The Implications of Türkiye and Brazil on Global Democracy

Fears of global democratic backsliding have become all but ubiquitous among international relations scholars, as complications emerge from fracturing in established democracies, such as the United States, and the rise of authoritarian powerhouses like China that offer an alternative political system for countries to consider. Are such fears warranted? Is democracy in retreat worldwide? To expand upon this discussion, this article will focus on two specific case studies of countries that could help forecast the future directions of democracy: Türkiye and Brazil.

This article will take a retrospective look at the political atmosphere in Brazil in the aftermath of Bolsonaro’s tumultuous 4 years in office, and a prospective look at the democratic outlook in Türkiye in the wake of the earthquakes and the forthcoming 2023 elections. In doing so, it will analyze what the domestic politics in these countries can tell us about what’s in store for global democracy.

Türkiye

Türkiye is in a crucial transition point, wherein the intersection of earthquakes, the general election, and the war in Ukraine could prove to have a ripple effect on democracy in Eastern Europe and beyond. Türkiye is facing a dire humanitarian crisis, with tens of thousands of casualties, billions of dollars in property damage, and millions of people being displaced, because of earthquakes in the region. The sheer scale of these earthquakes and the disruption of life that has ensued for large swathes of the Turkish population makes it pertinent for the AKP to address the immediate damage and mitigate the long-term effects to avoid adding insult to injury for Türkiye’s already struggling economy. With Türkiye’s elections mere months away, there’s little room for error, as resentment from a lackluster long-term response on Erdoğan’s part could jeopardize his bid for re-election. In that regard, the decision to call for elections a month earlier could backfire if the aftermath from the earthquakes isn’t addressed properly and lingers in the minds of voters when they’re casting their ballots.

The world is watching Erdoğan’s response intently, as it could prove to be a decisive moment for Western democracy and NATO unity. Another 5 years could embolden Erdoğan to consolidate more power, further endangering the already fragile system of checks and balances in place and eroding democratic institutions. Domestically, an emboldened Erdoğan could take past efforts to restrict the information available to the public one step further, through cracking down on dissent and curtailing the freedom of press, endangering a lifeline of any functioning democracy. Internationally, a successful re-election bid would provide Erdoğan with a concrete victory for him to tout as proof of the popularity of his policy, which he could use to justify further distancing from the West. Erdoğan’s intent and willingness to stall NATO operations is present and clear, it’s just restrained so he can gauge whether his base is receptive to it or not. Erdoğan’s refusal to let Sweden and Finland join NATO until he extracted concessions from alliance members was a clear example of this, and it could only be light work compared to what could happen if he wins re-election. A re-election would serve as validation for his foreign policy that promotes Türkiye’s self-interest above all else, including its NATO allies. The war in Ukraine is a test of Western resolve, and more pushback from Türkiye in NATO operations would only undermine the narrative of a cohesive unit that is committed to upholding international norms, and with it, Eastern European security.

Conversely, if Erdoğan’s election efforts are unsuccessful, a more democratic Türkiye could help NATO present a more unified front against Russia and put more pressure on countries such as Hungary and Poland to fall in line and undertake reforms to reinvigorate their democracies. If NATO’s greatest spoiler were to suddenly embrace cooperation with its fellow alliance members, it would send a clear signal to Putin that NATO is stronger than ever. Any desire Putin may have had to see whether NATO is bluffing about Article V commitments in the event of an invasion of the Baltics would be extinguished, effectively deterring further expansion in the region.

Furthermore, if Türkiye is on board with NATO operations, focus would be redirected towards two other members of the alliance that are struggling with democracy: Hungary and Poland. Without Türkiye to hide behind, Hungary and Poland would either fall in line with NATO initiatives, or risk being condemned by alliance members now that they’re in the spotlight. Hungary and Poland need not completely reform their democracies to be an asset for the alliance, nor should we expect them to, so long as they don’t stall NATO initiatives. Once Hungary and Poland are pressured into cooperation, NATO could reap the benefits of a more cohesive alliance, which would allow it to be more effective at accomplishing objectives across the board, but also would put autocracies on the defensive. In the absence of hurdles, NATO could pursue large initiatives that would make them more integrated than ever before. Further interdependence would strengthen NATO even more and allow it to take additional steps to promote democracy and condemn autocracy worldwide.

Brazil

Jair Bolsonaro ran on a platform that stoked nationalism among the populace by scapegoating globalization, gender minorities, and environmentalist efforts to protect the Amazon for the economic problems that the country was facing. By diving headfirst into the culture war, Bolsonaro was able to draw upon and weaponize the resentment brewing among the Brazilian public for his own political gain, a tactic that’s being increasingly used by politicians around the world.  Populists like Bolsonaro are able to tie people’s economic qualms to social issues, such as climate change and equality for members of the LGBTQIA+ community, areas which they may be underinformed or misinformed about, and use that confusion to steer them towards them. They identify that there is a problem that is causing dissatisfaction among the general public, pin the problem on something, and then argue that their policies can remedy the fabricated “cause” of the problem. By exploiting the ability to spread information quickly and the willingness of some to take this news at face value and without skepticism, Bolsonaro was able to win the Brazilian Presidential Election in October 2018.

Bolsonaro’s tenure was marked by repeated attempts to undermine democratic institutions, restrict the freedom of press, weaken the checks and balances in place, and was capped off with the promotion of unwarranted claims of electoral fraud. The installation of military officials into high-ranking government positions and efforts to close Congress and the Supreme Court sparked concerns of a return to Brazil’s military dictatorship. Then, in last October, Bolsonaro was unseated by former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in a run-off election, putting an end to his four years in office. Bolsonaro’s war on democracy was far from over, however, and was carried out by his supporters, who stormed the capital, calling for Bolsonaro to be reinstated as president, in an event that quickly drew comparisons to the January 6th insurrection. A cynic may look at these events over the past five years and be pessimistic about for the future of Brazilian democracy; however, Brazilian democracy’s perseverance through all of this offers reason for optimism, as it shows the resiliency of robust institutions in the wake of right-wing challenges.

Among the reasons to be sanguine about the outlook of Brazilian democracy is the durability of institutions. Brazil was only able to survive four years of constant attacks on democracy and an extravagant grand finale at the capital because of its durable institutions, which have been quick to adapt and respond to the attempts at unraveling the system. The Supreme Court’s consistent blocking of Bolsonaro’s undemocratic attempts to expand his power were complemented by Congress’ refusal to pass bills that condoned such behavior. The future looks bright for these institutions as Brazilians have elected a president who has shown a strong commitment to maintaining the integrity of them and working with them to achieve his efforts. Furthermore, the rejection of Bolsonaro’s particular brand of far-right populism by the masses is an indication of the strength of the movement against autocratic governance. The fact that Bolsonaro’s blatant disregard for the liberal international order and his anti-globalization, anti-environmental, and anti-immigrant stances were ultimately dissuasive to the Brazilian public is a win for liberalism and can inspire people worldwide to pushback against far-right populists. While skeptics might point to the recent election of far-right populists in other parts of the world, such as Giorgia Meloni in Italy, as a reason to be cautiously optimistic, or even pessimistic, about the future of global democracy, they underestimate the effect that experiencing a far-right populist presidency has on the strength of the resistance movement. In the United States, for example, a major reason that Joe Biden got 15 million more votes in the 2020 presidential election than Hillary Clinton got in 2016 was because of the resentment people had for the Trump administration—resentment that was only amplified by the administration’s incompetent response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Similarly, after experiencing 4 years of Bolsonaro’s abrasive style of politics, Brazilians reached the same conclusion, and there’s fair reason to believe that Italians will too, and that Italian democracy will emerge stronger than ever.

