify the country by rebuilding the state. To implement an inclusive governing system, Yemen should transition to a decentralized federation. In a federation, the central government would not have much overriding power over the governorates. Each governorate would have a higher degree of autonomy and will get to control more of their internal affairs. For example, a governor should not be appointed by the president, rather through local elections. For local elections to be efficient, they must be supplied with sufficient infrastructural resources by the central government. In addition, to prevent the overpowering of the central government, the constitution must be well-written by all parties to ensure that the central government cannot use broad statements to excuse its over-bearing interference and exploitation of governorates. This will address the issues raised by the Houthis, who want more voice in Houthi-majority governorates, and southerners, who want more authority over their resources as well. Because each governorate would have greater control, there would be less marginalization and exploitation of different regional and religious groups, and there would be a boost of participatory democracy. This is essential, as Yemen has been a historically tribal society, with multiple ethnicities, religions, and communities.

The central government must be anti-corruption and be represented by all groups. Corruption creates distrust of the government, which could lead to more protest and violent conflict. To combat anti-corruption within the central government, there must be several key players, including a coalition of politicians, civil society organizations, senior government officials and private businesses. This coalition can mitigate corruption problems, especially when it comes to the central government abusing its power and not integrating revenues into all governorates to invest in Yemeni communities and create stronger infrastructure and economic opportunity. The central government must also be responsible for rebuilding damaged infrastructure, especially the sewage and electrical systems, roads, and buildings for medical facilities, government, and other essential purposes.

Strong local governance is an essential key to Yemen's government system. The absence of local authorities and councils negatively affect the governorate's leadership, as well as the representation of civil society organizations. Governorate Hadramawt is a good example of the importance of local authorities. Local authority in the governorate Hadramawt brought about local culture and social awareness that prohibited this community from getting involved in the war. The reason for this is that the governorate had communicated with all political, social, and religious figures in the community. Hadramawt is currently creating an advisory council for the governor, which consists of the political, social, and intellectual leaders. This advisory council would hold repeated discussions on issues in the governorate and how to solve them. Hadramawt is a strong example for why local authority is important, and this must be a framework followed by other governorates. Local councils maintain the social fabric of Yemeni communities and keep them stable and secure, therefore they must be preserved and strengthened to give Yemenis voices in their communities.

Moving forward, local councils must have political rights for elections, and local councils must have some autonomy to not be dissolved by the central government or be misused to benefit the central government. To strengthen local governance, it must have the power to manage and develop local resources, provide public services such as medical facilities and schools, and create jobs for the youth. Local authorities must have the power to manage development and construction projects and manage local resources that meet the governorates expectations of development and public services. The local authorities must be able to grant licenses to industrial, trade, services, and investment companies. Local governance must invest in schools, as education is a fundamental factor in elevating the citizens in terms of economic class, decreasing inequality between boys and girls in education, creating human capital, and eventually allowing for educated citizens to improve technologies for infrastructure and industries.

To begin reforming the economy, Yemen must find a way to generate revenue. One way is to improve the agricultural sector and move away from dependency on food imports. To improve the agricultural sector, the central government must invest and develop a functional irrigation system, which has been weak due to insufficient water and land resources. Despite this, Yemen can take advantage of its diverse climate to produce different agricultural products throughout the year, and implement more terraced agriculture infrastructure, which has worked in the past. The private sector must be incentivized to produce more agriculture and sustain limited resources. There also needs to be the implementation of policies that give tools for large and small farmers, such as the agricultural techniques and education, a good irrigation system, marketing opportunities, business practices, agricultural mechanization, fertilizers, and management of crop and yield.

Before the civil war and currently, Yemen has had a weak production base and insufficient economic diversification. Therefore, aside from the agriculture and petroleum sector, there must be other high productivity sectors in Yemen. This includes the fisheries sector, the food industry, the construction industry, and other industries such as tobacco products, cement, and metals. For example, Yemen can improve its fishery sector due to its advantageous geographic location. Yemen has a 15,534-mile-long coastal strip that spans across the Red Sea, Indian Ocean, the Gulf of Aden, and the Arabian Sea. This provides enough diverse aquatic life to sustain Yemen's fishery sector. The central government must invest in this promising sector by providing sufficient infrastructure and tools for fishers. This is essential because this will tackle part of Yemen's dependency on outside food sources and massive unemployment.

Another product that could potentially be used to export is qat, a plant that contains a stimulant that many people enjoy chewing. Though Yemen has had issues with qat addiction and replacing other agricultural production with qat production, it can still be used for an advantage in exports. If there is government regulation on the amount of qat being produced, qat can be a small potential industry that can help with exports for Yemen. Lastly, Yemen has historically exported coffee to numerous countries and can revive this past triumph by using fertile lands throughout Yemen. Yemen has sufficient land for cultivating coffee beans and can use this as an advantage for exporting and generating revenue. Traders can buy coffee from farmers and sell them among international businesses, which they have done before. Other sufficient foods that can be planted are almonds and vegetables, which are great for the economy and the people. Of course, this is only a small amount of what Yemen can expand with sufficient infrastructure.

Outside assistance is needed in Yemen to jump start Yemen’s economy again. Donor assistance in long-term development projects is what will help rebuild the economy. When Yemen’s political leadership is stable and there is an established government, international organizations must reopen their offices in Yemen. The World Bank must re-open the 32 development assistance projects they were working on before the war, as they were worth over 500 million US dollars over many sectors. In addition, organizations such as USAID must re-establish their aid relief programs when it is safe. The World Bank’s Damage Need Assessment calculated that Yemen needs post-conflict rehabilitation projects, and the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation calculated that Yemen needs at least 100 billion US dollars to reconstruct Yemen. Yemen cannot rebuild by itself, as its economy is damaged and collapsed. There must be external assistance to redevelop Yemen to have a starting point to drive its economy upwards.

