The World Owes Haiti an Apology: The Perils of US Intervention

Via Picryl

The United States is a country that wears its values on its sleeve and thus takes it upon itself to carry the weight of the world on its shoulders. Upon its very birth, it stood upon a foundation of freedom, justice, democracy, fairness, and opportunity, principles that it proudly emblazoned on its seminal Constitution and that it immortalizes in its physical monuments. These are the traits that define the outlook of America’s history; these traits make up the hallowed, almost deified American Dream; these are the traits that Americans seek to embody at home and abroad. It is what distinguished early America from the antiquated and repressive monarchies that it sought to free itself from. Yet, travel to Haiti, a nation scarred by American intervention, and these traits will seem like a myth when ascribed to the U.S. Travel to Haiti, and it will seem like freedom and justice are in short supply.

Seemingly from its inception, the Caribbean country that makes up around one-third of the island of Hispaniola has been mired in a stubborn, unrelenting downward spiral of abject poverty, political instability, and despair. The reputation of being “the poorest country in the Western hemisphere” has clung to its national character for over a generation and supersedes any further conversation about Haiti. The irony is, Haiti was once the wealthiest colony in the entire Western Hemisphere. The juxtaposition between its former abundance and its current suffering can be explained by the legacy of colonialism and occupation, originally occurring under the Spanish, and later the French and American imperial projects. 

The story of Haiti’s contact with the West unfolds in a familiar way to its peers in the Western Hemisphere. Initial Spanish contact brought disease, which ravaged the indigenous populations, as the Spanish crown enacted the racial and economic hierarchy that facilitated its rule. Hundreds of thousands of Africans were trafficked onto the island via the Transatlantic Slave Trade. Amid weakening Spanish power, France laid claim to the Western part of Hispaniola, transforming the colony into an economic powerhouse fueled by cash crops like timber, sugar, and coffee. But in 1791, Haiti was struck by an intriguing turn of events: a massive slave revolt, led by the revolutionary and ideologue Toussaint L’Overture, proved an existential threat to French colonial rule. After thirteen years of brutal war, the former Haitian slaves successfully declared independence, in a land free from the tyranny, exploitation, and humiliation of slavery. This constituted the world’s first ever successful slave revolt to gain independence, and mirrored the effect of the “shot heard ‘round the world” so embodied in American ideals.

Yet, even from the outset of Haiti’s existence, America’s presence could be felt. Though early in the United States’s lifespan, the young nation had already demonstrated an interest in its peers in the Western hemisphere, in a foreign policy approach that would eventually culminate in the Monroe Doctrine. The U.S. supported the global isolation of Haiti during the Jefferson administration, maintaining its alliance with France and the global balance of power. However, the U.S. had its own vested interest in preventing the success of the Haitian Revolution: the Jefferson administration did not want the country’s own slaves to revolt following inspiration from their Haitian comrades, especially given its already tense racial politics. Of course, Thomas Jefferson and his peers would never admit that their approach directly contradicted the premise of universal rights and economic freedom, upon which they had fought a war with the British less than thirty years earlier. But from its very birth, Haiti was defined by the interests and potential aggression from foreign powers, a trend that would only continue. 

Shortly after Haitian independence, the French levied enormous debts upon Haiti, which it was forced to pay under threat of force, to make up for the lost wealth of French slave owners and landowners. This was a threat made to Haiti, which was already outgunned and underdeveloped due to the existential war it had just fought. Haiti was forced to take out loans from French banks to pay this debt, and then accrue additional debt from French banks to cover its original debt. So while France continued to profit from its former colony long after its occupation, Haiti was deprived of the essential income needed to develop infrastructure, education, and other systems needed for a stable government. Its rural farmland continued to supply cash crops, as its infrastructure and farming methods grew increasingly antiquated, and as its people languished for generations. Around World War I, the United States re-entered the picture. 

In 1915, the Wilson administration occupied Haiti, under the pretense of establishing stability (eventually a common refrain in U.S. foreign policy) after the assassination of their president. The Americans also wanted to curb growing French and German influence (owing to their debt policies and economic interests toward the nation, respectively) and prevent their intervention during this time of chaos. But instead of ensuring stability and lasting peace, American intervention was brutal, corrupt, and altogether scarring to the Haitian people. The U.S. seized Haitian economic assets and land, enriching American banks and government coffers while damning the Haitians to debilitating yet familiar exploitation. Yet more damning, perhaps, is how U.S. Marines killed 15,000 Haitians who rebelled against American rule, and made chilling examples of opposition leaders. 

Make no mistake: U.S. intervention was not welcomed by the Haitian people, and this pattern of U.S. occupation and profiteering in the name of democracy or stability can be found across the Western Hemisphere. Around the same time, the U.S. effectively forced the creation of, and profited greatly from, the Panama Canal; it replicated a similar model of Haitian occupation in Cuba following the Spanish-American War; a few years before its actions in Haiti, the U.S. had ended a bloody, years-long war for control of the Philippines. While the Americans would often establish infrastructure in the countries they intervened in, these institutions were often not accessible to much of the country’s poor majority. But more importantly, even if this infrastructure (roads, ports, the Panama Canal itself) immediately or eventually created value or otherwise brought economic or social success to a community, I would assert that that value is incredibly dwarfed by the value of a people’s self-determination, self-governance, and control over its resources. I would surmise that the Founding Fathers would be inclined to agree with that statement. For the United States, freedom, justice, stability, and prosperity were the shades under which it imposed its will and hegemony onto others, relegating smaller countries to the very fate that it had escaped from itself at birth, and leaving death and destruction in its wake. 

While formal U.S. occupation ended in 1934, its influence over Haiti continued to loom large–most notably in its control over Haitian finances lasting until 1947. As Haiti weathered the brutal dictatorships of François “Papa Doc” Duvalier and his son Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier during the 20th century, the United States propped up their regime in the interest of Cold War hegemony, especially after the Duvalier regime made concessions to Washington, including tax breaks for foreign companies and anti-communist alignment. Haitians continued to suffer violence, imprisonment, repression, and poverty on the part of the state; the cascading disasters of Haiti’s history had left the country’s systems in disrepair. All the while, a deep well of corruption continued to replenish the country’s elite, a chasm of inequality separating rich and poor. Haiti’s ongoing crisis only deepened after a devastating earthquake in 2010, a 7.0 magnitude wave of destruction that killed an estimated 300,000 people and displaced another million. This brings us to Haiti’s current conditions: after the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse, the nation has been overrun by gangs, who contend for control in the capital, Port-au-Prince. The actual government has lost much of its legitimacy following the aforementioned political turmoil, and the Haitian people are caught in the middle. A UN-backed intervention force, this time led by Kenyan police, has been dispatched, to minimal success.

What can we take from this? Again and again, even after Western colonialism and the Cold War, the United States’s intervention has damned Haiti to a fate it did not choose and did not deserve. American intervention was done in the interest of profit and hegemony, instead of the freedom and democracy that the country prides itself on. The common notion that Haiti’s current condition is the result of the failure of its people and the deep corruption of the country is, at best, reductive. Persistent foreign occupation and violence severely hindered the nation from creating strong institutions and infrastructure. Moreover, the support for illicit regimes (like the Duvalier dynasty) and the constant misappropriation of funds reinforce the vast inequality that Haiti experiences while preventing the socioeconomic mobility of the Haitian people, even given the country’s abundance. Indeed, many of the skilled and professional among Haiti’s population have migrated outward, many of them to the United States, where they are often the victims of xenophobic rhetoric. 

This fashion of American intervention was not just practiced in Haiti, though. It is a trend across recent American history, done in the interest of preventing communism or maintaining stability, but often ignoring the will and perpetuating the suffering of the people within. During the Arab Spring in 2011, as Egyptians rallied in the streets demanding freedom and self-determination, the United States continued to support the authoritarian Mubarak regime in the interest of regional political and economic stability until the final hour, once its collapse was all but inevitable. Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 was, in large part, a failure: Iraq today maintains an unstable democracy, and the U.S.’s actions created a power vacuum that left an easy entrance for the Islamic State, one of the most destructive terrorist groups of the 20th century. There are also examples where the U.S. didn’t intervene, but should have: the United States, “leader of the free world,” sat idly by as the Rwandan genocide saw the senseless deaths of hundreds of thousands. President Bill Clinton himself publicly recognized this mistake during a visit to Rwanda after the genocide. Time and time again, the United States did not stick up for its values. However, there is precedent for positive examples of U.S. intervention and peacemaking when there is political will. American involvement in Somalia in the 1990s, while originally invoking the infamous “Black Hawk Down” debacle, eventually pioneered a positive model of diplomacy. The peace process was aided by the measured stability induced by foreign involvement, remained in the country until the peace process was fully complete, and made use of local power brokers to bring agreements that were effective–all lessons that can be applied to the current situation in Haiti. 

The Haitian people have suffered for generations. The United States and the world owe Haiti an apology. But an apology is not enough. The United Nations, with the backing of the United States and other important countries, must make a concerted effort to re-establish stability and the basic functioning of the Haitian state. While this is a form of intervention, it is a necessary one to prevent Haiti’s continued misery. From there, these organizations must work with Haitians to create Haitian-led institutions; there is precedent for state-building like this within Haiti (with the Aristide regime) and outside of it (the re-establishment of the democratic Sierra Leonean government by UN and UK forces after the rebel takeover in 1996). But one thing must remain true: the next chapter of Haiti’s future must be written by the Haitian people.

Panama’s Recent Response to Trump’s Canal Desire

Panama’s president, José Raúl Mulino (EPA/FMT image)

On March 5th, Panama and BlackRock reached a deal granting the US company control of the Balboa and Cristobal ports in the Panama Canal. While the Panamanian government granted this concession in an effort to ease tensions with the United States, it has instead instigated US President Donald Trump's further ambitions of owning all the ports. Panama’s current strategy of appeasement is ineffective in maintaining its sovereignty and, absent readjustment, could ultimately lead to a domino effect in which Trump's imperial ambitions permeate the rest of Latin America.

A US focus on the region isn’t unheard of; since the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, and the Roosevelt Corollary of 1904, the US has adopted a hands-on approach to Latin American politics. During the Cold War, the United States became heavily involved in Latin American politics, spreading capitalist ideals in the wake of communism. Notable examples include Operation PBSuccess, which overthrew the leftist Guatemalan president in favor of a right-wing dictator allied with the US, and the failed invasion of the Bay of Pigs, which hoped to depose communist dictator Fidel Castro in Cuba. Earlier, in 1904, US President Theodore Roosevelt struck an agreement with Panamanian separatists, who were striving for independence from the Colombian government, to build the Panama Canal. The deal permitted the US to construct an artificial canal in exchange for its support for Panama’s rapidly growing independence efforts. Construction was finalized in 1914, and the US controlled the “Panama Canal Zone” until 1977, when the Torrijos-Carter treaties relinquished control to Panama gradually by 1999. During the 1990s, Panama continued dealing with US intervention despite gaining canal control. In 1990, President George H.W. Bush launched Operation Just Cause, aiming to depose the military dictator Manuel Noriega, who was suspected of drug trafficking and allying with Soviet-backed governments in Latin America. The US sent troops to Panama, capturing and convicting Noreiga, causing the deaths of around 300 civilians while leaving the state with a democratic structure that has endured to this day.

Once Trump came into office for his second term, his pursuit of regional and economic security against foreign powers, such as China, led him to the canal. He argues that the Torrijos-Carter treaty is a “disgrace” to US pride, and therefore should be invalidated.  In the 21st century, the US has shifted to economic control of Latin America with heavy investment in the region. From a trade standpoint, Trump’s interest in the canal is clear: access would be economically beneficial for the US, granting them control over trade and shipping in an area where 40% of US container traffic goes through. In doing so, they can obtain cheaper rates for the US and impose higher rates for their adversaries, consistent with Trump’s America First trade policy. Beyond that, Trump’s move is also motivated by a desire to hedge back against major attempts from the Chinese government to get a foothold in the region via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Chinese have helped construct several projects in Latin America, and are in the process of constructing many more in the future, threatening US power in the region. With the increase of Chinese economic expansion, the Trump administration has aggressively diverted its focus to the region to maintain the US’ regional sphere of influence and strengthen its position. 

In light of Trump’s aggression, the Panamanian response has been a policy of appeasement and accommodation. Following Trump’s inauguration, the state audited two Chinese ports in the canal, both part of the BRI, to gain favor with the new administration. During Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s first mission abroad, the Panamanians granted the US free passage of warships through the waterway, allowing the US to consolidate influence and defend against rivals like Venezuela. Further attempts have been made to move closer with the US: President José Mulino has withdrawn from the BRI as a whole, coinciding with US skepticism of Chinese influence within the Canal–information Rubio brought up to the Panamanian president. This policy has continued to be problematic, as in April 2025, US troops are now set to deploy near the canal in Panamanian territory. The idea of Panamanian sovereignty has begun to slightly erode, unable to stop US authority within its territory.  

Mulino’s objective has become unsuccessful; rather than neutralizing Trump’s aggression, it has failed to satiate his appetite. The day after the deal with BlackRock was announced, Trump addressed Congress, asserting that the deal implied Trump was reclaiming the canal from Panama. President Mulino has responded by accusing Trump of lying in the address. He emphasizes that “the transaction was purely commercial,” based on mutual interest, and not a form of concession. The Panamanian Canal Authority immediately rejected the claim of US warships, and a statement posted on X reaffirmed Panamanian sovereignty of the canal. Despite Mulino’s statements, the Panamanian government has been reluctant to use many of its resources to reaffirm its sovereignty in the face of US antagonism. Recently, Mulino met with US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth in an attempt to address certain concerns. In this meeting, the US was said to have been granted a cost-neutral compensation scheme for US warships and joint military training in the canal. While the statements struck a friendly tone, the point of Panamanian sovereignty remains. The government has refused to consult the United Nations or the Organization of American States about the issue. Recently, Mulino met with US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth in an attempt to address certain concerns. In this meeting, the US was said to have been granted a cost-neutral compensation scheme for US warships and joint military training in the canal. While the statements struck a friendly tone, the point of Panamanian sovereignty remains.

Panama’s genuflection to Trump could encourage him to force the hand of other nations in Latin America. As more and more nations in Central America have been welcoming Chinese cooperation, such as Costa Rica and Guatemala, Trump will likely turn his attention to these nations to expel Chinese influence.

This move has also worried the maritime powers that use the canal to shorten maritime trade and reduce shipping costs, such as Chile, Colombia, and Peru. The threat of US invasion and ownership of the canal could disrupt a vital shipping route, especially integral to these three nations, who rely heavily on trade with Europe and other Atlantic regions for resources. President of Colombia Gustavo Petro and Chilean President Gabriel Boric have continued to fight for the sovereignty of Panama through statements expressing unconditional support and denouncing Trump, while President Petro and Mulino are working together on other agreements, such as a bill reinforcing Panama’s sovereignty, a clean energy project, and issues on migration.   

In the meantime, to push back against Trump, Panama should take a harder stance on preserving their sovereignty and avoid the horrors of further US intervention. Their policy of appeasement has only been to the detriment of Panamanians and can embolden Trump to push his limits as far as he can in Latin America.  Panama must adopt a new strategy, potentially aligning closer with nations such as Canada, Mexico, and Colombia, which have already gone head-to-head with Trump on trade matters. All of these nations have responded to Trump’s aggression by appealing to international law, condemning Trump while threatening retaliation, and imposing tariffs with varying levels of success.

This could be through publicly criticizing US actions at the UN and OAS, invoking international law to defend its rights, and finding alternative economic partners, such as Mercosur, to open new economic opportunities, protect the canal, and strengthen regional independence in the wake of China and the US competition. Currently, Panama’s future is surrounded by uncertainty regarding Trump’s next steps for targeting the canal, and if they fail to reorient their current strategy, it may result in the US eventually taking full control of the canal through coercive means.

PARLACEN: The Rats Den

What is the PARLACEN?

The PARLACEN (Parlamento CentroAmericano) or CAP (Central American Parliament) is the parliamentary body of the political organization known as SICA (Central American Integration system) whose objectives is to help integrate and develop, peace, political freedom, development, and promote free trade among Central American Countries. However, it has recently been used  as a vessel for former Presidents, elected officials, businessmen, and even the families of these involved parties to escape crime in their home countries. 

The PARLACEN, being an international organization between states, grants diplomatic immunity to those who are members in Latin America, meaning that these politicians are immune for crimes in Central America. With the rare of exception of Honduras, who suspended their diplomatic immunity after Ex-President Porifio Lobo Sosa who at the time was the President of the Honduran National Congress suspended their diplomatic immunity. This is interesting because a few years after that decision, Lobo Sosa's wife, former First Lady Rosa Lobo, was indicted in Honduras for misuse of Public Funds. Lobo Sosa himself has been accused of many crimes and headlines as one of the most recent Central American politicians who has been blacklisted from the U.S. a big first in the country’s history. Lobo Sosa was indicted in the United States for charges of Drug Trafficking, Racketeering, Tax Evasion and more. Even without these protections, it is rare for a country like the United States to prosecute them while they’re international deputies regardless of whether there is clear evidence of a crime because of diplomatic red tape. Countries with charismatic leaders or whose parties control a majority of the government would most of the time not allow a fellow member of that party to be extradited and being a member of the PARLACEN would only make that harder.

What grants them immunity?

The rules of Parlacen are extremely ambiguous, essentially granting the countries the freedom to pursue their own agendas and rules. They base other countries' diplomatic powers on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. What does this mean? The internal rules of the Parlacen allow for the same immunity and protections stipulated in the Vienna Convention if the sending state (the country that sends the deputies) agrees to them. This rule in the Parlacen allows that any elected official (as long as they're permitted) is granted this immunity in Central America. There are exceptions to this, like a host country may ask the PARLACEN to lift or suspend a specific deputies privileges.

As of 2023, each country sends twenty officials, each with a deputy, to the Parlacen. The rules of the Parlacen also state that each elected official is elected the same way they would in their own country. For example, in Guatemala, there is a direct election, while in other countries, primaries are held or in some cases parties will appoint a specific person for the ticket. Furthermore, former heads of states (presidents) of a member country also qualify as members of parliament; however,  this grace period is dependent and given by each individual country. 

Electoral Courts

Most Latin American Countries have within their public administration an entity known as Electoral Courts, which are in charge of overseeing every election. Amongst their powers and responsibilities is this jurisdiction in which they can bend some rules during elections; even if unconstitutional. For example, there has been ruling by these courts to allow private citizens with legal trouble to run for office. This is known as a fuero, here on now referred to as special privileges These special privileges allow the courts to acknowledge this legal trouble, whether domestic or abroad, and still allow that candidate to run for office. Most recently, we see the Tribunal Electoral of Panama rule in favor of former President Ricardo Martinellli,who has been sentenced to 10 years in prison yet still allowed to run because his appeal negates the guilty conviction needed to bar him from the election. While some may be quick to point out how judges can be bought and that judicial accountability is a rare phenomenon in Latin America; I argue that these courts are the most overseen by justice department because, just as they have the right to give you special privileges as a politician or party leadership, they can take it away.

Unethical by purpose or design?

One country who is notorious for using the PARLACEN as a vessel for special privileges is Panama. In 2023, the sons of aforementioned former president of Panama Ricardo Martinelli, whose sons were involved in money laundering, bribery, and illicit enrichment charges in Panama and the United States were sworn in to the PARLACEN as alternate deputies. This means that they get the immunities granted to them by the Vienna Convention, essentially stalling out their sentence. Ironically enough, Ricardo Martinelli himself attempted to leave The Parlacen, at the time calling it “a den of thieves,” However, both international and Panamanian courts found the action rash and unconstitutional.

The Martinelli brothers are not the only Panamanian Politicians seeking this special benefit. Former President of Panama Juan Carlos Varela, who is blacklisted from the United States for alleged involvement in corruption, is also seeking a seat in the Parliament. Varela is facing serious charges of corruption and bribes. Ricardo Martinelli, whom Varela once served as Vice President under, is leading the polls in the upcoming presidential election in 2024 (even despite all of those corruption charges) which for Varela, who is considered a nemesis of Martinelli, means he’s in really hot water if elected. 