Closing Thoughts

This article sought to expand the conversation on democratic backsliding by examining the democracies of two powerful international players: Türkiye and Brazil. Turkish democracy is at a crossroads, and it’s likely that the road it embarks upon will depend on the Erdoğan administration’s response to the earthquakes. If the response is successful and receives public praise, it could allow Erdoğan to secure another term, which could spell the end of Turkish democracy. If the response is lackluster and receives continued scrutiny, then a challenger could unseat Erdoğan and revitalize Turkish democracy through pursuing domestic reforms to strengthen the institutions and increase cooperation with its NATO allies, bolstering European democracy in the process. Similarly, Brazil’s democratic resilience offers a case for optimism about the ability of democracy to persevere against right-wing power grabs. Brazil’s ability to withstand several massive shocks to the system indicates remarkable democratic resilience, and not only does Lula’s victory offer a beacon of hope for protestors around the world who are fighting to reverse democratic backsliding in their country, it provides optimism for democratic prospects in other countries, such as Italy. Ultimately, it’s time to look closely at Turkish politics and see if their democracy shares the same resilience as Brazil’s.

Turkish Honor Culture and the Philosophy of Surveillance

By all accounts Pınar Gültekin was an ordinary, young Turkish woman studying economics at the Muğla University School of Economics. She was bright, ambitious, and beloved by her family. In the summer of 2020 she disappeared. After days of searching, her body was found, having been brutally strangled. Following a police investigation and court case it was revealed that Gültekin had been killed by her former partner, Cemal Metin Avcı, who claimed to have murdered Gültekin in a “moment of anger.” However, further investigation revealed that Avcı had the help and support of his family members in covering up his crime. Originally condemned to life in prison, Avcı’s sentence was then dramatically reduced to twenty-three years, given the “unjust provocation” by Pınar Gültekin that drove him to murder her.

Femicide

         The tragic and horrifying death of Pınar Gültekin is unfortunately one of many murders of Turkish women in recent years. Femicide, the intentional killing of women or girls, is the most violent form of misogyny, and its rise across Turkish society is cause for international concern. The Stockholm Center for Freedom recently reported that thirty-one Turkish women in the month of August alone were victims of femicide. These women were murdered by their male partners and relatives, frequently after having already issued a restraining order or having left the relationship.  The World Health Organization defines femicide in four distinct categories: intimate femicide (committed by a current or former husband or boyfriend); non-intimate femicide; “honor killing” (when the motive is to preserve/restore his family’s honor); and dowry-related femicide (the husband and in-laws kill the bride when the family does not meet the dowry demands) (Toprak and Gokhan, 2). Experts have traced the increase in femicide killings to the “policies of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, which protects violent and abusive men by granting them impunity.” Cemal Metin Avcı’s reduced sentence and the practice of reducing sentences on the basis of female provocation are examples of such policies.

Pınar Gültekin’s death is an example of both an intimate death and an honor killing within the categories of femicide. Examining the origins of honor-based femicide killings lies in the Turkish societal practice of honor and surveillance.

Honor Culture

Honor culture is an international phenomenon which has existed across societies for thousands of years. Across cultures and continents there are thousands of examples of varying forms of honor culture. In ancient Rome, honor culture frequently led to justified honor killings, and Roman law punished men who refused to kill their adulterous female family members. Thousands of years later, the British Empire established the British Penal Code of 1860 which introduced “the notion of ‘modesty’, and related concepts of ‘chastity’, ‘enticement’ and ‘abduction’, as part of a framework of collective ‘honor’. Rather than safeguarding the rights of the affected individual woman, the law upheld the rights of third parties, be it the state, community or immediate family members.” Honor culture exists in varying forms; it can not be understood as a national issue applying to each and every citizen, but varies at a regional, familial, and individual level. In contemporary Turkish culture, honor determines both an individual's worth and societal structure through connecting individual honor to one's family. Therefore, honor exists as a collective that can be applied and upheld by an entire family. However, this complicates an individual’s relation to honor, because their honor can be destroyed by the actions of another family member. Turkish families must broadcast their honor as a collective unit to society. When women break behavioral norms, such as by acting more masculine or immodest, they not only destroy their own honor, but also the honor of their male family members which in-turn affects societal harmony by destroying the honor of the family unit. Retaliation often takes the form of violence or murder which has led to the increase in femicide and phenomena of “honor killings.” Honor killing refers to the cultural practice of killing an individual to protect the family or society’s honor. However, in Turkey there is a further complicated element in which “there seems to be a social apprehension that man’s violence against the ‘insubordinate’ female is understandable and justified.” Turkish male violence is directly linked to the longstanding multicultural acceptance of justifying violence when it stems from defending one’s honor. Consensual understanding that women’s purity is seen as the symbol of family honor, thus allowing family members to avenge anyone who compromises her honor, especially if it is the woman herself.

Unpacking the Origins of Honor Culture

French philosopher Michel Foucault was fascinated by society’s obsession with surveillance as a means of control and regulation, and much of his philosophical analysis can be seen as an attempt to create a visual metaphor for modern day surveillance. Applying the Foucauldian [BJ1] concept of surveillance provides a new lens of analysis and method of understanding for the intersection between honor culture and surveillance. Foucault described societal surveillance as a panopticon: a philosophical concept based on a unique prison design that was structured to ensure constant surveillance for all individuals within the prison. The panopticon has become a metaphor in surveillance studies as a tool to analyze the role of surveillance in a certain culture or industry. Honor culture relies on the societal acceptance of being watched constantly, as if under  the watch of an ever-present panopticon. Constant surveillance creates a unique human experience, as individuals adjust their behavior to cope with the limitations imposed upon them due to a constant “assumed gaze.” Much of the self-regulation that exists in Turkish honor culture is directly linked to individuals dealing with the pressure of being constantly watched.  Foucault also wrote about how self-regulation due to surveillance creates a “discipline blockade” that refers to how individuals regulate their behavior in dangerous and fatal ways as a response to surveillance. Although it may not directly kill, constant surveillance creates environments in which individuals can put their own life at risk because of the constraints against them. In Turkey the highest rates of suicide occur for young women under the age of twenty-four. Although experiences of suicide are highly individual, there are numerous reports of Turkish women attempting to end their own lives as a result of the pressure they felt from their family and community to protect their honor and purity. When seventeen year old Derya’s [BJ2] family discovered her romantic relationship, they informed her that she had blackened the family name and needed to kill herself in order to end the family’s shame.  Despite wanting to live, Derya felt immense pressure and obligation: “My family attacked my personality, and I felt I had committed the biggest sin in the world..I felt I had no right to dishonor my family, that I have no right to be alive. So I decided to respect my family’s desire and to die.” Thankfully, her suicide attempts failed, and she sought refuge at a Turkish women’s [BJ3] shelter. However, Derya’s story reveals that the lack of agency and opportunity that Turkish honor culture gives to young women is deadly.