In conclusion, the most important aspect of Yemen's development is firstly coming to a stable political solution, which can be helped by an inclusive peace building process. It is only after this war is resolved, and all internal tensions are resolved, that Yemen can begin reconstructing all aspects of its country by decentralizing the government, promoting economic diversification and development, and strengthening local governance. This will take decades, but it can be done if the process leading to development is inclusive, since Yemen is very tribal, ethnically diverse, religiously diverse, culturally diverse, and regionally diverse. For this reason, the only way the country can rise up is if everyone has a voice and is there to pull it up together.

U.S. Policy Towards Saudi Arabia: The Up's and Down's

The United States’ (U.S.) policy towards Saudi Arabia restrains numerous determinants and interests. The U.S. considers the global market for oil, counterterrorism efforts, containing Iran, trade, and human rights when conducting policy towards the kingdom. The U.S.-Saudi relationship is significantly progressing as both countries share a number of interests in the Middle East. 

The U.S. trade in goods with Saudi Arabia has been steady since 1990. At that point in time, U.S. exports were $4 billion and imports were $10 billion, while in 2010, exports were $11.5 billion and imports were $31.4 billion. In 2019, exports so far have amounted to $8.9 billion and imports to $9.8 billion. Over the years there has been a pattern established where the total value of imports exceeds that of exports. The U.S. imports hydrocarbons from Saudi Arabia, which is a crucial component of petroleum and natural gas, making it essential for U.S. energy needs. The U.S. then exports weapons, machinery, and vehicles to Saudi Arabia. 

Historically, the U.S. was dependent on oil from Saudi Arabia. However, the U.S supply of oil has changed. As of now, the U.S. is the top oil producer and the largest consumer of crude oil and petroleum products, surpassing Russia and Saudi Arabia in the production of crude oil. The U.S. has numerous reserves with various natural resources, including crude oil. As a result of technological advancement in oil extraction, U.S. oil production is expected to increase even more in the future. Though the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) continues to be the largest oil producer, non-OPEC countries such as the U.S. and Canada will contribute significantly to the growth of world oil supply. Despite this, Saudi Arabia is still an important player in the world market for oil.  As a key member of OPEC, Saudi Arabia is able to coordinate with other OPEC members in order to control oil prices through the manipulation of the oil supply. As a "swing producer," Saudi Arabia is able to influence the world market quickly and independently with its spare oil capacity.

Saudi Arabia is more important to U.S. interests because of its capacity to change the world price of oil than as an oil exporter. Even though the U.S. is a top exporter of oil, it is still dependent on the world price of oil as part of the global market. If Saudi Arabia increases its supply, the world price of oil would fall, which would harm U.S. oil producers. For example, if the U.S. imposed restrictions on imports of Saudi oil, U.S. oil refineries would experience a shortage, as Saudi Arabia imports an estimated five million barrels a day to the U.S. While the five million barrels Saudi Arabia imports is significant, the U.S. is in a position to replace that with oil imports from Canada or domestically produced crude oil. However, the cost to U.S. oil producers from a Saudi-led price drop would be considerably more detrimental to U.S. economic interests. 

Because Saudi Arabia plays a major role in controlling the global oil market, U.S.-Saudi policy should be governed by collaborating on the world price of oil rather than focusing on imports and exports. As top exporters, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia could collaborate to meet increasing oil demands from emerging economies. According to the World Bank, as developing nations' economies grow, their demand for fuel and consumer goods that are dependent on crude oil will also increase. This allows the U.S. to prioritize energy independence without weakening relations with Saudi Arabia. In the long run, policy focused on cooperating with Saudi Arabia on regulating the global oil market would benefit U.S. economic interests. 

U.S. energy policy extends beyond oil to nuclear energy within Saudi Arabia. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which represented their willingness to cooperate on nuclear activities in medicine, industry, and electricity production. In 2018, Secretary of Energy Rick Perry and Minister of Energy, Industry, and Mineral Resources Khalid al Falih discussed the potential for civil nuclear engagement, including new technology sharing. In 2019, the Trump Administration stated that it would share its nuclear technology if Saudi Arabia agreed to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections. The U.S. must be especially wary of Saudi attempts to develop nuclear weapons considering escalating tensions with Iran in the aftermath of the crumbling Iran Nuclear Deal. However, if the U.S. pushes too hard for the enrichment and reprocessing restrictions, several U.S. Administration officials and nuclear advocates have argued that Saudi Arabia would search for nuclear cooperation with Russia or China. Therefore, the U.S. is constrained in its ability to push for IAEA inspections, which puts them in a difficult position since inspections are essential for nuclear security. It is necessary for the Trump Administration to demand IAEA inspections, as a nuclear conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran would be incredibly detrimental to U.S. national security. 

There have been a number of security-related events that have positively and negatively affected the U.S.-Saudi relationship. Shortly after the Cold War, the Gulf War that lasted from 1990 to 1991 strengthened U.S.-Saudi cooperation after half a million U.S. troops were deployed to Saudi Arabia in order to push back Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. At the same time, Salafi jihadism was spreading in Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia. For political reasons, Saudi Arabia suppressed the internal Salafi opposition but did not react to transnational Salafi jihadism. Saudi Arabia did not want to have a conversation about Salafism domestically seeing as it was ideologically similar to jihad and Wahhabism, an ideology central to Saudi government institutions. U.S.-Saudi relations then worsened after Al-Qaeda bombed the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and conducted the September 2001 (9/11) attacks. Saudi Arabia denied any connection to Osama Bin Laden including financial connections to Al Qaeda. Saudi Arabia additionally viewed the U.S. negatively after the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.