During many of these elections, it is often seen in a lot of campaign trails for these politicians, who later attempt to benefit from the special privileges, their disdain for the governmental entity. Martinelli tried to leave the PARLACEN, as did Varela,yet, they did not revoke their privileges as Honduras did. Honduran politicians agreed to leave ability for immunity off the table while Panama still kept theirs. This begs the question: did these politicians foreshadow their future intentions or do they really believe in these anti-corruption methods? Because if they truly believed in the PARLACEN being a den of thieves  and leaving did not work, why not revoke the immunity anyway to deter and avoid the loophole? They do this by mix of saying what they need to win a crowd, and planting the idea in their minds to diminish the shock when they run PARLACEN after leaving office. One of the reasons why they get away with it is a mentality of “nothing is going to change”. A lot of people refer to Martinelli’s Administration with the quote “Robó pero hizo” (Stole but did) referring to the Millions of dollars embezzled from projects and the subsequent bribes that brought his alleged crimes. Furthermore, in a lot of Latin American countries, voting is seen as important; most citizens see the Central American Parliament as a joke entity for thieves, and they don’t actively participate in these elections other than to support their favorite former politicians from the hands of “injustice.”

Panama, however, is not the only instance where we’ve seen this; they’re just the most recent. In 2003 Nicaragua’s former president, Arnoldo Aleman also sought refuge within the Parliament,which ended up stripping him from his immunities and allowed him to be charged in an effort to save its reputation; there are also instances of corruption from Members of Parliament. The former president of the Central American Parliament, Mario Facusee Nadal, was charged with illegally appropriating some properties that belonged to the state. He also once sought to repeal the immunity, with Panama as a co-sponsor.

Conclusion

A lot of politicians and political pundits do not really see the point in the PARLACEN. While its reputation precedes itself, the same people are seen to be claiming it is an institution in which accountability is not enforced. The mission of the PARLACEN is to foster economic and cultural alliance between central american countries. More than three decades later it is now just a question of, is it worth it? Consequently, I believe that there are several solutions that could fix this problem if all parties agree to it.  Firsty, amending the internal rules of the body itself, abolishing this diplomatic immunity, and special privileges that are given to these congresspeople. Likewise, they can also make membership more exclusive by adding a morality or similar  clause barring citizens who have open investigations against them or have been charged with a crime before. The last solution I propose is to abolish the organization. If concern for corruption is high, and there have been efforts to leave the PARLACEN, then I believe this is an option worth considering, while extreme it would make facing accountability in Central American countries easier.

Venezuela in Crisis: What Does the West’s Waning Opposition to the Current Regime Mean for the Future of the Country?

Introduction 

Venezuela is a country full of striking natural beauty and one of Latin America's most urbanized places. It is the birthplace of Simon Bolivar, contains the Los Roques Archipelago, and is famous for its Pan de Jamon (bread filled with ham and olives) and Hallacas (corn or cassava dough stuffed with meat, olives, raisins, onion, and more.). However, in recent years, Venezuela has been plagued with social, political, and economic strife. 7 million people have left Venezuela, fleeing poverty and political crisis. Many are at risk of eviction, exploitation, and are forced into debt that they could never repay. Of course, the COVID-19 pandemic made things worse, plunging Venezuelans into an even deeper economic crisis. People are forced to flee in unconventional and unsafe ways, many falling prey to smugglers, kidnappers, and traffickers. While some Venezuelans make it to the United States, many go to surrounding Latin American countries, such as Ecuador, Colombia, and Brazil. Adding to their suffering, Venezuelan refugees are stigmatized and scapegoated by the countries they flee to, with limited job opportunities and access to public services, they are often left to fend for themselves. While host communities and countries remain committed to helping the refugees, the sheer numbers mean that resources are stretched thin and finances are almost nonexistent. Understanding the present reality for many Venezuelan citizens requires examining the external factors at play.  

In this article, I explore how a country with such a rich culture and economy, due to its oil reserves, came to be in such a perilous situation politically and economically. I will also discuss how the West’s initial opposition to the current Venezuelan government is fragmenting, after many years of strong condemnation. Finally, I will discuss what is next for Venezuela and how the international community is assisting in one of the biggest humanitarian crises of the 21st century. 

How did Venezuela get here?

There are two parts to how Venezuela got into its current situation, political reasons and economic reasons. However, they intertwine and together they have engulfed the country in a crisis that has caused millions of people to flee. The executive powers of the president are incredibly strong and have only been strengthened in the past few decades. Since 1999, Venezuela has been run by two individuals from the same political party: Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro. Chavez was a socialist president from 1999 until his death in 2013. He emphasized key elements such as nationalism, a centralized economy, and a strong military that frequently engaged in public projects. His approval rating was quite high, reaching up to 80% public support. He ran on an anti-corruption platform which made him very popular. He increased social welfare programs and redistributed the country’s oil wealth. Riding this wave of popularity, Chavez’s party gained control of key institutions, such as the judiciary, electoral council, and the Venezuelan Supreme Court. Over time, the system of checks and balances became weakened and the president’s power was often left unchecked. When Maduro was elected following Chavez’s death, global oil prices decreased. Venezuela’s economy relies heavily on oil, which led the country into a 7-year recession. Basic goods were scarce and inflation skyrocketed. It was clear that Maduro was not as beloved by the public as Chavez was because there were many anti-government protests between 2014-2017. It did not help that Maduro ordered a brutal police crackdown on the protestors. During this time, many Venezuelans left the country to escape the economic repression and political crisis. 

Everything came to a head in the 2018 presidential election. Despite public discontent with Maduro, he was reelected president. This election was dismissed by citizens as neither free nor fair and many accused the government of corruption to help Maduro hold onto power. Many other candidates that planned on running were imprisoned or ran from the country out of fear of imprisonment. As discussed earlier, many of the institutions in Venezuela that performed checks and balances were under the socialist party’s influence. So when these institutions were called upon to investigate the claims of a corrupt democratic election, they refused and there was a lot of division. In January 2019, the speaker of the National Assembly, one of the only institutions that was still credible and influential, Juan Guaido, declared himself the “interim president” of Venezuela. He proclaimed the seat of president vacant because Maduro’s re-election was not valid. He predicted that he would be governing the country within a few months. In hindsight, this process would become extremely complex and detrimental to the people of Venezuela.

Venezuela’s economy is very dependent on the income from oil imports and exports. So much so that Venezuela could be thought of as a petrostate, where the government is dependent on oil, power is concentrated, and corruption runs rampant. The country is home to one of the world’s largest oil reserves and while that has been financially beneficial in the past, it has also been its downfall because there has been no diversification in the economy. The oil price in Venezuela has plunged from $100 per barrel in 2014 to $30 per barrel in 2016. Even though the prices have started rising again in recent years, Venezuela is still in an economic recession where conditions remain in turmoil. This is because of oil dependence, falling production rates, high levels of debt, and hyperinflation. Many experts believe that economic diversification will be difficult for Venezuela in the future. It would take an enormous investment to first put the oil sector back on track and then develop and cultivate other industries. 

The West’s Opposition 

More than 50 countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom, recognized Guaido as Venezuela’s legitimate president. Yet the international influence was limited, as the military stayed loyal to Maduro. He remained firmly in charge of the country with the support of China and Russia behind him. In response, the US put sanctions on the Maduro government making it harder for him to sell his country’s oil in 2019 on Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA). These sanctions cut off the US as PDVSA’s main destination for oil exports, which restricted Venezuela’s access to foreign currency. Because the economy was in freefall, Maduro loosened the foreign currency regulation brought in by Chavez. This helped a little with the economic crisis but the majority of citizens do not have access to foreign currency, leaving them to continue to struggle.. In August 2019, the US issued sanctions on Maduro’s government blocking and freezing the property and interests in the United States and within the control of US persons. In January 2021, the US imposed oil-related sanctions on Venezuela. The Treasury targeted three individuals, fourteen entities, and six vessels for their ties to organizations attempting to assist PDVSA. This network allegedly helped PDVSA sell oil to Asia despite the US sanctions. The Treasury argues that any profits from the sale of oil help to contribute to the corruption in Venezuela’s government. 

The United States and the international community have also condemned Venezuela’s current government for its human rights abuses. The government has been repressing dissent and opposition as they did during the protests between 2014-2017. There are violent crackdowns on peaceful street protests. Since 2014, more than 12,500 people have been arrested in connection to the anti-government protests. There has been imprisonment of any potential political opponents and the prosecution of civilians in military courts. On top of removing the checks and balances system, the government has also stripped power from the opposition-led legislature. There are shortages and scarcity of medical supplies, food, medicine, and a lack of access to essential healthcare. In 2018, 80% of Venezuelan households experienced food insecurity. The infant mortality rate has increased by 30%, cases of malaria by 76%, and maternal mortality by 65%. For more than a decade, the government has abused its power to regulate the media and has worked to reduce the number of media outlets that criticize them. Self-censorship is a serious problem for fear of the media outlet being suspected, flagged, or its journalists arrested. 

The humanitarian crisis, human rights abuses, and persecution of dissents have caused a refugee crisis. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, more than 7 million people have fled Venezuela however it could be more as many who are not registered by authorities have also left. Many are vulnerable to exploitation and abuse while in other countries because they have limited access to jobs, healthcare, schooling for their children, and other public services. 

Is the Opposition fragmenting?

Despite initial opposition and sanctions by the United States and the international community, recently the opposition has been fragmenting and waning. They have recognized that these restrictions are only making the humanitarian crisis worse. In March 2023, the United States announced that it will be sending 120 million dollars in humanitarian aid to Venezuela. This is to help relieve the limited resources that are causing the current humanitarian crisis. In November 2022, the US announced that they will be easing oil sanctions after Maduro signs an accord to create an UN-administered fund to provide humanitarian aid to his people. This agreement is part of a long-term solution to finding a common path out of Venezuela’s complex economic crisis. This will include the relaxation of limitations on Chevron’s operations in Venezuela and would allow them to re-enter global oil markets. Canada, the United Kingdom, and the European Union have recently pledged to review their own sanctions in exchange for the release of political prisoners. The Biden Administration has signaled that they are prepared to ease up on their sanctions in exchange for concrete steps by Maduro and his government to not ban opposition parties from running against him in the 2024 presidential elections. 

What is next for Venezuela? 

So who is the president of Venezuela? Is it Maduro or Guaido? If you ask who the current president is, it is clearly Maduro who has the support of the military. If you ask who the rightful president of Venezuela is, that is a more complex question. What is next for Venezuela? How will they get out of the crisis that they are currently in? How are they going to fix the economic situation in their country so more citizens have to leave in order to survive? 

For one, the Biden Administration has signaled that they are prepared to ease up on their sanctions in exchange for concrete steps by Maduro and his government to not ban opposition parties from running against him in the 2024 presidential elections. In order to survive and fix its economy, many experts believe that Venezuela must diversify its income and end its dependence on the export of oil and natural gas. This has worked in other countries such as Norway and Saudi Arabia where oil accounted for a large part of their GDP. If strong democracy was redeveloped in Venezuela, with an independent press and judiciary, this could help hold the government and oil companies accountable.  They have to strengthen their political institutions so there are checks and balances within the government. Anti-corruption is important in order to keep the government accountable in the eyes of the public to win back their trust. Most of all, they must expand their social service programs as Chavez did early on in his presidency. The humanitarian and refugee crisis is an immediate threat to people’s lives, the short-term goal if you will. The long-term goal is to push Venezuela away from being a state reliant on one source of income. International aid and intervention can only do so much; governmental and institutional reform has to come from the Venezuelan government itself by recognizing the precarious situation of becoming a failed state they are in danger of falling into.

Indigenous Communities: A Path to Self-Determination in Western Hemisphere

The Western Hemisphere is a region that features some of the world’s constitutional frameworks that are most attentive and inclusive to the matter of indigenous rights. While many of these strides are highly commendable and even revolutionary, given humanity’s oppressive history, these texts stand in large contrast to the actual reality on the ground where indigenous activists continue to face ignorance, persecution, and, in some cases, death. Even amongst activist circles, the discussion surrounding indigenous communities tends to focus on land protection or a degree of land autonomy at best, which is itself often poorly enforced in practice, and indigenous people’s rights are seen as a means of enriching the nation’s diversity and standing against the colonial past but often with the result of mere commercialization of said culture. Without a more meaningful recollection of the past and an education geared towards a more in-depth appreciation of local customs and diversity, indigenous localities and cultures are reduced to a mere superficial acknowledgement and a figurine an indigenous artisan is attempting to sell to a mildly excited foreigner.  

It is crucial to maintain and strengthen the present rhetoric of inclusion, as well as remember the injustices of the colonial past that saw indigenous people subjugated and stripped of their own land and basic human rights, and recognize the contributions of indigenous communities’ to the crucially needed struggle for environmental rights, but the only way to truly move forward is through a broader legal and social recognition of the right to self-determination of these communities. To truly acknowledge and guarantee indigenous people’s humanity and rights and allow for actual preservation and celebration of indigenous people’s identity, culture, language, and socioeconomic progress and inclusion, is to give indigenous people’s voices an actual platform, support better community organization, even across the modern national borders where possible, to listen to input coming from indigenous communities themselves rather than outside assumptions aimed at simply checking off an inclusionary-sounding box when making policy, to guarantee the right to land and meaningful preservation of one’s history, and not to reduce the conversation to a discussion on tourism and environmental rights happening in a vacuum but rather to acknowledge the imperative need of indigenous communities to participate at every level of societal organization and be able to contribute to legal, economic, and sociocultural practices of their country, neighborhood, and local community - to enjoy their human right to self-determination.  

First Things First: The Land 

When discussing the issue of indigenous peoples’ rights, this rhetoric is often inextricably tied to land. Each indigenous group, as understood by tribal alliances and modern understandings of ethnic boundaries, is assigned a specific geographic space and either given a certain degree of authority over it or paid certain symbolic respects as a reference to the original inhabitants of that geographic space. While land and territory are often key aspects of a group’s identity, it should also be acknowledged that conventional understandings of territorial boundaries may not apply to the indigenous societies of the Americas. To claim a certain territory for a certain group may actually discredit its group’s actual association with the land or impose a foreign and post-colonial worldview.  

In the case of Canada, many indigenous groups prefer to not associate themselves with the Canadian identity and actually do not even agree with the very idea of the Canadian entity. While this does not mean Canada does not exist as a country in present world, and it does not necessarily imply these groups’ refusal to acknowledge or even operate within Canada’s framework, it is true that the very idea of citizenship, international and internal treaties, or the idea of land ownership and claims do not necessarily reflect the worldview of these groups and Canada’s attempts to formalize its relationship can be met with reasonable distrust as imposition of the idea of land claims, borders, or the idea of “Canadian” sovereign indigenous nations can come across as paternalistic and reminiscent of colonization. In fact, Canada has also introduced a statement of acknowledgement read in schools, official functions, and even concerts, sports events, and award ceremonies. These statements are meant to pay respect to a specific group that lived on this territory by mentioning their name and recognizing the “enduring presence of the Aboriginal peoples on this land.” The statements are also adapted to read specific region’s most prevalent indigenous groups and acknowledge their specific partaking in Canada’s historical and modern day state-formation processes.  

While these statements are a step forward from previous history of forced assimilation, sterilization, and betrayal of prior treaties with the indigenous groups in modern-day Canada, the statements also do not acknowledge the modern lack of advancements in terms of addressing indigenous peoples’ concerns, such as the issue of disappearances of men and women, environmental rights, the very issue of historical injustice, forced assimilation, and illegal overtaking of land. Therefore, the very statements that are meant to pay respect can, at best, actually reveal the ironic hypocrisy of the promise of acknowledgement while not taking concrete action and are in fact potentially just another way to subjugate indigenous groups to the idea of Canada and presence of Canadian hegemony. Additionally, in some cases, the groups mentioned in statements, like the Haudenosaunee and the Anishinabe, may themselves be in disagreement over who had historical presence in certain areas, which can lead to additional confusion and alienation, and some with the authorities all the while continuing to insufficiently address concerns submitted by the peoples that these statements are supposed to protect. While acknowledgement of historical and present day contribution of indigenous people to the land is the very least a modern government can do, any discussion of land rights and historical and modern day presence should not be casually presented on behalf of the modern hegemon state but rather carefully discussed and presented in accordance with the indigenous groups’ worldviews and discussion.  

All discussion, seemingly needless to say, should also be transparent and respectful of differences the governing present-day nation state has with cultural and legal frameworks of indigenous groups it is intending to include in these conversations and formal treaties. In the case of Argentina, for example, one can argue that historically most oppression and erasure of land settlements and original socio-cultural relations has been done by the colonial Spanish Crown. However, some of the nations that emerged out of anticolonial struggle for independence and freedoms, such as Argentina and Chile, have themselves expanded their borders thus pushing out original settlers, and the very entities of each modern state in the Western Hemisphere today can be considered a de facto hegemonic presence on behalf of the indigenous, settlers of these lands. While history cannot be undone and lands cannot simply be return due to complexity of demographic and cultural shifts, the very least each of these nation states can do is recognize the enduring legacy of pre-colonial nations, the painful colonial history of injustice and violence, but also continuous contributions of each of these original nations to modern day state-making and sociopolitical life, without implying the need of indigenous, or original (a term often used in some parts of South America to avoid colonial and othering connotations of the word “indigenous”), peoples’ need to assimilate in the modern concept of a nation state but rather allowing for this concept to be expanded to accommodate the people it is supposed to be composed of, which includes indigenous peoples and their homes. 

However, going beyond this, present-day nation states should not leave indigenous people as part of a “tradition” and the “past” but rather recognize the very existence and agency of these groups in modernity. Indigenous, or original, peoples should be offered protections by the present-day hegemon state and their input should actively be acknowledged and respected, with concrete action taken to address these concerns. Going back to the Southern Cone, Argentina also is amongst states that presently and historically have had the most inclusive constitutional and legal texts as it pertains to indigenous peoples’ land rights and cultural acknowledgement. Regardless of this, on a regular quiet, breezy day in Buenos Aires, the historic Plaza de Mayo features a constantly present tent that proudly stands right across from Casa Rosada, with the raised Wiphala. While some of the reasons for protests are more structural, such as corruption, abuse of power by authorities, need for greater justice in local governance etc., many of the signs just ask for the government to grant indigenous women an audience, and each reason could best be addressed with greater effort to include indigenous leaders on negotiating tables, and actually listen to their input, their vision for land organization, and their understanding of governance and its principles.  

Going north to the beautiful Falls of Iguazu, original communities are largely left to look for their own educational resources and recent treaties actually stripped some of the smaller but very present communities of their original land claims. I personally had the honor to visit these communities and saw hotels that were originally not supposed to be there inhabiting more than half of the area designated for this group. A 2005 accord with the government, according to local residents, encoded confusing language and manipulated tribal leaders into signing treaties that gave up virtually half of their territory. This meant that this society suddenly got hotels and tourists instead of assistance in programs meant to ensure preservation of the local language, history, and culture, assist the members of this group in capacity-building and use of modern professional tools needed to succeed and bring socioeconomic gain and recognition to the area. This discussion is not meant to critique or single out either Canada or Argentina, but rather to applaud existing well-meaning efforts at integration and acknowledgement these governments have undergone but also remind of the need to be critical and not only acknowledge but also address underlying inequalities in power dynamics between modern states and indigenous peoples.  

In the end, any discussion about land is not just about land. It is about a larger question of identity, of the right to resources, and of recognition of the negotiating power and agency of the people of this land. To recognize this is to move beyond the idea of territorial claims, and even of the very concept of modern-day nation-state, and allow for changes necessary to ensure acceptance and actual transparent, educated, and democratic inclusion of the people that inhabit the land. 

Communities Across Borders 

Tied to the very idea of competing understandings of citizenship and belonging to land is the fact that indigenous groups of the Western Hemisphere oftentimes are situated and made to work within a territorially constricting modern nation-state boundary. In other words, indigenous communities are oftentimes separated from fellow community members by an international border, a reality that only makes community organizing, activism, negotiating, and retention of a linguistic, social, and cultural identity that much more difficult to obtain, maintain, and perfect. In some cases, like in the case of Guaraní-speaking groups of the Iguazu Falls, friendly relations amongst Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay maintain the borders open and circulation and transport can be more easily negotiated, with Paraguay maintaining legal appreciation and practical fluency of Guaraní amidst its borders and facilitating retention of this language, even if colonial time changes. However, friendly relations and sociopolitical exchanges amongst these states have not historically been consistent to say the least and there is nothing, all three being sovereign states, that prevents any of these states from hypothetically choosing a more repressive legal framework that would, if not completely cut off, then more severely restrain movement and intragroup exchange of these regional peoples. In the case of the Miskito people, Honduras and Nicaragua have also enjoyed friendly relations and have also constituted a shared political entity at times. However, they enjoy sovereignty and can similarly choose to restrict the processes of community organizing of Miskitos across their sovereign borders. Furthermore, the effect that the recent proclamations of states of emergency in Honduras and the recent prosecution of journalists and international organizations in Nicaragua, as well as the recent assassinations of prominent environmental activists of indigenous descent in both countries, is yet to be better understood, especially as it pertains to indigenous groups that already lack acknowledgement of sovereignty, a seat at the UN, or another concrete legal recognition on national and international levels.  

