Claire Spangler 3/9/18 Claire Spangler 3/9/18

Forgetting Franco: The Creation of a New Spanish Identity

Contributing Editor Claire Spangler examines the nationalist undertones of Franco revivalism taking place around a historic symbol: the Franco flag.

In October 1st, 2017, Catalonia, the northeastern-most autonomous community of Spain, voted for independence. The vote was riddled with violence and controversy, as the referendum was not legally recognized, and was disputed by the Spanish government. Across Catalonian communities, including the city of Barcelona, voters, protesters, and police came out in great numbers. Many citizens displayed their sentiments by hanging symbolic flags from their balconies, lighting the city ablaze in color. Similarly, halfway across the country in the capital city of Madrid, the same phenomenon was also appearing. Spain has a troubled history with their flag. A remnant of the Franco regime, the flag was never redefined after the transition to democracy. The Catalonian referendum ignited a renewed and unprecedented return of Spanish nationalism: a formerly right-wing sentiment. Given Spain’s history with Franco symbols, it is apparent that the flag has been reborn with a new identity, one dependent on, and contrasting, the rise of Catalonian Nationalism.

Background

It is called the “Red Effect” when Spaniards display the official Spanish flag in full force. Since the fall of Franco, it has only appeared following soccer victories such as the 2010 World Cup win. Across Spain, the Spanish flag was waved and displayed from balconies to celebrate the great victory. In other countries, flag displays are nothing to note, perhaps even commonplace, yet Spain has a uniquely controversial relationship with its flag. The flag is colloquially referred to as “La Rojigualda,” and flies with two red stripes on either side of a wider yellow stripe, which hosts the Spanish coat of arms on the left side.

Every day the flag is flown alongside European Union flags on government buildings and hotels. However, it is very rare to see the flag in non-official capacities, save for following soccer victories. This is due to the sordid history of La Rojigualda, as a former symbol of Spain’s former dictator, Francisco Franco. As explained by Marian Ahumada Ruiz, a professor of constitutional law for the Autonomous University of Madrid, the Spanish flag “has historically proved a problem because of the way it was appropriated and politicized during the Spanish Civil War and the subsequent dictatorship of Francisco Franco.” Indeed, during the days of the Franco regime, the flag was displayed across the country as a symbol of the unity that Franco campaigned for. The flag was only slightly different then, displaying the slogan “One, Great, Free” over the eagle of St. John and the yoke and arrow— all symbols of Franco’s supporters.

However, the basic stripes and coat of arms were the same. Standing as a symbol of the oppressive and violent regimes of Francisco Franco, supporters of the flag have been labeled as right-wing radicals in the years since the democratic transition. This conflict goes beyond the flag, as all forms of Spanish nationalism have been associated with Franco. When the Franco regime rose to power after a bloody civil war, it enforced a specific Spanish identity. Regional languages, flags, and customs were prohibited as a single, unified Catholic-Spanish identity was promoted. Nationalism was enforced by the military and all autonomous regions of Spain were stripped of their historic autonomy and regional cultures and were forcefully united under Franco. Thus, nationalistic sentiments became irrevocably intertwined with the Franco regime— one that many were eager to put in the past.

Spain’s transition into democracy is unlike most regime changes. Following the death of Francisco Franco 1975, Spain was free to begin the democratic process, starting with the question of how to leave Franco’s era behind and move into the 20th century where they were already behind by European standards. The political parties at the time decided to focus all Spanish attention and resources on building the Spanish economy and rejoining the contemporary world. Thus, matters of the past were purposely forgotten. Spain did not have the time or resources to address the many Spaniards who had supported and committed violence at the word of Franco. Neither did those in power want to drag their freshly liberated country through the still fresh horrors of the civil war. The Pact of Forgetting allowed the country to move forward, granting amnesty to those who participated in Franco’s regime, and leaving all Spanish collective memories in the past. Thus, there were no public channels for commemoration: the civil war is not recognized each year, and the many remnants of former nationalistic elements have been wiped clean, such as the national anthem. (The anthem was once sung in Castilian Spanish, a propaganda piece to force Basques and Catalonians to speak Castilian instead of their own regional languages, which Franco banned.) Instead of lingering in the past, Spaniards dove into their new era of modernity. As explained by William Chislett, “over the last 40 years Spain has enjoyed an unprecedented period of prosperity and peaceful co-existence, even taking into account the prolonged recession that ended in 2014. The changes have been profound; the country propelled its political, economic and social modernization into a much shorter period than any other European country.” In many ways, Spain left its past behind and created a relatively prosperous country that allows for the freedoms of its citizens. Furthermore, Spain has gone further than many other countries in embracing the times we are now living in. It was a leader of the gay rights movement, passing a very liberal law in 2005 allowing for gay marriage. Spain is also a leader in women’s equality with women making up 40% of parliament. Both are impressive milestones, considering Spain was once a deeply Catholic country where being homosexual was illegal and women could not sign legal documents. In many ways, Spain is recognizable from what it once was. Yet, in October, the familiar red and gold stripes burned brightly across Spain, reminding the county and the world of the man who Spain has so quickly and passionately left behind.

The Red Effect of 2017

In the decades since the fall of Franco, the Spanish flag is primarily used in official capacities. With few exceptions, the Spanish flag has been treated like all memories of the Franco era: erased from the Spanish identity. However, with the potential secession of Catalonia from Spain, there is currently an unprecedented resurgence of the flag. Apartment buildings and protesters in the streets are draped in the red and yellow stripes, promoting Spanish unity in a way that hasn’t been since Franco’s political rallies. Madrid, in particular, was ablaze with the “La Rojigualda,” as nearly every building displayed their opinion of the Catalonian movement. Spaniards also changed their profile pictures to the image of the flag— the modern day political expression. This rise in nationalism is in tandem with rising Catalonian Nationalism. Barcelona, the largest city in Catalonia, is similarly draped in flags -although here the ‘Estelada’ flag is flying high.

The Catalonian Independence flag, the ‘Senyera Estelada,’ or the Estelada for short, is the official Catalonian flag’s (the Senyera) yellow and red stripes, with an additional superimposed blue triangle with a white star on the left side.

This flag, unlike the Senyera flag, is in favor of separation from Spain and is waved and hung by Catalonian separatists. The flag is currently very visible in Catalonia and Barcelona in particular. The Senyera, on the other hand, can be interpreted a number of ways. Some see the Senyera, the traditional flag of the region, as being pro-Catalonia in Spain, or simply as pro-Catalonia, regardless of the outcome of the independence movement. However, the Estelada is the more visible independence symbol. Indeed, the more vocal the Catalonian Secessionist Movement has become, the pro-unity crowd has become more prominent as well. This includes both counter-protesters and the rise in popularity of the Spanish flag.

Oppositional Identity Creation

It is common for nationalist movements to feed off one another. It was the rise of Franco and subsequent oppression of the Catalonian people that fostered today’s secessionist movement. Today, the Catalonian movement is creating a new form of Spanish nationalism. Joan Culla, a Catalan historian, stated, “Nationalist movements need to feed off each other. It’s both unfortunate and normal that the escalation of Catalan nationalism, particularly in recent days, will fuel a Spanish nationalism.” Many consider this rise of the counter-protesters an attempt to drown out the original party’s voices. However, it is more nuanced than that. Identities created in opposition to another identity are simpler to establish. This is common in former colonies when they gain independence. Post-colonial identity creation, as exposed by Andrew Fallone, is the creation of an identity that it purely in opposition to that of the former sovereigns. This identity creation is formed as a means of distinguishing themselves from the colonizers. While Spain and Catalonia are not in this predicament of colonizer and colonized (as related to this instance), the same identity crisis is unfolding amidst Catalonia’s bid for independence. The Catalonian Secessionist Movement’s highly visible campaign is forcing the pro-unity opposition to also become highly visible. The pro-unity crowd is feeling the same pressure that former colonies do, in the need to distinguish themselves and make themselves visible, as well as finding an identity that the country can rally behind. After Franco, being Spanish was difficult for people to accept, as they saw ‘Spanish’ as Franco perpetuated it. Thus, after his fall, the Spaniards sidestepped their confused identity— even going so far as to not refer to Spain as Spain, but as ‘the country’ instead: a social aspect of the Pact of Forgetting. This collective amnesia has left the question of what it means to be Spanish unanswered for decades. The Catalonian situation is a vehicle for Spain to answer this question. Spaniards are now able to find a Spanish identity in the flag and in pro-unity sentiments.

Alternatives

An easy alternative explanation for the rising popularity of the La Rojigualda is that Spain is reverting to its conservative past. Nationalist sentiments are often associated with the far right, as seen in movements in America, Germany, Britain, and France. Often, shows of nationalism are associated with the national flag: a symbol of the nation. However, Spain is uniquely divergent from this form of flag waving. Unlike other countries where national flags are growing in visibility, Spain has no far-right party. While the leading party, the Popular Party (PP), was created by former Francoist officials, it is conservative with support from the right wing: it is not a right-wing party itself.

Conclusion

The rise in Spanish Nationalism cannot be simplified as ideas of the far right, as it can be in other countries at the moment. Instead, Spanish nationalism emanates from a larger sentiment. Spaniards are finally creating their own identify, albeit in opposition to the Catalonian secessionist identity. With this, the world can expect to see changes in how Spain reconnects with its forgotten past. Likely changes may be as small as reincorporating lyrics into the national anthem. However, larger impacts may come as well, like the potential disbanding of ETA. Further strengthening of Spain as a whole maybe be seen in other political and cultural situations as well. Only time will tell what may come out of the newfound “Spanishness.”

Jonathan Scolare 3/9/18 Jonathan Scolare 3/9/18

The Arctic Theater; Revisionism Through Exclusive Economic Zones

Staff Writer Jonathan Scolare sheds light on Russian encroachment in the Arctic zone.

In August 4, 2015 a mini-submarine commanded by famed Arctic explorer Artur N. Chilingarov touched down on the ocean floor at the exact location of the North Pole. The underwater pod gathered soil from the seabed and planted a Russian flag made of titanium in the soot. It was a signal to the world of Russia’s interest in the region. While, historically, Moscow has focused on the mineral wealth stored in the arctic, it has since changed focus to oil and natural gas exploitation. With melting ice caps, longer summers, and new technologies that allow for safer passage through the treacherous waters, including a growing fleet of icebreakers, resource exploitation has become much easier in the area. However, other states have also noticed the growing potential in the North. This growing attention has set the stage for an Arctic standoff, with multiple actors vying for access. At the literal center of this standoff is a gap formed by the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of each country. The North Pole, along with its trove of untapped natural resources, is located in this hole. According to longstanding international law, this area cannot be claimed by any state, but countries have made claims that it belongs to them. Russia has the longest coastline and the largest EEZ in the Arctic, but to what extent it’s Zone reaches is a point of contention in the international community. Russia has already made leaps and bounds in asserting its claim over the region with only the Law of the Sea to stand in its way. It is this revanchism that is making the Kremlin rather than the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) the King of the North.

The definition of Exclusive Economic Zone is, “sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing natural resources, whether living and nonliving, of the seabed and subsoil.” Every country that has a coastline has an EEZ that extends into the ocean. The limit of the zone is the continental shelf on which the state is located. Under the 1982 United Nations convention, the Law of the Sea, a nation may claim an exclusive economic zone over the continental shelf abutting its shores. In 2007, around the same time Russia planted its flag on the North Pole, Russia claimed that its shelf “extends far north of the Eurasian landmass, out under the planet’s northern ice cap.” This claim is based off of the belief that “The Arctic has always been Russian” according the Chilingarov, who was tasked to prove this when he gathered soil deposits from the seabed. Russia submitted the proposal in spring of 2016. The United Nations (UN) has yet to announce its verdict. It should be noted, however, that should Russia be granted the area it has claimed, it would only own the seabed and the resources lodged within, not the water above. Given the potential for the Arctic to become a great source of natural resources, for not only Russia, but also Denmark and Canada, a standoff is imminent, possibly involving military means. The Kremlin has already taken the initiative in building up its military presence in the area, including re-opening ports and increasing military drills in the region.

One strategy Russia has implemented to protect and fulfill its territorial ambitions in the region is the building up its northern naval fleet while also updating the existing military presence there. In the past few years, “Russia unveiled a new Arctic command, four new Arctic brigade combat teams, 14 new operational airfields, 16 deepwater ports, and 40 icebreakers with an additional 11 in development.” This buildup is to show a proactive role in claiming the region as part of the Russian Federation. While it may not be ‘officially’ Russian territory, or part of its EEZ, a strong military presence in the Arctic would give Moscow a stronger case that the Arctic is in the Russian zone of sovereignty. Katarzyna Zysk, an associate professor at the Norwegian Defense University College, explains, “There are three basic drivers: military-strategic calculations, economic development, and domestic objectives.” These three goals can be seen in one of the founding documents of Russian Arctic policy: “Russian Federation Policy for the Arctic to 2020.” In it, Moscow outlines how it seeks to use the Arctic “as a strategic resource base of the Russian Federation providing the solution of problems of social and economic development of the country.” This excerpt alludes to Russia’s economic dependence on natural resources such as oil and natural gas that provide trade income for the Kremlin. While this action plan was written before the current economic ailments plaguing Russia broke out, this quote is nonetheless relevant. Tapping into such resources would provide more income for Moscow.

In recent years Russia has rebuilt Soviet-era naval bases and airstrips on several Arctic islands near Alaska, while also implementing modernization efforts on existing forces. Professor Zysk notes that “As a result of the military modernization, Russia is today better prepared to participate in complex military operations than a decade ago, especially in joint operations, strategic mobility and rapid deployments.” Moscow is prepping for all three of these situations. In the event of a conflict with the U.S., Russia believes that the Arctic will become a major target due to the latter’s exposed border to NATO countries. Such an event is unlikely, however, considering that NATO’s role in the Arctic is at the moment “uncertain and unfocused,” although it should be noted that every country that has stake in region is a NATO member-state, Russia notwithstanding. Simultaneously, Canada and Norway have all conducted military and naval operations in the Arctic to stage their capabilities and demonstrate their sovereignty. The Kremlin is already showing its strength and prodding other countries’ airspace. In 2014 alone Norway “intercepted 74 Russian warplanes conducting air patrols on its coast,” a nearly 50 percent increase from the previous year. The United States, meanwhile, has been more modest in this regard as the Arctic policy has a lower tier status in US national interests. In sum, while Russia is strengthening its military presence in the Arctic, it is doing so in such a way that it does not create an armed run-in with any other NATO member-state in the region.

Next, Russia’s interest in natural resources found in the Arctic, such as oil, natural gas, and precious minerals must be explained. As explained before, resource extraction is one of the main objectives of the Kremlin’s interests in the region. “Regarding Russian territories in the Arctic, it is estimated, that 90 percent of her gas and 60 percent of her oil can be found there. Moreover, there is up to 90 percent of the hydrocarbon reserves, as well as nickel, cobalt, copper and platinum metals.” Such a high density of industrial elements and energy sources make the region a lucrative area of investment for Russian businesses. However, these percentages are just estimates. It is unclear and nearly impossible right now how much of what is embedded in the Arctic soil. Permafrost makes it excruciatingly difficult to test what lies underground and technology has not come far enough to create conditions in the ice-laden waters to sample the seabed for anything. Russia did sign a pact with U.S-based oil giant ExxonMobil for “joint ventures” in the Arctic, but these plans were scrapped in 2014 with the onset of Western sanctions. This partnership, however, is only one example of a 90-year history of resource exploration in the Arctic. Over the past few decades, “more than 400 onshore oil and gas fields have been discovered north of the Arctic Circle,” although roughly a quarter of them are not yet in production. Global oil prices and Western sanctions are hurting Russia’s economy. When it comes to low oil prices, Russia has two options: diversify its exports, so that the Kremlin’s export-related income is not as reliant on petroleum; or find and tap into more oil reserves. The latter option is more conceivable since the infrastructure is already set up to due so. Thus, the Arctic becomes that much more important to solve Russia’s energy needs and economic woes.

The Arctic has a great deal of untapped resource reserves that presently cannot be extracted due to climatic and technological difficulties, but climate change and rapidly advancing technology is changing that. What’s more, the Kremlin sees the Arctic as an emerging field in which Russia can assert its sovereignty and strength. In addition to new ships, including a small armada of icebreakers, Russia is also modernizing its existing military presence in the region. Placing a Russian flag at the North Pole seabed showed to the world that Russia was staking its claim as the King of the North.

Andrew Fallone 12/4/17 Andrew Fallone 12/4/17

Making Long Distance Work: The Relationship between Nordic and East Asian Countries

Staff members Claire Spangler and Andrew Fallone co-author a piece on the uncanny relationship between Nordic and East Asian nations.

This piece was co-authored by Claire Spangler and Andrew Fallone

Just as they can between people, relationships between geographic regions can flourish across incredible distances. Nordic and East Asian countries encourage long-term relationships in their economics, cultures, and regional identities. The Nordic countries, which includes Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Iceland, have strong economic interests in the Asian market, both in terms of imports and exports. East Asian nations pursue their disparate economic goals by increasing foreign investment in the region through deeper economic integration. Both Nordic and East Asian nations utilize the strengths of one another’s economies to supplement the strengths of their own. It is possible to transcend the vastly different business cultures and foster greater transregional bonds with astute attention to differences in communication norms. Collaboration between the Norden and East Asia centers on the economic benefits that both regions reap from their independent regional integration, overcoming cultural differences to obtain greater economic importance on the world stage through transregional cooperation.

Managing the Distance: Cooperation and Clashes between Norden and East Asian Countries

The differences in Nordic and East Asian communication norms illustrate obstacles created by distinctions in the regions’ cultures. Actions that may be commonplace in Nordic countries may offend in East Asia, and vice versa. To fully understand the business relations between the two regions, it is necessary to break down the dimensions of the two cultures, following Hofstede’s structure.

Hofstede’s structure makes it is possible to understand the differences in the manner that Nordic and East Asian countries conduct business, and the challenges that cause them to adapt to the other’s business styles. Hofstede identifies five essential components to culture: power distance, individualism and collectivism, masculinity and femininity, long or short-term orientation, and uncertainty avoidance. Power distance is the extent at which hierarchies play into a culture. Nordic countries have a relatively low power distance, meaning that low level employees frequently collaborate with high-ranking members of their organization. This also plays into the relative collectivism of Nordic countries. In contrast, East Asian cultures have very high power distances. High power distances play into business dynamics in two ways. Firstly, with high power distances there is a larger emphasis on the individual, and relatively low emphasis on teamwork. When working in the Norden, the differences between individual and collective work hinders the communications between the two regions. East Asian business people expect one contact in the Norden, but may end up working with multiple contacts. Second, with individuals pursuing their own projects, they risk more. East Asian cultures have a heavy emphasis on ‘Face.’ The concept of ‘face’ can be defined as a person’s reputation. A person who ‘loses face’ risks losing their honor, which can further affect their families. Thus, high power distances allow a buffer zone that is not affected by others’ mistakes. In business negotiations, the danger of losing face often comes in the form of East Asian business people forgoing additional explanation when unclear on a subject. Nordic business people’s failure to realize this component of communication contributes to the failure in negotiations. Thus, business failures result from disruptions in communication norms. This can be counteracted by deliberately slow-paced negotiations between teams on both end of the relationship, allowing both sides enough time to process information in a cohesive manner. However, the two cultures have additional challenges regarding their negotiation styles.

The negotiations styles of Nordic and East Asian countries are dependent on the strength of the relationship between the collaborating partners. Negotiation styles can fall into either the category of masculine or feminine, as prescribed by Hofstede. Nordic cultures lay firmly in the more feminine side where negotiations and compromises are the norm. East Asia differs in that is primarily a masculine culture, where relations are assertive and focused on material success. Additionally, strong personal relationships are a prerequisite for business relationships. The Chinese name for such relationships is Guanxi. Guanxi are relationships that one relies on for survival. These relationships are reciprocal in nature, and thus ensures that the other party responds in kind, as they will ask for favors in the future. Thus, East Asian business people will often act ambiguously not only to save face, but also to ensure the continuation of the relationship; losing face would put their necessary relationships at risk as the other party may not want to depend on someone who has lost prestige. In this manner, East Asian cultures straddle the divide between Masculine and Feminine culture types. It is especially important for Nordic countries to understand differences in negotiation styles because they tend to have a short-term orientation. Business relationships between the two countries must have long-term goals and a history of cooperation for deals to be successful.