Despite these events negatively affecting the U.S.-Saudi relationship, they have partnered together in counterterrorism efforts. For example, Al-Qaeda campaigned against the Saudi Arabian regime and conducted terrorist attacks there in 2003. After Saudi Arabia condemned Al-Qaeda following the 2003 terrorist attack, the U.S. cooperated with the kingdom in intelligence sharing and eliminating financial sources to jihadist groups. Like the U.S., Saudi Arabia views Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaeda's affiliates, ISIS, and Salafist-jihadist groups as a threat to Saudi national security. The U.S. believes that Saudi Arabia has improved its counterterrorism efforts since the 9/11 attacks, and it has been more involved in cooperative initiatives. For example, Saudi Arabia co-chairs the Counter-ISIL Finance Group of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS, and since 2014, Saudi Arabia has prevented Saudis to travel abroad to support terrorist groups. In 2017, Saudi officials stated that they plan to contribute to stabilization efforts in Syria and get involved with Iraqi leaders. U.S.-Saudi relations also continued to cooperate because they have a shared interest in containing Iran, as it remains both a threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East and a rival power of Saudi Arabia. 

It is necessary to examine the policies that continue the counterterrorism alliance between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. because they face similar threats from common enemies. The U.S. benefits from having a counterterrorism partner in the Middle East, especially from a wealthy nation that has significant political influence over Arab states. The U.S. should ally with Saudi Arabia to contain Iran, especially because of the current high tensions between the three actors. U.S. and Iran tensions have recently escalated after potential military attacks and an Iranian shootdown of a U.S. drone over the Strait of Hormuz. If the U.S. were to get into a military confrontation with Iran, it is in U.S. national interest to cooperate with Saudi Arabia, where it could access Saudi air space and bases for troops. Thomas Lippman, Adjunct Scholar at the Middle East Institute, claims that Saudi Arabia is not crucial for U.S. security interests because its military capabilities are limited. The U.S. holds naval headquarters in Bahrain, maintains a large airbase in Qatar, and has troops in Kuwait and Djibouti, among many other areas. He claims that the U.S. should go by an "issue-by-issue basis" with Saudi Arabia, rather than maintaining a close partnership. I disagree with this point; even though the U.S. has strategic military bases in numerous areas in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia is still an important asset for intelligence sharing, and using it for additional military space would be an added benefit of partnering with them.

Though Saudi Arabia has limited military capacity, the U.S. conducts arms sales and training and service support to strengthen the Saudi military. For example, there is the United States Military Training Mission (USMTM) in Saudi Arabia and the Saudi Arabian National Guard Modernization Program (PM-SANG), which supervises U.S. defense cooperation with Saudi Arabia. In May 2017, President Trump indicated that the U.S. would continue strengthening bilateral defense cooperation with Saudi Arabia through arms sales. In 2019, Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Hale went to Saudi Arabia to meet with the Saudi Deputy Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman Al Saud and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Adel al-Jubeir. Secretary Hale emphasized the strong U.S.-Saudi partnership and shared interests in working with other regional partners to contain Iran's influence over the Middle East, as well as promote security and stability.

Encouraging dialogue between Saudi Arabia and Qatar is also in the U.S.’s security interests. Saudi Arabia has had a rocky relationship with Qatar for over twenty years as they have been concerned over Qatar's ties with Iran, in which Qatar provides natural gas reserves. In 2017, Saudi Arabia cut diplomatic relations with Qatar, closed its land borders, air space, and waters to Qatari vessels, and disallowed Saudi nationals from visiting Qatar, as well as demanded Qatari nationals to leave Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia had claimed that Qatar supported terrorism, interfered with the domestic affairs of other Arab countries, and supported Iran's push to destabilize Saudi Arabia.

This is of significant concern to U.S. security interests in the Middle East. The U.S. has close defense cooperation, including in arms sales, with both Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Because the U.S. has major facilities in Qatar, it is in the national interest to attempt to fix Saudi Arabia's relationship with Qatar, as this broken relationship is unsuitable for U.S. security interests. If the two states went into military conflict, the U.S. would be in a difficult situation because it has defense cooperation with both countries. Picking sides would further the conflict and severe one or the other relationship.

Another current event pertaining to U.S. security and human rights interests in Saudi Arabia is the Yemen Civil War. The Trump and Obama Administrations have diplomatically supported Saudi Arabia's attempts to reintegrate the Hadi government, and have also provided logistical and intelligence support to their military operations. The Saudi-led coalition has contributed to Yemen civilian casualties, a humanitarian disaster, a blockage on the flow of goods and humanitarian aid to Yemen, the empowerment of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, and Iranian support for the Houthis. Following a Saudi airstrike that killed numerous children in 2018, Lieutenant General Michael Garrett went to Saudi Arabia to pressure the government to investigate this accident. The Saudi-led coalition found that the accident violated the coalition's rules and recommended that it comes with punishment. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo additionally stated to Congress that authorities from both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are taking action in preventing the danger imposed on Yemeni civilians and infrastructure. 

U.S. arms sales and military support to the Saudi-led coalition have sparked debate within U.S. Congress. Proposed foreign military and commercial arms sales aligning with the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) have been criticized by several Congress Members because Saudi Arabia has been using them for airstrikes in Yemen, which violates international humanitarian law. Congress has also attempted to investigate an instance where an exception was made under the AECA, allowing the Trump administration to continue selling weapons to Saudi Arabia without a required congressional review period. Those critical of the arms sales argue that the U.S. should instead share more advanced U.S. technology and increase training and intelligence support to the Saudi air force. Other members offered for the implementation of conditions for the Department of Defense activities and U.S. support for the coalition. Another proposed solution is for President Trump to withdraw U.S. military forces from Yemen missions. Numerous members proposed to require more oversight reporting on U.S. activities, disallow deployment of U.S. military personnel or U.S. funds to be used for specific goals in Yemen, and prohibit sales of a specific type of weapon to Saudi Arabia. On the other end of the debate, several members argue that U.S. support lessens Yemen civilian casualties by encouraging more human rights.

