Panama’s Recent Response to Trump’s Canal Desire

Panama’s president, José Raúl Mulino (EPA/FMT image)

On March 5th, Panama and BlackRock reached a deal granting the US company control of the Balboa and Cristobal ports in the Panama Canal. While the Panamanian government granted this concession in an effort to ease tensions with the United States, it has instead instigated US President Donald Trump's further ambitions of owning all the ports. Panama’s current strategy of appeasement is ineffective in maintaining its sovereignty and, absent readjustment, could ultimately lead to a domino effect in which Trump's imperial ambitions permeate the rest of Latin America.

A US focus on the region isn’t unheard of; since the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, and the Roosevelt Corollary of 1904, the US has adopted a hands-on approach to Latin American politics. During the Cold War, the United States became heavily involved in Latin American politics, spreading capitalist ideals in the wake of communism. Notable examples include Operation PBSuccess, which overthrew the leftist Guatemalan president in favor of a right-wing dictator allied with the US, and the failed invasion of the Bay of Pigs, which hoped to depose communist dictator Fidel Castro in Cuba. Earlier, in 1904, US President Theodore Roosevelt struck an agreement with Panamanian separatists, who were striving for independence from the Colombian government, to build the Panama Canal. The deal permitted the US to construct an artificial canal in exchange for its support for Panama’s rapidly growing independence efforts. Construction was finalized in 1914, and the US controlled the “Panama Canal Zone” until 1977, when the Torrijos-Carter treaties relinquished control to Panama gradually by 1999. During the 1990s, Panama continued dealing with US intervention despite gaining canal control. In 1990, President George H.W. Bush launched Operation Just Cause, aiming to depose the military dictator Manuel Noriega, who was suspected of drug trafficking and allying with Soviet-backed governments in Latin America. The US sent troops to Panama, capturing and convicting Noreiga, causing the deaths of around 300 civilians while leaving the state with a democratic structure that has endured to this day.

Once Trump came into office for his second term, his pursuit of regional and economic security against foreign powers, such as China, led him to the canal. He argues that the Torrijos-Carter treaty is a “disgrace” to US pride, and therefore should be invalidated.  In the 21st century, the US has shifted to economic control of Latin America with heavy investment in the region. From a trade standpoint, Trump’s interest in the canal is clear: access would be economically beneficial for the US, granting them control over trade and shipping in an area where 40% of US container traffic goes through. In doing so, they can obtain cheaper rates for the US and impose higher rates for their adversaries, consistent with Trump’s America First trade policy. Beyond that, Trump’s move is also motivated by a desire to hedge back against major attempts from the Chinese government to get a foothold in the region via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Chinese have helped construct several projects in Latin America, and are in the process of constructing many more in the future, threatening US power in the region. With the increase of Chinese economic expansion, the Trump administration has aggressively diverted its focus to the region to maintain the US’ regional sphere of influence and strengthen its position. 

In light of Trump’s aggression, the Panamanian response has been a policy of appeasement and accommodation. Following Trump’s inauguration, the state audited two Chinese ports in the canal, both part of the BRI, to gain favor with the new administration. During Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s first mission abroad, the Panamanians granted the US free passage of warships through the waterway, allowing the US to consolidate influence and defend against rivals like Venezuela. Further attempts have been made to move closer with the US: President José Mulino has withdrawn from the BRI as a whole, coinciding with US skepticism of Chinese influence within the Canal–information Rubio brought up to the Panamanian president. This policy has continued to be problematic, as in April 2025, US troops are now set to deploy near the canal in Panamanian territory. The idea of Panamanian sovereignty has begun to slightly erode, unable to stop US authority within its territory.  

Mulino’s objective has become unsuccessful; rather than neutralizing Trump’s aggression, it has failed to satiate his appetite. The day after the deal with BlackRock was announced, Trump addressed Congress, asserting that the deal implied Trump was reclaiming the canal from Panama. President Mulino has responded by accusing Trump of lying in the address. He emphasizes that “the transaction was purely commercial,” based on mutual interest, and not a form of concession. The Panamanian Canal Authority immediately rejected the claim of US warships, and a statement posted on X reaffirmed Panamanian sovereignty of the canal. Despite Mulino’s statements, the Panamanian government has been reluctant to use many of its resources to reaffirm its sovereignty in the face of US antagonism. Recently, Mulino met with US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth in an attempt to address certain concerns. In this meeting, the US was said to have been granted a cost-neutral compensation scheme for US warships and joint military training in the canal. While the statements struck a friendly tone, the point of Panamanian sovereignty remains. The government has refused to consult the United Nations or the Organization of American States about the issue. Recently, Mulino met with US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth in an attempt to address certain concerns. In this meeting, the US was said to have been granted a cost-neutral compensation scheme for US warships and joint military training in the canal. While the statements struck a friendly tone, the point of Panamanian sovereignty remains.

Panama’s genuflection to Trump could encourage him to force the hand of other nations in Latin America. As more and more nations in Central America have been welcoming Chinese cooperation, such as Costa Rica and Guatemala, Trump will likely turn his attention to these nations to expel Chinese influence.

This move has also worried the maritime powers that use the canal to shorten maritime trade and reduce shipping costs, such as Chile, Colombia, and Peru. The threat of US invasion and ownership of the canal could disrupt a vital shipping route, especially integral to these three nations, who rely heavily on trade with Europe and other Atlantic regions for resources. President of Colombia Gustavo Petro and Chilean President Gabriel Boric have continued to fight for the sovereignty of Panama through statements expressing unconditional support and denouncing Trump, while President Petro and Mulino are working together on other agreements, such as a bill reinforcing Panama’s sovereignty, a clean energy project, and issues on migration.   

In the meantime, to push back against Trump, Panama should take a harder stance on preserving their sovereignty and avoid the horrors of further US intervention. Their policy of appeasement has only been to the detriment of Panamanians and can embolden Trump to push his limits as far as he can in Latin America.  Panama must adopt a new strategy, potentially aligning closer with nations such as Canada, Mexico, and Colombia, which have already gone head-to-head with Trump on trade matters. All of these nations have responded to Trump’s aggression by appealing to international law, condemning Trump while threatening retaliation, and imposing tariffs with varying levels of success.

This could be through publicly criticizing US actions at the UN and OAS, invoking international law to defend its rights, and finding alternative economic partners, such as Mercosur, to open new economic opportunities, protect the canal, and strengthen regional independence in the wake of China and the US competition. Currently, Panama’s future is surrounded by uncertainty regarding Trump’s next steps for targeting the canal, and if they fail to reorient their current strategy, it may result in the US eventually taking full control of the canal through coercive means.

Meet America’s New Sheriffs

“President-elect Donald Trump and Kash Patel, his pick to lead the FBI, during the Army-Navy football game at Northwest Stadium in Landover, Md., on Dec. 14, 2024.” Doug Mills / The New York Times/Redux via NBC

The Trump administration would like you to know that there is a new sheriff in town. They invoke the trope frequently, from a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Facebook post praising President Donald Trump and DHS Secretary Kristi Noem for deterring illegal immigration to a speech by Vice President JD Vance in which he lambasted European nations for their anti-hate speech laws. In Western films, where the trope originates, the archetypical “new sheriff” arrives in a frontier town ruled by corrupt or incompetent lawmen, deposes them, and establishes a new order that promises a truer form of justice. In the month since Trump returned to Washington, purges in every major part of the federal law enforcement apparatus have left it beyond doubt that a reordering is underway. However, the kind of justice that Trump’s emerging order will produce largely remains to be seen. The task of forging this order will fall to the new wave of conservative officials appointed to replace their mostly non-partisan predecessors.

To lead the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), America’s premier federal law enforcement agency, the Trump administration has appointed a pair of loyalists, Director Kash Patel and Deputy Director Dan Bongino. Both have a skeptical relationship with the agency. Patel, an embittered former federal prosecutor, spearheaded the Republican-led House Intelligence Committee investigation into the FBI’s investigation of Trump’s ties to Russia. During this investigation, the CIA criminally referred him to the Justice Department (DOJ) after he allegedly disclosed classified intelligence related to the investigation to people without clearances. Patel was ultimately not charged with a crime. Patel has asserted that the FBI is part of the “deep state” and even proposed turning the bureau’s headquarters into a museum showcasing its crimes. Multiple FBI officials made Patel’s so-called “enemies list” of government officials supposedly part of the “deep state,” including former Directors James Comey and Christopher Wray. If anything, Bongino, a prominent right-wing podcast host, has been an even more virulent critic, arguing without evidence that the bureau hid information about the pipe bombs planted outside the Democratic and Republican National Conventions because they were part of an “inside job” to frame Trump supporters for the violence. 

Given their appointment of two men who hold the agency in contempt to its highest positions, it is unsurprising that the Trump administration has also sought to purge disfavored individuals from the bureau. Under the direction of Acting Deputy Attorney General Emil Bove, eight senior executives were fired, and an additional seven executive assistant directors (who had led the bureau's Criminal, Cyber, Human Resources, Information and Technology, National Security, Response and Services, and Science and Technology branches) were demoted. Bove, who previously served as one of Trump's personal defense attorneys, has also sought the names of all FBI agents who worked on cases related to the January 6th Capitol riot. That effort concluded with a legal agreement not to publicly reveal the names of agents who worked on those cases without giving them two days’ notice and the opportunity to contest the decision in court. Despite this seeming victory, one of the agents most strongly resisted Bove’s attempt to access the names, James Dennehy, was forced out not long after the agreement was signed. Dennehy, who led the FBI’s New York field office, had told his staff that he would “dig in” in response to the firings of senior FBI leaders. 

Retaliation against those who worked on Capitol riot cases has not confined itself to the FBI. The interim U.S. Attorney for Washington D.C., Ed Martin, has overseen the demotion and firing of prosecutors who worked on cases related to the January 6th attack, as well as the forced resignation of a prosecutor who refused to freeze Biden-era environmental funds. Martin, who previously represented three Capitol riot defendants, recently referred to himself and those working under him as “President Trumps’ [sic] lawyers”. Martin has expressed openness towards pursuing other political goals on behalf of the Trump administration, including threatening to prosecute Democratic lawmakers for statements that he argues are tantamount to incitement of violence. Martin’s office has sent legal threat letters to Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and Representative Robert Garcia (D-CA), accusing them of threatening violence against their political opponents. In particular, Schumer’s comments, in which he stated that Supreme Court justices Brett Kavanaugh and Neil Gorsuch had “released the whirlwind” and “w[ould] pay the price” following a 2020 abortion-related case, caused a stir when they were made. Following condemnation from the American Bar Association, Chief Justice John Roberts, and Congressional Republicans, Schumer apologized on the Senate floor. Despite this widespread backlash, the letter from Martin was the first indication that Schumer might face legal consequences for his remarks, which likely do not meet the legal standard for true threats. 

Perhaps the most dramatic showdown between Trump’s appointees and the old order came in the Justice Department’s Southern District of New York (SDNY), an office with such a reputation for independence that it has been nicknamed “the sovereign district.” Acting Deputy Attorney General Emil Bove, once again serves as the administration’s chosen enforcer. Bove, a former SDNY prosecutor, has a complicated relationship with his old office, having been investigated there multiple times for allegations of abusive behavior towards his subordinates. The recent clash occurred after Bove ordered interim U.S. Attorney Danielle Sassoon to dismiss a corruption case against New York City Mayor Eric Adams, a Democrat, who was charged in September with accepting bribes from Türkiye. Sassoon, a registered Republican and member of the Federalist Society who clerked for Justice Antonin Scalia, refused to do so, instead accusing Bove of arranging a quid pro quo in a letter to his boss, Attorney General Pam Bondi. According to Sassoon’s account, Adams’ lawyers informed Bove that the mayor would only be able to assist the administration in conducting immigration enforcement if the charges against him were dropped. Sassoon then offered to resign if the Department of Justice was still unwilling to allow the case to go on. Bove responded with a blistering eight-page letter accusing Sassoon of insubordination, accepting her resignation, placing the line prosecutors working on the case on leave, and defending the decision to dismiss the case. Bove accused the prosecution of being politically motivated, echoing allegations made by Adams’ lawyers that the Biden administration had prosecuted him in retaliation for his criticism of their immigration policy. Bove also defended the idea that advancing the Trump administration’s immigration policy was a legitimate reason to drop the case. Following Sassoon’s forced resignation, seven other lawyers, comprising nearly all of the supervisors in the SDNY’s Public Integrity unit, resigned. One of them, Hagan Scotten, another conservative who clerked for Chief Justice John Roberts, accused the administration of choosing to dismiss the case without prejudice in order to use the threat of reopening the case as leverage against the mayor, calling any lawyer who would obey the directive to dismiss the case a “fool” or a “coward.” The morning after the mass resignations took place, Bove summoned the remainder of the Public Integrity unit to a meeting in which he informed them that he wanted a prosecutor from the unit to cosign the motion to dismiss. He then left the unit time to decide who would sign the motion. After a discussion in which the unit reportedly considered resigning en masse, Edward Sullivan, an experienced anti-corruption prosecutor who is nearing retirement, offered to sign the motion, supposedly to avoid a mass firing. The dismissal was filed just hours later. Around the same time, Eric Adams gave federal immigration agents access to the jail complex on Rikers Island, becoming one of the first public officials outside of the administration to accede to its demands under legal pressure. During the old order, the apolitical nature of America’s federal law enforcement institutions was assumed but rarely felt. Now that the officials who defined and defended these institutions are gone, the Adams case shows the consequences of their removal. 

Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth became the latest Trump administration official to move against his department’s law enforcement apparatus with his firing of the top Judge Advocate Generals (JAGs) for the Army, Air Force, and Navy. The JAG Corps forms the core of the US military’s criminal justice system, fulfilling a variety of roles from prosecuting and defending accused criminals to advising senior military leaders on the legality of their actions. It is this latter role that has earned them Hegseth’s ire. Hegseth, a consistent defender of American war criminals, blamed JAGs (derided in his book The War on Warriors as “jagoffs”) for imposing restrictive rules of engagement that he believes crippled the American war effort in Afghanistan. Hegseth has only just begun to replace the fired JAGs, recently appointing his personal lawyer, Timothy Parlatore, as a commander in the Naval Reserve JAG corps. Parlatore previously served as defense counsel for two Navy SEALs: Eddie Gallagher, who was demoted for photographing himself posing with a corpse, and another SEAL who was charged with sexual assault. In a letter to Congress, five former Defense Secretaries, including one former Marine Corps General James Mattis, who served during the previous Trump administration, have denounced the firings of the JAGs and other military leaders, condemning what they saw as the President removing constraints on his power. Their letter was hardly necessary. At a press conference a few days earlier, Hegseth had all but said as much, stating that the fired lawyers would have been “roadblocks to orders that are given by a commander in chief.”

Intent is often difficult to discern in the actions of the Trump administration, particularly as its reign remains in its early stages. However, Trump has shown a repeated tendency to appoint officials to the leadership of agencies that they have reason to despise. Kash Patel, who launched his career in conservative politics attacking the credibility of the Russia investigation, sees the FBI as a tool of the deep state. Ed Martin represented Capitol rioters imprisoned by the office he now leads. Emil Bove gutted the DOJ office where he had faced multiple investigations. Pete Hegseth, who had always chafed at the idea of men in suits telling men in boots how to fight, was given authority over the JAG corps. From the President down, a sense that they have been greatly wronged - and that retribution is necessary - pervades the Trump administration. Now that they have struck against their enemies in the government, nearly all of whom are either gone or on their way out, what comes next is unclear. What is clear is that the sheriffs of the old order are gone. The lawmen who run Washington now prize a single virtue: loyalty. Those who can’t get behind that had best be on their way.

Trump & Content Creators: The Sexist Entanglement that Targets Young Men

Credit: Nicholas J. Fuentes

Following Trump’s re-election, social media platforms witnessed an explosion of misogynist speech, centered on the virality of far-right misogynist and white supremacist, Nick Fuentes, who popularized the phrase “your body, my choice.”  In just the 24 hours following Trump’s re-election, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue reported a 4,600% increase in the posting of the phrases “your body, my choice” and “get back in the kitchen” on X. This is no coincidence. After Trump announced he was pursuing re-election in November of 2022, he dined with Fuentes at his Mar-a-Lago home, along with Kanye “Ye” West, who has come under intense scrutiny for his blatantly antisemitic posts and selling swastika merchandise on his Yeezy website. But while online sexism saw a massive, overt influx post-election, it’s simply the consolidation of more covert online trends that have been present for years, normalizing and disseminating misogynistic themes. This trend backwards into misogyny is not a mere apparition, but rather a corrupt and engineered manipulation to garner support for right-wing candidates. 

In recent years, “alpha male” online personalities have gained notable traction, such as self-proclaimed misogynist Andrew Tate, and the aforementioned Nick Fuentes. The consequential harms of these sexist individuals holding platforms are exemplified by the media personalities themselves: both Tate and Fuentes now face charges for violence against women. 

Tate, during his peak popularity around 2022, peddled disgustingly sexist narratives to his audiences, including how rape victims must “bear responsibility” for their attacks, that women are men’s property, and how he prefers to date women who are 18 to 19 years old, so he can “make an imprint” on them. In 2022, Tate was arrested in Romania on charges of forming an organized crime ring, investigated for potential human trafficking and sexual intercourse with minors, as well as accused of sexual aggression charges in the UK in 2024.

Fuentes, on the other hand, considers himself a sexist, a white supremacist, and a proud “incel” (short for involuntary celibate). His wide array of deeply problematic claims include that rape is “so not a big deal,” and that women are too emotional to make political decisions, among other narratives that range from fascist to anti-semitic to homophobic. Fuentes faced battery charges for pepper spraying, shoving, and breaking the cell phone of a woman who knocked on the door of his Illinois home. He has now asked a Cook County judge to seal his records of the battery case.

The most alarming layer to this issue is the relationship between these individuals and our governing body. The Trump administration began pressuring Romania to lift the travel restrictions on Tate and his brother Tristan. Less than two weeks later, the travel ban was lifted and the Tate brothers flew from Romania to Florida, where they credited Trump for making them feel safe upon their return—although, the UK is currently considering submitting an extradition request on grounds of the brothers’ pending charges of rape and human trafficking. Similarly, Republican lawmakers have collaborated with Fuentes’ America First Foundation, with multiple members of Congress, including Rep. Paul Gosar of Arizona, former congressman Steve King, and Arizona Senator Wendy Roger, who have publicly appeared at his events. This comes in addition to the aforementioned dinner between President Trump and Fuentes prior to his re-election campaign. 

Trump’s 2024 campaign was devoted to collecting endorsements from popular male influencers and internet personalities such as Paul brothers Logan and Jake, TikToker Bryce Hall, streamer FaZe Banks, streamer Adin Ross, and so on. Podcast host and content creator Tana Mongeau claimed that she declined an offer of millions to endorse a presidential candidate and was made aware of a lengthy list of influencers that received and accepted similar offers. Mongeau implied that this was an offer to endorse Trump, stating that her views did not align with the candidate of the endorsement; she later publicly endorsed former Vice President Kamala Harris. Nonetheless, it seems as though Trump’s election strategy paid off, with the young male vote shifting significantly in Trump’s favor: 56% of young male voters say that they voted for Trump in 2024, compared to 41% in 2020. 

There seems to be quite a mutualistic relationship between these content creators and Trump: content creators gain more traction and popularity, Trump gains more votes. This relationship rides on one foundational idea that is exploited by both the media personalities and Trump: framing young men’s unhappiness and dissatisfaction to be a result of the deviation from “tradition” and classic gender roles, which calls for a sharp reversion to remedy the issue. This framework of blame provides a clear-cut explanation for the “male loneliness epidemic,” which describes the high levels of loneliness that men have been feeling in recent years. Yet in reality, women and men self-report loneliness at almost the same rates: 15% for women, 16% for men. So, why is there this consensus of higher male loneliness in the first place?

