Hackers for Hire: Russian Hacktivism on the World Stage

After the 2016 U.S. presidential elections, every American became more aware of the importance of cybersecurity. More notably, they became aware that foreign actors were interfering in American politics. The country became more divided with every mention of Russia, and the effects of the Russian hack can still be felt in the polarized political environment to this day. What most Americans didn’t know was that a few months later, British cybersecurity authorities voiced their concerns that Russian bots and fake social media accounts had influenced the outcome of the Brexit referendum. After some examination, the link between the two situations became clear: both were information warfare operations conducted by Russian hacktivists.

“Hacktivist,” a term first used in 1989 by the hacker “Omega," defines an individual who conducts cyberattacks against private computer networks to further a political goal. They are generally unaffiliated with government entities and often use their skills to defy the actions of the state. Hackers first emerged in the late 1980s  to seek profit from their operations. Modern hackers are decidedly different, having arisen not from the desire for money, but the desire for change. They are activists that can have immense impacts upon a state or community. Hacktivists are credited with assisting the 2010 Arab Spring movement by attacking Tunisian government websites, and were an essential component to revealing the billions of dollars tied up in the “Panama Papers.” International coverage of these successful hacktivist operations has resulted in a noticeable rise in hacktivist activity all over the world. 

In addition to these cyber vigilantes, some hacktivist groups tend to operate in support of their state’s foreign policies. Some countries, such as Iran, North Korea, and China, have outsourced their cyber operations with limited success. Russia has also hired private actors to conduct cyber warfare against their cyber adversaries; unlike the groups in the other states mentioned, Russian hacktivists have been incredibly successful in their cyber operations, and are considered to be among the best hackers in the world. Where most hacktivist groups operate independently or receive some corollary funding from a discreet government agent, many Russian hacktivist groups are highly suspected to be associated with the security and information arm of the Russian government, the Federal Security Service (FSB).

According to Connell and Vogler in their paper “Russia’s Approach to Cyber Warfare”, Russia has specifically adjusted their cyber strategy so that independent hacktivist groups may play an incredibly large role in Russian information warfare. They are cost-effective (sometimes hackers will conduct operations free of charge, as long as the motivation or political goal aligns well with their interests), require little to no oversight (they operate independently and only require a target and desired effect), and have an incredibly high success rate. They can spread propaganda or disinformation, conduct a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack on a target website, create Trojans and malware, steal financial information, and store illegal or stolen information discreetly (learn more about these attacks here).

On numerous occasions, the Russian government has claimed that they played no part in cyber-attacks against other countries. The attribution problem, which has arisen from the tendency for cyber operations to be quick, discreet, and difficult to track, has prevented the international intelligence community from accurately finding the culprit of cyber attacks for many years. Hiring hacktivist groups to conduct operations for the FSB allows the Kremlin to order these attacks without repercussions on the international stage. When accused of actions of cyber warfare, they often assert that “patriotic hackers” were responsible. Although the international security community highly suspects the FSB has been contracting these hacktivists to conduct operations on their behalf, definitive proof of a connection is incredibly difficult to find. Communication with hacktivist groups is conducted through various platforms on the dark web, and payment can be completed through e-payment platforms such as Bitcoin. Thus, this tactic has proven to be incredibly effective. Hacktivists played a major role in the Russian attacks against Georgia, Ukraine, and the United States. The very first operation in which cyber attacks were a complementary component to a larger kinetic conflict would not have been so successful if Russia had not hired hacktivists.

The Georgian Conflict

The Russo-Ossetian war is well-known in the security community as the first conflict in which cyber operations were used to complement a larger kinetic conflict. The conflict began after years of negotiations regarding the sovereignty of the territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, both claimed by Georgia, broke down. This resulted in the armament of separatist groups, who received funding and weapons from Russia, and Russian military movement into both regions. Throughout the conflict, armed combat was accompanied by DDoS attacks against websites vital to the communications network of the Georgian government and military. Since the international security community was unable to discern the exact origin of the DDoS attacks, the Russian government denied responsibility for the actions and instead blamed the attacks on Russian hacktivists. Additionally, the hacktivists were employed to conduct an intensive disinformation campaign within the region; fake websites and social media accounts spread propaganda and misinformation regarding the nature of Georgia’s role in the conflict. As a result, the international community--and, more importantly, the citizens of the region--had no reliable account of what was happening until the conflict had already ended. A lack of definitive proof that the Russian government was involved in these cyber attacks and a general misunderstanding of the nature of the conflict allowed Russia to avoid punishment. Having witnessed the strain that Russian cyber attacks can have upon a government in a time of crisis, many Eastern European states began improving their cybersecurity strategies. Unfortunately, Ukraine realized in 2014 just how difficult it is to withstand attacks from Russian hacktivists when the government is in political turmoil.

The Crimean Crisis

After the Russo-Ossetian war, Ukraine began building up their cybersecurity in anticipation of a Russian attack. This attack eventually came during the 2014 Crimean crisis. Seizing the opportunity created by the Euromaidan protests, Russia employed an advanced disinformation and propaganda campaign. This campaign was accompanied by low-level espionage and disruption missions that targeted Ukrainian government officials through spear-phishing and malware. The propaganda was spread via bots and hackers on social media, much like the disinformation spread during the Russo-Ossetian war. A DDoS attack was also conducted against Ukrainian government websites, which resulted in the websites crashing for several hours before Ukrainian security officials were able to reject the bots from the servers. These operations ultimately undermined the 2014 Ukrainian elections as illegitimate and the Ukrainian military was blamed for numerous false-flag operations against various pro-Russia separatist groups. An investigation into the source of the hacks revealed that the attacks originated with Russian IP addresses; however, the Russian government once more claimed that Russian hacktivists unaffiliated with the government had been responsible for the information operations. Nevertheless, the international community refused to believe these claims, declared the Russian-sponsored referendum to be illegitimate, and denounced the Russian occupation of Crimea in a United Nations General Assembly resolution. Some actors, such as the United States and the European Union, recognized the threat that the Russian information warfare posed to their security, and placed sanctions on Russia. This further dissolved the already fragile tensions between Russia and the United States, and these tensions reached their lowest point since the end of the Cold War when Russian hacktivists hacked the 2016 U.S. Presidential Elections.

The Hacking of the United States Presidential Election

During the 2016 U.S. presidential election, several U.S. political entities, most notably the Democratic National Coalition (DNC), reported that they had been hacked. Soon after private information about Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign was published on websites such as WikiLeaks and DCLeaks.com. Targeted ads and articles also began appearing on various social media platforms during the election, with many of them focusing on divisive political and social issues. The hacks and the ads were both easily traced back to Russian hacking groups with known affiliations to the Kremlin. The U.S. intelligence community determined, with high confidence, that Vladimir Putin had ordered the hacks and the divisive disinformation campaign. The discovery and attribution of the hacks resulted in immediate outrage from the U.S. population and ultimately caused further polarization along party lines.

The software and tactics used to conduct espionage on U.S. political entities were both rather simple, though thorough. The hacktivists employed by the Kremlin belonged to the group that the U.S. intelligence community refers to as “the Dukes.” The Dukes are well-known by the U.S. intelligence community; they have spent countless hours trying to remove the hacker group from public and private email servers all over the country. The hacktivists sent targeted emails containing malware to members of the DNC and other organizations. This practice is known as spear-phishing and often results in the target unknowingly installing viruses or malware to their computers. Once the malware has been installed to the computer, it can search for files, see the computer’s history, and access the internet. The hackers secured files through malware that was downloaded to the computers at the DNC, then revised and released the files in a way that would intentionally discredit the members of the Democratic National Coalition. This practice was perfected by Russia through employing it against their population; any entity that opposed the Kremlin or its policies were infiltrated, prostrated, and publicly shamed by “hacktivists.” The US political atmosphere remains tense years after the hacks were discovered, causing people to worry about how truly devastating hacktivist involvement in international politics can be.

Moving Forward: International Response and Action

The investigation and confirmation by the U.S. intelligence community of interference by the Kremlin and their hired hacktivists severely polarized the U.S. population. The government’s reaction, a ban on several Russian companies and individuals from conducting business in the United States, has been considered by many to be a “slap on the wrist.” Lack of a vehement response or clear policy direction highlights just how extensive the problem is on an international scale. Without the ability to punish hacktivist groups or the entities that employ them, the frequency and severity of cyber attacks will continue to grow globally.

The number of hacktivist groups worldwide has already increased since 2014, according to Dan Lohrmann. As a form of response to the “civilian” hacker groups used by the Kremlin to further their political goals, hacktivist groups in countries such as Ukraine and the U.S. have been created. Some, such as the Ukranian group led by a hacker known as “RUH8” (or “Roo-hate,” expressing the group’s disposition towards the Russian government), were formed with the sole purpose of counteracting Russian influence in their country’s politics after the Crimean Crisis. Others, like the Western hacktivist group “Anonymous” claim that their activities are protesting injustice and corruption where they see it occurring. 

Though the cause supported by a hacktivist group may be noble, the strength and skill with which Russian hacktivist complete cyber operations has caused governments all over the world to take action against Russia and hackers in general. The international community has striven to address the growing concern that cybercrime and hacktivism pose through diplomacy and economic sanctions; however, creating resolute legislation or treaties has proven to be extremely difficult. NATO has reported that the sanctions placed upon Russia in response to the Crimean Crisis have been largely successful and have “inflicted damage on the Russian economy,” but Russian hacktivist activity and cybercrime continue to grow. As a new form of technological warfare, cyber warfare has no international norms that may govern the actions of actors. A lack of clear definitions, acceptable actions, and understood repercussions allow actors to continue using cyber warfare without punishment.

Experts have begun to fear that Russian hacktivism will extend beyond the borders of Russian foreign policy and cybercrime to become its own black market business. The U.S. security firm Taia Global has assessed that the 2014 hack of Sony Pictures by North Korea may have been conducted by paid Russian hacktivists. Documents leaked from the studio were traced to a Russian hacktivist with suspected ties to the FSB. This presents a harrowing possibility: states may, given the opportunity, hire Russian hacktivists to conduct cyber espionage missions on their behalf. Any situation in which states hire foreign nationals to conduct illegal activity in cyberspace would further complicate the attribution problem and make it much more difficult to stifle cybercrime across the globe.

If the international community truly wishes to combat cyber criminals and hacktivists on a global scale, then international laws, norms, and treaties must be set in place to govern the actions of cyber states. Although many experts such as Brian Mazanec assess that norms would be incredibly beneficial for all states suffering from hacktivist and cyber attacks, they also realize that the creation of these norms is highly unlikely under normal circumstances. Many of the worlds largest powers have no interest in creating constraining norms for cyber warfare, as the absence of these norms allows them to attack one another freely; however, the rise of state-sponsored hacktivism has brought the lawless free-for-all within cyberspace to a new turning point. Before hacktivists were deeply involved in international relations, the political and social climates of states were largely unaffected by its cybersecurity policies. After the 2016 election and the polarization of the United States population, a state’s cybersecurity policies became a priority for ordinary citizens in different countries all over the globe. The control over cyberspace that states once had is now threatened by hacktivism, and it is time to consider creating laws and norms that would constrain cyber activity for all actors. Although they may prevent the world’s largest cyber powers from using cyberspace to attack one another, it could also disrupt the startling trend of political polarity in democratic states by punishing the actors using bots and hacktivists to further their political goals. 

Hacktivism has arisen from the continued proliferation of cyber weapons internationally. Although the 2008 Russo-Ossetian War, the 2014 Crimean Crisis, and the interference in the 2016 U.S. elections were all examples of successful Russian hacktivist operations, they certainly are not the only ones. Great Britain continues to grapple with the effects that Russian hacktivists had upon their political climate, and leaders all over the globe worry that their next elections will be undermined by Russian influence. With no laws, norms, or treaties governing cyberspace, the world waits impatiently for another Russian hacktivist to strike. Only two questions remain: Who will be the next target, and when will Russia strike next?

The Immigration Battle: How the U.S. and Germany’s Respective Immigration Models Affect Immigrant Economic Participation

The 2015 migrant crisis was one of the worst in global history. As a result of the ongoing conflicts in Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq, as well as the unbearable living conditions in Eritrea, Kosovo, Yemen, and other nearby states, over 19.5 million refugees fled their native countries, mostly in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, and arrived at Europe’s and Asia’s borders in unprecedented numbers. This sudden influx of people by both land and sea into the European Union (EU), Germany in particular, created deep divisions within society over how to best cope with the vast amount of incoming refugees, many of whom could not speak the local language and had no documented proof of their existence. In addition to Europe, the United States was another preferred destination for refugees, although reaching America’s borders was a greater logistical challenge. 

Nonetheless, with the highest immigration rate out of all 28 EU countries and another whose existence is essentially built on the backs of immigrants, Germany and the United States are two of the most salient states to examine when analyzing the impacts of the recent immigration crisis. Both of these respective nations pride themselves on their ability to serve as a beacon of hope, change, and freedom for all, and while they share a lot of the same immigration laws and issues, they also differ immensely in their long-term treatment and adjustment plans for immigrants. This disparity, despite their similar roles as two of the most popular migration destinations in the world, downplays the important role and potential impact that immigrants can have on the country that they move to, especially in the economic sector. Despite the popular claim that immigrants steal native jobs, the economic and employment sector is often analyzed to determine how prosperous a state is. As a result, understanding how immigrants are accepted into the employment division in Germany and the United States is crucial to understanding the complexities of the Western immigration debate.

Overview of American and German Immigration History

The United States

Often said to be a “nation of immigrants,” the United States has been a desirable destination for refugees and immigrants alike for hundreds of years due to its promises of change and the opportunity to achieve the coveted ‘American Dream.’ However, immigration to the United States really began to take flight when an 1850 census included questions regarding nativity for the first time. Data from that census revealed that there were 2.2 million immigrants residing in the United States at that time, making up about 10 percent of the overall population. In the next 60 years, those numbers increased as people began to leave Europe because of lack of employment, crop failure, rising taxes, and famine, with the majority coming from England, Ireland, and Germany. In that period of time, the percentage of foreign-born individuals in the United States stayed between 13 and 15 percent, eventually reaching a peak of 14.8 percent in 1890. 

However, the culmination of the Great Depression, World War II, and new restrictive immigration laws that only let in strictly northern and western Europeans significantly decreased the rate at which people were coming into the U.S., leading to a low of 9.6 million immigrants, or 4.7 percent of the total U.S. population in 1970. After 1970, the number of immigrants residing in the United States quickly increased as more and more people immigrated from Latin America and Asia primarily. New laws including the Immigration Act of 1965 that abolished admission quotas, paired with the nation’s growing economy, led to an all-time high of more than 44.4 million immigrants in the United States as of 2017.

Yet the United States is no stranger to restrictive immigration laws; in 1882, Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act suspending the immigration of Chinese workers for ten years, and in 1892, it passed the Act to Prohibit the Coming of Chinese Persons into the United States. Yet, despite those restrictions, which were later repealed, and the continuation of those social attitudes by many Americans today, the United States also made significant strides in welcoming immigrants and refugees alike in later years. The most notable ones were the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 which “authorized the admission of up to 205,000 non-quota immigrants fleeing Europe,” and the Refugee Act of 1980, which established a new system for “processing and admitting refugees from overseas” and formally defined a “refugee” as “any person… who is unable or unwilling to return to [a] country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution.”

Nonetheless, since the September 2001 attacks by al-Qaeda, there has been an increased focus on immigration, specifically on immigrants from the MENA region, as well as calls for a return to more restrictive immigration laws. During his 2016 presidential campaign and throughout his presidency, President Donald Trump continuously pushed for a crackdown on illegal immigration by enacting the ‘Muslim ban,’ which has been shot down in many states for being unconstitutional, and building a wall at the southern border. President Trump's anti-immigrant rhetoric is primarily targeted towards Mexicans and Muslims, although he recently called for increased visa restrictions on Chinese citizens as well. This rhetoric, although in opposition to the country’s global role as a beacon of hope and freedom, is strikingly similar to the country’s anti-immigrant behavior from over a hundred years ago.

Germany

Whereas the United States faced an unprecedented influx of immigrants in the 19th and 20th centuries, Germany battled the opposite; between 1820 and 1920, as a result of war, famine, and political upheaval, around 6 million Germans left their home country in search of opportunity. However, around 1890 the emigration rate slowed down considerably as the German Empire entered a period of industrialization, attracting both those who had left as well as foreign workers who saw the potential to make a big profit in the newfound coal and steel industries. 

Yet while Germany was a country made up of immigrants, it was not a country whose society was very welcoming towards those who were foreign-born. In fact, xenophobic attitudes manifested themselves drastically in the 1920s under Adolf Hitler and the Nazi party who advocated for the creation of a “pure” and “superior” German race, who he referred to as the “Aryan race.” This translated into nationalistic and anti-Semitic world views and a strong hatred for those who were neither German nor white. This anti-immigrant behavior later manifested itself into a 1973 government act known as the “Recruitment Ban”; this ban essentially ended the “era of foreign labor recruitment” of “guest workers” to West Germany and prevented them from entering the country from states who were not part of the European Economic Community at the time. Post-1973, immigration rates in Germany actually increased when the Soviet Union fell and the situation in Yugoslavia turned bloody and violent. Yet with the new influx of immigrants, xenophobic behavior also grew and mob violence broke out across many Germany cities and towns. Another significant anti-immigrant act was also passed in 2005 and became known as The Immigration Act or the Residence Act; this act essentially established Germany as a “country of immigration” with a legal duty towards integration. Having experienced the extremist views under Hitler, this fundamentally changed the way in which Germany presented itself in the international community as an immigrant ally.

Since joining as a member of the EU in 1957, Germany has become the second most popular migration destination in the EU after the United Kingdom, with approximately 15.96 million immigrants living in the country by 2011, amounting to about 19 percent of the population. Yet with the 2015 migrant crisis and the influx of migrants from the Middle East in particular, the population in Germany rose to 82.2 million people, an increase of 978,000 or 1.2 percent. In that same year, immigration to Germany totaled 2.14 million people, a 46 percent increase from 2014. As a response to the immense wave of immigrants fleeing the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, German Chancellor Angela Merkel called for an open border migration policy that would allow Germany to welcome those from primarily Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq. While Merkel was alone in this decision and her popularity levels dropped significantly, immigration to Germany in recent years has slowed considerably, with most individuals originating from Turkey and Poland.

The United States: Geared Towards Permanent Residency

At present, the current discourse among scholars in the field of immigration is that the American immigration system is more exclusionary and geared toward permanent residency. For those immigrating to the United States, the process to become a U.S. citizen can be done one of four different ways: acquiring citizenship by birth, acquisition, derivation, or naturalization. Immigrants also have the option of obtaining a Green Card or a Permanent Resident Card, which would allow them to permanently live and work in the United States. While the process to become a U.S. citizen is a long and difficult one, it is a process and a system that is designed to grant someone permanent residency and not simply a temporary stay. While the United States does offer temporary work, school, and travel visas, those have a time limit, and after a certain amount of time, the individual must return to their home country unless they choose to overstay their visa and risk deportation. Obtaining permanent residency is the only way to live in the United States in the long-run without facing potential repercussions with immigration authorities.

Furthermore, the United States’s immigration system has an exclusionary design which is made more difficult due to the length of time that it takes to become a U.S. citizen, as well as the necessary documented proof and other government obstacles that must be overcome. The citizenship process tends to be a long and arduous one if citizenship by birth is not an option, and much like the vetting process for refugees, it can take up to 18-24 months including an array of comprehensive interviews and security checks that are completed by the Department of Homeland Security and the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. The entirety of this process first includes getting sponsored by a U.S. citizen, be it a relative or an employer. To even be considered for an immigrant visa, the immigrant must be sponsored, which then leads to the submission of a petition for citizenship. After the petition is filed, the immigrant must pay processing fees, submit financial and supporting documents, and go through an interview; if the immigrant passes the interview, he or she will then be granted their immigrant visa and legally be allowed to enter the United States. This process is exclusionary in nature because many immigrants either do not have the necessary documentation and proof of their existence, do not have the financial means to pay the processing fees, and/or do not have someone residing in the U.S. that will sponsor their visa. As a result, only a fraction of immigrants applying for visas are accepted.

Additionally, despite immigration being one of the most salient issues a country can face, misperceptions still persist, especially regarding how immigration affects a country’s economy and workforce. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the U.S. labor force, defined by the BLS as “all people age 16 and older who are classified as either employed and unemployed,” was approximately 160 million people in January 2018. There is also the Labor Force Participation Rate (LFPR), which is the percentage of people in the labor force who are either working or actively looking for work. Out of that 160 million in the labor force, immigrant laborers, mostly from Latin America, make up a record high of 17 percent as of 2019, amounting to roughly 27,200,000 people. With 2019, the economy is said to be on track to have the same success as it did in 2018, where output increased by $560 billion and grew by 3.1 percent.

Yet irregardless of the aforementioned data, many immigration critics argue that immigrants, regardless of their legal status or the percentage that they hold in the labor force, “steal American jobs” and “hurt the American economy.” President Trump is one such proponent of this belief; in November 2018, he stated that “Illegal immigration hurts American workers, burdens American taxpayers, and undermines public safety” in addition to them “taking precious resources away from the poorest Americans who need them most.'' However, while many stand behind that belief, the data reveals that the U.S. economy relies heavily on immigrant laborers and foreign-born workers in the labor force to contribute to national economic growth. A 2017 report by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine found that “immigration has an overall positive impact on long-run economic growth in the U.S.” Furthermore, the report revealed that second generation immigrants are “among the strongest fiscal and economic contributors” in the country, as they contribute around $1,700 annually per person. That data, paired with the fact that there has been a recent increase in more educated immigrants, demonstrates how immigrants are and will continue to be economically beneficial.

The immigrant assimilation process into the economic and employment sector is also aided by the infusion of their native cultures and the establishment of self-made enterprises or businesses, which assists with urban revitalization. While the popular claim is that immigrants steal jobs that are meant for American workers, many immigrants do not have the proper documentation, experience, or language skills to work in high-paying positions. In those cases, they often resort to working the jobs that American citizens do not want, particularly in the fast food and agricultural sectors, as well as many manual labor positions. The impact of immigrant work is seen by their ability to transform “desolate areas into thriving neighborhoods” by increasing the local population, expanding the tax base by setting up their own businesses, and bringing in more customers for both their own companies and domestic companies. The establishment of a business that hosts elements of the owners native culture not only normalizes that culture in an American context, but it draws in people and customers. For example, the beloved Chinatown sector that is found in many urban cities across the country, such as San Francisco and Chicago, is a product of Chinese immigration in the 19th century when Chinese-Americans wished to preserve their culture and surround themselves with similar people. In fact, despite gentrification efforts in many cities, Chinatown continues to survive on its promise of a strong restaurant culture with unique ethnic food.

All in all, while a large percentage of Americans may vehemently disagree, admitting immigrants and foreign-born workers into the country is an economically beneficial decision, regardless of their legal status. Now while there is also a link between immigration and crime rates, which is an aspect of the immigration debate that fuels anti-immigrant supporters, the overarching takeaway, as seen previously by the data presented, is that immigrants are helpful contributors to the U.S. economy. Without foreign-born workers, the United States’ labor force would decrease by 17 percent, amounting to a loss of over 27,000,000 workers. This would significantly damage the U.S. economy, potentially destroy certain industries that are immigrant-based and fun, and decrease the overall Gross Domestic Product (GDP), or the amount of economic activity within the country per year. While immigrants are not essential to the economic sector, the United States is much better off with the continued employment of foreign-born workers. 

Germany: Geared Towards Temporary Workers

In contrast to the United States, Germany’s immigration model is focused more on the temporary entry of foreign workers rather than the acquisition of permanent residents. However, much like the process to become a U.S. citizen, receiving admission to live or work in Germany is also a lengthy affair and has strict requirements that must be met. Admission into the country is further complicated by the fact that Germany is part of the EU, so there are different requirements depending on the status of the immigrant. If the applicant is a non-EU citizen, immigration is dependant on their skill level, as only those who are skilled or highly educated, as well as their family members, are accepted into the country. If the non-EU applicant plans to stay more than 90 days, then they must obtain a Residence Permit, otherwise their short-term visa will expire. 

There is also the option of getting an EU Blue Card, which is a temporary residence permit lasting up to four years, as well as a work permit for those who are highly-qualified as employees. The requirements for that particular permit include holding a college degree and making a salary of EUR 47,600 or more a year. Yet as of recent, those restrictions for non-EU citizens have lessened under a new German immigration act that permits non-EU citizens to work in the country if they have the “qualified vocational training” as well as an “employment contract.” However, if the immigrant in question is an EU citizen, then the process is significantly simplified. The applicant, if from one of the other 27 EU states or Switzerland, must only have a valid passport to enter Germany, but is required to change their address to match their new one in Germany within three months of their arrival. Otherwise, no extra steps are required for EU citizens.

