Resistance in Syria

In early 2011, protests broke out against Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria as part of the Arab Spring. The government responded to the protests - whose motto was ‘the people demand removal of the regime’ - with a violent crackdown. The attempted suppression of the protests quickly backfired, with many Syrians beginning to call for a revolution and taking up arms against the regime. The resulting violence quickly escalated into the Syrian Civil War. For years, the civil war has had the attention of the world as the Syrian people struggled against the dictatorial Assad. The Ghouta chemical attacks in 2013 horrified the world, as the regime killed 1,429 people (426 of whom were children) with sarin gas. This blatant massacre prompted the first, of many, foreign interventions in the civil war, as the United States and its allies threatened to retaliate against the regime if all chemical weapons were not turned over. A few years later, ISIS emerged from the power vacuum and conflict in eastern Syria, fighting both the regime and the rebel opposition. This prompted another foreign intervention, as much of the world cooperated to combat the rise of ISIS’ caliphate. The most significant intervention of the entire war though began in 2015, when Russia began a mass bombing campaign in order to support its ally Assad and keep him in power, which has been tragically effective and deadly.

The Syrian Civil War is still ongoing today and has been marked by intense violence, different factions, and the presence and interventions of multiple foreign powers, each with their own proxies. Today the civil war is far from settled, though the Assad regime has conquered, or pacified, large parts of the country - largely as a result of the brutal bombing campaign by its Russian ally. Despite the fact that the conflict is still ongoing, the international community has inexplicably moved on, acting as if the war had been won by Assad’s government. It seems that much of the world, and now recently even the Biden administration, is treating the Syrian Civil War as solved, and is now considering rapprochement towards the regime. This is a gross rehabilitation of a vicious regime. One that has utilized chemical weapons to kill thousands of its own people, and developed horrific new weapons of war, such as barrel bombs. It also ignores and downplays the conflict and continued resistance that occurs within Syria today in cities like Daara and Idlib, and the Kurdish northeast.

The city of Daara in southwestern Syria has been called the ‘birthplace of the Syrian revolution.’ The arrest of two teenagers in 2011 for anti-Assad graffiti led to an outbreak of protests, to which the regime had a brutal and deadly response. This incident was one of the opening salvos of the civil war. Only after seven long years of fighting was Daara largely captured during a Russian-led offensive in 2018. The remaining areas of the city soon came to an agreement with the Assad regime, brokered and guaranteed by Russia.

Disgruntled and dissatisfied by the lack of good faith shown by the regime in honoring their side of the deal, protests broke out in Daara in late July. Assad’s forces responded swiftly in their usual manner - an indiscriminate bombing campaign and siege of the city. The regime specifically targeted the neighborhood of Daara Al-Bahad, whose representative Central Committee has begged for a ceasefire to solve the water and food shortages. To date the regime’s bombings have killed at least 15 people, with some estimates rising to four times that number.

Yet the bombing of Daara has attracted little to no international attention or support. Daraa represents not only the birth of the struggle against Bashar Al-Assad’s regime, but also that it is ongoing. The regime’s ‘control’ of much of its claimed territory is tenuous at best, and fresh resistance is still taking place.

Similarly, fighting has intensified in and around the city of Idlib in northwestern Syria. A Russian bombing campaign seeks to displace the opposition forces that control most of the governorate. This campaign carries additional risks as well - the situation in Idlib is not as straightforward as in Daara. The city of Idlib and much of the governorate is controlled by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an Islamist group. But a significant portion of the governorate is controlled by the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, an opposition group, which risks a larger regional conflict between Turkey and Russia. Russia’s bombing campaign in Northern Syria also extends to areas firmly in control of the Syrian National Army, deep within the so-called Turkish ‘safe zones’ like Afrin.

But the most significant remaining opposition to Assad’s government is the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria - better known as Rojava. To the east of the Euphrates river, Rojava is a self-governing democratic region of Syria. While dominated by the Kurds, Rojava is notably multi-ethnic, especially in the wake of the influx of refugees and internally displaced persons created in the civil war. With its own armed wing - the Syrian Democratic Forces - Rojava has enjoyed great success combating not only Assad’s forces, but ISIS as well. In fact it was the SDF who led much of the ground fighting against ISIS in Syria.

But for the moment, it is not Assad’s regime that poses the greatest threat against the continued existence and independence of Rojava. Ever since President Trump pulled American troops from their supportive role in Rojava, Turkey has carried out a number of operations against Rojava, invading from the north and seizing territory - making the largest remaining resistance to Assad’s rule fight on two fronts. Turkey sees the existence of an independent Kurdish state as a threat, as they harshly oppress and persecute their own Kurdish minority. The threat posed by Turkey to Rojava is so great, the government of Rojava has indicated they would be open to some form of alliance with Assad’s government against Turkey. Yet despite all these challenges, Rojava has maintained its independence, making the recent attitudes towards Assad all the more strange.

Despite the fact that continued resistance to the regime is still ongoing throughout Syria, the last few months have seen a shocking movement towards acceptance of Assad’s regime. The governments of Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar have all sent emissaries to meet with Assad in the past year, a stunning change of policy when most of these states have previously harshly opposed him. Interpol, the international police organisation, announced in October that Syria - as in Assad’s government - would be readmitted to the body. Not only is this an immoral recognition of the regime, but in time the government will have access to red notices  - the international equivalent of an arrest warrant, allowing the regime to target and harrass dissenters and critics abroad. Recently, even the Biden administration has begun to open negotiations with the regime. Washington is in the early stages of a deal to transport Egyptian natural gas through Jordan and Syria to energy deprived Lebanon - with Assad’s government getting a cut in the process. 

This deal would be a betrayal of those who continue to struggle against the regime and would be a disgusting acceptance of someone who has butchered those who protested against him. Worse, it would make the United States complicit in the crimes of Assad’s regime. Supplying Assad with resources like natural gas only makes it easier for him to keep his grip on a country that rejected his rule. The attempt to alleviate Lebanon’s energy crisis is laudable and humanitarian, and doubtlessly would do much in the way of reducing suffering there. But there has to be another way in which Lebanon’s crisis can be relieved without tying the solution to Assad. This deal would not only help legitimize his rule - recognizing him as the power in Syria - it will provide him with material assets to continue his oppression. The money and energy that the regime will gain from this deal could go straight to propagating the security forces that terrorize the Syrian people.

The United States should reject cooperation and recognition with the Assad regime. It is wrong to ignore the continued resistance towards his regime, and to abandon the allies that we have supported in Syria - especially the bastion of resistance that is Rojava in the Northeast. It is wrong for the international community as well to wash their hands of what is happening in Syria, to pretend that the war is over when the humanitarian crisis is still ongoing. The international community should not seek diplomatic rapprochement with Bashar al-Assad, should not let him and his cronies out from the cold. To do so would be an insult to all the Syrians that he has slaughtered and those that continue to languish under his rule.

Russia’s New Role as Mediator in the MENA Region

President Donald Trump made the abrupt and heavily criticized decision to pull American military personnel out of the Turkey-Rojava border in early October 2019, allowing Turkey to invade the Kurdish-controlled land and for Russian troops to quickly occupy the space that had previously been occupied by United States (U.S.) troops. Since then, the international community has been speculating about Russia’s new role as a mediator in the Middle East, as their rocky past of national-interest-driven policy in the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region has led some to call for an examination of Russia’s priorities in the MENA region. If  Russia’s future endeavors prove successful, Russia has the potential to replace the United States as the most influential non-regional power in the Middle East.

As the successor state to the Soviet Union, Russia inherited all of the experience and influence that the Soviets had earned when politicking in the Middle East. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States were constantly participating in proxy wars. Many of these proxy wars took the shape of civil wars and political coups in the Middle East and Africa, including the Congo Crisis and the Angolan Civil War. However, Middle Eastern and African allies of the Soviet Union were often “disappointed” with the quality of their support: weaponry and training provided by the USSR was less advanced than those provided by the U.S., and the Soviet Union failed to prevent the defeat of their allies. As a result, the general opinion of the Soviet Union--and later, the Russian Federation--gradually declined among Arabs and many states instead turned to the U.S. for monetary and military assistance. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s influence and involvement in the region has diminished as the state’s leaders focused on domestic growth and reform. The United States assumed the helm of the most influential non-regional power in the MENA region and has managed to protect this title without serious competitors until President Trump withdrew American troops from the contested area in northern Syria in October 2019.

Now, the tables have turned. Russian involvement in Middle Eastern politics was renewed in the early 2000’s, shortly after Russian President Vladimir Putin took office. Attempts to regain influence in the MENA region were generally unsuccessful, as before 2011 the only significant mode of influence that Russia pursued were arms sales. Middle Eastern politics were not a priority of Russia until the Arab Spring of 2011, when the protests and revolutions that occurred during this tumultuous time had the potential to destroy any remaining allies that Russia had been able to retain in the Middle East. As their allies in the region began toppling one by one, Russia began to support Syria in earnest through their diplomatic powers in the United Nations. When faced with the possibility of being deposed, the Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, began using violence against Syrian protesters and revolutionaries. Kurdish forces in northeastern Syria fought forcefully for their lands, resulting in Assad withdrawing troops from the region (now called Rojava), leaving nearly ¼ of Syria’s territory to the People’s Protection Units (YPG), a mostly-Kurdish militia. Thus, Russia’s eventual military intervention on behalf of Assad in September 2015, ordered under the guise of fighting terrorism in Syria, was welcomed by the Syrian president, and the deployed Russian forces were ordered to put down the rebels that were threatening Assad’s grasp on the rest of the country. It was this military intervention that cemented Russia’s role as a major player in Middle Eastern politics.

Russia’s decision to support Assad was not simply an attempt to retain allies in the Middle East; it was also a political power play of Putin to indicate Russia’s dedication to sovereignty and centralized government, which simultaneously affirmed Russia’s disapproval of Western leadership structures and military interventions. During the Arab Spring, protests in defiance of Putin and the illiberal policies of the Russian government were occurring throughout the Russian capital of Moscow. Instead of supporting the newly created liberal democracies like Western states (particularly the U.S.), Russia made a point to support the centralized, autocratic governance of Bashar al-Assad and, in doing so, was defending Russia’s own domestic interests. Allowing liberal democratic reform to completely destroy any relationships that Russia had in the Middle East would not only lessen the power and influence that the Kremlin had in the region, but would also diminish Putin’s own legitimacy as a strongman president.

Since the intervention in 2015, Russia has helped Assad regain control of nearly every major Syrian city outside of Rojava, launched peace talks, negotiated a demilitarized zone with Turkey, and maintained a significant military presence within Syria. Russia’s intervention is widely accepted by foreign policy experts as the only thing that ensured the continuation of Assad’s presidency, and the creation of de-escalation zones has helped Assad recapture large areas of land within Syria. Both Assad and Putin have also been heavily criticized by the international community for their use of drones and chemical weapons throughout the duration of the conflict. Russian drone strikes are estimated to have killed around 7,000 Syrian civilians alone, and more than 150 cases of chemical warfare have been reported within Syria since 2015. Although the international community has attempted many times to hold Bashar al-Assad responsible for these war crimes, Russia has proven itself to be both a difficult obstacle for the West and a steadfast ally of Syria. Turkey has been particularly vocal in their condemnation of Erdogan’s and Putin’s actions, as more than 3.6 million refugees of the Syrian Civil War have already fled to Turkey.