The U.S. is in a difficult position in the Yemen conflict. On one hand, both U.S. officials and Saudi Arabia have concerns about the Houthi movement due to its ties with Iran. Houthi forces additionally operate cross-border attacks to Saudi Arabia, which also threatens American citizens there. Both countries are concerned about armed threats from Al-Qaeda and Islamic State supporters in Yemen. Despite these concerns, there have been civilian casualties, mass displacement, and infrastructure damage caused by Saudi intervention using U.S. weapons. 

There should be a sense of compromise to this debate. The U.S. should not discontinue arms sales to Saudi Arabia. If Saudi Arabia does not purchase U.S. arms, it will seek out other partners such as Russia and China. Russia and China would be less likely to have human rights concerns in Yemen and would not make any effort to hold the Saudi-led coalition accountable for its actions. However, the U.S. could terminate the sale of a specific type of weapon used in Saudi airstrikes. That way, it is a stronger signal to the Saudis that they should be careful of where they target. It is additionally important to not single out Saudi Arabia and claim that they are committing all of the humanitarian violations in the conflict. The Houthis and Iran are equally responsible. Therefore, it would not be tangible to simply discontinue arms sales to Saudi Arabia, because it would imply that Saudi Arabia is not there to bring a political solution to the issue. On the diplomatic side, the U.S. should continue encouraging a United Nations negotiated resolution that incorporates the GCC transition document which was signed and agreed to in 2011. 

Aside from Yemen, Saudi Arabia has a low record of domestic human rights as well. The Kingdom is run by Islamic sharia law, which does not allow freedom of expression, press, religion, or association, and political parties are prohibited as they are seen as going against the Kingdom. Saudi Arabia gives death sentences to crimes committed by minors and uses torture to interrogate alleged criminals and force confessions out of them. The government also unlawfully interferes with the privacy of families and homes. The government decides which media content can be public in order to maintain internal security and prevent chaos or division. Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi journalist who lived abroad in "self-exile," was murdered by government agents in Istanbul, Turkey. In 2016, Saudi authorities banned Khashoggi from writing, appearing on television, and going to conferences because he had made critical statements about Saudi government officials. Per the U.S. State Department's 2018 report on human rights in Saudi Arabia, human rights activists were detained and later released but warned not to use social media for their activism or reach out to foreign diplomats, international human rights organizations, and travel outside the country. The use of torture has also been employed against detained human rights activists, including women who fought for the right to drive.

Dana Stroul, a former senior professional staff member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, states that human rights in Saudi Arabia can progress with the U.S. simply encouraging change. While the U.S. does not have a say in how to run another government, their assistance can help promote long-term change. For example, the Two Holy Mosques Scholarship Program admits 50,000 Saudi students each year to attend U.S. universities, which provides them an American-style education. These students go back home with ideas they have learned through this education. Though this is a catalyst for long-term change, it is better than telling Saudi Arabia what it should and shouldn't do. If there were a situation that went against U.S. interests, U.S. policy should be direct and question Saudi Arabia's actions. For example, the U.S. should condemn and outright state that it believes that Saudi imprisoned civil-rights activists should be let out. Additionally, the U.S. must be more forward with holding Saudi Arabia accountable for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. Overall, it is better to maintain positive relations with Saudi Arabia to encourage human rights, because if the U.S. severs its economic, military, and strategic relations, then Saudi Arabia would turn towards powers such as China and Russia, which would not have much interest in encouraging respect for human rights. 

After discussing U.S. policy and interests in Saudi Arabia, it is reasonable to argue that the U.S. should continue keeping Saudi Arabia as a close security partner in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia has the potential of being an even stronger U.S. ally in counterterrorism efforts and containment of Iran because it is a wealthy and influential nation in the region. In regards to human rights, there is a more likely chance that Saudi Arabia would cooperate with the U.S. rather than other powers, which may not consider the issue. Lastly, it is important to maintain economic relations with Saudi Arabia for the world market for oil and to take advantage of emerging economies in the long run. Though there are disagreements and a difference in views between the two nations, there are more benefits than disadvantages in their relationship.

The Myth of the Mideast Ally: The Moral and Strategic Failure of American Foreign Policy Toward Saudi Arabia

As a student of Latin America, I am in no way blind to the historical moral shortcomings (to put it lightly) of American foreign policy. When I lived in Asunción, Paraguay, my school’s first field trip was to the Museo de las Memorias, a museum housed in a former detention and torture center used by the Alfredo Stroessner regime. Stroessner was a Cold War-era dictator responsible for the deaths of thousands of his own citizens, and like many of his regional contemporaries, he was supported by the United States solely because he opposed communism. (A recent World Mind article brilliantly questions the legacy of Henry Kissinger, the architect behind these alliances.)

One would hope that the American foreign policy establishment recognized the damage wrought by decades of autocratic rule, learned from its mistakes, and then ceased the practice of abetting dictators in exchange for money and influence. Unfortunately, this iniquitous style of transaction remains in the U.S. foreign policy toolkit, as evidenced by the current American partnership with Saudi Arabia. In spite of a laundry list of human rights abuses and an enduring legacy of violent extremism perpetrated or enabled by the regime, the Trump Administration has not shied away from Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (known as MBS), the charismatic young heir to the throne. Since taking office, President Trump has expanded operational support to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, significantly increased weapons sales, and refused to acknowledge the crown prince's involvement in the gruesome assassination of Washington Post columnist and U.S. resident Jamal Khashoggi.