Long and short-term orientations similarly contrast between Norden and East Asian countries. Nordic culture is short-term orientated and is only judged by recent or present events. Relative collectivism influences this cultural difference, as there is less on the line for business people in a collective culture. East Asian cultures differ in this as they have a long-term orientation. This orientation is affected both by their individualism and need for strong relationships. Their relative individualism causes more risk in decisions, and thus, decisions take longer to deliberate on. Additionally, due to the emphasis on strong personal relations in East Asian cultures, it is necessary to have a long-term orientation. Relationships take time to develop, yet ultimately are valuable in their reciprocity. As aforementioned, to combat these differences, business deals need to be negotiated over an extended time period to ensure success.

The final aspect of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions is uncertainty avoidance. Uncertainty avoidance is the extent to which members of a culture will feel threatened by and avoid the unknown. Both Nordic cultures and East Asian cultures have very low uncertainty avoidance, meaning that they feel secure in the future and in new circumstances. This similarity between the cultures explains the great economic cooperation between the regions, regardless of cultural differences and misunderstandings. Successfully navigating the cultural differences between the Norden and East Asia requires careful attention to communication norms.

Regionalism

While Nordic and East Asian motivations for fostering regionalism diverge, they have similarly efficacious implications. Regionalism is the collaboration of nations on both regionally and internationally pertinent issues using institutional frameworks to increase their total influence. Three waves of regionalism are often discussed, the first stage concerns the infancy of European regionalism and import-substitution integration. The second phase of regionalism involves deeper economic integration in Europe with the Common European Market Act of 1985 and the emergence of Regional Trade Agreements throughout the world. The third and final phase of regionalism includes the erosion of the control of international monetary institutions, with nations such as those of East Asia preferring bilateral and minilateral trade agreements. Regionalism developed at different times in each region, following the Second World War in Nordic nations and the fall of the Soviet Union in East Asian nations. Thus, regionalism manifested in different ways in each region due to different sovereign priorities and different experiences with supranational organizations. Through an examination of the development of regionalism in each region, avenues for future collaboration between the Norden and East Asia become clear.

Nordic nations have a long history of collaboration, yet have found the most success in aligning regional policy priorities and contributing to regional defense cohesion. All the countries of the Norden region (excluding Finland) have languages that are so similar to one another that were they not tied to state identities, they may be considered to be regional dialects of one another. The region has developed its own set of policy priorities, including rule of law, environmental initiatives, and regional solidarity. These priorities encouraged the formation of regional supranational organizations to help coordinate action on these priorities. Another factor contributing to the success of regional cooperation is the similarly small populations within the Norden. When compounded with similarly post-industrial service oriented economies in each Nordic nation and a common Lutheran cultural foundation, regionalism between the Nordic nations is easily understandable. Initially instigated by the threats of crowding out by the Soviet Union and the European Union, Nordic nations’ collaboration allows them to utilize their varied economies to enhance their global competitiveness and communally develop in order to maintain their international relevance. Although efforts to establish a single Nordic market in the 1950s failed, as did the Nordic Economic Community (NORDEK) in the 1970s, some of the ambitious goals outlined in NORDEK have been achieved. Such examples include the Nordic Council of Ministers, the Nordic Industrial Fund, and the Nordic Investment Bank. The Nordic Council is a pillar of collaboration in the Norden, allowing for intergovernmental cooperation while drawing its legitimacy from resolutions passed by each individual nation, demonstrating each Nordic nation’s recognition of the benefits of regionalism. Originating from the Treaty on Nordic Cooperation in 1962, the Nordic Council of Ministers was established in 1971 in order to create policies that would achieve regional goals and send those policies to each member nation’s respective government for implementation. The goal of the council is to allow for Nordic synergy when responding to local and international issues. The Nordic Council of Ministers also allows for cohesion in economic priorities, focusing on regional economic goals while simultaneously focusing on regional political cooperation with the European Union. One of the strengths of the Nordic Council of Ministers its absence of supranational authority, allowing for each member state to interpret its recommendations. The different relationships with the European Union that each of the member nations maintains exemplifies the Nordic Council’s lenient structure, keeping its members united despite their differences.

Another key component of Nordic regional collaboration is in the area of defense. Although individually small, the Nordic countries have a combined GDP the size of Russia or India and a defense budget larger than those of Turkey or Spain. Three collaborative defense institutions (NORDAC, NORDCAPS, and NORDSUP) combined into the Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO) in 2009, with a decentralized structure wherein each nation’s defense ministers meet twice a year to create comprehensive solutions to regional defense challenges. One of the largest achievements of NORDEFCO is the near daily communal military exercises in the North Calotte region of Finland, Norway, and Sweden, allowing for exercises that cross borders freely and develop capabilities cohesively. The regional cooperation in policy, economic, and defense matters across the Norden region has allowed countries with small populations and economies to maintain their power in international affairs while coordinating the achievement of internal regional policy goals.

Regionalism in East Asia has similar intentions to regionalism in the Norden, yet is rooted in different factors and manifests itself through different frameworks. Cooperation emerged from the Asia-Pacific regionalism of the 1960s, tied to American reconstruction efforts in East Asia, with East Asian nations relying heavily on American investment. This led to broad East Asian participation in multilateral trade agreements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and World Trade Organization (WTO), with every founding member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) becoming GATT members. Even as local regionalism began to develop, China joined the WTO in 2001 and was followed by Taiwan in 2002. After the export-economy based boom of the 1980s in Asia, an Asian ‘trade triangle’ emerged by the mid-90s, wherein Chinese and Japanese investment enabled other East Asian nations to expand their manufacturing potentials and export goods to Western markets. This fostered greater transregional cooperation in East Asia, with China becoming a full dialogue partner in ASEAN in 1996. In 1997, the ASEAN Plus Three summit in Manila took a step towards greater regional integration, with Asian leaders expressing their intentions to continue “strengthening and deepening East Asian cooperation at various levels and in various areas, including energy, transport, and information and communications technology” following their distaste with the response of international financial institutions to the economic shocks of the year. In December of that year, ASEAN Plus Three nations decided to combat the financial crisis at the time after finding international institutions’ support inadequate, outlining plans to create the Chiang Mia Initiative that supplanted to role of the IMF in the region by enabling currency swaps between member nations’ central banks. Despite these actions, ASEAN has been unable to promote economic integration by eliminating trade barriers and tariffs. Although lacking any formalized institutional framework, the regionalism present in East Asia is primarily market driven. Regionalism’s economic impacts vary widely based on the different regime structures of East Asian nations, ranging from democratic states such as Japan and South Korea to authoritarian states such as China.

In the absence of an institutional framework, East Asian nations find the economic success they seek principally through international and regional trade agreements, such as the Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement (JSEPA) of 2002. The powerhouses of the trade agreements promoting East Asian regionalism are the Japanese and Chinese economies, with the most prevalent trade agreement transition from bilateral Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) to minilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), promoting deeper economic integration by allowing for the widespread trade liberalization that multilateral trade agreements had failed to provide. Such trans-regionalism manifests as bilateral FTAs between the ten ASEAN nations and nations such as China (CAFTA), Japan (JAFTA), and Korea (KAFTA). The China – ASEAN FTA has operated as a model from which further minilateral agreements can be based. Another component of regionalism in East Asia is the security community it fosters, with the ASEAN charter itself highlighting its intent to create a cohesive security, economic, and socio-cultural community. The security community is key to economic goals by providing greater security through the prevention of war, with the declaration in the Bali Concord II stating that ASEAN “members shall rely exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-regional differences and regard their security as fundamental linked to one another and bound by geographic location, common vision and objectives,” thus encouraging greater stability that will encourage investment. Even the China – ASEAN FTA is likely related to security concerns, with China looking to secure its influence in the region as a counterbalance to American interests. The largest factor promoting East Asian regionalism is the union of CAFTA, JAFTA, and KAFTA, for two reasons. First, the three agreements compound to wed the economies of China, Japan, Korea, and the ten ASEAN nations together, thus uniting more than 2 billion people into a free trade agreement, allowing for an incredible amount of regional growth. Second, the vast united economies’ potential for growth is likely to attract the attention of investors, further encouraging regional prosperity. Thus, the economic priorities of East Asian nations overlap to allow for transregional growth through regional trade and international investment, even without a formal framework.

While the origins and manifestations of the Norden and East Asian regionalism differ, certain factors make collaboration between the two regions predictable and mutually beneficial. Regionalism in Nordic countries is based primarily on their similar characteristics, such as language, population, economy, and policy priorities. In contrast, East Asian regionalism is influenced primarily by external market factors such as the confluence of globalizing economies. Despite the differences in the levels of formal institutions framing regionalism in the Norden and East Asia, uniting both regions has allowed them to combine the disparate strengths of their members, thus making cross regional coordination exponentially beneficial for each member. In East Asia, instead of relying upon natural resources to act as the catalyst for Foreign Direct Investment, regional economic collaboration shows the potential for widespread growth, which encourages FDI. The globalized multinational corporations of the region utilize the regional economic integration to procure the resources they need, incur lower costs, and benefit from larger commercial markets. This makes them a great target for investment for external nations and companies, and given the high levels of economic coordination in Nordic nations, there is great potential for cross regional cooperation to the benefit of both. European direct investment in ASEAN nations increased from 24 percent to 40 percent from 1995 to 2001, and the greater transregional cooperation in East Asia has only encouraged greater FDI since then. This economic cooperation also works in the inverse, with China entering into Preferential Trade Agreement talks with Iceland in 2006. Despite China’s relatively small economic gains from such an agreement, it demonstrates the Chinese commitment to economic diplomacy and cross regional cooperation. While Iceland is not an EU member, it is a member of the Nordic Council of Ministers, creating the opportunity for greater cross regional cooperation in the future. Beyond economic cooperation, East Asian nations such as China can take advantage of lessons in regional financial liberalization from the Norden. China shares many key similarities to Nordic nations’ pre-liberalization economic systems. Scholars from the MIT journal Asian Economic Papers note that both share “a bank-dominated financial system, strong credit controls, exchange (capital account) controls, [and] lack of risk management experience…” with the ‘boom-bust’ financial liberalizations of Finland, Norway, and Sweden providing a cautionary example for Chinese and East Asian economic liberalization. Furthermore, Nordic nations can also use pan-regionalism to promote their regional objectives. Following the 2008 financial crisis, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden used their role in guiding the Asian Development Bank’s financial disbursements to promote “ecologically, socially and economically sustainable” economic development. The utilization of regionalism to promote economic growth in East Asia provides an opportunity for the institutionally regionalized Nordic nations and East Asian nations alike to benefit from increased trade, investment, and policy alignment between the two regions.

Business: West to East

While the European Union is the Nordic countries strongest trading partner, East Asia makes up for a large part of the Nordic economy. Two notable connections between the regions include the business relationships between Sweden and China, and Norway and Japan. In 2016 Swedish exports to China amounted to the equivalent of 5.5 billion US dollars. This number, on average, increases every year by 1.7%, and has since China’s acceptance into the World Trade Organization. Much of this trade is of Swedish machinery and equipment, in addition to medical products. Norway and Japan, on the other hand, trade relatively less, and exports to Japan only account for 1.4% of Norway’s economy. However, Japan is Norway’s second largest Asian trading partner, following China, and is notable because of its reputedly difficult market to infiltrate. Norway has been relatively successful in their trading ties with Japan because of the 112 years of diplomatic ties between the two counties. Additionally, Norway spent significant time sending business counsels and cultural experts to aid trade relations. These efforts resulted in 1.6 billion US dollars in exports to Japan, primarily in fish and petroleum products. Indeed, the exportation of fish to Norway is possibly the most interesting connection between the two counties. Norway is the largest provider of salmon for Japan’s world famous sushi. In 1985, the Norwegian Export Council began marketing Norwegian salmon to Japanese markets, a difficult endeavor considering that salmon was not traditionally used in sushi. Norwegian salmon, however, is larger and lends itself better to the art than pacific salmon. The endeavor achieved amazing success, and in 2016 Norway exported 34 tons of salmon to Japan, perfecting the exportation to take only 35 hours from Norwegian fjord to Japanese market. This case study exemplifies how, with appropriate effort and over a significant time period, Norden countries can overcome cultural differences to build flourishing trade relationships with East Asia.

Business: East to West

Economic cooperation between Nordic and East Asian countries is also in the best interest of East Asian countries. Not only can they receive investment and desired consumer products, but they can also invest in Nordic companies and technologies. Norway, Denmark, and Finland occupy the top three spots on the Global Prosperity Index as of 2010, with Sweden in 6th place, distinguishing Nordic economies as important partners for any global economy. The economic competition between East Asia and the Norden has overcome cultural differences such as Nordic nations having relatively low context cultures compared with high context East Asian cultures. Yulia Lamasheva explains in the Niigata University Journal of Economics that post-modern values such as freedom of expression and interpersonal trust in both regions have promoted cross-cultural communication and trans-border economic cooperation. These factors allow complementary economies such as Norway and China to collaborate. China is the largest ship builder in the world, and Norway has a well-established maritime sector that develops new designs and technologies. Furthermore, China is the largest consumer market in the world, and Chinese consumers have a taste for Norwegian products such as purified water. East Asian investment in the Norden is also mutually beneficial, with China investing approximately 56 billion USD in Europe in 2016 and Norway relying on FDI for 25 percent of value creation in the nation. Partnership between Chinese and Norwegian firms has also been meaningful for both regions. In the late 2000s, the partnership between Nordic telecommunications firm Telia and the Chinese technology giant Huawei led to the launch of the world’s first 4G and 4G-5G networks in Norway. Cooperation on renewable energy also allows for the realization of Nordic policy priorities and the utilization of technological innovations from the Norden by East Asian nations. The Norwegian firm Cambi turns sewage into clean energy in increasing numbers of Chinese cities, and Norwegian firm REC solar is helping to create floating solar farms in Singapore to combat growing power needs and limited land. Also high levels of tourism to the Norden from Asia have become key to supporting Nordic tourism industries, leading to the creation of the Scandinavian Tourist Board in Asia. Each Nordic country’s distinct branding increases tourism to each individually. Other ideas, such as the use of Vikings cartoons in advertising, and promoting cultural concepts such as Hygge, or coziness, have proven successful in promoting East Asian tourism to the Norden. The economic goals of both regions can be simultaneously achieved through the regions’ ever deepening economic cooperation.

Conclusions

The Norden and East Asia both benefit from their collaboration, despite the obstacles that must be overcome to make it possible. Cultural differences can be navigated in the pursuit of common goals. Regional institutions’ organizational structures differ, but transregional initiatives offer positive outcomes for both regions. East Asian nations can learn important lessons from financial liberalizations across the Nordic nations of decades prior. Nordic nations can both invest in and accrue investment from East Asian nations. Complementary economies allow both regions to benefit from the strengths of the other. With careful attention to detail, both the Norden and East Asia can continue to prosper through their relationship in the future.

Claire Spangler 12/4/17 Claire Spangler 12/4/17

Making Long Distance Work: The Relationship between Nordic and East Asian Countries

Staff members Claire Spangler and Andrew Fallone co-author a piece on the uncanny relationship between Nordic and East Asian countries.

This piece was co-authored by Claire Spangler and Andrew Fallone

Managing the Distance: Cooperation and Clashes between Norden and East Asian Countries

Regionalism

Business: West to East

Business: East to West

Conclusions

Dayana Sarova 12/4/17 Dayana Sarova 12/4/17

Russia and Euro-Atlantic Security: Twenty-Six Years at the Doorstep of the European Order

Staff Writer Dayana Sarova explores the ramifications of the U.S.-Russian relationship and its status today.

The convoluted forces behind any country’s foreign policy are often hard to speculate about. However, some states and their international endeavors, are more perplexing than others. For many years, Russia has been an especially puzzling case both for theorists and practitioners of international relations, especially in the West. Forewarning the complications anyone inquiring about Russia’s intents will face, Winston Churchill famously remarked back in 1939 that this country is a “riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma.” More than seventy years later, the European Union and the United States are still forced to busy itself with trying to discover the key to the Russian foreign policy riddle. The existing consensus among scholars, analysts, and policymakers in this guessing game is that Vladimir Putin’s aggressive land-grabbing and zero-sum politics are the sole reasons behind hostility between Russia and the West. However, scant attention has been paid to the role of the West itself in engendering this animosity. The U.S. and EU have been contributing — whether unwittingly, recklessly, or deliberately — to the debilitation of Russia’s ability to trust and therefore cooperate with them. While analysts are bemoaning their hopes that Moscow will eventually accommodate itself to be a partner in upholding the European and Euro-Atlantic security, they avoid discussing the lack of honest efforts to assist Russia in becoming a part of the post-Cold War regional and transatlantic arrangements.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia found itself at the periphery of a bloc created by its adversaries. Despite proclaiming their intentions to include Moscow in the emerging European order, Western powers deliberately left it outside of European institutions. The norms that began governing the region after the end of the Cold War were mere extensions of the rules devised during the Cold War era by and for the countries who were historical rivals with Russia. In her 2009 book, 1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe, Mary Elise Sarotte reveals that U.S. and European diplomats were very conscious in their choice to adopt the institutions inherited from the Cold War and to reject or ignore other options in the process. By denying Russia the opportunity to contribute to designing the rules it was nevertheless obliged to abide by, Western leaders made the first step on the long road to alienating Moscow and creating an environment susceptible to uncertainty, hostility, and insecurity that now characterize its relationship with the West and fuel Russian great-power revisionism. In the early 1990s, Russia was pushing to transform the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe — the first truly pan-European institution with a comprehensive membership — into the central pillar of the new European order. Americans and Europeans, however, refused to give the OSCE more importance out of the fear that it might start competing with NATO and the EU and weaken U.S. domination of the regional security arrangements. Moreover, even though Russia was able to join the Council on Europe, G7, and WTO, none of them was as essential to the new security order as NATO and EU. Western leaders were so preoccupied with preserving their newly acquired hegemony on the global arena that they failed ensure Russia is effectively bound to the emerging institutions and has an interest in the success of regional security arrangements. More than two decades later, the costly consequences of these mistakes are one of the important ingredients that make up what some call a “state of Hobbesian anarchy and fear” of the Euro-Atlantic security system. Russia is now uninterested not only in being European but in playing by the European rules, the disregard for which it has clearly demonstrated in Crimea. Furthermore, security relations between the two biggest nuclear powers are increasingly, and dangerously, turbulent. The mutual accusations by the U.S. and Russia of violating arms control treaties have been around for quite some time, but only recently was the collapse of a key pillar of transatlantic nonproliferation regime seriously mooted.

When the West did attempt to help the post-Soviet Russia restore its internal stability and become a part of the European peace, these attempts looked at best misguided, and at worst insincere in the eyes of the Russian public. Although American and European interference in Russian domestic affairs was in no way an attempt to isolate Russia from the rest of the region, its disastrous consequences nevertheless contributed to Russia’s growing mistrust towards its Cold War adversaries. The common sentiment of the public, voiced by Mikhail Gorbachev in his recent interview, is that the West very deliberately kicked Russia when it was down. As baffling as this view may seem to a Western observer, the catastrophic state Russia found itself in after following the Western recipe for democratic transition provides a solid justification for Russia’s current indignation and suspicion. The experience of the 1990s gave birth to a principle axiom of Russia’s current foreign policy: neither the U.S. nor Europe should be trusted, and everything should be done to draw a clear line between Russia and the West.

It started with Boris Yeltsin’s instituting the shock therapy, a set of radical economic reforms prescribed by the IMF and designed by Harvard University economist Jeffrey Sachs, which was quickly characterized as “all shock and no therapy.” The implemented deregulations reversed 60 years of price controls, raising the prices by as much as 500 per cent. To attack this state-created inflation, the Central Bank simply stopped printing money. Additionally, the government massively cut the budget, which, in the absence of functioning economic infrastructure, led to predictable chaos. Living standards and life expectancy were rapidly falling, and the debt of state firms to one another and the Central Bank increased by 8,000 per cent in six months. The IMF and G-7, however, were holding a reward of $24 billion in credit in front of Yeltsin’s face for following the prescribed market liberalization policy, so the chaos continued unleashing. After the economic damage had reached a degree that the public was not willing to tolerate anymore, widespread opposition to Yeltsin promptedthe constitutional crisis during which the West actively voiced support for Yeltsin’s undemocratic course of actions that included the dissolution of the country’s legislature, encirclement of the White House with tanks, and the consequent storming of the building with special troops (spetsnaz). Fast forward to the presidential election of 1996, when the Russian economy was still on the verge of collapse and social protections were being stripped away — all the results of Sachs’ shock therapy — the IMF approved yet another loan to Russia. The timing was critical: the loan was expected to help Boris Yeltsin win the election. It did its job, but the consequences of Western meddling into the Russian political process reached far beyond one presidential term: less than four years later, Yeltsin would appoint Vladimir Putin the Acting President.