The severity and devastation of Turkey’s honor culture lies in its systemic surveillance, which both requires and encourages a constant shared observation of every individual. Justified male violence against women may first appear as a result of patriarchal culture that is dominated by misogynistic thinking; however further examination of honor culture reveals that it is rooted not in misogyny, but in surveillance. Pearce and Vitak explain that “Surveillance is the norm in such cultures because others must validate that an individual is adhering to the behavioral code.” An individual must be constantly watched by their family and society, while simultaneously watching others, in order to make sure that their collective honor is respected. As previously mentioned, an individual cannot determine one’s own honor, instead it is directly linked to their family and community; this collective concept of honor therefore demands a culture of surveillance. Individuals are both constantly watched and constantly watching others.

Surveillance as a tactic

An awareness of constant surveillance is behind the fear and motivation for engaging in honor culture, but awareness also requires understanding how surveillance can appear as different manifestations of power. Surveillance can exist at the state sanctioned level; this type of surveillance manifests itself in virginity examinations imposed upon women that can be requested at the behest of individuals, police, and schools. In a survey conducted on virginity examinations, 70% of Turkish doctors reported conducting at least one virginity examination that year. The legal system is another form of institutional and state sanctioned surveillance. By refusing to adequately punish men accused of honor killings, the legal institution is indirectly contributing to surveillance culture by creating an atmosphere in which surveillance and violence can thrive. However, surveillance can also occur at the private level, such as between families. As revealed above, honor killings are frequently carried out by a woman’s male relations, thus revealing how surveillance is conducted in the home. Familial surveillance builds relationships of cynicism and distrust between family members.

Conclusion

Understanding the role that systemic surveillance plays in honor culture is key for Turkey to overcome the issue of femicide. In order to eradicate femicide rooted in honor killings, Turkish legal institutions must place greater effort towards recognizing the larger institutional barriers that surveillance supports. Although there is dire need for reform and justice, Turkish activists are rallying and protesting across the country to ensure that the deaths and lives of Pınar Gültekin and other victims of honor killings are not forgotten or ignored. Organizations, such as the Turkish Women and Democracy Association, known as KADEM, work tirelessly to advocate for greater gender equality for men and women across Turkey. The Turkish Women Union seeks to promote women’s political rights and agency across the country. Other organizations, such as We Will Stop Femicide (WWSF) actively combat the issue itself. These varying organizations all demonstrate the important role of Turkish civic society and collective organization. Despite Turkey’s current authoritarian regime, the brave work done by feminist and human rights organizations, as well as individual citizens can allow us to be optimistic.

Russia’s New Role as Mediator in the MENA Region

President Donald Trump made the abrupt and heavily criticized decision to pull American military personnel out of the Turkey-Rojava border in early October 2019, allowing Turkey to invade the Kurdish-controlled land and for Russian troops to quickly occupy the space that had previously been occupied by United States (U.S.) troops. Since then, the international community has been speculating about Russia’s new role as a mediator in the Middle East, as their rocky past of national-interest-driven policy in the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region has led some to call for an examination of Russia’s priorities in the MENA region. If  Russia’s future endeavors prove successful, Russia has the potential to replace the United States as the most influential non-regional power in the Middle East.

As the successor state to the Soviet Union, Russia inherited all of the experience and influence that the Soviets had earned when politicking in the Middle East. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States were constantly participating in proxy wars. Many of these proxy wars took the shape of civil wars and political coups in the Middle East and Africa, including the Congo Crisis and the Angolan Civil War. However, Middle Eastern and African allies of the Soviet Union were often “disappointed” with the quality of their support: weaponry and training provided by the USSR was less advanced than those provided by the U.S., and the Soviet Union failed to prevent the defeat of their allies. As a result, the general opinion of the Soviet Union--and later, the Russian Federation--gradually declined among Arabs and many states instead turned to the U.S. for monetary and military assistance. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s influence and involvement in the region has diminished as the state’s leaders focused on domestic growth and reform. The United States assumed the helm of the most influential non-regional power in the MENA region and has managed to protect this title without serious competitors until President Trump withdrew American troops from the contested area in northern Syria in October 2019.

Now, the tables have turned. Russian involvement in Middle Eastern politics was renewed in the early 2000’s, shortly after Russian President Vladimir Putin took office. Attempts to regain influence in the MENA region were generally unsuccessful, as before 2011 the only significant mode of influence that Russia pursued were arms sales. Middle Eastern politics were not a priority of Russia until the Arab Spring of 2011, when the protests and revolutions that occurred during this tumultuous time had the potential to destroy any remaining allies that Russia had been able to retain in the Middle East. As their allies in the region began toppling one by one, Russia began to support Syria in earnest through their diplomatic powers in the United Nations. When faced with the possibility of being deposed, the Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, began using violence against Syrian protesters and revolutionaries. Kurdish forces in northeastern Syria fought forcefully for their lands, resulting in Assad withdrawing troops from the region (now called Rojava), leaving nearly ¼ of Syria’s territory to the People’s Protection Units (YPG), a mostly-Kurdish militia. Thus, Russia’s eventual military intervention on behalf of Assad in September 2015, ordered under the guise of fighting terrorism in Syria, was welcomed by the Syrian president, and the deployed Russian forces were ordered to put down the rebels that were threatening Assad’s grasp on the rest of the country. It was this military intervention that cemented Russia’s role as a major player in Middle Eastern politics.

Russia’s decision to support Assad was not simply an attempt to retain allies in the Middle East; it was also a political power play of Putin to indicate Russia’s dedication to sovereignty and centralized government, which simultaneously affirmed Russia’s disapproval of Western leadership structures and military interventions. During the Arab Spring, protests in defiance of Putin and the illiberal policies of the Russian government were occurring throughout the Russian capital of Moscow. Instead of supporting the newly created liberal democracies like Western states (particularly the U.S.), Russia made a point to support the centralized, autocratic governance of Bashar al-Assad and, in doing so, was defending Russia’s own domestic interests. Allowing liberal democratic reform to completely destroy any relationships that Russia had in the Middle East would not only lessen the power and influence that the Kremlin had in the region, but would also diminish Putin’s own legitimacy as a strongman president.

Since the intervention in 2015, Russia has helped Assad regain control of nearly every major Syrian city outside of Rojava, launched peace talks, negotiated a demilitarized zone with Turkey, and maintained a significant military presence within Syria. Russia’s intervention is widely accepted by foreign policy experts as the only thing that ensured the continuation of Assad’s presidency, and the creation of de-escalation zones has helped Assad recapture large areas of land within Syria. Both Assad and Putin have also been heavily criticized by the international community for their use of drones and chemical weapons throughout the duration of the conflict. Russian drone strikes are estimated to have killed around 7,000 Syrian civilians alone, and more than 150 cases of chemical warfare have been reported within Syria since 2015. Although the international community has attempted many times to hold Bashar al-Assad responsible for these war crimes, Russia has proven itself to be both a difficult obstacle for the West and a steadfast ally of Syria. Turkey has been particularly vocal in their condemnation of Erdogan’s and Putin’s actions, as more than 3.6 million refugees of the Syrian Civil War have already fled to Turkey.