Turkey protested heavily when Assad allowed the lands in northern Syria to be occupied by the YPG, as the Turkish government believes the YPG to be associated with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a recognized terrorist organization that has been leading an insurgency in Turkey for many years. When the U.S. troops withdrew, Turkey’s military was able to stage an incursion into the Kurdish-controlled lands of northern Syria, displacing thousands of Kurdish people. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has stated that he plans to resettle Syrian refugees in the northern Syrian lands occupied by Turkish soldiers. Outraged and at risk, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Syria’s Kurdish militia alliance with whom the U.S. had partnered with in an effort to fight the Daesh in Rojava, were forced to make a deal with Assad that allowed his army to advance to the border of Turkish-claimed territory. Thus, the U.S. withdrawal has incited anger and conflict in a region where they had once hoped to prevent further violence.

Acting as a mediator, Russian forces directed the SDF and the Syrian army to the land which had been besieged by Turkey for the past month. On October 22nd, Russian President Putin and Turkish President Erdogan met in Sochi to negotiate a ceasefire. They reached an agreement which created a 75-square mile “safe-zone” along the Turkish-Syrian border, away from which the YPG militia was forced to fall back. Since then, a joint force of Russian and Turkish military has been patrolling the new safe-zone and nearby borderlands to ensure the YPG doesn’t return, and the U.S. has promised to assist in keeping the Kurdish out of the area. As of the time at which this article was written, clashes within the safe zone continue.

Although the Turkish incursion into Kurdish territory has upset many in the West and caused many deaths, Turkey, Russia and Syria have all benefited from the strife. Turkey received a new swath of land in which they can resettle refugees, Syria has further cemented their alliance with Russia, and Russia has gained a new role in this important region. The incursion also occurred during a time in which Russia was already seeing an increase in approval in the Middle East, which can be largely attributed to their “Astana process” dialogue between nations in the region and their well-trained diplomats. Now, having filled the space that the U.S. has abandoned as a mediator, Russia may be able to exert more influence than ever before.

In contrast, the U.S. is showing a decline in popularity within the region due to various foreign policy errors and military failures. President Donald Trump’s ban on migrants from several Muslim countries outraged the Arab community, and the U.S.’s failures in Afghanistan and Iraq have led some to doubt the American military’s ability to succeed in Middle Eastern conflicts. American approval in the region plummeted from 63 percent in 2016 to 41 percent in September 2019, before the U.S. troops were even removed from Northern Syria. This recent misstep, preceded by several years worth of unsuccessful operations and uncertain foreign policy have granted Russia many opportunities to improve their standing in the MENA region--all of which they have used to their advantage.

Since the Cold War, Russia’s foreign policy in the Middle East has been defined by competition with the West. Now that the U.S.’s influence has diminished and their reputation in the Middle East damaged, Russia is taking on the role of mediator between Syria, Turkey, and the Kurds. So far, Russia has taken to this role rather well by using the mistakes that the U.S. has made to their favor and putting the national interests of Russia ahead of the interests of the region.

Most of the actions that Russia has already taken thus far in the MENA region have been entirely self-serving in nature, and either directly or indirectly serve to improve Putin’s grasp of leadership on the world stage. The jihadist threat that created conflict in Chechnya and Dagestan has contributed to Russian foreign policy in the Middle East, as part of their national defense strategy is to prevent terrorism within Russia by fighting jihadist and Islamic terrorist groups while they remain outside of Russia. Additionally, having allies within the Middle East will give Russia access to negotiations regarding oil; as a major oil exporter, Russia would gain from the ability to negotiate international oil prices with other oil rich countries throughout the Middle East.  

By courting Turkey and Syria simultaneously, Russia accomplishes two goals--maintaining influence and power within the MENA region, and pulling Turkey away from its NATO allies. And they’re succeeding--Turkey’s western allies have been withdrawing arms deals, expressing outrage, and threatened sanctions for their recent treatment of the Kurds, engagement in Russian arms deals, and Erdogan’s newfound friendship with Vladimir Putin. Despite the complicated relationship that Turkey and Russia have had in the past, both Erdogan and Putin are more than likely to agree to a new, more friendly relationship if it proves beneficial for both leaders in the long run. Currently, Russia provides Turkey with more than half of its natural gas and almost a quarter of its oil. Additionally, a flourishing trading agreement and the status of Turkey as a popular tourist destination for Russians give Russia and Turkey a very positive economic relationship. This relationship couldn’t come at a better time for the two countries, who are both languishing under Western sanctions. All of these factors are only certain to push Turkey further into the grasp of the Kremlin, as they will be more than happy to continue providing Turkey with arms while simultaneously pulling them away from NATO.

Russian influence and presence in the MENA region is self-serving and interest-driven; however, the presence of the Russian military in Syria and the negotiations and peace talks occurring under the Russian flag have caused some to wonder whether or not a new influence is needed in the Middle East. Others argue that if the non-Western solution means selling out the Kurds, the solutions aren’t worth ponderance. Many opportunities to mediate the conflict have arisen from failures on behalf of the West, and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s skillful navigation of the relationship between Syria and Turkey has astounded policy makers throughout the international community. As Russia continues to engage in peace talks and negotiations, the world watches with bated breath. If Vladimir Putin truly wishes to restore Russia’s status as a major player within the Middle East, he’ll have to continue successfully mediating a conflict that seems to have no easy solution. 

Rogue Ally: Despite Turkish Aggression, the U.S. Should Support the SDF in Syria

On July 20, 2019, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo called his Turkish counterpart, Mevlut Cavusoglu, to discuss the growing list of issues between the pair of longtime allies. While no transcript was provided, the State Department released a summary that, despite its brevity, managed to encapsulate the Trump Administration’s stance on Turkey and Syria: ever ambiguous and deficient in courage. As Turkish troops amassed on the Syrian border, threatening an invasion of territory liberated from the Islamic State (ISIL) by the U.S.-allied Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Secretary Pompeo “reaffirmed” U.S. commitment to Turkish national security while also “reiterating” its support of allied forces in Syria.

What these contradictory statements mean for said American allies –particularly the Kurds, who, in spite of their integral role defeating ISIL, are frequently labeled “terrorists” by Turkish pro-government media– is highly unclear. It is notable that since President Donald Trump’s abrupt call for a total withdrawal of American forces in Syria, then subsequent flip-flop two months later, Washington’s foremost think tanks have gone conspicuously silent on the issue of U.S.-Turkey relations as they relate to Syria, focusing instead on President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s apparent gravitation toward Russia following his government’s purchase of the S-400 missile systems. One can hardly blame them; it is, in fact, quite difficult to analyze a policy when the policy doesn’t appear to exist.

That isn’t to say that the U.S. has been entirely inactive. After Germany declined an American request to deploy ground troops to Syria, both France and the United Kingdom pledged 10 to 15 percent more soldiers, a victory for a president that campaigned on promises to lighten the burden on the U.S. military. However, one report notes that such an increase translates to only “several dozen” troops, an inadequate quantity considering the size of SDF-controlled territory. Additionally, top U.S. officials have visited SDF officials in Syria twice in the past two months, but discussions reportedly centered on counterterrorism strategy rather than political solutions to the Syrian conflict or the looming threat of a Turkish invasion. These are the questions that need answering. No one doubts U.S. desire to combat terrorism.

What the Trump Administration fails to realize –or at the very least, is too content with a tenuous status quo to do anything– is that good counterterrorism requires robust and lasting support, politically as well as militarily. The U.S. certainly desires the enduring defeat of ISIL, but its failure to develop tangible policy reflects a lackluster, fragile commitment to preventing the revival of an extremist safe haven. With multiple regional parties demonstrating aggression toward the SDF, the U.S. needs to act quickly and decisively in support of its ally by pressuring all parties involved into a fair, multilateral deal grounded in citizen security and civil liberties. Continuing down this path of inaction will only result in the perpetuation of conflict, the prolonging of the refugee crisis, and the potential for a revival of a territorial ISIL.

Current Threats to Stability in Northeastern Syria

Presently, the SDF-held territory in northeastern Syria –known as the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (NES)– rests in an extraordinarily precarious position. Its western border is shared with two parties, the Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army (TFSA) and Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian Arab Army (SAA), both of which –though in conflict with one another– oppose the SDF. The TFSA, in congruence with the anti-Kurdish sentiments of its patron, has launched two major operations that targeted Kurds, the latter of which resulted in “widespread human rights violations” and displaced over 150,000 people from Syria’s Afrin district. As for the Syrian regime forces, Assad has stated that he intends to retake all territory within Syria’s pre-war borders, an undertaking that would take years, but, considering his backing from Russia, is a credible threat nonetheless.

Internally, the SDF struggles against remnants of ISIL. Having been territorially defeated in March, its militants now resort to asymmetrical warfare in the form of urban bombings and rural arson; the former disrupts a sense of rare, cherished stability in a region engulfed by conflict, while the latter destabilizes an already feeble economy. ISIL cells have destroyed some 50,000 acres of NES land since May, reportedly costing the nascent governing administrations $50 million worth in crops.

Turkey’s Historical Oppression of the Kurds and its Contemporary Relevance

While the TFSA, Assad regime, and ISIL cells make for pressing threats, the NES’ greatest challenge emanates from its northern neighbor. Since the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the founding of the Republic of Turkey, Turkish authorities have sought national unity through societal homogeneity, or Turkification. This policy essentially criminalizes cultural diversity; from the Armenian Genocide in the early 20th century to today’s ongoing anti-Semitism, minorities in Turkey have long faced persecution at the hands of the government. In Turkey’s Kurdish Question, a 1998 book by Graham E. Fuller and Henri J. Barkey, the authors point out that the government’s anti-Kurdish sentiment was not just rhetoric, but law:

In the 1924 [Republic of Turkey] constitution, the terms “citizenship” and “citizen” had been equated with Turkishness. Accordingly, the document stated that one had to be a Turk to become a member of parliament and the like. Certainly Kurds could qualify as “Turks,” but only at the expense of denying their own ethnic identity.

Rather than do so, Kurds organized and revolted, most notably in the form of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). In 1984, after years of preparation and intra-Kurdish strife, the PKK launched its insurgency against the Turkish state, striking military checkpoints and barracks in the towns of Semdinli and Eruh. It was the start of a decades-long conflict that, despite the 1999 capture of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan and the occasional ceasefire, endures today.

Herein lies Turkey’s issue with American partnerships in Syria. The SDF is a pluralistic organization consisting of Arabs, Syriac Christians, and Yazidis, among others, but it is predominantly Kurdish, having originated from the People’s Protection Units (YPG), a well-organized Syrian Kurdish militia dating back to 2004. The U.S. listed the PKK as a terrorist organization in 1997 but never extended its designation toward the YPG. Turkey, on the other hand, views the YPG as an extension of the PKK, and given its proximity to Turkey’s southeastern borders, as a viable threat to its national security. 