The policies pursued by the U.S. and the EU toward Russia shortly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union resembled an agreement between the winners and the loser, where the former dictate the rules and the latter is forced to accept them. Russia, however, perceived itself as neither defeated nor conquered. It has been, after all, the largest polity on earth for most of the last 400 years, and was, by some measures, the most successful imperial enterprise in history. Even weakened and wounded, Moscow strove to be accepted as an equal by the great powers of the West. The actions of both the European Union and the U.S. have significantly debilitated Russia’s trust and willingness to cooperate, by both excluding the country from important security arrangements and intervening in its domestic politics. It should be therefore of no surprise to anyone on either side of the Atlantic that more than two decades after its struggle for a place in the existing European system, Moscow still finds itself at the doorstep of the European order but never inside — this time, however, by choice.

Celia Lohr 12/4/17 Celia Lohr 12/4/17

Beware of the Risen People: Public Support as a Crucial Factor in the Outcomes of the FLNC and IRA Insurgencies

Staff Writer Celia Lohr analyzes the risks of popular insurgencies.

The 1970s witnessed a rise of insurgent groups ranging from anarchists to reformists to preservationists. The insurgencies waged by the Irish Republican Army (IRA, including the Provisionals) and the National Liberation Front of Corsica (FLNC) emerged as parallel struggles alike in their secessionist, ethno-national, anti-imperial armed struggles. So it is imperative to ask why – from two insurgencies so similar in context – one reached a renowned peace process with substantial political gains while the other faded into submission. Inability to maintain popular support stymied the FLNC insurgency and precipitated its failure to achieve its long-term goals; through comparison the IRA, it becomes clear that the FLNC eroded public support through mishandling of propaganda and overreliance on terrorism.

Members of both the IRA and the FLNC participated in prison hunger strikes during 1981 in order to gain “political prisoner” status that would further legitimize their struggle for independence. While the IRA realized relative and objective success, the FLNC mangled a crucial opportunity to gain public support for their cause. After two months of starvation, 27-year-old Bobby Sands, the charismatic leader of the IRA hunger strike died in prison. Throughout his and his inmates’ suffering, the IRA and its political counterpart, Sinn Féin, capitalized on the opportunity to bolster support. They directed massive media campaigns to appeal to Irish sympathizers, those believing in nonviolence, and international audiences. When Bobby Sands was elected MP from behind bars, Sinn Féin realized it had gained the legitimate power of the vote. Most importantly, the IRA and Sinn Féin harnessed the feelings of the masses – rage and powerlessness, especially regarding the deaths of young IRA volunteers – and transformed passive supporters into active ones: after Bobby’s death, the IRA experienced a momentous surge in recruitment. The propaganda campaign tied to the hunger strike provided the Irish public with a sense of personal self-determination and agency, thereby reinforcing the ideology of the struggle for independence within a critical mass of people.

In contrast with the IRA’s tactical propaganda for public support, FLNC members disaffected the Corsican people by executing a weak hunger strike followed by domestic terrorist attacks. In November 1980, after only a few weeks, FLNC members ended their hunger strike prematurely and thus forfeited their ability to negotiate terms of “political prisoner” status. Even though the strike had been briefly accompanied by a poster campaign and fundraising attempts, the decision to end the hunger strike damaged the FLNC’s credibility and undermined faith in their political endurance. Perhaps this slump in public support prompted the FLNC to overcompensate with large-scale acts of terrorism against police forces to try to regain public confidence in their ability to lead an insurgency. Unfortunately for them, the insecurity generated from their attacks alienated passive supporters who may have been swayed by a more successful, nonviolent hunger strike.

Though terrorism often provides a powerful tool to gain public support for insurgency, its overuse by the FLNC revealed deviation from the ideology of self-determination that once fueled public support for the movement (O’Neill 2005, 103). Over the course of its nearly 40-year armed struggle, the FLCN executed 10,000 violent attacks including bombings, assassinations, and mass shootings. At first, the attacks demonstrated capability to defeat France’s colonial influence; but over time, the connection between local bombings and independence failed to resonate with the people. Much of the public’s grievances were economic, so the bombings of community commercial properties and those “totally unconnected to political consideration” aggravated tensions between FLCN members and the public (Ramsay 1983, 173). Moreover, leaders of the FLCN “did not elaborate on their earlier policy of demanding self-determination and independence” while carrying out these attacks. In summary, the FLCN undervalued public opinion and demonstrated their diminishing commitment to the ideology of independence and therefore to the people. These mistakes cost them a critical mass of support and jeopardized the movement itself.

Unlike the FLNC, the IRA emphasized fierce commitment to their ideology of self-determination for the Irish people in connection with their acts of terrorism. The IRA ‘Green Book,’ emphasizes that each operation “enhances rather alienates [IRA] supporters,” and that “for all our actions… [IRA volunteers] must explain by whatever means… why [they] bomb.” This portrayal of accountability to the people proved an effective method of reinforcing public support. In addition to building solidarity with the people, the IRA paired their terrorism with defensive propaganda designed to preemptively justify the deaths of anyone against the cause (Gross 2015, 221). Through the pairing of ideology and terrorist acts, the IRA insulated their campaign from loss of public support.

Sinn Féin and the IRA succeeded by prioritizing public support and exercising mastery of propaganda. In contrast, the FLNC lost the war of ideology as it lost the critical support of the Corsican people. When the Irish people demanded peace after years of terror, Sinn Féin responded with nonviolent peace talks. While divergent from their original long-term goal of a unified Ireland, Sinn Féin and the IRA achieved political representation in the North: perhaps their most notable achievement was to recognize that self-determination in a globalized world cannot and will not resemble traditional nation-state politics. In contrast, when the Corsican people demanded peace, the FLNC clung to its counterproductive strategy of terrorism at the expense of public support: their struggle faded in the hearts and minds of the people and concluded with a voluntary surrender, a failure to achieve independence.

Celia Lohr 10/13/17 Celia Lohr 10/13/17

The Predicament of the Pro-Choice Movement in Ireland

Staff Writer Celia Lohr explains the impediments to abortion access in Ireland.

Over the past three decades, more than 205,000 women have left Ireland to procure abortion services. This mass exodus could finally change following the announcement of a referendum to repeal the Eighth Amendment to the Irish constitution set for May or June of 2018. As it stands, the Eighth Amendment equates the life of a fetus to the life of a person and outlaws abortion in all circumstances. Despite pressure from the United Nations and EU Court of Human Rights to amend their restrictive laws, the Irish government refuses to enact meaningful policy change. As a result, its citizens depend on foreign agents and unregulated websites to receive procedural care.

In 2016, the United Kingdom Department of Health recorded 3,265 cases – roughly 10 per day – of women who traveled from Ireland to the UK to receive abortion services. Women who cannot afford to travel have limited options. The miscarriage-inducing medications Mifepristone and Misoprostol are smuggled into the country somewhat successfully. At the same time, online services like womenhelp.org have begun shipping the pills to Northern Ireland addresses for Irish women to collect.

Regardless of how they obtain the pills, an estimated three Irish women self-administer medical abortions every day, facing up to 14 years in prison if they seek help for complications. The high demand for these basic medications has led to the emergence of underground communities of women sharing tactics to circumvent obstructive laws in countries all over the world. The Dutch medical organization, Women on Waves, lists advice for women to procure Mifepristone and Misoprostol in different forms:

“To obtain one of these medicines, one could, for example, say that your grandmother has rheumatoid arthritis so severely she can not go to the pharmacy herself, and that you do not have money to pay for a doctor to get the prescriptions for the tablets.
If there are problems to get the medicines in one pharmacy, try another pharmacy, or a male friend or partner might have fewer problems obtaining them… Usually one can expect more luck at the smaller pharmacies that do not belong to a chain.
Sometimes Cytotec can also be bought on the black market (places where you can also buy Marijuana). However try to make sure that is really is Misoprostol and not fake pills or some other medicine!”

Without protection from their governments or healthcare providers, women place their trust in informal networks and endanger themselves needlessly.

Beyond faceless statistics, these policies have dire consequences for the women themselves. In October 2012, 31-year-old Savita Halappanavar was admitted to University Galway Hospital for back pains. She was 17 weeks pregnant. When it became evident that her back pain was a symptom of preterm labor, Halappanavar asked if it were possible to save her baby, but was told that a miscarriage was “inevitable.” Doctors denied her an emergency medical abortion, and instead kept her hospitalized for three days until she was forced to deliver a stillborn girl. Four days after that, Savita Halappanavar died from advanced septicemia and organ failure.

At the time of writing, no members of Halappanavar’s medical team have been held accountable, despite a jury verdict of “medical misadventure.” After Halappanavar’s death, Irish MP Teachta Dála Clare Daly introduced a bill to clarify cases of legal termination of pregnancy – designed to prevent deaths like Halappanavar’s – but the bill was defeated in the lower house of Parliament by a vote of 101 to 27. Against a backdrop of government inaction, to the credit of the women of Ireland, Halappanavar’s death was met with protest and a wave of activism across the country.

In 2012, pro-choice organizations across Ireland formed the Irish Choice Network, now the Abortion Rights Campaign. Their first and second annualMarch for Choice garnered around 2,500 people, and their numbers have climbed somewhat slowly over the past four years. Then, on International Women’s Day, March 8th, 2017, the Coalition to Repeal the Eighth Amendment organized a “Strike For Repeal” demonstration that saw an estimated 10,000 people take to Dublin’s streets to demand a referendum to repeal the Eighth amendment – by far the largest pro-choice demonstration in Irish history. The success of the Coalition to Repeal the Eighth Amendment culminated with this protest, which led to a Citizens Assembly and ultimately to Prime Minister Leo Varadkar’s decision to hold the referendum.

How did the pro-choice movement grow from a couple thousand to tens of thousands, and how did it inspire such open resistance to some of the most restrictive abortion laws in Europe?

The answer: the Coalition to Repeal the Eighth Amendment generated and leveraged social capital to harness passive rejection of prescribed politics and transform it into active resistance. That is, in a predominantly disaffected youthculture, the Repeal campaign created space for young people to access socio-political ideas and express their support in a way that generated social capital. Specifically, the Coalition’s capacity to mobilize young people in unprecedented numbers relied on three elements.

Photo: @lhj__photography a protestor for the REPEAL campaign shares her story

First, the REPEAL jumper addressed the need for young people to vocalize their beliefs without the constraints of traditional politics and processes.

According to Anna Cosgrave, the creator of the jumpers, her purpose was to enable:

“… people that otherwise felt nervous about the political and academic rhetoric around reproductive rights to be able to wear a jumper and be like I care without having any of the linguistics or technical terms.”

For people of all ages and backgrounds – especially youth – the REPEAL jumper provides access to a growing socio-political discussion. Its first impression is stark. Its black and white contrast conveys severity, simplicity, and power. In an organized demonstration, the jumper becomes a uniform of resistance; in everyday life, one of solidarity. The jumper displays a public statement about a shunned issue, creating new political practices in place of traditionally accepted ones. The REPEAL jumpers attract so many people, perhaps, due to their function an emblem of resistance that allows wearers to determine their own meaning by interpreting the message of REPEAL: resistance to tradition, resistance to a Catholic state, resistance to male-dominated politics. The flexibility allows each person to share deeply personal meanings with others, and thus creates a community for building social capital. Also significant, the quote that accompanies the Repeal campaign’s Instagram photo underscores the importance of accessibility in social movements. The woman in the photo describes the way to “reclaim our bodies from the State.” Here, the notion of REPEAL has transcended simple popularity and become a way for young people to engage highly intellectual ideas about the role of government in people’s lives.

The evidence the jumpers’ popularity speaks for itself: On their first day in stores, they sold out within an hour. The online shop has stocked and restocked, but remains sold out for the foreseeable future. From an economic perspective, the low-level infrastructure of Cosgrave’s microfinance project unintentionally produced an unmet demand that bolstered the social capital of those lucky enough to possess one of the coveted jumpers.

The second element of the Repeal coalition’s ethos emerged in chants used at protests that reiterate a rejection of traditional politics. The first:

Not the Church, not the State

Women must decide their fates

This chant, like the jumper, calls into question the role of institutions in women’s lives. It emphasizes collective independence from both the Church and State, breaking from longstanding traditional politics, and instead presents a new framework for considering women’s issues.

The second:

Enda, Enda

Where’s the referendum?

At protests, this chant is performed in a taunting manner. The speakers refer to then-Prime Minister, Enda Kenny by his first name, thereby denying him respect and formality. This language places the protesters and the nation’s Prime Minister on equal footing. Together, the structure and performance of these chants display the protesters’ resistance to traditional politics.

The third element of the Repeal coalition’s success in generating social capital rests in its official and unofficial social media presence. The official social media pages of just a few members of the Coalition to Repeal the Eighth have over 65,000 followers between Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter, plus avid supporters at entertainment news websites like her.ie, which boasts 175,000 followers on various social media platforms. Thousands of young people use social media as a platform for expressing solidarity and continued support: #repealthe8th was among the top trending hashtags in Ireland in 2016 and spiked at over 36,000 tweets in a single day during 2016’s March for Choice rally. The online community created by the Repeal coalition produces and reproduces social capital as online momentum grows.

Popular social media pages independent from the Coalition have also bolstered the coalition’s cause. Humans of The Sesh provides a solid example of the new political practices surrounding the Repeal the Eighth movement. With over 23,000 followers on Twitter and 556,000 on Facebook, Humans of The Sesh holds a special place in youth culture history in Ireland and the UK. They are nihilistic, self-proclaimed “sesh gremlin documenters” with a philosophy of recreational inebriation, deadpan commentary, and emotional decay. Primarily, they make memes. In June, Humans of The Sesh tweeted its annoyance at a
government move to discontinue large packs of Amber Leaf tobacco:

First and foremost, in this tweet, Humans of The Sesh expresses its frustration with the Irish government from a youth perspective. Second, the tweet equates two completely different policy points – tobacco and women’s healthcare. Notably, the tweet equates them to highlight their absurdity: repealing the Eighth Amendment should be just as straightforward as ‘repealing’ a tobacco product, and the Irish government is therefore out-of-touch and ridiculous for repealing one but not the other. As a group fundamentally catered to disaffected youth, it is significant that Humans of The Sesh deliberately referenced a socio-political issue. Their presence on social media platforms, separate from and critical of traditional political spaces, provides them with a source of social capital from young people. By referencing the Repeal the Eighth movement, Humans of The Sesh leveraged the movement’s social capital and amplified it for its own followers.

In another example, the Repeal movement’s social capital bleeds into independent social media in a post retweeted by the Abortion Rights Campaign:

This image demonstrates the flexible boundaries between political and non-political spaces for Irish youth. The people in the photo are attending Electric Picnic – the wildly popular summer festival best known for its teen-dream lineup and open-minded drug policies. By definition, it is a space outside of traditional politics. More importantly, it is a space distinct for young people in which festival goers gained social capital for embedding their political views. The people in the photo carry an inflated banana with the word “repeal” misspelled to make a pun about the fruit. Like Humans of The Sesh, their language choice draws attention to the movement in a humorous, accessible way. The social capital generated by the Repeal movement enabled these people to express their political opinion in a format that reproduced more social capital for themselves.

The Repeal the Eighth movement drew unprecedented numbers of young people into the fold by generating social capital for its participants. For Irish youth, the ethos of the Repeal campaign reproduced a familiar rejection of prescribed politics, and provided common access to socio-political discussions. Through the use of the REPEAL jumpers, protest chants, and social media, the Coalition to Repeal the Eighth gained enough power to pressure the Irish government into holding a Citizen’s Assembly and a referendum.

With the upcoming referendum set for the summer of 2018, the Coalition to Repeal the Eighth Amendment has achieved its principal goal. While popular opinion and all major political parties support repeal, many of these groups will likely begin to lobby to replace the amendment with certain restrictions on abortion access. Yet again to the credit of the women of Ireland, the most recent March for Choice celebrated tens of thousands of participants: now, women’s rights and lives depend on the Repeal coalition’s ability to sustain support and adapt to emerging political challenges.

Jonathan Scolare 10/13/17 Jonathan Scolare 10/13/17

Cold War Revivalism? Characterizing the U.S.-Russian Relationship in the Contemporary World Order

Staff Writer Jonathan Scolare analyzes the changing relationship between the US and Russia.

The Soviet Union disintegrated exactly 25 years ago this past winter. It was the final nail in the Cold War’s coffin. Yet today, a quarter of a century later, rhetoric from politicians, and pundits declare there is a “New Cold War” or a “Cold War 2.0.” While it is clear that tensions exist between the United States (U.S.) and Russia, especially with regards to Syria, Ukraine, and allegations of Moscow’s meddling in the 2016 U.S. elections, to say these elements are analogous to those of the Cold War would be a fundamental misunderstanding of history. For starters, U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles have been slowly yet surely decreasing, rather than increasing as part of an arms race. Additionally, neither state is boosting its military budget vis-à-vis the other’s moves. Next, there are no definitive examples of proxy wars between Washington and Moscow like those that existed during the Cold War. Many will argue the situations in Ukraine and Syria count as proxy wars, but that is not possible due to the lack of U.S. or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops in either state directly combatting Russian forces. Lastly, and probably most importantly, while the Cold War was fought along ideological lines, today there is no ideology and no “-ism” to which Russia adheres. While the U.S. still sees itself as the defender of capitalism and liberalism, Russia has been experiencing a dearth of ideology for it to exemplify in the world. There is no “New Cold War” between Russia and the United States because the current relationship cannot be compared to the ideologies and motives either party defended throughout the second half of the 20th century. Neither power is looking to trump the “ism” of the other, nor do they see themselves as a savior to world order in relation to each other.

For starters, the arms race synonymous with U.S.-Soviet relations of the mid- to late 20th century is behind us. Data shows that since 1991, the U.S. and Russia have each reduced their nuclear arsenals to a quarter of what they once were. The arms race was a key component to the Cold War, with the militaries dominating each country’s federal budget. In his 1963 speech at American University, President Kennedy stated, “[W]e are both devoting massive sums of money to weapons that could be better devoted to combat ignorance, poverty, and disease. We are both caught up in a vicious and dangerous cycle with suspicion on one side breeding suspicion on the other, and new weapons begetting counter-weapons.” Presently, neither government is forming its policies based on what the other side does. Each country’s policy remains largely independent of the other’s. True, there is still plenty of suspicion between Moscow and Washington, but that is not fuel for greater stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Additionally, Russia’s military budget is about one ninth of what the U.S. spends. Even if Russia wanted to spend the same dollar amount on its armed forces that Washington does, it would require the Kremlin to spend 45% of its gross domestic product (GDP) in military, compared to the 5.4% that it spends now. The Russian economy cannot handle that burden. Thus, it is impossible to have an arms race today like that seen several decades ago.

It should be noted that the Cold War never involved direct military conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, but rather was comprised of many smaller-scale wars around the world. These wars were fought to install governments friendly to either Soviet communism or American liberalism. These wars were known as proxy wars. Herein lies another difference between current Russo-American relations: neither state is intervening in countries around the world in order to prevent the other from “winning.” The world is no longer seen through a “zero sum” lens, which is to say an actor that does not support one state does not necessarily support that state’s enemies. For Washington, this means that a state not being aligned with the U.S. does not mean that it is aligned with Russia. While issues like Crimea can be seen as zero sum (either Ukrainian or Russian), the same cannot be said of Afghanistan, Iraq or Kosovo, where U.S. and NATO troops are stationed. The U.S. and her allies have avoided sending in troops into active combat duty in Syria and Ukraine, where Russian actions are most prevalent. During the Cold War, Washington was quick to send in troops and covert specialists when it looked like there would be a leftist swing in states like Vietnam, Honduras, and Iran. Today, states cannot “fall to Russia” or its ideology. Herein lies the last yet greatest difference between the Cold War and current Russo-American relations: the role of ideology.