The Administration argues that in our alliance with Saudi Arabia, the benefits outweigh the costs. Popular talking points center on money and combatting extremism; according to the executive branch, increased defense sector employment, cheap oil, and counterterrorism cooperation are invaluable to U.S. interests.

However, upon closer examination, all of these arguments fail to justify the American alliance with the Saudi regime, especially when placed in the context of the Kingdom’s atrocious domestic and foreign policies. By analyzing these policies, it becomes clear that such an alliance is not only immoral to the liberal internationalist, but also counterproductive for the conservative realist. The U.S. stands to gain nothing – neither as devout moralists nor cutthroat strategists – from the robust commercial, political, and military partnership with the Kingdom that the current administration goes great lengths to maintain and defend.

Saudi Human Rights Abuses and the Global Perception of the U.S.

During the spring of 2018, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman embarked on a three-week tour of the United States as part of an ambitious attempt to revamp Saudi Arabia’s global image. Eager for a piece of the royal family’s opulence and influence, American investors, politicians, and movie stars rolled out the red carpet. Harvard University and MIT both welcomed the young prince. He visited Wall Street, Washington, and the Silicon Valley. He sat down with Oprah and dined with Morgan Freeman and Dwayne Johnson.

Would these individuals still entertain the crown prince if they were provided a detailed report of the Kingdom’s human rights record? If they could see the contrast between MBS’ extravagance and the plights of Saudi Arabia’s tremendously disadvantaged citizens? If they understood the extent of the humanitarian crisis in Yemen sparked by the Saudis and exacerbated by U.S. arms sales?

Although MBS’ American tour came some 10 months before the highly publicized October 2nd assassination of Jamal Khashoggi, Saudi Arabia’s prior transgressions were already widely known. According to the 2018 edition of the Human Right Watch (HRW) World Report, the Kingdom “has committed numerous violations of international humanitarian law” in Yemen, including scores of “unlawful attacks… some of which may amount to war crimes.” The report notes that coalition airstrikes have repeatedly struck “homes, markets, hospitals, schools, and mosques.” To date, an estimated 10,852 civilians have been killed or injured by coalition airstrikes.

Domestically, Saudi activists and dissidents are silenced, and women are subject to some of the most archaic laws in the world. The same HRW report details the arrest of numerous peaceful, pro-reform activists, some of whom received multi-year prison sentences and travel-bans. The Kingdom is known for its use of the death penalty, performed inhumanely and often for non-violent offenders, as well as torture; as recently as March 31st of this year, The Guardian reported that leaked medical documents describe up to 60 political prisoners suffering from “malnutrition, cuts, bruises and burns.” While Saudi women were recently granted the right to drive, the most critical regulation barring gender equality in the Kingdom remains in place: according to the BBC, under the “guardianship law,” a woman’s male relatives “[have] the authority to make critical decisions on her behalf.” As long as such a law exists, any concessions the regime makes to Saudi women’s rights activists should be considered insincere.

What do the crimes committed by one distant nation have to do with the U.S.? 100 years ago, when even the world’s hegemons largely operated within their own geographic regions, human rights abuses in a nation as far away as Saudi Arabia might not have demanded the attention of U.S. policymakers, but today is a different story. As long as the U.S. supports Saudi Arabia, it cannot expect to have the respect or cooperation of fellow nations as it attempts to shape the world order. Any American policies put forth in the name of peace, freedom of speech, or women’s rights are liable to objection by even our closest allies; for example, suspension of aid toward a nation due to human rights violations could be easily deemed hypocritical given the overwhelming security assistance we provide the Saudi regime. In such a case, the effect of American aid suspension would have diminished impact, as the international community might not be compelled to join.

In short, a lack of global moral standing means a lack of global influence, too. Surely, arms deals that have limited impact on the American economy are not worth our ability to enact beneficial international policy.

Wahhabism and the Perpetual War on Terrorism

The instances of regime-led crackdowns on dissent outlined above are typical of a highly-centralized power structures terrified of losing control (think North Korea and Venezuela). In addition to brutality and oppression, however, the royal family employs another form of social control: ultra-conservative religious ideology.

The rise of the House of Saud, Saudi Arabia’s namesake and longtime ruling family, is indebted to the 18th century merging of politics and religion on the Arabian peninsula. In 1744, Muhammad ibn Saud, an influential tribal leader, and Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab, an iconoclastic Muslim scholar, swore an oath to form a state guided by Islamic principles. Al Wahhab’s interpretation of Islam was not widely shared –in fact, it condemned many Muslims then inhabiting the peninsula– but Saud was desperate for a “clearly defined religious authority” he could use to establish authority. This authority would stretch far into the coming centuries, as noted by a 2008 CRS report on what is now known as Wahhabism:

[After 1930,] Wahhabi clerics were integrated into the new kingdom’s religious and political establishment, and Wahhabi ideas formed the basis of the rules and laws adopted to govern social affairs in Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism also shaped the kingdom’s judicial and educational policies. Saudi schoolbooks historically have denounced teachings that do not conform to Wahhabist beliefs…

Saudi-born professor Madawi al-Rashid of the London School of Economics echoed this analysis in a 2015 BBC article:

The Wahhabis were given full control of the religious, social and cultural life of the kingdom. As long as the Wahhabi preachers preached that Saudis should obey their rulers, the al-Saud family was happy. In the 1960s and 1970s the Arab world was full of revolutionary ideas. The Saudi government thought the Wahhabis were a good antidote, because they provide an alternative narrative about how to obey rulers and not interfere in politics.

By relinquishing significant societal control to Wahhabist clerics, the regime created a united and obedient populous over which it could rule. Additionally, it cultivated and promoted an intolerant and often violent ideology that would later form the basis for violent extremist groups.

Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and fearing the global spread of secularism, the Saudi regime weaponized Wahhabism, imploring its citizens to travel to fight the spread of communism. Terence Ward, in his book The Wahhabi Code, describes how the Kingdom funded Wahhabi schools in Pakistan to indoctrinate both Pakistani youth and Afghan refugees fleeing the Soviet invasion. These foreign fighters, inspired by the Wahhabist interpretation of holy war, are the first example of the exportation of Wahhabism and violence. Future examples include al-Qaeda, Daesh, and related fundamentalist groups operating in Syria.

The connection between Saudi-promoted Wahhabism and global terrorism is not a new revelation. For years, analysts have commented on the absurdity of our relationship with the country that produced 15 out of the 19 9/11 hijackers; one Brookings Institute scholar quipped that the Saudis are “both the arsonists and the firefighters”, and a 2015 New York Times op-ed refers to Saudi Arabia as “the ISIS that made it.”

In defending their sustained support of the Kingdom, the Administration again points to arms deals, in addition to joint counterterrorism efforts, as justification for our partnership with Saudi Arabia. My argument regarding U.S. arms sales to the Kingdom is simple –quick profits are not worth a long-term fight against extremism– but what about the Saudis’ counterterrorism operations?

A 2018 CRS Report identifies the Kingdom as a strong partner in the fight against extremism, claiming that the “U.S. government now credits its Saudi counterparts with taking terrorism threats seriously and praises Saudi cooperation in several cooperative initiatives.” There is little evidence to suggest otherwise; in 2014, the Kingdom’s leading Islamic authority denounced Daesh and al-Qaeda, and a 2017 State Department report detailed Saudi Arabia’s “strict supervision” of illicit funding of terrorist groups. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia itself is frequently the target of terrorist attacks perpetrated by extremists.

However, multiple reports suggest that Saudi Arabia’s promotion of Wahhabism and religious intolerance domestically carries global effects. A 2016 New York Times article details the role one Saudi-funded mosque in Kosovo played in sending 314 men, women, and children to join Daesh, and 2017 Voice of America article cited experts linking an uptick in terrorism in Africa to Saudi scholarships provided to regional youth. Another Times article cautions observers from heaping blame on solely on Saudi Arabia, as grievance-related factors also contribute to radicalization. Still, it notes that Daesh used official Saudi textbooks in its schools until it was able to publish its own, much to the embarrassment of the regime.

Thus, while Saudi Arabia deserves credit for its kinetic counterterrorism efforts, it is losing the long-term ideological war against extremism by funding and promoting religious intolerance. In partnering with the regime rather than pushing it to alter its policies, the U.S. is losing as well, effectively implementing a counterterrorism strategy that neglects the root of the problem and perpetuates terrorism. CNN’s Fareed Zakaria might have put it best: “The Saudi monarchy must reform itself and its export of ideology,” he wrote in 2016, “But the reality is, this is far more likely if Washington engages with Riyadh rather than distancing itself, leaving the kingdom to fester in isolation.”

Moving Forward: Talk to Saudi Arabia, But Don’t Reward Them

In Ben Rhodes’ memoir, The World as It Is, the former national security adviser and speechwriter recalls one particular instance of Barack Obama’s frustration on the 2008 campaign trail. Members of the foreign policy establishment had just ridiculed the young senator for suggesting he would engage in diplomacy with historically hostile nations, much to his bewilderment. “It. Is. Not. A. Reward. To. Talk. To. Folks,” the future president emphatically argues, pounding his palm on a table as he does. “How is that working out with Iran?”

Obama’s point was this: a U.S. presidential administration can engage with an undesirable foreign government without promoting its detrimental interests. His flagship piece of foreign policy, the Iran Deal, is a perfect example of this in that it edged Iran toward membership in the responsible international community without granting it nuclear weapons or excusing its autocratic domestic policies.

The U.S. should handle Saudi Arabia in a similar fashion. Cooperation can continue in the areas that it has worked well, such as counterterrorism, but U.S. officials should not hesitate to publicly criticize and seek to curb the regime’s oppressive domestic policies, illegal military strikes in Yemen, and exportation of intolerance. Thanks to the Texas shale revolution, an abysmal economic outlook in Saudi Arabia, and significant U.S. commercial investment in the Kingdom, the regime has little in its arsenal to counter hypothetical demands from American policymakers; the U.S. is insulated from OPEC’s whims, and sanctions leveled on U.S.-Saudi business interactions would seriously damage the Kingdom’s economy.

It’s clear that the Trump Administration has no interest in molding Saudi Arabia into a respectable ally, otherwise it would have already started down that path. Whether Mr. Trump’s eagerness to buddy-up to MBS is the result of greed, myopia, or personal affinity is anyone’s guess – presently, the most that Americans can do is hope that the next president, Republican or Democrat, does not perceive the Kingdom through the same ignorant lens. Such perception will only result in further human rights violations at the hands of the regime, the continued implementation of an ineffective counterterrorism policy, and lastly, almost irreparable damage to U.S. global standing. After all, as Asunción’s Museo de las Memorias demonstrates, history does not forget those who side with tyrants.

Saudi and Iranian Manipulation of Sectarian Violence as an Incubator for an Emerging Balance of Power

The history of man is the history of crimes, and history can repeat. So information is a defense. Through this we can build, we must build, a defense against repetition.

—Simon Wiesenthal

The theory that history repeats itself has never been truer than in the Middle East. In a region that has always been what strategist George Friedman calls a “geopolitical flashpoint,” 2016 has started to become reminiscent of 1979. This past January, the House of Saud beheaded a Shi’a Sheikh, Nimr al Nimr, prompting Iranians to take to the streets and torch the Saudi Arabian embassy. Saudi Arabia, just like in 1988, has strangled relations with their Iranian neighbor; and both states have embarked on a power-grab. Iran has incited the Kingdom’s Gulf neighbors with Shi’a minorities – most notably, the Houthis in Yemen – to liberate themselves from their Sunni leaders. Across the Levant, North Africa, and the Gulf, the gloves have come off and the two powerhouses have conducted interventionist strategies, funded terrorist organizations, propped up dictatorships, and manipulated religious fervor – all to fuel a sectarian conflict in this winner-takes-all game.