Turkey protested heavily when Assad allowed the lands in northern Syria to be occupied by the YPG, as the Turkish government believes the YPG to be associated with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a recognized terrorist organization that has been leading an insurgency in Turkey for many years. When the U.S. troops withdrew, Turkey’s military was able to stage an incursion into the Kurdish-controlled lands of northern Syria, displacing thousands of Kurdish people. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has stated that he plans to resettle Syrian refugees in the northern Syrian lands occupied by Turkish soldiers. Outraged and at risk, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Syria’s Kurdish militia alliance with whom the U.S. had partnered with in an effort to fight the Daesh in Rojava, were forced to make a deal with Assad that allowed his army to advance to the border of Turkish-claimed territory. Thus, the U.S. withdrawal has incited anger and conflict in a region where they had once hoped to prevent further violence.

Acting as a mediator, Russian forces directed the SDF and the Syrian army to the land which had been besieged by Turkey for the past month. On October 22nd, Russian President Putin and Turkish President Erdogan met in Sochi to negotiate a ceasefire. They reached an agreement which created a 75-square mile “safe-zone” along the Turkish-Syrian border, away from which the YPG militia was forced to fall back. Since then, a joint force of Russian and Turkish military has been patrolling the new safe-zone and nearby borderlands to ensure the YPG doesn’t return, and the U.S. has promised to assist in keeping the Kurdish out of the area. As of the time at which this article was written, clashes within the safe zone continue.

Although the Turkish incursion into Kurdish territory has upset many in the West and caused many deaths, Turkey, Russia and Syria have all benefited from the strife. Turkey received a new swath of land in which they can resettle refugees, Syria has further cemented their alliance with Russia, and Russia has gained a new role in this important region. The incursion also occurred during a time in which Russia was already seeing an increase in approval in the Middle East, which can be largely attributed to their “Astana process” dialogue between nations in the region and their well-trained diplomats. Now, having filled the space that the U.S. has abandoned as a mediator, Russia may be able to exert more influence than ever before.

In contrast, the U.S. is showing a decline in popularity within the region due to various foreign policy errors and military failures. President Donald Trump’s ban on migrants from several Muslim countries outraged the Arab community, and the U.S.’s failures in Afghanistan and Iraq have led some to doubt the American military’s ability to succeed in Middle Eastern conflicts. American approval in the region plummeted from 63 percent in 2016 to 41 percent in September 2019, before the U.S. troops were even removed from Northern Syria. This recent misstep, preceded by several years worth of unsuccessful operations and uncertain foreign policy have granted Russia many opportunities to improve their standing in the MENA region--all of which they have used to their advantage.

Since the Cold War, Russia’s foreign policy in the Middle East has been defined by competition with the West. Now that the U.S.’s influence has diminished and their reputation in the Middle East damaged, Russia is taking on the role of mediator between Syria, Turkey, and the Kurds. So far, Russia has taken to this role rather well by using the mistakes that the U.S. has made to their favor and putting the national interests of Russia ahead of the interests of the region.

Most of the actions that Russia has already taken thus far in the MENA region have been entirely self-serving in nature, and either directly or indirectly serve to improve Putin’s grasp of leadership on the world stage. The jihadist threat that created conflict in Chechnya and Dagestan has contributed to Russian foreign policy in the Middle East, as part of their national defense strategy is to prevent terrorism within Russia by fighting jihadist and Islamic terrorist groups while they remain outside of Russia. Additionally, having allies within the Middle East will give Russia access to negotiations regarding oil; as a major oil exporter, Russia would gain from the ability to negotiate international oil prices with other oil rich countries throughout the Middle East.  

By courting Turkey and Syria simultaneously, Russia accomplishes two goals--maintaining influence and power within the MENA region, and pulling Turkey away from its NATO allies. And they’re succeeding--Turkey’s western allies have been withdrawing arms deals, expressing outrage, and threatened sanctions for their recent treatment of the Kurds, engagement in Russian arms deals, and Erdogan’s newfound friendship with Vladimir Putin. Despite the complicated relationship that Turkey and Russia have had in the past, both Erdogan and Putin are more than likely to agree to a new, more friendly relationship if it proves beneficial for both leaders in the long run. Currently, Russia provides Turkey with more than half of its natural gas and almost a quarter of its oil. Additionally, a flourishing trading agreement and the status of Turkey as a popular tourist destination for Russians give Russia and Turkey a very positive economic relationship. This relationship couldn’t come at a better time for the two countries, who are both languishing under Western sanctions. All of these factors are only certain to push Turkey further into the grasp of the Kremlin, as they will be more than happy to continue providing Turkey with arms while simultaneously pulling them away from NATO.

Russian influence and presence in the MENA region is self-serving and interest-driven; however, the presence of the Russian military in Syria and the negotiations and peace talks occurring under the Russian flag have caused some to wonder whether or not a new influence is needed in the Middle East. Others argue that if the non-Western solution means selling out the Kurds, the solutions aren’t worth ponderance. Many opportunities to mediate the conflict have arisen from failures on behalf of the West, and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s skillful navigation of the relationship between Syria and Turkey has astounded policy makers throughout the international community. As Russia continues to engage in peace talks and negotiations, the world watches with bated breath. If Vladimir Putin truly wishes to restore Russia’s status as a major player within the Middle East, he’ll have to continue successfully mediating a conflict that seems to have no easy solution. 

Rogue Ally: Despite Turkish Aggression, the U.S. Should Support the SDF in Syria

On July 20, 2019, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo called his Turkish counterpart, Mevlut Cavusoglu, to discuss the growing list of issues between the pair of longtime allies. While no transcript was provided, the State Department released a summary that, despite its brevity, managed to encapsulate the Trump Administration’s stance on Turkey and Syria: ever ambiguous and deficient in courage. As Turkish troops amassed on the Syrian border, threatening an invasion of territory liberated from the Islamic State (ISIL) by the U.S.-allied Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Secretary Pompeo “reaffirmed” U.S. commitment to Turkish national security while also “reiterating” its support of allied forces in Syria.

What these contradictory statements mean for said American allies –particularly the Kurds, who, in spite of their integral role defeating ISIL, are frequently labeled “terrorists” by Turkish pro-government media– is highly unclear. It is notable that since President Donald Trump’s abrupt call for a total withdrawal of American forces in Syria, then subsequent flip-flop two months later, Washington’s foremost think tanks have gone conspicuously silent on the issue of U.S.-Turkey relations as they relate to Syria, focusing instead on President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s apparent gravitation toward Russia following his government’s purchase of the S-400 missile systems. One can hardly blame them; it is, in fact, quite difficult to analyze a policy when the policy doesn’t appear to exist.

That isn’t to say that the U.S. has been entirely inactive. After Germany declined an American request to deploy ground troops to Syria, both France and the United Kingdom pledged 10 to 15 percent more soldiers, a victory for a president that campaigned on promises to lighten the burden on the U.S. military. However, one report notes that such an increase translates to only “several dozen” troops, an inadequate quantity considering the size of SDF-controlled territory. Additionally, top U.S. officials have visited SDF officials in Syria twice in the past two months, but discussions reportedly centered on counterterrorism strategy rather than political solutions to the Syrian conflict or the looming threat of a Turkish invasion. These are the questions that need answering. No one doubts U.S. desire to combat terrorism.