Nonetheless, participating in the German economic and employment sector is not too difficult, no matter if the immigrant is an EU citizen or not, but it does hold more stringent requirements than the United States. Foreign-born workers in Germany must first have a job offer and then get a temporary residence permit which authorizes them to be in the country for work purposes. Next, immigrants tend to need to meet eligibility standards, such as being able to speak German and getting the approval to work that particular job by the Federal Employment Agency. Upon completion of all of that, the immigrant is then able to apply for a Residence Permit, with the length of stay determined by the immigrant’s employer.

This overall focus on the skill level and educational background of the immigrant relates back to the fact that the German immigration system is designed in a way that encourages the temporary entry of foreign workers rather than the acquisition of permanent residents. Because German birth rates significantly declined in the 19th century as well as most recently in 2015, leading to vacancies in jobs across the economic sector, Germany has actively tried to recruit foreign-born workers to fill those empty positions. Most of the individuals immigrating to Germany now are highly skilled and well-educated, and are taking jobs in high-paying positions where they can utilize their academic backgrounds.

The focus on temporary workers rather than permanent residents does not seem to have damaged Germany’s economy too much. In fact, with the recent surge of immigrants and asylum seekers from the Middle East and Africa in particular, Germany has experienced an economic boom. Data collected by the EU’s annual labor-force survey, which analyzes participation, employment, and unemployment rates for several demographics, reveals that between 2007 and 2017, the foreign-born employment rate in Germany for individuals aged 20 to 64 rose by 8 percent, increasing from 62 to 70 percent. Immigrants are not only coming to Germany in large numbers, but they are actively contributing to the economy by seeking jobs and earning an income. However, despite their economic success, immigration integration is not seamless and without complications. Created in 2005, the German government has utilized a nine-month integration course that attempts to “expedite the assimilation of approved asylees” and aid them in obtaining “needed linguistic skills, as well as softer cultural skills and understanding.” Because one of the requirements for a legal Residence Permit include the ability to speak the local language, that being German, this integration course assists with the acceleration of employment efforts.

Yet it is not just immigrants from other countries that have boosted the German economy. According to the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), intra-migrants from other EU states have boosted Germany’s GDP growth by approximately 0.2 percent every year from 2011 to 2016. Since 2011, about 10 million immigrants have entered Germany, half of them coming from other places in the EU. With the influx of migrants, the labor participation rate has increased, with data showing that EU migrants participate more in the economy than German natives. In 2017, employment rates for native Germans was 70.6 percent while their immigrant counterparts was 74.6 percent. Because their focus is on temporary workers, migrants head to Germany with the primary objective of finding a job and making money. Per Marius Clemens, an economic researcher at DIW Berlin, “Germany’s GDP would have grown by 1.2 percent instead of 1.5 percent in 2015” had it not been for EU immigration rates, therefore showing that “EU immigration has made-and continues to make-a considerable contribution to the economy.”

Irregardless, while both the United States and Germany are both desirable destinations by immigrants and are two countries that not only share a history of immigration, but are also facing a large influx of immigrants in the present day, neither of their immigration models is without fault. Whichever model is deemed the “better one” is based entirely off of the immigrants’ objective purpose. If the applicant wishes to become a permanent resident in the United States, then it is advisable that they not only be prepared to endure a long and arduous application and screening process, but that they steel themselves against the awaiting xenophobic attitudes and anti-immigrant rhetoric that is perpetuated by many American citizens. However, if the applicant wishes to find work in an environment that has a less strict process (to a degree), then Germany’s immigration model would be the better option.

Regarding immigrant participation in a nation’s economic sector, both the United States and Germany rely on foreign-born workers to boost their economy and contribute to economic growth. In these two respective countries, immigrant laborers and immigrant-owned businesses are invaluable in their contributions to the national economy. The overall participation process for an immigrant in either of these states is a long process, as to be expected, but once admitted into the country on a permanent or temporary basis, there are numerous opportunities for an individual to participate in the economic and employment sector and contribute to the national economy.

Aren’t We Forgetting Something? Brexit’s Impact on International Development

On June 23, 2016, a referendum was held to decide the United Kingdom’s (U.K.) membership to the European Union (E.U.). This resulted in 51.9 percent of voters opting to withdraw from one of the largest political unions in the world. Since then, news headlines, politicians, and analysts alike have vacillated endlessly, existing in a vacuum of uncertainty and doubt as the intricate relationship between the E.U. and U.K. unravels.

Among the countless documents and political statements considering the implications of Brexit, perhaps most notable is the relegated status of international development policy as a priority in Brexit negotiations. While it’s easy to become lost in the widening sea of proposals and policies, we should look beyond the reductionist analysis of the E.U.-U.K. relationship and focus instead on its ramifications for global development.

Forget Article 50: U.K.-E.U. Relations Before Brexit

Before delving into a complete analysis of E.U.-U.K. dynamics, it’s important to examine their past relationship to inform current and future implications of collaboration in the development sphere.

The U.K. is legally obligated to spend at least 0.7 percent of its gross national income in foreign aid. It has done so for the past 5 years, becoming one of the largest major donors in Official Development Assistance* (ODA) terms. In the 2018 U.K. Government report examining the U.K.’s contribution to the E.U., it was estimated that the U.K. channeled $1.9 billion of ODA through E.U. institutions. This amounts to approximately 11 percent of all U.K. aid. These institutions included instruments such as the European Development Fund (EDF), an extrabudgetary apparatus designed to provide development aid to African, Caribbean, Pacific countries (ACP) and additional overseas countries and territories. The U.K. was the third-largest donor to the EDF, making up about 15 percent of the fund. The two main sources of E.U. ODA funding are the E.U. budget and the EDF. Approximately 12 percent of the E.U. ODA budget was from the U.K. 

The E.U. and U.K. have been what Mikaela Gavas, Senior Policy Fellow at the Center for Global Development, called “multipliers for each other’s development policies.” A symbiotic relationship predicated on sharing closely aligned development priorities, the E.U. offered the U.K. access to its extensive global presence—such as in fragile states—while the U.K. created an E.U. “development surplus” through its financial contributions, technical expertise, and experience.

U.K. collaboration with the E.U. considerably reduced transaction costs in implementing aid for the U.K. Department of International Development’s (DFID). Instead of expending resources to develop and administer aid, the U.K. could use the E.U. and its mechanisms to reduce costs and enter regions not always accessible for non-Member States. For example, according to a Bond report by Simon Lightfoot et al., the E.U. is present in all 43 fragile states while DFID only has projects in 11. 

Acting as “economies of scale,” E.U. institutions acted as an effective channel for U.K. aid to influence and achieve development policy objectives. One instance of this is the U.K.’s involvement with the E.U.’s European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO).

ECHO, the European Commission’s (EC) department for overseeing humanitarian aid and civil protection, is the world’s third-largest humanitarian aid donor. Its global reach includes more than 40 countries, including countries in which DFID has limited field presence in as well as U.K. priority countries, such as Somalia. U.K. financial contributions composed approximately a fifth of ECHO’s budget, enabling the U.K. to wield significant power and influence on one of the world’s leading humanitarian donors.

In examining the relationship in the converse, in which the E.U. funds the U.K., a 2017 Bond report found that the U.K. was the second-largest recipient of E.U. aid to Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). CSOs are organized civil groups that can include entities such as non-government organizations or faith-based organizations. Between 2012 and 2016, E.U. development and humanitarian aid contributions to U.K. CSOs averaged approximately €300 million each year. In 2017, British NGOs received the equivalent of $258.4 million in new grants from ECHO, amounting to about 28 percent of all NGO funding allocations by the E.U. In the wake of Brexit, CSOs will likely face considerable financial shortfalls, limited access to programs in the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs), and a diminished ability to influence development policy and participate in partnerships across the 140 countries the E.U. is present in.

The E.U. is the world’s largest donor, providing about half of all global aid, and is a leader in international development. Because of its collaboration with E.U. development institutions, the U.K. had extensive access to the E.U.’s financial instruments and the opportunity to affect E.U. development policy, programming, and direction. On this, Dr. Sophia Price, Head of Politics and International Relations at Leeds Beckett University, argued that U.K. membership in the E.U. “allowed the U.K. to magnify the impact of its aid and influence E.U. development policy to align with its objectives.” However, despite the mutually beneficial nature of E.U.-U.K. cooperation, the prospects of current or future collaboration remain decidedly undecipherable.

How’s Brexit Going? The E.U.-U.K. Relationship Currently

The deadline for Brexit is currently October 31, 2019. While the E.U. has granted the U.K. a six-month extension, leaders have insisted that the U.K. must choose to ratify the exit treaty, opt for a no-deal Brexit, or cancel its departure. 

Throughout the chaos, the U.K. Government has indicated a continued willingness to collaborate with E.U. aid, whether by a cautious “case-by-case basis” or by partnering with E.U. development and external programs and instruments. According to remarks made to the House of Commons by former Secretary of State for International Development (SSID) Penny Mordaunt MP, the U.K. will continue to contribute funds towards the outstanding E.U. budget for 2020. However, she stated that the U.K. “will stop funding in the way [they] currently do in 2020.” In the most recent publication on a future relationship between the U.K. and the E.U., the U.K. Government proposed a cooperative accord allowing for U.K. participation, including allowing U.K. CSOs access to deliver E.U. programs and apply for funding.

Despite DFID’s keenness to continue collaborating with the E.U., many fear the same fate for U.K. CSOs that happened for Swiss NGOs: being no longer eligible for funding since the U.K. is a non-Member State. With a Brexit deadline approaching and little additional information about their status, NGOs have either stopped or scaled back their bids. In response, DFID has committed to underwriting U.K. NGOs if there’s a no-deal Brexit. This promise applies only to ECHO bids and does not apply to funding through the Development and Cooperation Directorate General (DEVCO), which is responsible for creating international cooperation, development policy, and delivering aid. 

The U.K. has suggested that the E.U. offer flexible aid instruments that are open to non-Member States. However, the E.U. has not indicated a willingness to design such mechanisms. Instead, it has proposed an extensive structural reform of its development instruments and funds for its long-term budget (2012-2017). It has also called for a reconsideration of its partnership with the ACP countries--typically funded by the EDF--as enumerated under the Cotonou  Agreement. The proposed Neighborhood, Development, and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) would merge at least nine separate development instruments included in the current budget and incorporate components of the EDF. Proponents argue that this reform would create a more efficient development instrument, avoid the complex tangle of hybrid programs, and replace values-driven development with needs-based policies.

However, critics of the proposal, such as Oxfam, believe the new instrument was designed to “promote the E.U.’s short-term domestic interests in mind…[and] risk[s] undermining long term sustainable development” and collaboration with non-E.U. actors. Countries that usually receive aid from the EDF may experience decreased funding or a change in relations with the E.U. It’s important to note that the NCIDI proposal does include the caveat that various actors from within or outside of the E.U. may have access to the NDICI’s funds and programs. However, there is no reference made to arrangements for non-E.U. countries in the management of those programs.

The current status of U.K. development policy and E.U.-U.K. cooperation remains uncertain. Additionally, the political landscape of the U.K. has drastically changed since the referendum, creating even more confusion. 

Boris Johnson was recently elected as Prime Minister (PM) following the resignation of Theresa May. Though there is doubt regarding the longevity of PM Johnson’s tenure, his appointment makes it likely that ODA spending is likely to be diverted from DFID. Johnson has been an outspoken aid skeptic and critic of U.K. development efforts, espousing that aid should “do more to serve the political and commercial interests of the country.” While using the foreign aid system as a vehicle for geopolitical interests is certainly not a novel concept, Johnson’s statement signals a marked departure from previous positions.

PM Johnson recently named Alok Sharma as the U.K.’s latest Secretary of State for International Development, alleviating concerns that DFID would have been incorporated under the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Sharma opposed Brexit and is a newcomer to the development world; little is known about his ideological position on U.K. aid beyond his support for the U.K.’s 0.7 percent of GNI commitment.

What are the Alternatives?

Many have suggested proposals for post-Brexit cooperation that seek to limit the losses on both sides. One of these is the notion of joint programming, which is when the E.U. works with external development partners to create and implement programs. This would allow the U.K. to leverage the expertise of the E.U. and Member-States while also effectively mitigating the financial and technical expertise shortfalls the E.U. would be experiencing. However, this would increase the U.K.’s cost of administering bilateral funds and the U.K. would only have status as a third-party country, wielding a significantly lower degree of influence.

Another option is for the U.K. to pursue the E.U. aid delivery mechanism called delegated cooperation. This is a process in which the E.U. entrusts funds to a Member-State or third-party donor that has special geographical or technical expertise. They would be then allowed to lead and implement a project. Again, this would increase the U.K.’s administrative and implementation costs and diminish its influence on overall E.U. development policy.

Some have supported the Norway or Swiss model of cooperation with the E.U. Both are non-Member States but are part of the European Economic Area (EEA) and benefit from structural funding. However, a caveat that withers in the face of political realities makes this an almost impossible option: the U.K. would be required to be a member of the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA). Alternatively, it must negotiate an amalgam of complex agreements with the E.U. similar to Switzerland.

An EEA membership means that the U.K. would be able to make substantial contributions to the E.U. budget. However, it would be required to follow certain E.U. rules and laws, such as the essential “four freedoms”: unrestricted movement of individuals, goods, services, and capital. This is likely not politically maneuverable in the U.K., as distaste for such commitments contributed to Brexit in the first place.

The Future for Development Under Brexit 

In examining Brexit’s implications for DFID, former SSID Rory Stewart suggested that there would have to be careful consideration of what to do with the 11 percent of U.K. ODA—“Brexit dividends”—that was previously allocated through European mechanisms. As Lightfoot et al. anticipates, aid allocation could follow an alternative pattern, moving through the private sector and to organizations with less experience in the development field. As predicted by a study commissioned by the European Parliament, U.K. aid previously channeled through E.U. institutions would likely only be dedicated to British bilateral programs and economic infrastructures, negatively affecting social infrastructure and humanitarian development. Both predictions would follow a pattern paralleling Johnson’s statements.

Depending on the political landscape, U.K. development policies could either be completely internalized to promote more domestic-oriented goals or follow a “European-like” pattern, in which aid follows the same distribution methods pre-Brexit. The latter is unlikely, as Johnson’s new cabinet houses numerous outspoken critics of aid, such as new foreign secretary Dominic Raab and new House leader Jacob Rees-Mogg.

On the challenges of Brexit, the European Parliament found that it’s likely that the secession could either force the E.U. to wield more localized regional influence or hinder its path in becoming a global leader. Unless the E.U. compensates—both quantitatively and qualitatively—for the loss of Britain’s contribution to E.U. aid, it risks cutting 1 percent to 4 percent of ODA in countries throughout Eastern Europe and Northern Africa. Perhaps most importantly, global aid may decrease by up to 3 percent as both the E.U. and U.K. experience considerable reductions in funding and expertise.

Simon Maxwell, chair of the European Think Tanks Group, observed that E.U. development policy is likely to be “less poverty-focused” post-Brexit. A majority of the E.U. budget is spent addressing the needs of middle-income countries (MICs) while lower-income countries (LICs) are typically funded by the EDF. If the 2021-2027 budget incorporates parts of the EDF while pivoting to geographical development instruments over thematic ones, more aid money will likely be spent in MICs instead without the U.K.’s voice in policy decisions.  

Recommendations

U.K. aid and influence in the development sphere would have been most effective in the context of the E.U. Because reentering the E.U. is unlikely, recommendations must instead focus on the best strategies for U.K. development efforts post-Brexit.  

The U.K. should not withdraw from the E.U. without an agreement in place.

With the current political climate swirling around empty statements and puzzled MPs, it’s in the U.K.’s best interest to establish new economic and political alliances beyond Europe. While it’s important to maintain financial commitments to E.U. aid programs and instruments, the U.K. should focus on alternative multilateral institutions to channel their ODA, such as through the World Bank. The U.K. has signed several continuity agreements attempting to replicate preferential access in the case of a no-deal Brexit. Countries such as Ghana and Cote D’Ivoire, however, have not signed agreements. The U.K. should continue these efforts to mitigate the costs Brexit will entail for the U.K. and other countries.  

A no-deal Brexit could cause a weakened U.K. general import regime, devaluation in the British pound, and a decrease in GDP compared to current levels. Uncertainty in the economic system already endangers key development initiatives in LICs and will crystallize if a no-deal Brexit occurs. The government should revise its recently announced temporary tariff schedule in the event of a no-deal Brexit. The current schedule will lower tariffs for a larger pool of countries, injecting competition in developing markets and endangering the preferential access that some countries enjoyed.

E.U. funds for Asia, Northern Africa, Eastern Europe, and Latin America are what is at stake in Brexit negotiations. DFID should work to ensure that U.K. CSOs are eligible as direct contractors and can participate in the creation and administration of E.U. development programs beyond LDCs and HIPCs. DFID should strengthen its promise to underwrite contracts for both ECHO and DEVCO in the event of a no-deal Brexit. If unable to do so, the inability for CSOs to continue to bid or participate in development programs endangers global humanitarian efforts.

There remains uncertainty regarding ACP-E.U. relations and the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), which would create the NCIDI. Because of what the E.U. has categorized as  “institutional evolution and a continuous shift in the balance of powers,” simple renewal of ACP-E.U. relations is not an option. The E.U. is seeking to shift focus away from the ACP and EDF, creating a significant opportunity the U.K. should take advantage of. The U.K. should circumvent ACP-E.U. collaboration and instead reform its relationship with African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries and other overseas countries and territories.

Boris Johnson’s shift towards bilateral aid programs narrowly framed under commercial agreements that focus only on economic sectors and infrastructure is a poor policy decision. It’s a position that endangers current and future initiatives that attempt to address the diversity of global issues inherent in international development. This policy approach should not be adopted nor should it guide U.K. development objectives. 

Perhaps most significantly, the U.K. should not relinquish its influence in determining the trajectory of the E.U. for the next several years. Instead of abstaining from important policy decisions, the U.K. should increase its presence. While domestic and international political realities limit the U.K., it should work to insulate itself from the instability that Brexit poses. Instead of adopting a diminished role in the debate on the E.U.’s MFF and renegotiations for the ACP-E.U. partnership, the U.K. should leverage its influence to create an environment conducive to its development objectives post-Brexit. If they are unable to do so—or refuse to do so—they risk finding themselves to be what former Chair of the European Parliament Development Committee Linda McAvan characterized as “outsiders and another kind of lobbyist out here.”

Conclusion

Brexit poses substantial ramifications for international development—ones that have been largely ignored in debates. Besides working outside of E.U. mechanisms to mitigate the costs of Brexit in development terms, it’s important to recognize that the E.U. is the largest major donor in the world. Even if there was an option to circumvent the organization, doing so would be incredibly detrimental to the U.K.’s impact in development, whether through programming, expertise, or influence.

When considering cooperation with the E.U. in international development, the U.K. should attempt to foster the softest Brexit deal, adopting strategies mentioned previously. This should include a series of agreements between the E.U.-U.K. that will perhaps be more complicated than its present relationship already is. Simply put, when it comes to international development, there is no alternative.

*The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development defines Official Development Assistance as financial flows that are undertaken by the official sector (state and local governments, including their agencies). These efforts must have the main objective of promoting economic development and welfare. The financing terms must be concessional, such as the World Bank providing a loan below market financial terms or incorporating a grant element.

Note: This article only examines the dynamics of the E.U.-U.K. in the development sphere and the best ways to mitigate the costs of Brexit. As such, it does not seek to analyze the impact and nuances of development practices or policy. It consequently does not comment on the ethical or political considerations of international development and aid. For example, some criticize foreign aid regimes as an extension of neoliberal policies (see Margaret Thatcher’s infamous quote referred to in this article: “There is no alternative”) that lead to the crystallization of inequality while maintaining neocolonialist tendencies. That is a subject in and of itself and one that cannot fully be addressed in the context of this article.

Brexit: The Mess That Could Set Back Years of UK-Ireland Progress

All of us are getting news notifications on our phones and computers, almost on a daily basis, on Brexit and the issues surrounding the exit deal. But what actually is Brexit and why does it really matter?

In a June 2016 referendum, voters in Britain, Wales, Scotland, and most parts of Northern Ireland chose to leave the European Union in a close vote of 51.9 to 48.1 percent. The European Union (EU) is a political and economic union of 28 member states located primarily in Europe that works to promote stability and economic cooperation between its member states. Since March 2017, the United Kingdom and European Union have been engaged in negotiations on the terms of the UK’s exit and the future of their relationship. One of the main challenges to finding an agreement on a final deal has been meeting the requirements of Northern Ireland’s unique circumstances.

The UK is currently part of the EU’s customs union and single market. The customs union is a principal component of the EU. There are no tariffs or non-tariff barriers to trade between members of the customs union, and members states impose a common external tariff on all goods entering the union.The single market is made of the 28 EU member states and seeks to guarantee the free movement of goods, capital, services, and labour. After Brexit, the UK will leave both the customs union and single market.

This will raise questions about the status of the Irish border, particularly whether or not the border will become a customs border with all the associated checks and controls that come with that title. A customs border is a border control that checks any items and goods crossing the border, where taxes or tariffs could be imposed.This will most likely create practical and economic challenges and could reverse relations between the US and Ireland and all the progress that has been made in recent years.

The border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland was a source of major conflict and violence between the two countries. When the Republic first split from the UK and Northern Ireland, the border line was insignificant. However, after some time passed, hostility between the UK and Ireland resumed. As a result, the UK established customs checks at the border. The two countries eventually entered into a trade war and tariffs were placed on agricultural produce, steel, coal, and other things. By the late 1960s, this trade war turned violent. Conflict broke out in Northern Ireland between nationalist militaries (like the Irish Republican Army) who believed that Northern Ireland was rightfully part of Ireland and the British were oppressors; and as such, there should be no restrictive border between the two states. Ireland's Nationals population unionist militaries fought back to defend their place in the UK. Both groups brought violence to the streets by blowing up buildings and setting off car bombs, among other things.

The UK deployed thousands of troops to Northern Ireland during his time, who became a common target of nationalist attacks. A lot of these attacks occurred at the border of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, which for nationalists was the ultimate symbol of British occupation. The UK military secured the borderline with walls, towers, guns, and patrols. They controlled the 20 official border crossings with an iron grip and screened all people and vehicles crossing the partition. The conflict in Northern Ireland turned this into a hard border. The violence lasted for more than 30 years and killed over 3,600 people. This period of time is most commonly known as the “Troubles”.

The Good Friday Agreement, signed in 1998, brought an end to the conflict and established power-sharing in Northern Ireland. The agreement gives EU membership to the UK and Ireland, while also creating an understanding for the UK and Irish governments to cooperate on EU matters. The Good Friday Agreement also allows people born in Northern Ireland to choose either Irish citizenship, British citizenship, or both. The UK has stated that it wants this option to continue after Brexit. The agreement also established special EU funding programmes, known as PEACE, to reinforce the peace process and support cross-community projects. It also created the North South Ministerial Council (NSMC), which allows the governments in Dublin and Belfast to cooperate in various areas, including agriculture, education and transport. The UK, Ireland, Northern Ireland, and the European Commission have all agreed that the withdrawal process cannot undermine the Good Friday Agreement.

Once the UK leaves the EU, the only land border will be the 310-mile line between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland and decisions will have to be made on how to manage the movement of people and trade across that border. The UK, Ireland, and the EU have all said they want to maintain the Common Travel Area, which has been in place for most of the period since the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922. The CTA allows free movement of British and Irish citizens between the UK, Ireland, the Channel Islands, and the Isle of Man. The agreement also gives access to various government services in each country. Ireland will continue to allow free movement for citizens in the other EU countries, while the UK is thinking about an inland control approach. Through access to labour markets and social security, the UK will enforce immigration policy without requiring checks on people crossing the Irish border. This move would greatly affect and possibly lead to the breakdown of the CTA.

The UK, Ireland, Northern Ireland and the European Commission have also all agreed there should be no hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic, for trade as well as people (European Commission Joint Report). The UK’s decision to leave the EU Single Market and Customs Union means that it will become a “third country” to the EU, creating a land border between the UK and the EU. This is the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland and if no arrangements are made for the Irish border, the EU will have no choice but to put in place the standard checks it has at its border with other third countries. These would include both customs checks, documentation of products, proof of where the good originates, collection of tariffs, and regulatory checks, all to verify that goods comply with the EU’s standards.

Last November, UK Prime Minister Theresa May published her original Brexit plan that included an Irish border backstop. The backdrop is an insurance policy to avoid a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland if the UK leaves the EU without securing a concrete deal. Both the UK and EU agree on the need for a backstop to ensure no hard border returns.

The backstop was the most hotly debated issue in the parliamentary debates on the draft Withdrawal Agreement. The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) is the unionist and socially conservative party political party in Northern Ireland. The DUP is also in a coalition with May and her Conservative Party in Parliament and they are notably pro-Brexit. In January, however, their 10 MPs in Parliament voted against Prime Minister May’s Brexit Plan. The party has always been against a “special status” for Northern Ireland in the Brexit negotiations, saying any differences between Northern Ireland and Great Britain could threaten to break up the United Kingdom.