Here again we have to acknowledge that historical injustice cannot simply be undone and that inclusion cannot be achieved overnight. However, the United Nations have created working groups, forums, committees, and assembled conventions and proclamations to address the issue of indigenous rights and their representation in the international system, and have also invited actual tribal leaders to speak in the interest of their nations. This is a beginning but is a practice that is still lacking consistency, transparency, education, and mutual respect, and equal footing needed for actual democratic inclusion of the indigenous peoples. Furthermore, there should be more effort on behalf of regional bodies to address local concerns and assist in indigenous community organizing across borders. This does not mean that countries need to give up their sovereignty but is rather again connected with the aforementioned idea of care for all citizens that the present-day states claim are trying to protect.  

It is Not Just About That Souvenir 

I am adding this section because I all too often see people going to North American reservations to buy dream catchers or buying those Wiphala stickers as a proud souvenir from their trip to South America. This is not to say that there is anything inherently wrong with these practices, and they in fact oftentimes are the main source of income and sustenance for many indigenous groups throughout the Hemisphere and the world. The problem I see with this practice is when people buy these items without realizing they are more than just items, that their meaning contains actual spiritual and political significance. Furthermore, it should be questioned that this type of tourism and souvenir selling is what entire groups of people need to be able to survive. Why are indigenous peoples’ industries being reduced to consumption by tourists from mainstream hegemonic circles? Why are objects that hold spiritual, historical, and sociopolitical meaning to them being commercialized, instrumentalized, and misunderstood? This is another power dynamic that we can begin to address through greater education, transparency, and democratic respect for human rights and inclusion of these groups and their practices. A single tourist choosing to learn about what Wiphala stands for or choosing not to buy a dream catcher from Target but invest in a handmade product instead and learn of its origins will not generate a structural change individually. However, this may look like a step in the right direction.  

More structurally speaking, however, the culture and very existence of indigenous groups would not be commercialized if proper respect were given to their identity, sovereignty, and sociocultural context. Does this mean sovereignty is necessary to allow for proper self-realization and self-determination of indigenous peoples? This seems to be the actual central question of each subset of issues that surround indigenous rights, be it citizenship, political representation, environmental protection, or cultural preservation issues. This of course depends on complex historical and political implications that are specific to each local and regional contexts. I do want to highlight current successes and implications in granting actual self-determination rights to indigenous peoples.  

Of all current world constitutions, only the Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia grants explicit rights to self-determination to the indigenous people on the country’s soil, as article 30 in its second clause contains reference to the rights of “self-determination and territoriality” when discussing the country’s “nations and rural native indigenous people.” Just the very phrasing in terms of the level of nationhood when talking about the country’s minority and indigenous communities is very unique and revolutionary as the very phrasing would be considered by some world leaders as dangerously giving up on the hegemon nation-state’s sovereignty. However, this particular permission has scarcely been exercised in practice given that the pandemic, a coup d'etat, and various administrative changes have delayed the process of granting autonomy to those that requested it or were in the process of requesting it. The case of Guaraní Charagua is fascinating because, since 2015, this particular nation has managed to gain a level of autonomy within its territorial boundaries, with deliberative assembly and traditional forms of governance creating a successful hybrid style of decision-making, functioning effectively in the broader global neoliberal framework while also introducing and maintaining the local customary decision-making processes. However, the tension with the departmental and state governments, and particularly with differently racialized groups, with white mestizos in particular, means that the ability to reach self-determination and own expression without de facto limitations and judgment is not yet realized. Constitutional provisions themselves might not yet be sufficiently detailed and widespread to guarantee self-determination, but Bolivia’s Constitution represents a potential step in the right direction, where nation-state recognized its plurality and that complexity of its constituents’ identities goes beyond the traditional framework of the nation-state, and provisions granted for local autonomy, language and collective knowledge-sharing as means of cultural and scientific preservation can be argued to have significantly supported Bolivian state-formation and human rights prospects.  

Another particularly interesting case is that of Chile and the rejected new constitutional framework proposed officially in the latter half of 2022 following extensive protests demanding justice and a new constitution back in 2019. Amidst a constitutional drafting process that was designed to be exceptionally inclusive of the country’s women, minorities, and civil society but that also ended up embroidered in a degree of controversy and many delays given the pandemic and complex global realities, Chile saw its new constitutional proposal in September of 2022 that was widely rejected in spite of the fact that majority expressed a willingness to move away from Pinochet’s constitutional framework still in use in Chile. The sheer length of the text, as well as some of the vague and legally unsecured language embedded by largely politically inexperienced constitutional assembly, were signs of alarms for many voters. Additionally, some described the constitutional draft as utopian and as putting economic progress of Chile at risk due to potentially expensive social protections it guarantees. However, this attempt at a change in constitutional framework represents a very important subject of study to perfect future processes of constitutional drafting. Of particular interest to this article are provisions given to indigenous groups in Chile. The assembly of indigenous community leaders was proud to include clauses on self-determination and even on independent judiciary processes for indigenous communities. However, this proved to be some of the most controversial additions to the new constitutional draft as many felt that this would create a legal gray area and infringe upon Chilean sovereignty and equality of its people under law. This is a legitimate concern and legal implications of such decisions as well as the final supremacy of the constitutional law must be carefully discussed and understood. On the other hand, however, amongst the responses to these concerns on behalf of indigenous leaders also stands a clear understanding and promise by the Chilean state that, by signing to various international laws including the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, the state already committed itself to allowing a degree of autonomy and self-determination rights and the peoples are in fact looking for what already was signaled as legally appropriate. While there is much to learn from this process and contradictions continue to present themselves, the fact that these attempts have occurred and that some other world regions, such as West Africa, have shown profound steps forward in terms of local judiciary and democratic assembly styles and representations being constitutionally recognized, there are avenues for learning and future advancements on this complex legal and social issue.  

Conclusion  

The issue of inclusion and granting and securing actual self-determination rights to indigenous peoples of the Western Hemisphere, and the world, is a very complex one. It is evident that the very definition of who gets the claim of belonging to a people, a territory, or the very status of a nation is a very complex problem. However, recognizing this complexity, allowing space for a greater conversation, more education, transparency, democracy, and supremacy of the issues of human rights and inclusion as conversational and constitutional drafting frameworks pose a potential step in the right direction. While these issues are becoming increasingly understood, which can be seen in the solutions proposed throughout the text of this article, practical examples from real life show that there is still a lack of education on the issue of indigenous rights, freedoms, and sociocultural integrity amongst the general populations, the modern nation-states stand largely in practical denial of their responsibility, and actual conversations that allow parity and conscious participation to indigenous communities in the state-building and rights-securing processes are still dangerously scarce in practice. It is only through involvement of indigenous communities themselves, one which goes across borders and beyond the present-day restrictions of the globalized neoliberal frameworks, that a change in the right direction can be taken.  

How Grassroot Movements in Latin America can help influence the fight for Reproductive Rights in the United States.

Grassroots movements in Latin and South America, such as The Green Wave, have generated change and progress in reproductive rights by implementing modern human rights frameworks and emphasizing that criminalizing abortions does not stop them from happening. Hopefully and eventually, these movements will be adopted in the United States to help mobilize their grassroots movements to fight for reproductive 

rights by spreading awareness of the goals and methods of these groups. The United States Supreme Court’s recent nonadherence to stare decisis in the overturning of Roe v. Wade will not only have detrimental consequences for reproductive rights in the United States, but the whole world. Roe v. Wade was a landmark decision by the Supreme Court and was considered as an advocacy model for reproductive rights in many countries. In 2020 in the United States, the abortion rate was 1 out of 5 pregnancies ended in abortion. It is estimated that 20-26 states could outlaw abortions and reduce the number of resources and rights for someone who is pregnant. These new laws can then act as trigger laws for more reproductive rights reduction in more states. 

In 1970, an anonymous woman known as Jane Roe filed a lawsuit against the district attorney in Dallas, Texas, named Henry Wade. She wanted to challenge a Texas law making abortion illegal except if necessary to save a woman's life. She alleged that

the law was unconstitutional, vague, and did not protect her right to privacy. The main question that the Supreme Court had to answer: does the US Constitution recognize a woman’s right to terminate the pregnancy by abortion? 

Ultimately, the court decided that the Texas law was unconstitutional because the 14th Amendment of the Constitution has a due process clause which protects individuals against state action called the right of privacy. They decided that a person’s right to choose to have an abortion is within the right to privacy and that any other law that would prohibit abortion violates that right. 

However, in June of 2022, Dobbs v. Jackson was decided and overturned the decision of Roe v. Wade. This is because, in 2018, Mississippi legislators passed a law called the Gestational Age Act, which prohibits abortions after 15 weeks. The only licensed abortion clinic in Mississippi called the Jackson Women’s Health Organization filed a lawsuit that went all the way up to the Supreme Court. The ultimate question that they had to answer was is the Mississippi’s law banning abortion after 15 weeks unconstitutional? In the end, they would find that there is nowhere in the Constitution that gives a person a right to an abortion. The Supreme Court has broken from stare decisis in following a precedented and influential decision from 50 years ago. In the Majority Opinion, written by Justice Samuel Alito, he discussed the right to abortion as neither deeply rooted in the nation’s history nor an essential component of “ordered liberty.” 

What exactly is the United States’ history with abortion and reproductive rights? Unsurprisingly, the history is rooted in sexism, the patriarchy, and the idea that the American woman’s duty and sole purpose was to bear children. The first time that abortion was actually criminalized was in the mid-nineteenth century. In the 1850s and 1860s, doctors helped legislators pass anti-abortion laws to make it

illegal to have an abortion and to take birth control. And yet, even though all these new laws were passed criminalizing birth control, women started to take control over their bodies, pregnancies, and abortions. During this time period, many argued that too many native-born white women were terminating their pregnancies. Many people were afraid that if white American women stopped having children, America would be overrun by foreigners. Many were against the use of contraceptives as well, likening the women who used them to prostitutes. Some leaders of the anti-abortion movement were of the view that pregnancy and having children were women’s purposes in society. One of those leaders, named Horatio Storer, wrote “what a woman is in health, in character, in her charms, alike of body, mind, and soul because of her womb alone.” The ideal, white, American family was seen as one that had lots of children to carry on the ideal American society. When women started to unsubscribe from that idea, many anti-abortionists felt it threatened their society and way of life and left them open for an ‘invasion,’ if you will, of foreigners. It has only been since the 1960s that women could even think about getting access to a birth control pill. Even today, while more accessible than 50-60 years ago, birth control is still not as widely accessible as one might think. Now with the overturning of Roe v. Wade in Dobbs v. Jackson, many women in America are worried that more policies will follow that could make their accessibility to reproductive health resources even smaller. 

What about the rest of the world? A lot of times, when the United States makes policies about issues, other countries would try to follow it or model their policies on the United States. A region of the world that is very interesting to look at as a case study is Latin and South America. As the United States’ southern neighbors, a lot of what the US does affects them. As of this moment, there are only 6 countries in Latin and South America that have a ban on abortions. They are El Salvador, Haiti,

Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Suriname, and Nicaragua. In most of the countries where abortion is legal, they usually have one of two models: 

● The Grounds Model: this model is where abortion is criminalized except in certain circumstances. These could include when a pregnancy is the product of rape or if the pregnant person’s health will be at risk if they go through with the pregnancy. 

● The Mix Model: this model is used in countries such as Argentina, Colombia, Uruguay, and Mexico. It gives access to legal abortion 

resources and there are no specific circumstances or requirements to get one. 

The Grounds Model has been the most commonly used model in the Latin and South American regions for many years. However, due to increasing feminist activism there has been a rise in social movements in Latin America that have paved the way for their countries to move towards the Mix Model instead.. 

In the 1970s, an activist group started in Argentina called Abuelas de la Plaza de Mayo, or Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo as a result of the human rights abuses at the time. It was founded in 1976 with the goal of finding the children and grandchildren stolen and illegally adopted during the Argentine military dictatorship that occurred from 1976-1983. These children were stolen from Los Desaparecidos, or those who disappeared because they spoke out against the regime and its leaders. It is estimated that 30,000 people disappeared during the regime and at least 500 babies were taken from their parents while in captivity and given to childless military couples. This organization has made a lot of progress; since it was started, they identified thousands of bodies and relocated many of the missing children and reconnected them with their families. During their protests, Abuelas de la Plaza de Mayo wore white headscarves

on their heads which symbolized their right to know the final fate of their children and grandchildren. 

This organization has inspired many pro-abortion activitst movements today in Latin and South America. For example, a women’s rights movement called The Green Wave wears green headscarves as a symbol of their protest and solidarity with each other. This organization started in Argentina and was directly inspired by the progress and change that Abuelas de la Plaza de Mayo has made in achieving its goals. The Green Wave has helped deliver groundbreaking change and progress in reproductive rights in Latin America. Through mass protests and keeping up the pressure on lawmakers, they have gotten the government to make major steps in decriminalizing abortion. They also have helped people break away from the stigmas of birth control and abortion and have raised general awareness around reproductive rights. Through their efforts, they have forced policymakers to make sure reproductive rights and access to resources are at the center of political debate and decisions. This grassroots movement’s influence has not only been confined to Latin America. It has spread throughout the world and people are seeing their success at making real change happen around reproductive rights. For example, in Poland, people protesting against abortion bans are using green scarves on their heads as a symbol of their right to reproductive autonomy. 

Grassroots movements such as The Green Wave are focusing their goals on trying to get policymakers to move their laws closer to compliance with international human rights obligations. The global trend recently with legislators is to try to expand access to legal abortion by including and following international human rights laws into the laws of their own countries and constitutions. A good example of this strategy is in Colombia; in February 2022, the Constitutional Court in Colombia decriminalized

abortion for up to 24 weeks of pregnancy. This is a historic step in reproductive rights and for grassroots movements. Their reasoning behind this decision came from the need to decriminalize abortion so that sexual and reproductive rights could be preserved. They noted the studies done by the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ESCR Committee) where they mention the right of all to enjoy the highest standard of health. 

The ESCR Committee has General Comment No. 14 and General Comment No. 22 which also played a role in Colombia’s decriminalization of abortion. These general comments talk about the right to health, equality, and freedom of conscience. By extension, the interpretation of these international human rights laws implies that denying women access to abortion is a form of discrimination that is in contrast with basic human rights. Colombia’s new policies and laws adhering to international human rights have influenced other countries in Latin America to do the same and now abortionservices have been included in health care systems all over Latin America due to the persistence and pressure of grassroots movements to make sure reproductive rights are a present topic in policy debates. 

In addition, grassroots movements have also emphasized to lawmakers how criminalizing abortions is not going to stop them from happening. Criminalization threatens the ability of women to get access to essential reproductive health care and resources. At the same time, it also increases inequality and discrimination. If a wealthy person has the resources to get an abortion, then the chances of deadly results are slimmer. The rate of unsafe abortions is four times higher and is increasing in countries with abortion laws that are restrictive and where abortion is criminalized. According to a study done by an organization in Colombia named La Mesa por la Vida y La Salud de las Mujeres says that only 1 to 12 percent of abortions are performed legally. This

implies that most women in Latin America getting abortions are doing so in unsafe conditions where their health could be at a much greater risk. Furthermore, many of the legal abortion clinics are located in major cities, which are unaccessible to many women. Women who live in rural areas already experience greater discrimination and marginalization and are now being put in an even more vulnerable situation. This is why grassroots organizations and movements are fighting for better access to clinics, information, and resources to obtain an abortion in safe conditions. The organizations are positioning reproductive rights as a social justice issue, the absence of which is a violation of women’s rights. By putting this topic into public conservation, they are helping everyday people and lawmakers think of circumstances and conditions that have not even crossed their minds. 

The main question here is: will the policymakers in the United States try to incorporate some of these strategies that grassroots organizations are implementing to help women get more access to resources for safe abortions and take steps to decriminalize abortions and birth control fully? Well, seeing how grassroots movements such as The Green Wave have already spread all through Latin and South America and have even gone to Europe, it is conceivable that these methods could be adopted by similar protest movements in the United States. By putting pressure on lawmakers and generally informing the public about abortion access and reproductive rights, these movements can make sure that these issues are at the forefront of political conversations and debates. On paper, the United States is a secular country, with very clearly laid out foundations for a separation of church and state.The model which protects the rights of women most is the decriminalization model, where abortion is recognized as an essential health care service that no one needs to be prosecuted for or die from. It is only when personal and religious beliefs are set aside and looking

toward movements are arguments that have worked for others that the United States can finally make progress in the realm of reproductive rights. 

Rise of the "Global South": Potential of Mercosur and Regional Organizations

Our world remains on the path of globalization in spite of the challenges posed by nationalism, extremism, xenophobia, coronavirus etc. Even in the particularly challenging times of a global pandemic, countries are persistent in maintaining their global connections and, in particular, economic ties, in order to continue benefiting from world trade and business opportunities.

Of course, it is undeniable that globalization, here defined as increased interconnectedness of the world politically, economically, and socially, can also lead to tension, marginalization, and increased levels of inequality in spite of greater economic profits. What bears witness to this is the fact that, although world poverty has decreased in the last decades, global levels of inequality kept on rising. 

Therefore, it is apparent that though there is potential within the current system, there is a need for a rearrangement, or better yet, a fresh perspective and an alternative to current operational mechanisms in order to address the downsides of the current track of globalization and allocate its benefits proportionately throughout humanity. 

One way in which the present state of inequality is manifested is through the very division of the world into the “global north” and the “global south” (terms which will remain under quotation marks due to their relativity and many connotations to be briefly elaborated on below). Whereas some countries have seen proliferation in democracy, human rights, a rise in GDP and standard of living, and deserved thus to be placed in the “developed nations” of the “global north,” others have suffered from political instability and economic uncertainty, which have landed them into the “global south.” 

The terms themselves point to the assumption that it is countries in the northern hemisphere, on the continents of North America and Eurasia that have prospered the most. Nevertheless, there are notable exceptions of Central America, North Africa and a good chunk of South Asia which are all considered to at least economically be south. Conversely, those states south of the equator, with the notable exception of Australia, are somehow condemned to particular challenges in further economic development under this “global south” definition. 

These terms may thus imply geographic significance, but the exceptions listed above point out to the fact that a country’s positioning from the equator cannot be quite directly linked to the country’s GDP. Instead, no one country or one particular group of people is doomed to failure as terms may imply. The matter is actually far more complex and it seems that the current system and institutional complexities of globalization are at play. Thus, the countries seen as most “developed” and suitable to compete in the current system are those that have well-established  markets and a well-arranged flow of goods. Those seen as best role models would be the US and the European Union which, not coincidentally, also happen to be major creators of the current global system. 

Countries of the South American continent, in particular, have not been given a significant role in the creation of the current globalized system, which is evident in the fact that none of the permanent UN Security Council seats belong to a South American state and that South American countries are certainly not in the top stakeholders in associations such as the World Bank. This means that trade and political systems dominating the current track of globalization are not based on these countries' values and interests, so political decisions and trade flows are likely not to be inclusive and reflective of the region's perspectives, instead disproportionately more benefitting what is seen as the “global north,” which in this way largely reinforces the status quo and maintains reliance and dependence of the south on the north. 

Regardless, there are still ways in which South American countries can advance their representation and role in the current system. One way that South American countries are increasing their competitiveness in the world market, which the current system necessitates, is by creating a strong regional body of their own, in likeness of that of the European Union, which was itself created in order to increase Europe’s competitiveness. 

This body is Mercosur, a South American regional organization formed in 1991 when Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay signed the Treaty of Asuncion which established political and economic union, thus creating a South American trading bloc. The Treaty of Asuncion emphasized the “importance of securing their countries a proper place in the international economy” and the Treaty, they concluded, “must be viewed as a further step in efforts to gradually bring about Latin American regional integration.” 

This treaty gave birth to Mercosur as an embodiment of that commitment and, though its success is staunchly debated, it remains a strong base for moving the integration of the region of Latin America forward, as an economic model of the “global south”  heading into the mainstream flow of globalization. This article will outline the challenges to the growth of Mercosur, as well as the potential and necessity of this organization for the future of Latin America and the so-called “developing world.” 

Mercosur’s historical trajectory: Challenges and Successes

Since its conception in 1991, Mercosur remains with only four members, which are the original founding members. This is also reflected in its logo featuring the four stars of the southern sky’s famous Crux constellation, and the South American continent, but with special focus and light shone on the permanent and founding members, thus bringing special attention and significance to the founding members. 