The issue lies in the patriarchy, of course. Through childhood development, those assigned male and female at birth are treated differently based on their perceived gender, from which they learn a schema of behaviors and traits associated with that gender stereotype. These are aligned with the typical patriarchal design, where boys are encouraged to play roughly and act tough, and girls are expected to play cooperatively and quietly. Through this socialization and reinforcement of toxic masculinity, boys have less opportunity to learn how to healthily feel, articulate, and cope with their emotions. Toxic masculinity is built on seeing anti-femininity and toughness as power, which also reinforces the idea that women are weak, less intelligent, and less capable due to their emotions. 

Along with this harmful and limiting gender socialization, screen time and smartphone usage have a positive correlation with rates of loneliness. This generation of young adults has grown up with near unlimited access to the Internet, and was isolated during a critical period of socio-psychological development over the COVID-19 pandemic. The key difference, generally speaking, is that girls have been more societally socialized into cooperative and emotionally supportive friendships where the barrier of toxic masculinity is not a common factor. Men don’t necessarily have fewer friends than women do, but less intimacy in those friendships. Seeking professional help and turning to close friends for support is far less common for men, likely due to the lasting stigma surrounding mental health and a fear of appearing weak. 

According to a famously cited study by a Harvard University psychiatrist who spent three decades tracking the health and mental wellbeing of 724 American men, men overwhelmingly see relationships as the key to a healthy and fulfilling life. The emphasis and pressure placed on romantic relationships being the necessary condition for men’s happiness becomes a self-reinforcing cycle of dissatisfaction; when the perceived key to happiness is supportive long-term relationships, the inability to emotionally connect with others presents a significant obstacle. It also places the entire burden of emotional labor upon the woman in the relationship (in the stereotypical heteronormative context), due to male friendships’ tendency to lack emotional depth and support. 

Additionally, self-reported “loneliness” seems to be conflated by many men with celibacy or singleness. This sort of thinking created the incel community that Fuentes is a proud member of: a population of men who have been unable to secure any sexual and romantic partners, and blame society and women for this perceived oppression against them. Feeling entitled to women and sex is inherently problematic, but this population is also particularly vulnerable to extremist and radical narratives due to their high levels of social isolation. In fact, teen boys that spend greater quantities of time socializing and engaging in political discussion online are the most vulnerable population to radicalization. The combination of these factors paints this population of young men as the ideal targets for politicians pushing right-wing agendas or alpha male influencer content, both of which promise a return to tradition and gender roles as the solution to their qualms— effectively scapegoating women rather than addressing the root of the issue. 

The practice of paying off influencers and content creators to sway their audiences' political opinions presents great potential for violating our democratic processes. Additionally, personalized algorithms have a high potential to create filter bubbles and echo chambers that can repeatedly push radicalizing or harmful content. The intertwinement of the media sphere and our current administration is already concerning, with the most prominent social media platforms bowing down to Trump’s administration; politicizing entertainment and weaponizing algorithms for political means is a threat to democracy. The explosion of sexism on media platforms should be taken seriously— the seemingly harmless entertainment content that viewers consume can socialize them into problematic beliefs, leading to a sense of normalcy in the face of bigoted policy changes, or swaying vulnerable populations towards radicalization. The consequences of ignoring this rapidly spreading phenomenon are severe, with dozens killed by incel-related attacks over the past decade. Without comprehensive action against this multifaceted issue plaguing our socio-political atmosphere, it’s clear that these widespread harms will continue to escalate. 

Global Health in Crisis: The Ripple Effect of The U.S. Withdrawal from The WHO

Evan Vucci/AP

On his first day in office, President Donald Trump pulled the U.S. out of the World Health Organization (WHO). Within the executive order, Trump cited the WHO’s mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic, failure to adopt reforms (i.e. including Taiwan in proceedings and doing independent scientific investigations), failure to be independent from other states (namely China), and making the U.S. pay dues that are far too high. However, pandemics don’t care about nationalism. Abandoning the WHO does nothing but make the U.S. more vulnerable while alienating allies and weakening global disease response efforts. If the goal was to protect Americans, this move does the exact opposite—it’s reckless, shortsighted, and frankly, foolish.

Global health governance

The U.S. withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO) disrupts global health coordination and security by weakening international responses to public health crises. The WHO plays a central role in pandemic preparedness, outbreak response, and global disease surveillance, ensuring that countries share critical information and coordinate containment measures. By leaving the organization, the U.S. risks diminished access to real-time epidemiological data, medical research, and collaborative response efforts that are essential for mitigating future health threats. During the COVID-19 pandemic, for instance, the WHO facilitated the rapid dissemination of information regarding the virus' spread and coordinated vaccine distribution efforts through COVAX (an international program aiming to expand access to COVID-19 vaccines). Without direct participation, the U.S. will face delays in obtaining crucial health data, reducing its ability to prepare for and respond to emerging outbreaks effectively. Additionally, this withdrawal could undermine global trust in the U.S. as a reliable partner in international health governance, weakening its influence in shaping health policies and emergency response strategies. Ultimately, this decision risks hampering both U.S. public health security and broader global disease response efforts, as pandemics and outbreaks require multilateral cooperation to contain and control. 

Financing WHO

As one of the largest contributors to the WHO, the U.S. has historically provided substantial financial support for global health initiatives, including disease eradication programs, vaccine distribution, and emergency response efforts. Without these funds, the WHO will struggle to maintain essential health programs (vaccinations, maternal and child healthcare, chronic disease appointments, etc), particularly in low-income countries that rely on its support for basic healthcare infrastructure and outbreak preparedness. The consequences of this financial instability will be severe. The WHO plays a critical role in coordinating immunization efforts, medical aid distribution, and epidemic response, particularly in regions with limited resources. The loss of U.S. funding will disrupt these programs, exacerbating global health disparities and weakening the world’s ability to respond to future pandemics. Reduced WHO capacity does not just affect other countries; it increases the risk of uncontrolled outbreaks that could easily spread across borders, ultimately threatening U.S. public health as well.

Eradication of disease/global health equity 

The WHO has been instrumental in combating diseases such as polio, HIV/AIDS, and malaria, coordinating international vaccination programs and treatment initiatives to limit the impact of the pathogens. The U.S., as one of the largest contributors to the WHO, has played a pivotal role in funding these programs. The withdrawal of U.S. support jeopardizes these critical initiatives, potentially leading to a resurgence of preventable diseases, particularly in low-income countries that depend heavily on WHO assistance. Moreover, the thawing of permafrost due to climate change poses additional risks. As permafrost melts, it can release ancient pathogens that have been dormant for millennia, potentially leading to new disease outbreaks. A well-funded, coordinated global health response is essential to monitor and address these emerging threats. However, the U.S. withdrawal from the WHO undermines such efforts, leaving the global community less prepared to handle these challenges.

Disease surveillance

The WHO facilitates international collaboration by coordinating research and disseminating vital information on disease outbreaks, such as tracking new COVID-19 variants. By exiting the organization, the U.S. not only forfeits access to this real-time data but also diminishes its role in contributing valuable health information, thereby weakening global efforts to monitor and control diseases. This disruption in collaboration hampers the ability of all nations, including the U.S., to respond effectively to public health crises. As noted by the American Medical Student Association, the withdrawal isolates the U.S. from a key global health body, diminishing its ability to influence international health policies and initiatives that directly affect the safety and security of its population. Moreover, the absence of the U.S. in the WHO's coordinated efforts could lead to delays in identifying and containing outbreaks, increasing the risk of widespread transmission. The Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health emphasizes that withdrawing from the WHO would hamper national and international pandemic preparedness efforts, potentially leading to public health disasters.

Economic/global health consequences

Pandemics have massive economic consequences, from disrupting global supply chains to forcing costly government interventions. The COVID-19 pandemic alone caused trillions in economic losses, and stimulus measures such as direct payments contributed to inflationary pressures. By weakening the WHO, the U.S. increases the likelihood that future pandemics—like the ongoing spread of avian influenza—will last longer, cost more, and require even more drastic financial interventions. Failing to contain outbreaks quickly doesn’t just put lives at risk; it directly threatens economic stability at home and abroad.

Beyond economic fallout, withdrawing from the WHO also means the U.S. is no longer bound by international health regulations (IHR), which are critical during global health emergencies. The IHR framework ensures coordinated international responses to pandemics, mandating transparency and containment measures that prevent localized outbreaks from escalating into global catastrophes. Without these obligations, the U.S. could mishandle emerging threats, increasing the risk of uncontrolled outbreaks that could devastate both public health and the economy. By abandoning international health cooperation, the U.S. is choosing short-term isolation over long-term security—putting both lives and financial stability on the line.

Military/biodefense

The WHO serves as a critical platform for early warnings about infectious diseases, facilitating rapid information exchange and coordinated responses among member nations. By exiting the organization, the U.S. forfeits access to this vital intelligence, potentially delaying its awareness of emerging health threats and compromising its ability to implement timely countermeasures. This gap in early warning systems could lead to delayed responses to outbreaks, increasing the risk of widespread transmission and endangering public health.

Moreover, U.S. military personnel deployed overseas rely on WHO-led initiatives to combat endemic diseases in their regions of operation. The WHO's efforts in disease surveillance, vaccination programs, and health infrastructure support are integral to maintaining the health of service members. Withdrawal from the WHO jeopardizes these collaborative efforts, potentially exposing military personnel to higher risks of infection. While the U.S. Department of Defense has its own health surveillance and vaccination programs, these are often implemented in conjunction with WHO guidelines and support. The absence of WHO collaboration could lead to gaps in disease prevention measures, adversely affecting the health and readiness of U.S. forces.

Ironically, many service members who may support the withdrawal are the same individuals who will face increased health risks as a result. According to a 2024 Pew Research Center survey, 63% of veteran voters identify with or lean toward the Republican Party. This not only undermines global health security but also directly endangers the well-being of U.S. military personnel, who depend on international cooperation to safeguard their health during deployments.

Modeling

The U.S. withdrawal from the WHO did not occur in isolation–it set a precedent for other nations to disengage from global health governance, further weakening international cooperation. Argentina, for example, has followed the U.S.’s lead and has withdrawn from the WHO, citing similar concerns to President Trump. This sets the stage for a potential domino effect, where countries begin prioritizing nationalist policies over collective health. The consequence is clear: a fragmented global health system wherein nations are isolationist and fail to track pandemics, diseases, and any type of healthcare-related data. This shortsighted nationalism ignores the reality that no country, no matter its power, can single-handedly end a pandemic. If more states begin to follow suit, the world will be at significant risk regarding future health emergencies, leading to higher mortality rates, prolonged economic disruptions, and general instability.

The Trump Administration’s Oncoming Attack on Birthright Citizenship: What Does It Mean to Be an American?

Via Flickr

American birthright citizenship, and the associated rights and liberties, is core to the American experiment. The idea that someone born in the fifty states, regardless of their race, gender, status, or parents’ country of origin, is entitled to all of the freedoms, protections, and civic responsibilities that the United States has to offer, is an incredibly compelling one. American citizenship is intrinsic and inalienable. It has given us some of the nation’s best and brightest and created a distinct national identity; we can recognize our distinct ethnic, religious, or regional differences while living in the same communities, voting together, catching a football game, and so on. It unifies us – we are all “one America.”  It is what allows American communities to become cohesive and truly great; removal and separation breaks down the communities that make up our nation. It is this integral, compelling core value that is being challenged by recent executive orders by the Trump administration. 

Mere hours after being inaugurated again, President Donald Trump signed an executive order “Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship.” In doing so, the Trump administration seeks to “protect” American citizenship by redefining birthright citizenship to require both parents of a child to, at minimum, be legal residents of the US (green card holders) or full citizens. Prior to this, any child born on US soil was granted birthright citizenship, regardless of their parents’ legal status or nationality. This principle was codified in the 14th Amendment, which was designed to overturn the court precedent established in Dred Scott v Sanford, the landmark 1856 Supreme Court case that denied African-American slaves American citizenship despite being born on American soil. It was further solidified in another SCOTUS case, United States v Wong Kim Ark, in which a Chinese-American born in San Francisco had been denied citizenship on the basis that his parents were Chinese nationals during the time of the Chinese Exclusion Act, even though his parents were considered permanent residents of the United States. Ultimately, in the case Wong Kim Ark was found to be a citizen, therefore establishing the precedent that the parents’ origin is irrelevant to the citizenship status of their child. Birthright citizenship applies in almost all cases, with children of foreign diplomats being the only exception, as they’re not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States. The question is, how does this executive order overturn years of legal convention?

It is that exact phrasing in the 14th Amendment, “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” (meaning the jurisdiction of the United States) that the Trump administration has used to justify the executive order. In essence, the executive order asserts that a child born to parents that are not in the United States legally or are in the United States temporarily (on a visiting or student visa) is therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, but rather the parent’s country of origin. In other words, the administration has exploited the vagueness of the terminology to say that the US has no legal responsibility to someone whose parents do not hold permanent residence in the US. Executive orders, from a legal standpoint, are used to direct how the executive branch should enforce legal policy; often, they are used to enact policy that would otherwise be legislatively difficult, but it is still possible to legally challenge or prevent an executive order through the legislative and judicial branches. For the time being, a federal district court judge has blocked the order temporarily on the grounds that it is built off a bad-faith constitutional interpretation, calling it “blatantly unconstitutional.” But, the directive still holds political weight; it makes good on Trump’s political promises, yes, but it also establishes a more essentialist view on what it takes to be an American, especially in the context of the country’s changing demographics and rising rates of global migration. Moreover, it is an order that, while likely to be overturned, still inflicts fear in both his political opponents and any prospective migrants. 

Where do we go from here? Should the case go to the Supreme Court, there is a good chance that even the Trump-appointed justices break from the administration. Justice Amy Coney Barrett has been shown to break rank in favor of logical and clear constitutional rulings, highly valuing her own conservative principles and not wanting to serve as a mere pawn to the Republican agenda. Chief Justice John Roberts places high value on judicial precedent; this is evident in his concurring opinion in Dobbs v Jackson Women’s Health Organization, in which he emphasizes judicial restraint and stare decisis. Justice Neil Gorsuch has also occasionally taken more diverse ideological stances, authoring the majority opinions in Bostock v Clayton County and McGirt v Oklahoma, opposing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and in support of the sovereignty of Native American lands. Something with this clear of a judicial precedent is unlikely to be overturned easily, but it is still a possibility; in recent years, the court has shown a willingness to overturn long-held precedent, especially given the recent decisions overturning Roe v Wade and Chevron v NRDC. More than that, however, this executive order has opened the political and ideological floodgates. The country is facing an intense, vehement reckoning over immigration, from the looming crackdown on irregular migration to the political battles over H-1B (work visa) recipients. Amid these political battles, we again ask, what is the meaning and value of American citizenship? Who deserves to be a citizen? This executive order may well be a step toward a narrower, more exclusive definition of what an American citizen is.

A Double-Edged Sword: AI, Journalism, and the Era of Trump

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Artificial intelligence’s (AI) explosion in popularity has spanned nearly every industry, acting as a catalyst for rapid transformation across the makeup of many sectors. The media and journalism world is no different, adopting AI to increase efficiency and convert large sums of information into digestible outputs for the general public. Utilized to expedite transcriptions, facilitate content production and drafting, and assess audience analytics, AI has become a powerful tool for many journalists. However, the negative implications of AI implementation into journalism are twofold: replacing human journalists with machines, and compromising the integrity of journalism as a whole. Absent oversight or guiding standards, these developments could undermine the five values of ethical journalism—accuracy, independence, impartiality, humanity, and accountability—destabilizing the foundation of free and open media.

In terms of replacement, the field of journalism is experiencing a period of mass layoffs. Whether these layoffs are a result of AI’s growing popularity in the industry, or conversely, AI is being utilized as a means to lessen the load on short-staffed outlets, there is an undeniable relationship between the two. While some argue that AI is simply a supplemental tool in journalism, not a replacement mechanism, the phenomenon of automation bias across many various manifestations of AI remains problematic. The human tendency to over-rely on automation can completely overtake human decision-making for the sake of expediency and ease. For example, younger generations are losing the ability to read physical maps in favor of putting their full faith in navigation apps. This blind trust can lead to disastrous situations so common that they’ve earned their own moniker: “death by GPS.”  In journalism, automation bias can mean reporters spend less time verifying AI-generated content, inclined to trust it at face value despite generative AI (GenAI) needing significant human oversight due to its experimental nature. 

Additionally, layoffs in journalism disproportionately impact marginalized groups, specifically people of color and women. This issue of declining diversity in journalism mirrors the recent pushback against Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) initiatives spearheaded by the Oval Office. The devaluation of marginalized voices is problematic in any context, but in the media field particularly, a reduction in perspectives can create an environment conducive for harmful misinformation and inaccurate representations. Replacing journalists with AI exacerbates the potential for extremely biased reporting, due to the fact that GenAI models are commonly known to amplify both racial and gender-based stereotypes. Without someone in the room to add their lived experience and nuance to the conversation, journalists may unknowingly perpetuate negative stereotypes or greenlight AI-generated content that does. 

Journalists are already fighting an uphill battle against AI-generated misinformation. Falsely generated AI news and deepfakes have made it increasingly difficult for journalists to verify facts in their reporting. These technologies have the power to sway public opinion and quickly spread false information during crucial times, such as crises and elections. AI’s use on both ends, for content creation and content verification, manufactures a cyclical media landscape dependent on AI. This becomes an epidemic of “platformization” of newsrooms, due to tech giants like Google and Microsoft selling newsroom AI products that can render publications completely dependent on Big Tech for their journalistic processes. Preserving the integrity of unbiased and truth-based reporting is becoming more and more crucial as social media platforms are overrun with unregulated misinformation. 

As previously mentioned, AI-produced outputs necessitate human oversight to catch any errors born from the nature of models trained on the Internet; troves of both factual and fake information live on the Internet, which ChatGPT and other GenAI models indiscriminately draw upon to craft their responses. With this comes an increased risk for AI to plagiarize sources without accreditation, unbeknownst to the journalist using the output for their own publications. GenAI is also known to “hallucinate” by creating and dispensing baseless information as fact; ChatGPT has even fabricated entire articles, and then tacked on the names of real reporters as the authors. When adopted into media environments, GenAI’s implementation muddies the world of credit attribution and factual integrity, while simultaneously pressuring journalists to prioritize speed over accuracy. Accelerating the processes of journalism with AI leads to higher competition to break stories first, which can reduce time spent on necessary fact-checking and verification.

The most recent developments regarding AI and journalism come from OpenAI; while already enmeshed with 19 popular news publishers, OpenAI is now moving to directly fund local Axios newsrooms enabled by OpenAI products. The partnership’s ultimate vision is an AI “super-system” that ascends beyond the one company, and would quality-control editing, create visuals for articles, and control distribution of articles. 

It seems this super-system is already materializing in some respect, with President Trump’s endorsement and partnership in the $500 billion AI infrastructure venture with a company called the Stargate Project. The partnership extends across borders, consisting of OpenAI, Oracle, Japan's Softbank, and the United Arab Emirate’s (UAE) MGX. This would fund massive AI data centers in the US, and supposedly generate hundreds of thousands of American jobs. However, the origin of the $500 billion is up for debate, with Elon Musk commenting that “they don’t actually have the money.” Alternatively, one source claims that the bulk of funding is coming from the technology arm of the UAE’s sovereign wealth fund. Such significant foreign funding in our media and content-producing sphere is cause for concern, especially when considering multiple countries’ attempts to meddle in US affairs in the past. 