To the DUP, the backstop represents everything they don’t want for Northern Ireland: regulatory differences that mean only Northern Ireland would continue to follow some EU rules, no time limit, and the ability to exit the backstop would need to be agreed jointly by the UK and EU. On December 4, 2017, DUP leader Arlene Foster said that the DUP “will not accept any form of regulatory divergence which separates Northern Ireland economically or politically from the rest of the United Kingdom.” Foster also added that the DUP also does not want to see any changes to the current border arrangements between the North and the Republic.

A majority of people in Northern Ireland, however, support the backstop (most likely due to the fact it would give Northern Ireland special access to both the UK and EU markets). In January of this year, the UK government published proposals on how the UK can influence both the decision to use the backstop and its governance if it comes into effect. The proposals also reaffirmed the UK’s commitment that the rest of the UK will abide by the Single Market regulations being applied in Northern Ireland.

Ireland and Northern Ireland also share a single electricity market and electrical infrastructure. Keeping this arrangement will require Northern Ireland to continue to comply with EU regulation, without having any say over their development. If this agreement is not kept in tact, the single electricity market could be reversed, along with any benefits brought about by it. A notice from the UK Government published in October 2018 said if the UK leaves the EU with no deal, electrical supply from Ireland to Northern Ireland could be disrupted.

One of the problems for the Ireland is that its economy is intertwined with the economy in the UK. Currently, around 80% of the goods Ireland exports are transported to the UK or go through the UK. Ireland also sources 41% of its food imports and 55% of its fuel imports from the Britain. According to the Irish Ministry of Finance in October 2016, Brexit “is expected to have a material negative impact on the Irish economy.” A report from the Irish Government also called for “the closest possible trading relationship between the EU and the UK.”

On January 15, 2019 members of parliament rejected Prime Minister May’s Brexit deal by 432 votes to 202 - which is a historic political defeat in Britain. Then on March 12, after Theresa May had gone back to the EU to secure further legal assurances, Parliament rejected the deal again. And March 29, which was the original day that the UK was due to leave the EU, Parliament rejected the deal for a third time. Since Parliament did not approve Theresa May's withdrawal deal in a vote on March 12, May was forced to ask other EU leaders to delay Brexit. They agreed to postpone it until May 22 if MPs approved her deal in a new vote. On March 29, the UK missed that deadline and faced leaving on April 12 instead. But May has now gone back to the EU to ask for another extension - which the EU has agreed to. The new deadline is October 31. However, the UK can leave before then if May can get her deal approved by Parliament. The government will continue talks with Labour to try to come up with a solution. If the two sides do not come to an agreement, Theresa May has said she will propose additional options to members of parliament to work out a future plan.

Peace Walls and a Potential Hard Border: The Continued Struggle for Reconciliation after Northern Ireland’s The Troubles

When you have a conflict, that means that there are truths that have to be addressed on each side of the conflict. And when you have a conflict, then it’s an educational process to try to resolve the conflict. And to resolve that, you have to get people on both sides of the conflict involved so that they can dialogue.

— Dolores Huerta

A small state located above the Republic of Ireland and part of the nearby United Kingdom (UK), Northern Ireland is famous for its violent intrastate conflict during a thirty-year period of political violence known as The Troubles. Internal state conflict, such as the genocide between the Hutus and the Tutsis in Rwanda in the 1990s, often arises due to clashes over group territory, resources, and opposing identities. However, The Troubles was unique in that it was the final culmination of deeply-rooted ethnoreligious sectarian tension between Catholic Irish nationalists who wanted unification with the Republic of Ireland, and Loyalist Protestant unionists who favored the continuation of British rule. Nonetheless, despite the passage of the Good Friday-Belfast Agreement that formally ended the tumultuous conflict in 1998, continued social stratification, political upheaval, and overall uncertainty about the outcome of Brexit further decrease the possibility of successfully reconciling the two warring communities. As long as tension between British and Irish identities remains unresolved, Northern Ireland (NI) will continue to face potentially long-term sectarian strife.

Historical Overview of The Troubles

The seeds of The Troubles are rooted in the early 1600s with the British-supported migration of Protestant “planters” to six counties in the Ulster region of Ireland, then controlled all by Britain, thus allowing for the composition of a mostly Protestant community in NI today. In that same century, England dealt with growing sectarian politics between warring Protestant and Catholic groups who desired to establish control over the throne. This political and religious tension bled into Irish politics, as Protestant migration continued to disrupt the primarily Catholic majority that was already established on the island. In 1921, the Anglo-Irish Treaty officially divided Ireland into north and south and established the southern Republic as a self-governing entity while the north remained part of the UK. To better comprehend what propelled NI into social and political turmoil, the following events must be understood: the Battle of the Boyne and the impact of William of Orange on present-day Irish society, as well as the horrific events of Bloody Sunday.

The Battle of the Boyne was the culmination of extreme tension between the Catholic and Protestant communities, as well as a continuation of the grapple for power and control over the English throne. A struggle between Protestant William of Orange and deposed Catholic King James II, the battle restored Protestant power in England with the victory of William of Orange. Furthermore, the battle was and currently still is seen as a source of cultural and political pride for Protestants in the present-day, who consider it as validation and evidence of their superiority over Catholics.

The social implications of the victory of William of Orange manifest most popularly in the almost sacred annual celebratory march on July 12, otherwise known as Orangemen’s Day, which has major symbolic significance for Protestants who live in Northern Ireland. The Battle of the Boyne’s most tangible effects are seen by its yearly commemorations that are carried out by The Orange Order, a fraternal-like organization that marches to honor William’s valiant efforts to dispose of King James II and to acknowledge him as the sole individual who secured Protestant ascendancy in the country. However, these marches are quite controversial. The route that the Protestants marchers take often comes close to Catholic neighborhoods, sparking further sectarian violence for those who see this public display of victory as a way in which Protestants can blatantly rub in their historical dominance. The marchers also carry with them an assortment of flags and banners, many of which display the Union Jack (the national flag of the UK), as the UK is often seen as the founding state of The Orange Order. This creates more tension between the two communities as the Union Jack is a glaringly obvious symbol of separation, which is in direct opposition to the unified Ireland that Catholics desire. The night before on July 11, or the “Eleventh Night”, is also characterized by violence in the form of immense bonfires set ablaze in Protestant communities that intentionally burn Catholic and other non-unionist symbols. These bonfires are historically known to get out of hand, with some houses and other buildings burning down amidst chants of “No surrender!”

These societal divides continued to deepen as a result of the events that transpired on January 30, 1972, a day that is more famously known as “Bloody Sunday”. Said to be one of the darkest days of The Troubles, Bloody Sunday started out as a Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) march against internment that mirrored the efforts to combat discrimination and prejudice by Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. in the United States. While some marchers stopped at the now iconic ‘Free Derry Corner’, others continued until they reached army barricades and were stopped by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), NI’s police force at the time. Violence, then an everyday occurrence, soon erupted between the RUC and members of the crowd; the British Army ultimately killed 13 civilians and wounded 14 others. Bloody Sunday was critical in shaping the course of the conflict and fueling the efforts made by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), the core paramilitary group that aimed to end British rule and reunify Ireland. As a result of the massacre of unarmed protesters that day and the subsequent cover-up by the state, the conflict became increasingly militarized from thereon out, leading to increased IRA recruitment.

Due to the complex nature of The Troubles, it is important to discern which groups and parties belonged to which side of the conflict. Of the Republican paramilitaries involved in the hostility, the most infamous was the IRA, which was responsible for many of the violent attacks that characterized The Troubles. On the Loyalist Protestant side, there was the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), the predominantly Ulster paramilitary group, and the Ulster Defense Association (UDA), another large vigilante group. Furthermore, British security forces were involved in the form of the law enforcement-based RUC, as well as numerous activists, politicians, and political parties such as the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the primary unionist political party in NI, and the opposing Sinn Féin, the left-wing Irish party that is still active in both NI and the Republic of Ireland.

Ongoing Divisive Issues

Efforts to put an end to the unrelenting conflict seemingly concluded with the formal passage of the Good Friday-Belfast Agreement that was signed by British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Irish politician Taoiseach Bertie Ahern in Belfast, NI in 1998. The terms of the peace agreement included, but were not limited to, the decommissioning of paramilitary groups, the establishment of a power-sharing government split between the DUP and Sinn Féin, the demilitarization of the hard border between the UK and the Republic of Ireland, and the release of political prisoners on the condition that they won’t re-engage with their former organizations. However, while the conditions of the treaty were attractive in principle, deep divisions are still evident within Northern Irish society, acting as roadblocks in the peace and reconciliation process.

While the Good Friday-Belfast Agreement attempted to quell all domestic issues, full implementation of the peace treaty has been challenging as various forms of social stratification remain unresolved due to enduring societal norms and attitudes. While Orangemen’s Day and the Eleventh Night bonfires are merely annual demonstrations of Protestant pride, the persistence of segregation and sectarianism is still visible in the structural layout of many communities in NI, most notably in Belfast and Derry/Londonderry where the infamous ‘Peace Walls’ continue to physically divide Protestant and Catholic communities from one another. These walls, which separate the two communities at contentious intersections in the hopes of minimizing violent interactions, serve as blank canvases for political statements and are decorated in a variety of colorful murals detailing the thirty years of conflict. Common images include messages of revenge and oppression, as well as famous figures such as Bobby Sands, a member of the Provisional IRA and the UK Parliament who died while on a hunger strike in prison and was ultimately seen as a martyr for the Irish Republican cause. However, while these walls are meant to act as peaceful dividers, their mere existence perpetuates an “us versus them” mentality that makes it difficult to reconcile the two communities with one another. Some murals in Derry, where Bloody Sunday occurred, even go as far as to compare the IRA to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

In addition to the use of imagery to further the divide between Protestants and Catholics, inequality in unemployment, housing, and education persists. Historically, Irish Catholics have experienced higher unemployment rates and less housing availability than their Protestant counterparts. The disparity was evident in 1992 towards the tail end of The Troubles, as the Protestant unemployment rate was 9% in comparison to 18% for Catholics. While those rates have decreased, dropping to 5% and 7% for each respective group in 2016, this economic inactivity still heavily impacts the Catholic community to a greater degree. In fact, one study conducted by R. L. Miller and R. D. Osborne, drawing upon a government survey that monitored over 3,500 unemployed males during 1976-1977 at the height of the conflict, found that Catholics were “more likely to have been unemployed in the previous three years, for that unemployment to have last longer, to experience a longer period before securing a job, [and] to receive from Employment Offices fewer job submissions… [which] could not be accounted for by variations in education, skill level, geographical mobility or general motivation”. Despite the government’s attempts to level out the playing field, Catholics, namely ex-terrorists, have faced far more social barriers than Protestants in terms of their inability to get public sector jobs, insurance, or even travel to other countries. This pervasive inequality acts as a breeding ground of sorts for paramilitary activity, who view the lack of government intervention as siding with the Protestant community. Furthermore, research conducted by scholars at Ulster University shows that welfare dependency rose, suicide rates doubled, and men’s life expectancy fell in the areas most affected by The Troubles. Ironically these areas, such as Derry/Londonderry in NI, are primarily Catholic.

Pervasive social norms and stigmas have also obstructed the peace process, especially in regards to education. Schooling in Northern Ireland is heavily segregated, and its persistence often fuels the debate that the education system in the state is acting as more of a perpetuator of division than one of peace. With a population of only about 1.8 million, analysis of the fragmented school structure shows that 93% of children in primary school (ages 4-11), and post-primary school (ages 11-18), attend segregated schools that are either majority Catholic or majority Protestant. This blatant academic separation demonstrates the passing of sectarian views through the generations, as many adults who were involved or impacted by the events of The Troubles have chosen to further the divide and hinder the peace process by having their children attend segregated schools. This ultimately limits the opportunity that children and adolescents have to interact with and form their own perceptions of “the other side”.

Political Upheaval

A core component of the Good Friday-Belfast Agreement was the establishment of a power-sharing government in Northern Ireland, commonly known as Stormont, between the mainly Protestant DUP and the Catholic-leaning Sinn Féin. The dynamics of this relationship essentially meant that the two groups both had a say in the political sphere within NI. However, recent events have made it difficult for any progress to be made at all, ultimately leading to the collapse of the regional governing body in NI. In January 2017, Sinn Féin’s leader, Martin McGuinness, resigned as deputy First Minister. The party then let the deadline for the nomination of a replacement pass, which goes against the conditions of the peace agreement, thereby forcing an early election, an action that the DUP saw as Sinn Féin “putting its partisan interests ahead of the public good”. Adding to the divide is the fact that Sinn Féin’s president Gerry Adams stood down in late 2017; this, combined with the death of McGuinness, has left the government in a tricky situation, enough to where the assembly stopped meeting, an overhaul of the region’s health system was postponed, and any and all long-term decision-making processes were ended. The lack of a functioning government has forced the state to run off of the work of civil servants with very limited funds and resources.

Efforts to reinstate a functioning government were attempted in January 2018 with the election of Karen Bradley as Northern Ireland’s Secretary of State. Bradley ultimately got the two political parties to talk and draft a deal that satisfied both sides, however, at the last minute the deal fell through. While the precise reasons are unknown, circulating rumors claim that the deal included the foundations for an Irish Language Act, which would give the Irish language the same power and prestige as English. This is an act that the DUP is in complete opposition to, as it means equalizing the two communities in a way that elevated Irish culture and diminished British identity. As a result, there continues to be no active government in the region to this day.

Brexit Uncertainty

Moreover, Northern Ireland’s persistent challenges are not limited to domestic causes, but they also stem from international disputes, including the uncertainty surrounding “Brexit”, or the UK’s potential departure from the European Union (EU), and the possible political and economic ramifications associated with that decision. Brexit, a contentious issue that continues to plague European citizens, could destroy the little peace that has been achieved in Northern Ireland, as it brings into question the status of the country as a member of the UK. The political ramifications of Brexit are often discussed in relation to the “Irish backstop”, another way to refer to a guarantee that a “hard” Irish border will not be reinstated between the north and south if the UK splits from the EU. During The Troubles, the hard border that existed was known to be especially sensitive to violence, as the soldiers who patrolled it were seen as easy targets and enforcers of British occupation. Complete demilitarization of the border was a key condition of the 1998 peace agreement, but full or even partial reconciliation seems further and further out of reach as the uncertainty of Brexit, paired with the lack of a functioning government, threatens to reestablish the border, leading to immense social and economic consequences.

However, the border is currently viewed as a “tripwire” of sorts, where any slight miscalculation or aggressive action on behalf of either side threatens to open old wounds and reignite the bloody conflict. One of the most recent incidents occurred in January 2019 when a car bomb exploded outside of a courthouse on an empty street in Derry, NI. This violence was seen again in April 2019 when Lyra McKee, a reporter who specialized in The Troubles, was shot and killed during riots in Derry/Londonderry. These types of acts were all too common during the conflict, and demonstrate that violence still persists even to this day and could very easily occur on or near the border if it is recreated.

In terms of its economic impact, Brexit could do a large amount of damage to the British and Irish economies. In an interview in February 2019, Irish Deputy Prime Minister Simon Coveney stated that there are around 40,000 Irish companies that trade with Britain, amounting to almost a 75-billion euro trade relationship. The reestablishment of a hard border could have detrimental effects on that trade relationship, making it more difficult for the two countries to give and receive goods. Furthermore, the European Single Market that was created in 1993 allows for the easy passage of goods between members of the EU, while the EU Customs Union is a club of countries where customs (or tariffs) have been removed from goods. If the UK leaves the EU, then they leave the single market and the customs union. Thus, they run the risk of having NI and the Republic follow two different rules; as a result, all goods would need to be verified when moving between the two countries, requiring border checkpoints, which many see as a potential source of future violence. To mitigate these potential impacts, the EU and the UK created the “Irish backstop” deal as a sort of last resort policy so that there will be no hard border again, allowing for the easy movement of citizens within the island of Ireland.

Issue Recommendations

Building off of the fragile peace that exists requires a three-pronged approach that addresses the social, political, and economic issues that continue to persist in Northern Ireland. This comprehensive approach entails the gradual removal of the ‘Peace walls’ that exist primarily in Belfast, increasing the number of integrated schools across Northern Ireland, reestablishing a functioning government in Stormont with the help of the UK, and preventing the return of a hard border by monitoring the developments regarding Brexit.

The gradual destruction of the walls that divide Protestant and Catholic communities in many cities across Northern Ireland is the first step towards reconciliation. While many view the walls as dividers that actually aid in the peace process because they limit group interaction and therefore minimize violence, the mere existence of the walls promotes segregation. Many of the walls are located in economically disadvantaged neighborhoods, especially in Belfast, and this has caused a lot of disagreement that goes back to the issue of Catholic rates of unemployment and housing shortages in comparison to Protestants. However, demolishing the walls would be the practical first step, but the reality of the situation is much more complex. While the violence may have decreased substantially since the signing of the peace agreement, the walls represent more of a psychological than a physical barrier that provides a sense of stability and protection from the other side. Nonetheless, while not much progress has been made since the goal of tearing down all 48 of Northern Ireland’s peace walls by 2023 was declared, local artists have used the walls as blank canvases to display peaceful images rather than the harsh, sectarian pieces that adorn some sections of the walls. Until more walls come down, artists should be encouraged to spread and promote peace through the use of imagery; for example, the Arts Council of Northern Ireland has formed the Re-Imaging Communities project that gives local community members grant money to create new art pieces that help tackle sectarianism. These “post-para” murals commemorate general “cultural treasures”, such as C.S. Lewis, who was born in East Belfast and is famous for his novel The Lion, The Witch, and the Wardrobe, or George Best, the boy who popularized soccer in the 1960s.

British and Irish cultural differences have also had effects on the education sector; to bridge this division, there should be a focus in Northern Ireland to create more integrated schools that host both Catholic and Protestant students in a comfortable and inclusive setting. At present, there are around 62 grant-aided integrated schools throughout NI, and results from a 2013 public opinion survey revealed that 66% of parents wish to increase the number of integrated places in Belfast from 4% to 33%, and 83% believe that integrated education is a vital part in moving forward in the peace process. New-Bridge Integrated College, an integrated school in Loughbrickland, Northern Ireland, focuses on this narrative of peacebuilding through social cohesion by stressing respect and tolerance for everyone, no matter their background. While these schools face challenges of addressing student questions of culture and identity, the needs of young people for reconciliation and inclusivity in NI should take precedence over parents’ desires for continued segregation. The overall goal should be to combat these negative social norms and attitudes that encourage divisiveness rather than unification.

With over two years since it last had a government, it is pertinent that Northern Ireland returns to having a functioning political system; one of the ways in which this could happen is if Westminster, the UK government that resides in London, steps in and controls NI from afar. While the UK is not quite keen on this idea, continuing without any government only further damages the country and puts a halt on the peace process. Currently, few decisions have been made and little action is being taken to address any issues that plague NI as a direct result of the limited resources and lack of working ministers. Reestablishing a functioning government would essentially help mitigate some of the economic and social issues that citizens face, as well as provide Northern Ireland with more of a voice in the Brexit debate. Ever since Stormont collapsed, concerns over health care in specific have grown, with the Department of Health finding increased wait lists up to 52 days for an initial consultation, staff shortages, and stalled hospital reform to be major sources of concern for individuals who need assistance as soon as possible. With the aid of Westminster, both the DUP and Sinn Féin representatives at Stormont could work together to at least satisfy the basic needs of their citizens and later use Westminster as a sort of third-party mediator to help facilitate dialogue and overcome their differences.

Lastly, in terms of solutions for the politically-fuelled border debate, all efforts should be taken to prevent the re-implementation of a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The border was the site for lots of conflict, and to add patrolmen and physical infrastructure such as cameras, sensors, and drones to monitor movement between the two states is to create easy targets for sectarian violence. The results of a shocking survey, however, found that approximately 60% of the business community in NI were in support of a soft Brexit, including both nationalists and unionists. A soft Brexit means that the UK stays either within the European Single Market by becoming a member of the European Economic Area, the EU Customs Union, or both. The impact of a soft Brexit would, given the limited options, not be a terrible choice, as it would satisfy the interests of all sides by avoiding the reestablishment of a hard border. Nonetheless, as the various governments continue to issue statements regarding the progress of Brexit, and therefore the Irish involvement in that process, the hard border continues to be brought up. To make one single recommendation that would prevent the re-establishment of a hard border is difficult given the complexities of the issue among the parties involved.

The entirety of The Troubles was characterized by sectarian violence, clashes between the police and citizens, and general disagreements over culture and identity that led to the death of some 3,600 people, all of which are common markers of intrastate conflict or a civil war. While the Good Friday-Belfast Agreement formally ended the conflict, it failed to provide any practical recommendations or solutions on how to maintain peace while reconciling the past. Northern Ireland is still fraught with social, political, and economic issues today, making it difficult to work on the peace process whilst also addressing old wounds. The paramilitary violence of The Troubles may have stopped for the time being, but the underlying sectarian and nationalistic views that ignited the conflict continue to persist.

Economic Integration vs Economic Nationalism: The Deutsche Bank Merger

Introduction

The European Central Bank (ECB), founded in 1998, established  monetary policies after the creation and implementation of the euro as a transnational currency in the Eurozone. The Euro currency, used by the majority of members in the European Union, helps create a single market, which is essentially one large region which allows for trade to be done between European countries without any form of regulations or tariffs. The Euro system promotes more than economic cooperation; it promotes integration and merging of different European banks to further promote the financial cooperation the ECB strives towards. While strides have been made in order to further integrate European banks, there has been push back from European nations such as Germany to have a  “national champion”  in the financial system in order to support national companies. German believes this national champion is Deutsche Bank, one of the oldest banks in Germany whose foundation was based upon supporting German exports.

However, this once powerful bank is currently on the verge of collapse. Beginning from the financial crisis in 2008, Deutsche Bank is at the center of financial scandals, low profits,and other issues which will be discussed later. Members of the management board of Deutsche Bank and German politicians believe the solution to saving Deutsche Bank is by merging with competitor Commerzbank, another old failing bank who focuses more on domestic companies. While German politicians are hopeful that the merger with Commerzbank will help solve many problems surrounding the German banking system, it does not eliminate the underlying desire for a German bank to aid German companies. Germany’s agenda to have a national bank support national companies goes against the ECB's long-term plan to establish a Pan-European banking system between different European banks.

Deutsche in Danger

Without any form of reformation, Deutsche Bank is heading down the path to be Germany’s equivalent to the fall of Lehman Brothers. The global financial crisis of 2008 was the beginning of the decline for the German bank, which only deepened as scandals and conflicts internally within the bank as well as with outside actors continuously arose one right after the other. For example, in 2018, Deutsche Bank released its net profits on the company website for the first time since 2014. The numbers show an underperformance in comparison to the targeted reports. In 2018, Deutsche Bank only made a net profit of $390 million, which is lower than the Reuters projected target at $517 million. Another issue, which only makes matters worse, is their dependency on foreign companies. In a market where competitors are banks such as J.P. Chase Morgan and Citi Bank group, whom dominate market in and outside of the United States, Deutsche Bank relatively is small compared to its competitors. This, among other financial issues, declining revenues, and adverse market conditions have laid out the foundation to the pending doom of Deutsche Bank. These issues do not fully address different external scandals Deutsche Bank has fallen under for the past several years with outside actors.

These external scandals only make Deutsche’s road to recovery even harder. For example, Deutsche Bank recently came to a settlement with the US Department of Justice for $7.2 billion for misleading investors in the purchases of residential mortgage-backed securities. Other scandals, such as the one in which Deutsche Bank lost about $1.6 billion worth of bonds bought in 2007, and a tax evasion scandal that led to Deutsche Bank to pay $94 million, spill over a large amount of money the German bank owes to different countries, specifically the United States. While such scandals are not necessarily rare in the banking world, their accumulation and the long period it is taking for the German bank to pay back the settlements only make Deutsche’s situation worse.

A Complicated Merger

If the merger happens, Deutsche Bank will reap more benefits than Commerzbank. It will cause  cost cuts will need to be done in order for the newly merged bank to soundly operate. One way this could be executed is through cutting employees. While a measure such as this is normal to any bank merger or acquisition, the reductions required from Deutsche Bank would be substantially less than if the bank restructured itself.  While the alliance allows both banks to expand their markets domestically and internationally, Deutsche Bank’s expansion into the domestic market will diminish its dependency on any international trade operations or need to lend to international companies.