The Case for the SDF

I suppose this is the world we live in: one in which a state can spend nearly a century attempting to erase the identities of its indigenous ethnic groups, then throw a tantrum when one of them decides to revolt. The only catch here is that the SDF, unlike the PKK, does not aspire to harm Turkey, its well-armed bully of a neighbor; in fact, the U.S. formed its alliance with the SDF on the condition that it would not target Turkish state forces, as such an attack would require an American response under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization charter. All NES residents want is for the Assad regime, ISIL, and Turkey to leave it alone.

Why should the U.S. stand by the SDF? For one, the U.S. is safer with a stable Levant. ISIL’s rise was only possible because of the vacuum created by the Syrian Civil War. With a well-governed political entity positioned in its former territory, the vacuum closes, and the region is less susceptible to extremist violence. This is especially critical given the SDF’s protection of the al-Hol camp, a facility holding some 70,000 displaced individuals, many of whom are family members of former ISIL militants. Deputy major commander of the U.S.-led coalition called inhabitants of al-Hol the “next generation” of ISIL, but the international community has taken no major steps to resolve the problem. The U.S. could take the lead by assisting the SDF and human rights organizations in maintaining and securing the camps while administering rehabilitation programs and returning foreign fighters to their native countries for trial.

Secondly, U.S. presence in the region acts as another theater to indirectly confront Iran. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s government has real influence in Syria and Iraq via its support of the Assad regime, its regional militias, and the transnational shipping route often referred to as the “land bridge.” A capable, U.S.-supported SDF can deter the Assad regime and Iranian militias from encroaching in northeastern Syria, and its presence also inhibits Iranian arms, supplies, and fighters from reaching the Syrian regime or Hezbollah, Iran’s proxy force in Lebanon and a principal threat to Israel.

Lastly, the SDF’s territories is the antithesis of its enemies. NES is a multiethnic, religiously diverse entity operating on principles of feminism, secularism, and local governance, all of which are in sharp contrast to Erdogan’s nationalism, ISIL’s extremism, and Assad’s autocracy. It is rare that the U.S. arms militants whose values reflect a fervent interest in human rights and democracy.

Reevaluating the U.S.-Turkey Relationship

Whereas the SDF has proven itself as an accountable ally, Turkey’s domestic political trends and ties to Syrian-based extremist groups suggest that its relationship with the U.S. is not what it used to be. The U.S. cannot afford to be sclerotic in its foreign policy –realizing and adapting to changing realities is requisite to being a positive global force– and at the present, it must respond to Turkey’s gross incompetence in combatting terrorism and clear democratic backsliding. 

Known as the “gateway to Jihad,” the Turkish-Syrian border became a port for the 40,000 foreign fighters that traveled to participate in the conflict. With ISIL recruits pouring over the Turkish border into Syria, the Erdogan government played dumb, refusing to implement even basic measures that would stem the flow of fighters. Scant oversight at the border allowed active militants to retreat into Turkey for health services. “We used to have some fighters — even high-level members of the Islamic State — getting treated in Turkish hospitals,” an ISIL commander told the Washington Post in 2014.  “And also, most of the fighters who joined us in the beginning of the war came via Turkey, and so did our equipment and supplies.”

Turkey stood to gain from an extremist insurgency in Syria in the most cynical of senses; the republic shares two common enemies with Da’esh and like-minded groups, the Alawi government in Damascus and the majority Kurdish population in the northeast. Now that its initial strategy to defeat Kurdish-led forces via extremist proxies has failed, President Erdogan’s government is transitioning to plan B, applying significant political and military pressure on the SDF in an effort to bring the U.S. to a detrimental agreement. The aforementioned TFSA invasion of Afrin in 2018 was not a direct threat to American ground forces, but it drew Kurdish SDF militias out of NES territory who wanted to protect Kurdish civilians, weakening the region’s security. In early July, Turkey began amassing troops along the NES border, and shortly after, Foreign Minister Cavusoglu warned of an attack if his government’s proposed “safe zone” was not established. As of today, Turkey’s aggression has met little U.S. resistance.

Recommendations: Robust Military, Economic, and Political Support for the SDF

Turkey hopes that its acts of aggression will force the U.S. to accept its proposed “safe zone,” a plan that roughly translates to Turkey unilaterally annexing of a large portion of SDF-controlled territory. This is a nonstarter for Syria’s Kurds, who justifiably expect persecution under a Turkish occupation. Thus, the U.S. needs to move quickly and definitively against Turkish pressure by supporting the NES with increased military presence, as well as valuable economic and political assistance.

In regards to military support, the U.S. and coalition members should increase the number of ground troops in the NES. While thousands of Turkish troops are gathering on the border, U.S. coalition forces are said to only number in the hundreds. This is not an endorsement of armed conflict with our NATO ally. The issue is that Turkey believes the U.S. is susceptible to persuasion, and with good reason; after all, President Trump’s decision to withdraw forces in December came immediately after a phone call with President Erdogan. By succumbing to pressure, President Trump demonstrated uncertainty about supporting the SDF, an uncertainty that Turkey is currently exploiting. An increase in troops would signal firm commitment to the SDF, robbing Turkey of its diplomatic leverage and granting NES residents peace of mind.

Economic well-being is closely related to citizen security Northeastern Syria, with its sprawling agricultural fields and oil reserves, has unique potential to thrive economically, but it lacks the adequate technology to do so; currently, Syrian farmers use antiquated methods to harvest their wheat and have no way to effectively fight the crop fires ignited by Da’esh arsonists. Destroyed roads can inhibit the transportation of goods and aid, and damaged sewers create sanitation problems. The U.S. should formally declare its backing of the SDC and provide it with the resources it needs to develop sustainably.

Political recognition and assistance would permit the SDC a seat at the negotiating table, giving northeastern Syria a say in its future. As of the publication of this article, Syrian opposition parties have not allowed SDC representatives to participate in talks with the Assad regime and its international backers. Demonstrations of international support for the SDC, such as a Swedish delegation visit in early July, have reportedly warmed opposition parties to the idea of inviting SDC representatives to talks. A clear demonstration of American support would influence them further.

Final Thoughts: Support of SDF is Worth the Diplomatic Rift

In April, I wrote that the U.S. should revise its policy toward Saudi Arabia given its perpetration of human rights abuses and continued failure to curb extremism. The U.S.-Saudi relationship runs deep, but American policymakers are too keen to turn a blind eye to the Kingdom’s transgressions for the sake of the relationship. Turkey’s case is similar; as with the Saudi regime, we could bend to its wishes, defer to the judgment of its leaders, and dismiss undemocratic and harmful policies as irrelevant or untrue. President Erdogan’s behavior in his region is his prerogative, the thinking goes; as an ally, we trust him to act broadly in our interest.

However, this is clearly not the case, and it’s time to turn a new page in U.S.-Turkey relations. Its faults are egregious and well-documented, and its enemies are our friends. The U.S. should not fear divergence from an ally if that ally diverges from American values and goals.

Fixing an International Dilemma in an Unstable Region: U.S. Mitigation of the Turkish-Kurdish Conflict

The Dilemma

The long-standing relationship between the United States and Turkey continues to deteriorate due to the intensifying armed conflict between the Turkish military and Kurdish insurgent groups in Syria, Iraq and Iran who desire an independent Kurdistan that would give them greater political and cultural rights.

To combat the Islamic State (IS), the United States supports the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union (PYD) and relies on the PYD’s military wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG). Yet the main reason for the ongoing U.S.-Turkey military conflict lies in US support of the PYD. Because Turkey is battling the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), a listed terrorist group that President Erdoğan believes is an offset of the PYD, Turkey sees American support for these Kurdish organizations as undermining their interests and regional power.

It is imperative that the United States act immediately to de-escalate the tensions between Turkey and various Kurdish insurgent groups while continuing the fight against the Islamic State, who, despite recently losing territory and influence in the region, continues to pose a threat to nearby countries and the US. The United States in particular is one of the leading actors in this issue, and must continue to be a primary fighting force, because national interests are at stake. As long-term NATO allies, the US and Turkey not only share an allyship, but Turkey is in a key geopolitical position, serving as a central point between Asia, Europe, and Africa. By mending their relationship with Turkey, the US will continue to be able to rely on Turkey as the only Muslim NATO member to serve as a bridge between the Western and Muslim worlds, which can help stabilize the volatile Middle East. Furthermore, Turkey similarly relies on the United States and its Western forces to battle the IS, a group that continues to engage in violent terrorist attacks within the country.

Failure to immediately rectify the situation may result in the degradation of the US-Turkey alliance and the growth of the Islamic State. Should the US side with the Kurds, they run the risk of Turkey strengthening their political and economic relationship with Russia, and it could push Turkey to further retaliate against the YPG and ultimately the US. Yet, the United States relies heavily on Kurdish insurgency groups, such as the PYD, as the main fighting forces against the IS on the ground, especially in aiding local Arab militias in Syria. Therefore, if the United States sides with Turkey, they may lose critical Kurdish trust and military support in the fight against the IS due to the tension between the Turks and the Kurds. Nevertheless, fixing the rising tensions is possible and can be done three ways: by revising the current Turkish Constitution, continuing to supply Kurdish fighters with American weapons, and utilizing the US-Turkey relationship as NATO allies to begin talks of a ceasefire.

First Recommendation: Modify the Turkish Constitution

The United States should encourage Turkey to make changes to its 1982 Constitution to grant basic rights back to the ethnic minority groups that reside in Turkey. Successfully updating the constitution should be a priority in solving the Turkish-Kurdish dispute. The conflict’s origins and subsequent intensification stems from the lack of rights attributed to the Kurds in the country’s constitution. The Turkish government historically oppressed Kurdish cultural identity and language through impediments in the process of assimilating them into society. After declaring itself a republic in 1923, Turkey’s capital of Ankara adopted an ideology with the goal of eliminating non-Turkish elements within Turkey, all of which were primarily Kurdish. The country’s efforts to “Turkify” individuals by relying on Turkish ethnicity to define citizenship resulted in the mass persecution of the Kurdish population, which is one of the driving forces behind the desire for an independent Kurdistan today.

As of now, the Turkish Constitution is authoritarian and alienating to those who aren’t of Turkish ethnicity, but unfortunately the discussion and possibility of revising the constitution has decreased. The lack of an inclusive constitution with rights and protections that extend to minority groups has been a factor in causing social unrest among the Kurdish population and furthering the mission of the PKK. This, again, contributed greatly to the Kurds’ desire to create an independent Kurdistan that would allow them to have greater political and cultural autonomy. Therefore, the Turkish Constitution should be revised immediately. Significant changes would make it more democratic and establish that all differences, such as ethnicity or language, are protected under the constitution. With this, the improvement in the view and treatment of the Kurds may lay the foundation for peace talks in the future.