For the duration of the Cold War, a widespread fear was held in the U.S. that its geopolitical adversary would seek to spread its ideology to any and every part of the world it could. George Kennan first wrote about this in his Long Telegram, stating, “Russians will strive energetically to develop Soviet representation in…countries in which they sense strong possibilities of opposition to Western centers of power.” To Kennan – and everyone in Washington thereafter – Moscow was on a mission to turn the whole world against the West. In other words, the Soviets saw themselves as the defenders and propagators to communism, collectivism, and Leninism throughout the world. On the other side of the Atlantic, the U.S. saw itself in a similar manner towards capitalism and liberalism. Thus, both sides sought to curb the spread of the other’s core ideology, or the other’s “ism.” This objective can be best seen in President Reagan’s 1982 speech to the British Parliament, where he declared, “the march of freedom and democracy will leave Leninism and Marxism on the ash heap of history.” Here the mission of the Western world was no longer to contain Soviet ideology, but to vanquish the “ism.” Such rhetoric does not exist anymore, and for good reason: Russia no longer has an “ism” to champion. As the Soviet Union disintegrated, so too did communism, collectivism, and Leninism throughout Eurasia. Russia has been experiencing an existential crisis ever since. Furthermore, because the Kremlin does not have an “ism” of its own, there is no Russian ideology for the U.S. to counterbalance. Bearing in mind that nearly every foreign policy move taken by Washington during the Cold War was to trump Soviet communism, it is clear that current relations do not resemble a “Cold War 2.0.”

Elements that were present during the Cold War can be seen in current Russo-U.S. relations, although they do not constitute a “New Cold War” by themselves. First, there is the Syrian Civil War and the Russian annexation of Crimea. From a quick glance and brief background knowledge of either conflict, echoes of past U.S.-Soviet standoffs are evident. Both Moscow and Washington have shown support for actors who are conflicting with each other. Furthermore, these actors are operating in a “zero sum” arena – it is highly unlikely, if not impossible, that President Bashar al-Assad will create a coalition government with the rebels similar to how it is unlikely that Donetsk and Luhansk will ask to rejoin Ukraine. Yet these do not qualify as proxy wars because, while Russian troops are present in Syria and eastern Ukraine, NATO and U.S. forces have limited intervention to airstrikes and aid packages. At the same time, it is evident that both the West and Russia have interest in integrating Kiev into their own respective institutions and governance systems. Therefore, Ukraine can be best seen as a sphere of influence battle, a phenomenon seen throughout the Cold War. In the Syrian case, on the other hand, all actions conducted by the U.S.-led coalition have been in the name of counterterrorism, rather than toppling the Russian-friendly regime. Thus, Western intervention has not been necessarily geared towards countering Russian actions or gaining influence over Syria, but rather as part of the War on Terror.

Secondly, propaganda has been playing a heavy role in influencing each society’s perception of the other. Russian media outlets enthusiastically backed Donald Trump during the 2016 presidential campaign while U.S. outlets have run the story that Russia rigged last year’s elections. While the rhetoric has softened over the past 25 years, Russophobia is alive and well in the United States just as it was in the mid-20th century. However, propaganda does not equate to war. Information battles have been waged between Moscow and Washington for several years now, but they are not analogous to those seen during the Cold War. Indeed, the propaganda we see is developed under the banner of fear and alarmism rather than actual threats. Russia will not be the end of the American way of life; that will come only from the American people.

Claire Witherington-Perkins 4/24/17 Claire Witherington-Perkins 4/24/17

On the Brink of Collapse: The European Union’s Transition as it Strives to Survive

Staff Writer Claire Witherington-Perkins examines the EUs efforts to counteract Euroscepticism.

The recent vote for the United Kingdom (UK) to leave the European Union (EU), commonly called Brexit, was a manifestation of Euroskepticism, a term coined to describe resistance to European integration or involvement in the EU within the UK but which has now spread to other countries. Before the establishment of the EU, the UK, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, and Germany came together to form the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which bound France and Germany’s coal and steel industries together, the two industries absolutely necessary to wage a war, hoping to bring lasting peace to Europe. The ECSC has since expanded to encompass other policies and countries, transforming over time into the EU as it is now. However, the EU is now seen as a failed utopia, and Euroskepticism, encompassing everything from uber-nationalist political parties and their supporters to those providing constructive criticism with a goal of reform, is on the rise in many European countries. The recent struggles the EU has faced began with the acceptance of poorer nations without strong democratic histories, a principle on which the EU was founded, and is culminating in peripheral countries such as Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Italy, which were formerly pro-EU, succumbing to Euroskepticism. Euroskepticism is also rising in countries like Germany and other solvent members of the EU because they now have lacking finances and little willpower to bail out financially struggling members. Euroskepticism is the manifestation of problems in the EU like economic stagnation, the Euro crisis, conflict over migration, and Russian threats and pressures, many of which stem from the much-enlarged, poor, and diverse EU. Overall, the EU is struggling with overall coherence, policy, and solidarity, and while the majority of young people feel they have a European identity, many others feel a European identity is overshadowing and threatening to their national identity and sovereignty. Additionally, there is a tendency to blame Brussels as the head of the EU for problems that may or may not be covered under national responsibilities. Throughout this uncertain period in EU history, there have been many options for the EU: to disband altogether, to remain as it is, to strengthen the binding ties between EU member states, to leave the Euro and keep the EU intact, or have members pick and choose which parts of the union to adhere to. Given all the potential solutions for the EU’s future, the most effective solutions would be to establish a “two-speed Europe”, a pick and choose system.

One factor sparking a call for change in the EU’s operation like a two-speed system is the normalization of far-right political parties in Europe and around the world, marking the first time that far-right groups have been widely popular since World War Two. If far-right parties succeed in key upcoming elections in Europe, they will restrict freedom of movement in the EU, potentially catalyzing the breakup of the Eurozone and the EU as a whole. The upcoming elections in Italy and particularly France have led to uncertainty surrounding the future of the EU and the Euro. The Front National’s Marine Le Pen sees political conflict in Europe as populists, or Euroskeptics, against globalists, or pro-EU thinkers. Le Pen sees the Euro as a political move, rather than a currency, in order to get countries to follow EU protocol and rules. Additionally, Le Pen, claiming that the EU has an authoritarian nature, supports Frexit, the French exit from the EU, if France cannot gain control over their border, currency, sovereignty, economy, and laws (in other words, everything that the EU was created for: linking France and Germany together to prevent another war in Europe). A Le Pen victory could signify the end of the EU, as France was a founding member of the EU. While Le Pen is most certainly the most conservative and controversial candidate in the French election, Francois Fillon, a conservative candidate, is also Euroskeptic, anti-Euro, and anti-migrant. While the French election won’t be finalized until May, the Dutch general election held in March resulted in a win for the ruling liberal party (VVD) with the second most seats going to the far-right party (PVV); however, all other parties have stated that they will not collaborate with PVV to form a government. The UK will also be holding local elections at the beginning of May, and the pro-EU party, the Liberal Democrats, is strong in the polls. Finally, October will mark important elections for the EU as Chancellor Angela Merkel seeks another term and is likely to succeed, but the far-right party AfD is polling well and is likely to take several seats in the Bundestag. AfD is campaigning on a platform that is anti-EU, opposed to funding for Greece and Italy, and anti-migration. The Brexit vote illustrates the importance of the upcoming elections, as any further dissolution could be disastrous for the future of the EU.

One option for mitigating problems in the EU is to create a “two-speed Europe,” or a pick-and-choose system of membership. In other words, this system would allow groups of members to continue integrating while others continue as they are. This solution would have eased the concerns in Britain over losing sovereignty in the EU, which may have prevented Brexit had this been in place to begin with. Some pro-EU thinkers believe that this system is the best option. For example, Greece should not have been able to join the Eurobecause it wasn’t ready; however, as part of accession to the EU, new member states agree that they will one day join the Euro. Likewise, states that are not ready or are resistant to certain policies should not have to or should not be allowed to partake in those programs, as they won’t gain anything by participating in a program they don’t agree with. These ideas are cemented by the fact that the EU member states are very diverse, which should encourage flexibility rather than uniform convergence. However, some countries like Hungary and Poland fear marginalization through this two-speed system. Even though EU membership is still popular in many periphery countries, as citizens have benefitted from EU funding and the freedom of movement, many politicians fear that Western liberalism is eroding their identities.

Dissolution of the Euro is another option, as much of the strain on these countries stems from the financial obligations and burdens of carrying member states with struggling economies that use the Euro. Britain, Scandinavia, and Switzerland never joined the Euro, and now developing members not on the Euro yet, like Poland and the Czech Republic, are reluctant to join because of its economic shortcomings. In order to make the Euro work, the EU would need to streamline policies like taxation, spending, and banking, which would create a super-state weighted toward Southern Europe. A super-state Europe is out of the question, as many countries are disenchanted as it is now and believe that they are losing sovereignty and identity. Thus the only feasible solution to making the Euro work, creating a super-state, is out of the question and would only aggravate current political conflicts.

The final option for the EU is its complete dissolution, meaning every member state would become completely sovereign once more. These countries would have complete autonomy over their economies and policies, which is appealing to many nationalist or populist political parties and supporters across the member states. However, Germany is the powerhouse of the EU and has held the EU and Euro together for many years, meaning it has the most to lose if the EU or Euro failed. Therefore, Germany would not let the EU fail and would try its best not to let the Euro fail. Many other member states still enjoy the benefits of the EU and would want to keep it from failing as well. Finally, since the EU was created to prevent another war in Europe from breaking out, some politicians and citizens understanding the significance of this union would need to find another solution to prevent another war in Europe or make peace with the fact that there is no longer a safeguard. The complete dissolution of the EU is not a realistic option for the future of Europe.

When determining the best course of action for the future of the EU, we must take into account both the current political situation in many of the key countries like France, Britain, and Germany and the options for the future of the EU. Considering politics in the decision between creating a “two-speed Europe” and just dissolving the Euro, countries would still be unhappy even if the EU dissolved the Eurozone because it would not solve the problem of sovereignty, national identity, border security and migration, and a plethora of other controversial subjects. When taking all of this into account, creating a “two-speed Europe” is the best option for the future of the EU. In order to keep countries content, the EU must offer options and the member states can choose which best suits their needs, preparedness, and willingness. Countries will participate in programs that are suited for what they are prepared for. Despite the concerns of some peripheral countries, this option would be the best system for each individual country because they would be able to keep their national identity, have say over their sovereignty, and hold referendums on issues that are important to them or controversial in their country rather than being forced to participate in programs that they don’t agree with. Creating a “two-speed Europe” would ensure that member states are content with their membership in the EU and would make justification for leaving the EU more difficult, meaning another Brexit would probably not happen. Thus, a “two-speed Europe” is the best option for the continuation and future of the EU.

Matthew Chakov 4/24/17 Matthew Chakov 4/24/17

An Exotic, Yet Surprisingly Appropriate Government: A Look at Consociationalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Guest Writer Matthew Chakov explains the benefits of the structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s government.

Imagine a government with three presidents who have veto power over each other, all of whom represent different minorities in the country. A government where all three presidents simultaneously serve a four-year term and switch off every eight months when it comes to who holds the ultimate power. A government where the highest constitutional court is not appointed entirely by people in the country itself, but rather partially by an international body. A government where there is a foreign leader chosen by an international body who has the power to remove any elected official in this country on their own accord. A government with a constitution that contains an amendment process, but an amendment process which could only modify certain parts of the constitution and not others.

This hypothetical government probably evokes a number of reactions in the reader: certainly it’s exotic, but also strange, unconventional, probably ineffective, and seemingly the conception of somebody dead-set on watching the world burn. However, this quirky governmental style is not hypothetical at all. It’s alive and kicking in the small Balkan country of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has had this form of government since the mid-1990s. Contrary to what may have been the reader’s instinctual reaction, this actually makes a lot of sense for the country’s situation, and while rare, this type of government known as a consociational democracy has existed throughout history in many countriesall over the world such as Cyprus, Lebanon, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Macedonia.

The Solution to Insurmountable Divides

According to the Encyclopedia of Governance, consociationalism is a “stable democratic system in deeply divided societies that is based on an elite cartel.” Upon reading the definition, one might underestimate the level of division in a society to warrant the need for a consociational government. One might think the United States is a “deeply divided society.” After all, Pew Research has found that partisanship is currently at its highest point in modern American history. However, “deeply divided” in the context of consociationalism means that the different groups in society were literally killing each other, which was exactly the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s (Democrats and Republicans are not killing each other… yet.) Or it can mean that the groups in question had differences and animosities that walked the line between solvable and insurmountable.

Consociationalism works because all of the groups who normally have trouble getting along get a say in the government through the elites that represent them and their interests. These elites get a say through constitutional provisions that mandate that institutions share power between the very diverse groups. This works in practice by having a constitution that says Group X must have Y number of members in Z Legislative Body or Council, regardless of the numbers of votes cast for each group in an election. Once again, this sounds foreign to Americans who are so used to the first-past-the-post plurality voting system in the United States, but even some institutions like the Federal Election Commission use a power sharing system derived from consociationalism as only three of the six commissioners are allowed to be from the same political party. While the FEC is not a particularly impactful body (at least as compared to the institutions that usually feature power sharing structures in the divided countries), it shows that even relatively integrated societies sometimes want to ensure that one group does not garner too much power.

Turmoil in Bosnia and Herzegovina comes to a Resolution

As alluded to earlier, the transformation of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian government to a consociational democracy came about after the country’s large-scale civil war. Prior to the 1990s, Bosnia and Herzegovina was a part of the former Yugoslavia that was made up of six distinct republics, and the entire country was united behind the Communist Party. However, the dissolution of Yugoslavia caused war in Bosnia and Herzegovina for many reasons. Among those reasons was the deep animosity and mutual distrust of the three largest ethnic groups in the country: the Bosnian Muslims, the Croats, and the Serbs. Over 100,000 people died in the Bosnian War between 1992 and 1995, but eventually the United States and other countries stepped in to help the parties come to a resolution and an eventual modus vivendi.

In 1995, the Dayton Peace Accords were agreed upon by the parties involved, which stopped the fighting and created a Bosnian and Herzegovinian Constitution. This constitution formed a central government for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but most of the power was left to the two statescontained in the country. On the one hand, there was the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (different than the Republic which is the overarching central government) which was territory controlled by the Bosnian Muslims and the Croats, and on the other, the Republic of Srpska controlled by the Serbs. The power that was allocated to the overarching central government was to be shared between the various ethnic groups, and interestingly also with foreign entities. Fred L. Morrison describes this power sharing in an article in the Constitutional Commentary Journal,

The central government is organized on a federalist scheme – but one driven to an extreme of states’ rights. Everything is apportioned in thirds – one part Serbian, one part Bosniac, and one part Croatian. The Presidency consists of three individuals, one from each group. The bicameral legislature consists of an upper house (House of Peoples) with five from each group, and a lower house (House of Representatives) with fourteen from each group. Each of these bodies is to have three presiding officers who rotate in office.

However, this gets even more complicated because one member of the presidency could say that a decision by the other two is “destructive of a vital interest of the Entity from the territory from which he was elected,” and then essentially veto it if two thirds of those in the legislature of the ethnic group representing the dissenting president agree. The upper legislative body also has what Morrison termed an “ethnic veto” because the individual ethnic groups have the ability to tank any legislation they do not like irrespective of the other ethnic groups.

Perhaps more interesting than the power sharing between domestic ethnic groups is the power sharing between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the world. Below is a bar graph showing the number of foreigners in the various government entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Source: The Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Fred L. Morrison — **Source:** *The Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina* by Fred L. Morrison

The constitutional court is made up of nine members: two from each of the three ethnic groups and “three foreign neutrals, appointed by the President of the European Court of Human Rights after consultation with the Presidency.” It must be odd living in a country where foreigners make up a significant portion of the highest court and therefore make decisions that govern your life. However, as stated before, the Bosnian and Herzegovinian government is decentralized with little power at the federal level as most of the power is reserved for the entities of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Srpska. Nonetheless, it may be surprising to learn that the individual with the most power is actually a foreigner who is appointed by the international community. The Office of the High Representative is occupied by a foreignerwho has the power to dismiss elected officials in Bosnia and Herzegovina, enact “substantial legislation,” annul decisions by the highest constitutional court, and amend any Bosnian legislation. This kind of ultimate power is yielded to foreigners to ensure that Bosnia and Herzegovina is developing the way that the international community would like it to.

The Future of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Countries tend to move away from consociationalism after they become more stable as we see in cases like Colombia, Malaysia, and South Africa. I suspect that Bosnia and Herzegovina is moving in this direction and soon could be rid of these rules and institutions that undermine their sovereignty. The Office of the High Representative will shut down, but only after the international community agrees that the country has met the necessary conditions including the “Fiscal Sustainability of the State” and the “Entrenchment of the Rule of Law.” The country is also working on joining the European Union with a membership application accepted by the bloc in September, although the process to fully join will be long as many reforms are necessary. The stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina is reason for optimism and, even though their consociational government may be exotic, it makes sense for their situation and hopefully they will grow out of it in the near future.

Claire Spangler 2/27/17 Claire Spangler 2/27/17

The Puzzle of Scottish Independence and EU Membership

Guest Writer Claire Spangler explores the potential for Brexit to further the Scottish independence movement.

The possibility of an independent Scotland and its consequent European Union (EU) membership holds a plethora of issues and ambiguities left to be clarified. The issue at hand is that the Treaty of the European Union does not address how, or if, a region of a current member could obtain membership, if that region becomes independent. The impending ‘Brexit’further complicates this matter. This grey area of potential membership is increasing the demand for clarification regarding membership acquisition in light of the ‘Brexit’ and the growing instability of the European Union. The potential secession of Scotland from the United Kingdom (UK) and entrance into EU membership poses a multitude of issues: defining the type of relationship an independent Scotland would have with the EU, what the process would be to become a member and how the process would manifest, and how the ‘Brexit’ affects Scotland’s want for membership.

There are contentious debates surrounding the Scottish need for departure from the UK and its subsequent reapplication to the EU. Some experts assert that an independent Scotland would only need to ratify a number of treaties to be a full EU member, while others state that Scotland would become a “third country” (a non-EU member) and thus would be immediately expelled from the EU.

Each theory has its discrepancies, and no one method has been defined as the clear course with which an independent Scotland should proceed. Furthermore, Scotland’s role in the EU will also be reintroduced within the context of the ‘Brexit.’ The outcome of the 2014 Scottish independence referendum was largely affected by the Europhile sentiments of the region and its desire to retain its EU role; thus, the ‘Brexit’ could trigger another referendum on independence that could result in Scotland preferring the EU to the UK. The EU-Scotland relationship needs to be defined, with a process for enacting that relationship decided upon, in order to present a clear future including EU membership to the Scottish people. By defining and asserting a clear path for Scotland, the EU can preemptively avoid any future issues such as drawn out negotiations or shocks to the EU economy.

Scotland’s want for independence is politically and economically based. The country, which has been ruled by the UK parliament since 1707, came under UK rule during a time of economic need, when insufficient supplies and catastrophic illness crippled the country. However, Scotland has matured in the modern age and is no longer in need of an economic system rooted in regional co-dependence. One of the primary arguments for secession is that Scots would gain political sovereignty (a wish that was only partially met by the creation of the Scottish Parliament in 1998. This furthered sovereignty would also have economic benefits, with increased economic freedom from UK obligations. However, both Scotland’s current political and economic standings are dependent on its membership in the EU. Scotland wishes to be politically independent in order to represent itself both to the world and to the EU specifically. With individual membership, Scotland would gain its own vote in EU matters; currently, the United Kingdom has a vote in EU matter, which represents the whole of the UK. In becoming an individual member, Scotland would be able to vote along the lines of its own interests and not merely be represented by the UK. Furthermore, economic independence would retain Scotland’s current dealings, while opening the economy per the wishes of the Scottish people. Thus, the question at hand is whether or not an independent Scotland could be a EU member in order to gain politically and economically.