Due to the fact that Commerzbank’s main clientele are small-medium enterprises in Germany, the merger of these two banks would create  the largest lender in Germany. The concept of having one large bank financing various companies in Germany follows an agenda of many German politicians, which is a large German bank supporting German companies. This concept of a megabank promotes the idea of a  national champion, which the German government favors. By having Deutsche Bank as the country’s primary bank to finance majority of Germany companies, politicians hope this will decrease the global footprint of foreign banks such as J.P Chase. Although the merger is a protectionist-like measure to limit external interference, it does not fix the flaws in the German banking system. The merge might even make the banking system of Germany more complicated.

The country’s banking is currently suffering from overcrowding. Overall, there are three pillars in which all German banks fall. The three pillars are; private banks, which are banks that deal with the financing of specific individuals; public banks, which normally pertains to commercial companies and co-op banks which is a combination of both private and public banks. With the amount of banks in each pillar ranging  from as small as 385 banks to as many as 1000 banks, this results in a system that is weak and underperforms. Although banks, including s Commerzbank, have attempted to salvage the situation through consolidations and merging with smaller banks, it did not prove to be helpful in reducing the number of players in the system since it did not erase the fact that there are too many banks in Germany.

This merger, if it occurs, will result in this new bank being the third largest bank in the Eurozone. While Germany is overall in favor of this merger, it still needs the ultimate approval of the European Central Bank in order for it to fully take place.

The European Central Bank has given a set of criteria which must be met by both banks for the merger to be approved. Nevertheless, the merger goes against the broader plan of the European Central Bank to have a Pan-European banking system where banks within the Eurozone will merge with other banks in the regions as well as finance companies beyond their national border. In 2018, the ECB created the Target Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS), which allowed transactions between European banks to be processed instantaneously, regardless of where the primary base of a bank is. Although only a few European countries use the TIPS, the hope is that all member-states will use the system to make financial transactions more timely and efficient. The Deutsche-Commerzbank merger will not wholly dissolve this program, but it will weaken the goal of having financial integration among member states. If the European Central Bank is promoting the idea of European banks merging and financing companies outside of their national borders, the idea of German companies only being supported by German banks goes against the agenda of the European Central Bank.

Recommendations

German politicians should focus their efforts on reforming their entire banking system instead of focusing  on saving Germany’s oldest, and not most efficient, banks. While it may be in Germany’s best interest to have German banks  support domestic companies, it is more important to reform the banking system. Through this, Germany will hopefully create a more financial market which will enhance the performance of banks within the financial system as well as reducing the risk in banks collapsing. The reforming of Germany’s banking system can also ease any worry of the European Central Bank system about Germany’s protectionist path. Although board members of the ECB have not released any form of hard push back against the merger, they have listed different demands or criterias which need to be met in order to gain the full approval for the merger to occur.  One of these criterias given by the ECB is for Deutsche Bank to increase their fresh funds, which is the amount of funds that are neither withdrawn or newly deposited funds into a bank. Criteria such as increasing the amount of fresh funds is just one way for Deutsche bank to create a safety net in case the merger is not successful.

All in all, the merger reflects many things internally in Germany as well as the Eurozone. Internally in Germany, the ongoing negotiations to save one of the oldest banks in Germany is a reflection to preserve their pride of national banks financing national companies. Even in an overcrowded banking system, politicians hope the new merged will be the answer to their prayers. Externally, through the lens of the European Central Bank, the possibility of the third largest bank in all of Europe who wants to have a global footprint as large as American banks and finance all German companies is an ambitious dream for Germany to have their cake and eat it too.

The Deficit the EU Should Really Worry About Is Not Fiscal – It’s Democratic

Earlier in February, the European Commission – the executive arm of the EU – published a report outlining a pessimistic economic outlook and persistent substantial market risks in the region, with the projected real GDP growth rate under 2 percent for 2020. The report came at a time the strength of European institutions is tested not only by poor macroeconomic indicators but also by declining citizen confidence in the ability of supranational governance to be transparent and accountable. According to a 2018 Eurobarometer poll, less than two-thirds of Europeans are satisfied with the opportunities for individual citizens to participate in political life. More alarmingly, voter turnout for the European Parliament elections has fallen by over 30 percent since 1980s and now constitutes only 40 percent of the EU population.

Weakening citizen trust – the main symptom of the EU’s growing ‘democratic deficit’ – and worsening economic performance are, however, not just coinciding with one another by chance. The perceived legitimacy of the EU, more so than that of the majority of political arrangements, is highly dependent on its delivery of satisfactory economic results to member-states. Economic self-interest, as illustrated by Britain’s break from Brussels, is a powerful driver of both regional integration and disintegration. Despite the limitations of examining the European project through a performance efficiency lens, the notion that a single common market – with standardized regulations and supervisory mechanisms – is good for member states continues to prevail in explanations of the EU’s emergence and survival.

The 2010 crisis, low levels of growth, high unemployment, and Italy’s current standoff with Brussels over its 2019 budget all undermine result-based legitimacy of the EU and can leave lasting damage on its authority. National governments and the public might be prompted to question the economic desirability of staying in the Union. While unlikely to follow the path of the UK and withdraw completely, countries can potentially model their conduct after Italy and undermine the internal cohesion of the EU by disregarding its rules.

No less urgent are concerns about the transparency and accountability of the European system of governance, oftentimes perceived as an elitist, unelected technocracy. Many citizens believe that supranational decision-making is becoming only more inaccessible to them due to its increasing complexity. The worsening of regional democratic deficit manifests itself in lower voter turnout and overall weaker citizen support for the European project.

The perceived failure of regional institutions to provide member-states with clear and otherwise unattainable economic benefits and the unresponsiveness of EU governance to the concerns of ordinary citizens both pose a major threat to the continuous success and even survival of the European project. However, the debate surrounding these two shortcomings of the current institutional setup not only tends to overlook the interconnectedness of the two issues but oftentimes portrays democratization of regional governance and economically optimal outcomes as being at odds with each other. From the ancient Greeks to the modern-day libertarians, the ‘short-sightedness and ignorance’ of the masses are cited as the reasons institutional arrangements – especially in spheres so technical as fiscal and monetary policy – should be protected from excessive popular influence if they are to yield desirable results. In the sphere of European economic and financial governance, however, the opposite seems to be true.

The undemocratic procedures by which European budgets and money are managed erode not only citizen confidence but the performance efficiency of European institutions. Greece provides perhaps the most telling lesson in the importance of transparency and accountability in economic governance on the national level, which is no less applicable to supranational institutions. It was, after all, falsification of data on the levels of sovereign debt that triggered the country’s crisis in 2010 and its subsequent spillover into the rest of the eurozone. The Greek government’s failure to accurately report on the country’s financial standing led to dramatic downgrades of Greek government bonds and overall reduced the attractiveness of the country’s financial markets.

That same year, several EU audit institutions published a joined report that acknowledged the importance of fiscal transparency and proper oversight of public finance management in crisis prevention and mitigation. Following the financial turmoil of 2010, a new strategy for the development of the European Monetary Union (EMU) identified “democratic legitimacy and accountability” as one of the five building blocks forming a more robust monetary system. All in all, EU officials seem to be coming to the realization that democratic accountability is more than a just complementary dimension of political legitimacy. It is an essential component of a sound economic and financial structure, upheld by both voter and investor confidence.

The unwillingness of technocratic elites to introduce democratic controls to the procedures that govern EU’s financial and monetary affairs will only strengthen the appeal of populism. Arguments pointing out the benefits of a technocratic form of governance over national economies and public finance are typically underpinned by the assumption that the average voter cannot be trusted with control over her country’s power of the purse. Such contempt for the ordinary citizen is what gives validity to claims like that of Michael Grove, who, at the height of Brexit, announced that the UK people “have had enough of experts.”

What makes technocratic arguments more dangerous is their propensity to shy away from the evident need for greater economic and financial literacy among the populace. Aside from the established associations this form of literacy has with countries’ national prosperity, citizens with a clearer understanding of the issues discussed away from the prying eyes of the public have better chances of becoming legitimate participates in policy debates that affect their everyday lives. It is, of course, unreasonable to expect an ordinary European to acquire the technical expertise necessary to understand all the intricacies of fiscal and monetary affairs of their countries and the EU, yet unelected officials deliberating on vital issues behind closed doors out of an irrational fear of the masses should seem no less absurd.

The Illiberal West: A New Era for Central and Eastern Europe

In 1989, on the eve of the Cold War’s final chapter, Francis Fukuyama suggested that the world had come face to face with the ‘end of history’ and that the fundamental ideology behind liberal democracy would henceforth be free of any obstacles to global domination. It has become somewhat of a cliché to lambast his theory, but reflecting upon it is important as it succinctly captures the zeitgeist of the post-Cold War era. Many in the West did, and still do, believe that liberal democracy is the single most successful socio-political system; a system which was bestowed upon the people of Central and Eastern Europe in a shared victory over authoritarian Communism between 1989 and 1991. This is part of the reason why liberal democracy’s contemporary losses in the region, notably to Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Poland’s Jarosław Kaczyński, are often received as a shock. While self-proclaimed illiberal nationalists now lead Hungary and Poland, the sentiment they harness is palpable across almost all the post-Communist states which moved to integrate with Western Europe, indicating a broad regional phenomenon. There are various theories as to why these nations are on their current path, but two principal factors stand above the rest: demographic anxiety and a rejection of what European and Western identity has come to mean.

First, it should be noted that economic decline has not played a significant part in this particular rise of illiberal nationalist sentiment, which makes the root factors of the region’s recent political shift distinct from theories explaining Western Europe’s lurch to the right. Poland, especially, has seen exponential economic growth for the past 26 years, and even managed to escape recession during the 2008 crisis. With GDP per capita growing by 6% on average over the past 20 years, it would be difficult to argue that the populace is suffering from economic grievance. This goes without mentioning that the region actually boasts high income equality, even relative to Western Europe. While Hungary has experienced some economic hardship, such as recession around 2008, the rise in illiberal thought across the region is largely unexplained by economic decline.

To fully understand Central and Eastern Europe in the decades following the end of the Cold War, one must understand its demographics. The Economist estimates that around 18 million people, or 6% of Central and Eastern Europe’s population, have left the region since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Unlike past revolutions, in which the losers form the emigrate population, the end of Communism presented a situation in which liberal minded citizens, the winners, were the ones to depart in mass numbers. This alone has made a significant political and psychological impact on the remaining populations, but the demographic issues do not end there. The area also suffers from an incredibly low fertility rate, with the regional average coming out to a rate of about 1.4 children per a woman (the replacement rate, or the rate at which a population maintains its size, is 2 children per woman). This means that not only has the Central and Eastern Europe lost millions due to emigration, but emigrants are also not being replaced. In other words, the region is growing older and shrinking.

With these numbers in mind, it may be easier to imagine why the surge in numbers of migrants arriving in Europe, starting around 2013 and peaking in 2015, was seen by many as a threat to national survival. While almost none of the migrants arriving in Europe aspire to immigrate to post-Communist states, there was widespread fear that they would, and that nations in the region would be unable to assimilate them or preserve their national identity due to the dire demographic situation. This emerged as a driving factor in the popularity of right wing and nationalist political forces. Illiberalism is closely related to this, as skepticism in the liberal model had already begun due to the demographic impacts integration with the West had on Central and Eastern Europe. However, the perceived failure of Western European nations, seen as liberal role models, to properly deal with the migrant crisis significantly increased support for the rejection of liberal democracy, and married the sentiment to the political right.

This rejection of Western European judgment is something that has been festering for quite some time. Since the end of the Cold War, the region has striven to imitate the West and become a part of the Western world in almost every way. Governments in the region therefore allowed judgements according to Western standards, and the remaining populace often felt as though they were in some ways losers for having not left for the ‘promised land’ further west of them. However, the reality is that post-Communist Europe is very different from the rest of the continent. Social values are an important example, as the region is very much more socially traditional than its western neighbors, and while imitating God-loving Reaganite America was appealing in decades past, the West has since changed. Much of Western European and American society now embrace secularism, LGBT rights, cultural diversity, and liberal social values in general. Illiberal movements in Central and Eastern Europe are a response to this, both in terms of rejecting the idea that the region should imitate nations with different values than them, and that it should be the submissive partner in the imitation game. More specifically, they believe that roles should be reversed, and that traditional Central and Eastern Europe is, in fact, the real Europe that should be imitated across the West. This is elegantly expressed in a quote from one of Viktor Orbán’s 2017 speeches, in which he proclaims, "Twenty-seven years ago here in Central Europe we believed that Europe was our future; today we feel that we are the future of Europe.”

However, the differences between East and West go both ways, and there are some issues with spreading Hungary and Poland’s right-wing illiberal model to the rest of the continent. Most importantly is the fact that Orbán and Kaczyński are selling a model designed to prevent ethnic and cultural diversity, rather than to deal with an already diverse population. Despite this, it is very unlikely that European-wide expansion will be given up on easily. Some illiberal leaders, notably Viktor Orbán, seem to understand that the best way to remain in power is to secure the regions and institutions of which they are a part. As Orbán’s Fidesz party constitutes an important member of the largest parliamentary group in the European Union, the center-right European People’s Party (EPP), it is likely that the European Parliament will manifest as an important battleground in this struggle. More specifically, the battle over the ‘soul’ of the broader European center-right will be crucial, as a center-right more sympathetic to right-wing populist and illiberal movements could greatly shift the balance of political influence in favor of post-Communist states.

Broader strategic developments are also important to note when regarding the future of this region, especially as Chinese funds increasingly make their way into the scene. As a wealthy and authoritarian power, China’s rise may provide an opportunity for illiberal nations to reduce their reliance on Western Europe and the United States. Although some countries, such as Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria, express sympathy towards Russia, the area’s traditional influencer is unlikely to regain significant inroads in the region due to financial constraints, as well as historical grievances with important local actors, notably Poland and Romania.

If China does signal greater interest in Central and Eastern Europe, Western Europe and the United States may need to consider more dynamic responses in order to retain their level of strategic influence. This could take the form of certain concessions, such as reduced criticism of the region’s disregard for “European values”, of which both Poland and Hungary have been accused in the form of article 7 procedures filed against them by the European Parliament. This would resemble treatment towards Ukraine, or Saudi Arabia, which are not liberal democracies yet retain Western strategic support. Another possible strategy is an aim at the deeper roots behind this issue - demographics. Financial and political support for pro-natalist policies in the area could significantly boost the image of Western Europe and the United States in the eyes of the local population, along with a reduction of the demographic anxiety playing a significant part in this phenomenon.

History has come back to post-Communist Europe with a vengeance. This is true both in Fukuyama’s terms, but also as regarding the essence and flavor of the illiberal revolution taking place there. While Poland, Hungary, and other nations in the region have their differences, they are united in a common experience of demographic devastation, a search for identity, and fear in a rapidly changing world. This has lead to a rejection, in various degrees, of the liberal democratic model and the definition of Western identity in terms of social liberalism. This does not mean that Central and Eastern Europe has necessarily been “lost”, especially if Western European and American policymakers begin to demonstrate an understanding of the root causes of these developments, and adapt to them accordingly. However, they should also understand that the region is unlikely to return to its immediate post-Cold War state of mind, and this is ultimately a new era for Central and Eastern Europe.

Italy’s Changing Climate

The refugee crisis that reached Europe by the summer of 2015 is no stranger to anyone now, and the effects are now strongly echoing in Europe’s political climate, including the friendly, and at least until recently, very internationally minded nation of Italy. There exists significant literature concerning the relationship between the rise of the right wing in France and Spain and both nations’ acceptance of a considerable amount of refugees. This is a component of the larger discussion surrounding whether Europe, and the whole world, is headed toward a return to the traditional nation state order with distinctive national differences, little to no interaction amongst states, and absence of international institutions. Given that concerns about globalization are on the rise in many major countries, events such as Brexit and withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Climate Agreement confirm suspicions. Slaughter interestingly points out in her article for The Financial Times that, after the meeting between President Trump and President Putin at the Helsinki Summit this past summer, it is not inconceivable to see the world in which there is emphasis on “rule in the name of tradition, nationalism, and ethnic purity” given that both major presidential figures displayed support of more limited bilateral and international cooperation, agreeing that they will be ‘friends’ on some and ‘foes’ on other issues. Trends such as these seem to suggest that globalization, especially in the cultural sense, has exhausted its power and is now becoming a negative force leaving nations in fear for their own self-preservation. Furthermore, to make matters worse, the praise of a globalized, connected world is not only weakening, but triggering isolationist and nationalist movements to counter advancements in connectedness and blurring of the borders and cultures achieved through globalization thus far. These movements are openly supporting discrimination through their emphasis on national exceptionalism and moving the world into another extreme. Italy’s political change is following the same pattern of isolationism and exceptionalism with its, although still small, very innovative and persistent parties, increasingly attractive to the public worried about the influx of refugees and erasure of the Italian culture. This is challenging the future of the liberal international order previously seen as key to preventing another world war and promoting progress, stability, and protection of people around the globe.

Globalization did not prevent expression of positive, non-discriminating national feelings. However, history of the previous century gives clear warnings of nationalism’s potency to become a major threat to security, leading to discrimination and horrifically escalating into fascism and genocide, which is why more caution is taken with how nationalist tendencies are expressed. Europe, being the epicenter of both world wars, is no stranger to outbreaks of violent nationalist movements, which is why, as The New York Times points out, Germany went on to install laws restricting one’s freedoms of speech and expression when they are used to incite nationalistic violence and support neo-nazism, making events such as Charlottesville in the US unthinkable. Similarly, as ANSA outlines, Italy has been strictly reinforcing Muncino law since 1993, which served to dismantle continuous attempts of resurgence made by neo-fascists following Mussolini’s agenda by permitting persecution for “incitement of violence” and using symbols of hate. While Germany’s conservative Alternative for Germany (AfD) gets a lot of attention, an interesting resurgence of Italy’s right wing more often goes unnoticed. Italy’s last major formal far right political party was Alleanza Nacionale (National Alliance). National Alliance never reached the political organization and parliamentary strength of Germany’s AfD, but the party membership steadily grew with the influx of foreigners, mostly from war-stricken areas of the Balkans and the Middle East. Although National Alliance dismantled, due to mostly internal power struggles, the party still actively supported departure from the EU, emphasis on sovereignty, closing Italy’s borders, and even fought to repeal the anti-fascist Mucino law thus being the first major hint at modern resurgence of neo-fascism in Italy. Rise to power of parties such as these represents a danger to democracy and stability of international relations, and it can have devastating effects on refugees who would face nothing but more persecution and conflict that they are running from in the absence of internationally accepted laws to protect them.

Given the events of this decade and a change in migration flow, especially with the refugee crisis in 2015, some Italians are very actively and zealously returning to nationalist, conservative ideals, and some are joining CasaPound Italy-CPI. The party was formed in 2003 in Rome’s neighborhood of Esquilino. It remains situated in just a handful neighborhoods, mostly surrounding Rome, but it gives a platform to neo-fascists given that its members openly and proudly identify themselves as fascists. CPI and National Alliance both show support for sovereignty, Italian social programs (when centered around Italians), and Italian religious institutions. Many members also emphasize that their agenda matches that of the Third Position, which is political ideology that originated in France and Italy in the latter half of previous century. It is neither communist nor capitalist in nature, but rather looking for midground. This means that they themselves do not recognize classic definitions of right and left and thus do not self-identify as radical right, though their anti-immigration, anti-Zionist, and pro-sovereignty policies suggest they belong further right on the spectrum. Their persistent arguments claiming that they do assume this mid-position make their campaign misleading and draw attention of more people that then get radicalized and begin not only protecting Italian territory and unique cultural identity, but also displaying open hatred, intolerance and violence towards refugees.

CasaPound used to be under the wing of Tricolour Flame or Flamma Tricolore until it got separated in 2008 with its 6000 members. Tricolour Flame has, unsurprisingly, nationalist and neo-fascist, agenda, similar to that of CasaPound. CasaPound has only 6000 members, while Tricolour Flame has 5000, and, unlike National Alliance, neither has any seats in the Parliament,. However, both parties are embodiment of an ongoing social movement storming through Italy and finding recruits in the youth. Additional appeal comes through the passion of these groups to improve failing social program, providing public kitchens and free medical care. CasaPound has 23 families squatting in a state-owned building, owning a “fascist hostel” which provides medical and nutritional services underneath Mussolini’s fascist party flags and national symbols, as reported by Channel 4. However, it is necessary for all aid recipients to prove loyalty to Italy and Italian culture. The party also has its merchandise, but remains committed to its anti-capitalist, communist-leaning goals, though claiming additionally to be better at providing social service than the Communist Party. All of this is making the party even more attractive to young individuals looking for alternative approaches to make a better world. Were this party’s rhetoric and platform to become more dominant, or to find a way to integrate at least some of its agenda into the general public’s mindset, the effects on the marginalized would be unthinkable.

Although not strong enough to gain the 3% of the vote necessary to get into the parliament, a party such as CasaPound can still thrive within Italian provincial offices, holding a seat in Ostia council since 2017, gathering thousands of people to support it and continuously working on spreading its appeal to the youth, thus making it, provided the global trend of returning to similar isolationist right wing movements continues, a potential parliamentary active party of the future. How long will the international institutions (such as the UN, UNESCO, G20, G7) be able to sustain themselves with the pillar countries such as the US, France, and now Italy leaving the international peace and collaboration agenda? What will the world without these systems to mitigate effects of war and poverty look like and who would protect the vulnerable? Are nationalistic parties such as CasaPound really a solution to national and global problems? After all, globalization leads to deterioration of cultural norms and for some people too rapid mixing and even disappearance of cultures, thus becoming a problem and making some nationalistic concerns expressed through these parties very viable. Additionally, providing such effective social services as CasaPound does is truly admirable, as well as being innovative in regards to how resources are allocated not fully adopting either of the two economic extremes. However, it is hard to believe that a world where empathy is exclusively limited to Italians, or any specific nationality, is the key to salvation. It may be best to point out to bright, young individuals, who are willing to do such noble things as committing their valuable time and energy to help fellow party members so extensively, that they might find people worth saving outside of their conventional bubble, that it may be best for them, and their country, to consider alternatives and recognize that hopeful, young, respectful people, not so much unlike them, are willing to work on making Italy stronger together despite of having been born elsewhere.

Evolving Unions: Brexit, Scotland, and the British Constitution

The United Kingdom is having an identity crisis. A fast-approaching March 29 Brexit deadline has thrown Prime Minister Theresa May’s government and Parliament into a state of prolonged chaos as Members of Parliament (MPs) from across the ideological spectrum cannot agree on any single direction. On January 15, the House of Commons rejected May’s proposed deal by 230 votes, the largest margin for a government in history. Beneath the surface of procedural jargon and party politics, major existential questions about the future of the UK in Europe continue to cause gridlock and uncertainty. Leaders of the oppositional political parties, mainly the Scottish National Party (SNP) and Labour have suggested a second referendum to reverse course and remain in the EU, though Labour is also internally divided over Brexit. In the daily political circus, an often forgotten issue is the territorial nature of the modern British system beyond the center of power in London and the consequences that Brexit holds for internal divisions within the plurinational union. This article comprises discussion of political contexts in Scotland which contribute to an ongoing Brexit divide, a brief examination of SNP discourses, and a consideration of Brexit’s impact on the territorial British constitution.

Scotland’s independent religious and educational institutions, in addition to a general lack of confidence in Conservative leadership, have shaped a distinctly Scottish political culture and complicated union with the rest of the UK. Scottish institutional representation in British politics was an incremental process throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, with the creation of a largely symbolic Scottish Office in 1885 in response to criticisms that Scotland was neglected by Parliament and civil service. Administrative devolution left a legacy of limited Scottish political autonomy as well as a national identity shaped by such autonomy and nationalism. Politically, devolution of some legislative powers from Westminster arose out of discontent with conservative government policies during the Thatcher era, reaching a turning point in 1997 when Tony Blair’s government held a referendum on the formation of a Scottish Parliament with tax-varying powers. The Scottish Parliament’s purpose was described by McHarg and Mitchell as “a defensive institution, designed to protect Scotland from Westminster Governments that sought to pursue policies opposed by [the] majority opinion in Scotland.” The Brexit outcome and subsequent implementation tests the absolute limits of this balance between devolved Scottish government and Westminster, as the majority opinion in Scotland has been overruled by the rest of the UK in both a political and constitutional sense.

Contrary to the traditional understanding of the British state, the UK is not a unitary state but rather an asymmetrical union of four nations: England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. These unions developed over centuries with the English and subsequently British state absorbing Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Irish cultural identities without wholly replacing them. In the 2016 referendum, only England and Wales voted in majorities to Leave the European Union. Leave defeated Remain by a slim 52-48 margin overall whereas 62% of Scottish voters cast their vote to Remain in the EU. Scotland and Northern Ireland both voted in majorities to remain in the EU but have also expressed a desire to remain in the UK; now they cannot have both. The institutional unions between Westminster, Scotland, and Northern Ireland developed differently and gradually due to complex histories, however British internal politics adapted to plurinational unions with relative stability. According to James Mitchell of the University of Edinburgh, the changing relationship between Westminster and the UK’s component nations characterizes the UK “as a state of evolving unions […] Institutions may frame politics but people make choices as to how the institutions operate.” At the heart of Brexit lies this conflict among institutions and identities, processes of union and separation, and, above all, the constitutional adaptability and volatility of the British state.