President Donald Trump’s policy stance on AI remains consistent with his enthusiasm towards the Stargate Project, seeing as he just signed an executive order rescinding former President Joe Biden’s 2023 executive order that sought to establish guardrails and standards for AI usage and development. Biden’s extensive executive order touched on many aspects impacted by AI, requiring transparency from prominent AI developers, standards of safety and security created by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, as well as stipulations pertaining to privacy, consumer protections, and civil rights. Trump’s executive order “calls for departments and agencies to revise or rescind all policies, directives, regulations, orders, and other actions taken under the Biden AI order that are inconsistent with enhancing America’s leadership in AI.” In other words, anything inhibiting or hindering the profit and expansion of the AI industry in the US is to be effectively eliminated. 

President Trump’s coziness with Big Tech presents another alarming layer to this issue. Trump is already in cahoots with Meta, Tiktok, and X, so the link between Trump, OpenAI, and newsrooms like Axios becomes particularly troubling. With the end of fact-checking across Meta platforms, and the rapid dissemination of misinformation on social media in general, the importance of reputable journalistic reporting is more essential now than ever. 

The implementation of AI into journalism must be done with intentional and careful considerations of the advantages and disadvantages of the tool, as well as clear guidelines for use and credit attribution. Transparency in how, when, and why AI is utilized must become the standard. Otherwise, we risk devolving into a period where reputable reporting is nonexistent or highly inaccessible. At a time of such heightened political tensions and ever-evolving current events, protecting the integrity of journalism must be a priority.

The Future of Climate Policy for Brazil and the United States after Bolsonaro and Trump

On October 30th, 2022, former president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva beat incumbent Jair Bolsonaro in the Brazilian presidential election. It was a close election, with Lula getting 50.9% of the vote and Bolsonaro getting 49.1%. Bolsonaro had a turbulent and divisive one-term presidency with attacks on the democratic institutions in Brazil, improper COVID-19 policies which left 700,000 citizens dead, unfounded claims of voter fraud in the most recent presidential election, and telling his supporters to take to the street in protest. Now, if you think that this all sounds familiar, you are right. Former United States president, Donald Trump, also had quite a divisive and controversial presidential term that has similarities to Bolsonaro’s in terms of ideologies and policies. However, one of the most impactful and important ways that these two conservative presidents were similar was their climate and environmental policies. The two almost seemed to copy and bounce off each other with such matching policies and rollbacks. Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro have similar degradation of environmental policies such as wanting to withdraw from the Paris Climate Accords and dismantling their federal environmental agencies, the EPA and the MMA. However, now that both countries’ recent elections have ousted both the right-wing presidents, Biden and Lula are now cutting back on conservative climate policy to try to fill the gap.

The Paris Climate Accords

What exactly are the Paris Climate Accords? Put simply, they are a legally binding international treaty concerning climate change. In December 2015, world leaders came together at the UN Climate Change Conference (COP21) in Paris, France because they agreed that climate change is a global emergency that all the countries of the world need to concern themselves with. The agreement that they came up with a set of long-term goals for the 194 countries in attendance. The agreement’s main goals were to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions, limit the Earth’s temperature rise to 1.5C, review countries’ commitments to cutting emissions every five years, and provide financial aid to developing countries who need help financing environmental policies. Every five years, each country is expected to submit a climate action plan to the United Nations. In that plan should be the actions they plan to take to meet the agreed upon long-terms of the Paris Agreement, which are mandatory. This plan lets countries chart their own course on how they contribute to fighting climate change that best suits them. This will spark a huge economic boom for the rest of the century. There are greener jobs everywhere now, from the manufacturing of electric cars and the installation of solar panels. Not only will this plan help fight global climate change but it will also help the global economy. So why then, did Trump and Bolsonaro want to withdraw their countries from the Paris Climate Accords? In 2017, not even two years after the agreement was signed by the United States, Trump announced that the United States will withdraw from the agreement. In a press statement from the State Department that came out in November 2019, it stated that the US would withdraw from the accords because of “its unfair economic burden imposed on American workers, businesses, and taxpayers by the US pledges made under the Agreement.” It also claimed that the United States does not need the help or regulations of the UN because they have already been reducing emissions and ensuring the citizen’s access to affordable energy options. However, it promised to continue to work with other countries to react to the effects and impacts of climate change. Others believe that Trump pulled out of this agreement because it would be popular with his voters and supporters, who work in the fossil fuel industries.The US now represents around 15% of global greenhouse gas emissions, it remains the world's biggest and most powerful economy. So, when they are the only country so far to withdraw from this agreement, it raises a global problem of trust and responsibility.

Bolsonaro’s presidency

Early on in Bolsonaro’s presidential campaign, he said that he wanted to withdraw Brazil from the Paris Agreement. Just before the election, Bolsonaro changed his plan saying that he would keep Brazil in for now but only if certain conditions were met. While his mind kept changing about this particular agreement, he was dead-set on pulling out of others, such as the 2019 United Nations Climate Conference (COP25) and Brazil’s 2015 carbon emissions education pledge. In 2018, Bolsonaro said that Brazil would remain in the agreement if someone could give him a written guarantee that there would be no “Triple A” project and no “independence of any indigenous area” Triple A is a proposal of an NGO from Colombia for some protected areas between the Andes and the Atlantic. Bolsonaro thought that this proposal is a conspiracy to take the Amazon rainforest away from Brazil. When he referred to the “independence of indigenous areas,” what he really meant was foreign governments are trying to get indigenous communities to declare independence from Brazil so that those governments can take the Amazon as their own. While Bolsonaro eventually scraped his pledge to withdraw from the agreement, and the US remains the only country to actually do so, this could have set a dangerous precedent for other powerhouse countries to leave the agreement as well, effectively nullifying it.

Comparing Trump’s environmental policies to Bolsonaro

Trump and Bolsonaro also had similar plans to defund or dismantle their federal environmental agencies, for the US, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and in Brazil, the Ministry of the Environment (MMA). In the US, the Administrators of the EPA were deep in scandal and controversy. The first one was Scott Pruitt, a senator from Oklahoma, who was a fossil fuel industry enthusiast and had a disdain for climate science. He supported Trump in his rollbacks of the EPA regulation on multiple different issues. Trump signed an executive order in 2017 that would lift bans on federal leasing for coal, lifts restrictions on the production of oil, natural gas, coal, and shale, returns the power of such regulation to the states, and a re-evaluation of the Clean Power Plan. This is Obama’s signature climate policy which intended to cut 32% of power plant emissions by replacing coal with renewable energy. This plan only works if the EPA has regulation power of carbon pollution regulations. However, under Trump, this was not going to happen. If these carbon pollution regulations do not happen, the American people, especially the poor and people of color will suffer from it. There is also something called the Waters of US Rule, which Trump also wanted to eliminate. This was passed by the EPA in 2015 to include smaller streams in the Clean Water Act that could provide drinking water to a third of Americans, especially some in rural areas where access to clean drinking water is sparse. If the EPA’s ability to regulate the Clean Power Plan and the companies that produce fossil fuels, we could have a global climate crisis on our hands. Bolsonaro has used similar tactics to dismantle his federal environmental agency, the Ministry of the Environment (MMA). In 2019, he announced that he would be stripping the environment ministry’s authority over regulations in the forestry and water agency, which is a big problem since the Amazon rainforest is included in that description. Critics of this decision said that the lack of clear directives to fight against climate change is not allowing Brazil to meet its commitments to cut greenhouse gasses, which Bolsonaro has already done. Environmentalists at the time feared that since the ministry does not have as much regulatory power, deforestation in the Amazon will increase. In addition, in 2020, his government published 195 acts, ordinances, decrees, and other measures which would continually dismantle Brazil’s environmental laws. These acts would allow those who illegally deforested and occupied conserved areas of the Amazon to receive full amnesty for their crimes. Also, the supervision of fisheries was being relaxed so this could increase the illegal trafficking of tropical fish. These acts have also led to the firing of specialized agency heads and the hiring of personnel with little to no experience in environmental management. Under Bolsonaro, the Amazon rainforest has suffered an increase in deforestation rates. Brazil was once the standard for environmental conservation since they have a rainforest, whose protection is necessary for survival on Earth. However, since Bolsonaro took office in 2019, he stripped enforcement measures of the MMA, cut funding for the MMA, fired environmental experts and replaced them with personnel with little to no experience, and weakened indigenous land rights. There have been many forest fires and criminal activity such as illegal logging due to the MMA’s inability to enforce its regulations and protections. In the first three years of his being in office, the Amazon had lost 8.4 million acres, which just for context, is the same size as the entire country of Belgium. It is a 52 percent increase from the deforestation rates from previous years. In 2021, 17% of the whole rainforest had been destroyed. There are estimations that if that number reaches 20 to 25 percent, it could threaten millions of people and animals whose lives depend on the rainforest.

The new presidents and their policies: Biden and Lula

However powerless we feel as individuals about the inevitability of climate change, there is hope for the United States and Brazil in their new leaders. Both new presidents have promised to undo a lot of the policies, cuts, and setbacks to the environment from the last administrations. In the 2022 Brazilian presidential election, many felt that the Amazon’s fate was at stake. Lula has pledged to protect the Amazon and is the ‘greenest’ candidate that ran in the election. He was president also in 2003 and he often points to his track record during that term to show that he can succeed in his plans. He started enforcing a policy called the Forest Code which got many government agencies to work together to decrease deforestation. When Lula was in power, deforestation fell dramatically by 80%. Since Lula’s win of the office only occurred a short while ago, we can only look at his past performance to see if he will hold to his future promises to reduce deforestation. In the United States, the same environmental promises were made by Joe Biden when he was elected. Since Biden has been in office since 2020, we can look to see how the promises he made during his campaigns have fared. Biden has started protecting land that was opened to drilling. Trump approved the Keystone XL and Dakota Access pipelines, which invaded Native American and farming land. He also opened up federally managed land and ocean for oil and gas drilling. Biden, however, has halted oil and gas leasing, reserved land and ocean drilling for oil and gas, and blocked the Keystone pipelines. In addition, Biden has started enforcing environmental regulations again. Trump allowed businesses that polluted to not be prosecuted by the federal government for any broken environmental laws. Biden has started cracking down on pursuing and prosecuting polluters while also suing fossil fuel companies for the climate damage they have caused. He restored flood protection standards, revoked the executive order that made it harder for agencies to issue environmental rules, and reserved the requirement to reduce climate considerations when assessing the impact of a project. All that being said, the future of the environment and the impact of climate change will be decided in the next few years. All we can do as individuals are elect the officials with the Earth’s best interests in mind and hopefully, the policies being created now will help prevent irreversible damage further down the line.

Trump’s Legacies in China: Lessons Biden Can Learn

Introduction

President Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from international institutions, and subsequently the international arena, has left rising powers such as China to undermine the liberal world order. The US has classified China as a revisionist power on the basis that China is exploiting global rules and norms in favor of its own interests over the interests of others. Yet, President Trump’s approach towards China does not prevent China from taking advantage of the US and will have long lasting implications for the future of US-China relations. Before President Trump, disagreements between China and the United States over trade, human rights, and cybersecurity already existed. President Trump’s strategy towards China did not resolve these issues but exacerbated existing conflicts and created new problems. President Trump’s attempt at holding China accountable for taking advantage of the US economy, intellectual property, and institutions have pushed the two countries to the brink of war. With Joseph Biden winning the 2020 US Presidential election, American allies, scholars on US-China relations, and citizens of both countries are paying close attention to what President-elect Biden’s approach to China will look like. Based on the current tensions between the US and China, it is likely that the confrontational approach of President Trump will continue under Biden. The enduring implications of President Trump’s foreign policy towards China has lessons in which President-elect Biden can learn and develop a more effective way of dealing with the superpower.

Lessons Biden Can Learn From 

Lesson #1: Trade disputes can be resolved by economic tools other than tariffs, and trade agreements should address structural issues.

President Trump has regularly prided himself on the fact that he is a businessman and believes his skills will help the US gain a competitive advantage over China in trade. In the summer of 2018, Trump began his lengthy trade war with China by imposing tariffs on thousands of Chinese manufactured products. Before the trade war, the Chinese economy was already showing signs of slowing economic growth. Therefore, the trade war further impacted China’s economy. The tariffs that Trump imposed significantly impacted Chinese manufacturers who saw a decline in exports to the US by more than 12%. The trade war exacerbated China’s existing sluggish economic growth and forced smaller businesses to exit the market. 

Despite the negative impact of the tariffs on China’s economy, the real evaluation of the trade deal Trump negotiated with Beijing is whether it benefits the American people. Trump’s trade war has received much criticism from economists and scholars who argue that the cost outweighs the benefits. US consumers who have to pay higher prices for imported goods are taking the brunt of the high tariffs. A study conducted by Moody’s Analytics estimates that the trade deal has caused the US to lose more than 300,000 jobs and reduced US GDP by 0.3% in just one year into the trade deal. The US is not a price setting country which means that the tariffs did not lower the world market price of imports. In other words, the impact of higher tariffs is fully passed on to US consumers and businesses. Tariffs are not the best economic tool in dealing with China. For instance, Tom Giovanetti, president of Institute for Policy Innovation, argues that a more effective way of dealing with trade disputes with China is to use the World Trade Organization and other international economic institutions to pressure them. President Trump either did not get consider or understand the impact of tariffs on American people and firms before he enacted the tariffs. Another downside to tariffs in the trade war with China is that it does not address the structural issues that are behind the origin of China’s economic expansion. For example, Ana Swanson and Alan Rappeport explain how cybersecurity issues such as hacking are linked to trade and remain unsolved in Trump’s trade deal with China. Another issue Swanson and Rappeport bring up is the failure of Trump to address China’s currency manipulation and subsidization of goods by the Chinese government which allows the “cheap goods to flood the United States.” Without addressing the structural issues linked to trade, the US cannot stop China from taking advantage of the global economy. Therefore, the lesson that Biden should take away from Trump’s trade negotiations with China is that a successful trade deal should consist of effective methods that do not involve tariffs and address structural problems associated with China’s unjust economic practices.

Lesson #2: Multilateralism is one of America’s best tools for addressing transnational issues.

US democracy and the US-led liberal order is under threat due to the Trump administration. During Trump’s presidency, he withdrew the US out of several international institutions thus abandoning multilateralism and the spread of US democracy. Some of the international organizations Trump has pulled out of include the Paris Agreement, the UN Human Rights Council, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The most important implication of Trump’s unilateral “America first” approach is allowing revisionist powers such as China to shape the international rules and institutions that the US once founded. 

As seen in China’s creation of the Belt and Road initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank, China’s goal is not simply to surpass the US in the global economy, but to replace the US-led liberal world order. Therefore, the more crucial conflict between the US and China is over ideology. The ideological nature of the conflict makes it more important to emphasize multilateralism as a way to counteract China’s threat to the liberal world order. William Moreland, a research analyst at the Brookings Institution, explains that the three main dimensions to multilateralism are “measured collaboration on shared challenges, revitalize to provide for deconfliction and crisis off-ramps, and compete selectively both with existing institutions and via new ones to better defend democratic values against authoritarian rivals.” In other words, multilateralism creates a support system of similar ideologically based countries. Although Trump rejected multilateralism on issues such as the environment and economy, in the past year, he has started to restore friendly relations with allies in Europe to address cybersecurity challenges Western countries face from Chinese tech companies such as Huawei. Some cybersecurity challenges that China poses include state-sponsored espionage, threatening and monitoring dissenters abroad, and intellectual property theft. President Trump’s efforts in persuading European countries to divest from China’s 5G network and technology companies have been successful so far. For example, Britain, Germany, and Sweden are countries who have most recently succumbed to President Trump’s pressure to not use Chinese technology. As more countries join the US-Europe front to halt Chinese tech, China will eventually run out of markets to sustain Chinese tech companies and be forced to play by global rules and norms. In the aspect of cybersecurity, President Trump has started an effective multilateralism campaign to address challenges with Chinese tech. However, President Trump’s multilateralism ignores a core aspect of US values which is human rights. President Trump has ignored China’s human rights violations against the Xinjiang Uyghur population, due to a “fear of jeopardizing trade talks with Beijing.” By upholding one aspect of the liberal world order at the expense of human rights is contradictory and can undermine the coherence of the ideologies that created multilateralism in the first place. During President-elect Biden’s campaign for the presidency, he made remarks vowing to “renew trust in American international engagement and leadership” which will restore disbanded international agreements and strengthen existing multilateralism with US allies. Biden’s track record on emphasizing American leadership in the international system and continued cooperation with US allies will help the US restore core democratic principles that were undermined during the Trump administration. 

Lesson #3: Rash decisions lead to misperceptions about the opponents actions and escalate tensions between the two countries. 

China is the world’s second largest economy next to the US and is projected to surpass US GDP in around a decade. There exists a debate within the field of international economics about whether China will actually surpass the US since there are signs that its economy is slowing down. Despite the debate between scholars on whether China will be able to sustain its rise, however, facts show that China is projecting its influence and coercing regions such as Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In other words, the US is no longer in an asymmetrical power relationship with China. 

As the power dynamic between the US and China shifts from an asymmetrical relationship to a symmetrical relationship, there needs to be a change in the US approach towards China. The US is no longer in a more powerful position to make China subordinate to the US. China has responded to the US’s attempts to avert China by mimicking US actions against China. This places the US and China in a tit-for-tat strategy. An example of the tit-for-tat strategy playing out in US-China relations recently is President Trump’s order that restricted Chinese graduate students and researchers from attending American universities this past summer. Beijing responded to President Trump’s order by similarly, restricting and detaining US academic scholars and journalists in China. The initial provocation started by President Trump led to an escalation of US-China relations into a “hostage diplomacy” scenario. President Trump’s decision to detain and exclude Chinese graduate students and researchers sends a message to Americans to view “Chinese students as perpetrators of espionage and intellectual property theft.” President Trump’s action merely shifts the blame on Chinese academic scholars which for the most part is not involved in problems involving China’s economy, human rights, cybersecurity, etc. President Trump’s short-sighted decision to block students fuels xenophobia and does not answer the underlying issues of intellectual property theft by China. China responded to President Trump’s order to restrict Chinese students and researchers by initiating similar threats against US researchers and journalists which instantly escalate the existing conflict between the two countries. Therefore, as China’s power becomes just as compelling as the US, the Biden administration’s foreign policy towards China needs to emphasize decisions that can help achieve long-term goals as opposed to short-term reactionary decisions. Long-term preventive measures also have the benefits of being able to negotiate with China beforehand to prevent retribution of an action on the US. 

Adapting to Change in the New Era of US-China Relations 

By the time President Trump leaves the Oval Office, US-China relations will not be where it was previously. The change in US-China relations is not only due to decisions President Trump made during his presidency, but also the evolving nature of China and its relationship with other countries. The confrontational foreign policy approach President Trump has employed on dealing with China helped make clear China’s intentions and the problems the incoming administration needs to address. However, President Trump’s way of dealing with China has also led to a decline in US engagement in international agreements and organizations. Therefore, there needs to be a better strategy to address China’s unjust practices. Decisions based on short term reactionary impulses will not solve the underlying issues China presents because it undermines certain pillars of US foreign policy (i.e., human rights) for economic or political advantages and lacks long term preventive measures. 

The incoming Biden administration needs to be aware of the evolving nature of China and other countries. The actions that were taken during the President Trump administration or previous administrations are not going to be effective in dealing with China in a new international environment. An adaptive strategy that acknowledges China’s rise, but also addresses the violations and challenges China poses for the US in terms of sustaining its international competitive edge and democratic values is necessary to effectively deal with China. During Trump’s presidency there was an attempt to establish superiority and contain China which has colonialist overtones and can exacerbate the existing tensions between the two countries. The new administration’s goals with China should not be one that emphasizes dominating China, instead it should be one that focuses on establishing preventive measures and addressing China’s existing misconduct and foster a more cooperative relationship based on common goals. The US and China are the two largest countries in terms of GDP and representatives of the two opposing ideologies in contemporary times which makes it more important for a new strategy that is focused on long-term preventive measures and foster a favorable atmosphere for cooperation.