Venezuela had a brief flirtation with the group when it joined in 2012, but was suspended in 2016 due to the Maduro regime’s high levels of corruption and failure to comply with the group’s commitment to democratic values coming from the 1998 Ushuaia protocol on Democratic Commitment. Paraguay, one of the four founding members, was also ironically suspended from 2012 to 2013 due to doubts regarding its democratic stability, though this was seen as a political affair meant to allow space for Venezuela to enter, given Paraguay was the only center right government at the time that did not agree to accept leftist Venezuela. 

These events shed some light on a widespread problem of political stability of the organization given that the last decade saw political play and tension that led to these fractures. There is also tension coming from economic pressure between Argentina and Brazil, the two largest economies of the bloc, which further complicates things and often blocks Mercosur countries from expanding trade outside of their bloc and Latin America. 

This political instability and economic tension sheds light on the reason Mercosur is taking longer than the EU to integrate more members and connect the continent. There were, for example, attempts to create common currency similar to European euro, which would combine the Brazilian “real” and the Argentine “peso” to make the “real peso” (which also reaffirms who the two major players of the bloc are), but this idea is still debated and the countries remain worried of the risk of inflation that the region has witnessed too many times. 

This is not to say that Mercosur does not remain in many ways a revolutionary body in nature. It is the largest trading bloc of the region, worth roughly $3.4 trillion, followed by the Pacific Alliance, which includes Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, at about $2 trillion. Mercosur has also succeeded in naming Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, and Suriname associate members, which all have reduced tariffs in trade with the bloc, with Bolivia in the process of acquiring full membership. 

Furthermore, Mercosur’s decision-making body, called the Common Market Council, provides a high-level forum for coordinating political and economic policy, and its presidency rotates alphabetically to each full member every six months. While Brazil and Argentina remain in a competition for regional dominance, Mercosur manages to facilitate cooperation and balance, and has survived major stresses such as Brazil’s 1999 currency devaluation and Argentina’s 2001 financial crisis while remaining  the largest trading bloc of the region, which adds credibility to the organization. Aside from trade benefits, citizens of the four full member countries have the ability to travel, work, and live anywhere within the bloc without restrictions.  

Mercosur’s Present-Day Significance 

 Following the coronavirus outbreak, most Latin American countries instituted strict lockdowns and are still amongst the most affected countries of the world, with half of the top 10 countries with highest number of cases worldwide being in Latin America as of September 2020, even though Latin America comprises only less than 8.5% of the world population. 

The impact of these lockdowns on the regional economy is unprecedented, with massive spikes in regional unemployment rates. Brazi, in particular, is suffering a historic record with 50% of the population out of work, and projected reductions of 6% in GDP that could set the region’s growth back for a decade and exasperate the region’s structural challenges. 

While all of these economic challenges pose threats to promoting regional integration and creating a common currency,  regional integration may be a key factor in reviving South America’s broken economy. This type of integration will in fact be crucial in mitigating the challenges posed by the  pandemic, which call for a transparent, interconnected regional body where ideas, trade, investment, and innovation are well-facilitated, and where a high value is placed on political, social, and economic stability. 

These promoted values and mechanisms would directly confront the impacts of a pandemic that is drastically reducing investment and productivity rates, exasperating the usual regional challenges. Mercosur is currently positioned in a way that makes it very suitable for bringing as much of the Latin American region as possible to the negotiating table and facilitating greater cooperation, and this opportunity should not be missed in today’s critical period. 

Mercosur Going Forward

Another potential impact of Mercosur lies in its increased trade with countries outside of the bloc, with deals recently having been made with the  EU and Egypt. The deal with Egypt is into its fourth year and may encourage further trade opportunities between Mercosur and the Middle East. However, the deal with the EU, in spite of years of negotiation and drafting, is now being lagged due to Amazonian deforestation concerns brought about by France, which Brazil, on the other hand, sees as protectionist policies on behalf of France which often attempts to, through protectionist policies aimed at strengthening domestic production by avoiding competition and free trade, protect its own industries. 

Whether the protectionist allegations on behalf of France and the EU are true or not is less important than Mercosur’s position in this deal and the need of the “global south” to step away from dependence on the “global north.” It is important to note that, unlike the EU, Mercosur has begun its career not only as an economic treaty organization but has also included elements of political and social integration, as well as a clause relating to environmental protection. These policy elements add to the value and unique identity of Mercosur. 

In addition, in order to allow for the truly long-lasting, sustainable, and authentic development of Mercosur, the region, and the so-called “global south,” it is important that Mercosur remains aware and true to these foundational policies no matter the outside pressures. This is why deforestation of the Amazon is not justified and future deals should be focused on issues such as environmental safety as well as the rights of indigenous communities, which Mercosur should see itself as a key actor in protecting and putting forth.  In fact, the original 1991 Treaty of Asuncion mentions the “optimum use of available resources”  “preserving the environment,” as well as “economic development with social justice.” This is exactly the alternative vision and priority that the current globalized system needs in order to improve its trajectory and something Mercosur can and should pride itself in. 

One important deal currently being drafted, and of great importance to the southern hemisphere’s economic platform, is between Mercosur and Singapore that would cover a variety of issues, such as further easing trade barriers, boosting intergovernmental negotiation, providing space for e-commerce, supporting micro and macro enterprises, etc. Though this deal is also facing a delay, due to Argentina’s need to focus on the economic crisis at home ignited by the pandemic, the deal has huge potential due to Singapore’s immense experience in similar deals and its connection to Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) countries, which are another significant bloc of the “global south.”

Thus, cooperation between ASEAN and Mercosur is exactly the kind of increased economic activity between the countries of the so-called “global south” that this article is arguing for. This would gradually shift the focus of globalization from the “north” and allow for better worldwide integration, expansion and diversification of available perspectives on development in the mainstream climate of the international community. It is important, however, not to let the pandemic slow down the process, and actually understand the benefit that integration and cooperation during the pandemic can have in the long-term. 

In this way instead of continuing the current trends of environmental damage, sidelining of minority and indigenous groups, disregard for multilingualism and multiculturalism, and lack of concern for increasing inequality, there would come an age with a new perspective. Still, this can only be attainable if emerging economies of the so-called “global south,” and particularly so in South America, are able to stay true to their constitutional and regional agenda that, unlike northern counterparts, begin their focus with regard for these very issues. The “global south” has had time to observe and learn from mistakes or shortcomings of the current system which made it possible to have such holistic treaties as 1991 Treaty of Asuncion that made sure Mercosur actually positions environmental and social health as its priority where the EU and the US had to learn from their mistakes and are reluctant to, as stakeholders in the current system, take on a fully different base for the way they conduct business. Bolivia, a contender for membership in Mercosur, prides itself in being a plurinational state and actively recognizes historical injustices and works on maintaining its indigenous languages. If such examples remain prominent in the region, and are reflected in both text and actions, then the “global south” will provide a truly viable fresh perspective the current system needs. 

Conclusion 

Globalization continues to be challenged and it is certainly lacking even integration and provision of equal opportunity to citizens of the world in its current trajectory. Thus, greater integration amongst the countries of the so-called “global south” will allow for greater opportunity to be achieved in order to allow for diversification of major players in the global economy and political thought, allowing for more voices to be heard, including of those who have been largely on the losing end of the current neoliberal policies that govern the world as is the case with current “developing world of the global south.” Instead, the Latin American region and the “global south” as a whole can develop a system of support amongst the countries disadvantaged by the system and thus provide an alternative to what is positioned by those who are more likely to reinforce the status quo they benefited from.

To achieve this, it is important to turn to organizations such as Mercosur, that has already had some success in integrating the region, and make sure it addresses the political and economic instability, as well as increase its cooperation with other blocs of the “global south” aimed at political, economic, and social integration, such as ASEAN and the African Union and decrease dependence of the south on the north. These corporations would eventually begin to tip the balance of world trade, and allow these regions to promote economic equality and political independence on their own terms. 

However, it is important that these organizations use their advantage of being newer and able to offer a new view to global development and progress. Mistakes of the past, such as disregard to ecological and social health that has been an unfortunate and gruesome collateral product of the current track to globalization as spearheaded by the “global north,” should be avoided, and this are some of the hopes and still insufficiently explored potentials that emergence of a strong southern market would bring to the stage. 

Brazil Takes Off as Washington-Beijing Trade Dispute Grows

Despite working to meet a December 15th trade agreement, dubbed “Phase I,” President Trump has repeatedly threatened to increase the levied tariffs on Chinese imports should one not be reached. United States (U.S.) Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer explains that Phase I only includes about 35 percent of the total trade discussion with China. Despite Washington and Beijing inching closer to an initial agreement, the world’s two largest economies maintain tariffs on a combined total of more than half a trillion dollars of goods, with rates ranging from 5 percent to 30 percent. The tariffs continue the Trump Administration’s critique of China and its trade practices with the United States. 

In 2018, trade of goods and services between the two countries (two-way trade) totaled US$737.1 billion, with total exports valued at US$179.3 billion and total imports valued at US$557.9 billion. Such values put China as the U.S.’ single largest trading partner by total traded goods and services. Despite this, President Trump has maintained his harsh critique of the Chinese, fulfilling a campaign promise to combat China’s alleged unfair trade practices. As the U.S.-China trade dispute wages on with both sides retaliating with additional tariffs, Brazil —namely Brazilian farmers— have emerged as beneficiaries of the confrontation.

Chinese Trade with Brazil

Since the beginning of the trade dispute in 2017, Chinese firms have been shifting to Brazilian agriculture products. For Instance, Brazil passed the U.S. as the world’s largest soybean producer and exporter as a result of the increased demand from China—a demand increase of more than 20 percent. Brazil’s dominance in soybean production was not unforeseen; in fact, between 2011 and 2018, the overall production of the crop in the country has nearly doubled to 119.3 million metric tons and is expected to reach nearly 129 million metric tons by 2027. Since President Trump began his anti-China trade rhetoric, Brazilian soybean exports’ value swelled by US$13.86 billion, while American farmers will be left with an unwanted “record high level of ending stock,” as exports to China will be one-third of what they have been for the last few years. As a result, competitive Brazilian farmers have directly benefited from the trade dispute, while American farmers have truly felt the negative effects of the trade dispute. While Beijing and Washington work on finding common ground to settle their trade dispute in Phase I, Brazilian officials remain confident that they can retain the increase in trade. 

While trade between Brazil and China has a lesser two-way trade value than that of the U.S. relationship, Brazilian trade with its Asian counterpart has increased by 170% within the last decade, to nearly 100 billion dollars, according to Brazil’s Ministry of Economy. During the same period, trade between the U.S. and China grew by only 68 percent. China has been Brazil’s largest trading partner, ahead of the U.S. for nearly a decade. To further emphasize Chinese engagement with Brazil, 2017 Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Brazil was US$19.5 billion, comprising 31.9 percent of the total global FDI destined for Brazil; in contrast, Chinese FDI in the U.S. was valued at US$39.5 billion, more than double of that in Brazil. However, Brazil was the largest recipient of China FDI in South America. As tensions between the U.S. and China unravel as a result of the trade dispute, Chinese firms have looked at other markets to import necessary products from. One beneficiary of this market exploration is Brazil. The South American nation, home to nearly 210 million people, has experienced a direct increase in two-way trade and improved diplomatic relations with China. However, Brazil’s recently elected president made some in Beijing uneasy about China’s relations with Brazil.

Bolsonaro’s Evolving Chinese Trade Rhetoric

Despite China’s investments in Brazil, President Jair Bolsonaro had been a harsh critic of Chinese investors. In October of 2018, the same year Bolsonaro was elected with an 11 percent margin, the then-president-elect warned, “what we need is to become aware that China is buying Brazil, not buying in Brazil, it is buying Brazil.” Importantly, Brazil’s president is often referred to as the “Trump of the Tropics,” for his similar rhetoric on social, political, and economic topics, including his critique of China. In a March 2019 speech at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Bolsonaro’s Minister of the Economy, Paulo Guedes, went on to state that “Temos um presidente que adora a América,” translating to “We have a president that loves America.” 

However, President Bolsonaro’s criticism of his Chinese counterparts has not dissuaded new investments in the country. In fact, according to the Brazilian Ministry of Planning, Development and Management (now a division of the Ministry of Economy) from 2016-2018, Chinese firms announced 11 greenfields and 38 brownfield investments, a total investment value of US$19.4 billion. Greenfield investments, defined as a form of FDI, is when a firm establishes operations in a foreign company and constructs new facilities. Alternatively, brownfield investments are considered as an operational expansion of a company in a foreign market, normally seen as the expansion of an existing facility. Such investment activity indicates a long-term commitment on the part of Chinese firms to invest in Brazil. Despite President Bolsonaro’s previous rhetorical repudiations of Chinese investments, the country is actually drawing closer to China, its largest trading partner. 

Notably, the Brazilian-Chinese relationship has changed as President Bolsonaro altered his tone with China. In October, while the U.S.-China trade meetings dragged on, a Brazilian delegation including the president visited multiple countries in Asia, most significantly China. There, President Bolsonaro not only made amends with his Chinese counterparts regarding the remarks he made during his campaign trail but also signed two trade protocols and outlined strategic growth in the relationship. He went on to assure that the Brazilian and Chinese governments are "completely aligned in a way that reaches beyond our commercial and business relationship.” Preserving such a relationship is crucial to the Bolsonaro Administration, which inherited a sluggish economy with high unemployment and inflation. 

Thus far, the administration has worked diligently to position Brazil more competitively on the global stage by pushing reforms in the areas of pension and tax, easing government regulation in select industries, and negotiating foreign trade agreements with individual nations and economic unions. All these initiatives ultimately pushing for economic liberalization. In the meantime, Brazil will be the beneficiary of the U.S.-China trade dispute as escalations make a final resolution between the two countries more difficult. 

Moving Forward

While Brazil’s new government is at the center of domestic and international controversy, that parallels the political polarization in the U.S., the government has taken proper economic initiatives to stimulate its sluggish economy. By proposing and passing vital reforms, Brazil has an opportunity to catapult its industries to the world stage and develop one of the “world’s most closed big economies”. The government has already announced two of the country’s largest trade agreements in its history between MERCOSUR, the European Union, and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), valued at nearly US$22 trillion and US$1.1 trillion, respectively.

China’s agricultural purchases in Brazil and direct investment have also contributed to the necessary fundamental changes and economic opening that is needed in Brazil. However, it is important that Brazil holds its neutrality in the trade dispute between the U.S. and China, as noted by Vice-President Hamilton Mourão in a meeting last month with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing. While China is Brazil’s largest trading partner by value, historically, the U.S. imports a greater amount of higher value-added products, such as aerospace and heavy machinery products. While this may be true in the past, China’s new-founded interest in diversifying its investments in Brazil, beyond purchasing low value-added goods, could reshape political ties, as already slightly seen with Bolsonaro’s revised rhetoric. 

Until then, Brazil will continue to silently draw itself closer to China amidst the Washington-Beijing trade dispute and push necessary reforms to develop its domestic industries to a formidable global competitor.

The Enigmatic Economics of Argentina

An oft-cited bit of wisdom in the field of international economics is a quote by Nobel laureate Simon Kuznets, who argued that there are four types of countries in the world: developed, underdeveloped, Japan, and Argentina. For decades, the case of Argentina has confounded economists, political scientists, and observers of international politics alike. A pendulum has swung from liberal democracy to military dictatorship and back, overseeing rapid transformation from late 19th-century growth to 20th-century depression and hyperinflation. Once thought to challenge Brazil for regional primacy, Argentina now more closely resembles a boomerang. When Argentines went to the polls on October 27, they voiced their displeasure with the center-right regime of Mauricio Macri and declared that the boomerang will come back again in the form of president-elect Alberto Fernandez. With mounting anti-democratic, right-wing populism on the rise in Peru and in power in Brazil and countervailing anti-corruption movements sweeping the region, establishing sound democratic and economic institutions is as crucial as ever if Argentina is to be spared from the same fate of turmoil. 

A Short History of Argentine Economics 

In the early 1900s, the future of Argentina appeared promising. Just this mere century ago, Argentina rivaled an upstart and industrializing United States, as both rode the first wave of globalization in the 20th century. Its economy, facilitated by livestock exports to Europe and the labor of immigrants from Europe, entered World War I among the ten largest in the world, and its average per capita income was vastly superior to that of Italy, Portugal, and Spain. The idea that the Argentine economy would see anything less than an absolute boom given its potential at the time would seem to have been unbelievable. 

Yet the economy is worse off today than it was in 1913. While the early 1900s were a tremendous time to be a farmer in the Americas, it would not last forever. When the United States followed the British model of industrialization, it was set up to take advantage of the new economy while its Argentine counterpart, still dependent on borrowing foreign cash to distribute beef to foreign markets, was not. As soon as 1930, meat exports to continental Europe had decreased by two-thirds from their 1924 level. 

The Great Depression further exacerbated things. Between 1929 and 1932, the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 25 percent. Yet the elite political class in Argentina, with its deep distrust of government intervention in the market, refrained from taking the dramatic social-democratic actions that were undertaken by American president Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the economy continued its decline. 

The controversial reign of Juan Perón presented a mixed bag for Argentina later. From 1945 to 1955, the Perón administration nationalized key industries, such as the Central Bank and the railways, and instituted generous social welfare policies. Inflation rose and persisted, averaging 26 percent from 1944 to 1974, but the modest GDP growth the country experienced during this time was quite well-distributed. Enforcement of minimum wage laws and the expansion of health insurance programs led to increases in real wages and the development of the largest and most unionized middle class in South America at the time. By the time the military dictatorship of 1976-1983 left office, the labor rights instituted by Perón were wiped out and the anti-democratic behaviors he engaged in were further legitimized. 

What followed over the next few decades was a period of neoliberal, market-based reforms that focused on opening Argentina to the global economy via agricultural exports and drastically reducing spending in accordance with the recommendations of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Each time this path was undertaken, the results were disastrous, with foreign debt accumulating and increased poverty and unemployment. The worst of these crises came in 2001; after the economy contracted by 15 percent in less than two years, more than half the population fell into poverty, and the country defaulted on almost $100 billion in foreign debt. 

The election of Macri, a businessman and former president of legendary football club Boca Juniors, energized conservative hopes for economic recovery. Yet as his presidency comes to a close, it is evident that no such economic recovery manifested. Even after he instituted market-oriented reforms, anxiety among foreign investors mounted, and ultimately, foreign capital dried up. He piled on foreign debt and sought the largest bailout in the history of the IMF, some five times the size of the package approved to stave off economic collapse in Egypt. With budget cuts constricting economic growth and equality, GDP is expected to decrease by three percent while the very inflation he sought to curb has increased to over 55 percent, a higher number than any other country in Latin America besides Venezuela. Furthermore, Fitch, one of the Big Three American credit rating agencies, changed Argentina’s credit rating from B to CCC, indicating a significant increase in financial precarity. Once a safe bet for economic development, Argentina is now in full free-fall. 

Persistent Challenges: Corruption and Weak Institutions 

At the root of Argentina’s economic issues are its struggles with corruption and unstable democratic and economic institutions. Declining faith in government and institutions like the central bank and the judiciary have sustained the country’s state of crisis. Despite the common umbrella of Peronism, the members of the political movement were fiercely divided. Perón himself deemed left-wing Peronists immature and enlisted his right-wing guerrilla allies to target them. This manifested in the fascist Minister of Social Welfare Jóse López Rega forming the Triple-A alliance, a far-right death squad that carried out acts of terrorism against moderate and left-wing opponents of the regime. Furthermore, in its later days, the Perón regime began detaining people indefinitely without a trial, a drastic shift in human rights in Argentina. With dissent stifled and liberal values like human rights cascading off the Argentine political map, faith in democracy reached a low point. This would be exacerbated by the U.S.-backed military coup that installed a military dictatorship from 1976 to 1983. While approval of the military and more independent civil-military relations was previously high, the human rights abuses (torture and forced disappearances) carried out by the military during the period known as the Dirty War (or the “Época de los desaparecidos”) resulted in a decline in approval of these hallmarks of democratic states and democracy itself. But broad disapproval of liberal values alone does not explain the instability and lack of sufficient development in Argentina. Corruption continues to be a major issue impeding development. Nowhere is this more evident than in the judiciary, which is independent of both politics and outside interference in name only. Odeberecht, the Brazilian construction company in the midst of a multinational bribery scandal (including an estimated $35 million in bribes paid in Argentina, including donating millions to Macri’s campaign), has faced almost no legal recourse. When state-owned enterprises were privatized in the 1990s by President Carlos Menem, fraud and kickbacks were an open secret. Yet today, Menem is a legislator, not a prisoner. Impunity is the norm rather than something that is to be avoided. 