As a regionalist political party within the parliamentary system, the original purpose of the SNP was to rally political support for Scottish independence. Ultimately, a 2014 referendum settled Scotland’s status as an independent country, resulting in a 55% “No” vote. Since 2014, the SNP’s vision seeks to advance the cultural notion of Scotland as distinct from the London-centric political establishment. As a center-left party, the nationalism encompassed by SNP rhetoric aligns with the EU and opposes the conservative and insular vision of the UK’s role in the European system. In a study of public opinion from the 1979 and 1997 referendums, Seth Jolly found links between pro-EU sentiment across Scotland and greater public support of devolution and independence. European integration is, therefore, a strategic benefit for an independent Scotland’s viability, not only as an institutional arrangement for trade but as an idea, as the EU provides an alternative to Westminster rule and traditional notions of English hegemony. This strategic relationship between Scotland and the EU is still a focal point for the SNP in the current Brexit debate.

The most principal actor in the formation of Scottish political discourse is First Minister Nicola Sturgeon, Theresa May’s counterpart as the leader of the Scottish Parliament and figurehead of the SNP across Scotland. Sturgeon has recently utilized her public platform to make clear that Scottish interests are not taken seriously by other UK political parties, therefore a renewed consideration of Scottish independence (in addition to a second Brexit referendum) should stay on the table post-Brexit. In a foreign visit to the United States in February, Sturgeon gave a speech on Brexit at Georgetown University’s Institute for Women, Peace and Security:

Scotland has a very proud European tradition. We see ourselves as a European country and people in Scotland by and large, perhaps in contrast with people elsewhere in the UK, don’t really see membership of the European Union as a threat to our own national sovereignty. […] But, amid the confusion and uncertainty of Brexit, one thing I think is clearer than ever. Scotland’s national interests are not being served by a Westminster system which too often treats Scotland as an afterthought, or too often sees our interests as not being material. In my view, they can only properly be served by becoming an independent country. But an independent country that then seeks to play its part in an interconnected world.

Framing Scotland as pro-Europe, culturally distinct from the rest of the UK, and inadequately represented in Westminster is consistent with the scholarly notion of the UK’s asymmetric union as well as the SNP’s political strategy, while the combination of these forces logically leads Sturgeon to steer discourse towards the direction of independence.

Since 2016, Twitter has become an especially relevant medium for the creation and dissemination of political discourse relating to Brexit, whether in the form of official statements, news, commentary, or jokes. MPs often post clips from their speeches in Parliament on social media in order to amplify their message among local constituencies in the Scottish political realm; however, Twitter can also extend beyond Scotland’s borders to shape the national debate. Vocal dissent amongst elected SNP MPs has brought attention to Brexit’s constitutional implications and Scottish grievances over perceived disempowerment due to the proposed Brexit deal going against the democratic will of Scotland’s Remain majority. Joanna Cherry, SNP MP for Edinburgh South West, bluntly described the power dynamic between Theresa May’s government and Scotland in a post on December 10, “Brexit has shown how unequal the Union of the UK is. The PM and her government have no respect for Scotland. Her #Brexit deal has failed and her government is failing. She must put the deal to the people. #PeoplesVote.” On January 21, Ian Blackford, SNP MP for Ross, Skye and Lochaber posted a clip from the House of Commons debate in which he framed Brexit as a precarious and existential situation: “We will not be dragged out of Europe by a Tory Government we did not vote for. We might not be able to save the UK but we can save Scotland. We have an escape route from the chaos of Brexit – an Independent Scotland.” Beyond just political difference on Brexit, the emphasis on the UK government’s authority to override Scotland’s Remain vote exposes the inherent power imbalances in the British system.

The official SNP Twitter account used similar language in a post on January 27: “We don't accept Scotland being dragged out of the EU against its will by a reckless, incompetent Tory UK government. Once the Brexit fog clears, the people of Scotland should have the right to look at a brighter future with independence.” The reality of a second independence referendum is unlikely, especially due to public fatigue with political instability and a complicated process for Scotland to hypothetically re-enter the EU as an independent country. However, the revival of SNP rhetoric about independence signifies not only strong political discontent with Theresa May’s government but a deeper frustration with the asymmetrical territorial distribution of power in the British constitution.

The largely unwritten UK constitution allows a wide range of flexibility to redefine the political fabric of the state, as legislation and convention can be rewritten, repealed, and reconsidered over time based on the governing political party’s interests. Unlike the United States Constitution, there is no single document that defines a unifying constitutional vision or clearly outlines the relationship between the central government and component nations. In the case of Brexit, the lack of a legal roadmap means that the UK is a “real-time experiment” in constitutional change. Scholarly understandings of the British constitution have changed significantly over time, as Vernon Bogdanor asserted in 1979 that the UK was “profoundly unitary” due to the supremacy and sovereignty of Westminster, in following decades a new understanding has emerged framing the UK as no longer unitary but perhaps still organized around the supremacy of the UK Parliament. Since 1999, devolution has allowed greater ambiguity in the constitutional arrangement between the UK Parliament and devolved legislatures. However, Brexit puts into question the nature of the territorial British constitution with semi-devolved powers.

A case that recently came before the UK Supreme Court shows competing constitutional visions in action. In R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, or otherwise known as the Miller case, the High Court determined that the UK Government may not unilaterally trigger the Article 50 procedure to formally exit the EU without Parliament’s approval in the form of legislation. The UK Government appealed the case to the Supreme Court which allowed the Scottish government to also claim their approval was necessary to trigger Article 50, due to “a fundamental alteration of the UK’s, and particularly Scotland’s, constitutional arrangements.” The Scottish government’s legal argument hinged upon the Sewel Convention, a principle “that the UK Parliament will not normally legislate on devolved areas without the consent of the Scottish Parliament.” The Court deemed the Sewel Convention not legally enforceable as a norm rather than a law, thus the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act passed through Parliament in March 2017 without the approval of devolved governments. McHarg and Mitchell concluded, “Brexit will affect devolved decision-making and questions of constitutional voice, in terms of how much influence they are able to exert over the form that Brexit takes, or indeed whether it happens at all.” In practice, Scotland’s constitutional influence on Brexit has been significantly limited by the UK Parliament, setting the stage for an even greater degree of SNP rhetoric about disaffection, independence, and self-determination.

It is impossible to know exactly how Brexit will affect UK politics in the long-term. The British constitution is dynamic and adaptable, though the EU referendum has exposed significant fault lines in the union between Westminster and Scotland. If the next generations of Scottish voters continue to feel perpetually unrepresented by British politics and expelled from the EU against their will as SNP rhetoric suggests, the current union arrangement may be unable to resist popular mistrust indefinitely. Similar forces of anti-establishment politics that made Leave appealing to the disaffected UK electorate in 2016 could eventually influence another referendum on a Scottish exit from the UK. Though Scottish independence seems politically improbable and absurd, the idea of Brexit itself also would have been unimaginable only a few years ago. Constant change in British politics is part of its institutional design, and as time runs out on the March 29 Brexit deadline, spectators of Parliament will find that absurd and unlikely things can happen quite often.

Rubles and Reindeer

The opinions expressed herein are the writer’s and do not reflect those of their employer.

I. Introduction

Last year marked the 100th anniversary of the Russian Revolution, which makes it an appropriate moment to discuss the plight of one of Russia’s largest indigenous populations who were victims of a modernizing and oil hungry Soviet Russia: the Khanty. According to a profile by the Guild of Inter-Ethnic Journalists, the Khanty currently have a population consisting of about 30,000 people, most of whom live in the region named for them, the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug (KhMAO). The Khanty are traditional, nomadic, reindeer-herding peoples that have long lived in western Siberia. As stated in a Russian state news profile, from 1930-1940 the autonomous okrug (or region) was “legitimized” by the Russian government, which intended to bring the Khanty into an official and governed status within the Soviet Union.

Today, the Khanty are one of the few remaining indigenous groups with their own autonomous region. Unfortunately for the Khanty, their historic region and home for centuries just so happens to sit on top of one of Russia’s three largest oil basins. In fact, 75 percent of Russia’s oil production comes from the region and the Western Siberia Oil Basin that lies under the KhMAO accounts for 67 percent of Russia’s oil reserves according to the International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy. The location of this particular oil basin puts the reindeer-herding Khanty in a precarious position and they are losing the fight for their traditional rights. They will continue to lose these rights as they confront a much stronger Russian government and Russian oil industry and there is not sign to this slowing down. The resulting environmental degradation that occurs all the while is a source of argument as well with the abuse of land and resources that could set the stage for worsening conflict. A Russian government that would support the ecology of the Khanty lands, assist representation and/or protect the local language would be the solution to this grievance; will the government actually do it is the true question.

II. The natives, oil and environmental degradation

The Khanty historically lived largely untouched alongside the Russian Empire in a fur-trading region with timber to trade, according to the region’s official website. Once oil was discovered in the 1930s and aggressively tapped in the 1960s, the once undamaged, scenic landscape yielded 70 billion barrels of oil over the following 40 years, as Paul Starobin wrote in National Geographic magazine in 2008.

A March 2017 Guardian article on the Khanty by Alec Luhn documented a specific grievance in the Khanty community that encompasses many of the problems they face (such detailed cases do not usually exist). A sub-region of the KhMAO, known as Surgut, is home to the oil and gas giant Surgutneftegaz, which was created as a combination of a few different state oil companies from the Soviet era. While this massive oil company continually drills into the Siberian land, a Khanty population of 4,000 in Surgut continues to hunt, fish, and herd reindeer as they have for centuries. With Russia’s economy in a slump, drilling increased in an effort to energize the economy with oil exports. As a result, the Kremlin knocked down Surgut’s protected status in 2013.

To compensate the Khanty for their land, Surgutneftegaz planned to pay individuals approximately 170,000 rubles (~$2,500) for the rights to their land. However, the contract that the companies have the natives sign is in Russian – a language in which many Khanty are illiterate. Lukoil, one of the largest oil companies in the world, offered 5 million rubles (~$84,700) to one family for a large parcel of land in another part of the KhMAO as reported by Georgy Borodyansky’s Open Democracy article from 2014.

Some land is worth more than others, but the variation in payouts illustrates that these companies have the ability and the will to pay off the population at any amount. Neither sum of money is enough to sustain the large family units the Khanty live in, especially when in some cases the population in question does not live close to another village, so they are unable to easily access food supplies and other goods. In fact, as Andrew Wiget and Olga Balalaeva wrote for Cultural Survival, a group that is known for research into indigenous populations, the food that the Khanty can gather from their limited river and forest land, they are legally unable to sell due to Russian government restrictions. These paltry payouts will not support them, nor are they able to support themselves. Though to the Khanty, money is not their utmost concern – the interruption of a lifestyle that they have maintained for centuries is.

A key issue regarding this situation is the local’s lack of voice in their local government. Lukoil was formed from Soviet state-owned western Siberian oil companies and Sugutneftegaz is another former state-owned oil conglomerate, which provides them strong government ties and influence. With the many sanctions hitting the Russian oil and gas industry, limiting technology to Russian domestic technologies, an oil company succeeding helps the economy keeps the country afloat. The head of Surgutneftegaz, Vladimir Bogdanov, is one of Russia’s wealthiest men. He is a member of the Khanty-Mansi okrug local government, and uses only Russian technologies and contractors. In fact, he employs a third of the city of Surgut’s 300,000 citizens as documented by Voice of America’s Russian service.

The aforementioned rollbacks on environmental protections are a result of Bogdanov’s clout. His domestic enterprise actually benefits from foreign sanctions and also from the powerless ethnic minority that is unable to push back due to oil’s economic importance. In fact, it is not only Bogdanov that represents the interest of oil in the local KhMAO government. A publication from Cultural Survival, noted in 1996 that not a single Khanty member was in the local representative council. The article goes on to describe how those who move into the KhMAO do so looking for oil work without any attachment or care for the community as a whole or the environmental situation at hand. Without a local voice, the risk of the land slipping further into ruin is more likely.

The degradation of environmental resources and general disregard for the Khanty’s lifestyle is the largest source of grievance between the Khanty and their Russian counterparts. The KhMAO suffered a great amount of damage due to the high oil yield the land has experienced. The landscape in 90 percent of the oil-producing areas has been damaged or destroyed, according to a Georgy Borodyansky’s 2014 Open Democracy article. In addition, there are constant forest fires that threaten the locals’ way of life and the lives of the reindeer they rely upon. Oil drilling fires and overall degradation have led to around 54 million acres of reindeer pasture being decimated according to an Ed Ayres piece in the World Watch journal.

The continuing uncertainty in environmental conditions led some of the Khanty victims to speak at the United Nations Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 21) summit in 2015 to air their grievances to a larger audience. The locals’ calls to the Russian government for an alleviation of drilling activities only results in the government willing to make monuments or national parks out of little corners of affected lands and, of course, allow the oil companies to pay off the locals. Unfortunately, as Wiget and Balalaeva’s article notes, this solution is hardly helpful because oil drilling already blocks access to traditional religious sites that may not have appeared on maps when drilling sites were set up. The oil companies and the indigenous population have no common interests and the former are absolutely powerless vs the latter who have local and national government’s ear.

III: Potential for violence and mitigating the conflict

The conflict’s potential for violence appears quite low. Research on this issue has only revealed a small number of violent incidents, including a 1930s revolution against collectivization and a story recounting a Khanty man shooting an oil company employee’s dog for biting his reindeer in Luhn’s Guardian article. Since, Khanty are a religious, hunting and gathering group that are in an extremely disadvantageous position against the Russian oil companies and they have no reason for violence. If they even consider fighting back or staging another rebellion, the Russian military, which has been known to use violence in suppressing violent conflict (i.e. the wars in Chechnya and Dagestan), would swiftly crush any opposition and likely elect another regional leader into power that would gracefully change laws and allow for more drilling. The more likely battle is a cultural one in which Khanty could lose their language and perhaps become extinct as an ethnic group.

The Khanty language is not widely spoken and Russia’s dependence and promotion of Russian, Khanty as well as other indigenous languages are in danger. Many Uralic languages have already gone extinct (including some Khanty dialects) and very few people today speak Khanty, according to an article on the website Languages in Danger. With fewer children speaking the language, its potential for survival is extremely low. With language, a key identifier of an ethnic group’s existence, its extinction would be a blow to the Khanty’s survival. The Russian government’s efforts to save the Khanty language are just as paltry as the oil companies’ payouts. The possibility of Khanty people eventually taking their payouts, giving up their land and moving to cities to start a new life or joining an oil company to stay close to home are the greatest threat to the culture’s survival. And this is the grimmest part of the conflict between the Khanty, the Russian state and the oil industry. The way to transform the conflict is a proactive resolution and assistance in preserving the Khanty culture, as well as to open up more opportunities for the Khanty population itself. Currently there is no violence in the region but that is simply a sign of Russian government intimidation.

Wiget and Balalaeva previously noted that not a single member of the Khanty community was on the local government in 1996. With statistics hard to come by, it is likely that this situation has not improved. For the conflict to mitigate, the Khanty will need to have more representation in their local government.  The federally-appointed current governor of the KhMAO is a woman by the name of Natalia V. Komarova from Western Russia with a background in construction and economics. This illustrates how people not from the KhMAO region are deciding on what happens to it. Ms. Komarova made a statement through UNESCO’s Russia branch that focused on promoting sustainable development and water protections in the region, but made no mention of drilling or its ramifications. Russia’s UNESCO branch also hosted conferences with the local universities, which provides a good start to promoting sustainability, but did not produce results. Having Khanty members on local councils and in State Duma seats is important, as it would check Ms. Komarova’s power in regard to processes that endanger the local ecology. She has also served on the Duma’s committee on natural resources, which influences her decision making on what is best for the Russian economy; especially given her economic educational background. While the Russian government has allowed UNESCO to establish climate change groups at the local university, but Moscow is too top heavy for this to have any effect in the short term where short term change is necessary.

IV: Specific recommendations

The problem with offering recommendations for a solution between the Khanty and the Russian government-backed oil industry is that the damage is mostly done. The derricks have been raised, the land destroyed, water resources contaminated and reindeer population reduced. Furthermore, recommendations only offer an opportunity to control or mitigate the damage rather than solve the grievance. It is important to understand what will not work before designing recommendations that could help. When dealing with the Russian Federation, for instance, sweeping recommendations that limit or hurt the oil industry will likely receive swift vetoes, as the country depends upon the extraction of natural resources. Also, intergovernmental organization decrees (like the United Nations Human Rights Council) would be taken as an insult and/or violation by the Kremlin. Any effective response must come at the local and state level.

The responses and recommendations for resolving the Khanty’s grievance with the Russian state and the country’s oil industry in the country are as follows: 1) restore environmental protections on the land with local engagement; 2) mandate the Khanty have representation in the local government; 3) provide the Khanty language with protected status while creating more local schools that teach Russian as well.

1) Restoring environmental protections is the most crucial recommendation, as the land can become uninhabitable if drilling and oil exploration are to continue at the current pace. The Russian government should meet with the local population, understand their concerns and decide with them how to properly protect their land and reindeer. The reindeer are extremely important for the Khanty, but due to drilling, it is estimated the region’s reindeer population fell by 28 percent during the 1990s as John Ross noted in Smithsonian Magazine. Data on the current status of the reindeer population decline is not easy to find. However, if oil production has yielded 70 billion barrels in the past 40 years, it is unlikely the population decline has ceased.  Allowing the land to sink further into an oil-soaked ruin, in which the rivers and forests routinely catch fire will cause problems for the native population and Kremlin alike. Adding more bureaucratic hoops to the government’s process for approving drilling operations will at least slow down the degradation and possibly lead to the reconsideration of some oil drilling operations entirely.

2) As noted above, another key issue is the Khanty’s lack of representation in local government. Mandating two Khanty representatives in the office of the governor and encouraging others to run for local council positions is crucial. The reason for having two is that there would be a better dynamic for discussion and more diversity from even within the Khanty community. A federally-appointed governor like Natalia Komarova needs to be balanced by local, indigenous representatives. The same is true for oligarch Vladimir Bogdanov and local government member Vladimir Bogdanov. This sort of influence without Khanty opinions present is dangerous. Having political checks on this influence can mitigate the disparity the Khanty population experiences as a result of its minority status in the Russian Federation.

3) The Russian government needs to work on protecting the language while bringing the Khanty population in from the fringes of Russian society. The population of Khanty in the KhMAO is only 19,068 people (1.3 percent of the population) according to the 2010 Russian census. Declaring the language endangered would attract some needed attention to this issue within the country. The language issue is lower priority compared to the other two recommendations, as it relates to the culture’s survival, and not specifically the people. It is part of a greater challenge as Khanty typically live in more remote sections of the KhMAO, and have less access to public schools. Improving educational opportunities is essential in not leaving a population in the fringes of society.

V: Final words

When studying any Russian indigenous group it is important to understand that many of them are endangered to a severe degree. The fact that the Khanty population still contributes to a percentage of the overall Russian population is a positive sign and should lead to the Kremlin’s further preservation of it. Unfortunately, as Cultural Survival discussed in 2014, within Russia, the native population councils/forums are either relatively powerless or nonexistent. This will need to change if any of the recommendations made above are going to take place. The Khanty should be able to choose whether to integrate fully into Russian society or not. Living on top of an oil gold mine should not be the reason for their demise, but in this case it is. Currently, there is no violence and there likely will never be. The population could die out quietly, before it ever fights back against the government or oil industry. If the culture dies off, the Russian government would be to blame for being complicit in the booming oil industry’s abuses, given the oil companies’ Soviet history and close ties to the Russian state. The fate of the Khanty lies in the hands of the Russian government.

Shedding Light on the “Prison-to-Jihad” Pipeline: Islam, Radicalization, and Terrorism in French Prisons

Since the Islamic State’s creation in June 2014, France has witnessed the most terrorist related violence across all of Europe and the United States. Brookings’ scholars McCants and Meserole recently published a landmark study identifying Francophone status as the biggest determinant for whether European countries experience Sunni radicalization and violence. These two data points highlight the continued risks posed by violent extremist organizations (VEOs) to the government of France and its citizens. Terrorism in France is too often wrapped up in conflicting narratives of nationalism, Islam, and immigration. Far-right candidate Marine Le Pen frequently used the trope of Middle Eastern refugees seeking to unleash violence against France in the name of Islam, a narrative that secured her one-third of the national vote in the 2017 presidential elections. Yet the overwhelming majority of recent terrorist attacks haven’t been carried out by refugees, but by French citizens socialized in the country’s secular schools. Moreover, a wide variety of groups have engaged in terrorism across France since the 1800s, including Basque, Breton and Corsican separatists, pro- and anti-Algerian independence movements, the far-left Action Directe, the far-right Organisation Armée Secrète, neo-Nazis, and more recently, Islamic extremists. Islamic extremists, as defined by the University of Maryland’s National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), engage in the violence in the name of a faith-based ideology in order to impose strict regulations on social life, though they often lack even rudimentary religious education. In the case of Islamic extremism in France, this violence is particularly anti-state, as the French government’s strict interpretation of secularism, or laicite, results in heavy restrictions on Islam in public spaces. Yet the roots of radicalization lie in specific social processes which take place at the individual rather than community level. While Muslims in France, and overlapping African and Maghrebi immigrant populations, face state violence and widespread economic discrimination, the overwhelming majority continue to reject violence and extremist ideologies. Prisons offer a clearer view of this complex relationship between government policies, Islam, radicalization, and terrorism. If authorities are to effectively dismantle radicalization networks in prisons, they must create targeted rehabilitation programs, end isolation of suspected radicals, empower Imams as independent authorities, and avoid securitizing entire populations who face continued discrimination.

Race and identity in the French criminal justice system

French pundits consistently highlight prisons as “incubators” for radicalization. The government estimates that 1,400 radicalized inmates currently reside in prison, 300 of whom are serving sentences for terrorism charges. A major blind spot for security services comes not from convicted terrorists, but from petty criminals who are radicalized while serving their sentences and who carry out attacks upon leaving. Notable former inmates charged with crimes like petty theft, drug possession, and larceny include Mohammed Merah, perpetrator of the 2012 Toulouse attacks, Mehdi Nemmouche of the 2014 Brussels Jewish Museum attack, and the assailants from the January 2015 Paris attacks, Amedy Coulibaly and Cherif Kouachi. Countering violent extremism (CVE) policies must, therefore, highlight both convicted terrorists and inmates more broadly susceptible to radicalization, despite clear indicators.

Hardline ideologies in French prisons exist alongside more broadly followed religious practices, namely Islam, which plays a major role in inmates’ social networks. Islam spread rapidly across the prison population in the 1970s with the spread of Tablighi, a movement within Sunni Islam which emphasizes piety. At first, prison authorities welcomed this trend and its stabilizing effect on prisoners, as it weakened the influence of organized criminal groups. It was only in the 1990s, during the Algerian Civil War and the growth of Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) cells across France, that prison officials began securitizing Islam, resulting in greater surveillance and the use of isolation on Muslim inmates. Currently, more than 60 percent of inmates identify as Muslim (almost 40,000 inmates total), despite making up only 12% of the general population. One reason for this overrepresentation stems from the failure of integration on the part of the government, as explained by sociologist Moussa Khedimellah. Many Muslim inmates come from banlieues, segregated neighborhoods predominantly populated by immigrant communities, with few opportunities for higher education or employment. Arrest rates in these neighborhoods far surpass the national average. While the government is prohibited from collecting statistics on race or religion, French Muslims, mostly from Arab or African descent, are estimated to comprise the majority of those arrested on drug charges, especially for marijuana. Another potential reason for the skew is widespread institutional violence directed towards France’s Arab and African population. The state of emergency passed in the aftermath of the November 2015 Paris attacks saw wide-scale police repression targeting French Muslims, with tens of thousands targeted with random searches and online surveillance, and thousands more subjected to house raids. Economic and political discrimination create additional issues. French Muslims are reportedly 400% less likely to receive a job offer than their Catholic counterparts, even when controlling for education and skill level. Second and third generation citizens with Arab and African surnames are told to change their names when submitting job applications. As a result of this widespread discrimination, charismatic “influencers” in prisons have little difficulty persuading inmates about the perceived irreconcilability of French identity and Islam when they can easily draw on lived experiences of institutional Islamophobia and the openly racist and violent discourse of political groups like the French National Front.