Worlds Collide: The Significance of the Abraham Accord and the Future of the Middle East

Introduction

On September 9th, Christian Tybring-Gjedde—member of the Norwegian parliament and populist Progress Party—nominated US president Donald Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize. Tybring-Gjedde was shortly followed by Swedish MP Magnus Jacobsson, and most recently four Australian law professors led by Dr. David Flint. All of these come ahead of the recent peace deals between Israel and the Persian Gulf states of the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Bahrain. These three parties have issued their support for Trump on grounds of their personal appreciation for his sentiments regarding the corruption of Western governments and unfettered immigration. This is not even the first time Tybring-Gjedde has espoused his support for Donald Trump, with the MP formally nominating Trump in 2018. The peace deal in the Middle East instead serves to underline how these individuals have interpreted the success of Donald Trump’s administration at home and abroad. Understandably, a fair deal of press has begun to circulate over this issue. Not only has partisan debate arisen concerning the nature of the deals themselves, but additionally over whether the President is deserving of these nominations. 

In regards to the Abraham Accord (the Israeli-Emirati treaty), the Director for the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic & International Studies Zbigniew Brzezinski has stated: “This will radically change the way Arab states will deal with each other and their problems.” Not only is this a win for Israel and its people, it is telling of a marketed shift away from the hegemonic control of Saudi Arabia and more autonomy in how the Gulf States—and the Arab World as a whole—deal with interstate issues. However, other commentators are less impressed. In mid-August, Steven A. Cook of the Center on Foreign Relations (CFR) correctly predicted Bahrain’s deal, but noted silence from Saudi Arabia and opposition from Qatar, Turkey, and most notably Iran. 

Similarly, Trump’s nomination has received an apparent partisan reaction. For Republicans, these peace deals have provided an easy point of praise for the Trump administration in the foreign policy realm. Jared Kushner—who was heavily involved with the deal—took the opportunity to praise Donald Trump for his “historic peace effort”. Alabama 2nd District candidate Barry Moore similarly expressed that the UAE-Bahrain-Israel peace deal was “truly a historic moment”. Opponents to Trump have conversely flipped his praise to contrast it with his failings in the foreign policy arena. Some have claimed that Trump has destroyed the US reputation for foreign policy entirely, and that this is only a drop in the bucket in a history of failures. This is the same debate which has prompted whether the successful Middle East summit is truly a landmark win.

Aside from partisan divides in Congress, negative reactions to the Abraham Accord have gained traction mostly out of their comparative analyses. Though some journalists praise the work of Trump’s Emirati-Bahraini delegation in securing the treaty, they report that this success follows a similar trend of foreign policy in the Trump Administration. Rather than nurturing friendships and maintaining alliances, critics of the “Trump Doctrine” laude it for comprising of diplomatic stunts; policies made to impress and awe rather than inspire change. For instance, Trump’s talks with North Korea are lauded as an act of grand-standing. They do more to inflate the ego of the administration than do anything productive.

Still, supporters and opponents alike argue the possible historic weight of these talks. Rather than looking to the past to influence policy in the Middle East, the Abraham Accords have attempted to “look forward”. Where treaties with other countries have been mostly done out of a means to discontinue armed conflict and align interests with the US, the Abraham Accords have been signed purely out of the interest of opening new roads for discussion with Israel and paving the road to increased measures of diplomacy in the region. The ramifications of the Abraham Accords are far-reaching, and it’s necessary to grasp them fully before judging the weight of them completely.

Before the Abraham Accord

It is no secret that Middle Eastern politics are complicated, but they become near unnavigable when the debate over Israel is thrown into the mix. The origin of this issue has to do with the creation of Israel post-World War II to give a homeland for displaced Jews. This decision fell in line with proposals from Zionists since the dawn of the 20th century, who were eager to escape persecution in the West by having their own ethnic homeland. Unfortunately, regardless of historical claims to the region, over the millennia, the region had become home to a significant Muslim Arab population. In a textbook example of decolonization, the British Mandate of Palestine was partitioned to arbitrarily grant land to the new Jewish population. As history suggests, the outcome of this plan led to a bloody civil war. Although this civil war is long over, its outcome has culminated in a micro-level cold war between Israel and Palestine. 

The Arab World has had mixed approaches to the Israel-Palestine conflict. Historically, Arab leaders of Sunni and Shi’ite stripes opposed the state’s very creation, and went out of their way to avoid interaction with it. While more moderate clerics and liberal politicians have been open to acknowledging Israel’s existence and opening talks, few countries have been willing to open diplomatic relations. Prior to the Abraham Accord, the only Arab nations to have recognized Israel were Turkey (1949), Egypt (1979), and Jordan (1994). In spite of their recognition of Israel, there remain complications to their relationships.

Turkey’s recognition of the state of Israel was certainly important for the era, yet primarily derived from Western influence on Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War. Egypt’s relations similarly came out of the involvement of the United States with the Camp David Accords. Anwar Sadat, president of Egypt, was seeking a closer alliance with the US and thus acted to service the broader interests of his own country. The treaty between Jordan and Israel was most deliberately influenced by the Westwith US president Bill Clinton politically pressuring and promising to forgive Jordanian debts for a peace deal with Israel after years of conflict. None of the countries who signed peace deals possess a significant amount of kindness toward Israel in their populace. According to an opinion poll from Vox, as of 2013, Turkey and Egypt held a favorability rating of Israel amounting to 8% and 1% respectively. Much of Jordan’s population is descendent from Palestinian refugees, who near-universally view Israel and its Jewish population with animosity.

The source of this animosity between Arabs and Israelis is at once simple and complicated. According to the Anti-Defamation League, well over 74% of the Middle East harbors anti-semitic views. For everyday Arabs in the Middle East—specifically those of the Muslim faith—Israel is an extension of Western imperialism and Jewish conspiracy. Thus, Zionism (the ideology advocating for the establishment of a Jewish state, specifically in the historic area of Palestine), its advocates, and Israel itself must be eradicated. Although more liberal elements of the Middle East have tried to claim that they are simple anti-Israel rather than anti-Jewish, it is clear that this is merely a dog-whistle to justify anti-semitic policies in the Middle East.

However, the more complex part of this equation is that there are social and political barriers to peace between Israel and Arab states as well. While individuals in the region value their religion greatly—the very name of the Abraham Accord is an eponymous reference to Jews and Muslims being children of Abraham—support of Palestine remains a key issue for Arab officials. Bolder countries like Qatar have directly supported Palestinian paramilitary groups, but for a majority of the Middle East, the question of supporting Israel cannot even be approached because it effectively abandons their support for Palestine. Thus, not only are Israelis left with little hope due to cultural divides, but for political and social obstacles as well.

On a geopolitical scale, the Middle East’s concentration of power has gravitated toward Saudi Arabia in recent years, primarily in response to the growing threat of an Iranian superpower. The reasons for this are varied. There is certainly something to be found in the rivalry toward Sunni and Shi’a sects of Islam for which the Saudi and Iranian governments serve to respectively represent. In the absence of a modern caliph, modern Sunnis have the House of Saud to look to in the containment of the Shi’ite threat of the Ayatollah Khamenei. For modern Shi’a Muslims, the revolutionary theocracy of the Ayatollah is a necessity to spread a Pan-Islamic revolution outside of the bounds of Iran.

It is because of this divide between Muslims then that Middle Eastern states act mostly in allegiance to Saudi Arabia. For instance, it is the means for the Saudis (and to an extent the Qataris) to justify their intervention in the Yemeni Civil War in providing arms to fight against perceived Iranian influence and the growth of Shi’ite Islam. Thus, the common foe of Iran has served to unite the Gulf and Levant states around Saudi Arabia, just as the problem of Israel has served to divide them.

Impact of the Abraham Accord

Through the Abraham Accord, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates have broken away from the common consensus among the Saudi-led coalition that Israel should be disavowed and Palestine should be supported. While the duo are far from the first countries in the Middle East to normalize relations with Israel, they do follow a common trend in the quest for closer relations with the United States by extension. These treaties represent more of a political move by the elite than a rising consensus among the populace. Whether the rest of the Arab World is to follow remains unclear, and highlights a discrepancy in the allegiance of these ambitious Gulf States to their counterparts as well as their hegemon: Saudi Arabia. 

To understand why the UAE and Bahrain agreed to normalize relations, a quick recap of recent events between the US and these countries is needed. The Abraham Accords point out that its signatories are “Recalling the reception held on January 28, 2020, at which President Trump presented his Vision for Peace.” The direct reference of this quote comes from the ambitions of the Trump administration to solve the Israel-Palestine conflict. Critics of the plan—while noting its complexity and adherence to a two-state solution—have lambasted it for being too one-sided and giving preference to Israel over Palestine.

However, whether the Vision for Peace is possible is a digression. The point is that the involvement of the United States in this agreement is salient even in the wording. Mention of the United States are only made three times, but it is where they count: in outlining the US’ future involvement in a “Strategic Agenda for the Middle East” and in “Expressing deep appreciation to the United States for its profound contribution to this historic achievement”. Just as with the Camp David Accords, there is a reason that Donald Trump is an official signatory of this treaty: because it is part of a larger goal to divert states in the Middle East toward recognizing and opening ties with Israel.

Interestingly, just as with Egypt, Turkey, and Jordan, neither the UAE nor Bahrain have particularly favorable views of Israel or its people. In the former, the lead-up to the Abraham Accord was one of skepticism and outrage toward the government. The phrase “Normalisation is Treason” trended among Emirati citizens, though particularly among ethnic Saudi youth. A petition—the Palestine Charter—opposing normalization reached more than one million signers from the Emirates. Only because of fear of government crackdown and the desire for a closer relationship with the US did Bahraini citizens quiet their dissent against the treaty. While the elites of these countries have signed the deal, its people are not so sure.

In addition, there are definitely ramifications for the greater Muslim World at stake, especially in the Gulf. Although Oman—and, surprisingly, Sudan—have agreed to seek relations with Israel, other states like Kuwait have condemned the treaty and Saudi Arabia has specifically demanded the condition of Palestine incorporating the Israeli-controlled Jerusalem as its capital for peace. Iran more ardently opposed the treaty alongside Turkey and the people of Palestine. These actors claimed that the peace deal of the UAE and Bahrain with Palestine was not only wrong, but a violation of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative which had been reaffirmed by both signing parties in 2017.

The future of the Middle East is an uncertainty. It is clear now that we will not be seeing a universal recognition in the Middle East of Israel any time soon—there is simply far too much ground to cover. But there is more to this peace deal than the outcome of Israeli sovereignty. For one: the Abraham Accord denotes a marked shift in the power dynamics of the Middle East. Where the UAE and Bahrain might have gone along with the indifference of the Saudis toward Israel—perhaps even outwardly supporting Palestinian revolutionaries—just a few years ago, this move has revealed a weak link in the armor of the Saudi coalition. Not only are the two Gulf states now more isolated from their Sunni brethren, but the alliance itself is now more unstable than it was previously.
Ultimately, what will be the final result of the Abraham Accord is hard to say. Brzezinski of the CSIS who I referenced earlier acknowledges: “The biggest losers are probably the Palestinians.” The heaviest role of the Middle East in refusing to acknowledge Israel was a sense of pan-Arab solidarity. Sans the influence of outliers, it was part and parcel of Middle Eastern policy since the Bush administration that Israel was in an underdog battle with the US in its ring against the rest of the Arab World. Now, it has put that dynamic into flux. While we will have to wait and see what the future holds, one can only hope that the redefinition of Middle Eastern policy will follow a more peaceful, more cooperative path in the wake of the Abraham Accord.

Advocacy in American Politics: Examining the Quality and Effectiveness of Lobbying in the Trump Era

The quality of the United States’ advocacy and lobbying practices, as well as the effectiveness of the profession’s role in policymaking, have become a recent subject of debate. The transition to the Trump administration has particularly served to amplify an ongoing criticism of the lobbying profession, particularly in regard to the influence of special interests and the economic elite. The quality of practice towards the end of a pluralist representative democracy and the profession’s ability to adapt was, and continues to be, scrutinized by the media, political pundits, and lawmakers alike. Ultimately, the quality of advocacy and lobbying practices within the United States is lacking, despite its effectiveness in adapting strategy and tactics to fit the unique political situation, particularly in response the growing distinction of partisan interests as well as congressional gridlock.

In measuring the quality of advocacy practices within the Trump administration, the standard that the Framers, particularly James Madison, envisioned for competing factions must be recognized. An “extended” republic, or a pluralist model of democracy, was proposed by Madison as the best defense against partisan factions, special interests, and a potential “overbearing majority.” This pluralist model ideally limits the influence of a singular dominate interest – the “tyranny of the majority:” a potential ill-effect of democracy addressed by Madison in Federalist No. 10 and later by Alexis de Tocqueville in his observation of American democracy. Ultimately, the standard of quality that contemporary advocacy practices should reflect is that of  Madison’s “extended” republic, with special interests remaining numerous and equally competitive within the policymaking process.  

The quality of contemporary advocacy practices, however, does not meet this standard of a well-functioning pluralist representative democracy. This concept is widely explored within political and sociological academia; one recent study conducted by Dr. Martin Gilens and Dr. Benjamin Page creates individual and comprehensive statistical models for four distinct theoretical perspectives of democracy. Gilens and Page measure the relationship between the policy preferences of average citizens, economic elites, and special interests and respective policy outcomes. The results suggest that organized interest groups maintain significant influence over the majority’s preference in the policymaking process, especially with the assistance of PAC contributions, lobbying expenditures, and membership. Moreover, this study reaffirms Madison’s argument that a domineering majority can be restrained as various interests in the United States compete for political influence. Yet, sociopolitical variables like money and organizational agency impede and conceivably discourage the open competition of interests. In short, today’s advocacy process fulfills the intent of a pluralist model of democracy, but the process is facilitated through an inequity of resources.

The inequity of monetary resources and organizational agency has led to an increased likelihood of ethical misconduct with contemporary advocacy practices. Indeed, these variables can influence how advocacy strategies engage in the policy-making process and influence their adherence to ethical standards. Attempts have been made, specifically by the American Bar Association, to limit the influence of financial contributions, “shadow” lobbying, and to emphasize organizational accountability by reforming the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA), which made significant strides in establishing transparent and ethical advocacy practices. The recommended reforms that target these key issues include the requirement for LDA registrants to specify specific public offices that are being targeted, as well as reporting all activities of the advocacy and partner entities. Yet, these reforms have faced setbacks, especially following the landmark ruling of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission in 2010 which lifted restrictions on campaign and advocacy donations. Nonetheless, the advocacy profession ideally fulfills the intent of a pluralist model of democracy with a competitive and level playing field for special interests.  

The role of special interests and their influence in the policymaking process has contributed to the negative disposition that the public has of lobbying practices, prompting notable responses from the Obama and Trump administrations. With the media’s reinforcement of a negative special interest narrative, both President Obama and President Trump crafted unique responses pertaining to ethics in order to reflect the public’s negative opinion on lobbying and corruption. For instance, both administrations established direct ethical standards by way of executive order, targeting gift bans and the “revolving door.” Even more pertinent is the Trump administration’s unorthodox structure, which creates indirect challenges for advocacy practices. Specifically, the Trump administration’s lack of intervention points/points of contacts, as well as the President’s frequent use of social media, mainly Twitter, as a platform to disrupt, veil, and shape his intentions, creates a dynamic and unpredictable environment to maneuver for advocacy practices.

Though the methods and strategies vary by organization, there are three distinct tactics that have proven effective within the Trump administration: (1) anticipating unpredicted outcomes, (2) isolating and targeting key players, especially through social media, and (3) emphasizing the player over the policy. Each of these tactics effectively counters some aspect of the Trump administration’s direct and indirect approach to impede the role of special interests and advocacy practices. Ultimately, the ability for advocacy practices to maneuver this political climate is noteworthy and illustrates the adaptability and effectiveness of the industry.

The intense partisan gridlock and the unpredictability of Trump’s style of governance has prompted organizations to anchor their advocacy strategies with administrative networks and the rulemaking process. Though Trump’s victory was not predicted within most academic circles, engaging with the Trump campaign and transition teams proved to be advantageous compared to strategies that relied on their established connections in presuming Secretary Clinton’s Beltway-insider victory. Moreover, the executive institution has grown in administrative authority and is uniquely comprised of appointed and hired officials with backgrounds in advocacy and special interests, such as the appointments of former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos. With the anticipated momentum of a unified government falling short on several legislative failures, strategies sought key administrative intervention points, despite facing difficulties with empty roles and a lack of appointments. Demonstrating network connections within the Trump administration displays to potential clients that an advocacy organization maintains control within an unpredictable administration. As such, strategies have been reallocating efforts towards the rulemaking process in an increasingly partisan and gridlocked environment.

Isolating and targeting key players through social media, especially Twitter, has become an increasingly utile strategy within advocacy. Though it is unclear whether President Trump’s Twitter habits are impulsive or calculated, the acute fixation on Trump’s tweets and other social media platforms provides publicity and the potential for earned media to promote targeted messages. For example, a coalition effort known as “Boot Pruitt,” which targeted EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt, promoted a targeted Twitter-ad campaign to reach key public officials in areas that EPA and Trump administration heads frequent, like the White House, the EPA, and Trump’s private club Mar-a-Lago. In subscribing to the media effects model, in that the media takes on an agenda-setting role in the policymaking process, Trump’s usurpation of the conversation has now become a manipulation of the policy-making agenda. In adapting to President Trump’s governing strategy, advocacy groups can easily test, deploy, and reassess their messages, tracking them through polling, focus groups, or statistical data gathering software, to refined and better implement their issue campaigns. With the media’s, political pundit’s, and the public’s attention focused on social media, advocacy strategies have increasingly become centered on social media issue campaigns.

The most noticeable adaptation that advocacy practices have made in response to the Trump administration is how issue-oriented campaigns now focus on the key players as opposed to the policy. Rather than emphasizing an issue and anticipating the opposition’s arguments, targeted messaging now pinpoints key players within the policymaking and/or rulemaking processes, as opposed to specific policies. As it turns out, the Trump administration has a high tolerance for unpopular public officials and contentious issues, notably with Secretary of Education DeVos and EPA Administrator Pruitt. Rather than argue over policy provisions, advocacy organizations and coalitions, like “Boot Pruitt,” have targeted messages surrounding the player’s background, qualifications, and overall character, which can be measured through focus groups, benchmarks, and brushfire surveys. While these messages can vary, a successful campaign can dehumanize key players and render their policies unpopular and without support.

The state of advocacy and lobbying practices in the United States consists of several, yet surmountable, issues. In an ideal pluralist model of democracy, public competition between interests over policy preferences is undoubtedly encouraged. Advocacy strategies and tactics of the profession are rather effective in adapting to President Trump’s unorthodox administration. The ability for lobbying organizations to skirt professional norms and ethical codes, however, detracts from the demonstrated effectiveness of advocacy practices. It reaffirms the negative perception lobbying and strikes at the quality of the practices. In adapting strategies of network engagement, message targeting, and discrediting attacks, it is necessary to increase transparency and oversight of the industry in order to encourage an open competition of interests.

Trump’s Tax Cuts are Overly-Optimistic, Likely to Inhibit Long-Term Growth

In December of 2017, President Trump signed the “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act”. Aimed at lowering taxes and spurring economic growth, this legislation contains many components that are highly controversial. Those most notable are the cuts in the corporate tax break and a shift in the tax collection scheme for multinational companies. Although aimed at simplifying the U.S. tax code and attracting more companies to America, the prospect of these aims coming to fruition are at the very best optimistic. The consequences of this bill have the potential to suspend economic progress and burden the United States economy with debt for generations. 