Declining faith in the judiciary is yet another lightning rod that amplifies the class conflict in Argentina. When powerful politicians and multinationals get away with committing fraud and bribery, it sends a message to ordinary civilians that the elites will always win, a message the Argentine people are all too familiar with. The legacy of politicians more concerned with an ideological crusade against socialism than supporting their citizens during a global economic depression looms in this regard. The chief factor holding back the independence of the judiciary and corruption reform is a poorly-designed plea bargain system. The 2016 law reforming the plea bargain system regrettably limits cooperation agreements to a small group of crimes, excluding such important and major crimes as criminal fraud. Cooperating witnesses are also rewarded only for evidence related to the case in which they are charged, though they may have evidence of unrelated crimes. These pointless restrictions make responsibly prosecuting corruption next to impossible and they must be dropped if Argentina is ever going to establish a viable liberal democracy for, by, and of the people. The central bank is another issue of institutional credibility. Turnover has plagued the institution, thereby inhibiting its consistency in monetary policy. It has had 23 different presidents in 36 years. Furthermore, even as most central banks in Latin America enshrined independence from the federal executive branch into their central banks during the regional hyperinflationary crisis, Argentina resisted the trend. Macri’s own selection for chair of the central bank blamed the current economic struggles on government interference in monetary policy. 

Argentina was once a rising economic star on par with the United States. Yet the downward trajectory of Macri’s political career is all too familiar to the Argentine people, who have spent the last half-century constricted by austerity and an insufficient social safety net while their elites escaped accountability for their misdeeds. Their frustrations were heard in the election of Fernandez and maybe, just maybe, their concerns will be reflected in the new administration’s policies. 

The Flaming Lungs of the Earth

Since the beginning of August, international media outlets have been perplexed with the recent fires in the Amazon rainforest, circulating the hashtag “PrayforAmazonia” all over social media. Known as the “lungs of the Earth,” the Amazon rainforest is the world’s largest tropical rainforest, covering much of northwestern Brazil and extending into various other South American countries. The importance of the Amazon rainforest is colossal, however, its recent fires have made people realize the extent to which the human impact of deforestation is threatening the rainforest that produces up to 20 percent of the world’s oxygen. 

David Sirota, a political speechwriter for Bernie Sanders, refers to the Amazon rainforest as “our spaceship's life support system,” and this spaceship's life support system is on fire. In just 2019 alone, Brazil has experienced a breakout of more than 74,000 fires. In 2018, there were about 40,000 fires, and the reason rests solely on human impact, as there is a direct relationship between the outbreak of fires and deforestation. As put forth by the Amazon Environmental Research Institute (IPAM), the ten municipalities that had the most outbreaks of forest fires in 2019 also had the highest deforestation rates. Unfortunately, a deforested area is worth more in the market than a forested area. During deforestation, the trees are cut down and the land is burned so that it can be cleaned and prepared to house either livestock or be the site of agricultural practices. According to experts, a natural fire would not spread at the rate it currently is. In between the months of January and August, the number of fires has increased by 82 percent. As a matter of fact, forest fires can arise due to a few reasons, yet Ricardo Mello, manager of the Amazon Program of the "World Wide Fund for Nature" in Brazil, states that in the case of the Amazon, almost all of the fires are associated with human activity: “It's the men setting fire. There is no other scenario.” Deforestation happens year-round, however, in the driest months of June, July and August, the fires spread and increase to international proportions.

The fires in the Amazon also pose a serious threat to the populations that depend on it, both human and non-human. Fire spots in indigenous lands, for example, have doubled from 2018 to 2019. There were 5,242 fire spots detected by INPE in 2019, against 2,544 in 2018. In the case of the Karipuna tribe, the fires found at its border are a consequence of the farms surrounding the territory which are deforested and burned to house pasture for livestock. Besides, the Karipuna tribe consists of just about twenty individuals, and as they live in an area threatened by loggers, the tribe is actually under the threat of genocide, according to the Public Ministry. Moreover, indigenous lands make up 7 percent of the burnings, and 23 percent of the Amazon as a whole. On the subject of indigenous tribes, it is a fact that indigenous peoples have the habit of burning fields in the land, however, according to Ane Alencar of the Amazon Environmental Research Institute (IPAM), this has been going on for thousands of years. Therefore, the increase in outbreaks in these lands can only be explained by the invaders and/or strong periods of drought.

Brazil's Legal Amazon (BLA) is the largest socio-geographic division in Brazil, containing all nine states in the Amazon basin. Created in 1948 it seeks to plan the economic and social development of the Amazon region. Domestically, six of the nine states of the BLA said they had taken new measures in 2019 to curb deforestation and burning, including decreeing a state of emergency, internalizing inspection bases, and setting up their own geoprocessing bodies and local monitoring. In two states, Acre and Amazonas, governments even declared an emergency because of the burning. But even so, it is an extremely difficult task to monitor all sites of deforestation given the dimension of the forest.

Nevertheless, deforestation isn’t a new or modern practice. Why then has  this issue only just become regarded as “important?” The truth lies in the fact that people started to understand the complexity and consequences of deforestation once it affected the richest Brazilian state, São Paulo. On August 19, the population in the Southeast region of the country saw the sky turn black at about 3 PM. Talk of the incident quickly became one of the most trending topics online. At the same time, the black smoke reaches the rain clouds and residents began collecting dark-colored rainwater, which also rapidly spread all over social media. The Institute of Chemistry of the University of São Paulo (USP) tested that rainwater, and identified the presence of “reteno,” a substance derived from biomass burning and considered a burn marker. Consequently, with São Paulo being affected, the fires in the Amazon were noticed quicker by the international community and became an international topic as world leaders manifested themselves and started pressing Brazil on acting upon it.

“The fire that devastates the Amazon rainforest is not only sad, but also an international crisis,” stated United Kingdom’s Prime Minister Boris Johnson. “The magnitude of the fires is worrying and threatens not only Brazil and the other affected countries, but also the whole world,” said Steffen Seibert, Merkel's representative. Protests at Brazilian embassies all around the world took place, celebrities and spokespersons cried out for action, yet Brazil’s President, Jair Bolsonaro, isn’t facilitating change to happen at the pace that it needs to. Due to a personal feud with French President Emmanuel Macron and allegations that all international support is an attack on Brazil’s sovereignty, Brazil has rejected the $22.2 million package from the G-7 nations to help fight the fires. The feud escalated to a point where President Macron has threatened to block the free-trade agreement, Mercosur-E.U., due to President Bolsonaro’s policies. Despite the aid rejection, President Bolsonaro has been open to receiving support from Israel with their airplanes and pilots experienced in fighting fires, as well as complying with President Trump’s willingness to help. This ambivalence shows how rising nationalism, alongside President Bolsonaro’s new government, is hindering international responses to global issues like climate change.

The fires in the Amazon demonstrate a multitude of things about the current global system. First, while it is known how globalization facilitates the spread of information at an increasingly fast pace, as soon as the information reaches a few nations, responsive actions are not that quick. Furthermore, the fires in the Amazon showed the international community that even weeks after multiple fires were taking place, the world’s richest nations pledged to give $22 million, however, in less than 24 hours after the Notre-Dame caught on fire, $945 million have been pledged. The Amazon fires are just an example of how man-made tragedies which directly affect the global population, aren’t dealt with with the same vigor as other devastations. They have shown that pride over sovereignty seems to be more important than the survival of the world’s largest forest.

Kissing Kissinger: The American Love of Foreign Policy’s Most Dangerous Mind

It is negligent to engage in a discussion of contemporary foreign policy without mentioning former Secretary of State Henry M. Kissinger. Kissinger, a Jewish refugee, became a household name during the Cold War era when he served as President Nixon’s secretary of state. Kissinger is considered by many contemporary scholars and politicians to be a leading statesman and one of the most well-known faces in the sphere of foreign affairs. Indeed, Kissinger’s tenure as secretary of state had a global impact still visible in countless countries. However, while Kissinger was an influential thinker, it is critical not to overlook his policies in the global south and how quickly he condoned acts of violence within these regions.

Henry Kissinger first came to the United States as a Jewish refugee after escaping Nazi Germany with the rest of his family. From his humble immigrant roots, Kissinger quickly rose to the center of US politics, serving as secretary of state and national security advisor under the administrations of Nixon and Ford, respectively. In 1973, Kissinger received the Nobel Peace Prize for his involvement in negotiating the ceasefire to end the Vietnam War. However, Henry Kissinger is perhaps best known for his work in opening up relations with China, and establishing a friendly rapport with one of the world’s emerging powers. His’s legacy extends far beyond his career as secretary of state. Indeed, Kissinger established a formidable reputation as a dramatic diplomat, and influenced diplomats within the Carter, Reagan, and Bush administrations. To this day, Kissinger is considered by many to be the leading voice in foreign policy analysis. While Kissinger’s influence has extended across continents and decades, not all of his actions resulted in the bettering of the world and the spread of so-called American ideals of freedom and justice. Although scholars excuse some of his more controversial policy decisions, saying that few policies stand the test of time, Kissinger’s policies and actions affected not just people in the past but also those very much in the present. To this end in addition to his impressive diplomatic career, Henry Kissinger also demonstrates how not to be a statesman.

Kissinger reached the height of his career during the Cold War - his reach far and widespread. In order to analyze the impact of his policies on a detailed level, it does not suffice to give a brief view of his involvement in different countries and regions. Rather, this analysis will focus on Kissinger’s impact within South America in order to give a more comprehensive explanation of who Kissinger and his beliefs really are. During the 1970s and 80s, fearing the spread of communism, the US government and the CIA helped back right-wing governments and organize military coups to oust leftist governments they felt posed a threat to U.S. interests.

In 1973, with funding and training from the CIA, Augusto Pinochet and Chilean military forces led a coup to overthrow the Salvador Allende, the first democratically-elected socialist leader. Throughout Pinochet’s bloody 17-year dictatorship, over 25,000 people were tortured and more than 3,000 were ‘forcibly disappeared.’ Kissinger, far from seeing Pinochet’s regime as a human rights concern, assured Pinochet that he “...did a great service to the West in overthrowing Allende.” In order to address the communist wave that was threatening to flood Latin America, Kissinger played a key role in green-lighting Operation Condor - a joint military operation with far-right dictatorships aimed at capturing and torturing political dissidents. Henry Kissinger did not play a observatory role within the dictatorships in Latin America, rather he was an active accessory to regimes that were responsible for murder, torture, and forced disappearances. In a memo from 1976, Kissinger urged Argentina’s military junta to act faster to establish government authority, “before U.S. opposition to its human rights violations gained momentum.” As secretary of state, Kissinger not only had the authority to approve US involvement in these coups, but to also further aid and encourage the individuals committing mass human rights atrocities.

Kissinger’s Latin American policy establishes him as de facto co-conspirator in the numerous coups d’etats and military dictatorships that quickly took root in Latin America. Immediately after the Argentine coup, Kissinger recommended increased security assistance. As a result, the US Congress approved 50 million dollars in security assistance to the junta, with an additional 30 million granted at the end of the 1967. Decades later, Kissinger refuses to cede culpability for the ramifications of his actions within the region. In a recent interview, Kissinger stated that “...when the charge of war criminal becomes an accepted form of discourse, the prospects of national cohesion disintegrate. Diplomacy loses its flexibility and strategy its force.” It is not always simple to rationalize past policies but in this example, Kissinger demonstrates that ethics and morality are desirable only as long as they don’t become a nuisance.

Latin America still faces the consequences of their dictatorships, visible in everything from social institutions to public policy. In Chile and Argentina, families still seeking justice for their murdered loved ones have been calling for decades for the prosecution of those at the top who allowed these atrocities to occur.  Ali Beydoun, of the Washington College of Law, brought forth a lawsuit against Kissinger on behalf of Chilean victims seeking reparations for wrongful deaths. While many academics still study and promote Kissinger’s ideas, many members of the global community have become outspoken in their characterization of Kissinger as a war criminal. Most famously, Christopher Hitchens wrote a book and produced a documentary entitled “The Trial of Henry Kissinger” where he explained the case for Kissinger to be charged for international crimes, among which war crimes, crimes against humanity, and conspiracy to commit murder, kidnap, and torture. Hitchens also went as far as to argue that Kissinger himself was directly involved in the kidnapping and murder of Chilean general René Schneider, one of the actions leading up to the military coup. Schneider’s family also attempted to sue Kissinger for his murder, but were also unsuccessful.

The primary issue in any analysis of the legacy and global impact of Kissinger is howto weight the value of both the good and bad he his policies and advise contributed to across several presidential administrations. Many continue to praise the statesman for his “opening” of China to the West as well as his role in the end of the cold war. Meanwhile, Kissinger’s fingerprints are clearly imprinted on the landscapes of Cambodia and Vietnam, as well as in the shadows of the thousands of persons disappeared under the military dictatorships in South America. The evaluation of whether Kissinger is inherently good or evil lies involves asking some of the hardest questions in the heart of politics, ethics, and world affairs -  what actors matter, whose lives have more worth, and to what extent is the West willing to justify the death of innocents as a just tradeoff for the winning of wars, the spread of democracy, and US global hegemony.

Searching For a Hero Like Trump The Parallels of Right-Wing Politics in Brazil and the United States

The arrest of Brazil’s former president, Luis Inácio Lula da Silva. As a result of his twelve-year sentence for taking part in one of the biggest corruption scandals in Brazil’s history, Lula’s arrest opened the window for the opposing political party to rise to the occasion. The Social Liberal Party’s (PSL) candidate Jair Bolsonaro has done just that: garnering support for his far-right policies and winning the presidential election with a huge margin of victory.  His election is the first election of a candidate with far-right views since the end of Brazil’s military dictatorship in 1985. Bolsonaro’s rise parallels that of U.S. President Donald Trump. Both candidates campaigned on fixing a broken political system and gained support around general dissatisfaction with the political status quo. In fact, pundits often refer to Bolsonaro as the “Trump of the Tropics”. With Trump in the White House and Bolsonaro at the helm in Brasilia, there exists the possibility of even stronger relations between the United States and Brazil on many fronts. However, with a right-wing president in charge of the world’s 8th largest economy, it should be questioned how the international community should respond to his ideas and the policies he wishes to advance. The international community should also be aware of how these election results will affect other nations whose elections are fast approaching especially in Latin America.

Despite Bolsonaro’s clear win over his competitor Fernando Haddad, his support base was not always so widespread.  The left-wing Workers Party (PT) - of which Lula and his successor, the impeached President Dilma Rousseff were members - was highly supported amongst Brazilians until the revelation of rampant government corruption under the so-called Operation Car Wash: a string of scandals involving the state-owned oil company Petrobras accepting bribes from contracting firms in exchanged for inflated prices as well as the left-wing Workers Party using funds in order to pay for the votes of politicians in order to strengthen their political campaign. Despite the numerous arrests, Lula’s charismatic personality, charm, and past political accomplishments and promises placed the corruption accusations on the back burner. When Lula entered office in 2002, it marked a turning point for a country where the political elite was controlled by upper-class white people despite more than half of the population being comprised of minorities and people below the poverty line. As a self-proclaimed “leader for the people,” he proclaimed “hope has finally defeated fear and the people have decided it [was] time to pave new roads,” in his inaugural speech. Similarly, Barack Obama’s election in the United States marked a turning point in a country that had only seen white presidents. He proclaimed that “we must pick ourselves up, dust ourselves off, and begin again the work of remaking America.” Both leaders marked the possibility of change for marginalized communities.

The Workers’ Party, both during Lula’s and his successor’s, made accomplishments that cannot go unnoticed. According to the left-leaning magazine The New Republic, some of the Worker’s Party greatest accomplishments include the establishment of different programs such as affirmative action policies which increased the attendance and retention rate of students at national universities, as well as the largest cash transfer program which gives families living under the poverty line a stable income as long as parents invest in their children’s education and health by ensuring attendance at school and regular visit respectively. Programs such as these elevated about forty million Brazilians above the poverty line. Brazil’s selection as the host of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and Rio de Janeiro’s selection as the host city for the 2016 Summer Olympics, a first for South America, signaled a dramatic improvement in the economic and political stature of the county. However, this boom was constructed on the shaky ground. Many large-scale development projects suffered significant pitfalls from pollution, crumbling infrastructure, and protests against government spending. These problems began to shed light on the poor practices and corruption within the Worker’s Party and its leaders.

Until recently, Jair Bolsonaro remained on the sidelines, waiting for the right opportunity to appear. As a Congressman for the State of Rio De Janeiro, Bolsonaro made his political opinions clear in different interviews across Brazilian media. He once told a fellow female politician “I would not rape you because you are not worthy of it;” another controversial comment he made is “the lightest Afro-descendent there weighed seven ‘arrobas’. They don’t do anything. They are not even good for procreation.” Despite these, his most controversial opinions lie on how he believes Brazil should be run.  In a 1999 TV interview when asked about what changes he make if he was elected president, he responded with ideas such as “closing Congress” and bringing about change through a “civil war.” His consistent voice in politics allowed him to create a ground of support before announcing his candidacy.

Bolsonaro’s current policies are parallel to Trump’s policies in the United States. Bolsonaro’s most important policy (and most unique compared to other candidates) is ‘law and order.’ Being an ex-army captain, he believes in order to combat the rising violence is to decrease restrictions on gun laws and give police officers bonuses for the more criminals they kill. This policy platform has been the driving force behind Brazilian’s support for Bolsonaro.

Another policy reform he wishes to implement are environmental policies specifically within the Amazon. Bolsonaro has the desire to build a highway through the Amazon rainforest, which is vital for the filtration of carbon dioxide for the earth’s atmosphere.  With the intention as well to pull out of the Paris Climate agreement, this leads to the second parallel made between US and Brazil politics. Both candidates take on a moral position in the political reformation and use hot topics such as environmental regulations and law order as the basis for their campaigns. In times where many people craved change, Bolsonaro and Trump rose to the political sphere by being outspoken candidates making promises and statements the electorate wanted to hear from their political leaders who felt out by recent liberal administrations. Many Brazilians, especially the elite, have greatly supported this change of political figure in Brazil.

Bolsonaro represents hope for a Brazil that has been suffering numerous problems. At a rally for Bolsonaro supporters, individuals such as mother Cibley Lopes believe Bolsonaro is “the future of this country...He represents hope.” Brazil has undergone so much turmoil that some individuals are willing to support any candidate that is not of the Workers Party. Many individuals like Lopes are among the group of white elite who are rallying behind Bolsonaro for a new Brazil; these individuals are also of the belief that Bolsonaro is a leader for all people, marginalized or not. In some ways similar to Bolsonaro, the supporters of Trump are primarily either one of two groups of people: educated or uneducated white individuals. Both groups of citizens are unhappy with the political status quo and wish for a hero to emerge from the ashes of despair and turmoil. Since Bolsonaro has such similar policies with President Trump in the United States, the established relationship between Brazil and the United States will most likely only strengthen. While it may seem beneficial for both of these countries to engage in even more bilateral deals, it is important to recognize and address the response from the international community.

Before Bolsonaro was elected and The Working Party was primarily in office beforehand and  the United States and Brazil already had a strong and stable relationship. According to the United States’ State Department, Brazil is US’s second largest trading partner. Besides economic trade benefits such as these, the United States has invested in Brazil through educational, technological, and their space program which had yielded positive results. All of the investments the United States has made in Brazil simply proves that Brazil needs the United States more than the United States needs Brazil.

Bolsonaro’s election is yet another wake-up call for the international community with regards to the rise of right-wing politics. The parallels between Brazil and the United States shows the rising right-wing politics specifically in Latin America. If more countries such as Peru, Argentina, and Bolivia follow the path of Brazil it would not only affect the relationships of developed countries but will change the identity of Latin America politics.

Bolsonaro and the Far Right’s Arrival in South America

Introduction

In modern day studies of geopolitics and international relations, South America unfortunately lingers on the global backburner in comparison to regions such as Eurasia and the Middle East/North Africa (MENA). After centuries of colonialism and imperialist control by Western nations, many perceive South America as an underdeveloped continent with little political power.  This belief stems from racist rhetoric and inaccurate assumptions. While many countries within South America are not considered “developed” in the eyes of the Western world, this is due to years of political and economic destabilization by the west. Perhaps this very history of Western meddling provided the right conditions for a growing far-right movement, which has steadily been gaining traction in several South American countries. At the end of October 2018, Brazil, South America’s most populous country, elected the far-right candidate Jair Bolsonaro as president. Believers in democracy and human rights defenders alike were shocked and dismayed in his election, and fear for the changes that Bolsonaro will inevitably bring to the continent, and their lasting implications on relationships with other countries and the geopolitical balance.