While the linkages between impoverished banlieue and radicalization are appealing, a closer look at recent attacks shows a more nuanced picture. In fact, while some attackers like the Kouachi brothers fit an expected pattern of fragmented social networks, poverty, barriers to employment, and repeat criminality, other attackers emerged from middle-class, secular families with access to education, like Coulibaly. Moreover, the average French citizen traveling to Iraq or Syria to fight for the Islamic State is increasingly white, middle-class, and occasionally female. France must address the rampant economic and social exclusion facing Arab and African populations in banlieu neighborhoods but should do so without the pretense of addressing the root causes of radicalization, which are far more nuanced. While difficult conditions certainly shaped the path to radicalization for some notorious individuals, the fact remains that the overwhelming majority of ‘banlieusards’ are not taking up arms against the French state. Therefore, while environmental factors can serve as stressors to sensitize an individual to radicalization, the unique social process that place in prisons requires a closer look.

The “Prison to Jihad Pipeline”

Most literature supports the idea that prisons, under certain conditions, can serve as potent incubators for radicalization. Across the Middle East, prisons hosted numerous jihadist figures, including Al Qaeda notables Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and ISIS founder Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Spanish, British, Belgian, and French prisons have all produced terrorists socialized during their detention who went on to carry out major acts of terrorism. Given the varying quality of life and style of detention across these different countries, radicalization is likely an individual process of socialization exacerbated by broader environmental stressors. Prisons offer unique opportunities for ideological indoctrination. The combination of emotional shock, isolation, and the need for social belonging push many prisoners to turn to moral frameworks or spirituality during their incarceration. Sociologist Farhad Khosrokhavar explains prison radicalization as a multi-stage process. Often, vulnerable inmates enter prison on minor charges and have little to no religious education. Once in prison, highly charismatic individuals will approach them and offer them a sense of belonging, beginning a gradual socialization process. The ideology used is designed to push individuals out of existing social isolation by giving them a worldview that is both empowering and highly intolerant, one that is especially attractive to those who already hold anti-state views. Once the relationship is established, the influencer uses a combination of violence and social norms to create a social network. These groups can outlast prison sentences, and connect former inmates to other extremists across Europe, and even with VEOs around the world. This radicalization process is seen clearly in the cases of Merah and Coulibaly. Both grew up in mostly non-religious households, and as a result of repeated experiences with criminal networks and the French justice system, came into contact with charismatic convicts who socialized them to violent, anti-state ideologies. This process of socialization continues to produce terrorists within the criminal justice system, and requires a strong policy response.

The general French state’s response to terrorism, informed by waves of domestic terrorism in the late 20th century, established a system that easily arrests and convicts suspects by casting a broad net over any individuals remotely linked to terrorist networks. While this allows a whole-of-network approach and can theoretically preempt terrorist attacks, it also solidifies otherwise weak links between terrorist networks and larger illicit economies present in banlieues. For example, the trabendo criminal networks present among first and second generation Maghrebi communities are mostly unconnected to terrorism, yet are frequent targets during mass arrests targeting potential terrorists, creating new linkages. Salah Abdeslam, the only surviving perpetrator of the November 2015 Paris attacks, managed to evade capture for over 150 days using social and family networks tied to the drug trade in the suburbs of Brussels. The very same ISIS cell involved in the attacks previously worked with petty criminals and drug dealers to recruit fighters for ISIS. While terrorism ought to be treated as a law enforcement issue, the government’s current approach is to broad and risks strengthening ties between otherwise unaffiliated criminals and terrorist cells. Moving beyond this approach would require greater intelligence gathering to target individual suspects, as well as broader policy shifts in urban development and limited drug legalization to weaken existing illicit economies.

Beyond arrests, the French approach towards deradicalization within prison focuses on more on sentencing than rehabilitation, an approach which undermines the potential for effective deradicalization programs. Over the last decade, in light of high profile attacks committed by former inmates, the government adopted several new approaches. First, prison officials gained an increasing power to overrule prisoner rights, notably the right to privacy, in the name of security. With the creation of a new Bureau of Prison Intelligence, prison officials can now wiretap phones, place hidden cameras, and examine electronic communications, using tools previously only available to intelligence services. Second, the government launched a new program designed to separately target “influencers” and inmates in the process of being radicalized. The program involves a higher ratio of wardens to prisoners, with staff trained in psychology, sociology, Islam, and history. Inmates are offered theatre workshops, debate seminars, and courses covering subjects ranging from legal studies to Japanese literature. These programs are intended to last six months, after which the inmate is released into the general population under close supervision by prison staff. Beyond prisons, the government has attempted to passed new laws to counter radicalization within schools, by better communicating the reasons for laicites to faith communities, teaching more colonial history in classrooms, and encouraging Arabic language courses within public spaces, although these have proven politically unattractive with conservative voters. This combination of policies seeks to deradicalize individuals through a variety of tools, which combat root factors in marginalized populations, engage with individuals along the path of radicalization, and isolate individuals deemed “too far gone.”

Results so far have been mixed. While the combination of isolation targeting influencers and robust CVE engagement with those at risk of radicalization has reduced the number of reported incidents of radicalization in prisons, analysts warn against premature declarations of success. In fact, many argue that influencers are now more hidden than they were in the past, as the policies have not stopped radicalization but rather pushed it further underground. This mirrors the government’s crackdown on hardline Imams in the early 2000s. One unintended consequence of this policy was that radicalization moved underground into social spaces where it couldn't be monitored or challenged by the government or community members. Another policy, the construction of dedicated isolation facilities for radicalized inmates, poses numerous problems. First, radicalization is difficult to measure and this sort of segregation results in pious inmates being lumped in with hardened extremists. Second, isolating radical prisoners from the general population risks pushing them furthers their radicalization, as they lose exposure to information beyond their personal beliefs and that of prison officials. Finally, this move risks empowering more radical cells amongst convicted terrorists. When the UK established such a special segregated unit in 2005, it put members of Al Qaeda, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and smaller Algerian outfits in the same unit. The result was a book, Limatha Intasarna (Why We Were Victorious), written by one of the inmates, collecting lessons from different inmates on military and organizational tactics, which was then smuggled out of prison for distribution to VEOs worldwide. Isolating radicals in special units may give the appearance of greater security, but simply enforces existing hardline ideologies and reduces the chance for radicalization to be challenged through a marketplace of ideas with other prisoners. However, the higher staff-to-inmate ratios and opportunities for education are promising, and show strong results in other countries where they are already deployed.

Beyond the potential backlash produced by isolating high-level influencers and radicalized inmates from the general population, these programs fail to fully interact with the environmental stressors that make inmates vulnerable to radicalization. One major issue in French prisons is the lack of faith services available to Muslim inmates. Research points to the crucial role that Imams can play in counter-radicalization efforts, as they can use theological arguments to dispel extremist ideologies. Yet as of 2008, only 100 Imams serviced France’s 200 prisons, compared with 480 Catholic, 250 Protestant, and 50 Jewish chaplains. More broadly, general debates about religion are heavily stifled by France’s strict interpretation of secularism, or laicite. In stark contrast to the United States, which bans government interference in religion, French laicite places strict restrictions on religious displays in public, notably in schools. Yet the country’s strong Catholic roots ensure that, to some degree, these restrictions target French Muslims to a greater degree than any other group. What debates do occur within prisons, are often undertaken by underpaid Imams and Islamic scholars who are vetted by authorities.  The strict regulations placed on their sermons by officials limit their ability to engage with radicalized inmates and result in their image as a tool of the state. As a result, radicalized inmates avoid contact with them, out of suspicion or fears of being punished for interacting with them. The government ought to empower Imams with more resources and independence, in order to create strong voices in prisons which can mediate between prisoners and officials, and counteract the power of influencers.

In addition to empowering religious figures, French prisons must better support the freedom of Muslim inmates to express their faith while serving their sentences, as current restrictions on gives additional ammunition to influencers. While Muslim prisoners can forego pork products, true halal meals are not an option in most prisons. Christian inmates receive special gifts from family members for Christmas, but Muslim inmates don’t receive the same on Ramadan. French authorities can significantly weaken “influencers” by enforcing religious requirements in line with standards established by the European Court of Justice and the United Nations. These include, among other things; defined halal menu options, alarm clocks to indicate prayer times, access to Korans, flexible dinner schedules to accommodate for fasting during Ramadan, the provision of soap and water at prayer spaces, and the right to meet with spouses in a private room. Religious accommodations in line with international standards can only serve to weaken influencers, and is crucial to promoting human rights in prisons.

If France seeks to break the prison to jihad pipeline, it ought to move beyond discourses which securitize broad segments of the population and empower moderate voices in prison indirectly, by giving Imams more support and autonomy, while ensuring that prisoners can freely practice their faith. While targeted support for prisoners at risk of radicalization can provide positive outcomes, it should be done in a manner that doesn’t fully isolate them, at risk of cementing hardline views. Finally, the prison debate should force a broader discussion in French society about the treatment of Muslims in general, with an emphasis on economic inclusion and genuine police reform.

Security Implications of Post-Brexit Fragmentation in European Financial Governance

Combating illicit finance, ensuring the stability of capital markets, and preventing crises are not purely financial concerns anymore. Not only has the relevance of military power arguably declined and that of economic power rose since the end of the Cold War, but financial markets themselves underwent major securitization. Budgetary and financial considerations have always constrained foreign policy, but finance and security now merge in less obvious ways. The intensified surveillance of banking after 9/11, rising popularity of financial, rather than trade, wars, and the growth of government interest in acquiring financial data are all making it ever more difficult and dangerous to treat the governance of finance and security as only loosely connected.

The expanding overlap between finance and security should raise additional concerns over the so-called “Brexodus,” the shift of financial power and competence away from the UK and toward the Continent. The UK’s loss of access to the integrated financial market will not only hit bankers and investors. Its implications are of national, regional, and global security importance. The European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), created to integrate financial supervision within the EU, are now preparing to relocate the headquarters of its major regulatory agency, the European Banking Authority (EBA), from London to Paris. The UK’s departure from the EU will exacerbate preexisting gaps in cross-border cooperation in combating illicit finance, which previously allowed for the movement of dirty funds revealed in the Panama Papers and the Global Laundromat series. Meanwhile, British firms continue to benefit from massive inflows of foreign capital, a significant portion of which the British government believes to be laundered, and London remains one of the most attractive destinations for potential ‘golden visa’ holders. Considering the reputation of the city as the money-laundering capital of the world, the relocation of such a prized regulatory body as the EBA is an especially salient issue, since Britain will now have to assume responsibility for building an independent administrative capacity to counter the estimated £90 billion worth of illicit financial flows that go through London each year. This number constitutes a staggering 17 per cent of total global money laundering – an amount challenging to handle in the absence of Europe’s regulatory framework the UK will lose access to. Having more than one-sixth of the world’s money laundering transactions face less regulation than ever before opens new opportunities for proliferation and terrorism financing, let alone tax evasion and anonymous shell companies.  

Back in 2016, British authorities lamented the deterioration of the UK’s status as a world leader on anti-corruption due to the continuing lack of transparency domestically. Now, its reputation as the upholder of European financial market stability is under threat, too. More than 90 percent of the euro-denominated derivatives business of euro banks are currently cleared via central counterparty clearing houses (CCPs) in the UK. Central clearing is a crucial function of the global financial system that ensures investors can access liquidity in multiple currencies across multiple markets. Britain handles the majority of euro banks’ interest rate and credit derivative transactions, as well as a significant number of commodity and equity derivatives. In light of Brexit, EU experts worry the potential CCP failure will result in massive, volatile movements in the comparative cost of using UK CCPs, which might trigger the transfer of hundreds of thousands of trades worth trillions of euros. Such disruption is likely to cause a liquidity drain and erode profitability in the short-run and leave systematic consequences on the global financial system in the long-run. With those concerns in mind, Yves Mersch, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, encouraged EU authorities to consider taking action to ensure the Eurosystem has adequate control over the impact of clearing activities in the UK. What it ultimately means is a transition towards a new European and global clearing system, over which London will have considerably less influence. Such a dramatic departure from the “London-centrism” of regional financial markets will undoubtedly give Britain more autonomy, but it will also weaken the UK’s ability to impose its preferences on regional and, consequently, global financial governance.

Some view fragmentation of financial governance as less detrimental, claiming it decreases chances of systemic risk due to more diversified and thus more robust regulatory systems. Jon Danielsson of London School of Economics and Political Science argues that divergent governance regimes protect against synchronized reactions of financial firms – one of the few mechanisms capable of triggering a collapse of an entire financial system. However, many consider it undesirable for the new British regulatory system to differ too dramatically from that of the EU. Fearing Brexit might pose a systemic risk not just to the domestic market but to the global financial system, Piers Haben, Director of Oversight at the European Banking Authority, has called for Britain’s exit from the EU’s financial system to be “as smooth as possible,” implying that the UK and EU should not do much to alter their regulatory regimes. Depending on what side of the argument one is on, Brexit can mean both greater and lesser systemic risk. What is certain is that there should be a balance between centralization, which provides convenience for market participants, and decentralization, which mitigates risks. Achieving such delicate balance requires key actors’ trust in one another and an environment conducive to successful negotiations. Brexit is very unlikely to encourage either of these things.

On the Continent, however, things are not looking entirely grim for the future of financial governance without extensive British involvement. While the prospects of a hard Brexit are becoming more and more likely with each week of unsuccessful negotiations, European financial governance is growing its emphasis on operational, rather than regulatory, functions, both regionally and globally. Scholars speculate that the UK’s presence in the EU was, in fact, a major friction preventing the euro area from further centralization of institutional governance. Now that this impediment is removed and the political support for a financial union is sufficiently high, the ESAs will find it easier to come to cooperative positions without the need to factor in the peculiar preferences of the largest financial market in Europe. The ESAs will be able to take a more assertive position and assume a more prominent role internationally. “If you’re tired of London, you’re tired of life,” the famous saying goes, but Brussels will have no choice but to make the most out of its inevitable break from the City.

Is This the End of a Free Internet in Europe As We Know It?

The Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, also known as the EU Copyright Directive, is a proposed European Union directive intended to give the European Union a singular and universal copyright law, while moving towards a Digital Single Market. The Copyright Directive was first introduced by the European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs on June 20, 2018. Just recently, as of  September 12, 2018, the European Union approved the directive and will enter formal discussions expected to conclude in January 2019. If ratified, each of the EU's member countries would then be required to enact laws to support the directive.

The EU says their main goal for pushing this directive through is to protect press publications, reduce the “value gap” between the profits made by internet platforms and content creators, and encourage collaboration between the two latter groups. This directive has gained a lot of media attention because of Articles 11 and 13.

Article 11, the “link tax,” and would require websites to obtain a license before linking to news stories. This specifically gives press publishers direct copyright over use of their publications by internet platforms like online news feeds. Some critics of Article 11 have said that this part of the law might stop ordinary web users sharing news stories, but the text of Article 11 does exempt individuals. It says that the new rights given to publishers “shall not prevent legitimate private and non-commercial use of press publications by individual users.” However, it’s not clear what counts as a commercial platform. What about blogs or RSS feeds that compile headlines like Google News does? What about a Facebook page that is followed by a lot of people? The other aspect of Article 11 that is unclear is what counts as sharing a news story? One amendment that was added to the directive says individual words or hyperlinks can’t be taxed, but how many words is that exactly and when do those words make up enough to be taxed?

Article 13, also known as the “meme ban,” requires websites which primarily host content posted by users to take “effective and proportionate” action to prevent unauthorised postings of copyrighted content and be liable for their users’ actions. The article further states that “storing and giving access to large amounts of works and other subject-matter uploaded by their users” are liable for copyright infringement committed by users. So, platforms and copyright holders must “cooperate in good faith” to stop this infringement from happening in the first place. The question now becomes how will this Article actually be enforced? The most effective, but controversial, enforcement would be implementing upload filters. Websites like Facebook and YouTube would be forced to scan every piece of content users share and checking it against a database of copyrighted material. The problems with having an upload filter are the filter would be subject to abuse, it would make millions of mistakes, and the technology for it simply doesn’t exist to scan the internet’s content in this way.

Most of the media attention facing Articles 11 and 13 is negative and widely critical. The Articles are opposed by over 200 academics from research centers, authors, journalists, publishers, law experts, internet experts, cultural institutions, internet users, civil rights organizations, and lawmakers. Google, which also owns YouTube, has opposed the directive since it was introduced. Executives from Google say the new rules would “turn the internet into a place where everything uploaded to the web must be cleared by lawyers.” In 2018 Google encouraged news publishers in its Digital News Initiative to lobby members of European Parliament on the proposals. Facebook is also opposed to the directive and released a statement expressing they believe the proposal “could have serious, unintended consequences for an open and creative internet.” A Change.org petition was also started to combat the directive and has gathered more than a million signatures. A few days before the parliamentary vote, Wikipedia also started a campaign against the directive. Members of the European Parliament who oppose the changes include Julia Reda (Germany, Pirate Party), Heidi Hautala (Finland, Green League), and Dan Dalton (UK, Conservative Party). Reda describes the law as large media companies trying to force “platforms and search engines to use their snippets and to pay for them.” Creators, however, are divided on this issue.

For the most part this directive is supported by mainstream newspapers, publishers, and the music industry. A campaign by the European Grouping of Societies of Authors and Composers collected a little over 50,000 signatures from creators in support of the directive, including one from world famous DJ David Guetta. Other famous musicians who support the directive include Paul McCartney and James Blunt. A different set of creators do not support this law - online creators. Cover artists and YouTubers like PewDiePie who use video games as part of their career, and artists who parody music. These are just a few of the creators who can be affected negatively from the directive and who have spoken out against it. YouTubers, like video gamer PewDiePie, used their platform to educate people on the directive and encouraging their viewers to get involved by calling their respective EU parliament members to vote against the law.

While Articles 11 and 13 have gotten the most attention so far, the new directive does also tighten up copyright in lots of smaller ways. There are concerns over how the directive treats text and data mining programs. This could apply copyright claims to automated scanners, for example. Another clause that was recently added to the directive would give sports leagues exclusive rights over any images or video of a game, making sports GIFs and photos taken by sports fans at games subject to copyright claims. This is the same for compilations, videos of people lip syncing to songs (like Music.lys), and many similar forms of media.

Alex Voss, a European Parliament member from Germany, is leading support for the bill in Parliament. Voss says companies like Google and Facebook are waging an unjust smear campaign against the directive. A coalition of European press publishers including the Press Association and the European Alliance of News Agencies issued a letter in support of the law. The publishers said the directive is “key for the media industry, the consumer’s future access to news, and ultimately a healthy democracy.”

The viability and constitutionality of versions of Articles 11 and 13 in the United States all depends on who you ask. Opponents of Articles 11 and 13 in the U.S. will be sure to cite the 1st Amendment as the reason why these articles would be unconstitutional. Putting these types of limitations on people’s creativity and on the press could set a dangerous precedent and it could definitely be seen as a violation of people’s right to free expression and free press. Proponents of the laws, however, would look to Article 1 Section 8, Clause 8 in our Constitution.  This clause is known as the copyright clause and it explicitly states the legislative branch has the power “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”

We also have specific copyright laws here as well. The Copyright Act of 1976 is our main foundation for a majority of U.S. copyright law and exceptions to copyright. The Act spells out the basic rights of copyright holders. The United States copyright law protects "original works of authorship," in a tangible medium including literary, dramatic, musical, artistic, and other intellectual works. This protection is available to both published and unpublished works. Our copyright law, however, is not as straightforward as people would think or want. For example, in U.S. copyright law there is this distinction called the idea–expression dichotomy. This protects the “expression” of an idea, but copyright does not protect the “idea” itself and this concept is fundamental to copyright law.

There is also the gray area of parodies and fair use. Fair use is the use of limited amounts of copyrighted material that does not qualify as copyright infringement. There are four factors that determine if something is fair use, but there really are no clear guidelines it really is a case to case basis. The four factors are: “purpose and character of the use, including whether the use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; “the nature of the copyrighted work;” “the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;” and “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.” There is also another unofficial factor added on to that list: is the material in question highly transformative? Meaning, is it so different from the original work that it is fair use and cannot even be qualified as copyright infringement since it is so different. Fair use and the transformative nature of copyrighted work comes into question when dealing with parodies. Many musical artists, for instance, do not always like when shows or YouTubers parody them and their music. Back in 2013, YouTube parody creator Bart Baker made a parody of Lorde’s song Royals. Lorde’s team did not like this, filed a complaint, and YouTube took the video down for a few weeks. This instance called into question the issue of fair use and many people were critical of both Lorde’s team and YouTube’s response to them. Eventually YouTube put the video back up but these things happen frequently whether it be on YouTube, Spotify, Music.ly, and more platforms. 

Recently, aside from issues of copyright, we now live in a world rampant with fake news, alternative facts, sensationalized news clips, and David Dobrik’s favorite - clickbait. Part of the EU’s reasoning behind the EU Copyright Directive was not just to protect artists, but they say also to protect people from buying into false news. Article 11 is intended to help prevent websites from using such false headlines that leave readers with the wrong impression once they scroll past it.

The EU Copyright Directive is still a long way from becoming law. The EU Parliament has to take it to the European Council, which represents the 28 countries in the Union, and then it goes to the EU’s executive body, the European Commission. The Commission will finalize the law and then send it back to Parliament, who will vote on whether or not to officially make it law in January. If it does pass, which seems likely right now, it then goes to each member state, each of whom have the right to implement the directive as it sees fit. It is possible that some countries may decide to implement it fully whiles decide to implement the law to minimize consequences. Nonetheless, free speech and free internet are at stake in this.

Fork in the Steppe: Ukraine’s Difficult History with Western Integration

The success of American strategy in the European continent relies on key instruments, particularly NATO with respect to military affairs, and the European Union with respect to economic and social spheres. These institutions compete with Russian initiatives to the east, which demonstrate a lack of commitment to the liberal norms and values championed by the West, and replace them with opposing governing models and a willingness to assert military force to achieve national objectives. This is particularly concerning for policymakers in Kyiv, who, prior to 2014, attempted to maintain a balance between a Central European and Eurasian identity, and are now trapped in a heated “frozen conflict”. As Ukrainian political debate began to find itself increasingly calling to engage in economic integration with one side or the other, Kyiv realized the mounting difficulty in maintaining its claim of neutrality. The series of events surrounding this struggle within Ukraine demonstrates the disparity between Western and Russian worldviews. Ultimately, they suggest that the United States and its European allies may be unprepared to prevent a long-term Russian success in the region, rendering the prospect of Ukrainian accession into the European Union and NATO low.

Ukraine and Russia have a long and intertwined history, spanning interactions both remembered positively and negatively. Russia notably recognizes the founding of the Russian state in the Christianization of Kievan Rus’, and emphasises the mutual historical and cultural links between Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus whenever it can. Other events, however, such as the Treaty of Pereyaslav in 1654, or the more well-known Holodomor, are understood in the Ukrainian historical narrative as events characterizing a relationship of mistrust with Russia. The former is noted as having legally commenced the characterization of Ukrainians as an inseparable part of the Russian people, after the Zaporizhian Cossacks controversially pledged an oath of loyalty to the Russian Tsar in exchange for protection against Poland-Lithuania. The image of Ukraine as being a branch of the greater Russian nation has survived throughout the Imperial and Soviet eras, and is an important factor in understanding their current relationship.

On the other hand, Ukraine also has a strong Central European influence, most notably in its west. This is best expressed by Foreign Minister of the Ukrainian SSR Anatoliy Zlenko’s assertion in 1990 that “a common history existing a thousand years and a deep cultural, linguistic, and ideological closeness have linked [Ukraine] with neighboring Poland. The western regions of Ukraine and the eastern provinces of Poland … are similar in makeup of population and economy”. While it cannot be denied that historic links exist, he refrains from mentioning that they have been experienced as mostly negative, perhaps even worse than with Russia. Despite this friction, policymakers in Kyiv saw their interests as increasingly aligned with those of Central European states following the collapse of the USSR, lending truth to Zlenko’s claim of the region’s close ideological proximity to Ukraine.

This is largely due to the fact that Central European nations were successful in both severing Moscow’s influence, as well as crafting a new identity for themselves as “Central European.” In search of a similar future, the Ukrainian authorities made it their priority to become a part of several Central European institutions, most notably in what was then the Visegrád Triangle in 1992. Today the Visegrád Four, this institution was a grouping of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, and was instrumental in developing a post-Communist Central European bloc independent of Moscow’s control. Despite close Polish-Ukrainian relations at this time, the initiative to “join” Central Europe ended in failure, hampered by other nations’ fears that accepting Ukraine would diminish their claims of a Central European identity and anger Moscow.

This aversion to antagonizing the Kremlin was not out of bad faith, as it is now understood that Russia certainly views social influence, such as perceptions of national identity, in zero-sum terms. In a world marked by greater international cooperation, a failure to participate in blocs or alliances can result in a significant loss of influence. In this way, a truly neutral Ukraine, as neither a part of the European Union or the Eurasian Economic Union, could have been in danger of marginalization. This led to pressure on Yanukovych to engage in an economic agreement with either the Eurasian or European Union, as maintaining equal partnership with both is technically and legally infeasible. Recognizing this, Russia did everything in its power to prevent a preference for greater Western ties, envisioning the risk of the eventual full admission of Ukraine into the European Union and possibly NATO. The Russian strategic mindset places a great importance on land as a defensive resource, most vehemently in the Northern European Plain, where no natural barriers exist between Russia and Europe. A Ukraine in NATO would put Western troops deep into this region, constituting unacceptable threat from the perception of Moscow.