Second Recommendation: Return to Supplying Arms

The United States should return to supplying weapons to Kurdish fighters in Syria who are combating the Islamic State. As of late 2017, President Trump announced that the US will no longer provide arms to the Kurds. However, the supply of weapons by the US is vital in creating a strongly armed group of Kurdish fighters that can successfully defend themselves as they counteract the IS. For example, in May 2017 President Trump approved a plan to arm the Kurds, and therefore the YPG, directly to prepare for their assault and capture of Raqqa, which was the IS’ de facto capital of the caliphate. Subsequently, after arming them with machine guns and other warfare weapons, the American-backed YPG successfully seized Raqqa in October of 2017 in what was a major blow to the legitimacy and control of the IS.

However, a drawback of this recommendation is that it could cause even more tension between the US and Turkey. Due to US support of the YPG, a group Turkey believes to be an extension of the PKK, Turkey’s President Erdoğan could see the supply of arms to the YPG as a threat to the country because those weapons could end up in the hands of the PKK. Yet, a benefit of this recommendation is that it aligns with America’s desire to decrease the number of troops deployed in Syria. By providing the Kurds with more weapons, the US can rely more on local forces and slowly begin to withdraw American troops from the conflict zone.

Third Recommendation: Negotiate a Ceasefire

Lastly, the United States should take advantage of its relationship with Turkey as NATO allies to lead a political peace process that negotiates a ceasefire between Turkish military forces and the Kurdish YPG in Syria. The YPG are instrumental in fighting the IS on the ground, yet they are suffering immense losses due to air and land attacks by Turkey’s military force.

However, a downside of this recommendation lies in the fact that Turkey views the YPG’s presence in Syria as a security threat to the country. Turkey’s President Erdoğan also considers the US’s support of the YPG militia to be a betrayal as he sees the YPG as an offset of the terrorist group PKK. Furthermore, the ceasefire would only provide a temporary solution to the complicated conflict so that the two sides could focus on defeating the IS.

An upside of this recommendation is that previous ceasefires between the Turkish government and the PKK succeeded for many years before they were eventually broken. While a ceasefire may be temporary, it would help centralize the fight around the IS and provide the foundation for more comprehensive peace talks and a long-term ceasefire in the future between the two groups.

Looking to the Future

The Turkish-Kurdish conflict began the moment Turkey failed to make a provision for a Kurdish state, thereby leaving the Kurds, a population of around 15 million in the country, with a minority status and a lack of both representation and rights. The tension between the two sides has been ongoing ever since, and as an ally to the United States politically and militarily, as they are instrumental in fighting the Islamic State, the US is heavily interested and involved in the conflict as well. As a result, all three recommendations for ways in which the United States can mitigate the Turkish-Kurdish conflict are presented with the following goals in mind: first, by successfully mitigating the conflict between the two groups, the US can begin to minimize the threat that the IS poses to them, as combating the IS would be easier when the two sides are working together with the same goal in mind; second, the US can start to decrease the volatility of the Middle East, as there will be one less pair of warring groups, and consequently states, to add to the mix.

The conflict continues in 2018, thirty-four years after the insurgency began, with little change. Since President Trump took office and called for a halt on the provision of arms to the Kurds, the Islamic State has lost territory, but still remains a threat, and tensions between the Turks and the Kurds remain high. Not much progress has been made between the two groups to de-escalate the situation, and the United States has failed to enact any significant changes. Unless these recommendations are made, the future for these two warring groups and the prospect of an independent Kurdistan looks to be the same as it currently is now: bleak.

The Global Struggle to Accommodate Displaced Persons: Options for U.S. Policy Towards the Syrian Refugee Crisis

In 2011, a civil war broke out in Syria displacing an estimated 11 million people from their homes. The war led to one of the largest humanitarian crises of the century. As a result, six million people have dispersed inside Syria, and another 4.8 million are seeking solace in neighboring states such as Turkey and Jordan. Further effects on the international community include: the rise of extremist groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and a change in the United States’ relationship with Russia and China. As a superpower, to help reduce the number of refugees worldwide, the United States must continue to mitigate the effects of the crisis under President Donald Trump. One option is to expand the country’s current “open door” policy. Another option is to implement changes to the current resettlement program. A third option is to increase the aid given to the countries that are hosting the majority of refugees. The preferred method is to reform the current resettlement program.

Background

When the Arab Spring uprisings began, President Bashar al-Assad responded by sending tanks into cities and using regime forces against civilians. Yet, the UN Security Council has since failed to reach a successful diplomatic solution; fighting has escalated, the death toll has risen, and human rights violations such as chemical weapons attacks, torture, and barrel bombing of civilian areas have continued to occur. The war has caused mass displacement. There are over 8 million refugees in Syria, 1 million in Lebanon, over 245,000 in Iraq, and 2 million in Turkey. While the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has provided medical supplies and food, the United States’ focus has been using military airstrikes against ISIS targets. Since the election of President Trump, the U.S. has increased military intervention. With the death toll unknown, the Syrian Civil War shows no definite signs of ending, and the continuation of the conflict will likely result in a greater number of refugees worldwide, prompting action from the international community.

“Open Door” Policy

One approach to mitigating the Syrian refugee crisis is to revitalize the United States’ commitment to accepting refugees with an open door policy. Essentially, this means the U.S. will greatly increase the number of refugees they accept annually. Such a policy has a plethora of benefits, including economic growth and urban revitalization. According to the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, the Turkish economy will expand by 3.5% in 2017-2018 despite spending nearly 5.37 billion euros funding 2 million refugees. While there were expenses, the costs to the stable country proved to be more social and political than economic. If the United States were to take in a fraction of the refugees that Turkey has, the economy would prosper at an even greater level. It is also important to note that an influx of refugees helps to revitalize urban cities that are facing early signs of deindustrialization. While the primary concern is that refugees steal American jobs, in many cases, refugees often take the jobs that Americans don’t want, and can transform “desolate areas into thriving neighborhoods” by increasing the population, expanding the tax base by setting up their own businesses, and providing more customers for domestic companies.

Yet there are several problems with this policy. First, an increase in the number of Syrian refugees in the country does not seem plausible amid the current political climate. As Europe takes in more refugees, violent attacks occur within the European Union (EU). Ever since the September 2001 attacks, the public has viewed refugees through a terrorist lens. After the 2015 attack in Paris, 53% of Americans said the U.S. should stop accepting refugees, which differs when compared to the 75% that supported Obama’s refugee efforts earlier that year. The coverage of the European attacks has caused increased feelings of fear and hostility among the public, who are seeing the risks that go with the acceptance of undocumented refugees in the EU.

On the international level, this policy seems unlikely as the United States is not lawfully obligated to take action. According to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, states are only told what not to do with refugees, which is to return them to their native country. International law also proclaims that the first country a refugee reaches is responsible for hosting them, and is usually where they will reside. Legally, the U.S. is not required to act beyond accepting those who make it to the border. However, as a global superpower, the U.S. faces international backlash and shaming if they don’t take action. While an “open door” policy seems like a simple answer, accepting more refugees only decreases the number abroad, and does not provide a solution for solving the refugee crisis in its entirety.

Reform the Resettlement Program

Implementing changes to the United States’ current resettlement program furthers the open door policy while remaining both feasible and practical. While a thorough process is necessary to weed out threats, the current vetting process is extensive and arduous. As of now, refugees must wait 18-24 months for acceptance into the country. Refugees must go through comprehensive interviews and security checks by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and nine nonprofits before being granted asylum. To speed up the adjudication process, the government should perform background investigations with more force and resources. The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) interviews applicants abroad to see if they are eligible for resettlement. Placing more USCIS groups on the ground has proven beneficial thus far; for example, in Maryland and Virginia, over 2,400 Syrian refugees arrived in 2016 due to upgrades in processing facilities and an increase in DHS teams in Jordan and Turkey. As Syrian background checks can take up to three years, the more applicants interviewed, the greater chance they have in moving on in the process. The government must also expand the USCIS’s reunification program to allow Syrian-Americans to bring extended family into the country. The USCIS grants refugees the ability to petition for relatives to stay with them, but it’s limited to their spouse or children. By making petitions available for extended family, such as grandparents or cousins, the number of refugees abroad will decrease, giving DHS teams the chance to quickly send certain refugees to the process’ security screening step.

Making changes to quicken the resettlement process has numerous benefits. For one, it reduces the death toll by immediately taking in the most vulnerable victims of the Syrian war. Those individuals are usually women, children, and the injured. Improving the program also holds symbolic importance by demonstrating solidarity among the United States and other countries within the international community. Simply increasing the number of accepted refugees can alleviate the pressure that refugee-heavy states feel and could convince alternative states to take in refugees themselves. By reforming the system to increase admission, the United States is also affirming their support for refugees and human rights, which improves their standing and reputation among other states in the international system.

Nonetheless, there are several obstacles with this policy. First, given the current hostile climate of the American public, it is unlikely that Congress will increase refugee admissions. Furthermore, the U.S.’s lack of action could prompt international shaming, and can undermine other countries’ efforts to provide asylum. While the U.S. has pulled its weight before when they took in over 700,000 refugees post-Vietnam War, their indecisiveness over Syrian refugees shows state selectivity and a lack of continuity when it comes to assisting in humanitarian crises. Overall, while making changes to the resettlement program lessens the number of displaced persons abroad, it doesn’t serve as a concrete solution to the Syrian war itself.

Increase Aid Abroad

Rather than accepting more refugees or reforming the resettlement program, the United States should provide more aid to the countries that are hosting the highest number of refugees. During the war, close to four million refugees were resettled in Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan, with more than 1.3 million in Europe. The war has spilled beyond Syria’s borders, which undermines the security in the volatile region, allowing for extremist groups like ISIS to gain power and traction. Due to its severity, many refugees are living with little food, water or shelter. If the hostile environment in the U.S. continues, the country’s objective should shift to ensuring that refugee-heavy countries have the resources to effectively provide for them. To help one such country, the U.S. sent $1 billion to Jordan to help provide military and economic aid. Internationally, multiple donors have contributed $14.6 billion in aid over the past four years, with the United States providing $4.5 billion. Much of the U.S.’s assistance comes in the form of non-governmental organizations relief efforts like UNICEF and the UNHCR, to which the U.S. donated over $1.4 billion. By providing more aid towards asylum countries, the U.S. is furthering efforts that work on crucial issues of displacement, humanitarian relief, and food aid.

If President Trump were to abide by this policy, there would be many benefits. First, there is the potential for the U.S to help prevent the destabilization of countries in the region. Many of the asylum countries are heavily reliant on international support. By providing food, shelter and medical care, the U.S. is slowing refugee travel, and mitigating the war's impact on local governments that are struggling to cope with the influx of refugees. These relief efforts also give the U.S. the chance to prove its ability to lead without directly accepting any risk to its own well-being. As most of the distressed states are western allies, namely Turkey, Lebanon and France, U.S. relief efforts place them in a favorable light in their international relationships.