What the Trump Administration fails to realize –or at the very least, is too content with a tenuous status quo to do anything– is that good counterterrorism requires robust and lasting support, politically as well as militarily. The U.S. certainly desires the enduring defeat of ISIL, but its failure to develop tangible policy reflects a lackluster, fragile commitment to preventing the revival of an extremist safe haven. With multiple regional parties demonstrating aggression toward the SDF, the U.S. needs to act quickly and decisively in support of its ally by pressuring all parties involved into a fair, multilateral deal grounded in citizen security and civil liberties. Continuing down this path of inaction will only result in the perpetuation of conflict, the prolonging of the refugee crisis, and the potential for a revival of a territorial ISIL.

Current Threats to Stability in Northeastern Syria

Presently, the SDF-held territory in northeastern Syria –known as the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (NES)– rests in an extraordinarily precarious position. Its western border is shared with two parties, the Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army (TFSA) and Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian Arab Army (SAA), both of which –though in conflict with one another– oppose the SDF. The TFSA, in congruence with the anti-Kurdish sentiments of its patron, has launched two major operations that targeted Kurds, the latter of which resulted in “widespread human rights violations” and displaced over 150,000 people from Syria’s Afrin district. As for the Syrian regime forces, Assad has stated that he intends to retake all territory within Syria’s pre-war borders, an undertaking that would take years, but, considering his backing from Russia, is a credible threat nonetheless.

Internally, the SDF struggles against remnants of ISIL. Having been territorially defeated in March, its militants now resort to asymmetrical warfare in the form of urban bombings and rural arson; the former disrupts a sense of rare, cherished stability in a region engulfed by conflict, while the latter destabilizes an already feeble economy. ISIL cells have destroyed some 50,000 acres of NES land since May, reportedly costing the nascent governing administrations $50 million worth in crops.

Turkey’s Historical Oppression of the Kurds and its Contemporary Relevance

While the TFSA, Assad regime, and ISIL cells make for pressing threats, the NES’ greatest challenge emanates from its northern neighbor. Since the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the founding of the Republic of Turkey, Turkish authorities have sought national unity through societal homogeneity, or Turkification. This policy essentially criminalizes cultural diversity; from the Armenian Genocide in the early 20th century to today’s ongoing anti-Semitism, minorities in Turkey have long faced persecution at the hands of the government. In Turkey’s Kurdish Question, a 1998 book by Graham E. Fuller and Henri J. Barkey, the authors point out that the government’s anti-Kurdish sentiment was not just rhetoric, but law:

In the 1924 [Republic of Turkey] constitution, the terms “citizenship” and “citizen” had been equated with Turkishness. Accordingly, the document stated that one had to be a Turk to become a member of parliament and the like. Certainly Kurds could qualify as “Turks,” but only at the expense of denying their own ethnic identity.

Rather than do so, Kurds organized and revolted, most notably in the form of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). In 1984, after years of preparation and intra-Kurdish strife, the PKK launched its insurgency against the Turkish state, striking military checkpoints and barracks in the towns of Semdinli and Eruh. It was the start of a decades-long conflict that, despite the 1999 capture of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan and the occasional ceasefire, endures today.

Herein lies Turkey’s issue with American partnerships in Syria. The SDF is a pluralistic organization consisting of Arabs, Syriac Christians, and Yazidis, among others, but it is predominantly Kurdish, having originated from the People’s Protection Units (YPG), a well-organized Syrian Kurdish militia dating back to 2004. The U.S. listed the PKK as a terrorist organization in 1997 but never extended its designation toward the YPG. Turkey, on the other hand, views the YPG as an extension of the PKK, and given its proximity to Turkey’s southeastern borders, as a viable threat to its national security. 

The Case for the SDF

I suppose this is the world we live in: one in which a state can spend nearly a century attempting to erase the identities of its indigenous ethnic groups, then throw a tantrum when one of them decides to revolt. The only catch here is that the SDF, unlike the PKK, does not aspire to harm Turkey, its well-armed bully of a neighbor; in fact, the U.S. formed its alliance with the SDF on the condition that it would not target Turkish state forces, as such an attack would require an American response under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization charter. All NES residents want is for the Assad regime, ISIL, and Turkey to leave it alone.

Why should the U.S. stand by the SDF? For one, the U.S. is safer with a stable Levant. ISIL’s rise was only possible because of the vacuum created by the Syrian Civil War. With a well-governed political entity positioned in its former territory, the vacuum closes, and the region is less susceptible to extremist violence. This is especially critical given the SDF’s protection of the al-Hol camp, a facility holding some 70,000 displaced individuals, many of whom are family members of former ISIL militants. Deputy major commander of the U.S.-led coalition called inhabitants of al-Hol the “next generation” of ISIL, but the international community has taken no major steps to resolve the problem. The U.S. could take the lead by assisting the SDF and human rights organizations in maintaining and securing the camps while administering rehabilitation programs and returning foreign fighters to their native countries for trial.

Secondly, U.S. presence in the region acts as another theater to indirectly confront Iran. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s government has real influence in Syria and Iraq via its support of the Assad regime, its regional militias, and the transnational shipping route often referred to as the “land bridge.” A capable, U.S.-supported SDF can deter the Assad regime and Iranian militias from encroaching in northeastern Syria, and its presence also inhibits Iranian arms, supplies, and fighters from reaching the Syrian regime or Hezbollah, Iran’s proxy force in Lebanon and a principal threat to Israel.

Lastly, the SDF’s territories is the antithesis of its enemies. NES is a multiethnic, religiously diverse entity operating on principles of feminism, secularism, and local governance, all of which are in sharp contrast to Erdogan’s nationalism, ISIL’s extremism, and Assad’s autocracy. It is rare that the U.S. arms militants whose values reflect a fervent interest in human rights and democracy.

Reevaluating the U.S.-Turkey Relationship

Whereas the SDF has proven itself as an accountable ally, Turkey’s domestic political trends and ties to Syrian-based extremist groups suggest that its relationship with the U.S. is not what it used to be. The U.S. cannot afford to be sclerotic in its foreign policy –realizing and adapting to changing realities is requisite to being a positive global force– and at the present, it must respond to Turkey’s gross incompetence in combatting terrorism and clear democratic backsliding. 

Known as the “gateway to Jihad,” the Turkish-Syrian border became a port for the 40,000 foreign fighters that traveled to participate in the conflict. With ISIL recruits pouring over the Turkish border into Syria, the Erdogan government played dumb, refusing to implement even basic measures that would stem the flow of fighters. Scant oversight at the border allowed active militants to retreat into Turkey for health services. “We used to have some fighters — even high-level members of the Islamic State — getting treated in Turkish hospitals,” an ISIL commander told the Washington Post in 2014.  “And also, most of the fighters who joined us in the beginning of the war came via Turkey, and so did our equipment and supplies.”