The grey area surrounding an independent Scotland’s EU membership originates in the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). When the treaty was written, it had not been anticipated that a region of a Member State would attempt to secede, and thus the treaty has not identified the process concerning regions that have seceded from Member States. This means that, while there is a process in place for a member state to leave the EU, there is not one that specifically addresses a region such as Scotland. Thus, there is no predetermined legal process for Scotland that addresses what it would mean to secede from an EU member state. One viewpoint is that Scotland, by seceding from the United Kingdom, is exiting the EU. This is the opinion of former presidents of the European Commission, Prodi and Barroso, who described Scotland’s secession as an immediate withdrawal from the EU. This, however, is not economically or legally feasible because Scotland is economically intertwined with the EU, and Scots are currently EU citizens. An overnight expulsion of Scotland from the EU would devastate its economy as it is reliant on EU free trade — three of Scotland’s top five export partners are EU members. Member States are also entangled with the Scottish market, as they too gain from Scottish imports such as petroleum and chemical products. An expulsion of Scotland would manifest in the form of duties on its exports and imports, as well as the potential creation of export quotas for goods going into the EU. These restrictions would stress Scotland’s economy and potentially create barriers for EU countries seeking Scottish goods. Furthermore, Scots are EU citizens and to strip them of their citizenship overnight would be a harsh act that would leave many abroad without the freedom to cross borders, or at schools they can no longer afford. In addition to these entanglements, an immediate expulsion of Scotland would disregard the EU principle of sincere cooperation, diminishing Scotland’s right to the democratic process and the principle of continuity of effect. At any length, it appears that if an independent Scotland were to be considered a third country (non-member state) to the EU, it would be necessary to invoke Article 50 of the Treaty. Even if the EU considers the British exit to be Scotland’s exit from the EU, the exit itself would have to be negotiated over a two-year period to finalize all aspects of former EU dealings. However, a radically different view of Scotland has also been proposed.

The Scottish government, prior to the election, stated that an independent Scotland would be able to “take its place as a full Member State within the European Union”. This wording assumes Scotland’s current role in the EU as partial membership; it acknowledges Scotland’s role in the EU while recognizing that it soon will not be a member state. The government has elaborated on this matter by stating that, following a vote for independence, Scotland would enter negotiations with both the UK and the EU to ensure a smooth transition into independent EU membership. This method of negotiation is corroborated by a number of experts that define Scotland as a non-member actor in the EU. However, this relation to the EU, and the process as previously defined by the Scottish government, is dependent on the UK’s role as a member state.

The situation in Scotland was made more complex by the ‘Brexit’ vote. Many people have incorrectly assumed that the ‘Brexit’ would simply incite another Scottish referendum because of Scotland’s Europhile tendencies; however, Scotland’s plan, as stated in a government white paper, Scotland’s Future, is dependent on the UK as a member state. In the proposal for an independent Scotland, potential EU membership is defined as full membership, but with certain opt outs such as abstaining from certain EU norms that the UK currently abstains from. Specifically, Scotland will not pursue an entrance to the Eurozone or the Schengen Area, opting instead to continue using the pound and to keep its current Common Travel Area with the UK, The Republic of Ireland, Channel Islands, and Isle of Man. These two opt outs are radically affect by the ‘Brexit.’ Scotland now faces more questions concerning its potential EU membership including whether or not Scotland can mimic the Republic of Ireland’s opt out of the Schengen Area, and keep an open border with the UK, regardless of the Schengen’s external border resolution. The other, and more complicated, issue of currency will also need to be resolved. While Scotland has stated that it intends on continuing its use of the pound, it is questionable that as non-member the UK would allow its currency to be used by a separate country that willingly removed itself from UK jurisdiction. This topic has no precedent and would need to be determined by the UK Parliament. In addition to these technical conflicts, Brussels has ruled out the possibility of Scotland remaining in the EU while Britain leaves. The European Commission came to this conclusion in late June, with the intention of relaying that an independent Scotland would need to reapply for membership regardless of the timing of independence, since it will be a post-Brexit vote. However, this declaration too has loopholes and leaves Scotland’s future with more questions. It has been speculated that Scotland could follow in Greenland’s footsteps from 1982 when Greenland itself broke away from the EU, but its residents (Danish residents) and Denmark itself remained in the EU. In this situation, Scotland (which has voted to remain in the EU and predominantly voted against the Brexit) could use this precedent loophole to retain EU benefits that it has desperately been pursuing.

Scotland’s future is facing many contradictions in terms of its participation in the EU. Scholars and politicians cannot agree on the terms of a Scottish claim to EU membership or the process by which an independent Scotland could attain membership. The Brexit has further complicated the matter by forcefully beginning Scotland’s unwanted exit from the EU and the single market in particular. Indeed there is no clear path for Scotland at this time. The only clear aspect of this grey area is that Scotland wants EU membership and has proved so time and time again. It is a key player in, and depends on, the EU single market, and is prepared to fully add to the system by commissioning a full vote. Should Scotland have the opportunity to be a full EU member, it would do so whole-heartedly.

Claire Witherington-Perkins 2/27/17 Claire Witherington-Perkins 2/27/17

Religious Ideology v. Feminism: How Poland’s Growing Feminist Movement is Challenging the Catholic Church

Staff Writer Claire Witherington-Perkins explains the relationship between the Catholic church in Poland and women’s empowerment.

For centuries, Poland was a patriarchal society defined by the Catholic Church, confining women to traditional roles, with the Church and foreign powers reinforcing women’s subordination to men through cultural traditions and customs. While foreign entities occupied Poland, the Polish Church, seen as the mother of Poland, became the only stability and source of resistance in the country, cementing the idea that to be Polish was to be Catholic. Communist attempts to discredit the Church’s authority increasedthe Church’s popularity, prompting citizens to proclaim their faith and follow the Church as a form of resistance to communist rule. Despite the communist government passing legislation encouraging women to work and to alleviate women’s domestic tasks, Poles’ assertion of Catholicism inhibited any real change in gender roles and relations, as the Catholic doctrine confined women to a motherly, domestic role.

Communism’s attempts to redefine women’s roles from traditional patriarchal roles left a legacy of distrust of feminism, and thus, the feminist movement has been slow to emerge since the fall of communism in the 1980s, when Poland received an influx of Western goods. These goods provided an opportunity to introduce contraceptives into society; however, Pope John Paul II allied with pro-life Poles and introduced Catholic family planning in Poland. The post-communist era reinstated the Church’s authority in society, mandating religion classes in schools and priests as teachers. These classes deteriorated women’s status, encouraging domesticity through their rhetoric. Thus, the Church is the dominant moral authority in Poland, formulating the norms of acceptable behavior in politics and society. The Church has been reasserting its presence in Poland at a time when Poles are becoming less religious, and the Church can still influence political debates, as many politicians try to avoid controversial topics like reproductive rights. Competition for political positions and politicians’ fears of losing power reinforces the Church’s influence in politics. Although the Polish Parliament has passed legislation regarding work and maternity, these laws mostly act as a formality and do not impact day-to-day lives. The vastly influential Church, the main hurdle for feminist and women’s rights movements and organizations, is the root of the lack of and opposition to gender equality and reproductive rights, spreading its ideology through its presence in schools and political debates.

European Union

In 2004, when Poland joined the European Union (EU), many Poles within the feminist community had the idea that EU accession would immediately create equality, quieting the feminist movement during the accession process (1997-2004). This process requires adherence to the acquis communautaire, a common set of rules ensuring values such as human rights, equality, or environmental issues embedded in EU legislation. However, this adherence has not assuaged gender discrimination in Poland, especially in the workforce. EU accession has actually reinvigorated religious rhetoric in politics, associating women with motherhood and the nuclear family. Instead of improving women’s reproductive rights, Poland’s EU accession legitimized Polish laws adhering to pro-life ideology. Additionally, EU governing bodies have limited influence on Polish political parties regarding reproductive rights because, legally, the EU cannot intervene on moral values, including abortion. Many feminists in Polandsay that they thought joining the EU would make a large impact on reproductive rights but that they are now uncertain about the future of reproductive rights because the EU has not drastically improved the situation in Poland.

Since Poland joined the EU, the Polish people’s approval of the EU is increasing, but attitudes toward gender equality have experienced limited change. Up to 87% of Poles, the highest percentage in the EU, do not believe that gender equality is a fundamental right, posing a problem for future feminist or women’s rights movements. Many women are unhappy with the state-sponsored provisions for gender equality, and some women have appealed to European legislative and judicial bodies to try to ensure their rights. The European Court of Human Rights ruled against the Polish State in a case where a Polish woman was unable to receive an abortion even though the law entitled her to do so. Furthermore, the Council of Europe stated that women should legally have access to abortion to ensure safety rather than forcing women to have unsafe illegal abortions; however, the EU is unable to take any legislative action regarding abortion. Women’s organizations use “Europeanization”, or becoming more like Western Europe, as an argument for the improvement of women’s rights and access to safe abortion. Furthermore, many Poles emigrate from Poland and move to other European countries with greater gender equality and more open ideas regarding reproductive rights. Currently Poland is at a crossroads: now that it is a member of the EU, it must legally ensure equal rights and oppose discrimination; however, Poland remains one of the most religiously parochial countries in Europe.

Abortion and Reproductive Rights

Abortion was made legal in Poland in 1956 under the Condition of Permissibility of Abortion Act, which overturned the abortion ban in place since 1932. Women from all over Europe traveled to Poland for abortions from 1956 through 1993, a time when the state subsidized abortion. Polish women saw abortion as a fundamental right; however, the Polish government severely restricted abortions in 1993 when it approved the 1993 Family Planning Act. Since then, abortion in Poland is only legal under three conditions: the pregnancy or prospective birth would endanger the mother’s health or life, the fetus has a high risk determined by using prenatal tests, or the pregnancy was the result of a criminal act. This law was seen as a compromise, merging proposed liberal and conservative bills, but it sparked few pro-abortion grassroots movements. The compromise in 1993 established the current tension surrounding every aspect of women’s reproductive rights, but especially those surrounding abortion in Poland today.

As a result of the abortion ban, Poland has a thriving underground abortion market, with an estimated 80,000 to 200,000 illegal abortions and only 200 legal abortions in Poland each year. An illegal abortion in Poland costs between 2,000 and 5,000 PLN ($493.53-$1,233.82), when the average gross salary in Poland is 2,000 PLN ($493.53). Thus, illegal abortions are restricted to wealthy individuals. Illegal abortions are a lucrative industry in Poland: individuals seeking illegal abortions have nowhere else to turn and therefore doctors performing these procedures can charge any price. Thus, pro-choice movements find it challenging to mobilize doctors to their cause, as they are making so much money in the underground abortion market. Even when a woman is legally allowed to receive an abortion, she faces harassment from pro-life groups, and doctors can enact the “conscience clause” that allows pro-life doctors to refuse abortions on moral grounds. To cement the problem, the Polish government does not enforce the legal right to abortion even though its laws state that women in certain situations have the legal right to an abortion. Poland currently has a de facto abortion ban, as many doctors are unwilling or scared to perform legal abortions because they want to avoid stigma and risk for their hospitals or practices. The Church states that this de facto abortion ban is the current social compromise. However, 74% of Poles would rather keep the current legislation than pass a bill proposing a complete ban on abortions, indicating that the majority of the Polish population is in favor of allowing abortions in certain conditions rather than a de facto or complete legal ban.

Many Polish youth are morally opposed to abortions, mainly due to the Church’s influence through the role of priests in education in public schools, calling the fetus or embryo “conceived life” or “conceived child” as rhetoric to discourage abortion. The Church uses these terms to focus on the fetus rather than the mother, which encourages pro-life supporters to think of abortion as the “civilization of death”. While many Poles view abortion as unacceptable, contraception might seem a rational precaution to take for many women; however, that is not the case in reality. Despite the fact that female contraceptives are legal in Poland, the Church exerts such influence that it can affect the availability of these methods. Additionally, many doctors will refuse to prescribe female contraceptives for moral or cultural reasons. Poles have limited literacy concerning contraceptives and different methods of contraception, and women must have awareness and money to find effective, accessible contraceptives. For example, a monthly pill costs six to ten percent of a monthly minimum wage. Thus, only the wealthy and those willing to put in an effort to find contraceptives will have a reliable method of contraception (other than condoms), making reproductive rights a class issue in addition to a gender issue.

Having previously rejected a pro-choice bill aiming to liberalize Poland’s abortion laws, on 8 October 2016, the Polish Parliament rejected a proposed bill that would have been a near-total ban on abortions. Although Poland has one of the most restrictive abortion laws in Europe, the proposed bill, backed by the ruling right wing party, PiS, and the Catholic Church, would have criminalized all abortions, punished women with up to five years in prison and assisting doctors liable for prosecution and prison. Polish women received press around the world for their protests, marches, and strikes. Only fifteen percent of Poles opposed the strike, despite Poland having the lowest acceptance of abortion in Europe. Opponents to the complete abortion ban argue that a complete ban would not only deprive women of the choice of what to do with their own bodies but also would allow an underground market to thrive, which would be dangerous and encourage abortion-seeking Poles to get abortions abroad. Additional criticisms include that women suffering miscarriages could be under criminal suspicion and that the bill would discourage doctors from conducting routine procedures on pregnant women for fear of being accused of facilitating abortion. Women opposing the proposed bill argued that the complete ban was against fundamental reproductive and human rights, threatening to women’s safety and dignity. Both supporters and critics of the bill are unhappy with the current situation of reproductive rights in Poland, leaving the debate at a stalemate.

Conclusion

Poland’s debate itself lacks many key aspects needed to grant women their reproductive rights. There are many aspects of reproductive rights, such as sexual education, access to contraceptives, and hospital conditions (especially maternity wards); however, Poland’s reproductive rights debate focuses on abortion, disregarding larger issues and multiple aspects of reproductive rights. Furthermore, Polish legal language limits social and political discourse for improving reproductive rights because there is no term for reproductive rightsthat is defined as ‘protection of reproductive health and self-determination in reproductive matters.’ In order to make progress on these issues, this crucial term must be defined in order to have meaningful discourse regarding women’s agency.

There are 150-200 women’s groups in Poland, most of which advocate for political and reproductive rights with some intervening in other areas like socio-economic rights. Many women want to have children, but limited access to the labor market inhibits their ability to care for any children they may have. Thus, a solution to this problem is to clear any restrictions women have to the labor market, such as the pay gap, employer gender discrimination, and ideas of domesticity for women, although this would take many years to achieve. Polish feminist movements are actively trying to alter laws, so changing labor restrictions for women is well within these organizations’ goals. To change laws, however, pro-choice women must gain representation in Poland’s political bodies. The main opponent to women’s rights is the Church: the Church claims to protect women’s rights, although many feminists define themselves as Catholic. Much of the debate about Polish feminism concerns how to define it rather than on advocating important women’s issues and grounding these issues in the Polish context. Growing feminist groups and organizations are slowly starting to engage women in projects or activities that increase participation, but this engagement needs to improve. Women need to advocate for themselves and convince other men to advocate for them; however, without a large movement promoting gender equality, Poland will achieve little progress in the area of women’s and reproductive rights.

However, the presence of the Church in Poland creates a difficult atmosphere to obtaining gender equality and reproductive rights in comparison to many secular countries also experiencing a push for equal rights and reproductive rights. To combat these religious ideas confining women to “traditional” or domestic roles will have a few steps. The first step consists of understanding the Church’s rhetoric and rationale concerning their positions on women’s rights and reproductive rights. The second step would be to use the Church’s own rhetoric to push back and argue for gender equality and reproductive rights, starting with less controversial issues and moving onto those issues once the movement has momentum and support. Although these steps are not perfect, they roughly outline the process feminist movements must take in order to combat the rhetoric of the Catholic Church.

Daniel Lynam 2/27/17 Daniel Lynam 2/27/17

Russian Aggression and the Annexation of Crimea

Guest Writer Daniel Lynam explores policy responses to Russian aggression in Ukraine.

Following the end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, power dynamics on the Eurasian continent were reshaped by expansions of Western institutions, such as the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). These expansions have strongly contributed to the current state of tensions between the US (and the EU) and Russia. Russia, under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, is attempting to restructure the balance of power on the continent. A restructuring of power dynamics on the European continent is seen as necessary by the Kremlin to maintain their territorial sovereignty. This is on display in conflicts in Ukraine such as the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and military buildups along Russia’s Western border. The current US policy towards Russian aggression includes raising the cost for Russia for its actions with the goal of regime change and supporting US allies in Eastern Europe.

Historical Background

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was forged in 1949 to ensure a US commitment to the security of the European continent post WWII and in response the rise of the Soviet Union. The Alliance was formed to ensure a sharing of burden would occur, and that the European nations would too be responsible for their defense in cooperation with the United States. The Soviet Union countered NATO with its own, similar arrangement, the Warsaw Pact between Russia and the communist states in Eastern Europe.

Andrew T. Wolff best describes the source of current Russian aggression as stemming from two historical contexts: a) Russia’s tradition of geopolitical emphasis and worldview and b) a strong disagreement over a 1990 “no expansion promise” made between Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Gorbachev and US Secretary of State James Baker.

Russia has long held a long-standing tradition of approaching the world through a geopolitical standpoint. Russia places an emphasis, above all else, on its own territorial sovereignty and maintaining a relative sphere of influence. This ideology can be seen throughout Russia’s centuries of history as an expansionist empire; some might even argue that this “empire mindset” has still not subsided under the new post-Westphalian state order. This territorial sovereignty is exerted by the ability of the Kremlin to influence politics of that area through political, economic, and social pressures.

The expansion of the EU and NATO, two organizations which deliberately elected to leave Russia out of their membership and operations for many years, pose, for Russia, a threat to its territorial sovereignty as well as its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe by promoting ideals and reform policies not in line with Putin’s administration. Due to the close ties of ethnic Russians across countries like Ukraine, economic and political success there may serve as a ‘spark’ leading to a call for reform in Russia itself—this poses a potential threat to Putin’s control over the country. While some might point to the strong favorability of the Russian leader in the polls, it is important to remember that Putin is looking towards his long-term placement. Should the Russian economy be struck again by recession or depression, that favorability will quickly turn into unfavorability as Russians who were simply content may no longer have a source of income nor food to put on their table.

On a similar note, the 1990 informal agreement between the US and Russia supposedly stated that in exchange for cooperation on a peacefully reunified Germany, NATO would not expand past East Germany. The breakdown comes in interpreting what this agreement actually meant. For the Kremlin, it meant NATO membership would not extend past East Germany, which it did. NATO’s first expansion was in 1999 with the addition of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into the alliance and has since grown to 28 members. According to a high ranking NATO official, the US and NATO understood this agreement to mean no NATO-deployed troops or bases would be stationed beyond East Germany, which there has not been until after the 2014 annexation of Crimea.

Ultimately, Russia’s interest does not actually lie in the Crimea, but rather the annexation can be seen as an attempt to destabilize the Ukrainian government which was seeking closer ties with the European Union. The government was on the eve of signing a EU-Ukrainian agreement, granting Ukraine access to the EU common market and a push forward on the needle towards accession. Keeping Ukraine from fully integrating with the ‘west’ is of utmost importance for the Kremlin to ensure its sphere of influence remains somewhat intact. This type of power move can also be seen in Georgia, where Russia invaded South Ossetia in 2008 following talks of Georgia looking to join NATO. While Georgia’s NATO aspiration was not the immediate trigger, it intensified relations which ultimately broke down with military build-ups following the downing of a Georgian unmanned drone.

Current US Policy

The current US policy in countering Russian aggression, namely the 2014 annexation of the Crimea and rebel activity in Eastern Ukraine is best described by Steven Pifer, a Senior Fellow at Brookings, in a testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Pifer broke breaks down the current US response into three sections:

“I. Bolster the Ukrainian Government

II. Reassure NATO allies of the US commitment to defend against Russian aggression

III. Penalize Russia with the objective of promoting a change in Russian policy”

These three aspects of the US’s strategy, in practice, seek to try to increase the cost of aggression for Russia both through sanctions and increased military support of our allies.

US efforts to bolster the Ukrainian government have been accomplished through disbursements of foreign operations assistance with US$513,502,000 budgeted for 2016, up from US$334,198,000 in 2015. These funds overwhelmingly went to support ‘Economic Development’, with the second largest spending category being ‘Peace and Security,’ which includes providing material support and training to Ukrainian troops. These efforts are meant to help sustain the Ukrainian government against opposition forces and help it fund programs to continue to develop the country economically and socially.

In reassuring NATO allies of the US’s commitment against Russian aggression, the US has pledged both support and weapons. The 2015 European Reassurance Initiative saw the Baltic states each receiving over US$30 million each in equipment to bolster their defense efforts as well as dramatic increases of US Foreign Military Assistance being pledged to these nations as well. The US is currently constructing a second anti-ballistic missile station in Poland in order to complete a so-called “European ballistic missile shield.”

During NATO’s 2016 Summit in Warsaw, President Obama announced the stationing of 1000 US troops throughout Eastern Europe, namely Poland and the Baltic states. While 1000 troops offer Europe minimal, if any, tactical advantage, it is moves like these that NATO sees as key to maintaining the alliance. Should an invasion occur into any of these nations, not only will the invaded nation’s troops be attacked, but so will the US troops, directly forcing the US into the conflict. The theory goes that now the US will have no choice but to pursue full engagement after attacks on their own troops.