Currently, any company that is headquartered in the United States is subject to the corporate tax rate of 35% on all of its earnings, including those made overseas. However, while all American-made earnings are taxed the year they are made, overseas income is only taxed if and when it makes its way into the United States. Critics of this system and proponents of the tax bill have long argued that this practice has discouraged investment in America. Recently, The Tax Foundation compared the American tax structure to Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member countries, and found that this model can partially explain why American-based companies flock to countries with a territorial based model. The result is the exclusion of America from the work of these businesses, a phenomenon referred to as the “lock-out” effect. 

While the Trump tax bill could address this problem, many critics of the plan have been quick to point-out that instituting a territorial-based model could actually exacerbate the practice of companies offshoring their assets. The Center for American Progress published a September 2017 article on their website warning that the effect of such a change would result in the loss of American jobs and decreased wages. A serious claim, the article cites a figure from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) that indicates over half of previously reported foreign income resides in just seven countries with extremely low corporate tax rates. This data suggests that instituting a territorial-based system would only reinforce movement of income to countries with more business-friendly tax systems and have serious consequences on the American economy. 

Economists and policymakers don’t have to search very hard for an example of how companies might actually respond to such a change. A 2011 reportpublished by The Tax Policy Center found that when the U.S. government instituted an income repatriation tax holiday in 2004, multinational corporations based in the U.S. were not as generous as proponents of the holiday predicted. Whereas policymakers who supported the holiday anticipated investment in American capital stock and job creation, instead, the report found that most companies bought more shares of company ownership or paid dividends to their shareholders. 

Aware of the impact this change may have, Republican lawmakers who crafted the Tax Cuts and Job Acts legislation made last-minute changes to the bill before it was passed to impose a one-time 15% repatriation tax on foreign income moving back into the US.  As a result, any of the estimated $2 trillion that is held overseas–if repatriated to the U.S, would be taxed at this rate once the law is instituted. This change came towards the end of the negotiations for the tax bill, after concerns were voiced as to how the bill would impact the deficit. Instituting this tax rate was a natural compromise; lawmakers cut the foreign tax rate in the hopes that it would spur investment the territorial-based model offered,  while raising revenue that would have been sunk without it. 

While reducing the tax rate companies pay on their income as it moves back into the United States does not resolve the many concerns that a territorial-based model presents, it does address a larger issue: how the tax cuts will create debt. Concerns with the cost of making these tax cuts have underscored the entirety of the tax reform debate. In general, two theories have prevailed: the first comes from the bill’s proponents, who argue that the anticipated growth the cuts will spur will create jobs, broaden the tax base, and therefore raise any revenue lost from lowering the initial rate. Critics on the other hand are far less optimistic; they argue that a lower rate will in lead to decreases in the national revenue, leading to future government budget constraints, inevitable cuts, and possibly even economic downturn in the future.

It is important to note that the fiscal conservatives who support the tax cuts rest their credibility on an optimistic prediction of growth offsetting future debt. Shortly after The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that the tax bill would result in $1.5 trillion in additional debt over a 10 year span, Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin claimed that if GDP grows at 2.9% over this same period of time, that growth will offset any revenue shortfalls. While supporters of the bill have rallied around this narrative, what this statement fails to capture is how rare this kind of growth is. According to the BEA, in only one year since 2010 has the U.S. had a growth rate of 2.9% or higher, and after President Bush signed similar albeit less extensive tax cuts during his Administration, 2005 and 2006 alone measured growth above 3 %. This, of course, was followed by a startling declining in growth and the Great Recession.

The CBO estimates that from 2009 to 2019, the Bush Tax cuts will amount to $3 Trillion in additional national debt. Just as these cuts have materialized into a greater burden of debt, the CBO projections show that Trump’s will only add to this. While the United States has a stable credit history, this does not shield it form the drawbacks of slipping further into debt. Foreign Policy magazine reported that before the bill was passed, adding the projected debt would hinder the creditworthiness of the US government and raise interest rates, thus increasing the cost of borrowing. This makes the cost of funding the government grow, thus only worsening the present situation by adding more debt with interest. 

Additional costs to borrowing will likely impact the day-to-day government function, particularly in areas of the budget that see the most funding, like national defense. The Brookings Institute found in a 2012 report that adding debt of comparable size to that which already exists would hinder the the creditworthiness of the US government, leading to higher interest rates and a higher cost to lending. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen called the national debt the single greatest national security risk, echoing concerns cited in the Brookings report that the increased cost of defense spending could jeopardize US leadership abroad. What’s clear from these analyses is that Republican lawmakers and other proponents of the bill have put their blind trust into an overly optimistic projection and corporate altruism. What is not so clear is how strongly these changes will impact future budgetary constraints, economic growth, and US leadership on a global scale.

It is helpful to contextualize this legislation to better understand how this may shake world economic power dynamics. While the US economy is strong, automation continues to sweep the nation, threatening the jobs and therefore the livelihood of millions of working class people. This makes the offshoring of multinational companies, and any bill that might incentivize this behavior, of particular concern. Further, as our population ages, we are reminded of the future financial burden that comes with increasing costs to health care and entitlements. Finally, our young people who will govern over the aftermath of these irresponsible spending measures have their own mountain to climb in the form of student loan debt, which was most recently reported at about $1.5 Trillion in total. 

The United States has a debt problem that doesn’t look like it will be solved anytime in the near future. This tax bill, through increasing the national debt and shifting from the global taxation scheme has the ability to rewrite the global economic order. Whereas the current administration touts its first and only major legislative victory as a major step towards economic renewal in the United States, almost every other sign indicates otherwise.

Donald Trump Could Drive a Wedge Between Mormon Voters and the GOP

In most presidential elections, predicting the winner of the heavily-Mormon state of Utah is a non-exercise. Democrats have won the state exactly once since 1952, in Lyndon Johnson’s 1964 landslide re-election; Republicans, meanwhile, have averaged 61 per cent of the popular voteand a 29-point margin of victory over the Democratic candidate. The 2016 election, however, seemed to be a departure from usual order. The Republican candidate, Donald Trump, faced historically steep disapproval ratings in Utah and polled so poorly that the state briefly appeared to be a toss-up on the eve of the election. Some commentators warily proposed that Utah, one of the most reliably Republican states in the union, could throw its vote to the Democratic Hillary Clinton or even to the last minute independent candidate and Utah native Evan McMullin. These predictions were ultimately dashed on election day, as Trump won Utah by a comfortable though historically small 17-point margin. Trump’s poor performance in Utah relative to past Republicans nevertheless demands greater attention to the political beliefs of Mormon Americans. The disapproval many Mormons express towards President Trump over issues of character and immigration policy could bring these voters to drift away from the Republican Party in favor of alternatives that are more consistent with their own faith.

Why Mormons Resisted Trump

Mormons, or adherents of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (LDS), generally receive little attention from researchers of elections and public opinion. Mormons are currently estimated to be slightly less than two per cent of the American population, with the vast majority being concentrated in rural Western states such as Utah (51%), Idaho (20%), and Wyoming (10%). Mormons consistently rank as one of the most reliably Republican religious groups in the United States next to white evangelical Christians, with 70 per cent of Mormons considering themselves Republican or Republican-leaning according to Pew Research Center. Analysis of the religious right often focuses primarily on evangelical and fundamentalist Christians that have historically dominated the movement, resulting in the nuances of Mormon politics and culture to be overlooked due to their position as a minority among even conservative voters.

In spite of their reliable and staunch conservatism, Mormons were also one of the resistant segments of the Republican base to Donald Trump’s primary campaign in 2016. Many of Trump’s worst primary states were in the rural West, pulling just 14 per cent of the vote in the Utah caucuses and performing similarly poorly in Wyoming and Idaho. Later in the campaign, polls showed a dire 61 per cent of Utahns disapproving of the Republican candidate. Many notable Mormon politicians also delayed endorsing Trump for President until late in his campaign or outright refused. Most notably, former Republican presidential nominee and Utah political icon Mitt Romney refused to endorse Donald Trump for President, publicly feuding with the 2016 nominee and stating that he was “dismayed” with the state of the party. The LDS-owned Deseret News, one of the biggest newspapers in the state of Utah, publicly called for Trump to resign his candidacy in October of 2016.

A significant portion of Mormon voters, clearly, were not happy with the Republican Party’s nominee in 2016. There are several reasons that could explain why Donald Trump has been so unpopular among Mormon voters, one of which being his personal character (or perceived lack thereof). Mormons are one of the most religiously devout and involved denominations in the United States, Pew Research Center, measuring importance of religion, frequency of prayer, and frequency of church attendance, found that 69 per cent of Mormons ranked high in religious commitment in contrast with just 30 per cent of the American public. As a result, Mormons’ religious faith is disproportionately influential on their political stances and their view towards integrity in public figures relative to other faiths. Donald Trump, well known for multiple divorces, infidelity, and vulgarity, stood in stark contrast to Mormon voters’ ideal vision of character and Christianity. The Access Hollywood tape, which depicted Donald Trump gloating about sexual assaulting female contestants on his various reality television shows, was particularly problematic among Mormons and prompted several high-profile Mormon politicians to call for Trump to step down as nominee. Utah governor Gary Herbert described Donald Trump’s comments as “beyond offensive [and] despicable” and announced that he would not vote for either Trump or Clinton for President shortly after the taped was released.

The history of persecution faced by the Church of Latter-Day Saints also appears deeply influential on its adherents’ views towards religious minorities, particularly Muslim-Americans. David Campbell, political scientist and author of Seeking the Promised Land: Mormons and American Politics, says that“Mormons as a group has [sic] deeply ingrained within their psyche that they are a religious minority that has experienced persecution in the not-distant past,” most notably the mass violence and attempted extermination the church faced in Missouri in the 1830s. A Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI) study found that 37 per cent of Mormons believe that Islam is at odds with American values, in contrast with 67 per cent of white evangelicals. Mormons were also 21 per cent less likely than white evangelicals to agree that the American way of life needs to be “protected from foreign influence.” Following Donald Trump’s call for a ban on Muslim travel into the US during his 2016 campaign and again after his State Department’s announcement of its travel ban list in January of 2017, the Church of Latter-Day Saints issued pointed statements advocating religious freedom and calling for compassion towards all those “fleeing physical violence, war and religious persecution.” Trump’s antagonism towards Muslim-Americans during his campaign likely resonated with Mormons’ own history of religious persecution, leaving them discouraged about the Republican nominee’s apparent embrace of religious intolerance.

The Church of Latter-Day Saints’ moderate line on immigration is also a probable factor in explaining Mormon voters’ antipathy towards Donald Trump. David Campbell, Christopher Karpowitz, and J. Quin Monson, authors of the upcoming book Mormonism and American Politics, have found that Mormons are one of the most welcoming religious groups in the nation towards immigrants, second only to Jewish-Americans. The authors theorize that Mormons are especially sympathetic towards illegal immigrants because of the number of Mormons that participate in mission trips to other countries, particularly the developing Latin American nations that many illegal immigrants come from in the United States. Mormons’ experience with overseas missions as well as their deeply-held religious faith, which emphasizes compassion towards the poor and suffering, makes them more sympathetic to the plight of many Hispanic immigrants in America. The western states where most Mormons live are also home to large Hispanic populations, and a PRRI study found that Mormons were more likely than other white Christians to say they live in a community with many new immigrants or that they had a close friend who was born outside of the United States. It appears that because of their experiences and compassion towards Hispanic immigrants in America, Mormons were much more likely to be resistant to Donald Trump’s anti-immigration and anti-Mexican rhetoric compared to the rest of the Republican base.

The Future of Mormon Politics

It’s unclear how the Mormon community’s disapproval of President Trump will influence Mormon politics in the long-term. A migration of Mormon voters to the Democratic Party, as some predicted during the 2016 campaign, appears unlikely. Hillary Clinton only modestly improved her share of the popular vote in Utah over Barack Obama’s 2012 performance. Her 27 per cent share of the vote is still far from enough for a Democratic presidential candidate to have a serious shot at winning the state in future election, and only 11 per cent of Utahns are registered Democrats as of 2017. The collapse in the Republican margin between 2012 and 2016 seems instead to owe mainly to former Romney supporters opting to vote Evan McMullin, the former Republican, independent Mormon, and Utah native who made a name for himself by running as a third party against Donald Trump in various, mostly rural western states. If Mormons do start to drift away from the Republican Party due to opposition to Donald Trump, they are unlikely to make peace with Democrats over divisive social issues like abortion and gay rights. Indeed, despite there being multiple open and contentious post-2016 elections in Utah, including the Senate seat currently held by Orrin Hatch and the special election to replace Congressman Jason Chaffetz, little attention has been given to potential Democratic challengers. If anything, Democrats are more likely to benefit from Mormon voters staying home on election day in states like Arizona and Idaho due to disillusionment with Donald Trump and the Republican Party.

Third parties and independent candidates, on the other hand, may have greater prospects for growth in states with considerable Mormon populations, particularly Utah. There is already precedent for third parties to be taken seriously in the state at the presidential level. Evan McMullin managed to pull in 21 per cent of the popular vote despite declaring his campaign in August of 2016 and having little in the way of campaign infrastructure, and billionaire independent Ross Perot managed to place second in Utah in 1992, beating out the Democratic Bill Clinton. The Libertarian Party has been floated as a possible alternative in Utah, but Mormon voters are unlikely to embrace the party as a whole due to its liberal positions on social issues such as gay marriage and marijuana. Instead, a third party in Utah may look more like the United Utah Party, which launched in 2017 as a centrist alternative to the major two parties by Brigham Young University political science professor Richard Davis. The party’s platform emphasizes government ethics reform in addition to combining a moderate stance on immigration with traditionally conservative positions on issues including abortion, the Second Amendment, and government regulations. Such a party could appeal to former Republican Mormons put off by the president’s personal indiscretions and hostility to immigrants as well as to more moderate voters in the state. Further, a UtahPolicy.com poll found that 63 per cent of Utahns consider themselves “not very loyal” to either party and would be open to voting for a third party like the United Utah Party. Though voters often describe themselves as being less partisan than they really are in public opinion polls, there is clearly some room for an alternative to both the Democratic Party and Donald Trump’s Republican Party.

Nonetheless, the best way to see if Mormon voters are actually willing to leave the Republican Party is to watch upcoming elections in Utah and other heavily-Mormon states. Recent polls have found lackluster approval ratings for Utah Senator Orrin Hatch, who is up for re-election in 2018, prompting speculation over whether he could be beaten by an independent Mitt Romney or by his likely Democratic challenger, Jenny Wilson. Similarly, Salt Lake County mayor and Democrat Ben McAdams has announced that he will challenge Congresswoman Mia Love in Utah’s 4th congressional district next year, where he may have a better-than-usual shot at victory as Salt Lake County makes up 85 per cent of the district. These races, and others in the region, could be a portent of things to come if non-Republicans are able to emerge victorious among Utah voters. In addition, Evan McMullin may run again as an independent in 2020 should Trump seek re-election, and would have considerably more preparation and infrastructure in a second campaign. Analysts of public opinion and elections would do well to keep an eye on these and related races in upcoming years to see whether there is serious movement away from the Republican Party among Mormon Americans. If other candidates – whether they be Democrats, United Utah, independent, or something else entirely – see electoral success with Mormon voters, the U.S. could witness the development of an even more distinct Mormon political identity unique from the rest of the religious right. This would be a historic political development and yet another splinter in the Republican Party’s polarized and conflicted base.

Infrastructure is Donald Trump’s Most Popular Policy, But The President Can’t Strike a Deal

“The oath of office I take today is an oath of allegiance to all Americans. For many decades, we’ve enriched foreign industry at the expense of American industry; Subsidized the armies of other countries while allowing for the very sad depletion of our military; We’ve defended other nation’s borders while refusing to defend our own; And spent trillions of dollars overseas while America’s infrastructure has fallen into disrepair and decay.”

Nearly 31 million Americans were listening in to the new president’s inaugural address on a chilly January morning. The speech they heard was unlike any other given by a U.S. president in living memory, calling out a dying nation whose most basic industry and infrastructure were in ruin. “American carnage,” he called it, pointing to the country’s once-famous highways, airports, and bridges that had fallen into disarray. The president went on to assure the audience that under his leadership, the nation would soon embark on the great mission of rebuilding its crumbling infrastructure “with American hands and American labor.”

This was not the usual promise of newly-elected Republican presidents, but it was a familiar refrain from Donald Trump, who had spent over a year on the campaign trail vowing to invest in American infrastructure. In October of 2016, the Trump campaign unveiled a groundbreaking new infrastructure plan: a spending package that would combine private and public investment, clocking in at over $1 trillion dollars, easily eclipsing Hillary Clinton’s $500 billion plan. Donald Trump’s campaign site on infrastructure included a length list of promises, including a “visionary” new transportation system in the tradition of President Dwight Eisenhower, the establishment of new pipelines and coal export facilities, and the creation of thousands of jobs in construction and manufacturing. Such a massive government spending project was major departure from Republican orthodoxy, which had long been averse to any such public spending increases. Just eight years prior, Republicans had staunchly resisted President Barack Obama’s post-recession stimulus proposal that included, among other things, broad investments in infrastructure and transportation. Donald Trump had never been a typical Republican, however, campaigning on a platform based more in populist nationalism that left little room for the fiscal conservatism that had come to characterize the Republican party. Americans recognized this, with polls showing that voters thought of Trump as less conservative than any other Republican presidential nominee in modern history.

From an electoral perspective, Donald Trump had plenty of reason to embrace the infrastructure investment plan. Increased infrastructure spending is popular among Republicans and Democrats alike, and was one of Trump’s most well-received budget proposals earlier this March with a 79 percent approval rating. At the time of his inauguration, 69 percent of Americans believed that President Trump’s pledge to increase infrastructure spending was “very important,” exceeding every other promise that Trump made on the campaign trail. Infrastructure also handily weds the liberal objective of public investment with the conservative goal of job creation and attracted support spanning the political spectrum from liberal economist Paul Krugman to former White House chief strategist Steve Bannon. The proposal also deliberately evoked memories of Dwight Eisenhower’s leadership of the Interstate Highway System, which remains widely celebrated by liberals and conservatives alike decades later (a rare feat). Infrastructure spending would theoretically be an easy sell to both the public and D.C. insiders, with significant amounts of support on the left and the right.

Donald Trump’s advocacy of an infrastructure investment plan also highlighted one of his strongest qualities as a presidential candidate, namely his reputation for deal-making and pragmaticism. Infrastructure has long been a major goal of the Democratic party, pushed repeatedly by President Obama and shot down time and again by congressional Republicans. Trump is no stranger to this fact, and has spoken openly about his goal of cutting an infrastructure deal with Democrats in Congress. Democratic senators representing states that Trump won could be particularly open to the promise of an infrastructure package, aiming to reach out to Trump’s base and bring needed investment to struggling states like Ohio and North Dakota. One New York Times interview showed President Trump beaming at the possibility of an deal, hoping for “tremendous” support from Democrats “desperate” for a win on infrastructure.

Eight months out from his inauguration, however, President Trump has taken little action to begin negotiating an infrastructure investment deal. In May, Trump announced that the White House’s plan was “largely completed” and would be released within two to three weeks if not sooner, but the story was quickly overshadowed as the president moved on to traditional Republican policy goals such as repealing the Affordable Care Act. Trump’s initial appointment of Elaine Chao as Secretary of Transportation was well-received, but other key positions in the department such as the administrators of the Federal Highway Administration and the Federal Railroad Administration have been left empty since Trump took office. Now the president seems more concerned with promoting the Republican party’s tax cut plan, even in the wake of destruction unleashed by Hurricanes Harvey and Irma that necessitates large-scale infrastructure rebuilding.