Yet, despite its advantages, this policy method is not infallible. The current aid provided by the U.S. is not enough to ease the pressure felt by asylum states, and the provision of that aid fails to fix the main source of the crisis. According to the World Food Program (WFP), it became necessary to reduce the value of food vouchers for Syrian refugees due to a shortage of resources and funding. In Lebanon, the ration allowance decreased from $27 per month per person to $13.50. The UN, despite requesting $8.4 billion to fund efforts in Syria in 2015, only received $3.8 billion, which is not enough to help everyone in need. Furthermore, while sending aid relieves and supports in the short-term, it fails to address the root of the refugee crisis. As withdrawing resources is not a practical option, the U.S. must continue to increase assistance while the statuses of refugee camps and states are still known. If the violence were to suddenly escalate, refugees would disperse, aid or not, and chances of survival for displaced people are higher if they have the resources to start with rather than not at all.

Preferred Method

The United States’ best option for effectively dealing with the Syrian refugee crisis is to reform the current resettlement program, as it involves a combination of options one and two. This policy would make procedural changes to increase the number of refugees accepted into the country, while also limiting the burden felt by refugee-laden countries and protecting the economic well-being of the United States. If the U.S. pursued option three, they run the risk of severe economic consequences. Increasing aid is not a practical solution as President Trump has repeatedly pledged to slash non-defense program spending, which includes emergency aid. Furthermore, both President Trump and the Republican party believe that reducing the current $21 trillion debt is imperative for the well-being of the country, and that progress is achievable by enacting cuts within the federal government. Thus, providing even more money to struggling states does not seem feasible in the current political climate, as it only serves to increase the debt.However, since the Syrian refugee crisis is a worldwide concern, it’s important that the United States utilize their available resources and take progressive action. As a global superpower, the U.S. has an international responsibility to protect and aid countries that are unable to do so themselves. By reforming the resettlement program, which then allows for the admission of more refugees, the U.S. is helping to decrease the number of displaced people abroad. Moreover, while reforming the resettlement process has financial consequences, it has the potential of enacting long-lasting change to an immigration process that could prove beneficial in the future if another dire situation arises.

The Struggle to Accommodate Refugees in the Global South

The nations accommodating the unprecedented number of refugees in the world do not possess the resources required to adequately meet the challenge before them. The host countries of refugees face a monumental task, no matter their circumstances. Migrant networks share information about modes of transportation and border-permeability. This allows ethnic and religious communities to reunite, even after forceful displacement from their countries of origin. Once refugee communities begin to coalesce in new cities, those cities are ethically obligated to attend to the needs of the displaced population that they are now accommodating. Federal governments may develop systems to distribute these communities to different cities throughout a nation in the face of a substantial influx, but this tests cities’ public infrastructure in cases of unprecedented numbers or extended duration. Destination cities for refugees are obligated to provide vocational training, labor market integration, social housing, security for such housing, language courses, health services, and supplemental programming such as athletic and cultural events. The strain that accommodating these needs puts a government under depends on the capabilities of that government.

Meeting these needs constitutes an enormous task for any city, but this challenge is especially pronounced for governments in the Global South. While Western nations are entangled in policy debates concerning how many refugees they should allow across their borders and how to properly integrate refugee communities into society, nations of the Global South struggle to muster the financial means to materially support refugees already within their borders. Nations in the Global North have the luxury to debate their moral imperative to support refugees. Nations of the Global South are not afforded such a choice. Countries of the subaltern, meaning those pushed to the social, economic, and political periphery in postcolonial theory, already spurned by global economic systems, presently support a disproportionate portion of the global refugee population. The number of refugees in the world has increased exponentially during the 21st century, rising from 21.2 million in 2000 to 40.8 million in 2015. The weight of this substantial increase in refugees rests squarely upon the back of the already strained governments of the Global South, with the Database for Institutional Comparisons in Europe reporting that the Global South currently hosts “86 percent of all the refugees registered worldwide and 99 percent of all internally displaced persons.” The approximately 35,000,000 refugees currently accommodated by nations in the Global South mark a stark contrast to the 50,000 refugees that Donald Trump mandated be allowed to enter the United States, the lowest number since 1986. The restricted resources commanded by governments of the Global South result in initiatives that often focus solely on the immediate needs of refugees, ignoring factors that are key to fostering long term stability. It is important to explore and understand the struggles that governments of the Global South face when accommodating refugees in order formulate the policy options available to them.

Context: Refugee Support in the Global North

The intense fiscal challenge of supporting refugees is best illustrated by an examination of the systems used by Western nations, such as Germany, to properly support their refugee population. The German model of refugee accommodation is highly bureaucratic, which, although providing some of the most comprehensive care for refugees, also comes with high administrative costs. This intense institutional support relies on Germany’s economic strength and rigorous tax structure, thus inhibiting nations of the Global South from replicating the system. Germany became an ersatz-haven for Syrian refugees in 2015 after invoking the “sovereignty clause” of the European Union’s 2013 Dublin Regulation (Regulation No. 604/2013, Dublin III Regulation) to opt out of relocating asylum seekers to their country of first entry into the EU. This was enacted to ease the challenges that accommodating the influx of Syrian refugees placed on EU border nations such as Greece and Italy.

Germany’s economic strength allows it to finance multiple levels of government agencies responsible for supporting its refugee population. Upon arrival, Germany’s Federal Office of Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge) allots refugees to different states, and then municipalities, depending on the local tax revenue and population. State governments cover the costs of schooling, initial registration, and the creation of reception centers. Municipal governments provide for long-term housing, health care, and integration measures. This spurred some municipalities to create their own further municipal offices to attend to such needs, such as Freiburg’s “Office of Migration and Integration” (Amt für Migration und Integration), which handles issues such as social welfare, volunteer coordination, and labor market integration. Immediately after applying for asylum in Germany, refugees are issued identification paperwork (Aufenhaltsgestattung), and receive social housing, government welfare, and employment assistance while their application are processed. During their first months after arrival, refugees live in a reception center where food and clothing is provided for, and they receive an additional roughly €150 per month for living expenses. Soon after, refugees move into social housing (Wohnnheime) with social workers on site, and can receive roughly €350 per month to cover all of their living expenses. If their application for asylum is accepted, Germany issues refugees a residence permit (Aufenhaltserlaubnis), allowing refugees to continue to receive government welfare funds for more than a year. Even if a refugee’s application for asylum is rejected, Germany does not deport them from the country. Instead, refugees receive toleration papers (Duldung) that allow them to remain in the country, still residing in social housing and receiving welfare funds, but for a more limited amount of time. This highly bureaucratic system adeptly attends to the needs of refugees arriving in Germany, yet it relies on strong federal and local governments supported by an impressive economy. This model of refugee accommodation cannot be replicated by countries of the Global South that do not have the same immense resources at their disposal, and thus a different approach is necessary.

The number of Asylum-Seeker welfare recipients per 1,000 inhabitants, demonstrating the strength of the German government support system. From the Brookings Institution.

Iraq: Supporting Internally Displaced Persons while in Conflict

The challenges that Iraq’s government faces diverge sharply from those supported by the well-funded German system, with the colossal challenge of supporting an internally displaced population resulting from decades of conflict and exacerbated by the emergence of Daesh in recent years.  Iraq’s history with internally displaced persons (IDPs) can be divided into three separate phases. Phase One encompasses the roughly 1.2 million people displaced by nearly four decades of Saddam Hussein’s rule in Iraq. Beginning as early as 1974, Hussein engaged in a campaign of ethnic cleansing and intentional displacement that was primarily enacted against the Kurdish population in the country’s north and the Marsh Arabs in the country’s south, in an attempt to homogenize and Arabize the nation. Phase Two of Iraq’s IDP struggle coincides with the United States’ invasion of Iraq in 2003 and Hussein’s departure from power. During this time, the American invasion displaced 200,000 new Iraqis, while another 500,000 simultaneously returned to their former homes following the end of Hussein’s rule. The majority of new IDPs created during this phase resulted from the sectarian violence between 2006 and 2008, ignited by the bombing of the sacred Shi’a Two Askari Imams in Samara. Retributive violence against Sunni Muslims increased the number of new Iraqis displaced during the second phase to 1.6 million people by the middle of 2008. After this new swath of sectarian-provoked displacements, the International Organization for Migration estimated that the total number of IDPs in Iraq reached 2.8 million. Finally, Phase Three of displacement in Iraq began with the fall of Fallujah to Daesh in 2014 that displaced more than half a million people in Iraq’s Anbar province, after which the number of IDPs skyrocketed due to the prolonged conflict with the terrorist organization. That same year, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reported that Iraq suffered the greatest number of new displacements in the world, with at least 2.2 million new displaced persons. The crisis has not relented in recent years, with the current IDPs numbering 3.2 million Iraqis, roughly one in ten people in the nation. The number of IDPs in Iraq reached an all-time high around June 30th, 2017, as the military effort to retake the city of Mosul in the Ninewa province concluded. More than one million people were displaced in the Ninewa province in total, and the same number of people in the Mosul area were estimated to be inaccessible to humanitarian aid. The Iraqi government is ill-equipped to support such a large internally displaced population while simultaneously fighting Daesh.

During the summer of 2017, an amalgamated 7.3 million people in Iraq were vulnerable and in need of required assistance across the country. Currently, in the Salahuddin province, municipal authorities have evicted nearly 600 families of Daesh militants from their homes. Despite condemnations from Iraqi politicians across the country, the policies of the Salahuddin province only exacerbate the problem of IDPS within their own country. Children comprise half of the recently expanded displaced population, with more than half a million forced to miss more than a year of education as a result of their displacement. In refugee camps, a scant 50 percent of children are attending school, and that number drops to 30 percent outside of refugee camps. Missing crucial education and at risk of physical harm, sexual violence, and radicalization, the situation of these children creates yet another challenge for the success of an Iraqi state in the future. In 2015, only 9 percent of Iraqi IDPs lived in refugee camps in Iraq, with between 60 and 90 percent living in private accommodations such as rented rooms and host families, and the rest in critical shelter arrangements such as former schools and hospitals. The large population of IDPs in Iraq living in private accommodations is characteristic of the distinctly different struggle of refugees in the Global South, for this population faces eviction if they are unable to pay for their accommodations. The Iraqi government attempts to mitigate the costs of such accommodations, providing an initial cash payment of 1 million Iraqi dinars (approximately $850) for each displaced family. However, this amount can only cover the cost of a meager few weeks of food and shelter, and this hardship is intensified by the fact that 40 percent of the new IDPs in Iraq have not received this payment. A large amount of the IDPs moved to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, due to the region’s more stable economy and a history of accepting religious minorities, causing the population of the region to swell by 30 percent. This unprecedented increase in population puts host families under intense strain, leading to negative coping mechanisms such as child labor and early marriages. The tenuous status of IDPs in Iraq and the lack of reliable infrastructure to support the displaced community resulted in a paucity of necessary health care resources, culminating in a cholera outbreak that pervaded 15 of the 18 governorates in 2015. The protracted nature of conflict in Iraq destroyed local infrastructure and created successive waves of IDPs that the state government is unable to adequately support.