While these moves have reassured many US allies, they do pose a very real risk of being interpreted by Russia as encroachment and escalation on its border. Without proper channels of communication and a clear understanding between the two parties, these troop movements may be countered by similar build-ups by Russian troops. This can lead to a continuous cycle of build-up by both sides in response to one another.

A key part of the US response to Russian aggression has been so-called “smart sanctions” which target individuals the US has identified as playing a role in guiding and execution Russian aggression in Ukraine and the Crimea. These sanctions are intended to increase the personal, economic, and diplomatic cost of Russian aggression. Sanctions range from freezing of financial assets to restrictions on travel for these individuals. Additional sanctions imposed in partnership with the EU and NATO members a) restrict access of state-owned enterprises to western markets, b) embargo oil production and exploration equipment exports to Russia, and c) embargo military good exports to Russia. The ultimate goal of the sanctions is to force a regime change through external pressure on the regime itself as well as pressure the economically-affected population.

While the Russian economy has been in an economic downturn since 2014, credit may not be fully placed on the sanctions regime, but rather on a global downturn in oil prices. The Russian economy relies extensively on oil exports with minimal diversification. The global downturn in oil prices as directly impacted the economy and the value of the Russian ruble. The sanctions regime has further hampered the recession by limiting the country’s access to credit, meaning it has limited sources of finance. With the recent OPEC agreement to cut production, it will be a true test of the strength of the sanctions regime and how much it will prohibit the economy from recovering fully.

Concluding Remarks

The current conflict in Ukraine is a symptom of wider Russian aggression. These moves, unilaterally executed by Putin, can be viewed as a response to long-term ‘encroachment’ of western organizations like the EU and NATO. These organizations which explicitly do not include Russia (although attempts have been made for more bilateral cooperation) pose threats to what Russia perceives to be its territorial sovereignty and its sphere of influence. Russian moves can be seen to attempt to destabilize the international systems set up by Western powers.

Many politicians and pundits like to talk of a “Russian reset” in which the US (and other Western powers) would attempt to reharmonize relations with Russia and start with a blank slate, of sorts. I can appreciate the sentiment of this approach and for sure, so does Donald Trump. However, I think it’s a folly. A fundamental basis of international relations is the idea of the “long game,” states and actors are always aware of how their actions affect their long-term status, credibility, and survival. The same concept can be applied in a backwards looking manor; it is laughable to think a state will forget previous actions and threats. Rather, I would argue, Trump and other western leaders should look to rebuild relations with Russia fully embracing our past and current clashes. A relationship with Russia should be folded into institutions where the Kremlin can have an equal seat at the table and reassure itself that any moves executed by Western powers does not pose a threat to Russian sovereignty. This is key if any successful and productive relationship with Russia is to move forward.

On the same note, we need to reemphasize it is never okay to sit idly by or fail to respond to aggressive moves on behalf of Russia that threatens sovereignty of other nations. Maintaining sovereignty of all nations is paramount to US security. If we don’t defend others, who would defend us should the day come. That’s why Donald Trump should continue the US’s trifold policy, until otherwise warranted, of bolstering support militarily and economically of Ukraine and its Eastern European allies as well as attempting to usher a regime change through sanctions.

Gretchen Cloutier 12/9/16 Gretchen Cloutier 12/9/16

The EU Single Market and the Economics of Brexit

Staff Writer Gretchen Cloutier unpacks the economic ramifications of Brexit for the European Union.

The future of the United Kingdom’s relationship with the European Union is unknown, though there has been much speculation on what the details of Brexit will entail. In regards to the Single Market, which guarantees free movement of people, goods, services, and capital among member states, some experts have called for a special deal to be made with the EU to uphold as many of these provisions as possible. While a unique agreement with the EU will help the UK maintain economic stability, it must also be met with many domestic and transnational policy reforms, as well as new trade negotiations. In light of the UK’s decision to leave the EU, it must be willing to forfeit all benefits and privileges currently enjoyed by EU agreements, including the Single Market. As such, the UK must develop a new plan to ensure continued economic growth and secure trading partners.

Prime Minister Theresa May has been clear on her position, stating in a speech, “It is not going to be a ‘Norway model.’ It’s not going to be a ‘Switzerland model’. It is going to be an agreement between an independent, sovereign United Kingdom and the European Union.” She went on to say that, “We will seek the best deal possible as we negotiate a new agreement [on the single market] with the European Union.” Currently, Norway and Switzerland, although not members of the EU, enjoy certain benefits of the union on an opt-in basis as established through various treaties and agreements. However, May’s statement underlines the UK’s increasingly isolationist position, and its determination to forge its own path in the international community. By insisting creating its own ‘model,’ the UK will have more opportunity to craft an agreement it sees as ideal; however, it also gives the remaining members of the EU more leverage in designing it as they see fit as well.

Regardless of the exact details of the new agreement, which will not be seen until well after Article 50 is triggered by March 2017, the UK will not have the same access to the EU Single Market that it does now. Even if the government secures some benefits of the current arrangement, the UK’s economy is likely to suffer from increased transaction costs in trade and limited access to the open market. In order to look for the best possible deal in the future, as May stated, it is important to understand how the UK’s economy currently interacts with the Single Market.

The UK’s economy is intrinsically linked to the EU Single Market. Half of the UK’s trade and foreign investments are involved with the EU, with 53 percent of imported goods and services originating in other member countries, and 44 percent of exports going to the EU. Like most developed countries, the UK primarily exports services, and this sector makes up over 75 percent of the country’s economic output. Additionally, the UK has maintained a trade surplus of about 5 percent of GDP, meaning that more is exported than imported. When the UK loses access to the Single Market, it will become more difficult to export to the EU due to higher trade barriers. Unless the UK can tap into a different export market, they are likely to lose this trade surplus and experience a decrease in economic output, leading to a higher deficit and cuts in government spending.

The Single Market also guarantees job mobility and free movement of people. There are currently 1.2 million Britons living abroad in the EU, with about 800,000 of them working. Furthermore, there are currently 3.3 million EU citizens living in the UK, with 2.1 million of them employed. Immigration concerns were a main cause of Brexit, so it seems unlikely that the UK will negotiate for the free movement of people in a new agreement with the EU. While proponents of Brexit might call this a success in taking ‘British’ jobs back from immigrants, the high employment rate of EU citizens in the UK is a sign of national economic prosperity, not a race to the bottom for limited jobs with low wages. Large companies located in UK cities will also look to relocate to other EU commercial centers in order to continuing benefiting from the free movement of their workers, goods, and services. The loss of both large employers and vast numbers of workers will lead to further depressed economic output in the UK.

Under the threat of stagnated or decreased economic growth and trade, the UK is already looking to potential new trade partners. At a state visit in early November, the president of Colombia said that a new agreement with the UK had the potential to be better than the current deal the South American country has with the EU. Colombia is part of the Pacific Alliance, a trade bloc composed of three other historically strong Latin America economics – Chile, Peru, and Mexico – which would provide an even larger opportunity for new UK trade.

May also visited India in early November, in her first bilateral meeting outside Europe, to discuss, among other things, a new potential trade relationship. Unlike Colombia, India does not currently have a trade deal with the EU, and any attempts to create over the last decade have ultimately been unsuccessful. As discussed earlier, the UK must secure partners that are interested in service sector exports; however, India has tough restrictions on importing professional services, such as business, banking, and legal sectors. Immigration is also a controversial issue between the two countries, and India wants more temporary student and work visas to the UK in exchange for allowing more business. However, since a main component of Brexit involves reducing the number of immigrants in the country, this seems to be an unlikely concession.

Finally, the UK also recently hosted China for trade talks, announcing several new agreements to strengthen investment and business between the two countries. China has committed to investing in the London Royal Albert Docks project, while the UK will reciprocate with an investment in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. UK Chancellor Hammond remarked that the UK’s “trade relationship with China is now more important than ever.” Unlike India and Colombia, China will carry out this agreement before UK negotiations with the EU are finalized, signaling that China will remain a reliable trade partner regardless of the outcome of the UK’s involvement with the Single Market.

The decision to leave the EU, and thus the Single Market, could have devastating effects on the UK’s economy, unless it seeks new markets for service sector exports. Colombia, India, and China all represent opportunities to connect with robust economies that will provide the UK with the exit strategy it needs. However, similar to the question of Indian immigration, there are likely to be challenges along the way, especially as most countries will not negotiate a new trade until after the UK has triggered Article 50 and has completed talks with the EU. While the possibility remains that the UK will successfully negotiate to retain provisions of the current Single Market, it is extremely unlikely that the EU will let the UK cherry-pick only the parts they want. No matter what deals are struck with any country, concessions will have to be made. Thus, the UK’s economic plan moving forward must be pragmatic, as well as diplomatic.

Claire Witherington-Perkins 12/9/16 Claire Witherington-Perkins 12/9/16

Re-contextualizing “The White Man’s Burden” to Understand France’s Recent Xenophobic Policies

Staff Writer Claire Witherington-Perkins explains the illiberalism of recent French policies.

On August 23, 2016, police forced a woman relaxing on the beach in France with her family clad in a blue long-sleeved tunic with black pants and a blue headscarf to either leave the beach or take off her headscarf and tunic; meanwhile, onlookers yelled “go home” and applauded the police while her daughter cried. This incident is just one exampleof the backlash on burkinis that began when a water park closed to only allow women covered from chest to knees. The opposition to burkinis further spread when many towns banned burkinis from their beaches, resulting in women being fined or asked to leave for wearing burkinis. The burkini waterpark day would provide an opportunity for women to observe their beliefs while enjoying typical summer activities such as going to a waterpark, which was the motive for the Lebanese-born Australian woman who created the burkini in 2004: to accommodate conservative values while still allowing observant women to swim. A local Member of Parliament (MP) voiced his concern that veils represent fundamentalists who want to control women, while the mayor of Les Pennes-Mirabeau opposed the Burkini Day because he thought it was threatening to public order. Even the French Prime Minister supported cities and resorts banning burkinis, stating that burkinis affirm “political Islam” in a public space. France has 5 million Muslims, about 2000 of which wear full veils. The burkini reveals an ideological battle in France over French identity and the influx of Muslim immigrants from France’s former colonies.

France has a unique identity, which, like all other national identities, was established in a mainly homogenous society through a perceived difference from other identities and nationalities. The origins of French identity mean that fully-assimilated French citizens possess a high propensity for xenophobia, which causes citizens to view different identities as intrinsically opposite to their own identity. “The White Man’s Burden,” a poem written during the Scramble for Africa in 1899 expressing the sentiment of the colonial time-period, stated that colonies are a burden that empires should acquire in order to “civilize” inferior, or non-European, populations. While “The White Man’s Burden” originally influenced Europe’s colonial agendas, contemporary French policies toward immigrants, particularly Muslims, demonstrate that the poem’s ideological core continues to reproduce itself in French policies, including bans on burkinis, niqabs, and headscarves, surveillance of immigrants, and assimilation efforts.

Europe began colonizing Africa in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in a race to secure profits in the slave, sugar, gold, and spice trades. France’s colonies were mainly in North and West Africa. France continued to consolidate their colonies in the late nineteenth century in order to secure their colonial economic system. In order to do so, the French government harshly implemented their hegemony in order to maintain their oppressive system. “The White Man’s Burden” expressed the rationalization for these oppressive policies, but by 1960, French-controlled West African states had gained independence, which spurred an increase of migrants in France.

Since 1960, there have been two streams of immigration: return, consisting of those of mostly European descent, and labor migration, resulting mainly from those indigenous to former colonies. After the independence of French West Africa, most labor migrants native to the former colonies were male workers looking for employment, whose settlement in French cities began postcolonial migration to France. However, these indigenous immigrants were not well-received, in part because of their history of exploitation which helps produce current prejudices and, in some cases, the fights for independence. Thus, colonization still impacts immigrants’ lives today: indigenous immigrants from former colonies face racial or ethnic discrimination and stereotypes as a result of colonization and might view the host country with suspicion because of their history of colonization. Many immigrants therefore find it difficult to assimilate into French society, and the history of exploitation during colonization becomes a present reality in employment discrimination. Oppression of indigenous labor migrants in France has occurred since the colonial era and continues today.

Much of the present discrimination stems from xenophobic, racist, or islamophobic sentiments dating back to French colonization. One of the events highlighting this discrimination in recent French history was an investigation in 1943 based solely on immigrants’ ethnicity. The 1943 investigation surrounded a rumor in French bureaucracy that Arab cafés in Paris were playing Arabic radio broadcasts that criticized French immigration policies. This rumor incitedinvestigations into civil status, political affiliation, nationality, and other qualities of the immigrants going to these cafés, marking the start of surveillance of immigrants in France that continues today. In the 1960’s and 1970’s, French surveillance became subtly and symbolically violent because authorities were alarmed at the perceived radicalization in the African immigrant community because of the potential to destabilize French society and politics. French surveillance emphasized control and undesirability of immigrants from former colonies in addition to understanding the immigrants and how to best assimilate them into French society. Since the 1980’s, radical right-wing parties campaigning on xenophobic platforms have grown in popularity in Europe, and these parties take advantage of citizens’ fears of threats from immigration in order to gain power and enact discriminatory legislation.

Presently, France’s population is comprised of 6% immigrants, 61% of which are from outside the EU; however, most immigrants of non-European descent remain poor due to segregated institution, failing school, low upward mobility, and racism and discrimination in employment, which are all remnants of the colonial era. France has limited immigration data since the French census or other data sources pose no questions of ethnic origin in order to adhere to France’s efforts to promote social cohesion. French citizens are generally more tolerant towards immigrants, but they demand more public order, which leads to intolerance, as they consider immigrants producing social disorder.

French colonial history has shaped the French government’s attitude toward this wave of immigration, viewing immigrants as unlikely to fit into France’s rigid society. France surveils its immigrants, as it surveilled indigenous peoples during colonial times. North African groups seek to be recognized as equal citizens instead of being viewed as natives because of their colonial history. Gaining citizenship as an immigrant from the Maghreb is difficult because of colonial history, and the colonial past is downplayed by justifying delays of granting citizenship as practical considerations. In order to obtain citizenship in France, candidates must prove they support the Republic’s values and cultural standards in public and private life. The French government uses surveillance techniques not only to understand the immigrant populations, but also to determine how to develop or alter policies regarding their presence in France and to shape immigrant communities in France. Thus, surveillance contributesto conformist policies. Xenophobic Frenchman view cultural difference as an obstacle to integrating immigrants into French culture and society.

French authorities have low regard for African immigrants because they believe African migration poses problems for a cohesive French society, illustrating the need to assimilate immigrants into French society. Authorities also viewedimmigrants as apolitical and grew concerned when immigrants became more politicized, thinking that African workers were radicalizing and thus threatening French society. This thought process justified the increase in efforts to detect radical or dangerous African immigrants. Recently, the populist extreme right has taken advantage of less social cohesion and status uncertainty by creating exclusionary policies, including the recent burkini bans, the 2004 headscarf ban in schools, the 2011 “burka ban” which banned face coverings from public spaces, and the May 2016 law passed in the National Assembly, giving police and prosecutors extensive power.

The 2004 headscarf ban protected the French Constitution’s interpretation of “libérté de la réligion,” which literally translates to two possibilities: freedom from religion or freedom of religion. The French government is organized around the interpretation, freedom from religion, which is the basis for their secular policies, or laïcité. According to the French government, the headscarf banprotects France’s policy of laïcité. The 2004 law that bans headscarves also bans other conspicuous, religious symbols including wearing a turban or a cross in school. Supporters of the ban argue that France must start the notion of secularity in schools. This law was made in reaction to tensions between ethnic or religious groups in France and in order to cement ideas of laïcité. Despite the controversy of the headscarf ban, it remains in place.

Additionally, in 2011, former President Sarkozy banned the niqab in all public spaces, meaning full face coverings are not allowed in public. Some women who wear niqabs or burqas are essentially under house arrest because they are not allowed to go outside wearing niqab or burka but value it such that they will not appear outside without it. Exemptions from the face-covering ban includemotorcycle helmets, face masks for medicinal reasons, and traditional face coverings such as for carnivals or religious processions. One woman filed a claim that the ban violates her rights and freedoms, but the European Court of Human Rights upheld the ban in 2014. With the face-covering ban in place, Sarkozy hinted at banning all headscarves in public places if he wins the French presidential election in 2017.

Other French politicians have reiterated Sarkozy’s suggestion to ban any headscarves from public places. French Prime Minister, Manuel Valls, has suggested a ban on headscarves for universities, asserting that the majority of the French people think that headscarves contradict French values. However, the education minister opposes this suggestion, asserting that banning headscarves would unjustly deny access to foreigners attending French universities and that university students, as adults, can independently decide to wear a headscarf. In defense of the headscarf ban at universities, Valls told a French publication, Libération, that banning headscarves would prove that Islam is compatible with the French Republic’s values and that he thinks it is possible for Islam to be compatible with the values of the Republic. Valls’ statements imply that he currently thinks that Islam is not compatible with the French Republic and its values. These statements showcase the growing xenophobic and islamophobic sentiments among government officials, which both reflect and are reflected in the public opinion towards similar policies. Islamophobic sentiments trigger oppressive policies such as headscarf and niqab bans, which reflect sentiments of “civilizing an inferior population” in “The White Man’s Burden.” This poem continues to portray public and government opinions on immigration, and in this case, particularly immigration to France from former colonies in North Africa.

Triggered by the recent terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels, another law, passed in May 2016, now gives police and prosecutors extensive new powers. Police can now detain a person for up to four hours without a lawyer to check his or her identity and can place someone returning from a terrorist hotbed on house arrest for up to a month, promoting racial or religious profiling and targeting those with immigrant backgrounds. Additionally, police have access toelectronic eavesdropping technology that was previously only used by intelligence agencies, and prosecutors can approve phone tapping, communication surveillance, and hidden cameras to observe suspects. Police can detain a suspect for 144 hours without a charge. Opponents of the law argue that it would allow exceptional measures used for states of emergency to become commonplace and that France is trying to institutionalize extended powers for when the state of emergency ends. This law further institutionalizes the already systemic issue of xenophobia, racism, and islamophobia that are all reflections of France’s colonial past.

The large influx of immigrants to France has created a feeling of uncertainty in French society, so right-wing parties are campaigning on xenophobic platforms are gaining support. For example, the Front National makes immigrants from North Africa scapegoats, and under Sarkozy, France tightened criteria for immigration, including good language skills, minimum base of knowledge of French history, and accepting major norms and values. The idea that immigrants, particularly those with Muslim backgrounds, must be monitored and controlled as much as possible for France’s safety stems directly from the ideas put forth during the colonial era. “The White Man’s Burden” portrays opinion during colonization, and, as many immigrants in France originate from former French colonies, these sentiments still resonate today. Although much concern was placed over the burkini ban, the motivation for bans takes precedence. These bans and regulations are rooted in the dangerous and uninformed idea that immigrants, particularly those of another race or religion, are inferior populations and must be controlled and monitored.

France reproduces ideology from “The White Man’s Burden” today through new laws extending police and prosecutorial powers over targeted immigrant groups, bans on headwear, and other discriminatory and exclusionary laws. French politicians are capitalizing on the public’s fear of the “other,” or the unfamiliar, by designing xenophobic, islamophobic, and racist platforms. However, this phenomenon is not only specific to France. The United Kingdom has announced plans following its referendum to leave the EU to make immigration from India, a former colony, more difficult in order to protect business. Germany has been accused of offering money to asylum seekers to return to their countries of origin, including former colonies such as Ghana. Other European countries are experiencing similar results in terms of both elections of xenophobic parties and implementation of xenophobic policies. Recent terrorist attacks fuel these kinds of policies and xenophobic and islamophobic sentiment; however, the majority of these recent policies targeting immigrants stem from “The White Man’s Burden” ideology, portraying the need to control and civilize “inferior” populations.

Olivia Valone 10/13/16 Olivia Valone 10/13/16

Life Without the Flashing Lights: the Reality of Living in East Germany

Guest Writer Olivia Valone examines Germany’s history under the DDR’s repressive regime.

November 9, 1989: East and West Germans broke through the Berlin Wall, coming together to celebrate the dissolution of the DeutscheDemokratische Republik (DDR) after 44 years of separation. As SED (Socialist Unity Party) officer Günter Schabowski announced that the citizens of the DDR were allowed to cross the border into East Germany, Beate Lukas was sleeping. People buzzed about the news in the Straßenbahn (tram) on the way to work, and when she arrived she realized that several of her coworkers decided instead to travel to West Berlin. A few days later, she made her way to West Berlin for the first time and encountered bright neon lights and colorfully lit signs. Flashing lights advertising products she had never heard of, shopping centers crammed with people, Cadillacs driving around instead of the usual Trabbis – she had never seen anything like it. At some point it becomes too overwhelming, and she returns to East Berlin. “When I returned to Alexanderplatz, everything was suddenly terribly gray – something which I had not noticed before.”