But even if Donald Trump did have his sights set on an infrastructure negotiations, he would likely face several obstacles on the path to a deal. Even though Trump should have an advantage with Republicans controlling both houses of Congress, his spending plan would likely be a hard sell with conservatives. Congressional Republicans have already spent the last eight years challenging President Obama’s proposals to increase transportation and infrastructure spending, including Obama’s post-recession stimulus package in 2009. Though Trump’s proposed plan focuses far more on private spending and investment than Obama’s, Republican leaders have still been lukewarm at best about the prospects of an infrastructure deal. Speaker of the House Paul Ryan and Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell have been largely silent on the issue, while House Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy has emphasized that he would only a consider an infrastructure plan that did not come with any increases in spending. Congressional Republicans, currently preoccupied with the conservative goal of large-scale tax cuts, are unlikely to provide much help to President Trump on a massive infrastructure spending package.

Trump’s recent negotiations with Democratic leaders on the debt ceiling and DACA point to the possibility that the president could push through infrastructure reform by working on a deal with Democratic leadership. However, this path poses its own difficulties. The president’s current deals could quickly unravel, owing to his impulsiveness and tendency to go back on his word, which raises doubts about the fate of any future negotiations. In addition, Trump’s current infrastructure proposal emphasizes private investment, which would likely face resistance from Democrats who favor a plan based in direct government spending. Though Trump could negotiate a new plan featuring greater public investment, he risks alienating many of the Republicans he would need to cross over and vote with Democrats to pass a bill. Congressional Democrats who were initially optimistic about the possibility of working with the president have also grown more wary in recent months. Ohio Senator Sherrod Brown, once open to negotiating with President Trump in areas they agree on, has expressed fears that the president’s infrastructure plan would empower Wall Street while sacrificing protections for workers and the environment. Trump would have to win over reluctant Democrats by proving that an infrastructure deal will be to the benefit of their own states and not just the current administration’s allies.

The prospects for Donald Trump’s massive infrastructure rebuilding plan seem great, and would likely be met with broad support from both the American public and the chattering class. However, the path to passing such a massive spending plan is far more rocky than the president’s rhetoric seems to indicate. Though Trump prides himself on his deal-making talent, he has yet to to demonstrate the commitment to careful and difficult policy negotiations that a bipartisan infrastructure spending deal would mandate. Striking an agreement between Republicans and Democrats in Congress would require President Trump to walk a fine line between private and public spending, and party priorities are currently focused more on tax cuts and DACA than on infrastructure. As it stands, Trump’s lack of interest in advancing his most popular policy proposal prevents these negotiations from even getting off the ground.

A Post-Truth Era: America’s Agora

“What people believe prevails over the truth” – Sophocles, The Sons of Aleus

Among the societal preoccupations and political wedge issues that have pervaded American culture, none is perhaps free from the entanglement and securing of the right to openly speak one’s opinion. The right to free speech is one of America’s most cherished and revered principles. It maintains the open marketplace of opinions and ideas that drive our social and political discourse; its role in American society is unrivaled, for it protects the public’s accessibility to the fundamental principles of liberty and equality. And yet, it would appear that this right has recently proven to have drawbacks, namely in facilitating the very divisive social climate that the American people find themselves within in 2017: one preoccupied with racial tension, political polarity and recalcitrant sentiment, misguided accusations of immorality; and the endurance of a social atmosphere void of mutual respect – an actualized culture war that is evolving from a “post-truth” era.

The concept of a “post-truth” era is relatively new in name, but its hallmarks can be identified throughout history. A post-truth era is entirely catalyzed by demagoguery, rhetoric, and an appeal to innate and primal tendencies of human behavior. Certain personalities are predisposed to this behavior; those who establish a Machiavellian public image, whether consciously or unconsciously, utilize traits of egotism and duplicity to garner a popular following based in persuasiveness and potency. Further, a post-truth era’s social and political climate heavily neglect objective fact in order to shape popular opinion. American culture has progressed to a point in that political leaders now have the option to take advantage of the fallibility of man. Espousing lies and false Cassandras to shape public opinion is now a reality. The truth has become blurred and the conflation of a dyadic relationship has integrated itself into political dialogue: the truth becoming a lie, a lie becoming the truth.

A dyadic relationship between truth and falsehoods is not exclusive to these virtues: love and hate, good and evil, light and dark, animus and anima all find universal meaning from their respective dyadic relationships. These ideas would come to be supported by the psychological research of Carl Jung, who observed and recorded these relationships across historical, literary, and artistic mediums. The ancient Greeks, as a matter of fact, were particularly fascinated in assessing the value of dyads, especially wisdom and ignorance throughout human nature. These relationships pervade human nature and exist in various forms. In today’s political landscape though, the concept of “truth” has been taken for granted and handled irresponsibly, ultimately being used to sway public opinion and to consolidate popularity.

The idea of “truth” and the virtue of wisdom has been held in question throughout history, especially during the Classical Greek period. Plato, for instance, describes Socrates’ encounter with a post-truth phenomenon in The Apology. Socrates argues with a politician who claims to be wise and, when Socrates begins challenge his claim, both the politician and several engaged bystanders become angry and hateful of Socrates’ prying. Of course, this is not to say Socrates’ inquisitions was not valid; the ancient Greeks were fond of argument and debate within the agora as a part of their culture. But Plato’s description of this encounter goes beyond a simple disagreement between two individuals; rather, he describes a confliction of virtue – of wisdom and ignorance – that generates greater hostility when compared to a simple difference of opinion.

This is seen throughout American history. The freedom to speak and to organize around those with like ideas and opinions has driven political discourse since the drafting of the Constitution. Yet once a faction seizes on a falsehood that people can perceive as truth, positions are entrenched more vehemently and our culture begins to sway and waiver. Factions that have historically advocated for these falsehoods as platforms carry many similarities to America’s current sentiment. The nativist sentiment pushed by the American Party, or the “Know Nothings,” purported ethnically charged lies about Irish and German immigrants; the domination of American culture by wartime propaganda throughout the World Wars that was particularly aimed at the Germans and the Japanese, displayed the government’s ability to take hold of and manipulate popular opinion; and even the fear-mongering sentiment of McCarthyism showed the extent at which government can pursue accusations without proper evidence. How can one say that our current situation is so unique when American culture thrives off of biases and skewed positions?

Interestingly enough, our current situation is unique; though historians can reflect on the past travesties of America’s culture, they are currently disavowing our present circumstances, essentially history repeating itself. And although the past and current sentiments may have been justified through ideas like patriotism and national security, a consensus has been drawn that at present this sentiment is proving a danger to America’s institutions, namely the abuse of the right to free speech. A clear example of this is an interview between then-candidate Donald Trump and conservative talk show host Hugh Hewitt; in this interview, Trump openly lies in asserting that then-President Obama had created the terror organization ISIL, affirming his no-nonsense, “tells-it-like-it-is” branding. Trump has manipulated America’s past sentiment and morphed it into a post-truth phenomenon, modifying it in a way that is impervious to any form of argumentative dialogue or debate, for it only fuels the haste and passions his followers.

To his credit, it would appear Trump’s campaign style depended upon the successful manipulation of mass media outlets like CNN, Fox News, and the New York Times. Whether his un-statesmanlike behavior was a strategic campaigning style or that his blunt statements carried his voting base, the mass media outlets’ coverage of the Trump campaign provided with about $2 billion worth in extended news cycles by February of 2016, despite the Trump campaign only spending about $10 million in advertising. Trump himself, as a prelude to his eventual Presidential run, remarked in the late 1980s that being “a little different, or a little outrageous” attracted the press. He would come to capitalize on this idea of political differentiation from a field of establishment candidates and built his platform that legitimized outrageousness and falsities, eventually manipulating the media to project the message.

And where do we go from here? American political culture is faced with a breach of precedent, accompanied by hyper-partisanship, ideological differences, and divisive rhetoric. Unfortunately, this has engendered an environment in which many organizations and institutions have resorted to restricting free speech as an instinctive measure. In a recent Pew Research Center poll, 40% of Millennials who responded claimed that they were in favor of restricting free speech through government censorship if the speech was considered offensive to minority groups. It’s a natural inclination to silence divisive opinions and ideas through government intervention as well as, more informally, social dismissal. Yet, this is not conducive to American culture for it limits the freedom, equitability, and accessibility to the right to freely speak. If an opinion has proven to be wrong, the open-market of ideas will deem it as so, without need of censorship.

Upon reflection, it is necessary to ask: what does the truth provide us? Plato, for instance, insinuates within his Allegory of the Cave that it is an ideal “form” to strive to achieve. This may hold some validity, but this proposition does not take into account the value of argument and debate, despite this process being integral to ancient Greek culture. John Stuart Mill, however, does write extensively about open dialogue as well as the benefit of free and open discourse in his essay On Liberty. He contends that the advantages of open dialogue is far more beneficial to an individual’s given potential compared to a society of restricted speech or false opinion. Mill writes:

“Men are not more zealous for truth than they often are for error … it [truth] may be extinguished once, twice, or many times, but in the course of ages there will generally be found persons to rediscover it, until some one of its reappearances falls on a time when from favorable circumstances it escapes persecution until it has made such head as to withstand all subsequent attempts to suppress it.”

Mill perceives the looming threat of falsehoods in a society of free and open dialogue, and purports that only time and engaged dialogue can reveal the advantages of free speech. Although this post-truth phenomenon is seemingly void of any logical dialogue, the presence of dissent and opposition is a healthy reaction when effected through a comprehensive dialogue.

In reality, it seems American culture has diverted from Mill’s quintessential society. Racial and ethnic tension, political divisiveness, and an acute lack of empathy pervades our culture, enabled by our social media platforms. Bret Stephens, a New York Times columnist and a recent recipient of the Lowy Institute Media Award, described the social climate in the United States in a recent lecture. He describes that American dialogue and, more particularly, dissenting dialogue is readily toxic in that:

“we fight each other from the safe distance of our separate islands of ideology and identity and listen intently to echoes of ourselves. We take exaggerated and histrionic offense to whatever is said about us. We banish entire lines of thought and attempt to excommunicate all manner of people … without giving them so much as a cursory hearing.”

This is what is allowing America’s post-truth era to flourish. Individuals form and hold opinions and do not challenge people openly and publicly – they limit their dialogue to the social consolidation and anonymity of the internet. The freedom of speech coupled with mass and social media has generated a culture of intense ideological siloing of individuals that do not truly engage and quash false ideas. Consequently, a sizable amount of individuals are left accepting lies and ignorance as truth.

In this present time, the freedom to openly argue and debate is an influential weapon to wield. Its comprehensive, logical, and if used effectively infallible. It is no surprise that it has been utilized in all aspects of public life, for it is the arrow to society’s target. And as new obstacles present themselves, such as the rise of fringe factions like the neo-Nazi party, anti-semitism, racist and bigoted factions, or any faction that is not representative America’s inalienable principles, understanding the value of unrestricted public discourse is monumental.

For leaders that perpetuate a phenomenon in which objective falsehoods, their time in power is — to Mill – ostensibly numbered. These leaders peddle demagogic rhetoric only to have it fall out of the graces of popular opinion soon after. But only the freedom to openly, respectively, and empathetically express dissent to others is how individuals can combat a post-truth phenomenon. Consider former President Kennedy’s inaugural words in the face of today’s post-truth era: “those who foolishly sought power by riding the back of the tiger ended up inside.” President Trump may have modified the political playbook, but it may be accompanied by drawbacks. Trump has interestingly played off of the emotions of Americans rather than objective fact. Emotions are dynamic and volatile; only time will determine Trump’s perception by the public, considering his support, in its entirety, is established off of emotions.

As American culture develops it is invaluable to understand these moments in time. Not only is it crucial to acknowledge that a post-truth society was enabled, and that truth and falsehoods were easily manipulated and conflated, but also how it was facilitated and what were the priming variables. Partisan polarization, ideological consolidation, association based in uniformity rather than diversity, have become symptoms of a post-truth era and should be considered in the future. Freedom of speech, though it appears to have been a major influence in this problem, has also shown to be a powerful way to overcome the natural tendency to trust in human emotion and impulse rather than objective fact. But until American society understand this value, only time will tell if American culture will understand the dangers of a post-truth era.

Donald Trump’s Short-Sighted International Aid Cuts Line the Pockets of Beltway Bandits

As we see changes begin to take place in the operations of our government, it is impossible to stay silent as the nation is steered towards disaster, and such is the case in terms of international development. The United States is a global leader in foreign aid, and this is a role which cannot be taken lightly, nor should it be embroiled in short-term partisan conflicts when its ramifications extend far beyond our own borders. Donald Trump has suggested cuts of approximately 31% to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which while serving his narrative of saving tax payer dollars, is likely to only result in much greater costs for the nation in the future when we will be forced to spend extravagantly to erase the consequences of this misstep. The majority of Americans mistakenly believe that we spend immense portions of our national budget on foreign aid projects, with most believing we spend upwards of 20% of our budget on aid. Now living in Trump’s America, this widely-held fallacious belief could be some of the reason that USAID found itself on the chopping block. In reality, international aid constitutes less than 1% of national budget. Given its miniscule apportionment of funds compared to other national agencies, any cuts to USAID are more symbolic and politically motivated than actually functional in streamlining government expenditure. The proposed sweeping cuts to USAID would result in more than just a loss of staff and intellect within USAID, but also the entire elimination of the independent U.S. African Development Foundation, U.S. Trade and Development Agency, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and United States Institute of Peace. The work conducted by these agencies is not simply chafe that can be harmlessly eliminated, for they make a real impact on the lives of people all over the globe. Even outside of USAID, international aid in general is being called into question, with a 35% reduction in funding for the Treasury International Programs. Trump has suggested that the funds freed by spending cuts like those USAID may experience will go to help emphasize our already immense military might. This is counterintuitive if Trump wishes to achieve his stated goal of defeating ISIS, for without the civilian support that fills the gaps left by local government, a similar threat will emerge in the future. Thus, the power wielded by our aid spending cannot be relinquished so quickly.

The soft power that the United States exercises through our aid financing allows us to prevent future conflicts and maintain a role as a global leader. 120 different military generals wrote a letter telling the current administration that they must recognize the importance of this soft power, highlighting that even those who would hypothetically benefit from receiving extra funding cut from USAID mark international aid can attest to the importance of development work abroad as a component of national security. Former Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Middle East at USAID Mona Yacoubian helps elucidate how crucial development aid is to achieving our national security objectives, explaining that security rests on “…the three-legged stool of defense, diplomacy, and development. In this era of complicated security challenges, development, alongside diplomacy, must retain equal footing with defense.” Those in our armed forces also recognize that wars cannot be won with their bullets alone, for as General Joseph Votel, the Commander of U.S. Central Command, was quoted by Foreign Policy to testify to congress, “The military can help to create the necessary conditions; however, there must be concomitant progress in other complementary areas (e.g., reconstruction, humanitarian aid, stabilization, political reconciliation)…Support for these endeavors is vital to our success.” Indeed, once strategic military objectives have been achieved, USAID’s work is crucial to ensuring that a maintained military presence is not necessitated for years to come. In a time when many are already critical of our widespread military involvement abroad, any initiatives which can lessen the need for the deployment of U.S. troops abroad should not be considered ‘wasteful’ spending. The importance of international development aid is further supported by the widely-held belief that following U.S. military involvement in Iraq, the lack of adequate civilian support is what laid the foundation for the formation of the modern Islamic State. As explained succinctly in an article by Washington Post columnist Michael Gerson and former USAID administrator Raj Shah, “Vacuums of leadership are not generally filled by the good guys.” With significant evidence clearly to the contrary, one questions whether Donald Trump’s budget choices result from blind ignorance, or purposeful malice. When speaking about international development aid, Trump told the Washington Post that “I watched as we built schools in Iraq and they’d be blown up. And we’d build another one, and it would get blown up. . . . And yet we can’t build a school in Brooklyn.” This quote illustrates the clear lack of intelligent thought being put into our national security, for while education in Brooklyn is obviously a priority, it cannot supplant aid abroad, because we are not fighting radical extremist terrorism from Brooklyn. Aid works to fill gaps left after military goals have been achieved, building the positive relationships between the United States and civilians abroad that are so crucial to counteracting radical ideologies. If Donald Trump truly wanted to put ‘America first,’ then he would not cut USAID and aggrandize already egregious problems abroad that will only necessitate further spending in the future.

It is clear that Donald Trump’s proposed cuts to USAID serve a larger partisan agenda and scapegoat the already much maligned global poor for no purpose other than easily-condemnable political posturing. Trump has already set a precedent of targeting groups who have little ability to defend themselves, attacking refugees with his first failed and subsequent second revised executive orders on immigration. Trump’s expansion of the ‘Global Gag Rule’ cuts family planning programs abroad, which has real palpable impacts on the lives of people who have no avenue to voice their protest through, and will likely resultin the cutting of malaria and HIV/AIDS prevention programs. Obviously, the global public good is no longer the priority. Refugees find themselves in the sights of Trump’s partisan attacks, for cutting aid to them can allow Trump to parade himself as a price-savvy budget hawk while targeting those who are not afforded the opportunity to create any recourse for such misguided actions. Ill-thought-out actions such as this have drawn criticism from member of Trump’s own party, such as Senator Marco Rubio, who tweeted that “Foreign Aid is not charity. We must make sure it is well spent, but it is less than 1% of budget & critical to our national security.” The despicable targeting of the world’s poorest for political purposes has also drawn the criticism of more than 100 faith leaders from around the country. In a letter to congress, they cite the fact that today we have the most displaced persons living on the planet since the Second World War to decry Trump’s proposed budget cuts, for when the need is so clearly demonstrated we cannot possibly deviate from our mission to promote freedom and human rights if we want to still see ourselves as a ‘city on the hill’ for the rest of the world to follow. Trump’s attacks on USAID are reminiscent of those of Senator Jesse Helm in the 1970s, and they will have similar ramifications. Helm’s attacks increased the reliance of USAID on controversial and problematic private aid contractors, and Trump’s proposed cuts would serve to further increase reliance on the detrimental industry.

International private development contractors profit off of reapportioning segments of money intended to go to international aid and siphoning it directly into their already-overstuffed pockets. Companies whose goal is profit, opposed to a government agency whose goals are more altruistic, cannot possibly compete to achieve the same results in international development, for at the end of the day, their pockets will always come before the stomachs of the global poor. USAID already relies on these “beltway bandits” more than it should, with the top 10 for-profit aid contracting corporations receiving more than $5.8 billion in contracts from 2003-2007. USAID does not have the staff nor the funding to be able to manage all of its projects internally, forcing it to divert funds that could be better spent to aid contractors to be able to achieve some of its goals. Yet, the problem with aid contractors is that they work to achieve very narrow and specific goals, ignoring the larger dilemmas that necessitated the aid in the first place. Indeed, how can we expect companies who profit of the persistence of global problems to have any incentive to solve them? Under president Obama, USAID director Raj Shah worked to move the agency away from its reliance on private contractors, saying that “This agency is no longer satisfied with writing big checks to big contractors and calling it development.” Furthermore, these contractors often struggle to even meet the objectives they are given, building only 8 of 286 schools and 15 of 253 medical centers planned in Afghanistan. Indeed, reliance on aid contractors is significantly problematic for these contractors are monetarily incentivized to falsify their achieved results in order to continue to receive funding, with one group receiving more than $150 million tax-payer dollars for goals that they failed to achieve in reality. Often, especially when considering budget cuts, development contractors are portrayed as a viable option to cut the costs of international aid, for they can more precisely set and achieve specific development goals. Unfortunately, opposed to addressing issues that local populations elect as important to them, or any of the underlying dilemmas that caused the issues in the first place, aid contractors’ goal-setting leads to resources being siphoned to specific issues that are designated by the for-profit organizations as reachable. Indeed, industrial development corporations (IDCs), subsist diverting money intended for the worlds’ neediest into their own pockets, for they rely on subcontracting to accomplish their goals, and at each level more aid funding is lost to profit-motivated contractors rather than furthering any development initiatives. IDC executives take their hefty cut, and then after paying their workers the leftover development funding goes to the companies hired by the IDC, and from there the resulting pittance is paid to local workers to conduct the actual labor of development. This profit-motivated managerialism has colonial roots in the Dutch and British East India Companies, and serves no purpose but to further divide the targets of development from the funds allotted to them, based around the problematic notion that western oversight is necessary to conduct effective development. Trump’s budget cuts for USAID will only increase reliance on IDCs that are erroneously viewed as capable of accomplishing specific objectives more effectively. The belief that for-profit contractors will be able to effectively initiate growth is willfully ignorant, in the face of the ample evidence that they rob increasingly large portions of money from the developing world for projects whose success or lack thereof has no bearing on the paychecks of the IDCs’ CEOs.