The displaced persons of Iraq who fled the country overwhelmingly reside in other nations of the Global South that have similarly scarce means of supporting them. In 2008, there were roughly 1.5 million Iraqi refugees living in Syria, 500,000 in Jordan, and 250,000 more in other countries. Syria was the primary destination for Iraqi refugees due to its close geographic proximity, which allowed Shi’a Iraqis to avoid the majority-Sunni Anbar province when fleeing sectarian violence after 2006. Furthermore, the Syrian government allowed Arab nationals, including Iraqis, three months’ stay without documentation, during which time they could apply for residence permits. Syria, as a whole, had a history of accepting the Shi’a population and had a more established health and education infrastructure. Syria also possessed a larger informal economy than other destinations, which afforded greater work opportunities to displaced Iraqis. But as civil conflict flared in Syria, the Iraqi refugee population was displaced once again, with the UNHCR reporting only 44,000 Iraqi refugees still in Syria as of 2013.

In Jordan, the 500,000 Iraqi refugees face an even more difficult struggle to achieve legally recognized residency. The two most common ways of attaining stable status in Jordan are to either receive a residency permit (iqama) or a work contract. Yet to receive a residency permit in 2003, Iraqi refugees were required to deposit $150,000 into a Jordanian bank account. Although this amount was later lowered to $20,000, only 25,000 Iraqi refugees acquired a residency permit by 2011. Attaining a work contract is an even more arduous process, as it requires mobilizing significant social capital (wasta) such as familial and political connections, such that only 2,000 Iraqis have received work contracts. These struggles resulted in 80 percent of the wealthiest bracket of Iraqis receiving residency permits, as opposed to 22 percent of the poorest bracket, further stratifying an already divided community. Between the conflict in Syria and a regressive residency system in Jordan, the governments of the Global South are ill-equipped to accommodate the refugee populations that they are forced to support.

The government of Iraq is unable to support the vast internally displaced population within its borders due to the ramifications of decades of conflict, such as eroded public infrastructure, significant brain-drain, and inadequate documentation. The capacity of the state in Iraq has been under assault since the time of Saddam Hussein, who expelled all non-Ba’athist government officials. This problem was further aggravated by the de-Ba’athification enacted by the American government after its ouster of Hussein that removed most remaining experienced government officials from power, compounded by American efforts undertaken to decentralize the Iraqi government. During this time, opportunistic militias emerged and seized the assets of institutions and extorted the local population. As these militias looted both hospitals and universities, the system of rentierism that had prevailed under Hussein collapsed, leaving the government unable to repair the devastated public infrastructure. What remains of the oil industry that previously supported the government is wrought with rampant corruption, further hampering state capabilities. The middle class of Iraq is disappearing, resulting from hyperinflation and targeted attacks. In 2007, a New York Times report expounded that 26 out of 30 students surveyed at the University of Baghdad intended to leave the country to start their careers. The militias took advantage of the state’s weakness and specifically targeted the middle class for kidnappings, believing that they would be more able to pay a ransom. In 2006, there were more than 30 kidnappings a day in Baghdad, and the majority of those targeted were academics, lawyers, and media professionals. The shrinking intellectual community and middle class in Iraq poses a direct threat to state capabilities in the future, for it is this population’s skills and tax dollars that are key to rebuilding a stable state. The health infrastructure in the country is similarly eviscerated, with many hospitals ransacked indiscriminately. The Iraqi Red Crescent reported that more than half of the nation’s doctors fled the country between 2003 and 2007. Daesh’s rise both contributed to the further destruction of state infrastructure, and prevented the repair of infrastructure previously damaged in sectarian violence. What remains of the state operates on a basis of innate discrimination, with the occupying Kurdish forces in Ninewa and Diyala preventing Sunni Arabs from returning to their homes. In Baghdad, security forces are equally suspicious of Sunni Muslims and even ignore crimes perpetrated against them. According to victims’ reports, Sunni homes have been burned, and eight Sunni men were blindfolded and executed behind a school in 2015 without any official investigation. Even when operating as intended, the government faces the obstacle of a dearth of documentation among IDPs, which prevents IDPs from utilizing what services do exist. The Iraqi legislation (Resolution No. 36, 1994) guarantees and protects citizens’ right to their property, yet without any documentation verifying their right to their property, IDPs may be unable to reclaim their homes. Government policies that diverge from the priorities of IDPs exacerbate this problem. While the International Organization for Migration reports that 87 percent of IDPs experiencing extended displacement hope to integrate in the communities that they were displaced to, government policy offers better financial support for IDPs returning to their homes and de-registering as IDPs. Thus, due to its lack of financial means, collapsing social infrastructure, and improper policy priorities and implementation, the Iraqi government requires new policy options to adequately support its internally displaced population.

Internally Displaced Persons in Iraq, as of June 2015, demonstrating the scale of the internally displaced population Iraq is supporting while still in conflict. From the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center.

Syria: Unprecedented Scale

Governments accommodating the Syrian refugee population face a struggle that similarly diverges from those faced by Western governments, due to the enormity of the displaced population in need of assistance. Currently, more than half of Syrians are displaced. The displaced population consists of 6,300,000 IDPs within Syria and 5,500,000 refugees who fled the country. Of the refugee population, one million have applied for asylum in Europe, with the two largest host nations, Germany and Sweden, respectively receiving 300,000 and 100,000 applications for asylum. Yet, the number of refugees in Germany and Sweden combined is still less than the number of refugees hosted individually by Turkey, Lebanon, or Jordan.

Displacement in Syria began with a drought that lasted from 2006 to 2010. According to Francesca de Chatel in Middle Eastern Studies, “the government’s failure to respond to the ensuing humanitarian crisis…formed one of the triggers of the uprising, feeding a discontent that had long been simmering in rural areas.” Fifty years of poor water management combined with aggressive agricultural development efforts plunged the northeast region into poverty as groundwater reserves emptied. Syria suffered drought during almost half of those fifty years. This drought caused 800,000 people to lose their jobs, sparking widespread displacement. The drought also heightened the pressure on the central government and exacerbated pre-existing tensions. In 2011, civil war broke out after the Syrian public learned of the government’s torture of peaceful protesters and Syrian government forces responded to massive protests by laying siege to Dara’a. As opposition forces dissolved into hundreds of groups, the constantly shifting frontlines of battle displaced constantly growing segments of the local population. The civil conflict lengthened and was complicated by the emergence of Daesh and the fracturing of opposition forces. As a result, repeated displacements became commonplace, with some refugees forcefully displaced up to 25 times before they could finally find refuge. Due to the devastated social services and quickly depleted personal resources, displaced persons entered into a destructive pattern of cyclical displacement, forcing refugees to rely entirely on scarce international aid. Refugees are sheltered in woefully inadequate camps, where the International Displacement Monitoring Center reports that “fifty-seven per cent of collective centres do not have sufficient water, 50 per cent lack sufficient sanitation facilities, and 54 per cent are overcrowded.” Early in the conflict, restrictions prevented external humanitarian access. Even now, it is difficult to obtain reliable data due to intentional inaccuracies from Syrian authorities, contrasting figures from independent sources, and vast areas controlled by violent insurgents where data collection is impossible. This lack of reliable information is especially pronounced for the population of ar Raqqa, where military operations to liberate the city from Daesh control have recently concluded. The population of ar Raqqa, however, is in critical need of help. More than half of the city’s population was displaced and the majority of the city was destroyed by the relentless shelling of American and Syrian forces. The size and extent of conflict in Syria has created the largest humanitarian crisis of our time, with governments of the Global South supporting the majority of the refugees created by the conflict.

The Syrian refugee population in other countries of the region has tested government institutions within the Global South. An examination of these governments’ successes and failures to provide services is essential to recommending the best policy options for the future. In Jordan, official numbers report around 650,000 Syrian refugees reside. This number is likely incomplete, for King Abdullah II declared at the Plenary Session of the United Nations’ 70th General Assembly that Syrian refugees compose 20 percent of Jordan’s population. Syrian refugees in Jordan utilize health services at a high rate and, when combined with the number of refugees in the country, Jordan’s public health infrastructure is under dangerous duress. A survey by UNHCR found that 86.6 percent of families who needed health care in the month prior to their survey sought care. The high cost of these health services, however, inhibits some refugees from utilizing them. Further refugees are precluded from receiving the care they need after the government of Jordan responded to the heightened pressure on their health infrastructure by terminating free access to health services for refugees in 2014. The switch to subsidized health services in Jordan has contributed to the deterioration of the economic status of refugees in Jordan. This results from inadequate international support for the Jordanian government, for while supporting a refugee population that accounts for 20 percent of their population, the Jordanian government has footed the $53 million bill for refugee care, while only $5 million in support was provided by UN agencies. The congestion of health facilities became a source of social tension in Jordan, with 60 percent of Jordanians and 39 percent of Syrians reporting it as the main source of tensions between the groups. This overcrowding is exemplified by the situation in the Mafaq Government Hospital in close proximity to the Za’atari refugee camp, wherein of the 16 neonatal incubators, 12 are used by Syrian refugees, two are used by Jordanians, and the final two are used other foreign nationals. Such struggles make it clear that Jordan’s current policies are inadequate to support the large number of Syrian refugees within the nation.

In Lebanon, the situation of Syrian refugees is similarly fragile. Official numbers report 1 million Syrian refugees in the country, yet the number could be as high as 1.5 million. The small nation is struggling to support the refugee population it now hosts. The nation suffers from a marked decline in trade and tourism due to the Syrian conflict, with its national debt totaling 141 percent of GDP in 2013, and annual GDP growth plummeting from 10 percent in 2010 to 1 percent in 2014. Rent in the country skyrocketed due to limited supply and increased demand from the refugee population, causing a 44 percent increase in rent between 2012 and 2013. This increase in rent has proven catastrophic for both Syrian refugees and poor Lebanese. Within the refugee population, roughly one third do not have the proper documentation to stay in the country, and 92 percent are working on the black market, subject to exploitative underpay and devoid of state regulated labor protections. The Lebanese government uses the financial support it does receive “to directly provide immediate needs to the affected populations, contributing to their dependency and not using their inherent capacities,” according to scholars in the Risk Management and Health care Policy journal. This further prolongs the damaging circumstances for refugees by offering no mode of exit. By failing to offer opportunities for refugees to secure upward mobility, Lebanon’s policies fail to adequately address the problems refugees face.

In Turkey, close proximity and positive border policies have contributed to the formation of the largest Syrian refugee population, numbering approximately 3,250,000. The undocumented incorporation of Syrian laborers into the Turkish economy has forced refugees into chronic poverty, putting them in an acutely precarious position with ever decreasing means of returning home. Despite collaborative efforts by the Turkish government and the European Commission, Syrian refugees living in Turkey are not offered the capability to support themselves. The support provided by the European Neighborhood Policy intends to assuage migration into the European Union, but this results in international support operating on skewed priorities. There are efforts to house Syrian refugees within Turkey, yet there is a paucity of adequate efforts to legitimately integrate these refugees into the Turkish economy.