Political History and Legacy of Brazil

Brazil, unlike the majority of South America, was claimed as a Portuguese colony from 1500 until its independence in 1822. One of Brazil’s most distinguishing sociopolitical features is its long established  history with slavery. Beginning in the sixteenth century, Brazil was noteworthy for having brought over more African slaves than would ever reach North America; in total, Brazil imported half of all the slaves that crossed the Atlantic Ocean. Brazil was the last Western country to abolish slavery, in 1888, more than two decades after the United States did. The social repercussions of the slave trade meant that Brazil became a heavily ethnically mixed nation, with significant intermingling of African, indigenous, and Portuguese populations. While it may expected that a sizable mixed race population would foster societal equality and tolerance, to this day Brazil remains a deeply unequal society, especially in regards to the intersections of race and socioeconomic status. The roots of Brazil’s unequal society largely stem from a failure to restructure society post-slavery. Freed slaves were left without land, money, or education, and centuries later millions of their descendants continue living with these same circumstances. In the modern day, Afro-Brazilians make up two thirds of the 60,000 annual victims of crime and two thirds of the prison population. After the eradication of slavery, Afro-Brazilians often still worked in modern forms of slavery, which was not outlawed until 1995. Contemporaneously, most instances of modern slavery and forced labor occur in rural areas, often in industries tied to environmental destruction, such as the logging industry. In 2016, the Global Slavery Index estimated that there were over 300,000 people in conditions of modern slavery on any given day.

In addition to the brutal and bloody legacy of Brazil’s slave trade, corruption also plays a large role in Brazil’s political history from colony to present day. Like many other South American countries in the 20th century, a military dictatorship ruled Brazil from 1930 to 1945. After less than two decades of democracy following 1945, the military once again intervened in 1964, overthrowing the leftist Goulart administration, and established Castelo Branco as the newest dictator.  Following Branco’s regime, military governments ruled Brazil until 1985, and the country had its first democratic presidential elections in 1989. In the 21st century, Brazil’s many presidential administrations were marred by corruption and scandal, and a growing distrust in the Worker’s Party which had been in power for several decades. Both “Lula” da Silva and Dilma Vana Rousseff were criticized for reckless spending and corruption during their respective administrations. However, under these Workers’ Party-backed administrations, the government made combating and assuaging hunger and poverty one of their top priorities. On a social level, Brazil’s rural vs urban struggles also take on another dimension when considering the debate regarding the use of natural resources and sustainability. In present day, there exists little to no data on peoples living in the Amazon rainforest and little regard for their residency in the region.

Brazil’s society, like many around the world, found itself at a crossroads during its most recent election, with its people divided between leftist and right-wing movements. The left wing of Brazil’s politics has become fragile, weakened by widespread corruption, while the right came out as the party of reason, calling for the restoration of order at any cost. With Bolsonaro’s recent election, Brazil is waiting to see just how high the cost of order will be.

Bolsonaro’s Rise and Popularity

After suffering the frustration and betrayal of several leftist governments ending with corruption charges, a 2016 poll found that Brazilian society as a whole had become more conservative, with 54% of the respondents shifting their social and justice beliefs to the right. As a whole, this has been accompanied by a growing movement of conservative Christianity, both in the public sphere and in the national legislature. Later during the same election cycle, public-opinion polls demonstrated that one in three Brazilians would look favorably upon a military intervention to oust the leftist government. It is important to know these facts in order to properly contextualize the environment in which Bolsonaro’s administration was born.

Jair Bolsonaro is a figure that is mostly known to the Western world as a “tropical Trump.” In actuality, Bolsonaro’s political history and infamously controversial statements may prove him to be a much larger threat to democracy in the Southern cone. Bolsonaro rose in the public consciousness by serving as a seven-term congressman after his military career. During his congressional tenure, Bolsonaro became known as a hardlined believer in law and order, and for some of his more inflammatory statements. Beginning with Brazil’s military and dictatorial history, Bolsonaro gained attention for saying in 1999 that he believed the dictatorship should have killed 30,000 more people. Additionally, Bolsonaro became known for several misogynistic, homophobic, and racist statements, over the course of several years. Since the beginnings of his political career, Bolsonaro has established himself as an extreme member of the conservative party, with many cautioning his neo-fascist ideas.

Once Bolsonaro publically entered the presidential race, he advertised himself as the candidate who would defend democracy and uphold the constitution. To help him achieve these goals, Bolsonaro promised his policies would focus on relaxing gun laws, reducing state involvement in the economy, and leaving the 2015 Paris Agreement. Bolsonaro entered the race as the candidate of the Social Liberal Party (PSL), an anti-establishment party known for their combination of social conservatism and pro-market policies. Bolsonaro’s running mate, Mourãu, hinted that Bolsonaro’s administration would go as far as to redraft the 1988 constitution, taking away representative input, in order to stack the Supreme Court. One of Bolsonaro’s key campaign promises was to help address the growing violence in Brazil. Unlike most countries, Brazil’s biggest threat to national security is not terrorism, but the heavily growing homicide rate within cities, especially in the favelas. In 2017 alone, Brazil broke its own homicide record, with a 3% uptick in murders, resulting in the murder of 63,880 people. Bolsonaro promised to face security issues with no-nonsense iron fist policies, such as relaxing gun control laws, allowing police more freedom to use violent tactics, and employing military forces to occupy the notoriously violent favelas. In Brazil, the drug trade and the resulting war against drugs further contributed to a nation-wide increase in violence.

Bolsonaro’s supporters mainly come from the more conservative members of society, as well as those who have felt betrayed by the Workers Party (PT), including the middle class, small business owners, independent professionals, members of the police, and armed forces. While some poorer populations were motivated to support Bolsonaro due to the worsening public security situation, the majority of Bolsonaro’s supporters are the rich and educated-- members of society whose voices are seldom silenced. Many members of Brazil’s upper-middle classes and elite have been fueled by class hatred, aimed at the PT. Echoing the dictatorial roots of Chile, Bolsonaro’s chief economic advisor (also hailing from the University of Chicago) promises to focus on privatization, a policy very popular with financial markets as well as media representatives. Many political analysts have cautioned that much of Bolsonaro’s rise to power has followed traditional steps towards establishing a fascist regime; Bolsonaro has threatened political opponents, activists, and labeled leftist organizations as terrorist organizations.

Spread of Far Right Movements in a Post-Trump World

In a post-2016-election world, it has seemed like there has been an outcropping of far-right movements all over the Western world. In the last decade, new right-wing movements have combined neo-Nazi groups with traditional free-market conservatives. Under the Trump administration, right-wing political rhetoric, often stemming from the president himself, has begun to normalize these ideologies. In Western Europe, this same rise in right-wing thought is not necessarily attributed to the working-class’s response to the economic state, rather, according to Liz Fekete, it stems from reactionary prejudice surrounding the war on terror, and its resulting increase in refugee presence. In the last decade, Europe has experienced several stunning terror attacks, from the attack on the Charlie Hebdo offices to last year’s attack on an Ariana Grande concert. These attacks, often attributed to young people of color, have led to a distrust in the growing immigrant population, and a resurgence of xenophobic and islamophobic attitudes. In many European countries, the uptick in immigrant populations has led to stricter policies, including media censorship and frequent raids on left-wing organizations. The purported stress on welfare states  brought on by an increase in immigration into Europe left many joining right-wing thinkers in criticizing the policies and norms as laid out by socialist states. As with the United States’ 2016 election, many who voted for right-wing parties did so out of frustration with the leftist parties and their governments.

Bolsonaro’s election is not only notable within the context of its impact in Brazil, but also the entire continent. His election seems to mark the arrival of the far-right wave into the Southern cone, after its spread to countries like Germany, France, and Sweden. Bolsonaro’s far right policies have two simultaneous effects: threatening Western-established democracy and following the Western neoliberal order. However, for some, fascism spells good business. Some Canadian and American businesses suggested that Bolsonaro’s presidency creates good business opportunities within the resource, finance, and infrastructure sectors.  As outlined in his campaign promises, Bolsonaro has promised to considerably weaken environmental regulations in the Amazon and also privatize government-owned companies. While Bolsonaro’s administration presents a threat to democracy throughout South America, for many Western nations, fascism pairs nicely with neoliberalist economic policies.

Conclusion

Bolsonaro’s election was met with strong emotions from members of Brazil’s left and right wings. Throughout Brazil’s recent election cycle, Bolsonaro quickly gained notoriety for his offensive statements involving women, the LGBTQ+ population, and Afro-brazilians. Since its very inception, Brazil has been a socioeconomically unequal society, with racial and class tensions existing to this day. Brazil’s swing to the right is due in part to the population’s disappointment in the Worker’s Party, but also has much to do with rising inequality and violence in the country. Bolsonaro’s election means Brazil now joined the ranks of the United States, Hungary, and the Philippines in its election of a right-wing populist leader. Based on Bolsonaro’s campaign rhetoric, Brazil’s newest president exhibits a commitment to erase what the left-wing sees as years of progress towards a more democratic and socialist society. Analysts concerned with human rights within South America argue that Bolsonaro’s administration poses a great threat to democracy within South America, as well as human rights concerns for Brazil’s indigenous populations. The world will see if these fears manifest into reality when Bolsonaro takes power beginning in January of 2019.

The Mirroring of the Two 9/11s

The infamous images of hijacked airplanes hitting the World Trade Center’s twin towers are etched into the minds of every American old enough to remember the morning of September 11th, 2001. The terrorist attacks of that day spurred a decades-long war in the middle east and heightened tensions surrounding what it really meant to be an American. 9/11 is a date known all around the world, but rarely does the world talk about the first violent 9/11 that occured in Chile. Whereas the United States’ 9/11 was the doing of jihadist groups, Chile’s 9/11 was a government military coup. The morning of September 11th, 1973, the military began to bomb La Moneda, the presidential palace. By the end of the day, the president, Salvador Allende, was dead, and Chile’s government transformed from a burgeoning socialist democracy into a bloody military dictatorship that would last seventeen years. Both 9/11s have eerie similarities beyond their dates; the two events can trace their origins to the Cold War, and the United States’ desire to prevent the spread of communism.

The Cold War and the Creation of the Taliban

With the creation of the Truman Doctrine, stopping the spread of communism became one of the United States’ biggest foreign policy focuses. During the Cold War era, the United States’ geopolitical strategies throughout the world were aimed at curbing the slowly spreading reach of the Soviet Union. Beginning in the late 1970s, the Soviet Union attempted to gain control over Afghanistan, first invading the country in 1979, and later establishing a puppet regime in Kabul. Afghanistan’s complex history and ethnic diversity made it difficult for a country-wide takeover, and as a result, the Soviets’ invasion carved out pockets of the country where power was divided between the control of communist forces and Afghani rebels. The Soviets’ attempt to take over the country was met with significant resistant from locals, especially from Muslims who felt that the communists atheist beliefs threatened the practice of their religion. These resistant groups later developed into mujahideen groups, consisting of Muslim rebels. One of the largest forces supporting the mujahideen groups was the CIA.

After failing to prevent Iran’s Islamic revolution, the United States viewed Afghanistan as a key player in the middle east region, and was intent on not letting it fall into red hands. Thus, the CIA created rebel training camps in Pakistan where they trained Afghani muslim rebels, including Osama bin Laden. The United States, along with other anti-communist allies, allocated funds to help arm Afghani rebel groups in their fight against communist forces. The Reagan administration armed the mujahideen with anti-aircraft missiles, breaking previous policies against supplying rebels with American-made weapons. From the underbelly of the CIA training camps, the beginnings of what would later become the Taliban emerged . Michael Rubin of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, explained that following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States left Afghanistan, creating “a policy void in which radical elements” would flourish. The Taliban quickly conquered areas of southern Afghanistan, gaining power and support, viewed as an alternative to the conflict created by territorial control by rival mujahidin forces. The Taliban took control of the Afghan government, under a platform promising peace, disarmament, and a return to Islamic values. Later on, Osama bin Laden came to the aid of the Taliban, providing a few thousand highly trained soldiers, and creating the foundation for the alliance between al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

Neoliberalism and the rise of socialism in Chile

While much of the spread of the Cold War was occuring on the eastern continents, the United States quickly became aware of a communist wave gaining momentum in South America. Prior to the rise of the Unidad Popular, Chile’s left wing party composed of socialist and communist groups, Chile had been one of the first nations to wholeheartedly embrace the neoliberal policies laid out by the Bretton Woods System and the Washington Consensus. Historically, Chile had always suffered from great classism and vast inequality gaps between socioeconomic classes. Once neoliberal policies were implemented, these inequality gap only grew larger, also widening social tensions between the wealthy American-educated upper class, and the lower class dwelling in campamentos on the outskirts of the city. Free market reform was heavily supported by the political-economic elites in Chile, whose wealth would only further increase from foreign trade, but in the long run, neoliberal policies led to high unemployment and the banking collapse of 1982.

Social and economic tensions played out across Chile’s three main political parties, the Unidad Popular, la Democracia Cristiana, and the Partido Nacional. These societal tensions took center stage during the 1970 elections, and as a result, Salvador Allende, running as the Unidad Popular’s candidate” won the presidency with 45% of the popular vote, establishing the first democratically elected socialist government. Allende promised the nationalization of Chilean resources, income distribution, and agricultural reform, all changes that appealed heavily to the lower class who suffered under neoliberal economic policies. While Allende was popular with the lower class, the Unidad Popular lacked a majority in congress, creating a major obstacle in accomplishing his administration’s policy goals. One of Allende’s first steps towards transitioning Chile from a democratic state to socialism was to nationalize the copper mines, Chile’s largest export. One year into his administration, the worldwide price of copper fell, causing the deterioration of the economy. While Allende did not come to power through a revolution, the United States saw him as a threat, due to his close friendships with Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, as well as his staunch defense of the Cuban Revolution.

The morning of September 11th, 1973, Santiago woke up to the sounds of machine guns, and soldiers marching towards La Moneda, as part of an American-backed military coup. By the end of the day, General Augusto Pinochet had poised himself as the head of the new military dictatorship, and Allende had taken his own life rather than surrender himself to the military. Backed by the United States, Pinochet sought to eradicate any and all traces of socialism in the country. Under his leadership, Operation Condor was created. This alliance of right-wing dictatorships included Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Brazil. With the aid of the United States, Operation Condor launched a campaign of political repression, targeting socialist and communist leaders and sympathizers throughout the continent. Additionally, US interests in the region were represented by the Chicago Boys, a group of economists trained at the University of Chicago. While working with Pinochet’s regime, the Chicago Boys helped to once again revert the Chilean economy to its previous neoliberal practices. Throughout Pinochet’s seventeen year long military dictatorship, an estimated 1,198 people were disappeared, with hundreds more being subject to torture, and political executions.

The United States’ indifference in the face of the human rights violations committed under Pinochet’s regime is a topic rarely discussed. The United States’ involvement in the military coup reached far beyond simply supporting Pinochet in the name of preventing the spread of communism. In one of the more infamous cases, it came to light that the CIA trained the head of the DINA, Pinochet’s secret police force. Manuel Contreras oversaw the DINA, whose operations were responsible for the torture and disappearances of thousands of political enemies. Contreras also claimed that at Pinochet’s request, eight CIA agents came to Santiago with the intention of helping to organize the structure of the secret police. The United States humored the brutality of Pinochet’s dictatorship, a small price to pay for one less communist state. After evidence arose that Pinochet’s DINA was responsible for the assassination, in the middle of DC,  of a former Chilean diplomat, public outcry around the world largely condemned the actions of the military dictatorship, but the United States took no concrete steps to sever its ties with the regime During the mid 80s of the Reagan administration, foreign policy advisors and analysts began to feel frustrated at Pinochet’s refusal to return Chile to its former democratic state. Pinochet had served his purpose in eradicating communism, and in 1988 US officials pressured him to hold a plebiscite, where he was succeeded by a member of the democratic christian party.

In Chile, the implications of the military coup still resonate to this day. Under Pinochet’s regime, basic human rights were violated, and the entire country lived under a reign of terror for seventeen years. During the dictatorship, many right wing supporters praised Pinochet for his quick improvement of the economy, while the poor suffered. Pinochet’s regime focused on destroying the informal campamentos that surrounded Santiago, instead forcing the poor to move into conventillos, where multiple families were crammed into small homes. Not only did this forced migration destroy the social fabric of the campamentos, but it also decreased sanitation and nutrition standards for many of Santiago’s urban poor.

9/11’s Impact and Legacy in the United States and its Foreign Policy

Exactly 28 years after Chile’s military coup, American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center at 8:46am. By the end of the day, the terrorists’ actions killed 2996 people. Shortly thereafter, Osama bin Laden, founder of al-Qaeda, stepped forward to claim responsibility for the attacks, claiming that “it was confirmed to [him] that oppression and the intentional killing of innocent women and children [were] a deliberate American policy. Destruction is freedom and democracy, while resistance is terrorism and intolerance.” Thus, the American  “war on terror” was launched with the Bush administration vowing not to end until every terrorist group was defeated. Under the guise of battling terrorism, the United States invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, from 2001-2006. Now, almost two decades since the 2001 terrorist attacks, US troops still remain in both countries.

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 impacted the United States in more ways than just in simple casualties and injuries. After decades of enjoying its position as the hegemonic world leader, the United States felt vulnerable for the first time, shedding the illusion that its power  was untouchable. In response, strong pro-American, nationalistic sentiments flooded the country, appearing in everything from renaming french fries to freedom fries to the increasing popularity of the American war hero movie genre. The aggression with which the United States launched its counterattack in Afghanistan was met with widespread hostility towards the west. Since 9/11, the U.S. government has spent more than $7.6 trillion on defense and homeland security, in addition to implementing policies like the Patriot Act, aiming to make America safer against the threat of terrorism.

The Two 9/11s and the Construction of Memory

In both Chile and the United States, the legacies of their respective 9/11s persist  to this day. In Chile, there still exists much social division in regards to public opinion of the dictatorship. Outside of the classroom setting, the dictatorship is a taboo subject, with most reluctant to admit their past support of Pinochet. Many Chileans still support Pinochet, emphasizing the good he did for the economy, while glossing over the atrocities committed under his regime. Other former supporters claim that they had no idea that the tortures and disappearances were anything more than rumors. In the many years since the end of the military dictatorship, relatives of the disappeared and tortured have led the human rights movement in the country. Many NGOs dedicate their time to helping to secure evidence of torture and killings, in hopes to bring forth charges against the responsible parties. While many continue fighting to know what happened to their loved ones, others have fought to repress this knowledge. The Bachelet administration fought to lift the 50 year “veil of secrecy” over the testimony heard by the National Commission on Political Prison and torture. Bachelet’s bill was hotly contested, with supporters urging the disclosing of detention sites, and the identities of over 30,000 torture victims. For family, the failure to lift the veil was devastating. Because the identities of many of those who participated in the torturings and killings are still unknown, these individuals continue to enjoy military benefits and pensions. It is undeniable that the dictatorship forever changed the landscape of Chilean society, instilling a chilling sense of terror over the entire country, that to this day still leaves its trace.

Just seventeen years after the United States’ own 9/11,  the marks of the terrorist attacks still appear on everything from pop culture to the attitudes of Americans towards foreigners, and vice versa. The surge in American nationalism unified many Americans, while at the same time gave rise to a growing sense of islamophobia throughout the western world. In 2001, 93 anti-Muslim related hate crimes were reported to the FBI. Strong nationalism gave way to strong anti-Muslim, anti-terrorist sentiments. Additionally, research showed that post-9/11, Americans’ preferences for media changed, with most movie-goes now being more likely to prefer films that do not require much cultural engagement. While xenophobic beliefs seemed to have had reduced gradually over the years, they have seen a resurgence in recent years due to anti-Muslim remarks made by then-candidate Trump throughout the duration of the 2016 election cycle. Recent studies have shown that in 2016, anti-Muslim hate crimes actually surpassed those reported in 2001.

Conclusion

With both the Chilean and American 9/11 events, their origins can be dated back to the Cold War and the United States’ anti-communist doctrine. While the two events may seem unrelated at first glance, their roots and aftereffects mirror each other. In both countries, many suffered human rights violations as a result of events that took place in 9/11. In the present day, both Chile and the United States have undergone political shifts towards the right, with the respective administrations of Piñera and Trump. In both countries, the younger generations have shown strong leftist tendencies, fighting to question the beliefs of the right-leaning administrations. While Chile’s 9/11 can oftentimes be mistaken as a long-ago part of the nation’s history, today people still remember that it has many consequences. Recently, the Chilean minister of culture was forced to resign after old Facebook posts of his resurfaces, where he had called the National Museum of Memory and Human Rights leftist propaganda that failed to accurately represent the dictatorship. Even now, many people within Piñera’s administration have faced criticism for their past support of Pinochet. Defenders of human rights urge the importance of preserving national memory in both countries, sparking many conversations surrounding how exactly the respective 9/11s should be remembered and represented for generations to come.