It is despicable that CEOs of aid contractors are content to eat luxuriously off money intended for those living on pennies a day, and Donald Trump’s proposed cuts will only further exaggerate the private-aid industrial complex. As USAID experiences further and further cuts, their staff will wane, allowing even less oversight of the aid contracting business which has shown itself to need oversight to prevent gross monetary fraud. Increased reliance on private development contractors does not just have ramifications for civilians abroad, for as Donald Trump sacrifices our nation’s soft power for political objectives, our own citizens will be forced to foot the bill of the inevitable cleanup efforts of the future.

The College Campus and Its Discontents: How Edmund Burke Can Explain the Political Dissonance Between College Campuses and the Trump Phenomenon

It is impossible to overlook the current sentiment being expressed on the American college campus following the 2016 election cycle. Acute anger, frustration, and denial has consumed the campus and its politically cognizant college students while intensifying and even radicalizing their partisan ideologies. It is not, however, outlandish to perceive these campuses as bubbles, who trapped inside, are the newest and youngest minds of the intellectual community that have come to vocalize their dissent of the recent election. The intellectual hubs of the United States – Boston, New York City, Washington D.C., as well as some newly recognized regions – have become entrenched in the mystique of their elite collegiate statuses, and yet seem to remain the most ideologically narrow. The observable campus radicalism on these campuses have come to define the dissonance following the election of President Trump. One can begin to understand how the average college undergraduate perceives the world differently from the “forgotten men and women” of the United States who delivered the election to Donald Trump; but perhaps something is being overlooked, particularly within the mores of a typical millennial college student. In considering the mores of the millennial college student within a campus bubble, the question naturally arises: what is inciting this reaction?

My answer to this question is entirely rooted in Burkean-conservative thought. But before attempting to pinpoint the chief influence that is exciting the mores of millennial undergraduates, one should first note the characteristics of a modern college campus and what kind of environment it engenders. The twenty-first century college campus takes elements of a standard collegiate institution and adds aspects of diversity, tolerance, and secularization – each a hallmark of the millennial generation. It is crucial to understand that the average college campus in 2016 is comprised of millennial students who tend to be both left-leaning in ideology as well as the most vocal and particularly criticalof the 2016 election outcome. Now, within the Trump administration’s first one hundred days, this vocal criticism has intensified with the assistance of social media (Facebook, Twitter, etc.) as well as late-night television, most notably Saturday Night Live, which has recently come to impersonate and satirizePresident Trump with more frequency and playful malice. These factors are substantially intertwined with the mores of the millennial generation; college undergraduates’ frequent use of the internet provides a forum of communication and information exchange (in which they interact with likeminded individuals) and also access to material that discounts oppositional opinions – ultimately reinforces their disposition.

This piece is not an analysis of the uncanny success of the Trump campaign; nor is it one on the unforeseen failure of the Clinton campaign. Rather, its aim is to examine the typical college campus and to understand what, exactly, is driving its discontent and frustration with regard to the recent election. One should not seek the obvious answer – an answer that is validated through disdainful name-calling, stark rejection of dissenting opinions, and emotionally charged positions that compose an intellectually lacking characterization of the Trump administration so far. This discourse only serves to divide the political climate further and contributes little to a constructive dialogue. In actuality, characterizing the Trump administration is such an apprehensive and dismissive fashion only serves to cloud the reasonable mind from understanding the election and the trajectory of United States politics.

Although any millennial undergraduate’s refutation of President Trump’s platform may, on its face, be in reaction to what appears to be rhetoric-driven and partisan policy initiatives, there is a universal and instinctive aura that transcends this campus spiritedness. This intangible and distinctly reactionary sentiment is difficult to understand for we tend to misperceive it as simple anger and frustration. Beyond the messiness of politics, theory provides a clear explanation to why the college campus has become so radical; after all, understanding the theoretical aspects driving the millennial voting bloc’s behavior may reveal questions previously unknown from direct behavioral observation.

As I stated earlier, my ultimate contention in this piece is to assert that the campus sentiment following the election of Donald Trump (and well into his administration) is a backlash premised in conservative thought. It is common to attribute contemporary conservatism to the Republican party; this notion should be discounted, especially within the context this assertion is framed around because this millennial sentiment is, in truth, liberal. Conservatism is not an ideology, but rather a disposition that can be embodied in any movement and reveals itself only in response to a threat. To a millennial college student, the concept of a threat deviates from the typical threats that most conservative strands tend to form their principles against, such as the degradation of tradition, family/community, and faith. Millennial undergraduates, particularly those born in the latter half of the 1990s, hold principles of diversity, tolerance, and secularism as essential aspects of a fulfilling society. They perceive anything contradictory to these principles as a threat to the progressive principles they became politically cognizant under and, also, within which they formed their perception of government and its role in society.

Dealing in absolutes is rather restrictive in any phenomenal examination. Isolating the cause of millennial generation’s reaction is of no exception to this maxim; thus, the millennial backlash against the election of President Trump can be seen as a reaction to the threat to both  core progressive beliefs and to establishment politics. Here, I add my conjecture that many moderate Republicans, who make up a smaller portion of millennials but may not hold their bloc’s attributed principles as dear, would also find issue with President Trump’s election. It would be prudent, though, that before assessing the threats to millennial principles, the concept of threats and appropriate reactionary measures are recognized through the founder of modern conservatism: Edmund Burke.

Burkean theory and the conservative disposition can largely be understood from Burke’s ideas within his work “Reflections on the Revolution of France.” In this, he is critical of the French Revolution, believing that the French abused the option to revolt against their monarchical government. It is here Burkean theory manifests; Burke conceives of a society that respects and acknowledges the traditions it was founded upon, preserving these core traditions for posterity. Here, Burke argues that society is, indeed, an intergenerational “social contract” that instills in each generation the principles and traditions of past generations; this is not to say society is to mindlessly follow the traditions of its ancestors, for Burke also contends that “a state without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation.” Burkean theory is largely premised on this concept of adaptability, but also situationalism. To Burke, there is no metaphysical ism that can be construed, abused, and philosophically understood and implemented. Rather, conservative Burkean theory holds the traditions of the past in reference to all unfolding situations, reconciling them with the trends of modernity, and transmitting them for preceding generations.

Understandably, most contemporary conservatives will rebuke the argumentative point that left-leaning millennials, who have come to be major proponents of contemporary progressivism, can be characterized as conservative. One must understand that the characterization of a conservative reaction is entirely different than labeling an entire generation as one that embodies a conservative disposition. It is particularly relevant, though, to recognize the millennial generation as a one of a new political basis – generation that has come to believe social welfare, big government, and aspects of diversity, tolerance, and secularization are all institutions of American society rather than debatable features; that these aspects must be enforced by a centralized authority in order for them to be perceived as legitimate. Therefore, when the argument is made that a nationwide millennial campus reaction is indeed conservative, it implies that these progressive institutions are their traditions and principles.

It is still necessary to understand why millennial undergraduates are having such an adverse conservative reaction to the election on Donald Trump. Of course, it is doubtful that this same reaction would be observed if a mainstream Republican candidate was elected; the issue, then, must be inherent in Trump phenomenon, specifically its refutation of progressive sentiment and its explicit intention of dismantling establishment politics.

A closer look at the progressive sentiments that millennial college students hold as a generational principle will reveal the foundation for their conservative backlash. Implementation of these progressive principles into public life characterizes the progressive movement. And although the modern left carries traces of Wilsonian progressivism, it is currently being cultivated under new trends of diversity, tolerance, and secularization by modern political figures like Barack Obama, Elizabeth Warren, and Bernie Sanders. Each of these figures had a major influence on the 2016 election, primarily for the Democratic Party and its ultimate nomination of Hillary Clinton, and can essentially be seen as epitomized progressive leaders that are praised by millennials. Yet, it is precisely these figures that Donald Trump used to emphasize his own political doctrine of refuting the nation’s public discourse of liberalism.

Millennial undergraduates, nonetheless, are steadfast in affirming their core progressive beliefs; they participate in protests and often use social media as a platform for sharing their political beliefs. It is not uncommon to meet a college undergraduate who is an avid supporter of  diversity/minority organizations or, more broadly, one who just supports broad progressive reform. Social media, primarily Twitter, is an advantage to them; they use hashtags (#BlackLivesMatter, #ShePersisted, #Resist, etc.) as a protest tool to grant their shared sentiment legitimacy in the public eye. Twitter, as a whole, has become an interesting forum in the 2016 election cycle being used by both the left and the right, the most notable (and controversial) figure being President Trump.

Perhaps, in some sense, it is here that millennial undergraduates feel threatened for not only are their core beliefs threatened by President Trump’s diametrically opposed policy mandates, but their public platform, too, is being compromised. The normalization of unwelcome ideas on a platform dominated by millennial sentiment can only cause disharmony within the campus bubble – an environment that embodies and champions progressive principles. This concept is rather Burkean in nature; the millennial generation from a young and malleable age has grown to understand social media as a key aspect of modern life. As they age and become politically cognizant they take on their political leanings (which tend to be progressive) in tandem with their use of social media. The mores of the millennial become established and cultivated under the trends of modernity. With the introduction of the Trump phenomenon, their progressive-based forum, as well as the mores, are compromised. Naturally, as Burke would understand it, the inclination to preserve one’s principles is warranted – which gives rise to the current campus atmosphere around the United States.

Establishment politics, which is mutually held as a desirable aspect of centralized government by moderate portions of the left and the right, has also been perceived as a threat by millennials. In a way, the millennial generation’s progressive ideals work in conjunction with establishment politics – in order for one generation to pass on progressive principles to the next, there needs to be an established order. This order has come to be recognized as centralized established politics, or beltway politics. The idea of order and the centralized establishment largely is Cartesian in nature and conflicts with traditional conservatism which holds the family, community, and localities as the main forum to maintain tradition and principle. Cartesian school of thought, established by thinkers like René Descartes and Jean Jacques Rousseau, can be seen as a juxtaposition to contemporary conservatism in that it sees society as a distinct entity from the individual and understands social processes (or centralized government) as a way to serve human ends. Yet, to millennial progressives (and some moderates), order and establishment through a centralized power represent a consistent method to influence society as a whole, for progressivism is inherently forward looking and continually adaptingto trends of modernity.

President Trump’s commandeering of an American populist platform has come to enrage the millennial college campus. His intention disseminate centralized power to localities and rural America are observed by millennials as a both backtracking the Obama administration’s progressive policies and as a threat to any established progressive principles. The Trump campaign branded itself as the anti-establishment movement and ran on the mandate of draining “the swamp.” In essence, the campaign sought to delegitimize establishment politics that has been institutionalized in Washington D.C. and utilized by various progressive movements – like the Woman’s Suffrage Movement and the Civil Rights Movement. Phasing out intermediaries like special interests groups that organize centralized Washington politics becomes a driving force in the Trump campaign and a core issue for his administration. One can imagine the naturally adverse reaction from the millennial generation that has grew in congruence with establishment politics and perceiving its role in society as a positive force. The Obama administration, particularly, can be well understood as the main vehicle of reinforcement, for millennial undergraduates established their partisan and ideological leanings during his campaigns and his two administrative terms. Burkean thought, specifically the intergenerational social contract, would add validity to this claim; the millennial generation has come to believe that establishment politics is principled tradition. They became politically cognizant under establishment politics, believing it is how to effectively implement policy in order to maintain their progressive principles; they are, therefore, in their right to maintain the institution in order to transfer it to the succeeding generations.

The American college campus, therefore, should be seen as having experienced an abrupt conservative backlash. The Trump phenomenon has shaken the foundation of the progressivism and the millennial generation’s principles, even though the overlaps between the Trump platform and progressivism cannot be discounted. For instance, many progressives came to support Senator Bernie Sanders for the Democratic nomination; his platform was similar to Trump’s, specifically in trade policy, special interests, and military intervention overseas. This policy “crossover” between the Trump and Sanders campaign can be explained by another conservative school of thought: paleoconservatism. Paleoconservatism, finds issue with both contemporary establishment Republicans as well as the progressive left Democrats. It detests Republicans for acquiescing on modern issues like lenient immigration policies and promoting a free market. Paleoconservatism advocates for nationalism and isolationism, and restrictions on free trade. Progressivism, interestingly enough, supports similar positions like non-interventionism (although still maintaining a globalist position), and more restrictive trade to benefit the working class. This gives reason to the fact that many of Sanders primary supporters  voiced their intentto cast a vote for Trump in the general election. Trump’s platform may be plainly detested by most progressive who believe in opposing policies, but there are observable similarities between both policy preferences of Trump and progressives.

Burke’s ideas of adaptable tradition and its reconciliation with the trend of modernity can attest to the concept of a millennial conservative reaction, though not to the progressive movement as a whole. What should be taken from this analysis of the average college campus and millennial undergraduate is the fact that modern political discourse (that is, up until 2016) has followed a liberal progressive trend. It has not faced a formidable opponent until the rise of Donald Trump who, with his exploitation of rhetoric and demagoguery, was able to overtake establishment politics. Perhaps this signals a newly emerging dynamic in modern political discourse; the ambiguity of the political climate among the divided major parties along with their traditions and principles implies a time strife, reorganization, and an emergence of new leaders. The college campus, although in conservative revolt, may actually be facilitating a reorganization of progressive principles which will come to defend the progressive trends they feel are threatened under a Trump administration. The oppositional dynamic of the intellectual elite and the “forgotten men and women” of America will be put on full display within the next few years and, with it, the contention of how to “Make America Great Again.”

Trump’s Budget Proposal: A Massive International Affairs Mistake

Early in March, President Trump released his budget outline for 2018. Among other things, the proposal cut spending on the State Department and USAID by around 35% while it asked Congress for a $54 billion increase in spending for the military, which amounts to about a 10% increase. Trump’s proposal is a political document, and Congress is unlikely to enact it, at least in its entirety. However, this proposal gives insight into the White House’s apparent preference for using hard power when addressing issues abroad, and it is incredibly disheartening that Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has thrown his support behind the proposal.

Diplomacy and warfare are not different ways of solving a problem, and are most successful when they are used in conjunction. As Former Ambassador to Iraq James Jeffrey said, “[d]iplomacy is not an alternative to military force; it is the use of all elements of U.S. force in a coordinated, cumulative way to achieve our results in other countries.” The use of soft power is critical to the continued success of U.S. hard power. By cutting an already tight State Department and USAID budget by more than a third, Trump and his team are demonstrating that they do not see diplomacy and warfare as two components of the same strategy, and by doing so are making a critical mistake.

Although the budget proposal is in no way written in stone, there is potential for real consequences because of the line of thinking that it demonstrates. In particular, USAID and the State Department can play a critical role in the rebuilding of institutions of war-torn countries post-conflict. In recent years, the US has embarked on many projects abroad that include some components of rebuilding a society post-conflict, often a conflict that the U.S. was directly involved in. When the State Department and USAID are not properly funded, the responsibility of conducting these political and diplomatic operations falls upon people who do not have the same training and experience.

One example of this phenomenon was the war in Afghanistan. The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan began in 2001, but in 2009 another military surge began. The military surge was supposed to be coupled with a “civilian surge” that would have included experts who could help rebuild the country. Unfortunately, the “civilian surge” never materialized because the agencies didn’t have the necessary funding. This led to troops trying to fill the gaps, but they lacked the training in local languages and culture that a Foreign Service Officer would possess, which meant they were not able to accomplish as much as FSOs would have been able to.

The failure of this “civilian surge,” among many other things, is why the U.S. is still engaged in a war in Afghanistan, nearly 16 years after first invading. If this war could be won by training Afghan soldiers and killing Taliban leaders, hard power actions, it would have been won. But, as the continuation of the conflict demonstrates, military action is not the only thing that is necessary to achieve the U.S.’s goals abroad, there needs to be knowledgeable diplomatic effort as well.

Although the budget proposal does not give the specifics of which programs would be impacted by the budget cuts, a 2016 report by the Heritage Foundation, entitled “How to Make the State Department More Effective at Implementing U.S. Foreign Policy,” gives insight into what programs might potentially face cuts. Although the counterterrorism bureau likely will not face large cuts, divisions that deal with arms control, military affairs, and cultural programs likely will. These cuts are in addition to many other likely cuts to a variety of key functions of the U.S. State Department, but that don’t particularly fall within the scope of U.S. military actions. These divisions are critical to the U.S.’s military efforts, particularly if the U.S. wants to do any form of state or nation building.

Although Trump has been skeptical of “nation building” in the past, there are crises around the world that will need to be dealt with that will demand the use of the State Department and USAID in this fashion. One such situation is ISIL. One of the few campaign promises Trump has kept is a firm on is his commitment to defeating ISIL, and as one Foreign Policy article put it, he is succeeding. Of course, while the elimination of ISIL is a worthy goal in pursuit of a safer world, it is not a matter of simply defeating them. Instead, one must ask whether anyone will simply take ISIL’s place in the event that they are eliminated, just as ISIL’s success could partially be explained by the power vacuum caused by the U.S. invasion of Iraq. This same power vacuum will exist after the demise of ISIL, and it is highly likely that it could potentially lead to a similar group emerging unless actions are taken to help rebuild the countries who have been most impacted by ISIL allowing them to defend themselves. This is a role that is better suited to the State Department and USAID than it is to the US military, but if they do not have the requisite funding, they will not be able to do it.

This same lack of understanding will cause problems for Trump on another foreign policy issue he will need to address while President, the ongoing civil war on Syria. It is harder to discern what Trump’s goals are regarding this conflict as he will need to reconcile two positions that are the antithesis of each other, his desire to work with Russia, and his desire to contain Iran. While on the campaign trail Trump often stated that he was not interested in getting the US involved militarily in the Middle East, however, in response to Assad’s use of chemical weapons against Syrian civilians, the White House ordered the use of Tomahawk cruise missiles to bomb Syrian airbases, saying that “something should happen” in regard to Assad. It is impossible to say what the White House’s long term goal is in Syria, however, in recent days a consensus has seemed to appear within the Trump administration that a solution will not come to Syria while Assad is in power, with U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. saying, “We don’t see a peaceful Syria with Assad in there.” Whether or not the U.S. pursues a foreign policy that involves deposing Assad or not, in a crisis where 11 million people have had to flee their homes and hundreds of thousands have been killed, large amounts of state building will need to occur post-conflict. But will a State Department and USAID who have had their funding severely cut be up to the task? I think it’s highly unlikely.

To be fair, Trump is hardly the first president to make this mistake. In fact, this is an endemic problem that has existed for many years, which is why the War in Afghanistan is a good example of the perils of underfunding the international affairs apparatus. Each year, Congress passes the National Defense Authorization Act, which sets funding parameters for the Pentagon. In contrast, a State Department authorization bill has not been passed in years. A widespread mistake is being made, over and over again, which is why for years, Secretaries of Defense have called on Congress to give the State Department and USAID the necessary funding they need to do their jobs. And it is why 120 retired US generals called upon Congress to fully fund the international affairs budget. Time and again, Congress has failed to deliver.

This question of funding is not a zero-sum game. An increase in spending on the State Department does not need to come at the expense of spending on the military, or vice versa. Although they are far, far better funded, the military has still experienced problems as a result of sequestration, especially in the civilian components of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. But when the military that receives the most funding on earth is getting an increase in spending, while an already underfunded State Department and USAID is getting a massive pay decrease, something needs to change.