Information insecurity is widespread throughout the Syrian refugee populations in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. The International Red Crescent administers a phone calling program in refugee camps that it operates in, allowing refugees a three minute call home every two weeks, but these services are underutilized due to the necessity of NGO supervision and the limitations imposed on topic of conversation. Refugees thus resort to alternative practices to mitigate their informational insecurity, such as calling home on private cellphones to verify any information from news sources. Problematically, practices such as this incur new costs for refugees, such as the need for a SIM card from the country they are residing in as well as one from Syria, and payments to marketplace vendors to charge their phone or download an app. The lack of reliable sources of information for refugees forces them to expend limited financial resource.

In summation, the Syrian refugee community demonstrates concerning signs of chronic poverty due to their protracted displacement. Endemic indebtedness and asset selling signifies decreasing welfare and inhibits long-term self-reliance. Given the overtaxed governments of the Global South’s dearth of fiscal means, policies priorities must be developed to enable limited government resources to better support the Syrian refugee community, so that refugees are not compelled to engage in activities such as under the table labor to offset medical and housing expenses.

Statistics demonstrating the immense scale of the Syrian refugee population. From the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

The Rohingya: Little Hope to Return Home

The government of Bangladesh faces a unique challenge as it struggles to support the displaced Rohingya population of Myanmar, given this population’s diminished possibility of ever returning to their homes in Myanmar. Myanmar is 90 percent Buddhist, with small Muslim and Christian minority populations numbering roughly 4 percent each. The majority of the Muslim Rohingya minority community resides in the northern Rakhine State of Myanmar, yet they are the subjects of a targeted, intentional displacement campaign by Burmese authorities. This state is one of the poorest and least literate in the country, with the Rohingya Muslim community therein facing institutionalized discrimination such as restricted movement and limited access to education.

The state justifies its discrimination against the Rohingya community by propagating the false narrative that the Rohingya are illegal immigrants from the Myanmar’s majority Muslim neighbor, Bangladesh. Since the 1990s, extremist and ultra-nationalists Buddhist organizations, such as the Organization for the Protection of Race (MaBaTha), have spread hateful propaganda against the Rohingya and the Muslim community in Myanmar as a whole. These groups portray the Rohingya as a “threat to race and religion” who threaten to destroy the Burmese “Buddhist state.” Even politicians in Myanmar have mobilized hate against the Rohingya population to garner support, with one politician in 2015 calling for his cheering crowd to “kill and bury” all Rohingya.

The greatest threat to the Rohingya population of Myanmar is the government enacted displacement campaign that UN Human Rights chief Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein has called “a textbook example of ethnic cleansing.” Government forces, primarily the military (known as the Tatmadaw) and the Border Guard Police Force of Myanmar (BGP), have undertaken extensive “area clearing operations,” which became especially egregious following attacks perpetrated by Rohingya militants’ on security forces on August 25, 2017, which killed 12 members of the security forces. These forced displacements are undertaken on the premise that the Rohingya villagers are hiding or supporting members of the Rohingya Solidarity Organization, a small rebel group that has fought for Rohingya rights since the 1980s. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights reports that local Buddhist villagers have been given military uniforms and armaments to assist in the brutal forceful displacement of Rohingya Villagers. It is also common place for local Buddhist Rakhine villagers to participate in the looting of villages, as well as the beating and sexual assault of Rohingya villagers. It is hypothesized that these civilians are a part of the Burmese “969 movement” which opposes the expansion of Islam into Myanmar. As a result of such forced displacement efforts, more than 1,200,000 Rohingya have fled to Bangladesh, paying smugglers and boatmen exorbitant fees, or holding on to plastic gasoline containers and attempting to float across the border if they cannot afford the price of a boat. These refugees have been subjected to some of the most heinous violations of human rights and dignity of our time at the hands policies officially sanctioned by the Government of Myanmar.

The actions taken by the Tatmadaw and BGP to forcefully displace the Rohingya population make it clear that the Rohingya population’s return to Myanmar is impossible without total regime change. The Tatmadaw locks down villages prior to clearing them, preventing villagers from leaving for up to ten days, thus closing off all access to food and forcing the local population into starvation. Once the actual clearing is underway, the atrocities escalate. Men are killed indiscriminately, beaten, and shot at close range. Grenades and random gunfire are used to torment the local population, and helicopters are often used to drop grenades and fire on civilians. Rohingya refugees report the military using long butchering knives to cut the throats of elderly relatives attempting to flee. Widespread reports tell of houses set on fire with families still inside of them, villagers pushed back into burning houses, and grass set alight around Rohingya villagers who have been beaten.  Rocket propelled grenade launchers are widely used to set homes on fire. Social and religious leaders have been the targets of forced disappearances, and are suspected to have been killed. Children are similarly attacked, with reports of babies being stabbed to death with knives and newborn children being stomped to death with heavy military boots. One woman recounts how her baby was torn from her arms and thrown into a fire, after which she and her two sisters were raped, with her two sisters murdered and her mother and 10-year-old brother shot. The majority of women interviewed in an OHCHR report experienced sexual violence, with instances of gang rape being reported by the majority of the victims. The women and girls who are the victims of such sexual violence do not have access to medical services in the northern Rakhine State, due to a dearth of doctors, high health care costs, and the social stigma tied to the sexual violence they have experienced. The material situation of the Rohingya population is being intentionally, irreparably eroded by government forces. Elderly members of the population report being beaten and then forced to give their personal belongings to Buddhist Rakhine villagers. In locked-down areas, schools and mosques are occupied by security forces. Food and cooking utensils such as pots and pans are destroyed, and livestock is killed to destroy potential food sources for any surviving villagers. Religious violence, such as the forced shaving and burning of the beards of religious leaders, is prevalent. Holy Qurans have been desecrated and burnt in public spaces. Women and girls have been deliberately raped inside of mosques. The intentionality of the government of Myanmar is clear, given that humanitarian aid is banned inside the Rakhine state. These atrocities are perpetrated before the Rohingya population leaves their own borders, which is exceedingly difficult to do as the journey to Bangladesh costs roughly $120 and a significant portion of the local population lives on less than $1 per day. These numerous atrocities leave the Rohingya population a nearly stateless people, compounding the difficulties for the large Rohingya refugee community living in Bangladesh.

Bangladesh faces a challenge that differs from those faced by most Western nations, for the refugee population it is accommodating is unlikely to ever return home. Thus, in addition to supporting the refugee population, Bangladesh must develop a plan for the Rohingya population’s future in the nation. The Burmese Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement Minister cited the nation’s Natural Disaster Management Law to argue that any burnt land becomes the government’s land, thus robbing Rohingya refugees whose homes were burned by the Tatmadaw and BGP of their property in Myanmar. Official figures from the government of Myanmar report that of the nation’s 471 Muslim villages, 176 have been entirely vacated, with more than 7,000 homes burned down. The Rohingya forcefully displaced by these actions walk up to 14 days to reach Bangladesh, and the sanctuary they find there is piecemeal. The government of Bangladesh relies heavily on the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to support the Rohingya refugee population, with the Bangladeshi Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commission providing derisory support such as basic first aid and water stations for new arrivals. The Rohingya refugees fleeing to Bangladesh arrive in Cox’s Bazar, which is one of Bangladesh’s poorest districts, with 33 percent of the population living beneath the poverty line. The refugees fleeing violence following the August 25th incident often bring few possessions with them, and exhaust what savings they do have to travel to Bangladesh and construct rudimentary shelters made of bamboo and thin plastic once they arrive. This forces Rohingya refugees that have recently arrived in Bangladesh to rely exclusively on government and humanitarian aid for subsistence. Already strained prior to August 25th, institutional support in Bangladesh fails to keep pace with the rapidly growing Rohingya refugee population following the Tatmadaw’s intensified village clearing operations. The majority of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh live in makeshift settlements and spontaneous settlements, such as sprawling tent cities. This lack of adequate accommodations is a self-perpetuating problems, for the vast makeshift communities are not conducive to developing infrastructure, such as clean water and food distribution sites. While new refugee sites are constantly being planned to accommodate the influx, refugees arrive to new sites before any humanitarian support infrastructure is established, and a critical lack of roads within these new sites inhibits the construction of such infrastructure.  Refugees react to the lack of clean water and sanitation facilities by resorting to drinking stagnant water from nearby paddy fields. Humanitarian interventions primarily target refugee camps and makeshift communities, yet the United Nations Development Programme reports that before August 25th, 76 percent of refugees in camps and makeshift communities had no access to clean drinking water. This number rises to 92 percent in host communities, due to the lack of humanitarian assistance. Such precarious conditions leave the population severely vulnerable to a diarrheal epidemic. A lack of space for health and sanitation facilities in makeshift settlements is an acute problem. Women and girls among the Rohingya refugees, who constitute 65 percent of all new arrivals following August 25th, are especially vulnerable. The lack of sanitation facilities forces many refugees to bathe and defecate in the open. This causes women and girls to combat the lack of proper sanitation facilities by limiting the amount they eat and drink, and by rarely leaving shelters during their menstrual cycles in order to preserve their privacy. Children represent a large portion of the refugee population, and more than 400,000 Rohingya children do not have access to education. Child labor is becoming more prevalent due to the dire conditions refugees face. Such insufficient accommodations clearly demonstrates that the Rohingya population in Bangladesh requires more proficient aid efforts.

International aid works to offset the duress that the government of Bangladesh is subjected to, yet such efforts are not entirely successful. Aid is constrained by the lengthy process that obtaining approval for humanitarian projects entails. The government of Bangladesh is inundated with project approval (FD-7) requests, and does not have the capacity to respond to them quickly enough. More than 80,000 refugees did not receive their full food rations due to this lengthy and time-consuming application process. In October, 2017, twice as many government counterparts applying to provide water, sanitation, and hygiene resources awaited clearance paperwork than received it. The United Nation’s priorities include the installation of shelter, water, and sanitation facilities, such as well and latrines. The United Nations also hopes to strengthen the capacities of local communities, but aiding local communities in accommodating refugees is not synonymous with providing refugees the means to succeed within such communities. Both the United Nations and the government of Bangladesh foresee the repatriation of Rohingya refugees as the solution to the crisis. Yet while the United Nations Assistant High Commissioner for Protection, Mr. Volker Türk, discussed facilitating the voluntary and sustainable repatriation of refugees with state officials in Myanmar, the Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network reports that there is “a growing realization that repatriation is unlikely in the short-term.” The government of Bangladesh and international nongovernmental organizations must recognize that the Rohingya population’s stay in Bangladesh is unlikely to be brief, and develop policy options that respond accordingly.