Turkey stood to gain from an extremist insurgency in Syria in the most cynical of senses; the republic shares two common enemies with Da’esh and like-minded groups, the Alawi government in Damascus and the majority Kurdish population in the northeast. Now that its initial strategy to defeat Kurdish-led forces via extremist proxies has failed, President Erdogan’s government is transitioning to plan B, applying significant political and military pressure on the SDF in an effort to bring the U.S. to a detrimental agreement. The aforementioned TFSA invasion of Afrin in 2018 was not a direct threat to American ground forces, but it drew Kurdish SDF militias out of NES territory who wanted to protect Kurdish civilians, weakening the region’s security. In early July, Turkey began amassing troops along the NES border, and shortly after, Foreign Minister Cavusoglu warned of an attack if his government’s proposed “safe zone” was not established. As of today, Turkey’s aggression has met little U.S. resistance.

Recommendations: Robust Military, Economic, and Political Support for the SDF

Turkey hopes that its acts of aggression will force the U.S. to accept its proposed “safe zone,” a plan that roughly translates to Turkey unilaterally annexing of a large portion of SDF-controlled territory. This is a nonstarter for Syria’s Kurds, who justifiably expect persecution under a Turkish occupation. Thus, the U.S. needs to move quickly and definitively against Turkish pressure by supporting the NES with increased military presence, as well as valuable economic and political assistance.

In regards to military support, the U.S. and coalition members should increase the number of ground troops in the NES. While thousands of Turkish troops are gathering on the border, U.S. coalition forces are said to only number in the hundreds. This is not an endorsement of armed conflict with our NATO ally. The issue is that Turkey believes the U.S. is susceptible to persuasion, and with good reason; after all, President Trump’s decision to withdraw forces in December came immediately after a phone call with President Erdogan. By succumbing to pressure, President Trump demonstrated uncertainty about supporting the SDF, an uncertainty that Turkey is currently exploiting. An increase in troops would signal firm commitment to the SDF, robbing Turkey of its diplomatic leverage and granting NES residents peace of mind.

Economic well-being is closely related to citizen security Northeastern Syria, with its sprawling agricultural fields and oil reserves, has unique potential to thrive economically, but it lacks the adequate technology to do so; currently, Syrian farmers use antiquated methods to harvest their wheat and have no way to effectively fight the crop fires ignited by Da’esh arsonists. Destroyed roads can inhibit the transportation of goods and aid, and damaged sewers create sanitation problems. The U.S. should formally declare its backing of the SDC and provide it with the resources it needs to develop sustainably.

Political recognition and assistance would permit the SDC a seat at the negotiating table, giving northeastern Syria a say in its future. As of the publication of this article, Syrian opposition parties have not allowed SDC representatives to participate in talks with the Assad regime and its international backers. Demonstrations of international support for the SDC, such as a Swedish delegation visit in early July, have reportedly warmed opposition parties to the idea of inviting SDC representatives to talks. A clear demonstration of American support would influence them further.

Final Thoughts: Support of SDF is Worth the Diplomatic Rift

In April, I wrote that the U.S. should revise its policy toward Saudi Arabia given its perpetration of human rights abuses and continued failure to curb extremism. The U.S.-Saudi relationship runs deep, but American policymakers are too keen to turn a blind eye to the Kingdom’s transgressions for the sake of the relationship. Turkey’s case is similar; as with the Saudi regime, we could bend to its wishes, defer to the judgment of its leaders, and dismiss undemocratic and harmful policies as irrelevant or untrue. President Erdogan’s behavior in his region is his prerogative, the thinking goes; as an ally, we trust him to act broadly in our interest.

However, this is clearly not the case, and it’s time to turn a new page in U.S.-Turkey relations. Its faults are egregious and well-documented, and its enemies are our friends. The U.S. should not fear divergence from an ally if that ally diverges from American values and goals.

Fixing an International Dilemma in an Unstable Region: U.S. Mitigation of the Turkish-Kurdish Conflict

The Dilemma

The long-standing relationship between the United States and Turkey continues to deteriorate due to the intensifying armed conflict between the Turkish military and Kurdish insurgent groups in Syria, Iraq and Iran who desire an independent Kurdistan that would give them greater political and cultural rights.

To combat the Islamic State (IS), the United States supports the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union (PYD) and relies on the PYD’s military wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG). Yet the main reason for the ongoing U.S.-Turkey military conflict lies in US support of the PYD. Because Turkey is battling the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), a listed terrorist group that President Erdoğan believes is an offset of the PYD, Turkey sees American support for these Kurdish organizations as undermining their interests and regional power.

It is imperative that the United States act immediately to de-escalate the tensions between Turkey and various Kurdish insurgent groups while continuing the fight against the Islamic State, who, despite recently losing territory and influence in the region, continues to pose a threat to nearby countries and the US. The United States in particular is one of the leading actors in this issue, and must continue to be a primary fighting force, because national interests are at stake. As long-term NATO allies, the US and Turkey not only share an allyship, but Turkey is in a key geopolitical position, serving as a central point between Asia, Europe, and Africa. By mending their relationship with Turkey, the US will continue to be able to rely on Turkey as the only Muslim NATO member to serve as a bridge between the Western and Muslim worlds, which can help stabilize the volatile Middle East. Furthermore, Turkey similarly relies on the United States and its Western forces to battle the IS, a group that continues to engage in violent terrorist attacks within the country.

Failure to immediately rectify the situation may result in the degradation of the US-Turkey alliance and the growth of the Islamic State. Should the US side with the Kurds, they run the risk of Turkey strengthening their political and economic relationship with Russia, and it could push Turkey to further retaliate against the YPG and ultimately the US. Yet, the United States relies heavily on Kurdish insurgency groups, such as the PYD, as the main fighting forces against the IS on the ground, especially in aiding local Arab militias in Syria. Therefore, if the United States sides with Turkey, they may lose critical Kurdish trust and military support in the fight against the IS due to the tension between the Turks and the Kurds. Nevertheless, fixing the rising tensions is possible and can be done three ways: by revising the current Turkish Constitution, continuing to supply Kurdish fighters with American weapons, and utilizing the US-Turkey relationship as NATO allies to begin talks of a ceasefire.

First Recommendation: Modify the Turkish Constitution

The United States should encourage Turkey to make changes to its 1982 Constitution to grant basic rights back to the ethnic minority groups that reside in Turkey. Successfully updating the constitution should be a priority in solving the Turkish-Kurdish dispute. The conflict’s origins and subsequent intensification stems from the lack of rights attributed to the Kurds in the country’s constitution. The Turkish government historically oppressed Kurdish cultural identity and language through impediments in the process of assimilating them into society. After declaring itself a republic in 1923, Turkey’s capital of Ankara adopted an ideology with the goal of eliminating non-Turkish elements within Turkey, all of which were primarily Kurdish. The country’s efforts to “Turkify” individuals by relying on Turkish ethnicity to define citizenship resulted in the mass persecution of the Kurdish population, which is one of the driving forces behind the desire for an independent Kurdistan today.

As of now, the Turkish Constitution is authoritarian and alienating to those who aren’t of Turkish ethnicity, but unfortunately the discussion and possibility of revising the constitution has decreased. The lack of an inclusive constitution with rights and protections that extend to minority groups has been a factor in causing social unrest among the Kurdish population and furthering the mission of the PKK. This, again, contributed greatly to the Kurds’ desire to create an independent Kurdistan that would allow them to have greater political and cultural autonomy. Therefore, the Turkish Constitution should be revised immediately. Significant changes would make it more democratic and establish that all differences, such as ethnicity or language, are protected under the constitution. With this, the improvement in the view and treatment of the Kurds may lay the foundation for peace talks in the future.