In 2013, at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, then Marine General James Mattis said “If you don’t fund the State Department fully then I need to buy more ammunition ultimately…the more we put into the State Department’s diplomacy, hopefully the less we have to put into a military budget as we deal with the outcome of apparent American withdrawal from the international scene.” Mattis is now the Secretary of Defense, but it appears his advice has been ignored. Of course, the U.S. has the choice not to engage in wars that will lead to the rebuilding of countries after the conflict, but it seems highly unlikely that that is something that will be pursued. Even if Trump has said he wants to avoid getting entangled in messy conflicts abroad, which seems unlikely in light of his quick reversal on Syria, things will happen during his presidency that will force his hand. Simply put, cutting the international affairs budget will not help solve any problems, except to assuage domestic voters who believe there is too much discretionary spending in the U.S., it will make them worse. A well-funded State Department and USAID is critical to the success of the US military. To underfund them is to make the military conflicts that much longer and more challenging. Hopefully the Trump administration realizes that, or they are doomed repeat the same mistakes as previous administrations.

How Popular Is The Trump Doctrine?

The Trump Administration’s foreign agenda for the next four years is easily summed up in two words: America First. What’s already being described as the “Trump Doctrine” represents a stark departure from decades of American foreign policy orthodoxy, putting aside traditional internationalist and moral principles in favor of an agenda that seeks to maximize American interests and power abroad. Several defining planks have already emerged from the President’s rhetoric outlining his radical policy agenda, including a new economic isolationism that involves pulling out of the TPP and renegotiating NAFTA; a crackdown on immigration from Mexico and Muslim countries; a realignment of the United States towards Vladimir Putin’s Russia while easing American obligations to NATO; an all-out war on what Trump insistently calls “radical Islamic terrorism” with distinctly anti-neoconservative pledges to target civilians, reinstate torture, and seize Iraqi oil.

Trying to gauge how the American public feels about “Trump Doctrine” at this point in his presidency is no easy task, however. Given the choice between President Hillary Clinton, who likely would have represented a continuation of the Obama Doctrine, and President Donald J. Trump, 62,985,106 Americans opted for the latter – a number which represents a substantial portion of American voters, yet at the same time a minority of the popular vote. Furthermore, at barely over two months into his term President Trump has had little time to demonstrate the effects of his policies, nor has he been presented with a real test of his leadership capabilities in an international crisis situation. It also remains possible that moderates in the State and Defense Departments could nudge the White House towards a more conventionally conservative policy agenda, should the Trump Doctrine run into major obstacles once it’s enacted in proper.

What we know now, however, points to complex and often contradictory feelings among the American public regarding President Trump’s foreign policy agenda. According to HuffPost Pollster, public approval for Trump’s foreign policy currently stands at around 47% disapproval to 40% approval – hardly outstanding numbers, but an improvement over his dismal 54% job disapproval rating. On specific policies and principles espoused by Donald Trump, polls have shown a mixture of support and opposition from the American public, narrowly divided on many topics and heavily tilted towards or against Trump in others. The President does not carry a mandate from the public on foreign policy, nor does he face overwhelming indictment.

In terms of principles, it’s clear that the American public has not embraced “Trumpism” on one of the defining elements of his foreign policy: isolationism. Gallup has reported all-time highs of Americans who view foreign trade as more an opportunity than a threat to the nation, at 72%, far beyond even the late Clinton years in the heyday of NAFTA. The CNN/ORC poll has also found a growing majority of Americans in favor of a pathway to citizenship for illegal immigrants in the United States, up to 60% in mid-March, a repudiation of the President’s pro-deportation stances. Contrary to popular talk of a new era of economic isolationism, Americans seem to be growing even warmer to open trade policies for the US since Donald Trump’s election.

Opinions become less clear when Americans are asked about specific policies promoted by the Trump Administration. Though recent polls show consistent majorities opposed to the President’s proposed Mexican border wall, 80% of Americans also support deporting illegal immigrants arrested for other crimes, a policy strongly advocated by Donald Trump. Meanwhile, several polls have indicated both narrow support and opposition to the executive order restricting travel to and from several majority-Muslim countries originally imposed in February. As Harry Enten discusses at FiveThirtyEight, respondents to online polls have demonstrated greater support for the travel ban than in live polls, indicating a sizable portion of Americans who support the ban but hide it out of concern for “political correctness.” Americans are similarly cooler on free trade in practice than in theory: voters are evenly split on whether NAFTA is good or bad for the United States, and when asked if the US pulling out of trade dealssuch as the TPP and NAFTA is a good idea, 43% said they “don’t know enough to say” while support and opposition to the proposal received just 28% each.

Americans are similarly conflicted on the issue of the United States’ involvement around the world. A 2016 Pew Research Center study found broad skepticism about the US’s role abroad, with 57% of Americans saying the nation should let other countries deal with their own issues and a 41% plurality believing that the US does too much in solving international problems. Another poll from NBC News found two-thirds of Americans worried about the country becoming involved in a new war during Trump’s term as President. At the same time, the Pew poll also shows a majority of Americans fearing that the US won’t go far enough to defeat Islamist militants, broad concerns that the United States is less respected internationally now than in the past, and growing support for increases in military spending. And while American support for remaining in NATO is overwhelming, opinions on the UN are more mixed, with the organization enjoying favorable approval ratings but also broad agreement that it has done a “poor job” in solving the problems it’s faced. The contradictory opinions felt by many Americans on the nation’s activities overseas could dovetail nicely with President Trump’s own rhetoric, as the President has vowed to stop wasting US resources abroad while at the same time promising to defeat ISIS and restore America’s status on the international stage.

The Trump Administration’s relationship with Russia is another area where polls show Americans holding mixed feelings about the President. A Quinnipiac University poll showed an overwhelming 72% of voters supporting an investigation into connections between Donald Trump’s campaign advisors and Russian officials, and disapproval ratings for Russia and President Vladimir Putin are at historic highs according to Gallup. However, recent polls have also shown little confidence among the public when it comes to indicting President Trump himself: a recent NBC News/WSJ poll, for example, showed a third of Americans having no opinion on whether or not Donald Trump is “too friendly” with Vladimir Putin. Less than 1% of Americans consider Russia the top issue facing the nation today, and only 20% believe that President Trump has done anything criminal in his relations with Russia. Americans may generally disapprove of Russia and Trump’s friendliness towards the country, but it appears that few are ready to press the issue against the President without further evidence of wrongdoing.

Another major development in the Trump Doctrine era of foreign policy is the striking partisan divide over several key foreign policy issues. While Putin’s approval ratings remain abysmal in the US overall, they’ve seen a marked increase among Republicans compared to four years ago, when Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney described Russia as the nation’s “number one geopolitical foe.” Similarly, ninety percent of Democrats consider Russian interference in the 2016 election to be somewhat or very important, while forty percent of Republicans consider Russian interference to be not important at all. Free trade, once a calling card of the Republican Party, has also emerged as far more popular among Democratic voters than among Republicans, with a growing rift between the parties since Donald Trump’s election. President Trump may enjoy a built-in policy insulator in Congress, where Republicans up for reelection in 2018 will likely hesitate to waver from a President so disproportionately supported by their constituents. At the same time, Trump will have an even harder time reaching out to congressional Democrats, whose voters oppose the President’s policies almost instinctively, which could pose a major policy obstacle should either house of Congress flip to Democratic control after the midterm elections.

Conclusions

While Donald Trump is struggling with public opinion to a degree unseen by most newly-elected presidents, there is no guarantee that it will cripple the President’s radical foreign policy agenda. Americans disagree with Trump in principle on many issues including immigration, free trade, and Russian relations, but they also seem to agree with the President’s instincts on American involvement abroad. When it comes to specific policy issues, many Americans also seem to be more convinced by the Trump Administration’s arguments, or at least less willing to hold their ideological disagreements against the President. And in light of the complex and contradictory foreign policy opinions felt by many Americans, Trump’s unorthodox and often self-contradictory rhetoric may prove to be a unique asset in advancing his foreign agenda.

It appears likely that approval for the Trump Doctrine will hinge on how effective the President is at enacting his policies. If Donald Trump can easily roll out his foreign policy agenda and show returns for Americans at home, he may enjoy public support in the foreign policy realm even as his job approval ratings continue to fall. In addition, without a single “smoking gun” that blows his credibility wide open, Trump is unlikely to face real indictment from Congressional Republicans over the slow drip of stories involving his administration’s connections with Russian oligarchs. If Trump’s policies are unsuccessful or unactionable, on the other hand, then he may face substantial backlash from the public; a majority of Americans already believe that Trump should stop trying to pursue the travel ban and move on to bigger issues, including a fair number of voters who initially supported the ban. The Trump Doctrine could face a collapse in support from Americans who agree with it in theory, but who would become disillusioned with President Trump’s leadership if he can’t get what he wants with his signature deal-making and bravado.

Trump’s Anti-TPP Stance Defied Big Donors

Keeping to his campaign promise, President Donald Trump officially withdrew the U.S. from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiating process after signing an executive order during one of his first weeks in office. Heralded as Obama’s signature trade deal, the TPP created a free-trade zone between the U.S. and 11 other Pacific Rim states – amounting to 40 percent of the world’s economy. Throughout his campaign, Trump denounced the deal as harmful to American manufactures and workers and vowed to abandon the TPP under an “America first” policy. The work that the Obama administration devoted over the last eight years to pass this deal has been swiftly dismantled.

Behind the scenes, powerful lobbying groups were also putting in work. In 2015, 436 organizations filed 1,751 reports that mentioned TPP, a Center for Responsive Politics analysis shows. In 2016, the TPP had 2,036 mentions from 443 organizations.

While an analysis of Federal Election Committee (FEC) data can shed light on which entities lobbied on the TPP, PACs do not have to disclose how much they spent lobbying on the deal or any other specific issue — only on a group of issues combined. One can, however, look at a slightly cruder metric: how many of an organization’s lobbying reports mentioned TPP, and what share is that of the total number of lobbying reports filed by the organization?

Companies and their PACs also don’t have to disclose what stance they took on a matter. The good news for a transparent Democracy: some organizations have not been shy about their positions. Automakers, brand-name pharmaceutical companies, labor unions and environmental groups have been especially vocal about their disapproval of the Partnership, while technology and media companies such as Google, Microsoft, Apple and Facebook were enthusiastic supporters.

Where did those who lobbied heavily on TPP put their chips when it came to the presidential race? While secretary of state under Obama, Hillary Clinton praised the deal, though she promptly flipped her position during the Democratic primaries – quite unlike Trump who strongly opposed the deal from the beginning of his campaign.

One rather large caveat here: most large organizations give to politicians based on a range of issues. While trade policy is enormously important to many large U.S. companies, so is tax policy, defense spending, intellectual property and so on.

There are some interesting connections between 2016 campaign contributors and their chosen candidates’ stances on the Trans-Pacific Partnership. One example of this is Altria Group, one of the world’s largest producers and marketers of tobacco and an outspoken opponent of TPP due to the stricter public health policies regulating tobacco in other countries. It spent over $19.6 million lobbying on a range of issues including TPP from 2015 to 2016 and mentioned TPP on 11 reports out of the total 169 reports it filed over the two years. The group contributed almost $18,300 to Clinton and just over $2,700 to Donald Trump. (The CRP data includes contributions totals for companies that include gifts from PACs, as well as from employees individually.)

Like most auto companies, Ford Motor Company opposed the TPP, and spent about $8.9 million in the 2015 and 2016 cycles lobbying on all issues including the trade deal. Ford, too, favored Clinton, though not by as wide a margin: $42,000 for her and more than $13,300 for Trump. General Motors spent $17.6 million lobbying since 2015 and gave more than $79,300 to Clinton and $22,800 to Trump.

On the other hand, the TPP-averse AFL-CIO, the largest federation of unions in the U.S., has spent about $10.3 million lobbying on all issues since 2015 and froze Trump out completely, contributing about $30,800 to Clinton during the 2016 cycle.

Big Pharma company Eli Lilly & Co spent over $14.3 million lobbying in 2015 and 2016 overall and gave more than $5,400 to Trump’s campaign and $35,900 to Clinton’s.

Pro-TPP groups also lobbied extensively and had deep ties to the candidates. Microsoft Corp spent about $17.2 million lobbying in 2015 and 2016; the company contributed almost $814,400 to Clinton and just over $34,740 to Trump. Bank of America, which spent over $2.2 million lobbying in 2016 alone, and Morgan Stanley, with $4.9 million lobbying since 2015, were Trump’s largest donors among those that have lobbied on TPP since 2008, contributing about $69,000 and $45,740 respectively to the business mogul’s campaign.

Berkshire Hathaway comes in a close third, with about $42,070 to Trump. Interestingly, Warren Buffett, multibillionaire chairman and CEO of Berkshire Hathaway, was an ardent Clinton supporter. Buffett’s company spent $13.3 million lobbying in 2015/2016 combined. Also in the pro-TPP corner are Apple Inc, which spent over $9.1 million lobbying various issues including the TPP and contributed just under $4,600 to Trump in 2016; AT&T Inc, which only reported lobbying on TPP in 2010 and 2011, but donated almost $32,400 to the Trump campaign; and General Electric, which spent $28.8 million lobbying since 2015 and contributed over $26,271 to Trump.

Eight of Trump’s top ten donors that also lobbied the Trans-Pacific Partnership since 2008 were pro-TPP, with two being ambiguous about their stance. This begs the question: does money really buy influence when it comes to President Trump?

This article was completed while the author was an intern at the Center for Responsive Politics. The story was edited by CRP reporters.

Trumpism and Immigration

This election has seen the deterioration of civil discourse and the proper exchange of ideas come to a boiling point. Statements issued by President Trump, Republicans, and Democrats have been shortened and maimed into brash statements that seem to only serve as a means for garnering attention. Trump is particularly guilty of this. A study by PolitiFact revealed that 75 percent of Trump’s statements turned out to be mostly or entirely false while the other 25 percent turned out to be half true or mostly true. This leaves us with a grand total of exactly zero fully true statements of all that were analyzed. The following analysis seeks to empirically illustrate the likely effects of various policies offered by Mr. Trump and his base.

The Wall

The construction of a wall along the Mexican border has been one of the most publicized and discussed policy proposals Trump has issued. The logistics of building this mammoth wall are far beyond anything Mr. Trump has ever attempted. Fortunately, structural engineer Ali F. Rhuzkan has done some work for us by doing research into the logistics of this proposal.

Some of the more striking observations that Mr. Rhuzkan makes are as follows:

• “This wall would contain over three times the amount of concrete used to build the Hoover Dam.”

• “Such a wall would be greater in volume than all six pyramids of the Giza Necropolis.”

• “That quantity of concrete could pave a one-lane road from New York to Los Angeles, going the long way around the Earth.”

• “We could melt down 4 of our Nimitz-class aircraft carriers and would probably be a few cruisers short of having enough steel.”

Rhuzkan’s wall model

I implore anyone reading this article to imagine all of the good that could be done with the money and materials that would go into making this wall. The funds could be used for programs to prevent the crime that Mr. Trump accuses undocumented immigrants of committing, shoring up our national debt, providing attorneys to refugees escaping violence, perhaps even for investing in foreign development to avoid the need for immigration in the first place.

Aside from the logistical and monetary realities of building this wall, it would tarnish our international reputation and harm our relationship with Mexico, a close regional ally. A wall between our two nations would send a message of indifference and hatred. It is hard for two cultures to learn from and respect one another through a barrier of cold steel and cement.

Another issue the wall creates is that it does not solve the underlying humanitarian issues surrounding immigration. The reality of the situation is much different than that which the political sphere has been discussing recently. Nowadays, immigration from Mexico has largely declined, with more Mexicans going back to Mexico than coming to the United States. However, a large portion of those coming to the United States are fleeing violence from Latin America and Mexico. These types of immigrants are not looking to sneak into the United States or steal jobs, but they are surrendering at the border. Many (roughly 38%) of these types of immigrants are women and children. No wall is going to stop these refugees from coming, and pretending they do not exist is not going to help their plight.

Deportation

Donald Trump has put his weight behind a deportation plan and, although he has backpedaled after his inauguration, the risk of him changing his mind further remains. Under Trump, 11 million undocumented immigrants could be deported. Among the reasons offered as justification are the costs to taxpayers, crime, and welfare abuse. More cynically, Trump has been quoted speaking to fellow Republicans saying that they should not pass comprehensive immigration reform simply because immigrants do not typically vote Republican.

Before moving into the issues with this plan, I would like to point out a contradiction regarding Trump’s reasoning for deporting immigrants. He has made broad statements claiming that immigrants come to America to take American jobs, but on the other hand claims that immigrants need to be stopped because they are abusing our welfare system. These two claims imply that immigrants are so hard working that they steal our jobs, but they are so lazy that they are feeding off our welfare system.

Aside from these issues with the deportation plan, like organizing a deportation force in the 21st Century to round up and forcibly remove 11 million human beings from this nation, there are significant economic consequences connected to this policy.

The sudden deportation of this many immigrants would leave a gaping labor shortage in our economy. The industries that immigrants work in are specific to immigrants (as shown in figure 2) and the loss of labor skills would leave certain industries bankrupt of labor with no one to fill the gap. Not every unemployed person in this nation is looking for any job, they will not settle for these low skill jobs.

Immigrant distribution across industries

The Washington Post illustrates a specific example of this labor shortage that would occur in California, Nevada, Texas, and New Jersey. The article states, “[E]ven if every unemployed American in those states took an undocumented worker’s job — wildly unlikely, given that most Americans are unwilling to do the dirty jobs filled by many immigrants — it would still leave hundreds of thousands jobs unfilled.” In California, undocumented workers range anywhere from a third to half of the agricultural workforce. Deporting these immigrants would affect about half of the fruits and vegetables consumed in America and cripple California’s farming industry.

Deporting 11 million immigrants would provoke massive international displacement. Dictators and extremists cause humanitarian exoduses, not those with democratic principles.

Regardless, all of this fear mongering over immigrants is in vain. On top of the evidence already presented, plenty of other studies have shown the benefits of immigration for host countries. I sifted through examples from Miami to Great Britain, but I settled on a  scenario from South Africa published in Foreign Policy magazine to illustrate my point.

Before the end of apartheid in the early 1990s, black South Africans had their citizenship revoked and were exiled to quasi-nation states called Bantustans, cut off from white South African society. Before apartheid fell, white South Africans were afraid, as many in America are today, of what would happen when the barriers fell and the black South African population (9 times that of the white population) flooded the labor market. To put this into perspective, this would be the same proportion as the entire population of Brazil, China, and India simultaneously immigrating to the United States. The result was unlike anything anyone expected. Household incomes for both black and white South Africans doubled between 1993 and 1994. This type of economic situation has repeated itself as well. When the EU lowered labor migration restrictions between European countries Portuguese immigrants rushed to Denmark for work. This left both Denmark and Portugal with a more than 2% GDP increase rather than economic collapse.

The above examples illustrate that immigrants are complementary workers to native populations. They get more work done faster, and they do not simply come and take jobs. They create more. More jobs and more wealth. This is a statistic that Donald Trump should look into. Instead of building a wall to block out immigrants and silence their cries for help, we should be building bridges to help those in need and allow them to contribute to our economy. Instead of deporting 11 million immigrants, we should be granting them a path to citizenship so they can continue to contribute to our economy and be allowed to pay taxes.

Conclusion

The Mexican border wall and broad deportation plan are the extreme end of President Trump’s policy statements on immigration. His administration has backpedaled from some of these claims, but the possibility of a partial implementation, or reversal of policy remains. My hope is that the aforementioned policy proposals have been placed in sufficiently clear light regarding their actual effects on the U.S. population and economy.