Bangladesh’s infrastructure is subjected to such strain because Rohingya refugees have few options but to relocate to Bangladesh. Other neighboring nations in the Global South, such as Thailand, have enacted policies mandating that the boats of Rohingya refugees be pushed back away from their shores, fearing that they could not handle an influx of refugees. Thai efforts to eliminate people-smuggling have also created further problems for Rohingya refugees, for smugglers now abandon boatloads of people at sea. Even if the Rohingya in Bangladesh desired to return to Myanmar, security forces have laid landmines along the border to Bangladesh, inhibiting the return of refugees. Within Myanmar, the displaced population is not supported, but instead imprisoned. The official government spokesperson Zaw Htay expounds that the camps where the displaced Rohingya reside are actually “for Bengalis,” thus supporting the government narrative that all Rohingya in Myanmar are illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. The camps in the Rakhine State are far from adequate refugee camps, likened to “open-air prisons” by commentators as they are little more than areas surrounded by barbed wire and security forces to confine the detainees. The government of Myanmar’s rejection of aid agencies prevents any support that might allow the refugee population to regain self-sufficiency, demonstrating that it has no intention of ever allowing a Rohingya population in the country again. While refugees’ stays in Western nations are often confined to the duration of conflicts in their nations of origin, the Rohingya population’s eventual withdrawal from states in the Global South such as Bangladesh is unlikely. Efforts that allow Rohingya to succeed in their new communities must be planned in response.

A small sample of the total number of Rohingya villages destroyed by government forces in Myanmar, demonstrating the implausibility of Rohingya repatriation. From the Myanmar Information Management Unit.

Policy Discussion

There are clear disparities in the challenges faced by governments in the Global North and Global South when supporting refugee populations, thus necessitating the advancement of new policy priorities for governments of the Global South. Raphi Rechitsky of the Center for Comparative Immigration Studies elucidates that governments of the Global North often invoke policies that deter refugees from reaching their borders and therefore confine refugees to the Global South. This puts governments of the Global South under increased strain when attempting to accommodate the refugee populations they host with already limited resources. The divide is most prominent when comparing the singular $850 initial cash payment that the Iraqi government gives to each internally displaced family to the more than €5,000 euros that refugees can receive in Germany over the course of 15 months. While refugees living in Jordan combat information insecurity by paying market vendors to charge their mobile phones, the ‘taschengeld’ given to refugees in Germany can be used to pay for mobile phone services. Feasible policy options must be developed for governments of the Global South such as Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Bangladesh that currently support significant refugee populations. If these governments solely focus on providing for the immediate needs of refugees without providing means of status improvement, the cycle of poverty is perpetuated. Successful refugee support in the Global South requires identifying clearly delineated and achievable policy goals so that governments can focus their limited capabilities where they will be most impactful.

One of these crucial policy goals for supporting refugees in the Global South is providing opportunities for upward mobility. This is attainable through a commitment to education, labor market integration, and cash assistance programs.

Education is crucial to giving refugees opportunities to find employment in the local economy of their host country, as well as providing better opportunities for voluntary repatriation in the future. Education also can help mitigate the effects of displacement on refugee children, providing an increased likelihood of stability in their countries of origin after repatriation. The Sri Lankan refugee population living in India has found exceptional success after they lobbied the Indian government to allow them to attend public schooling even without documentation from their schools at home. The Sri Lankan refugees also organized their own higher education and vocational schooling programs. The upwards mobility that this schooling provides helps to allow refugees to overcome the psychological ramification of their protracted displacement. One key component of such upward mobility is offering education in the local language of refugees’ host nations. Proficiency in the local language drastically improves refugees’ labor market access, allowing them to better provide for themselves in the long term. Education also alleviates the burden on local governments by enabling upward mobility, combatting both the material and psychological ramifications of forced displacement.

Another key component of upwards mobility is local labor market integration. Compensating for the situation of refugees by providing work permits at a low cost and with a decreased amount of required documentation allows refugees to begin to work and provide for themselves, further reducing the strain on government support institutions. Relaxed regulations on refugees entering the labor market has positive effects for refugees by providing a source of income and workplace protections, and for the local economies by taking advantage of the proficiencies that refugees bring with them.

Prioritizing cash assistance programs enable an increased concentration on the needs of each individual refugee. In Lebanon, each dollar of cash assistance spent by Syrian refugees resulted in $2.13 created in the local economy. When combined with access to bank accounts, cash assistance provides greatly increased stability in the lives of refugees. Paul Spiegel of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees writes that “cash assistance has the potential to transform aid effectiveness, support local economies, improve relations between refugee and host communities, and provide more choice and dignity.” In isolation, cash assistance programs only succeed in reducing the risk of poverty for refugees, but do not eliminate the risk of poverty in the future. When combined with other enablers of upward mobility, however, cash assistance can make a difference. Education, labor market integration, and cash assistance programs are all components of a broader prioritization of enabling refugees’ upward mobility that should be a focus of governments in the Global South.

Creating sustainable health care systems is the second policy goal necessary for governments of the Global South supporting refugee populations. The eroding capabilities of states’ health infrastructures poses an acute risk to human security. A widespread respect for refugees’ right to health is critical to protecting human security, which includes actively removing barriers to refugees’ health care access, such as cost. Instead of adhering to a single parallel program of health services, nations of the Global South must prioritize developing migrant sensitive health services. Migrant sensitive health services entail accounting for the unique health needs of the disparate refugee populations that nations accommodate. Even in areas still embroiled in conflict, where state governments have little capacity to support their internally displaced populations, humanitarian and government efforts are best served by identifying populations’ precise needs. This allows the resources mobilized to create the largest impact possible. Adequately adapting existing health services to the needs of specific populations necessitates broader public health assessments. Thereby, services offered align with the needs of the populations that they are serving. Health care can also provide a form of cursory documentation that can be key to allowing refugees to utilize greater segments of the services available. While Syrian refugees utilize health services at high rates, it must be destigmatized for the victims of sexual violence within the Rohingya refugee population. If differences in health seeking are identified by public health assessments, services that specifically accounting for such differences can be offered. Such services may include offering intercultural mediation and building health literacy. Initial health screenings are often lauded as essential to refugee health, yet the epidemiological vulnerability of populations must first be accounted for. If populations are sufficiently vaccinated and at low risk of communicable disease, resources used for health screenings are better spent improving living conditions. While Jordan’s initial health screenings of Syrian refugees diagnosed Tuberculosis at an incredibly high success rate before the disease could spread to larger segments of the population, health services must not be limited to health assessments. Such health screenings are key to reducing the strain on local health institutions in populations at specific risk of communicable diseases, yet health care must go beyond initial screenings by offer treatment for diseases and injuries identified in such screenings. The emphasis on initial health screenings dominates discussions of refugee health, problematically enabling governments to lackadaisically attend to refugee health needs by singularly providing such screenings. Wider public health assessments allowing for the more educated coordination of humanitarian actors, preventing oversights that result from an ad hoc approach to refugee health care. When screenings are necessary, they must holistically address the needs of refugee communities, including providing psychosocial services and care for noncommunicable diseases. Expending resources to improve refugees’ living conditions can dramatically reduce the strain on health care systems in the Global South, for a lack of clean drinking water and adequate shelter in refugee accommodations are notable sources of refugees’ health instability. Creating health care systems that can endure the strain of large refugee populations and protracted displacements must be a specific policy goal for governments of the Global South, and is achievable by assessing the unique needs of refugee communities and preventing the causes of health insecurity.

Finally, government leaders in the Global South must create sufficient institutional support for refugees in the key areas of combatting human trafficking, providing reliable information systems and forms of documentation, and providing support for voluntary repatriation.

One key areas of institutional support is the fight against human smuggling, although policy responses must be carefully designed so that they do not exacerbate problems for refugees. Often, victims of human trafficking who have been forced into sex-work are deported back to their countries of origin. As previously discussed, current initiatives fail to protect the refugee populations exploited by trafficking networks. Instead of focusing on the results of human trafficking such as sex work, law enforcement agencies must focus on preventing the networks that force refugees into this situation in the first place. Furthermore, corruption must be combatted, for reports of police warning community leaders before raids and traffickers bribing police illustrate the threat that corruption poses to anti-trafficking efforts. Within legal structures, policies that stratify the victims of human trafficking into separate categories can result in institutions only focusing on the victims whose situation they deem more egregious, resulting in institutions overlooking victims of labor trafficking in favor of aiding the victims of sex trafficking. The rights of all victims must be prioritized, including efforts to protect victims’ identities, and the provision of additional support to victims post liberation. One major component of preventing human trafficking is educating refugees and government agents alike on the rights that are endowed to refugees.

The institutional support of refugees also entails maintaining reliable information systems. Refugees in poverty should not be forced to expend what little financial resources they have to obtain reliable information through expensive phone calls home or hard-to-find internet access. In addition, the majority of refugees lack official documentation verifying their identity, education level, employment history, and even country of origin. Governments of the Global South must prioritize providing such documentation to refugees so that they are not precluded from accessing the services available to them. Such documentation is also key to enabling entrance to the local labor market, which promotes self-sufficiency within refugee populations. Where possible, governments of the Global South must also mobilize legal aid to give refugees adequate asylum support. Without achieving the administrative classification of "refugee status," refugees are left open to deportation, prevented from working, and may even be inhibited from accessing health care services.

Once conflicts pacify in refugees’ countries of origin, repatriation support must be offered for refugees who choose voluntary repatriation. While refugees’ intent to repatriate is debated, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees reports that “Voluntary repatriation…is the solution of choice for a vast majority of refugees.” Indeed, between 19998 and 2008 fourteen times as many refugees chose repatriation over permanent resettlement in their host countries. The United Nations designates four key areas of focus necessary to ensuring repatriation success, including physical safety, legal safety, material safety, and reconciliation. The word “voluntary” is crucial to successful repatriation, and to make a fully informed and uncoerced choice, refugees require information on their home countries, legal aid, and peace and reconciliation efforts in their home countries. The choice to repatriate must be fully agentive. In the past, Bangladesh has avoided accusations of refoulment, or forcefully returning refugees to their countries of origin, by withdrawing food rations from refugees, thereby replacing their agency to choose to repatriate with necessity.  Successful repatriation support further entails ensuring a source of livelihood through labor market access in refugees’ country of return, as often their home governments provide little support. Governments must also ensure that refugees can attain equal citizenship status in their home countries, with respect to the differences between their culture and the predominant culture in their home nations. The protection of refugee rights, provision of reliable information systems and adequate documentation, and attention given to asylum and repatriation support can all work to minimize the strain on governments of the Global South.

Conclusion

As has been argued, the governments of the Global South face challenges that can confound even Western governments. These challenges are exacerbated by the fact that 86 percent of refugees and 99 percent of internally displaced persons remain within the Global South. This dichotomy between challenge and resources necessitates the creation of policy goals that appropriately respond to the struggles that governments of the Global South face in supporting their refugee populations. Iraq is supporting a vast internally displaced population while simultaneously rebuilding state institutions and combatting active conflict. The governments of Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey are supporting the largest refugee population in the world, with a Syrian refugee population numbering upwards of five million. Bangladesh must prepare to accommodate the Rohingya refugee population that is unlikely to ever return to Myanmar. To successfully support these and other refugee populations in the Global South, local governments must focus their efforts on providing means of upward mobility, sustainable health care services, and institutional support in critical areas. By adopting these clear policy goals, governments in the Global South will be able to utilize their limited resources where they will be most effective, thereby creating the greatest positive effect for the refugee populations that they support.