This tug of war manifested itself in the back and forth saga over whether or not President Yanukovych would allow the passing of a Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement, which is designed to significantly increase the nation’s interactions with European institutions. Although having been largely committed to the agreement since March 2014, he experienced a last minute change of heart due to fears of Russian economic retaliation, a move which did not go over well with the Ukrainian public and sparked the Euromaidan Revolution. This climaxed in Yanukovych’s descent from power, putting celebrations in Moscow on hold.

A change in the balance of power almost never passes calmly, and this proved no exception, as, in early 2014, President Putin decided to use military force in Ukraine. This decision was partially inspired by NATO’s expression of military force against Serbia in 1999 as support for the self-determination of Kosovo. This use of hard power mixed with an emphasis on territorial self-determination was expressed in Russia’s use of unmarked soldiers to secure and eventually annex Crimea through referendum, as well as their support for armed separatists in eastern Ukraine. The annexation of Crimea was especially informative, as it not only violates international agreements, but levied accusations of disregarding the precedents set after the Second World War regarding the respect of territorial integrity between states in Europe. The Russian Federation thus revealed itself as a revisionist power in Europe, with a lack of commitment to the current world order that is seen as hypocritical and having been solely crafted by and for the West.

How the frozen conflict in Ukraine will mature is still to be seen. No nation engaged in territorial conflict can be admitted to the NATO alliance, and Ukrainian accession to the European Union has since become more unpopular with some member states, particularly Hungary. The reasons for this shift in Budapest’s positioning towards Ukraine are complex, but generally revolve around the Orban government’s newfound faith in illiberalism, a school of thought associated with Russia. Hungary has also espoused concern for the rights of the Hungarian diaspora in Transcarpathia, after a law was passed that greatly restricted the position of minority languages in education. This law was part of a broader movement of growing Ukrainian nationalism, which has crystalized in ways that would not have been possible without the spectre of an aggressive Russia. This national feeling is also marked by significant growth in Ukrainians’ positive perception of the European Union and Western institutions. This is a result of previous sentiments in Ukraine’s east, which were favorable to Russia, suffering due to the increased perception of a Russia that will act maliciously towards Ukraine, coupled with the loss of the most pro-Russian territories in the country: Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk. This has given way to a victory of western Ukraine’s vision of the nation. While there is still a great deal of caution when dealing with Ukraine, Central Europeans have recognized this more profound Western national consciousness, allowing Kyiv to make its way into institutions like the 2016 Visegrád Battlegroup. This stands in contrast to Ukrainian attempts to join Central European institutions in the early 1990s, when Central Europe itself was still fragile, Ukraine divided, and Russia less predictable.

Unfortunately for the current Ukrainian administration, the Russian strategy relies solely on time. As soon as it becomes clear that pro-Western Ukrainian officials are unable to fulfill their promises of economic and political integration, the public will become disenfranchised. This could lead to a rise in the support for more extreme platforms, such as Ukraine’s far-right, which is the most vehemently anti-Russian of Ukraine’s political movements, and has already gained a deal of respect due to its effectiveness in the War in Donbas. However, with enough time, economic stagnation, and Russian resiliency, disenfranchisement could also lead to a more pragmatic approach, one in which there is consensus that admission into the EU and NATO is quite unlikely, and only rapprochement with Russia is a viable path to developing into a prosperous nation. With Ukraine back on cordial terms with Russia, or even latter as a member of the Russian led Eurasian Economic Union, the public would experience increased economic growth and stability, the tangible benefits of which would likely cement support for this policy. Although with the potential to foster greater resentment, this strategy has already proven relatively effective. Moldova, the first country to experience a frozen conflict with pro-Russian separatists, since moved to become an observer state of the Eurasian Economic Union in 2017, 25 years after the Transnistria War.

The series of events surrounding Ukraine are a testament to the zero-sum reality that have materialized out of conflicting perceptions and onto the Ukrainian Steppe. For the post-Soviet nation, a difficult moment of choice between the values and identity of the West or Russia has begun, but only time will tell where that decision ultimately falls. In order for Ukraine to remain committed to Western values, it is in the interest of the United States and its European allies to ensure that Ukraine does not feel it is left out of Western institutions, even if NATO or EU membership is out of the question for the time being. Western assistance to Ukraine can be delivered not only politically, but also economically and militarily, and it would be unwise for Western policymakers to take these off the table. Corruption should be understood as an important piece of the Kremlin’s arsenal, and a tool with the potential to bypass unfavorable public sentiment. With popular support on the side of the West, decreasing the prevalence of corruption and helping to maintain Ukraine as a transparent democracy is a worthy strategy for Brussels and Washington. Despite their ultimate policy choices, however, it is critical for them to understand that time is not on their side.

A Changing Ireland: Catalysts and Social Revolutions

The Republic of Ireland is in the middle of a massive social upheaval that is projected to change the county in an unprecedented way. Ireland is historically and culturally steeped in the Catholic religion, yet the Irish people seem to be finding a more modern interpretation of their faith. In past years the Irish people have not only voted to legalize marriage equality by popular vote, but have also elected an openly gay Prime Minister and repealed their Eighth Amendment: a law defining most cases of abortion illegal. These changes are unprecedented and were thought to never occur in the highly religious country. Some are painting Ireland as the new liberal “darling” of the world. Indeed, it is a marker of the changing social sphere of Ireland that these changes are taking place. Such changes are occuring amidst and in reaction to various scandals within the Catholic Church and increasing economic globalization. To understand the phenomenon and potential future effects it is first important to understand the marker of change that have already taken place.

Repealing the Eighth Amendment

On May 25th, 2018 Ireland voted to repeal the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment, or Article 40.3.3 of the Irish Constitution, prohibited abortion - the only exception being in cases where the mother’s life was at risk. The amendment did not allow abortion in cases of rape or incest.  The consequence for women looking to bypass this law by purchasing abortion pills online was a 14-year jail sentence. Many women, instead, opted to travel abroad, an option legalized by the Irish legislature in 1992. This law has been described by some as “outsourcing abortion” and placed an economic barrier to entry on women seeking this option. The travel option worked for 168,703 women who traveled to England and Wales from 1980 (prior to the legalization of the travel decision) to 2016. In 2016 alone, 724 women traveled to England or Wales for abortions. This number only includes women who used an Irish address and does not include women who traveled to other nearby countries such as the Netherlands; the true number of Irish women traveling abroad for abortions is likely much higher than the number above. Furthermore, the number of women who bought abortion pills online is unknown. Given these numbers, it is surprising that abortion was not legalized earlier. However, what the numbers do not disclose is the stigma surrounding women seeking abortions. While more women have been speaking out about their experiences and needs in recent years, the public had not reached a consensus prior to the referendum. Ultimately, the vote went 66% in favor of repeal with a 64% voter turnout rate. Many were surprised by the vote as one fifth of voters were undecided in early polls. More surprising, however, is that abortion is now legal in a Catholic country. The vote’s passage is a marker of the radically changing social climate in Ireland. Should the vote have been a few years earlier, it might have resembled the 1983 referendum which struck down abortion rights by a large margin. This change calls in question a number of significant events that helped prepare Ireland for this change.

A number of high profile abortion cases affected the public perception of state-controlled abortion. Two cases in particular were used by the pro-choice movement to highlight the necessity of repeal. The X Case in 1992 was the legal case of a 14-year-old girl who had been raped and became pregnant. The girl and her parents applied for her to travel to England to undergo an abortion. The case was appealed to the High Court by the then Attorney General, who intended to ban the child from traveling. Ultimately, the girl was allowed to travel, but not before the case sparked outrage on both sides. A second case symbolically used by the pro-choicers is that of Savita Halappanaver, a woman who asked to terminate her pregnancy when complications arose. The hospital she was a patient at refused to comply and Savita later died from a septic miscarriage.

A mural of Savita Halappanavar in Dublin.

These cases, amongst many others, rose to the forefront of the movement in recent years. The women affected, and those supporting them, connected with the increasingly supportive public. The movement gained in momentum in recent years, with more women speaking out publicly and through art. The movement also gained from support by newly elected Taoiseach Varadkar, a supporter of the repeal movement.

Taoiseach Varadkar

In 2017 Ireland elected its first openly gay Prime Minister, Leo Varadkar.  Taoiseach Varadkar (as traditionally titled in the Irish language) is both Ireland’s and the world’s first gay world leader, marking an enormous change in global and Irish sociopolitical psyche.  Varadkar is widely recognized as the embodiment of the liberalization of the country. He openly supported the repealing of the Eighth Amendment long before the recent referendum. As a trained physician, he stated that the Irish should “trust and respect women to make the right choices and decision about their own healthcare.” Varadkar was formerly the health minister and  supported repealing the eighth amendment during his duration in the office. He spoke out on two cases in particular that changed his mind on the Eighth Amendment. One such case involved an asylum seeker who, when she traveled to England for an abortion, was denied access to the country. The woman had no other options and became suicidal; Varadkar recognized that in cases like this, the constitution was failing women.

Following the referendum vote, Varadkar celebrated by saying “what we have seen today really is a culmination of a quiet revolution that’s been taking place in Ireland for the past 10 or 20 years.” He continued by saying that “this has been a great exercise in democracy, and the people have spoken, and the people have said: We want a modern Constitution for a modern country.” Indeed, the Irish people have been proving time and time again that they want a more modern and progressive country. Changes began in the country in the 1990s, when divorce was legalized and homosexuality was decriminalized. On May 22nd 2015 Ireland became the first country to legalize same-sex marriage by popular referendum. With global attention honed on Ireland, Varadkar was elected just two years later by Fine Gael (the majority party) to become the first openly gay world leader, and last month, just one year later, the Eighth Amendment was repealed. A number of factors contributed to this surprising timeline including the disillusionment amongst the Irish people with the Catholic Church.

Declining Religion

Ireland is a historically Catholic country, with the church considered a pillar of the nation. Some have related the Church's influence to that of England prior to Irish Independence. The Irish, however, attend mass in steeply declining numbers. In 1980, 85% of the population attended weekly mass. Today just 30% of the Irish population attend mass regularly. While 74% of voters in the referendum still identify as Catholic, 27% attend just a few times a year and 29% hardly ever go to mass. The Church, it seems, is no longer a cornerstone of Irish society.

A number of factors led to this decline, one being the number of church scandals uncovered in recent times. Across the world, religious and nonreligious individuals were shocked at the volume and nature of child abuse cases. Ireland, with its intimate connection to the church, was particularly taken back. In Ireland 90% of state funded primary schools are controlled by the church and in 2009 a study found that tens of thousands of children were abused in school. This number is especially alarming in comparison to the 4.5 million population. It is evident that Ireland has been quietly suffering at the hands of the church for many years.

In a more public offense, Bishop Eamonn Casey was found to have fathered an 18-year-old son with Annie Murphy. The Bishop was once a prominent member of the Catholic Church in Ireland and his betrayal of his faith, in addition payments made to the mother from his diocesan accounts, shocked to the country. Situations like this, alongside past instances of abuse and public shaming, helped the Irish public to move away from the Church’s doctrines in their own thinking and beliefs. Bishop O’Reilly stated that “[Ireland has] the reality that many are now cultural Catholics” and that there is a “new reality in Ireland where the Church is no longer the dominant voice in society.” It is true that Ireland today no longer follows the Church as it once did.

Professor McElroy of Trinity College Dublin described the effect of the repeal vote on the Roman Catholic hierarchy as the “final nail in the coffin.” This is evident both in the recent referendum and in political leanings which are increasingly liberal. Former Deputy Prime Minister and Professor Gilmore said that Ireland is changing due to the influence of “a more open and growing economy; the diminishing influence of the Catholic Church, partly as a result of the sex abuse scandals; [and] growing support for the Liberal Agenda” amongst other factors.

Ireland’s Future

Recent legislative changes reveal that Ireland’s social sphere is changing. The significant legal changes on a relatively short timeline are evidence of a meaningful social change. The Catholic Church’s influence is lessening both because of various scandals and decreasing popular participation. The Irish people are less focused on religion to find guidance and are increasingly interested in personal stories of those affected by laws written for an age that has long past. The repeal movement found great success in using the stories of women wronged by past laws to change the hearts and minds of the voters. Indeed, similar methods worked in legalizing same-sex marriage. Considering the remarkable social leaps that Ireland has taken, and the success rate of newfound methods of campaigning for change, it will be interesting to see what comes next for Ireland.

ETA: What the Future Holds and How the Past Can Help Predict

The organization Basque Homeland and Freedom is fighting its last battle— a legal battle with Spain and France to formally demobilize and begin the reparation process.  The organization, better known as ETA, has been terrorizing Spain and France since 1958 as it struggled for a free Basque Country. Basque Country, or País Vasco in Spanish, is the north-eastern region of Spain located just below the south-easternmost section of the Spanish-French border.

Image from Financial Tribune

The area historically also extends into the southeastern corner of France. The region has developed a unique reputation of being unconquerable due to its mountainous land protections and unnavigable seaside. The region was remarkably removed, and prior to the unification of the region in 1512 by Queen Isabella and King Ferdinand, Basque Country was largely left untouched by the world due to its accessibility. Proof of this lies in the fact that the Euskara language is one of the most difficult languages in the world to learn, and holds little traces of outside influence. It is in this fiercely independent pocket of the world that ETA has flourished. Over the past 51 years, the group has engaged in local and national politics, as well as horrific guerrilla warfare. In total, the group has taken over 829 lives, largely civilian, through their comprehensive bombings and shooting campaigns. Their methods have landed 287 group members in prisons across Spain and France. Today, the group is attempting to lessen their prison sentences of their members by demobilizing.

History of ETA

ETAs roots are anchored in the historical battle between Basque Country and the Spanish Crown. The annexation of the region came at an extreme loss of life to both sides, and while it ended with Basque Country being incorporated into Spain, the people revolted against the central powers for decades. The Basque people have long felt that their wealth and freedoms were being drained by Spain, a notion that was captured by Sabino Arana, the founder of the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) in 1895. Arana, considered the father of the Basque nationalist movement, framed Basque history as an epic of military victories and popular revolts centered on the all-consuming goal of territorial unity and the continuation of the ever-disappearing Basque culture and language. These sentiments captured many Basques and steeped into their national identity until coming to fruition during the Franco era.

Image from Ingelesa Hobetzen

Francisco Franco rose to power following the Spanish Civil War. His reign lasted from 1939 until his death in 1975 and was characterized by a violent pursuit of a united Spain and a singular Spanish identity and culture. His regime demanded the extermination of regional cultures and languages. The insistence of the Basque people to keep their cultures and to continue to speak Euskara caused Franco to declare Biscay and Gipuzkoa (Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa in Spanish) as “traitor provinces.” It is here where the pro-separatist sentiments were the strongest.  Halfway through Franco’s regime, in 1958, ETA was formed as a clandestine group with the objective of reunifying Basque Country as its own state and bringing freedom to the Basque people. The existentialist desperation of the group propelled them to focus on guerrilla warfare tactics, often targeting civilians. The group solidified their means 1962 at the first assembly of the Basque Revolutionary Movement of National Liberation. Guerrilla warfare was decided upon as the most visible means of self-determination under Franco’s regime, where dissidents were quickly and publically persecuted. Whereas the Franco regime fell in 1975, these tactics have continued into modern day.

Government Background

Prior to the Spanish Civil War and the Francoist Years, Basque Country had certain regional exceptions from the rest of Spain. Deemed a historical province in 1936, the region had benefited from greater autonomy in comparison to the other regions of Spain (excluding Catalonia, which declared autonomy in 1932). This exception was meant to reflect the varied cultural background of the region in comparison to the rest of Spain. However, these exceptions had very real implications for Basque Country's political situation. It also granted the region a higher level of autonomy. These traditions were ultimately continued as Basque exceptionalism was reflected in the 1978 constitution.

The 1978 Spanish Constitution was introduced to a nation that was scarred by the Franco regime and undergoing a transition to democracy. Each region was also celebrating and clinging  to the regional identities that had almost slipped away in the previous years. The Constitution thus formed modern day Spain with respect to these regional identities, but also an eye on what a united Spain could become.  Therefore, the constitution (and later decisions) decided upon having 19 regions, generally informed by historical regions. Each autonomous region has its own parliament and lawmakers. However, Basque Country, Navarre, and Catalonia, were allotted the additional autonomy over the police forces in their region. Additionally, Basque Country and Navarra hold near-total control over their tax systems. While each region pays some money into the federal system, the majority of their taxes remain in their respective regions, and help pay for schools, infrastructure and other necessities. Basque Country received the highest level of autonomy in Spain (with Navarra), yet pro-separatists were unsatisfied, wanting a higher degree of separation. The PNV and other more moderate separatists called for abstention of the referendum for the Constitution that resulted in very poor voter turnout. Factoring in the absentees, only 34.9% of the electorate in Basque Country supported the 1978 Constitution.  Thus, the dissatisfaction in Basque Country continued to grow into the modern day.

ETA Violence

Soon after the implementation of the Constitution, ETA murdered 100 people in one year.  The majority of ETA victims are innocent civilians, not targets of the organization. Some of the most highly successful operations include the June 1987 bomb that went off in a supermarket in Barcelona, killing 21 shoppers. Similarly, in November 2001, a car bomb exploded in Madrid and injured 95 civilians. These attacks are amongst those committed by ETA that harmed the highest number of civilians. ETA has also targeted its direct political opponents-- government officials, police chiefs, and the Civil Guard. The number of lives claimed by this campaign is estimated to be 829. ETA has been a constant terror in Spain, striking with little warning and with complete disregard for human life. Their use of guerrilla warfare extends long past the Franco regime, when the group initially decided on this tactic.

ETAs political affiliations have also continued to grow within Basque Country. The “left abertzale” has gained credibility in recent years - an organization that refers to political parties and organizations aligned with Basque nationalism and separatism. The left abertzale makes up for about a third of the voting population, yet if it is combined with the Spanish left (socialists) they make up half of the votes. It is in this combined political faction that ETA has more recently begun to rely upon. Due to both the relative effectiveness and legality of pursuing Basque goals though the political system, ETA has begun to disentangle itself from violence. However, this is a reiterated theme with ETA, which has caused Spain much grief in the past.

The first ceasefire agreement between Spain and ETA was decided in 1998 and only lasted 14 months. Likewise, in March of 2006 was supposed to be the first “permanent ceasefire” with ETA. ETA broke the agreement nine months later by placing a car bomb in the Barajas airport in Madrid, killing two civilians. These ceasefires are not just validating ETA by allowing it space in the political realm, but ultimately are humiliating the Spanish government. The French government, in comparison, has had more success as the police force has arrested and imprisoned many ETA members. However, it is important to not that not only does the historic Basque region lay primarily in Spain, but also ETA has focused its efforts mostly within Spanish borders as it considers the 1978 constitution humiliating.

Regardless of the targets or reasoning behind the group, it is evident that ETA was not to be trusted in the past in regards to ceasefires.  However, the current state of the group may provide the opportunity needed for Spain and France to finally end the reign of this terrorist group.

Image from TIME

2011 and Beyond

In 2011, ETA announced an end to all “armed activity.” This came decision followed a vote by the  abertzale within their base on political vs. violent action. 80% supported continued political actions while only 20% supported violence perpetrated by ETA. Based on this vote, the left nationalist involved negotiators to help convince ETA to end its tirade of violence.  Indeed, it has worked: since 2011 the group has only made the news when members were caught by the police and sent to prison. This success is mainly attributed to the high percentage of ETA members in prison. Today, over 300 ETA members are in prison and there are an estimated 30 members still at large. The group has little-to-no threat capacity and engaged in disarmament in 2017. They’ve also begun cooperating with authorities; the group alerted the French authorities to eight hiding places over the French border that held over 120 firearms, ammunition, detonators, and three metric tons of explosives.

Currently ETA is only engaged in protecting and advocating for the rights of ETA members in prison. The group is frustrated that prisoners are not being held near Basque Country, preventing families from visiting their loved ones, and that they are not being allowed access to second degree prison rights.  All but eight ETA members currently have first-degree status, which is the status most similar to American prisons. Second degree would give the prisoners access to penitentiary rights, including 18 days outside of the prison per year. More than half of the members applied for second degree status last year and were denied on the basis that they are still members of a an undissolved band. Additionally, the prisoners are scattered between prisons in Spain and France, yet only two are held in Basque prisons. The separation of the prisoners in addition to their physical distance from their families has been named by Amnesty International as being against United Nation standards. Thus, the demobilization of ETA will allows members to access second degree status, and could open up talks of moving the prisoners closer to Basque Country.

Demobilization

ETA has announced that it will put demobilization to a vote in the early summer months. They are considering the term ‘demobilization’ as the UN does, and how it has been put to use in the case of the FARC in Colombia. ETA and the FARC have long had ties, as ETA members have provided the FARC with logistical and tactical knowledge, as well as training in explosives. It seems that ETA is drawing a final parallel with the group as it pursuers an outcome similar to that of the Colombian peace process. Likely, it is because of the lenient agreement that ETA is invoking links to the Colombian peace process. FARC members were granted land reforms and the development of rural areas (an original goal of the group), future political participation, and amnesty for all but those to committed the most serious crimes. While ETA is not asking for amnesty, they would lessen their sentences by not being a part of an active group, and would be able to continue to further their goals through the relatively stronger left wing parties in Basque Country. However, the Spanish government has warned the group that any potential agreement with ETA is not comparable to that of Colombia. Contrarily, this type of agreement appears to have crucial public support. Not only do ETA members stand to gain from this deal, but also supporters of their changed penitentiary deals. In 2014 tens of thousands of protesters took to the streets in Bilbao to demand the return of the prisoners to Basque Country prisons. Additionally, the political left in Basque Country, more than half of the votes, would stand to gain from ETA demobilization as the political parties could refocus their efforts on achieving Basque freedoms through the political system. It is unclear at this point how Spain and France will react to the likely demobilization of ETA in the coming months. For ETA to secure its goals, it will be necessary for the two countries to engage in negotiations with the group, a move that both have been reluctant to do since prior ceasefire violations. However, considering the relative weakness of the group and the potentiality for the countries to put behind them this reminder of tragedies suffered, the world may see a historical deal in the coming year.

Remembering Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Kosovo: Nationalism, Feminisms, Counter-Memory, and Justice

Recent Commemorations & Historical Context

On June 12th, 2015, Pristina unveiled a new monument and temporary exhibition in its city center to commemorate women victims of sexual violence during the Kosovo War. The first of their kind, Heroinat and Mendoj për ty depart markedly from the silencing and stigmatization of survivors common in Kosovo’s ongoing nation-building process.

The creator of Heroinat (Heroines) combined several portraits of women taken during the Kosovo War to depict the face of a single Kosova woman fashioned out of 20,000 brass medals to represent the war’s estimated 20,000 women victims of sexual violence. The “the heroine of Kosovo” is the country’s first monument dedicated to a woman aside from Mother Theresa.

More images can be found at these images' source here.

On the same day as the monument’s unveiling, a small group of women hung 5,000 dresses on clotheslines in an installation titled “Mendoj për ty” (Thinking of You) covering Pristina’s soccer field. Collected from across Kosovo, the dresses metaphorized “airing one’s dirty laundry.” Here, they symbolized the mass rape of women during the war, and confronted the lasting silencing and stigma of survivors of these atrocities.

Image from the Kosova Press

Image from the London School of Economics and Political Science

Following several wars in the Balkans, the Kosovo War lasted from February 1998 until June 11th, 1999. On June 12th, NATO officially entered Pristina and Kosovo became a United Nations Protectorate for the next 9 years until it declared independence in 2008. As with all wars, the conflict in Kosovo disproportionately affected women. The total number of women and men who suffered sexual violence during the war will never be known. However, brutal, systematic sexual violence committed primarily by the Yugoslav army and Serbian police and paramilitaries against ethnic-Albanian Kosova women left permanent scars that have never been properly addressed.  Rapid escalation and brutality, poor documentation, severe stigmatization of survivors, and a wish to respect the dead all contribute to the lack of certainty, but estimates range from 20,000 to 40,0008. During the 78-day airstrike campaign – in which NATO dropped over 6,000 tons of ordnance – Kosova Albanian women testified that they “feared the Serbian police and paramilitaries far more than the bombing.”

In a country currently involved in transitional justice and nation-building, Heroinat and Mendoj për ty should not be overlooked. Their command of attention at all scales, local to global, indicates an unfolding competition to shape the collective memory of the Kosovo War. Heroinat and Mendoj për ty forward two feminist discourses which depart markedly from the silencing and stigmatization of survivors of conflict-related sexual violence in Kosovo, legitimized by a patriarchal nationalist narrative. But to what extent are these commemorations subversive to Kosovo’s patriarchal nationalist discourse? And what impacts might they have on the future of justice for survivors of conflict-related sexual violence in Kosovo?