Second Recommendation: Return to Supplying Arms

The United States should return to supplying weapons to Kurdish fighters in Syria who are combating the Islamic State. As of late 2017, President Trump announced that the US will no longer provide arms to the Kurds. However, the supply of weapons by the US is vital in creating a strongly armed group of Kurdish fighters that can successfully defend themselves as they counteract the IS. For example, in May 2017 President Trump approved a plan to arm the Kurds, and therefore the YPG, directly to prepare for their assault and capture of Raqqa, which was the IS’ de facto capital of the caliphate. Subsequently, after arming them with machine guns and other warfare weapons, the American-backed YPG successfully seized Raqqa in October of 2017 in what was a major blow to the legitimacy and control of the IS.

However, a drawback of this recommendation is that it could cause even more tension between the US and Turkey. Due to US support of the YPG, a group Turkey believes to be an extension of the PKK, Turkey’s President Erdoğan could see the supply of arms to the YPG as a threat to the country because those weapons could end up in the hands of the PKK. Yet, a benefit of this recommendation is that it aligns with America’s desire to decrease the number of troops deployed in Syria. By providing the Kurds with more weapons, the US can rely more on local forces and slowly begin to withdraw American troops from the conflict zone.

Third Recommendation: Negotiate a Ceasefire

Lastly, the United States should take advantage of its relationship with Turkey as NATO allies to lead a political peace process that negotiates a ceasefire between Turkish military forces and the Kurdish YPG in Syria. The YPG are instrumental in fighting the IS on the ground, yet they are suffering immense losses due to air and land attacks by Turkey’s military force.

However, a downside of this recommendation lies in the fact that Turkey views the YPG’s presence in Syria as a security threat to the country. Turkey’s President Erdoğan also considers the US’s support of the YPG militia to be a betrayal as he sees the YPG as an offset of the terrorist group PKK. Furthermore, the ceasefire would only provide a temporary solution to the complicated conflict so that the two sides could focus on defeating the IS.

An upside of this recommendation is that previous ceasefires between the Turkish government and the PKK succeeded for many years before they were eventually broken. While a ceasefire may be temporary, it would help centralize the fight around the IS and provide the foundation for more comprehensive peace talks and a long-term ceasefire in the future between the two groups.

Looking to the Future

The Turkish-Kurdish conflict began the moment Turkey failed to make a provision for a Kurdish state, thereby leaving the Kurds, a population of around 15 million in the country, with a minority status and a lack of both representation and rights. The tension between the two sides has been ongoing ever since, and as an ally to the United States politically and militarily, as they are instrumental in fighting the Islamic State, the US is heavily interested and involved in the conflict as well. As a result, all three recommendations for ways in which the United States can mitigate the Turkish-Kurdish conflict are presented with the following goals in mind: first, by successfully mitigating the conflict between the two groups, the US can begin to minimize the threat that the IS poses to them, as combating the IS would be easier when the two sides are working together with the same goal in mind; second, the US can start to decrease the volatility of the Middle East, as there will be one less pair of warring groups, and consequently states, to add to the mix.

The conflict continues in 2018, thirty-four years after the insurgency began, with little change. Since President Trump took office and called for a halt on the provision of arms to the Kurds, the Islamic State has lost territory, but still remains a threat, and tensions between the Turks and the Kurds remain high. Not much progress has been made between the two groups to de-escalate the situation, and the United States has failed to enact any significant changes. Unless these recommendations are made, the future for these two warring groups and the prospect of an independent Kurdistan looks to be the same as it currently is now: bleak.

The Turkish Question; An Emergence of Opportunity in the Levant In The Moment of Turkish Instability

“A nation which makes the final sacrifice for life and freedom does not get beaten.” – Mustafa Kemal Atatürk

The world watched with trepidation as military tanks rolled through the streets of Ankara the night of July 15th. Within a matter of hours, soldiers once loyal to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan took the Chief of Military Staff hostage, attacked both the Turkish parliament and intelligence headquarters, exchanged gunfire in Taksim Square with loyalist forces, and commandeered media channels to announce a victorious overthrow of Erdoğan’s government. Or so it seemed.

Turkey is no stranger to military coups d’etat, having experienced four successful instances since 1960. President Erdoğan has also withstood barrages from political opponents throughout his 14-year hold on power. It has been assessed that the frequency of these strikes against the Turkish government have been somewhat of an experimental tradition in Turkey; a protection and preservation of Turkish democratic principles against minacious leaders. That said, the residuum of July’s attempt has demonstrated to the Turkish citizens President Erdoğan’s Achilles heel—a loose grip on the reins of power—and has tightened his grip on Turkey with government and military purges, a long-awaited military campaign in Iraq and Syria, souring the relationship with the European Union, agitating relations with the United States over the extradition of rival Fethullah Gülen, and a strategic pivot towards Russia in a burgeoning joint-military and energy partnership. These policy tasks in just the two months following July 15th have brought scholars and analysts to question whether the light of the once-heralded beacon of Eurasia will dim or brighten under Erdoğan’s tighter hold on power.

In this analysis, I will assess the questions that have been and should be asked during this moment of Turkish instability. These enquiries will assess Turkey’s position moving forward into a post-purge state after nearly 58,000 Turkish citizens have been deposed of their positions, as well as the country’s standing on the international stage and in regional institutions. The aftershock of Turkey’s political earthquake has proved consequential—–to the United States, the European Union, the Kurdish people, and of course, the Turkish constituents. While the achievement of internal stability will continue to ebb and flow, I predict the country will converge as a theater to play out geopolitical conflicts, and where invested actors will exploit opportune interests—particularly of the United States’ struggle in the Levant.

Purging for Prepotency; Erdoğan’s Grasp on Government

On July 15th, the Turkish nation awoke to a government shaken by force and a leader rattled by such events. In a widespread expulsion so colossal that many have considered it to be pre-conspired, Erdoğan imprisoned over 7,500 soldiers, 118 generals and admirals, 3,000 members of the Turkish judiciary, 1,500 state ministry staffers, and 100 intelligence officials. This widespread purge of lingering governmental opposition did not halt at the state level, but even seeped into the Turkish educational sector, religious institutions, and media outlets; 21,000 private school teachers, 1,577 university deans, and 100 journalists were dismissed. Of these, 9,000 remain in custody. This leaves all facets of the Turkish government and public services overwhelmingly understaffed across all fields and professions. This “counter-coup” signifies a newfound tenacity that will characterize a new era of the Erdoğan administration—one that will flex its muscle of control at home, while exercising defying the wishes of the West and appeasing the East.