Many scholars and critics have deemed the violence in Syria as a turbulent power vacuum. They are correct; a witch’s brew of dictatorial greed, decades of religious persecution, cultural and religious landscape at odds, and vulnerable economic conditions have produced one of the largest conflicts since the conclusion of the Second World War. We have come to know this conflict as an open invitation for foreign intervention. But many perceive Syria and Iraq as the second chapter of the Cold War, a stage for Russia and the United States to carry out countering strategic interests through proxy warfare. I will argue that this perception is clouded. The regional sectarian violence is really a theatrical showdown between two regional rising stars: Iran and Saudi Arabia, who puppeteer such violence to incubate a new balance of power in the Middle East, where Iran's rising power unhinges Saudi hegemony.

Questioning a Balance

In international relations, balance of power theory endures, yet is seldom experimented upon. If Kenneth Waltz saw the Middle East today, he might consider it a picturesque representation of anarchy. The competitors view themselves as custodians of Islam, vying for control in a region that has lacked a consistent multipolar power dynamic. Hans Morgenthau deems that the balance of power is a “perennial element” in international relations, regardless of the “contemporary conditions” of the international system. Many scholars are looking to the Middle East as a hub that places traditional realpolitik back in business -- and see that play out between the power plays between Tehran and Riyadh.

In the balance of power, states use various mechanisms to balance. There is equilibrium of power that mandates states adjust accordingly; when one makes gains, the other must outmaneuver to re-balance the scales. In the Middle East, however, the mechanisms of balance of power differ from those in the West. States do not necessarily focus on power plays amongst one another, but rather on what scholar Stacie Goddard calls the “dynamics of collective mobilization” and struggles for influence among political communities. To manipulate the balance of power in the Middle East, states must first establish one – something both Tehran and Riyadh have done through decades of military, economic, and religious expansion. States’ mechanisms to achieve regional power are not as simple as the West’s, and concentrate primarily on the nationalization and expansion of crude oil industries, leveraging their control of regional institutions (like the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the United Arab League) tapping into the anger of the Sunni-Shi’a divide, feeding nationalist fires, vying for huge arms deals with Western countries, and competing for great powers’ good graces. Saudi Arabia and Iran have been at odds over the region’s balance of power, moving levers to advance their position and hollow out a decaying power structure.

Exploring Historical Ramifications

Is some of this sectarian violence a motive that truly reflects the interests of both states, or a sway of rhetoric?  Before looking forward to understand these possibilities, we must reflect on the history between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Regional supremacy in the Arab World has been a strategic goal of Iran since the days of the Shah and since the al-Saud family’s rise to power. While these objectives are not new, the opportunities to achieve them are. The weakened governments in Iraq and Syria, the dormant Shi’a minority populations under Saudi-supporting leaders, and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action under the International Atomic Energy Agency all bolster Iran’s hopes to spread its influence in the Arab World, and incentivize Saudi Arabia to halt them in their steps.

Since the rule of the House of Saud, Sunni Wahhabism has thrived in Saudi society today and dictates the shape of its foreign policy. When the Crown Prince Saud came to power in 1953, he seized the opportunity to enhance the state’s presence in international trade. The years that followed introduced OPEC in 1960, the OIC in 1969, ownership of Aramco in 1980, and founded the GCC in 1981. Throughout this period, the Saudis learned the importance of dollar diplomacy and economic mastery. The 1990’s saw the al Sauds using the American relationship to advance their position and maintain stability in neighboring states by, for example, requesting American intervention in Kuwait in 1990. But it was in 2011 when the state of the union began to evolve for Saudi Arabia. The Arab Spring struck a chord with the al Sauds, prompting the government to ban public protests by Shi’a minorities in the East, to crack down in neighboring Bahrain, and to violate several international human rights obligations. Post Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia has sighed relief in maintaining regional control, yet looks upon their neighbors with caution.

Shi’a Islam has always been a key fixture in Persian society in Iran, and for centuries. But it was in 1979 when the Shah was exiled and the Islamic fundamentalist, Ayatollah Khomeini rose to power, spreading messages of anti-Americanism, call for the Shah’s extradition, the infamous Hostage Crisis at the United States Embassy in Tehran, and attempting to thread Shi’a Islam and nationalism together. It was during the 1980’s when Iran closely aligned itself with Russia, pushing the United States in the direction of the Saudis -- establishing a dynamic that served as the ‘status quo’ until the twenty-first century. The United States introduced the first round of sanctions against Iran in the 1990s, with oil and trade sanctions justified by an alleged support of terrorist organizations. The second wave began in the early 2000s, with the IAEA suspicious of uranium enrichment programs and a United Nations investigation, continued with the 2005 discovery of Iran’s violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Just in 2015, the international community has reached a long-awaited Joint-Comprehensive Plan of Action with the Iranian government on limiting the state’s nuclear production facilities through inspections.

The Middle East’s balance of power crucially shifted in 1979. The Iranian Revolution exacerbated Western-Iranian tensions and swung the United States to the side of the Saudis. The decades that followed saw the rivals compete for foreign alliances and play their animosity out through calculated measures, such as attacking embassies in 1988, cutting diplomatic relations in 1989, and carrying out small proxy wars in neighboring conflicts, such as Bahrain, Yemen, Iraq, and of course, Syria.