On the surface, these starkly contrasting images present a lively West Berlin and melancholy East. Although the strong wave of anti-communism that accompanied the Cold War has receded, it continues to affect the way we see communist and socialist societies, and these images may be taken to be indicative of the general sentiments within the respective governments. However, despite close surveillance, various restrictions, and a struggling economy – which, to Americans, is inconceivable – Beate and her colleagues recall a sense of security, community, and simplicity. Coming from the simple, unquestionable reality of the East, it was difficult for the Ossis (East Germans) to get used to the bright lights of the West, which drew them into a harsh, competitive world.

Following the surrender to the Allied powers in 1945, Germany was divided into two separate entities: the Bundesrepublik Deutschland (BRD) in the West and the Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR) in the East. Beate’s colleague Olaf describes the DDR as “a political entity that arose from German soil in the outcome of World War II and as a result of the Cold War.” And as it existed behind the ‘Iron Curtain,’ “the DDR was never a fully sovereign state, but always a part of the occupied territories of the Soviet Union, and treated as such.” Under the “benevolent eye” of the Western powers, the BRD adopted a democratic government with a market economy, “whereas in the Soviet zone the occupiers raided all the industrial equipment and confiscated private property” (Romano 145). In the DDR’s state-controlled economy, there were often shortages. When Beate turned 18, she received a form to apply for a car; the usual waiting period for a Trabant was about 10 years. When her family was remodeling their house in 1983, they were forced to trade items they had in order to get the material they needed.

Italian historian Sergio Romano’s obvious distaste for the command economy established by the U.S.S.R. was also shared by the United States. The U.S. government viewed the BRD as the only legitimate government and the future of Germany (Office of the Historian). While reading from Romano and the State Department’s website, I noticed that their arguments were relatively one-sided. It is true that the U.S.S.R. confiscated East German property, but it was used simply as a repayment for the damages sustained by the U.S.S.R. during the Second World War (Lindemann 328). The State Department focuses solely on the fact that the DDR was not a legitimate country in their eyes, and that its collapse was an inevitable victory – a triumph of light over darkness.

Beate grew up in an environment where the grim aspects of the DDR were not as apparent to her. There was always heavy Überwachung (surveillance) and a certain pressure, but she did not feel it personally. “Those who, in any way, ‘stepped out of line,’ for example, did not want to work, spoke out against the State, wanted to leave the DDR, watched television from West Berlin or West Germany (and listened to Western radio messages) felt [the pressure] quickly.” For disobedience, punishment ranged from losing the right to an education to being sent to jail. She recalls that a classmate, Susanne, did not receive a place in a university despite having high marks, because her father left for a business trip and did not return. Beate and her colleagues note that it was difficult to follow one’s desired career path. Without relatives who held high positions, worked internationally, or were members of SED, Beate did not receive a place at Humboldt University in Berlin. Instead of pursuing Ethnography, her preferred career, she only had the opportunity to study economics. Her brother was prevented from being a pilot on the basis that their father was a pilot. “It was feared that they would not return to the DDR and the rest of the family would also want to leave.” Similarly, her colleague Olaf was prevented from studying because only one to two students were accepted into Erweiterten Oberschule(EOS), a school which extended high school education after completing the eighth grade. He could not attain his preferred career as a geologist unless he enlisted in military training for three years, so he decided on job training. “No real performance or payment system existed in the economy, so one as a trained worker has earned partially less than his colleagues.”

Although the DDR restricted and controlled the outputs of its citizens in many ways, the government provided many benefits for its citizens. “The DDR was a state that, on one hand, offered its people a lot which is not typical today – work, support, free health care, free places in Kindergarten and schools, affordable houses. On the other hand, the economy was a Mangelwirtschaft (economy of scarcity). In the GDR, there was a persistent unpredictability of supply, which often expressed itself in shortages of chocolate, meat, butter, and other consumer goods. “There were many items which we did not have or rarely had – one often had to improvise or trade.” She remembers going to visit her grandma and getting the chance to eat a whole banana herself, the nicest thing she had ever eaten. The memories of scarcity, however, are not as compelling as those of security and simplicity in her childhood, along with the sense of community. She remembers being able to let her four-year-old brother walk the rest of the way to school alone without having to worry. As a society that valued community, or Gemeinschaft, everyone watched out and cared for one another regardless of status or financial standing. People typically associate socialism with oppression and constant misery, but that is not the case; Olaf contests that “otherwise the suicide rate would have been higher. Certainly one is often upset about certain inadequacies and restrictions, but one must also partially engage and adapt. Just like in every social system.” Initially following the reunification, the economic disruption caused a drop in life satisfaction in East Germany. Olaf believes the feeling he experienced in the DDR was the same as other young people in the BRD; the surveillance, pressure, and scarcity did not affect him as much as one would expect based on denunciations of socialism. In the current integrated society, former West and East Germans now display equal levels of happiness, which are far greater than the years directly after the reunification.

“I have predominantly good memories of the DDR. Sometimes I miss it.” Beate clearly displays the Ostalgie, nostalgia for East Germany, which many Ossis who grew up in the DDR experience despite higher levels of happiness under the current system (Lindermann 394). After the fall of the DDR, life was very different. The anticipated “swift and peaceful” German reunification was not feasible (Lindemann 393). Although Wessis and Ossis celebrated together when the Wall came down, it was still many years until the entire Berlin Wall and the psychological barriers separating them would be removed. The economy of East Germany was far behind the West and proved difficult to reintegrate (Lindemann 394). Regional inequalities still exist, leaving the East behind the West with higher unemployment and poverty rates, population decline, and scarcity of large companies. Unemployment in the former West Germany is at 5.6%, whereas in the former East Germany it is above 9%. Despite the economic difficulties, the United States viewed the fall of the DDR as a victory; Beate, however, had a different experience. “Life was totally different. There was no more security. I lost my job half a year after the Wende, something which would not have happened in the DDR.” After going through a retraining course and getting a new job, she was out of work for an operation. While there, she received a letter from her coworkers. Thinking it was a get-well-soon card, she was surprised to discover a termination notice. She repeats, “Such a thing was inconceivable in the DDR. People worked and held together. If someone was sick, then they were helped.” Olaf recalls that during DDR time, his wife received a year of paid maternity leave and still had her job at the end of it. Focus had shifted from collective well-being to profit. Beate also had to repeat her studies, because her credentials were not recognized under the new regime. The individualism of the new capitalist economy proved to be a lifestyle that was difficult for East Germans to adopt. Olaf appreciated that performance and skills became more important than belonging to a certain political party, but Beate resented the superficiality of the bright lights and flashy images. “People pay more attention to the outside, and to present yourself well is more important than a person’s character or to do something good… People have become ruthless, selfish, and superficial.”

After the fall of the Berlin wall, socialism in East Germany offered people a security which they had not felt since hearing Hitler’s promises. A 2009 pollfound that 57% of East Germans still defend and glorify the DDR. Citizens knew what was expected of them and what to expect of the government. Choice was mostly taken from the hands of the individual, but to some people, the simplicity and lack of many responsibilities was a sort of freedom. They may not have had the democratic rights to vote or openly express their opinion, but they were ensured the rights to basic necessities and security. Opinions about communism and socialism tend to focus on the negative aspects without mentioning the benefits, because it is seen as a great threat to American capitalism. Helmut, another colleague of Beate, said “socialism is an idea which also has to do with – somewhat philosophically – a common good. The theory can be difficult to implement, and in the DDR there was not truly socialism but actually a dictatorial state with Mangelwirtschaft.” It is difficult to put a finger on the concept of the DDR, but for some it represented a period of simplicity and togetherness.

Like the other DDR citizens, Beate received 100 Deutsch Marks as Begrüßungsgeld (welcome money) on her first trip to West Germany. Combined with her savings, she and her friends use this money to plan a trip to South Tyrol. They were the first citizens of the DDR to ever be greeted there. As they walked along the shore of a lake, some loud Italians tried to sell them leather jackets. “When we did not want to buy anything, they asked us where we were from – East Germany or West Germany. After our answer – from East Germany – they went away, because they knew we had no money. I can remember their disparaging look well.”

Fifi Baleva 10/13/16 Fifi Baleva 10/13/16

Britain and Immigration: Before and After the Referendum

Guest Writer Fifi Baleva examines the relationship between Brexit and international migration.

When citizens of the United Kingdom headed to the polls on June 23, they became the first group in history to opt out of the European experiment by popular vote. While many reasons prompted the British exit, growing migration was a prominent justification given by the Leave campaign. Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage, leaders of the Leave campaign, stated that there was no consent for the scale of migration witnessed in the past few years. They promised to bring migration to the normal levels of the 1990s when more people were leaving the UK than entering.

In the past few years, British citizens have continuously voiced their desire to halt or at least reduce the influx of migrants. After failed attempts by Prime Minister David Cameroon to fulfill these requests, Brits decided that leaving the EU was the only viable way to control their borders.

Now that Brexit is a reality, immigration continues to be a complicated issue as many EU citizens in Britain remain uncertain about their future in the country. Anxiety about growing migration is intricately woven into the decision to leave the EU and will remain a defining issue in the post-Brexit world. To understand Brexit, then, one must first understand migration.

United Kingdom Migration Laws

The European Union has adopted an open border policy to facilitate traveling and working throughout the continent. The Schengen Area is a zone of twenty-six European Union countries that have agreed to ease travel requirements with other Schengen Area members. The agreement allows EU citizens within the Schengen Area to travel throughout the area only using an identity card. It also allows non-citizens within the Schengen Area to acquire one visa and move throughout the twenty-six countries.

There are different types of Schengen visas including work and student visas. Work visas, for example, are acquired by individuals who would like to work in one or more of the Schengen area countries. The student visa is used by students who have secured a place to study within an educational establishment in a country in the Schengen Area.

The two European countries that have opted out of the Schengen Agreement are the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom. According to laws in the United Kingdom, migrants are divided into non-visa nationals and visa nationals. Non-visa nationals encompass a variety of groups including EU citizens. These non-visa nationals do not require a visa to enter the UK at ports or other points of entry. However, if migrants want to remain the country for longer than six months they must receive entry clearance. Additionally, European Union nationals traveling to the United Kingdom must show a passport or identity card which is strictly scrutinized against security databases.

Around 3.2 million people living in the United Kingdom in 2015 were citizens of another European Union country. European Union migrants make up half of the migrants in the United Kingdom, most of whom hail from Poland, Ireland and Germany. European Union nationals are more likely than UK citizens to participate in the labor market. Currently, 78% of European Union citizens are working in the United Kingdom compared to 74% of UK citizens.

Although foreign born citizens are employed in a variety of sectors, their presence is most prominent in low skilled sectors. In 2015, 59% of EU born workers were in a low skilled job compared to 45% of UK-born citizens. Conversely, 41% of EU born workers were in a high skilled job compared to 55% of UK-born citizens. The presence of EU workers in low skill sectors shows that EU workers are more likely to take on jobs that may be undesirable to those born in the UK.

So if the United Kingdom is mostly benefitting from European Union migrants why did the country choose to leave the European Union?

The Referendum and Immigration

While the Leave campaign presented several justifications for leaving the EU, a persistent theme was an emphasis on national sovereignty and the reduction of migration.

In 2015 the United Kingdom welcomed 630,000 migrants and in 2016 thus far the UK has welcomed 333,000 more. This influx of migrants, prominent throughout Europe, has prompted 77% of Brits to declare that there needs to be a reduction in migration. In fact, 50% of Brits believe that immigration is the most important issue facing Britain, compared to 27% who say the same about the economy.

This anxiety over booming migration played a major role in the Leave campaign’s justification for a European Union exit. The UK Independence Party, led by Nigel Farage, focused on the threats of migration leading up to the Brexit referendum, and anti-immigrant rhetoric persisted throughout European Parliament debates over the Syrian refugee crisis. Like U.S. presidential candidate, Donald Trump, UKIP painted migrants as potential criminals and terrorists taking over the United Kingdom. Nigel Farage even used a poster to emphasize that if the UK remained part of the European Union, the country would be flooded with migrants. The poster displayed by Farage leading up to the referendum depicts a long line of Syrian refugees on the Slovenian border with a caption which reads “Breaking Point: The EU has failed us all.” The posteralso cautions readers that Britain must break free and take control of its own borders. Now that referendum results are in, the country has “broken free” but what does that mean for its borders?

Immigration after Brexit

The Leave campaign proposed an Australian style point-based immigration system which would apply to all migrants, even those from the European Union. Under this system, the more in demand the skills and qualifications of an immigrant, the more eligible the immigrant is for a visa.

As resentment over Brexit mounts in Europe, it is likely that European countries will use migration as a concession for any future trade deals with the UK. In fact, Germany, Portugal, and the Czech Republic say the UK must accept free movement of people in return for access to the single market. The EU single market is an association of countries which trade with each other without restrictions or tariffs.

There are three main models for the UK’s post- Brexit relationship with the EU proposed by the Leave campaign. The first option is the Norwegian modelwhereby the UK exits the European union to join the European Economic Area which is what Norway did in 1994. Under this model, EU policies not covered by the EEA Agreement such as agricultural and fisheries policy would not apply to the UK. The UK would need to retain a range of EU legislation, however, including the free movement of people. So, under this model the promise of curbing migration would not be fulfilled because the UK would be forced to maintain the free movement of people.

The other alternative is the Swiss model. Under this model, the UK would join the European Free Trade Association but not the European Economic Area. The Swiss model is unique because Switzerland enjoys some access to the single market through bilateral agreements. In order to maintain access to the single market, Switzerland was required to allow the free movement of people, which would likely be a prerequisite for any bilateral agreements with the UK as well.

The last alternative is a total exit from the EU and the single market. Under this model the UK could join a Customs Union. The EU does not impose tariffs on goods traded from Customs Union countries in exchange for those countries’ compliance with EU single market regulations. The UK could also rely on the World Trade Organization rules on nondiscrimination whereby trading partners are not treated any less advantageously than others, unless there is a separate free trade agreement between the members. Under WTO rules, the UK would be treated as a third country that does not have a free trade agreement with the EU. The last option is the negotiation of a completely new free trade agreement with the EU. Even with a new agreement, however, there is a chance that free movement of people would be a prerequisite for any access to the EU market.

Implications

As European Union and British politicians continue to negotiate, European migrants in the United Kingdom are living in uncertainty. While those who have lived in the UK for more than five years are afforded permanent residence, no one knows if the EU migrants who have been in the UK for less than five years will be asked to leave. Additionally, there has been no clarification as to when European Union migrants will be forbidden from freely entering the United Kingdom.

The United Kingdom was never fully integrated in the European Union system of free movement but the country has welcomed EU migrants for decades. With growing hysteria about migration, however, Britain was unable to sustain its open border policy any longer. Capitalizing on anxiety, the Leave campaign framed migration as a threat to both security and sovereignty. The consequences of this fear mongering were grave—Britain became the first and only nation to leave the European Union by popular vote. Anxiety about migration led to a catastrophic decision which will have lingering effects for years to come.

So, as the world prepares to assess the state of geopolitics in 2016, it must consider the impact of Brexit. As individual nations and as a collective, we must not let anxiety about migration be a leading factor in any future elections. We must pick leaders who can unite us as a global community which can tackle the problems of the 21st century, not leaders who will divide us into fragmented nations living in fear.

Claire Witherington-Perkins 10/13/16 Claire Witherington-Perkins 10/13/16

A Tale of Two Memberships: Scotland and Northern Ireland’s Possible Paths to EU Membership as Independent States

Staff Writer Claire Witherington-Perkins examines the relationship between Brexit and independence movements.

The Brexit referendum on 23 June 2016 brought 30 million voters (with a 71.8% voter turnout) to the polls to decide whether the United Kingdom (UK) would stay in the European Union (EU). The “Leave” campaign narrowly won with 52% of the vote; however, when split by countries in the UK, Wales and England voted to leave while Northern Ireland and Scotland voted to remain by much larger margins. Additionally, demographics with a higher income, more education, and younger age generally voted to remain. Although the referendum was not legally binding, the new Conservative UK Prime Minister, Theresa May, stated that she has committed herself to the will of the people and will guide the UK leaving the EU. However, Prime Minister May also said that she will not invoke Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, which gives the country two years to negotiate its exit with EU members, before the end of 2016. Thus, the UK would remain a full member of the EU until Article 50 is invoked and the UK begins negotiations to leave. Once negotiations are fully over, the UK will officially no longer be a part of the EU; however, until that time, the UK is a full-fledged member. When the UK leaves the EU, it will need to negotiate a new trade deal because it will no longer be a part of the EU single market. Thus, there is a possibility that the EU would instate trade tariffs because the UK would not be part of the single market.

Since Scotland and Northern Ireland both voted overwhelmingly to remain, one or both of the countries may leave the UK in order to stay in the EU. However, there are two paths for the different countries. Scotland only has one option if it wants to remain in the EU: secede from the UK and join the EU as a separate country. Northern Ireland has two options: it can unite with the rest of Ireland in the EU and become part of the EU by joining an EU member state, or it could leave the UK and try to become a member of the EU member. The best option for Northern Ireland to remain in the EU is unification. Otherwise, Ireland would go through the same accession process as Scotland, which will have a long, difficult road to EU membership, if it gets in at all.

Accession Process

As the UK now has to negotiate its exit from the EU, there are talks of Scotland and Northern Ireland leaving the UK to join the EU. If Northern Ireland were to join independently, it would join Scotland in the EU accession process.

The EU has strict criteria for membership: a country must have stable institutions that represent and ensure democracy, human rights and minority protection, and rule of law, a functioning market economy capable of dealing with competition in the EU market, and the ability to effectively implement membership obligations and to adhere “to the aims of political, economic and monetary union”. The first step to membership is an application for candidacy. Negotiations can only begin with a unanimous decision in the EU Council.

Accession involves 35 chapters relating to policy areas such as environment, rule of law, human rights, energy, and transportation. These chapters are non-negotiable, but candidates can determine how and when to adopt and implement them. Meanwhile, the EU receives guarantees on completion and effectiveness from the candidate country and from the Commission, which monitors implementation and benchmark requirements. Outside the 35 chapters, candidate countries also negotiate financial and transitional arrangements. The negotiations occur between representatives and ministers of the EU and the candidate country at what is called an intergovernmental conference. For each chapter, in a process called screening, the candidate country must meet the opening benchmarks before the chapter can be opened. Then, for each chapter, the candidate country must submit a position for negotiation while the EU adopts a common position and sets closing benchmarks for the chapter, which must be met before closing negotiations for that chapter. Some chapters have interim benchmarks that must be met. Thus, the length of negotiations may vary depending how prepared the country is to join the EU.

In closing negotiations, all negotiations for individual chapters must be finished. Details of membership, arrangements and deadlines, financial arrangements, and potential safeguard clauses are all in the Accession Treaty. The treaty has three steps to becoming a binding agreement: it must have the support of the EU Council, EU Commission, and European Parliament; the candidate and all EU member states sign it; the candidate country ratifies it according to their constitution. Once ratified, the candidate becomes an acceding country and will become a full member on the date agreed in the Treaty.

Scotland

In the event that Scotland secedes from the UK, the EU headquarters in Brussels stated that Scotland has to exit the EU with the UK and cannot remain on its own. Additionally, if Scotland were to secede before the UK leaves the EU, it would be leaving an EU country and thus be leaving the EU. Therefore, Scotland will have to go through the accession process as an independent country.

The accession process poses a number of problems for Scotland, mainly the length of the negotiations and its financial burdens and obligations. Due to the lengthy negotiations, Scotland would be on its own, neither in the UK nor the EU, for some time, which would hinder trade and investment. Additionally, Scotland’s projected country deficit is three times that of the UK, and Scotland would have a higher deficit than the UK does now. The EU limits the amount of debt and deficit its member states can have, and since the economic crisis and the Eurozone crisis, it will likely oversee these requirements more closely and ensure that its members adhere to them. Thus, Scotland might have to reduce their deficit in order to become a member of the EU. Additionally, as reported in 2015,, Scotland has 6.2% unemployment, compared to the UK’s 5.1%, and GDP growth of 1.9%, compared to the UK’s 2.3%. In addition to these potential economic problems, EU membership would be vastly more expensive for Scotland than it was under the UK because Scotland would lose the UK membership contribution opt-outs that Margaret Thatcher negotiated during her time as Prime Minister.