Strongman rule is not new under Erdoğan. Since becoming Prime Minister in 2002, Erdoğan has been controversial in his pursuit to institute and champion political Islam in a traditionally secularpolitical system, initiating a slew of experimental reforms that exacerbated the political differences between Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), the Justice and Development Party, and other Turkish institutions of democracy. This development necessitated political partnerships, such as the alliance with a Sunni clerk, Fethullah Gülen, the founder of the Hizmet movement. Such a movement swept the nation with a message of religious tolerance and moderate policies of educational immersion and national service, prompting many followers of Gülen to become civil servants in Erdoğan’s administration. But political convenience steered the AKP, and a growing schism between Erdoğan’s political Islam and Gülen’s cultural Islam emerged, resulting in Gülen’s flight to the United States due to a rumored deposition plot and a governmental declaration deeming Gülenists a terrorist organization. In Erdoğan’s political reality, such political adversaries and connivances are commonplace—an intrinsic perspective that become intertwined with Turkey’s foreign policy platform abroad.

The NATO Question

This phenomenon has brought a series of questions to the assemblies, podiums, and cabinets of governments and regional organizations across the international system. The Turkish moment has not been taken lightly in the global order. Turkey’s relative instability, Erdoğan’s autocratic tendencies, combined with the geopolitical and strategic goldmine of Turkey’s location, is an important policy issue leaders will face in the next year.

In the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Turkey stands as the second-largest military in membership, and serves as host to 24 NATO military bases. Even before July 15th, Turkey’s membership had been criticized of its failure to uphold the principles of the Treaty’s first preambulatory clause that mandates members have “stable democratic systems, pursue the peaceful settlement of territorial and ethnic disputes, have good relations with their neighbours, show commitment to the rule of law and human rights, establish democratic and civilian control of their armed forces, and have a market economy.”

Erdoğan’s policies have had a dangerous downward trajectory in protecting constituents’ human rights, with intense discriminatory policiestowards ethnic minorities and a reputation for quashing freedom of expression and assembly. Erdoğan’s discriminatory policies towards the Kurdish people, an ethnic minority dispersed throughout Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, have been reported to infringe on the rights and lives of the Kurdish people, including disproportionate charges on the basis of supposed “terrorist motives.”

Yet despite the series of perceived violations, the July 15th attack on the Incirlik air-base has become a fulcrum for NATO’s concerns about the Turkish military’s durability and their adherence to the treaty. The Incirlik base has been an invaluable asset in both the U.S. European Command and U.S. Central Command, as well as the anti-ISIS coalition’s fight in Syria and Iraq. The base is a bulwark  in assisting air defense missions and generates significant intelligence cooperation with NATO allies, especially the United States. The base’s operations against Daesh were shut down as well as its commercial power and airspace the night of the attempted coup. Along with a five-day power outage, ten Incirlik officers and their commander, General Bekir Ercan Van, were detained in suspected coordination with anti-Erdoğan soldiers. While the base has regained power and operations have recommenced, the events of July 15th will continue to call into question NATO’s reliance on the security of their own bases in Turkey and cause NATO members to second-guess Turkey’s strategic capability under such an unstable political system. An air base forced to operate with backup generators while continuing to wage war against Daesh without access to their airspace is an inept one, which will pressure NATO into rethinking their reliance on Turkey.

This shift in relations between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Turkey is not equivalent to suspension or expulsion, contrary to the arrayof experts calling for the removal of Turkey as a NATO member. In fact, there is no official process or protocol of discharge regarding a member state within the NATO structure. Even if the organization were to establish a mechanism of expulsion, Turkey is too great a strategic treasure for such a consideration; Turkey is perched in the crossroads of the East and West; between NATO and its adversary, Russia, and between the Middle East and Europe.

The Turkish Moment Bears Inestimable Opportunity

How will the North Atlantic Treaty Organization deal with an incalculable Turkey? One scenario will involve maneuvering, rather than containing, Turkey’s recent shift towards Russia. Both countries recently struck a renewed energy and military partnership in St. Petersburg, after a chilled six months of stalled relations and sanctions. Moreover, NATO members can either reinforce strained relations by deterring Turkish European Union candidacy and further deliberation surrounding the question of Turkey’s NATO membership. Alternatively, NATO could incorporate the recovered Turkish-Russian relationship into their fight against Daesh in Syria and Iraq. Many have perceived this renewed alliance as a betrayal of Turkey’s responsibilities to NATO, as well as an example of Russian encroachment upon a vulnerable political system and paranoid leader. Yet, I argue that this is not a lost cause, but rather an unwonted opportunity.

President Vladimir Putin has provided military support to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, a policy fundamentally divergent from the United States and its allies, there has been rare proof of limited western-Russian cooperation against Daesh bears fruit. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254 established a tentative timeline that incorporated U.S., Russian, and foreign cooperation, urging “all states to use their influence with the government of Syria and the Syrian opposition to advance the peace process.” A failed 48-hour ceasefire sought to accomplish just that, brokered between the United States and Russian forces in Syria that attempted humanitarian assistance and civilian evacuation for nearly 275,000 people without the disruption of strikes from the Syrian government, Free Syrian Army, Syrian Democratic Forces, and foreign forces. The violation of the ceasefire and the continuation of airstrikes in Aleppo has emerged as a strained point of contention for the United States and Russia in both militaristic and diplomatic spheres. But cooperation is still a necessary feat in Syria, even after animosity between the two superpowers. The Obama administration extended a hand to Moscow this past year, with a proposed air campaign combatting Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, formally the al-Nusra Syrian branch of al-Qaeda, in addition to joint air-strikes expunging Daesh from its stronghold in Raqqa. From the established Russian front in Northwestern Syria and Turkey’s northern position, the United States and its allies could arrange a strategic operation that targets Daesh from its western stronghold in Palmyra to the East in Markadeh. No individualized military effort could accomplish such a feat in the region.

Russia’s position in Syria is one of immense strength and, while the United States’ presence has been felt in the Levant, Putin has greater leverage with Iran and the dormant Syrian government. Scholars Gordan Adams and Stephen Walt have advocated this as well, reiterating that no single power can defeat Daesh nor establish political stability in Syria. A united international coalition against the Islamic State continues to flounder without Russia’s presence, and will continue to as the Levant unravels into political pandemonium. Yet collaboration does not guarantee Assad’s deposition from power, just as cooperation with Erdoğan does not ensure Turkish avoidance of attacking Kurdish Peshmerga fighters in Syria and Iraq. It will be the United States’ responsibility to make the precarious decision whether to take a sensitive, but necessary step in their fight against Daesh.

Conclusion

This past summer, Turkey became a Eurasian flashpoint that marked a new wave of uncertainty towards the cohesion of their political system, the dependability of their military and NATO membership, and the respect of their constituents as a democratic institution. These questions will persist, as Erdoğan enforces his paranoia through stringent reforms and purges of officials. The entry of Turkey into the war against Daesh too sends a message of strength; President Erdoğan strives to grip power tightly as his administration recovers from an ill-fated coup attempt against him.

Yet while the global order has reason to lament over a clear shift in Turkish foreign policy, the moment of Turkish instability presents as many opportunities as it does challenges. A renewed energy and joint-military partnership struck between Erdoğan and Putin in St. Petersburg can serve as an opened door to the United States and NATO allies in their fight against Daesh in the Levant. International coalitions against the terrorist organization have proven weak and lacking in unity, and while the scarce cooperative efforts between the two hegemonic powers have not yielded success, U.S.-Russian collaboration could be the key to securing the Levant from Daesh.