Youth as a Catalyst for Change in Nicaragua

“SOS Nicaragua” the autoconvocados, or self-organized, yell in protest across Nicaragua. College students are organizing nationwide protests in order to change their country’s leadership. Millennials are taking the lead in hopes of bringing serious reform and reversing President Daniel Ortega’s policies. In April, Ortega implemented a social security policy that would reduce benefits for retirees and increase taxes on workers. Since then, the Nicaraguan government has faced backlash. The autoconvocados garner support from the majority of people in the country, despite the authoritarian response exhibited by the Ortega government. During the last election, he banned the main opposition party. He continues to maintain control over the military, the media and most branches of government. Nicaraguan university students want to end government repression, fearing that push Nicaragua will join Venezuela in being one of the only two Latin American countries to regress from democracy.

The first wave of student protest called for democratic change and an end to the recent government policies. These protests culminated in the deaths of several students, who were killed by Ortega supporters that found the students call to action threatening to an already weakening Ortega regime. A civic insurrection followed as furious citizens responded. Journalist Kyra Gurney explains in the Miami Herald that:

“Few could have been psychologically prepared for the violence the Ortega administration has unleashed on the protesters. The intensity of the demonstrations, and the response from government forces, have come as a surprise for many in Nicaragua, which in recent years has been a relatively safe, stable country. The Ortega administration has denied responsibility for the killings, blaming criminal groups and characterizing the protesters as right-wing gangs.”

According to the Organization of American States (OAS), 1,337 have been wounded, 212 killed and 507 arrested since the protests began. This does not include several undocumented kidnappings and murders. These clashes that began in April mark the deadliest protests in Nicaragua since its civil war ended in 1990.

The United Nations condemned human rights abuses perpetrated by pro-government forces. While the UN released a statement claiming that “The UN is available to assist national dialogue efforts to strengthen the rule of law, respect for human rights and the peaceful resolution of differences,” international attention on the situation is lacking.

The United States, which has a history of intervening in Nicaragua’s internal political affairs, should help mitigate the crisis by discussing options to grant asylum and place sanctions on high ranking Nicaraguan officials. Manuel Orozco characterizes the situation well, writing in the New York Times that “Mr. Ortega has shown that he responds only to pressure. In response to the demonstrations, he rescinded the social security plan that triggered the protests, and he freed some of the demonstrators who were jailed. The pressure must be sustained.” The lack of international uproar does not help the civilian agenda calling for stronger democratic institutions and early elections in 2019. The U.S. should enforce the Global Magnitsky Act- an American law used to punish people around the world for human rights violations - to further sanction members of Ortega’s business inner circle who sponsor his political agenda. This could apply to election commissioners who aided Ortega throughout fraudulent elections. Greater sanctions on individuals can aid the peaceful transfer of power in all branches of government.

Nicaraguans are afraid to leave their homes to protest because of the chance that they will be targeted and imprisoned. The Roman Catholic church is working to build peaceful coalitions to mitigate street riots. Following peace talks between student organizers, the Catholic Church and the government, the social security policy was amended. However, this does not make up for the restrictive path the government is continuing the follow.

Nicaraguan students remain committed to political change. Kyra Gurney explains the capabilities of the student movement as such:

“Despite their lack of preparation, however, the students have managed to keep their new bunker running smoothly. Each one of the roughly 900 students living at the university which they have occupied as a main base for their protests, which normally has about 40,000 students, has a specific task based on his or her major. The medical students run makeshift clinics. The law students document human rights violations and communicate with local human rights groups. The economics students administer the meager and financial donations.”

By maintain opposition despite a lack of resource, young Nicaraguans can inspire other youth movements in repressive countries around the world. In an effort redefine their country’s future, students have used social media as an outlet to broadcast the atrocities occurring across the country, since most public broadcasting is censored by the government. Autoconvocados are active in the diaspora as well. Nicaraguan-American citizens are organizing small rallies across the United States and pressuring their politicians to draft bills to sanction multiple Nicaraguan entities. This step is the first of many in hopes of garnering greater international attention while shaping a more stable and democratic Nicaragua.

Challenges to Democracy in Latin America: Sources and Solutions​​​​​​​

A region once characterized by its dictatorships, Latin America has enjoyed relatively stable democratic growth over the last few decades. With the exceptions of Venezuela and Cuba, all Latin American countries are now considered free or partly free on Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Scale. Despite this dramatic transformation, Latin American countries still face a variety of challenges that threaten democracy. The region’s principal challenges to its democracies are their delegative nature, “unrule of law,” and clientelism. While the degree to which each of these challenges affects democracy varies, all three pose a threat. The first part of this paper examines definitions of democracy and the democratic trajectory of Latin America in terms of those definitions. The second half of the paper breaks down the challenges of delegative democracy, unrule of law, and clientelism. Finally, I conclude by offering potential solutions to these challenges.

Definitions of democracy are widely debated by scholars. Some argue that a government is democratic if it holds free and fair elections, while others contend that a government must maintain a certain level of representation to be truly democratic. Some argue that democracies require a margin of equality, and still others assert that exercise of the rule of law is a critical qualification. The degree to which each of these components exists in Latin American democracies varies. However, under the most basic electoral definition (which requires a country to hold free and fair elections) the majority of the region qualifies as democratic. This may seem like a low bar, but just a few decades ago, between 1964-1990, eleven countries in Latin America (Ecuador, Guatemala, Brazil, Bolivia, Argentina, Peru, Panama, Honduras, Chile, Uruguay, and El Salvador) were ruled for significant periods of time by long-term military governments. In 1974, five counties—Cuba, Chile, Panama, Peru, and Bolivia—were ranked as “not free” by Freedom House, outnumbering the “free” countries. In 1978, only three of twenty countries (Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela) were democratic. In the 1980s, the tide began to shift as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile transitioned to civilian rule. Between 1974 and 1994, the number of free countries in Latin America doubled. By 2004, Cuba and Haiti were the only remaining authoritarian governments. With the exception of Venezuela, trends toward democracy have remained positive in the region over the past few decades. However, there is still progress to be made and challenges to be overcome.

One key challenge to democracy in Latin America is the lack of horizontal accountability. This ties into the argument that a democracy ought to maintain a certain level of representation. While some democracies are “horizontal,” that is, the elected leaders face checks and balances within the government, others are strictly “vertical,” wherein the leader answers to the people at election time but is then free to rule unchecked. In his chapter in the book Reflections on Uneven Democracies: The Legacy of Guillermo O'Donnell, Lucas González distinguishes between “delegative” and “representative” democracies, with delegative democracies lacking horizontal accountability and representative democracies ideally having both horizontal and vertical accountability. He uses various characteristics of delegative democracies (e.g. the president is taken to be the embodiment of the nation, the policies of his government need bear no resemblance to his campaign, and other institutions are considered impediments to the exercise of power) as indicators to classify each country. González classifies Argentina, Ecuador, and Colombia as recurring delegative democracies, Brazil and Peru as eroding delegative democracies, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Paraguay as intensifying delegative democracies, and Chile and Uruguay as stable representative democracies. This categorization demonstrates one analysis of the quality of democracy in Latin America. While all aforementioned countries are “democratic,” only two are considered by González to be representative. González finds that countries that face dire economic conditions and low pubic confidence in democracy are most likely to be delegative. As such, the implementation of neoliberal reforms in the 1990s (designed to curb inflation) might seem like a potential solution to the delegative nature of Latin American democracies. However, as Michael Walton argues, many Latin American countries were not in fact stabilized by neoliberal reforms and continued to experience high wealth inequality throughout and following their implementation. This lack of stability actually contributes to the delegative nature of some democracies. Additionally, as Michael Kurtz explains, democratic participation and political organization declined in the aftermath of neoliberal reforms. According to Kurtz, this is because free-market reforms disenfranchise poor people, create barriers to collective action, and increase the informal sector. All of these factors are likely to reduce the public’s confidence in their democracy, considering they can hardly access it, and in turn, bolster delegative democracies.

While formulating solutions for poor economic conditions is a complex challenge, low public confidence in democracy is easier to address. As it stands, this low confidence becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy; when citizens doubt the legitimacy or value of their democracy, they are unlikely to participate or challenge overreaches of power. Initiatives designed to educate, inform, and inspire citizens to be active members of their democracy might boost their confidence in it. However, to truly break the cycle, such efforts would have to be undertaken in conjunction with a strengthening of checks and balances. Again, though, institution strengthening (for example, giving the legislature more control over lawmaking, ensuring a strong judicial branch, etc.) is more likely to occur if an active public pushes for it and pushes back against an unchecked executive.

Another challenge facing Latin American democracies is the “unrule of law.” As Daniel M. Brinks and Sandra Botero point out in Reflections on Uneven Democracies: The Legacy of Guillermo O'Donnell, “democracy and the rule of law appear inextricably linked.” Without the rule of law, who is to stay that a democracy is even meeting the lowest bar of free and fair elections? As such, nominally democratic states must be evaluated by the extent that the rule of law operates throughout the country. Fortunately, as Brinks and Botero contend, Latin America has come a long way in terms of the law’s ability to “effectively guide social interactions” as “a source of both rights and responsibilities.” However, Brinks and Botero argue that the extent to which the rule of law exists varies from the national to subnational level. So while many Latin American democracies have made substantial progress in instituting the rule of law at the national level (through the establishment of formal laws), it does not hold to the same extent in all parts of a country. Guillermo O’Donnell highlights the prevalence of “brown areas” in Latin America, where the rule of law and democratic practice do not necessarily apply. These areas often reflect impoverished demographics. Other scholars, such as Edward Gibson, have examined the phenomena of subnational authoritarianism, wherein certain parts of the state are ruled by provincial authoritarian regimes, despite being located within a nationally democratic country.

Providing some instances of the subnational variation of the rule of law, Brinks and Botero examine Indigenous and Afro-Descendant land rights in Brazil. While indigenous and afro-descendant groups have seen progress in the incorporation of their demands into legal regimes, these rights are not realized in reality. They contend that this is because Brazil lacks the necessary ancillary institutions to make the formal recognition of these rights effective. For example, afro-descendant groups in Brazil have to be formally recognized by a state agency to be eligible for a communal land title; these titles are rarely granted, even to officially recognized groups.

In another example of the unrule of law, Brinks and Botero point out that gender-based violence prevails in many parts of Guatemala despite the enactment of several laws designed to protect women from different forms of violence. Compared to Argentina (where there are similar formal laws), Guatemala suffers from a significantly higher rate of gender-based violence. In this case, Brink and Botero point out that the difference is that Argentine women have historically successfully organized and earned political clout. These examples demonstrate that without political backing and reduced marginalization, these groups will not see their formal rights exercised in practice. As with the challenge of delegative democracies, increased political participation can be a potential solution to the unrule of law. If marginalized groups are able to organize and maintain a presence in the political sphere, its possible that they could gain the backing necessary to enforce formal laws in practice. However, as mentioned earlier, neoliberal reforms reduced political participation, making it more difficult to challenge the unrule of law. As Alejandro Portes and Kelly Hoffman argue, these market-oriented reforms also increased income inequality and contributed to the expansion of the “informal sector,” a large portion of the population that is excluded from formal jobs that are regulated, provide benefits, and allow for unionization. Members of the informal sector cannot organize in the way the formal sector can, making it all the more challenging to fight back when the rule of law is not exercised.

Finally, a key challenge to democracy in Latin America is clientelism (and more broadly, the poverty that sustains it). Clientelism is defined by Susan Stokes as the delivery of “material goods in return for electoral support.” As explained by Ezequiel Gonzalez Ocantos and Paula Muñoz, a clientelistic relationship is characterized by an asymmetric power dynamic; it involves a patron and a client. The patron (typically either a public official or a candidate for public office) has control over resources that the client (typically a poor voter) needs. Often there are “brokers” that operate between the two, delivering the goods and enforcing the elicited support. According to Gonzalez Ocantos and Muñoz, the extent of clientelism varies across the region; it is most likely to exist in traditional (rather than mass) societies, competitive political environments, closed economies, and societies with a small middle class and large undeveloped areas. They also point out that the longer that clientelism occurs, the more stable it becomes. It is sometimes even perpetuated by voters themselves, who organize into groups or ethnic blocs to guarantee their continued receipt of resources from the patron.

Political figures and parties in Latin America are savvy when it comes to using clientelism to stay in power. An excellent example of this is the Independent Democratic Union (UDI) in Chile. Despite Chile’s positive categorization as a representative democracy, clientelistic practices persist. Juan Pablo Luna explains that by employing a strategy of dual-representation, the UDI represents the programmatic preferences of the business and conservative sectors (its core constituency) and then uses their private funding to target poor, segmented non-core constituencies through clientelism. This allowed the UDI to maintain power despite the small size of their core base. Luna argues that this type of party-voter linkage strategy (non-programmatic exchanges of non-state funded benefits for votes) creates socially-skewed representation by disproportionately representing the interests of those who provide the funds.

The effects of clientelism are not so obviously all negative, however. In his book Poor People’s Politics, Javier Ayuero demonstrates through field research in Argentina that clientelism can function as a problem-solving network in poor neighborhoods. Examining the relationship between the Peronist government in Argentina, municipality officials and brokers, and poor citizens living in the shantytown of Villa Paraiso, Ayuero followed several individual brokers and describes the way in which they maintain a close inner circle for distribution of information and resources as well as a wider circle of beneficiaries and supporters (aka “clients”). The goods, provided by the government, are distributed by the brokers and their inner circles through programs like Plan Vida. In this instance of clientelism, brokers do not overtly elicit votes. Rather, they establish long-term relationships wherein beneficiaries depend on brokers for basic goods (food, medicine, jobs, etc.) in order to nurture loyalty that translates into political support. If the beneficiaries do not attend rallies or support the party, they stop receiving the resources. As Ayuero highlights, clientelism can work as a solution to the needs of the poor. Consequentially, this complex problem-solving network is deeply rooted, given that the clients themselves contribute to the structure in order to survive. While this network is no substitute for long-term, sustainable structural change to the system of poverty and inequality in Latin America, it offers an immediate solution to an immediate problem and it is difficult to fault clients for participating and therefore perpetuating the practice.

Further research needs to be done to determine how harmful clientelism is for democracy, but its restriction on the freeness and fairness of an election is obvious. Moreover, it contributes to the cycle of poverty, by giving the poor only the bare minimum needed to survive and denying them to ability to elect candidates with programmatic platforms designed to alleviate poverty and inequality in the long-run. As this paper demonstrates, poverty and inequality create further challenges to democracy by marginalizing certain groups and, in turn, inhibiting the rule of law. Moreover, poverty is correlated with reduced political participation, which contributes to the delegative nature of several Latin American democracies.

Latin America has made incredible democratic progress over the last three decades. Democracy has become more stable and more valued across the region. Despite these advances however, many democracies in the region face notable challenges. Delegative democracies are common; while they still entail free and fair elections, their executives face little to no accountability once elected and are not necessarily beholden to the people (or even to his/her party of base). Despite increased efforts to pass formal laws designed to protect and represent the interests of traditionally marginalized groups, the rule of law does not extend to all cities or people. A lack of political backing and organized political participation inhibits the institution of new norms and the informal execution of formal legislation. Implementing programs (whether administered by the government or NGOs) designed to educate and organize marginalized voters or members of the informal sector could work to boost public confidence in democracy and earn these groups political backing. These effects will promote governmental accountability at the executive level and provide support for the rule of law throughout the country. Finally, clientelism continues to persist throughout the region and will likely continue to so long as poverty and inequality remain high. While the poverty and inequality rates are lower now in the region than in the past few decades, the poorest still cannot attain basic resources necessary for surviving or carrying out day to day activities. While eradicating poverty requires long-term economic solutions (that will double as a solution to delegative democracies), smaller steps can be taken in the short-run to combat clientelism. The institution of social programs (like Bolsa Familia, for example, in Brazil) that successfully provide people with basic needs (that are currently being met by patrons) is one possible solution. If the standard of living of the poor is raised, clientelistic practices become more expensive and consequentially a less efficient means of obtaining political support. Overall, democracy is making gains in Latin America but it has serious hurdles to overcome. At the core of these challenges are poverty, inequality, and lack of political participation. Designing programs and policies to tackle these deeper issues (which are all linked to one another) will improve the quality of life for poor Latin Americans and have the external benefit of alleviating the complex challenges of delegative democracies, the unrule of law, and clientelism.

The Fate of the Temporary Protection Status in El Salvador

Salvadorans are the largest group of foreigners to benefit from Temporary Protection Status (TPS), a humanitarian program created by Congress in 1990 to allow populations suffering from war or catastrophe to live and work in United States. The Secretary of Homeland Security has the power to extend TPS protection as a result of ongoing violent conflict, environmental disasters, or other “extraordinary or temporary conditions”. In 2018, the Trump administration ended TPS for Salvadorans, leaving the community forced to choose between returning home or risking deportation.

Now, nearly 200,000 Salvadorans, many of whom have lived in the United States for over a decade, must leave the country by 2019 unless they can find another protection program. Most Salvadorans came to the U.S. in 2001, the year El Salvador was hit by a 7.6 magnitude earthquake that left thousands dead or homeless. Due to a lack of government funds, the rebuilding process stalled, and it took several years to rebuild damaged roads, buildings, water systems, and hospitals. Thanks to international assistance, most infrastructure has since been restored, allowing Washington to claim that TPS is no longer justified.

Yet major problems remain. El Salvador’s path to stability is thwarted by gang violence, corruption, and low economic growth. The violence stems from conflict between MS-13 and Barrio 18, two rival gangs who trace their origins to the United States. In the 1990s, civil war led thousands of Salvadorans to flee to the United States. Salvadoran gangs formed in California as self-defense groups. Following a deportation program by the U.S. government, these fully formed gangs returned to El Salvador, where low police presence and a lack of reintegration programs led to further violence. Gang presence has since grown, and El Salvador has become one of the most dangerous countries in the world as a result. This trend has only been exacerbated by the mass-migration of unaccompanied minors throughout Central America. If forced to return to El Salvador, mothers, fathers, and children could face extortion, rising gang violence, kidnappings, coerced service to gangs and sexual violence. 

The mass return of Salvadorans would also lead to economic harms. Salvadorans in the US currently act as a source of economic growth for their home country through the remittances they send home every year. The Salvadoran economy is too weak to provide employment or resources needed to sustain returnees. While the unemployment rate is at 7%, more than 40% of workers are underemployed and 66% work in the informal sector. Despite having an annual workforce entry rate of 60,000, the economy only creates 11,000 jobs a year. The entry of so many returnees would displace less skilled Salvadorans, increasing poverty and risking greater violence and immigration.

Ending TPS for Salvadorans will also damage the American economy. There are few Americans willing to take jobs currently held by Salvadorans in the service, construction, and child care industries. A study by the Immigrant and Legal Resource Center found that stripping Haitians, Salvadorans, and Hondurans of their TPS status would, over 10 years, deprive Social Security and Medicare of $6.9 billion and shrink GDP by $45.2 billion. Ending this humanitarian protection program would cost employers billions in turnover costs and reduce government revenue for social programs. 

Finally, this policy will damage thousands of Salvadoran families who would be torn apart. Economic opportunities for Salvadorans and their children would be limited after stripping away their work permits, leaving most children to live in poverty without the economic support from their parents. Children born with in the US would be separated from their parents. Those who stay illegally risk abuse at the hands of their employers. 

Ending TPS for Salvadorans risks tearing apart families, exposing them to violence, and generating economic harms. Salvadorans with TPS status consider the United States to be  their home.  Knowing very little about the current state of their home country, they would seem like foreigners in their own country. The Trump administration should extend the TPS program while working with the Salvadoran government to stabilize the country.

The Rocinha Power Struggle

Home to some 100,000 people, Rocinha is one of the most famous and largest favela or slum in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Homicidal violence is increasing in the favela with a vengeance of gun battles out in the streets between gangs and the Brazilian military. The military has now taken siege of the favela, in hopes to bringing the turf wars between gangs under control. Ongoing violence on the streets has brought some troubling concern to heads of state and impactful international organizations, who have worked over the years to decrease corruption, murder rates, and create an economically stable country. These concurring events and power struggle between drug related gangs could foreshadow a dangerous downfall of Rio which could be sinking back into its quagmire of violence, and instability as it was in the 1990s and early 2000s. The war on drugs continues to play a powerful driving factor in the violent struggle between Rio’s most powerful drug gangs, the Comando Vermelho (CV) or the Red command and Brazil’s largest organized crime syndicate, the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) or the First Capital Command, and the Amigos dos Amigos (ADA) or Friends of Friends.