Another potential problem for Scotland’s EU membership is the potential problems regarding its referendum to leave the UK. The EU values democracy, rule of law, and human rights; however,many Scots were ineligible to vote in the referendum. Anyone who is a citizen of a Commonwealth country, the EU, or the UK living in Scotland was able to vote; however, Scots residing outside of Scotland were unable to register to vote. This could call into question whether the process was truly democratic, as some Scottish citizens could not vote in the referendum. This issue must be addressed during negotiations, and Scotland would have to comply with EU democratic ideals, as many Scots were unable to vote in a decision. Thus, looking at all of the problems with Scotland’s independent path to EU membership, it would take years, if not over a decade, to negotiate membership.

Northern Ireland

Given the difficulties that Scotland will face if they try to become an EU member on its own, Northern Ireland’s best path to EU membership is through unification with the rest of Ireland. Using the case of German unification after the fall of the Berlin Wall as a precedent for EU accession, if Northern Ireland becomes part of Ireland, it will enter the EU as part of a member state.

When East Germany and West Germany united, East Germany gained from joining the EU because it “could rely on the tried and tested rules and institutions, the West German social market economy and immediate access to large amounts of financial resources”. Unification inspired high expectations, and East Germany gained advanced, sophisticated institutions and administrators. Unification eliminated most of the legal barriers regarding sovereignty, which usually delay establishment of institutions and full EU membership. However, there was a cultural difference between the two Germanys, and institutions were established on top of East Germany’s previous institutions.

There is still a divide between the two sides of Germany in terms of economic prosperity. After ten years of membership, labor productivity was still 60% of that of West Germany. There has been moderate improvement since unification, though. In 1991, East German income per capita compared to West Germany was 40%, and in 2016, East German income per capita compared to West Germany reached two thirds. Due to Soviet occupation for over forty years, East Germany has a higher level of social distrust than its Western counterpart, which plays a role in its development and integration in the EU. Overall, the economic gap between Germany and East Germany has significantly decreased despite remaining differences.

Although the German unification was successful, it highlights potential problems for Northern Ireland to light. Aside from cultural, religious, and historic tensions between Ireland and Northern Ireland, Northern Ireland might not be as developed because it would not go through the negotiation process or receive EU funding for meeting set benchmarks. However, Northern Ireland has been a part of the EU as long as the UK has, so it has the infrastructure required. Additionally, Northern Ireland was not under Soviet rule and has been developing alongside the rest of the UK and Ireland. Given the minor economic differences between the two countries, Irish unification would be the best option for Northern Ireland to remain in the EU.

Conclusion

Although Brexit will likely have a negative economic effect on the United Kingdom, the country is large and developed enough to thrive regardless of its EU membership status. However, if Scotland opts for independence, it will struggle while if Northern Ireland unites with the rest of Ireland, it will continue on its path in the EU. In particular, Scotland trades more with the rest of the UK than any other country, dwarfing its exports to non-UK countries by comparison. Looking at other economic indicators like deficit and debt, Scotland’s independence would likely increase borrowing and decrease economic stability and security. As Scotland relies heavily on its robust banking sector, the decrease in stability would lead to less investment and fewer banks in the country. As a result, Scotland would regret leaving the UK because the UK would remain stable and prosperous, as it could get products that usually come from Scotland elsewhere. In addition to economic instability, the likely lengthy amount of time it would take to join the EU, if at all, should dissuade Scotland from independence. With neither the UK nor the EU, Scotland would be a small country of just over 5 million with an unstable economy and decreased trade, investment, and movement of human capital. These consequences should, if Northern Ireland were to pursue independence, persuade Northern Irelanders to unite with the rest of Ireland and join the EU upon unification. Northern Ireland has a simpler path out of the UK and into the EU than Scotland, so it would likely not have a major effect on the economy other than changing currency.

Erik St. Pierre 10/13/16 Erik St. Pierre 10/13/16

Merkel’s Far-Right Conundrum

Staff Writer Erik St. Pierre analyzes the implications of rising right wing sentiments in Germany.

Recently, Germany held two regional elections that may foretell doom for Angela Merkel’s Christian Democrat (CDU) party in Germany’s 2017 federal election as well as for Merkel’s open-door refugee policy. The CDU’s two setbacks in the Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Berlin elections can be explained by the recent rise of the rightwing populist party, Alternative for Germany (AFD). AFD has been campaigning on a platform opposed to Merkel’s open-door refugee policy, which faces the enormous task of integrating over a million refugees into German society. In early September, the Christian Democrats placed third in Merkel’s own regional constituency, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. CDU placed behind the Social Democrats (SPD) in first and the three-year AFD in second, which gained 30.5% and 20.9% of the vote, respectively. While CDU’s loss in this region won’t impact the current administration’s composition, it has been largely seen as a symbolic victory for AFD and its anti-refugee rhetoric, especially considering Mecklenburg-Vorpommern makes up Angela Merkel’s own constituency. Despite this blow caused by AFD’s symbolic victory, the Christian Democrats experienced an even larger wake up call a few weeks later in Berlin, a notorious stronghold for the Social and Christian Democrats, where AFD, with 12.2% of the vote took third behind the Christian Democrats with 17.8% of the vote and the Social Democrats with 22.8% of the vote. While both the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats claimed victory in Berlin, many are calling it a meager win. For AFD, a fledgling and fringe political party, to do so well in Berlin signals that the far-right now has an opportunity to jump onto Germany’s national stage in its next federal election.

AFD’s victory over the Christian Democrats marks an impressive rise for the right-wing populists. They are now represented in ten state parliaments and show no sign of stopping or slowing down. AFD leaders state that their victories in Berlin and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern amount to a de facto referendum on Germany’s open-door policy to refugees. Prime Minister Merkel has been steadfast in defending her open-door policy. However, as her party bleeds voters to AFD, she has begun to signal that she may begin walking away from asylum seekers. As much of Europe becomes weary of the refugee crisis and dubious of its capacity to accept more, it now appears that Germany has also reached its limit. However, the question remains just how much Germany’s recent regional elections will impact the Grand Coalition between Merkel’s party and the Social Democrats that have defined German politics since 2013. If the far-right continues to surge as it has in Germany and other European countries then surely this Grand Coalition will falter. Currently, the world is looking to Angela Merkel to see whether she will accept the backlash against the open door policy or if she will stand strong and continue championing Germany’s dedication to refugees. Both stances will have profound effects on German and European politics.

AFD was founded in 2013 as a response to the Eurozone debt crisis and Angela Merkel’s policies towards it. At its founding, it was primarily composed of liberal academics and economists who opposed Merkel’s Eurozone bail out policies. In September of 2013, AFD were not able to win the 5% of the national vote needed to secure seats in the German parliament, however those days have largely changed with AFD now polling at more than 10% in national opinion polls. This remarkable surge of support since 2013 is no accident. Party leaders of AFD purposely focused at wooing xenophobic voters through the use the use of fear and paranoia during the peak of the refugee crisis. This is evidenced through the party’s link with the Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West (Pegida) movement, which has recently created a political party of its own, and is further exemplified by their shared commitment to work together to bring their anti-refugee platform to the federal level within Germany. Pegida is famous for its right-wing and hateful rhetoric that often electrifies the many protests against refugees and Islam it carries out in Europe. More recently the group attempted to boycott Kinder chocolate after the company began a marketing campaign that contained pictures of two children of African and Middle Eastern descent. Little did members of the movement know, the boys were actually German footballers. This illustrates just how quickly this movement’s Islamophobia and xenophobia can take hold. In addition to being affiliated with xenophobic groups, the leaders of AFD themselves have been accused of both Islamophobia and anti-semitism. The newly-elected AFD senator from Berlin, Kay Nerstheimer has recently taken fire from critics for both calling civilian victims of the Nazi regime “guerrilla fighters” that were not protected under international law and downplaying the atrocities of the Nazis. Nerstheimer has also referred to Syrian refugees as “disgusting vermin” and as “parasites that feed off the juices of the German people.” Despite AFD originally arising as a response to the Eurozone bailouts, they have now pivoted to scapegoating refugees as a way to power; and it’s working. The only question is exactly how much it will change the political landscape of German politics, and subsequently, that of the European Union.

Immediately after the Berlin elections, it appeared that Angela Merkel began backpedaling on her open-door refugee policy due to the rise of AFD in what was traditionally a bastion for the Christian and Social Democrats’ Grand Coalition. In a press conference, Chancellor Merkel expressed regret for Germany’s open-door policy stating, “If I could, I would go back in time to be better prepared for the refugee crisis in 2015, for which we were rather unprepared.” She’s also signaled that she is willing to be flexible regarding the policy’s future by stating, “If I knew what change in refugee policy the people in Germany want, I would be prepared to consider it.” This shows just how Merkel, who has previously been a staunch defender of the open-door policy, has been taken aback by the unexpected potency of the AFD. It also subtly shows just how much of a threat the AFD is for the Grand Coalition of the Christian and Social democrats in Germany’s federal elections. However, after these statements Merkel has continued on to say that she does “not see a change of course, but coherent work over many, many months” in regards to Germany’s refugee policy. These opposing statements make it unclear exactly how Merkel will move forward concerning refugees and AFD’s challenge to the Grand Coalition, however, Merkel’s stance will certainly have implications for Germany’s 2017 federal election.

The rise of the AFD has many questioning whether Chancellor Merkel will lead the Christian Democrats as their nominee for chancellor next year. Merkel has not yet publicly stated whether she will “stand again in next year’s general election,” and the growing disquiet around her chancellorship could create many challengers for her in the election, not just from the AFD, but even within her own party. If Merkel stands by her refugee policy and the AFD continues to surge it would not be surprising to see a candidate within the Christian Democrats challenge her for the chancellorship. This would be incredibly damaging for the Christian Democrats and would all but guarantee the fracture of the Grand Coalition and victory of the AFD. However, Merkel may still back down as the AFD gains political power in a move to win back voters and lick the CDU’s political wounds. The Grand Coalition may still survive, but it would concede a symbolic AFD victory as the country shifts right on refugee policy. Lastly, Merkel may concede her leadership and let her party choose a new standard bearer. This would allow her to continue standing strong on her refugee policy while at the same time let her party distance itself from the policy to save the Grand Coalition.

Regardless of Merkel’s next steps and the outcome of Germany’s 2017 elections, the surprising power of AFD’s challenge to the Christian and Social democrats spell a dark future for German politics, but also for European politics as other European countries also deal with their own far-right political party challenges. Racist politics have once again made their way into Europe’s most progressive policies and the unfortunate victims will be war-weary men, women, and children looking for an escape from violence.

Tanner Holland 10/13/16 Tanner Holland 10/13/16

Maskirovka and Predicting Kremlin Actions in the 21st Century

Guest Writer Tanner Holland provides a contemporary analysis of Russian decision making.

The word Maskirovka might not be familiar to many of us post-9/11 international affairs wonks but the word is all too familiar to our predecessors, namely the Sovietologists of yore. Maskirovka was a tactic born in the Russian Civil War that followed the October Revolution of 1917 and became official Soviet strategy not only in war but also in all manners of foreign statecraft in the Cold War. The concept emphasized the need for stealth, concealment and misdirection in all things in order to confuse one’s enemy, and though many Soviet ideas have fallen out of favor in modern Russia, Maskirovka remains very fashionable. Russian president Vladimir Putin was born and raised under the doctrine and has become one of its best contemporary practitioners, as he holds nearly all of Russia’s foreign policy decisions in his hands. Putin has demonstrated his mastery of the doctrine in Ukraine with constant misdirection, concealment, and stealth most recently with his military escalation in Ukraine after the death of a Russian security officer near the Crimean border, not to mention his equally rapid de-escalation.

This time, however, Russia’s de-escalation was perplexing for nearly all observers. Signs of the Kremlin’s escalation into open war were all there; an incident shrouded in secrecy that made Russian troops appear as the victim, an increase in Russian-backed separatist violence in the east, Putin’s statement of withdrawal from talks to end the conflict, and many others that Russian expertssaw as classic Maskirovka tactics. What could’ve gone wrong? The problem lies in the indicators being used by observers in media and academia. If peace and stability in Europe are to continue, a better set of indicators must be composed to monitor Russian aggression not just for Ukraine, but for all of Eastern Europe. If a line can be drawn between the realm of Kremlin disruption and imminent Russian invasion then European governments can tailor their response appropriately. Failing to understand the nature of Maskirovka and when it is being used for disruption versus invasion could mean a drastic miscalculation on the part of the local government that allows the Kremlin to capitalize on the situation. For example a scenario many scholars and defense writers think of is a crisis in a Baltic country that usually begins with an ethnic Russian protest that draws a harsh response from the local government. Seeing an opportunity to disrupt stability, Russia deploys large troops near the border and sends intelligence officers into the area to increase disruption. If the host country misreads these tactics and concludes that the military is needed to protect this region instead of routine riot police, the situation could easily spiral out of control thus allowing the Kremlin to appear as if it is forced to act on behalf of its Russian brethren. In this case, and many other cases of Russian Maskirovka, miscalculations can be fatal. This means discerning between indicators of Maskirovka that signal an impending military confrontation and indicators that are simply signs of Russian attempts to destabilize and disrupt.

Among the most often-cited indicators of an impending invasion is a Russian troop movement to a given area, but using troop movements to convince your reader of an impending invasion has proven recently to be no more than alarmism. Russia routinely moves troops in large numbers as a tool of political leverage. This is not to say that monitoring troop movement is useless, but to use it as an indicator of impending invasion will more than likely lead to incorrect conclusions and bad advice for NATO states and local partners. While Russia used troop build-up in Georgia prior to the 2008 invasion, recently Russia has moved troops in response to NATO announcements, used troop movements and exercises to exert political pressure in Moldova, and in response to Turkish actions along the Syrian border. Yet the Kremlin did not open hostilities against these countries and most likely had no desire to—the objective was political pressure and intimidation, not invasion. While it is difficult to know for sure, as the Kremlin constantly seeks to redefine its Maskirovka tactics, it is safe to assume that Russian troop movements are tools of disruption, not indicators of imminent invasion. Another flawed indicator of invasion is increased violence in separatist regions in Ukraine and other former USSR states where the Kremlin holds sway. This is flawed, since the Kremlin uses upticks in violence for the goal of political pressure in the same way it does with formal military movements. In the case of Ukraine, a rise in violence has now become a tool for political persuasion at pivotal moments such as the 2015 Ukrainian local elections when violence on the front line rose. However this uptick in violence was not the worst a sign of impending invasion as there were no reports of direct Russian involvement as in earlier parts of the conflict. Unfortunately, escalation at key moments has continued to imply that this routine escalation pattern is not a sign of impending invasion but rather of routine political pressure. The Kremlin uses this same tactic throughout the former USSR to exert pressure on local governments such as in Moldova and Georgia. Many times, these escalations in separatists regions have been cited as signs of impending invasion and have been inaccurate.

Yet some indicators recently cited as pretext of Kremlin invasion are worth retaining, namely, abandonment of peace talks, snap military exercises, and most importantly an incident (a bombing or gunfight) that ends in the death of Russians or Russian security personnel often shrouded in secrecy by the Russian government but still seemingly points clearly to a responsible party (a hostile government or terrorist organization) and thus puts the Kremlin on a defensive footing. For the Kremlin, exiting negotiations is generally a very significant decision and is not usually taken lightly—even as the battle to capture the cityof Debaltseve raged in Ukraine at Russian behest, the Russians remained in Minsk to sign a ceasefire deal with the Ukrainian government and as bombs rained down in Aleppo Russia remained at the negotiating table as well. Furthermore, snap military drills and inspections are classic Kremlin tactics used to disguise the deployment of troops as they did in Georgia in 2008, and shortly before and during the Russian military intervention in Syria. Unfortunately this indicator is tricky as snap military drills can also represent a Kremlin tactic of disruption, however if forces involved remain on alert or are kept out of their normal base of operations–as was the case in Georgia–the drills take on a different meaning. In this case in order to determine whether the Kremlin seeks to destabilize or invade, the focus must be on a micro level–watching how troops move after or during a drill–rather than a macro level. Lastly, a major incident that kills or harms Russians is the allowance of the Kremlin to appear to be in a defensive stance. This tactic was utilized in the run-up to the Georgian invasion when South Ossetian separatists baited Georgians into an attack by striking into Georgian territory with artillery—it’s important to note that Russians see Ossetians as a brother nationality. Additionally many believe the Russian security apparatus conducted alleged terrorist attacks in Russia, leading to the Second Chechen War, and thus are themselves an indicator of impending war. The Kremlin seeks to put itself on a defensive footing in order to justify its actions to the Russian public and make it seem like their actions are justifiable by international law as a part of their information warfare, a major aspect of Kremlin Maskirovka tactics that set the stage for greater Russian intervention and invasion.

However, to truly discern between Kremlin operations to disrupt and those pre-empting an invasion more new layers of analysis must be applied to the Maskirovka tactics we observe. Analysts and observers should rely on some traditional methods such as looking at operational level indicators of a Russian invasion; for example, the lack of field camps for Russian soldiers as pointed out by Nolan Peterson. Peterson, a journalist who has covered the Ukrainian conflict extensively, also notes that Russian troops only had enough fuel for one day of operation—another indicator of a lack of preparation. After the extensive reforms carried out by the Kremlin following the underperformance of Russia’s military in the Georgian invasion, it is safe to assume that if Russian forces were preparing to invade another country they would not be undersupplied. Other indicators that can be taken from the Kremlin’s preparation for the Georgian invasion include the deployment of separatists far beyond the theater of battle as Ariel Cohen and Robert Hamilton point out in The Russian Military and the Georgian War: Lessons and Implications in order to assist in laying the operational groundwork for an invading force. Cohen and Hamilton state that Russia used irregular forces from separatist states in Georgia to conduct advanced reconnaissance inside Georgian territory, a move that could easily be replicated in Ukraine. In Ukraine, “sabotage teams” from the separatist side occasionally attempt to break through Ukrainian lines, but if they were sighted farther inside Ukraine it would be a cause for serious concern.

The Kremlin, and Putin especially, pride themselves on being expert practitioners of Maskirovka and thus will always seek to confuse their enemy and change tactics. Unfortunately that means that the nature of the new age of Maskirovka is constantly changing and including more tactics of concealment, misinformation, and confusion. As the Kremlin seeks to conceal its intentions, the West must seek to pull back the curtain by analyzing more completely. As the Kremlin seeks to misinform, the West must seek to properly inform its decisions and ensure it has considered the consequences. Lastly, as the Kremlin seeks to confuse, the West must seek to understand Russian actions in order to more appropriately counter them. Western observers and analysts must have a more rigorous set of indicators to determine Kremlin goals, based on a tried and true study of Maskirovka tactics. Once again, the understanding of the goal of Maskirovka in the 21st century, whether it is simply to disrupt or to lay the groundwork for a large-scale conflict, is crucial in ensuring that the West appropriately responds to counter Kremlin objectives. The difference between an appropriate and inappropriate action has life or death consequences and could mean destroying the post-WWII peace that has become the European norm.

Recent Articles

Featured

Oct 25, 2025

The Shadows of Statelessness: Life in Kutupalong Refugee Camp

Oct 25, 2025

Oct 21, 2025

What the Sahel is Going On?

Oct 21, 2025

Jun 11, 2025

The World Owes Haiti an Apology: The Perils of US Intervention

Jun 11, 2025

Apr 15, 2025

Panama’s Recent Response to Trump’s Canal Desire

Apr 15, 2025

Background

The Red Effect of 2017

Oppositional Identity Creation

Alternatives

Conclusion

This piece was co-authored by Claire Spangler and Andrew Fallone

Managing the Distance: Cooperation and Clashes between Norden and East Asian Countries

Regionalism

Business: West to East

Business: East to West

Conclusions

This piece was co-authored by Claire Spangler and Andrew Fallone

Managing the Distance: Cooperation and Clashes between Norden and East Asian Countries

Regionalism

Business: West to East

Business: East to West

Conclusions

European Union

Abortion and Reproductive Rights

Conclusion

Historical Background

Current US Policy

Concluding Remarks

United Kingdom Migration Laws

The Referendum and Immigration

Immigration after Brexit

Implications

Accession Process

Scotland

Northern Ireland

Conclusion

Recent Articles

American University’s Undergraduate Foreign Policy Magazine