Sectarianism as a Political Sheath

Today we are witnessing the second phase of this tense relationship come to fruition. This has been accomplished through both states’ angering sectarian factions. Farea al Muslimi, an analyst, states, “All the sectarian rhetoric is becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy for these regimes who love to play the sectarian card.” In 1991, Iran and Saudi Arabia resumed diplomatic relations, and both nations experienced a relatively friendly period until the American intervention in Iraq in 2003, where Saudi Arabia perceived Iran manipulating Shi’a militants with the defeat of the Ba’athist Regime. Scholar Brendan O’Neill claims that “much of the bloodshed in Syria is an expression of the Saudi-Iranian battle for the vacuum created by the post-Cold War,” and this rings true when applying balance of power theory.

When the Arab Spring was alive and well, Iran perceived these uprisings as precious opportunities to support Shi’a minorities in neighboring Gulf States, while Saudi Arabia saw it necessary to defend them. I say this because in 2011, Bahrain experienced attempted revolution with the return of Shi’a activist Hassan Mushaima – believed collaborate with Iran – and popular demand for a republic. Days later, Saudi Arabia and the GCC sent military-transport vehicles into Bahrain to stop the uprising in its path. But this is a two-way street. One can see Iranian attempts for influence across the region through the funding of terrorism and revolutionary missions. In Lebanon, Iran has funded the Shi’a terrorist organization, Hezbollah. In Palestine, Iran has been linked with Hamas. In Bahrain – a 61.3% majority Shi’a country under Sunni leadership – it has been hinted Iran encouraged Shi’a citizens to protest al Khalifa’s leadership. In Yemen, Iran funded the Zaidi Shi’a rebels, called Houthis, in a successful attack upon the Yemeni government and President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, forcing him to flee in February 2015. Saudi Arabia followed up with aggressive airstrikes to defend their custodianship of Sunni Islam and purview of their southern neighbors. In Syria, both powers vie for influence among the sectarian divide, with Iran deploying their elite Revolutionary Guards to defend the Alawite Assad Regime and allegedly pour $9 billion into the war effort. This cat and mouse game has molded Iran into of a regional risk-taker and Saudi Arabia into a vulnerable monarchy, cornered and cautious of its neighbors, yet ready to defend those loyal to Sunni religiosity.

Yet, if one singular event turned this cold war between Tehran and Riyadh hot, it has been the Iranian nuclear deal. The inclusion of Iran in the international community is a fundamental threat to Saudi Arabia’s status quo, a status quo backed by a series of American administrations and supplemented through an expensive oil trade that ensured Saudi Arabia a strategic advantage over Tehran. The relationship with the United States has been integral in striking a truly unipolar balance of power in the region, and both states understand that. Saudi Arabia, along with the rest of Gulf countries, knows too well the historical lesson that a weakened relationship with the United States leaves them at the doorstep of their foes. A long-standing ally of the United States, Saudi Arabia feels “betrayed, and now they feel like they must do something, even if it’s the wrong thing.” Riyadh sees the Iran nuclear deal in zero-sum terms and has calculated a more aggressive strategy against Iranian presence in the Gulf, further enhancing this rivalry. To mask this insecurity, Saudi Arabia has been buffering its defense systems. Riyadh has established a 34-member military campaign against terrorism, with states such as Qatar and Pakistan, an alliance that alienates Iran, Syria, and Iraq, despite sharing a common enemy: ISIS. Saudi Arabia’s aggressive foreign policy leaves it vulnerable in the region. Its friends in the Gulf have prompted questioning, its reliable allies in the Levant have frayed under the spark of revolution, and Iran has broken the status quo.

Manipulating the Threads of Sectarianism

For these two regional powers, the logic of driving such a hard-lined sectarian agenda lies in maintaining domestic stability. Escalating sectarian tensions does not only establish a state as a custodian of its religious sect, but also attempts to promote nationalism among citizens.  As has been the case of stirring nationalism at home, foreign threats have also assisted in this pursuit. ISIS – while a threat to national security – has furthered nationalism, especially within Iran. ISIS has deemed itself the true representation of Sunni Islam and has persecuted Shi’a militants, governments, and civilians as a result. While ISIS brands itself as Sunni, it has been a clear-cut national security threat in Saudi Arabia. Yet, Saudi Arabia has tried to catapult itself into the role of commander in an Arab operation against the Islamic State. While it has shared success in isolating Iran, it has garnered several problems in its organization. First of all, Saudi Arabia has named the mission, “The Islamic Coalition,” yet has isolated important Muslim-majority states in the region, such as Syria and Iraq.

When the Kingdom executed al Nimr and ceased diplomatic relations with Iran – a calculated public relations strategy – it expected GCC states to follow their lead. Thus far, only Bahrain and Sudan have cut relations with Tehran, and the United Arab Emirates has promised to “downgrade” their relations with the Persian state. Yet the remaining series of the Saud family’s allies have remained – an unflinching demonstration of shifting confidence between traditional alliances.

Theorizing for the Future

Saudi Arabia and Iran’s rivalry in the region will certainly not alter the global power balance, but it will establish a new dynamic in a region. Looking forward, there are many reasons for Saudi Arabia to be cautious, as there many opportunities and bellicose maneuvers for Iran to seize.

When applying balance of power theory to Middle Eastern sectarian violence, one will realize that two powerhouses are not only tapping into existing ancient Islamic lesions, but also adopting a religious persona that compromises any political exhaustion of the Arab Spring and a fraying political system of dictators. Moving forward, government officials and citizens should be concerned that a rivalry between the two giants will give the Islamic State more leeway to operate and execute their objectives. In addition, the deteriorating relations will deter the momentum of the Syrian Peace Process, and establish an undercurrent of tension that will undercut whatever diplomatic resolution comes to fruition.

Through this we can build, we must build, a defense against repetition.