Each faction controls a specific part within the favelas as well in middle- class areas, with graffiti of gang symbols drawn in the cities to identify which faction is in control at the moment. In 2011, the ringleader of the ADA–Antônio Francisco Bonfim Lopes, known by the alias “Nem”–was jailed but continued to operate the largest cocaine trade by proxy, leading to conflict between the top figures within this gang, and the rise of challenging rival factions, who questioned Nem’s leadership and how long he would be able to maintain a stronghold over the cocaine trade. Nem’s second-in-command Rogério 157, as known within the favelas has moved to pledge his allegiance to the CV, while the CV gang has also indicated that Rogério supporters within the ADA would be more than welcomed to join their faction. Some are calling it a coup against Nem, since the CV is aiming to grow their influence in the favela, ever since the winter of 2015 when the FARC, a Colombian cartel, began dealing less cocaine throughout South America. But this is not without phasing challenges from ascending, up-and-coming gangs such as the PCC, who are rapidly seizing influence in the region.

Prisons holding both PCC and CV supporters have led to a stark rise in violence and mortality in the local and federal criminal justice systems. Until this point the PCC had remained neutral into who would take control of Rocinha, since they already control most of the drug trade within the five states of Brazil. But now the PCC is aiming to take control of the main cocaine supply to Rio by diminishing the control of the CV: this is a proper low-level war that is currently taking place inside Brazil with tactical and strategic aims aplenty, with the PCC attempting to draw in new partners to solidify its own power base while simultaneously weakening its rival.

The appointment of the new Brazilian Secretary of State for Security in 2016, brought the Pacification Police Units (UPP) to a new low, because although the objective of the administration was to flush out the drug gangs from the favelas and deploy a significant police presence to these territories; the reality is that the gangs have seized greater territorial control and widespread influence, and that local police often escape confrontation or practice corruption. The gangs are aware that making relationships with the local law enforcement through bribes, although costly, correlates to a lessened chance of prosecution and retribution.

Before corruption scandals by the police units began to break, units were imprisoning anyone and anything related to drugs, increasing the amount of prisoners in the system by 160 percent since the year 2000. Historically, violence in the prisons followed demands for improved prison conditions, but now the rupture of the longstanding truce between the PCC and the CV over ADA territory and increasing influence in region has left hundreds of prisoners dead over the years. This could be primarily due to the fact that Brazil’s state prisons are under indirect purview of drugs gangs and organized crime. Most prisons are divvied up among competing gangs, while the government has only minimal control. “Experts describe drug factions as a parallel state. Gangs have long recruited their rank and file from prisons and organize trafficking and racketeering” from the walls of the prisons, such as in the case of Nem, although he denies connection to any outside crime through proxies. There is a reflection of what is seen on the inside of prison walls, and what is seen on the streets. Brazil has a concerning criminal justice conundrum that fails to eradicate gang violence. Brutal conditions prisoners face are barely liveable; penitentiaries are mostly always filled to capacity, due to police crackdowns, only increasing gang recruitment from within the prison. According to the Justice Department, Brazil houses about 650,00 prisoners in just about 300,000 spaces, with the population continuing steady growth.

Gun downs on the streets of the favela between gangs has recently worsened, with the Brazilian military having set curfew and increased pat downs for its residents aiming to imprison most drug related criminals, in hopes of decreasing all criminal activity. Most officers monitoring the favelas favor heavy-handed sentences over rehabilitation and other lessened arrangements. The leading cause of imprisonment are minor drug offenses, although there are laws that recommend non-violent crimes should not lead people into the prison system. The war on drugs in Rio is not the answer. Research has found that 70 percent of inmates who are released find their way back into the system because of the duties they carried out under their gang, the gang that had once recruited themin prison. It is imperative that in order to stabilize the conflict, the military work and strategize to rehabilitate minor drug offenders back into society, and put less minor offenders in prison.

Gangs would soon have few inmates to recruit in the prisons. Through positive reform, criminals would then be put to work in the favelas where they’d be redirecting their energy to building better infrastructure for their community. Favelas’ workforce has proven to become most creative, resourceful, and hardworking people,many of whom have often fallen into drug trade only because of the lack of government benefits they now receive and little opportunities open to them that would allow them to make just as much money as their gang related jobs.

From the cities to the prisons of Brazil, the country’s ongoing corruption has stemmed from top government officials, who make it apparent that the lack of oversight by government agencies has allowed criminal organizations to grow. The Brazilian Presidential election of 2018 will prove critical to the future stability of the country and justice system, with the President possessing the ability to appoint officials to confront with corruption, prison reform, government benefits, and the gang crisis. Currently, the lack of public investment, and a hands-off tradition in criminal justice driven by governmental policy has led the favelas to produce a culture of creative survival.

Cuban Connectivity: The rise of free speech in the Digital Age

The virgin telecommunications market that is Cuba, has large tech corporations such as Amazon, Google, and Apple ready to invest as soon as restrictive United States sanctions are removed for the island to enter a smaller globalized world. Freedom of speech via global internet connection would give Cuban citizens an unprecedented arena to project their grievances, and access world information. An article by Freedom House labels Cuba as one of the world’s longest ranking repressive environments for information and communication technologies. The lack of digital communication on the island has also left the Cuban people frozen in time; and although around 27 percent of the people in Cuba have access to the internet, it is often through illegal streaming sites, extremely slow service and costly fees. But, through pressures being put on the Cuban government, by human rights campaigns, and the international community- the people of Cuba are growing ever more connected and facing less internet restrictions and punishments for projecting their beliefs. Rather than having the Cuban government see the internet as a tool of coercion, they should perceive it as a tool to unify the people

New technology, has been empowering individuals, in both positive and negative ways. And over the past couple year, the Cuban government has made progress to make internet access more feasible to its citizens, although recently this has become harder to accomplish due to the Trump  administrations rollback on Cuban – U.S. foreign policy, “cancelling” plans to ease cold- war tensions with Cuba, hindering negotiations being made by the government and companies such as Google. The Trump administration has not made it easier to for U.S. companies to provide commercial telecom and internet services, as well as to export cell phones, computers, and set up joint ventures with Cuban entities.

Technological corporations should not see this new U.S. policy as an opportunity to pull their small but growing investments, but as a reason to ensure the Cuban people that their voices will continue to be heard, because as the current President Raul Castro is proposed to retire in early 2018, Foreign Affairs magazine calls for in response to these difficulties, demands from centrist activists for a greater say in future economic decisions and in the coming leadership transition. The Cuban are already demanding more from their government, from better living conditions to more WI-FI. The people’s continuous effort to surpass government internet restrictions while pushing for better internet accessibility to promote progress and social changes within the country, should encourage more technological companies to invest more resources into infrastructure development. These internet spaces that create free speech promote movements can be important vehicles for social and political change, and have the potential to transform the systems of institutionalized politics in which they occur. Social movements can give us an insight into human action and why people voluntarily cooperate, mobilize and could have potential positive implications in the spread of democracy, or regime change.

A younger Cuban generation is hoping to emphasize the importance of internet connection for all, a “promise” their government is working to achieve for all its citizens by the year 2020, announcing plans to expand broadband access to 80 percent of business entities (private and state-owned), 95 percent of educational and health centers, and 50 percent of households by 2020. This level of connectivity would require significant investments in infrastructure, and with new regulations being rolled out by the Trump administration, unless the Cuban government supports heavy investing in their technological industries, change could take years longer than hoped for by the international community and the Cuban people.  

Cubans, have become much more aware of the power the internet possesses through projecting social justice projects to address their poor living condition, and shrinking gross domestic domestic through the closures of small businesses on the island. The internet is critical tool to advocate for government reform, and although the government believed that limiting access was for the safety and betterment of their people, it in fact, only hinders the progress the country is making toward government and economic reform.

The government has begun to take notice, of the positive possibilities that come from joining an interconnected world and has even increased education funding to computer software and computer sciences industries. Cuban universities have begun expanding their technology science curriculums, making it possible for grassroots efforts to provide more multimedia accessibility to the island. From these investments, emerges a generation of highly skilled graduates whose technical and abilities known as the “knowledge economy”, often go underdeveloped due to the lack of resources and support from the international community. In order to unlock the “knowledge economy”, the international community should aid in the WiFi revolution, by ending technological barriers between Cuba and its trading partners.

German Sociologist, Lorenz von Stein, introduced the term ‘social movement’ into scholarly discourse in the 1950’s. It conveyed the idea of a continuous, unitary process by which the whole working class gained awareness and power. Luckily, at the touch of a button, the Cuban working class is beginning to feel that power, along with the pressures and luxuries that come with internet exposure. While becoming more aware of how other people live and talking about their experiences to people all over the world, feeling that they are finally being given the chance to speak up and express their grievances and the actions other countries should be taking in order to facilitate a smooth transition of power from a communist regime to a more democratically based one.

Before the Obama administration began to normalize relations with Cuba, there was already an interconnected underground system that aimed to provide an alternative internet broadband. There is an entire informal job sector network growing out of these grassroots internet distributors working to provide affordable online streaming services to the people of Cuba. American corporations such as Netflix are beginning to stream to the island, but at 8 dollars a months, it is unaffordable to a majority of citizens that work at a wage between 20 and 60 dollars a month. More needs to be done by the government to support these efforts to secure the economic future of its small business and technological informal sector.

Weak infrastructure and innovation-stifling corruption are just some of the obstacles technological companies have been facing. Investing in telecommunications towers, and creeping away from government run-wifi would be a huge step in providing accessible internet. Since 2008, when the Cuban government lifted an almost total ban on the World Wide Web, there has been a skyrocketing number of Cubans beginning to engage in internet consumption. While Cuba remains one of the world’s least connected societies, ordinary citizens’ access to the internet has exploded since 2015 due to the government’s opening of over 200 public WiFi spots in parks and street corners all over the country. With an increasing number of WiFi hotspots becoming available to the public, spending the day outside scrolling through phones is becoming a daily routine for a younger Cuban generation. We are not only seeing WiFi being provided in hotel lobbies, and internet cafe’s; today’s WiFi availability in public spaces is creating a new type of socialization among the people.When most Americans think of internet consumption they picture a recluse teenager sitting, spending the entire day inside; but in Cuba, where internet at home is a rare luxury, many people have to go outside to public spaces to get connected.

Social movements are caused changes in organizational structures such as economic, institutional and social contexts of a country occur. In this context by growing the country’s access to social media,these changes in structural conditions make movements more likely. Social movements are not created by a single variable but rather by a set of variables that create an interaction effect, but successful movements are about mobilizing people for action and when they can persuade a significant amount of people that their cause is relevant and significant to the society’s betterment.

People in parks now sharing with each other what they find on the internet and holding discussions about what they are missing out on is just a stepping stone in the reform the Cuban people are hoping to achieve.  The internet being used as a tool for mobilization is giving their cause more attention and deeply worrying communist supporters who are wary about the impact it would have on the future of their party and political life on the island.  Discovering new ways to mass organize is just as essential for the occurrence of social movements as the grievances that would intrigue the people to organize in the first place, and social media is just one of the many websites giving voices to those people who would have not had one. By having ordinary people challenge the status quo and expressing their grievances in public spaces, potentially could lead to a new social movement. This is a step up from the extremely slow internet connection, and government run websites where most of the material posted was censored, and privacy rights violated.

Improving the ability of Cubans to the connect with the rest of the world will help foster economic growth and improve human rights on the island.

By being able to engage in discussions on relevant issues facing the community in open spaces with others listening,could one day lead to a new type of government for and by the people. Freedom of expression in internet communities could potentially lead a younger more exposed generation to radicalize through exposure to centrist, capitalist policies. This new type WiFi revolution would open the people of Cuba to unlimited reproduction and instantaneous distribution of digitized intellectual property of any kind worldwide virtually without cost.

The Cuban people do not want their growing right taken away, nor do they want to abuse their newly found power. Pressuring government authorities to facilitate talks with representatives from companies such as Google and Amazon to build partnerships and secure the economic future of small businesses, would open the door to new economic endeavors and allow declining industries that have been hindered by slow or no internet connection to prospers on the island.It may take some time to see some government reforms in Cuba by the people, but the eagerness and willingness by the people is there, they just need a better outlet to form a platform and united coalition.

Charles Tilly, who also defined social movements as a series of contentious performances, displays and campaigns by which ordinary people make collective claims on others, would agree when I say, that in a competitive world; in order to succeed we must be capable of handling technology in an appropriate matter, to express those opinions that matter the most to us, in order to catch up to other leading global players and not stay trapped in the 1950’s as Cuba once was.

The Role of Jamaican Nurses in Health Care Sectors

Mary Seacole was in London in 1854 when she heard about a shortage of nurses on the frontlines of the Crimean War. The Jamaican nurse offered her services but was turned away. Some contention remains about whether Seacole was rejected because she was a mixed-race woman or because she did not apply properly, but Seacole regardless navigated her own way to the battlefield. After opening a hotel and caring for soldiers near what is today Kadikoi, Ukraine, Seacole wrote a best-selling autobiography about her experiences travelling the world.

On its face, the story of a Jamaican nurse stepping forward to try and fill a need in the United Kingdom’s healthcare system seems like a relic of the colonial era. But fifty-five years after Jamaica gained its independence, Jamaican nurses are still heading to the United Kingdom. Unlike Mrs. Seacole, they are not being turned away. On the contrary, they are being given job offers that they cannot refuse.

The Caribbean Community and Common Market estimates that between 1996 and 2006, 50,000 nurses left Jamaica to work in other countries. This migration resulted in a loss for Jamaica of $2.2 million dollars in nurse training expenses. According to Janet Coore-Farr, head of the Nurses Association of Jamaica, Jamaica lost around one fifth of its specialized nurses in 2016 alone. The chairman of the University Hospital of the West Indies reports that around half of specialized nurses trained by the hospital are recruited by foreign organizations before they even graduate.

The nursing shortage has had dire consequences for the Jamaican healthcare system. Reports of short-staffed hospitals cancelling surgeries due to a lack of specialized nursing staff appear frequently in Jamaican newspapers. The impacts of the nursing shortage are not limited to any one sector of the healthcare system. According to a UN Development Programme report on Jamaica’s ability to meet the Millennium Development Goals, nursing shortages have adversely impacted Jamaica’s immunization and maternal health clinics. In 2006, the World Health Organization published a report providing evidence of a correlation between density of healthcare workers and population health outcomes.

Decades of nursing migration have caused a sizeable decline in nurses relative to Jamaica’s population. According to the World Bank, Jamaica had 1.65 nurses and midwives per 1,000 people in 2003. By 2008, that number had decreased to 1.08. For comparison, the World Bank listed the average number of nurses and midwives for OECD nations at 7.7 per 1,000 population in 2012. Meanwhile, the demand for nurses in Jamaica is expected to grow as the population ages. The World Bank estimates that the English-speaking Caribbean will need  10,700 more nurses by the year 2025. Nurses are a key component of any healthcare system, and a shortage of this magnitude could leave the nation unprepared to handle disease outbreaks and other public health emergencies. But nurses are also a key component of Jamaican society, often serving on the frontlines of public health provision and education in their communities. Without an adequate number of nurses, these communities will suffer.

Push and Pull Factors in Jamaican Nursing Migration

At its core, Jamaica’s nursing shortage is the product of decades of nursing shortages in the developed world. A rising demand for nurses, due in part to increasingly complex needs of an aging population, has been coupled with a decreasing supply of qualified nurses in many countries. A 2007 study of nurses in the American Midwest region found that 38% of surveyed nurses reported feeling problematic burnout associated with their jobs. Young nurses are even more likely to experience burnout, with almost 44% of nurses under the age of 30 reporting the same level of burnout. The stressful nature of the nursing profession has been compounded by staff shortages, driving more nurses away from nursing. Ironically, the nursing shortage also been exacerbated by a shortage of nurses qualified to teach in nursing schools. Over 75,000 qualified applicants are turned away yearly from US nursing schools because of a shortage of qualified faculty.

As nursing shortages ravaged healthcare systems in places like the United Kingdom, United States, and Canada, these countries began working to attract qualified nurses from other countries. In the case of the United Kingdom, the migration of nurses from other parts of the Commonwealth began with the formation of the National Health Service. A BBC documentary drawing attention to Britain’s black nurses reports that as staff shortages threatened the nascent NHS, thousands of nurses from Britain’s colonized countries stepped in to fill the need. According to a 2017 report by the British parliament, around 1,700 Jamaican medical staff currently work for the NHS.

In the face of these staff shortages, Jamaican nurses are attractive candidates for international recruiters. As part of the English-speaking Caribbean, Jamaican nurses are usually native English speakers. Due to their English fluency, Jamaican nurses passed the National Council Licensure Examination, a test used in the licensing of nurses, at higher rates than other international applications.

What attracts Jamaican nurses to positions abroad? The promise of higher salaries is an important factor. The average starting salary for a nurse in Jamaica is around $8,000 US dollars, and even experienced nurses may only make $20,000. Compare this to the the average starting salary of a registered nurse in the US, which in 2015 was $65,490. And while international medical centers often offer Jamaican-trained nurses lower salaries than they would to graduates of US and UK medical schools, these salaries are still significantly higher than in Jamaica. The World Bank found that only 6% of non-migrant nurses were satisfied with their salaries, compared to 85% of nurses who migrated out of Jamaica.

The Future of Jamaican Nursing

What does Jamaica’s nursing shortage tell us about the modern-day relationships between former colonizers and the formerly colonized world? It tells us that, even in a postcolonial world, relationships between colonizers and the colonized are complex and are still primarily an issue of inequity. The nursing shortage contributes to very real disparities in healthcare quality between Jamaica and many of the nations that are recruiting their nurses. Short-staffed clinics and hospitals and overworked medical staff can negatively impact the quality of life for many Jamaicans.

The migration of Jamaican nurses to other countries in search of better employment opportunities also benefits Jamaica economically, further complicating the relationship between the county and more developed nations.In order to get the most complete picture of Jamaica’s nurses working abroad, it is important to highlight the benefits that working abroad provides to the nurses and their families as well as to the nation as a whole. Surveys of migrating Jamaican nurses have found that those who migrate are considering a number of non-economic factors, including the chance to reunite with family members abroad, access better professional development opportunities, and have a better quality of life overall. Working abroad for higher salaries also allows nurses to send remittances home to their families. Remittances comprise an important part of the Jamaican economy, with an estimated $2 billion in remittances being sent back to the country each year. This money can be used to benefit Jamaican families and communities in a very real way.

How can Jamaica and the countries whose healthcare systems benefit from employing Jamaican nurses work together to reduce the nursing shortage? In response to the shortage, Jamaica has begun employing an international recruitment system of its own. The island is hoping to bring medical personnel from India and Cuba into its healthcare system in order to fill vacant positions. This outcome is ironic: as the developed world continues to lure away Jamaica’s nurses, Jamaica must try to attract its own nursing from elsewhere in the developing world. By recruiting nurses from other developing countries, Jamaica runs the risk of creating nursing shortages elsewhere in the world. Even countries that invite their nurses to find employment abroad are not immune to shortage. Under the 2001–2004 Medium Term Philippines Development Plan, the Philippines trained and actively encouraged its nurses to seek employment overseas. But within a few years of implementing this policy, the Philippines faced a nursing shortage of its own. Relying on the recruitment of nurses from even poorer countries can lead to a cycle of recruitment and shortage that strains healthcare systems across the world.

It is clear that the developed world must also take steps to reduce its dependence on nurses from Jamaica and other developing nations. Jamaican Minister of Health Dr. Christopher Tufton addressed the United Nations in January of 2017 to request the organization’s help in crafting multilateral and bilateral agreements to encourage the developed world to more responsibly manage their need for medical personnel without straining the healthcare systems of other countries. Writing for the Online Journal of Issues in Nursing, nurses Brenda Nevidjon and Jeanette Erickson offer several recommendations for reducing the nursing shortage in the developed world. These recommendations include increasing the number of nurse educators to allow for larger numbers of nursing students in medical schools and implementing a combination of long- and short-term strategies to improve the recruitment and retention of nurses.

When Mary Seacole’s offers to provide medical care for British soldiers injured on the frontlines were rejected, she probably could not have imagined the day when British hospitals would clamor over the opportunity to hire Jamaican nurses. The nursing shortage in Jamaica raises important questions about the future of the Jamaican healthcare sector and the relations between former colonizers and the formerly colonized in today’s postcolonial landscape. Jamaican nurses have been serving the healthcare systems of the United Kingdom and other developed nations for centuries. Now it is time for the developed world to support Jamaica’s healthcare system in return.