Collective Memory, Public Consciousness, and Commemoration

Acts of commemoration organize history and assign significance to events and figures, creating a repertoire of shared experiences and reifying the collective memory of a community – or in the case of a nation, creating a “national narrative.” While “remembering” has played an important role throughout human history, large-scale and top-down efforts to link memory, morality, and identity to “the nation” emerged only within the last 150 years. As newborn nation-states, like those during the collapse of Yugoslavia, struggled to achieve their autonomy and/or imperial ambitions, they found themselves “requiring national narratives of loyalty, timelessness, and belonging beyond the individual or local region.” In order to construct these national narratives, the states have sought to ground collective identity in collective memory: answering the question of “who we are,” in part, by answering the question of “where we come from.” Thus, commemoration can allow states to intentionally construct historical narratives in ways that guide identity formation, sharpen group boundaries, and establish and legitimate political and social order.

Yet, just as states use memory to consolidate power, so too can marginalized groups whose experiences the dominant nationalist discourse may have erased. These “counter-memories” aim to contest the manipulation of the past, as well as provide alternative interpretations of it. Commemorations in this light can constitute a force for resistance, redirecting attention to “forgotten” or silenced histories. The recent rise of memory studies has produced evidence to support commemoration and other memory-based processes (public testimonials, naming streets after the dead) as integral to positive, lasting peace. Heroinat and Mendoj për ty, therefore, can be viewed as part of the imagery of social discourse, a powerful tool to communicate who and what should be remembered, and to ultimately shape popular consciousness by encouraging individuals to accept these messages as their own.

Kosovo’s National Narrative & Stigmatization Survivors of Sexual Violence

Kosovo’s patriarchal nationalist discourse necessitates the erasure of women’s experiences during the war and perpetuates the stigmatization and mistreatment of survivors of conflict-related sexual violence, evident in top-down institutional approaches that deny survivors’ agency.

The end of the Kosovo War gave way to a reasserted sense of nationalist traditionalism (characterized by a fusion of masculinity, militarism, and nationalism) proffered by the former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) members who then comprised the ruling political elite. Key elements of this discourse included the “admiration of heroism, along with glorification of epic events, values, and figures of the ‘liberation war,’ [and the] honoring of fallen KLA fighters as ‘national martyrs.’” Countless memorials were erected following the war, honoring founding members of the KLA , martyrs, and even NATO. Missing from this surge of commemoration was any reference to the victims of sexual violence during the conflict. This omission is consistent with communicative memory scholar, Aleida Assmann’s, findings that nationalist collective memory “is receptive to historical moments of triumph and defeat, provided they can be integrated into the semantics of a heroic or martyrological narrative. What cannot be integrated into such a narrative are moments of shame and guilt.” In Kosovo’s national narrative, as in other patriarchal nationalist narratives, women remain seen as custodians of cultural and ethnic heritage, whose task is to use their bodies to produce soldiers, implying that their enemy is not simply the othered ethnic group, but its women. Thus, the experiences of at least 20,000 women cannot be neatly assimilated into the national narrative, especially when wartime sexual violence carries the symbolic humiliation and destruction of “nation” and society. In cases when wartime sexual violence is recognized, the political memory of women as victims becomes a tool to further the nationalist cause through a singular focus on the ethno-nationalist membership of the perpetrator and a possible fetus, thereby “dismissing both the raped woman and the crime committed against her.”

This dominant national narrative promotes both the extension of a militarized ethnic conflict and subordination of women to the nationalist cause. This said, it is also important to understand the appeal of joining an ethno-nationalist movement for women. Membership and supporting roles in the KLA gave women opportunities to enter the public, political, and military spheres to which they had previously been denied access. Indeed, women’s roles during the war included active members of the KLA, messengers, cooks, nurses, members of underground networks, and cross-ethnic anti-nationalist peace movements. But these contributions remain absent from the dominant narrative of the Kosovo War because memorializing women as agents in conflict departs from the strict gender roles and order of post-conflict society envisioned by patriarchal nationalist discourses. As Neluka Silva so succinctly summarizes, “interpellating [women] as ‘national actors’ and foisting a ‘nationalist’ label on them as mothers, daughters, educators, workers, and even fighters is not necessarily empowering if it merely reaffirms the boundaries of culturally acceptable feminine conduct and exerts pressure on them to articulate their gender interests solely within the terms of reference set by nationalist discourse.”

This being the case, feminist actors within a national framework have created positive effects for women in Kosovar society. Heroinat and Mendoj për ty were both completed following a decade of international and civil society efforts to recognize and assist survivors of conflict-related sexual violence. In 2014, President Atifete Jahjaga, Kosovo’s first elected president and the first female president in the Balkans, established the National Council for the Survivors of Sexual Violence during the Kosovo War and spearheaded one of the most important amendments to a law securing pensions and services to those harmed in the war. While best known for offering between €144 and €286 per month to survivors of sexual violence, this amendment also accomplishes the following: designates  “sexual violence victims of the war” as a distinct category alongside the existing recognized groups KLA martyrs, injured “invalid” civilians, and their family members; establishes rights to receive health services abroad, priority employment in the public and private sector, and residential care and collective social housing; eliminates the requirement to prove degree of bodily harm in terms of percentage; creates a government commission of representatives from the Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Health, from the Institute for War Crimes, clinical psychologist, psychiatrist, lawyer, and a representative from a civil society organization who has experience in supporting and protecting sexual violence victims; and enables petitioners to apply through multiple channels including the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, through various NGOs, and as individuals.

While President Jahjaga’s amendment was a critical development towards justice for survivors, the majority of top-down institutional approaches to date appallingly exclude survivors and deny their agency. In a study of the literature on women in conflict, Azza Karam explains that in post-conflict situations, “notions of victimhood and what women have suffered seem to be rallied as legitimate excuses to limit women’s agency in the peace-building process.” This finding certainly holds true in the case of Kosovo. A report published in 2016 by UN Women revealed that survivors were often excluded from justice and peacebuilding processes, largely due to the assumption that their requests for confidentiality and anonymity indicated a desire for non-inclusion. In a broader analysis of Kosovo’s gender relations, the report found that, “despite a strong gender-equality legal framework in Kosovo, in practice, women’s participation remains limited in decision-making processes, especially at the community level.” So, while some of Kosovo’s governing authorities have expressed a willingness to address the needs of survivors, their efforts have been hindered by the larger failure to involve women and survivors in justice and peacebuilding processes.

Moreover, initiatives by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the Kosovo Force (KFOR), and the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) were largely successful at conflict management, but not at peacebuilding. This failure replicated itself in the various systems of courts, tribunals, and truth commissions established after the conflict, most notably in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In name, these bodies valorized criminal prosecution and administrative reconciliation, yet practically failed at promoting deeper reconciliation between ethnic groups or delivering justice to perpetrators of sexual violence. The limits of these top-down approaches have yet to be remedied: At the time of this writing, the ICTY convicted only four men in connection to wartime sexual violence during the Kosovo War, and Kosovo’s domestic court system convicted none.

Long after the war ended, the day-to-day reality facing survivors remains stark. Once their identities are known, women face intimidation violence, and ostracism from their families and communities. Mistrust in local authorities, combined with a lack of proper documentation of crimes, further compels women to remain silent. Many refrain from seeking mental and physical healthcare due to fear of being identified as a survivor, and therefore fall into a cycle of discrimination in terms of their access to basic services and employment once identified. In 2017, 31 out 40 women interviewed by the U.S. Agency for International Development expressed concern about collecting the government pension extended by President Jahjaga’s amendment for fear that explaining the source of the funds would identify them as survivors. The dynamics of Kosovo’s patriarchal nationalism when codified, ritualized, and embedded in public and private life, perpetuates the lasting stigmatization and mistreatment of survivors of conflict-related sexual violence.

Heroinat and Mendoj për ty

Returning to commemorations as points of power affirmation or contestation, Heroinat and Mendoj për ty represent two significant efforts to combat lasting stigmatization of women survivors of conflict-related sexual violence in Kosovo and to foreground women’s pasts, presents, and futures in Kosovo’s public consciousness. These “counter-memories” keep the reality of mass sexual violence in the public eye and thereby emphasize an ongoing need for justice.

Heroinat illustrates the paradoxes between nationalism and feminism in Kosovo. Its accompanying description states that the monument is dedicated to “ethnic-Albanian Kosova women,” and specifically to those who suffered sexual violence during the war period. It is a narrow focus, but rightly so. Heroinat acknowledges the intersections of gendered violence and ethnic conflict that uniquely affected Kosovo’s ethnic-Albanian women following years of oppression under the Milošević regime. Furthermore, its permanent location in the heart of Pristina’s centralizes the experiences of women that have been silenced and stigmatized, and reclaims a prominent public place in the name of survivors.

At the same time, keeping in mind the government-sponsorship of the monument, elements of Heroinat reaffirm nationalist notions of women as “the mother of the nation, the martyr, and the heroine.” The material composition of the monument – brass medals – carries a militarized meaning of women’s identities, reinforced by the language used to describe the mass rape of women as “contribution and sacrifice,” presumably as soldiers “sacrificed” their lives. By portraying victims’ suffering as akin to “national duty,” the creator of the monument implies a level of consent that sanitizes the atrocity of wartime sexual violence, and refocuses attention on “the nation.” Heroinat’s militaristic tone further embeds ethno-nationalist divisions by reminding audiences of perpetrators’ identities: Serbian police and paramilitaries, and primarily ethnic-Serbian Yugoslav soldiers. In reality, sexual violence continued long after the war’s official end and has since been perpetrated against ethnic-Albanian women as well as minority populations, including “revenge rapes” against Serbian women living in Kosovo.

Finally, following Heroinat’s reveal, the government made no attempt to transfer ownership to the public or to women’s organizations capable of maintaining them, or to involve those affected by sexual violence. Most interviewees of a small study of responses to Heroinat perceived the monument as a “throwaway political gesture rather than an offer of genuine support” for survivors. Additionally, they expressed disappointment in the lack of facilitation of a larger societal discussion accompanying its construction. Unfortunately, these oversights perpetuate  the cycle of top-down failures and denial of survivors’ agency. But, despite these shortcomings, Heroinat remains a powerful step towards recognizing and de-stigmatizing survivors of sexual violence during the Kosovo War, even if through a nationalist filter.

Mendoj për ty embodies a more globalized feminism alongside the national feminism of Heroinat. Mendoj për ty symbolically subverts Kosovo’s militaristic, patriarchal national narrative in several ways. First, it utilizes the metaphor of “airing dirty laundry,” yet the clean dresses bore no stain or stigma. Second, Alketa Xhafa-Mripa, the project’s designer and a refugee of the war, collected dresses from multiple regions of Kosovo, thus allowing survivors to participate without compromising their anonymity. Third, the location of Mendoj për ty in a soccer field, a traditionally male-dominated place, challenges gendered, patriarchal notions of public life. Finally, Xhafa-Mripa dedicated the demonstration to survivors of conflict-related sexual violence in Kosovo, and extended solidarity to all survivors, transcending imagined ethno-national borders in opposition to strict ethno-nationalist conceptions of place.

Heroinat and Mendoj për ty embody the heterogenous feminisms active in Kosovo which arose to contest a patriarchal nationalist discourse that both erases the experiences of women during the Kosovo War and perpetuates stigmatization and mistreatment of survivors of conflict-related sexual violence at communal and institutional levels. These commemorations shed light on counter-memories’ potential to catalyze changes in popular consciousness, a necessary condition for meaningful societal change towards ensuring agency of survivors. Heroinat and Mendoj për ty have made clear that nation-building in Kosovo must not come at the expense of justice for its women.

Sovereignty, Secessionism, and State Rights: Examining Security Implications of the EU's Response to Post-Soviet States’ Self-determination Movements

 Intro

Relegated to icy obscurity, de facto states suffer from international institutions that operate on Westphalian norms in a post-Westphalian political landscape, and their fate may tip the scales of international geopolitics to come. The result of decades-old conflicts, de facto states are unrecognized governments that operate autonomously within sovereign, or de jure, states’ internationally recognized borders. Millions of citizens rely on de facto states that lack international recognition and credibility, yet these states must nevertheless provide government institutions for their citizenry. The Peace of Westphalia, in 1648, is the origin of modern conceptions of national sovereignty that international institutions rely upon, wherein each nation is entitled to independently rule its own territory, yet non-state actors such as de facto states lack recognized sovereignty while still ruling over their lands. Although the dilemma of de facto states is not limited to Eurasia, ranging from Anjouan in the Comoros islands and Puntland in Somalia to better known examples such as Palestine and Taiwan, the fall of the Soviet Union and ambiguous parameters for self-determination caused protracted conflicts to emerge within many post-Soviet states. As these conflicts persist, new state identities emerge that further deter and obfuscate lasting peace. The long timespan of these conflicts allows for independent national identities to be constructed, territorialized, and politically mobilized. In the post-Soviet sphere, new states won their own sovereignty, yet were quick to deny the same right to self-determination to groups within their new territories, and such is the case in the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (Transnistria), the Republic of Abkhazia (Abkhazia), the Republic of South Ossetia (South Ossetia), and the Republic of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh). International institutions operate on the norms of sovereignty outlined in the Peace of Westphalia, yet the existence of de facto states prove that we live in a post-Westphalian world where non-sovereign actors play a significant role. Without international recognition, these states can neither issue recognized passports nor formally create trade agreements with other nations. Observers often essentialize civilians of de facto states into a single monolithic entity, ignoring the heterogeneity of their political beliefs and preferences. Analyzing the context and impact of de facto statehood and denied self-determination in Transnistria illustrates the problems caused by international institutions that operate on Westphalian norms and elucidates the importance of de facto states for the future of international politics.  

Table created by Sebastian Relitz

Frozen, Secessionist, Self-Determination Movements

The frozen status of Transnistria’s self-determination movement allows space for state institutions to become entrenched, impeding the conflict’s eventual closure. Transnistria is a self-declared nation on the eastern banks of the Dniester River within Moldova, with a capital city, Tiraspol, and a population of roughly 500,000 inhabitants. Transnistria’s national history is nuanced, as it perennially existed at the juncture between nations. In 1917, the precursor to Transnistria’s parent state Moldova formed, the Moldovan Democratic Republic of Bessarabia, yet this state did not include territory east of the Dniester River, and thus did not include Transnistria. The next year, two more small regional states were combined with Bessarabia, creating ‘Greater Romania.’ Its creation brought with it an aggressive campaign of Romanianization, with a Romanian public schooling program, language tests, and loyalty oaths. As a result of Transnistria’s exclusion from the territory of Greater Romania, it did not undergo the same process of Romanianization, and the cultural ramifications of this persist today. Following the Second World War, the USSR created the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova with territory from Moldova and Bessarabia, now including Transnistria. After its creation, many ethnic Slav industrial workers migrated to Transnistria to work in its budding industrial sector, deepening the demographic divide between Moldova and Transnistria by contributing to a broader Russification. The Soviet administration promoted the development of unique cultural identities, promoting the use of the Cyrillic alphabet and positing “Moldovan” as a language independent from the Romanian that it is almost identical to.

As Soviet dominance faded in 1989, the Popular Front formed in Moldova as an amalgamation of the manifold Moldovan nationalistic groups. Pressure from the Popular Front pushed the USSR to declare Latin script the official letters used in Moldova. In the final days of the USSR, Transnistrian leaders supported the August 1991 Soviet coup, hoping to reverse some of the liberal policies enacted under the policy of perestroika, while Moldovan leaders opposed the coup due to their increasingly divergent nationalistic aims. When the pro-Romanian government in Moldova declared independence on August 27th, 1991, local governments in the east felt that shifting away from their Russia identity and shifting back to Latin letters was intolerable. A mere six days after Moldova declared independence, Transnistria declared its own independence on September 2nd, 1991. Steven Roper explains the cultural divide demarcated by the Dniester River in the Regional & Federal Studies journal as “…a conflict between Moldovans and a regionally concentrated Russophone population that has a ‘Soviet’ identity.” While the Moldovan nationalists were afforded the right to self-determination and their sovereignty became internationally accepted, the new Moldovan government acted in their own self-interest and did not extend such rights to the Transnistrian population in order to preserve their own territorial integrity. After Transnistrian political leaders were kidnapped by the Moldovan government, Transnistrians took up arms, and were supported by the former Soviet 14th army that was stationed in Transnistria. Aided by Russian manpower and weapons, Transnistrian paramilitary groups raced to stockpile arms and munitions. The 14th Army’s commander, General Gennadii Yakovlev accepted a position as Transnistria’s Minister of Defense, further complicating regional geopolitical loyalties. Military clashes in 1992 along the Dniester River that killed more than 100 people galvanized nationalist Moldovans in the Moldovan parliament to push for more decisive military action. The conflict escalated surrounding the control of the Transnistrian city Bender, and more than 1,000 were killed after Russian brokered ceasefire negotiations failed upon the Russian negotiators’ refusal to withdraw the 14th army, claiming that it would act as a peacekeeping force. Following these heightened hostilities, Russian and Moldovan actors signed a ceasefire in July, 1992.  The ceasefire stipulates a tripartite peacekeeping force, the Joint Control Committee (JCC), made up of six Russian, three Moldovan, and three Transnistrian battalions. The disproportionately large presence of Russian and Transnistrian forces outnumbered the Moldovan peacekeepers, resulting in the protracted, frozen conflict that persists today.  

Map of Transnistria and Moldova today

As is often the case with separatist regions, Transnistria constituted the majority of Moldova’s economy, yet financial tribulations seriously impaired Transnistria’s monetary self-sufficiency in the two decades following the ceasefire. The majority of Moldova’s manufacturing and energy plants at the time existed in Transnistria. Although Transnistria composes only 14 percent of Moldova’s total population, it produced 25 percent of the nation’s industrial products, almost 90 percent of the nation’s electricity, and all of the nation’s large electric machinery. While Transnistria is only 8 percent of Moldova’s total land area, some figures list its industrial production as high as 40 percent of Moldova’s total output. Furthermore, Transnistria’s foreign trade more than doubled from 1998 to 2008, growing from 200 percent of its GDP to 409 percent. While this paints an encouraging picture of Transnistria’s economic potential, changes in the international economy damaged Transnistria’s economic independence. Russia’s economic contractions in the 1990s damaged the economies of many post-Soviet states that relied heavily on trade with Russia, and Transnistria’s industrial output plummeted to a third of its 1990 level by the end of the millennium. Inflation in Transnistria ran rampant as money was minted to meet budget shortfalls, and in 1994, the Transnistrian ruble was revalued to equal 1,000 of the old rubles. Still, the value of the currency continued to plunge, skyrocketing the exchange rate from 257 Transnistrian rubles per U.S. dollar in 1994 to 1,100,000 Transnistrian rubles per dollar in 1999. In the year 2000, Transnistria again revalued its currency so that one ruble equaled one million of the previous rubles. Labor migration and changes in international demand for Transnistria’s main exports, such as steel, resulted in Transnistria’s deficits growing from 20 percent of its budget in 2008 to more than 70 percent of the budget in 2012. Transnistria also faces difficulty with its stamps and currency, as no other state recognize their de facto statehood. Such economic travails placed Transnistria in a perilous position. Unable afford the price of its energy bills, Transnistria now relies on Russia for its energy, with a $6 billion debt to the Russian energy giant Gazprom. As ersatz collateral for such debt, Transnistrian leaders pawned substantial portions of its infrastructure, and thus sovereignty, to Russian oligarchs with ties to Gazprom. The Moldova Steel Works in Transnistria, which represents more than 60 percent of Transnistria’s exports, and Moldavskaya GRES, Transnistria’s largest power plant, are now both controlled by Russian companies. This is an example of the soft power that Russia wields in much of the post-Soviet world. Transnistria lauds its welfare program as superior to that of Moldova, yet its welfare and pension programs are significantly supported by Russia, as is evidenced by the local slang for such pension funds, “Putinka.” Russia further gave Transnistria US$7 million of humanitarian assistance in 2009. Russia also donated the Kolbasna munitions depot to Transnistria, which provided many of the weapons used during Transnistria’s conflict the Moldova. In 1994, the depot contained 42,000 tons of equipment, yet today it contains half that amount, pointing to undocumented Transnistrian sales of weapons likely resulting from its economic hardship. Indeed, by the data on the number of tons of poultry imported into Transnistria, the average Transnistrian would eat 12 times as much chicken as the average German, but the majority of this meat is likely sold again through underground meat sales. These facts contributed to the development of an international perception of Transnistria as a ‘black hole’ for the sale of illegal goods, yet an EU mission’s investigation found this perception to be untrue. Still, the precipitous decline in Transnistria’s economic independence has serious and legitimate geopolitical ramifications, with economic reliance on Russia impeding rapprochement with the Moldovan government.

Transnistria also experienced similar political tumult. For two decades after its independence, Transnistria was controlled by Igor Smirnov, who ruled in a dictatorial fashion, with the Ministry of State Security and the intelligence service acting as secret police and impeding free elections. Political opposition to Smirnov was weak and superficial, with one ‘opposition’ party controlled by Smirnov’s son and fashioned to facilitate the control of Transnistria’s ruling party. Smirnov mobilized his political hegemony for his own personal gain, with a significant stake in the “Sherrif” store chain, which controlled (and still controls) much of the consumer spending in Transnistria, with grocery stores, sports stores, liquor stores, and a professional soccer team. Today, Transnistria still must rely on Moldova’s de jure government to enable its international trade, with Moldova forcing Transnistrian companies to register in the Moldovan capital of Chisinau in order to receive their customs certificates. This lack of autonomy impairs Transnistria’s political independence, with Helge Blakkisrud and Pål Kolstø explicating in Post-Soviet Affairs that “No matter how hard Tiraspol pretends to represent an independent state, its ability to conduct licit trade with the outside world still depends on Chisinau.” Transnistrian politics is also heavily influenced by the Kremlin, and following dissatisfaction with Smirnov’s use of Russian financial aid in 2011, Russia did not endorse Smirnov in the 2011 Transnistrian presidential elections. While Russia backed the former vice-President and Supreme Soviet Speaker Kaminsky, the ousted Supreme Soviet Speaker Schevchuk won, heralding the first transition of power in Transnistria’s history. In 2016, Vadim Krasnoselsky was elected president of Transnistria. Despite these economic and political hardships, Transnistrians believe that they enjoy a far better quality of life than Moldovans, and thus are unlikely to sway from their staunch rejection of reunification.

Transnistria’s situation is not identical to that of the de facto states in the Southern Caucuses, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia, yet its story serves as a case study for the difficulties that post-Soviet de facto states face on the international stage.

Tables created by The Polish Institute of International Affairs. Freedom House data can be found here.

Sovereignty and State Rights in a Post-Westphalian World

De facto states such as Transnistria’s experience are evidence of the problems that result from the contrast between subnational self-determination movements’ and international institutions’ approaches to sovereignty. While de facto states argue that they too should be afforded the same right to self-determination that their de jure states enjoy, de jure state governments argue that local stability must be a first priority and posit that territorial cohesion is essential to such stability. Despite international perceptions of de facto states as ‘black holes’ for smuggling and international trafficking, the protracted nature of these frozen conflicts forces de facto states to develop their own institutions, with Helge Blakkisrud and Pål Kolstø further elucidating that “even if we were to accept the argument that the secessionist agenda  was initially driven by shadowy economic interests rather than ethnic or regional discontent—that is, by greed and not by grievances—the time factor will eventually transform the secessionists into state-builders.” De facto states’ shift towards state-building enhances their local support, and thus entrenches their ideas of independent sovereignty, relying on Weberian ideas of legitimacy that are grounded in public support. As state institutions grow, identity politics becomes involved in groups’ battles for the right to self-determination. Administrations in de facto states, such as Transnistria, work diligently to construct a national demos, or sense of communal identity. For minority populations who are seeking to secede from a larger state, asserting their membership to the de facto state gives them a sense of security. Furthermore, de facto states’ militarization give their populations ideas of terrestrial borders, further engraining their ideas of their state’s legitimacy. As conflicts persist across multiple generations, Michael S. Bobick of the Center for Russian and East European Studies posits that “The ideological foundations of these geopolitical divisions are obscured by local demands and grievances against the central government, while the latent idea of empire slowly shifts geographic boundaries of Europe and Eurasia.” As the grounds for sovereignty are gradually obscured, sovereignty itself becomes a central political issue for de facto states, allowing one political party to assert a monopoly over the concept of independent sovereignty. Appealing to mutually enticing sentiments such as state sovereignty and self-determination allows political parties like that which Smirnov controlled for 20 years to invoke the social cohesion necessary to achieve a limited level of legitimacy provided by the popular support they mobilize. This mobilization of the beliefs of the majority population is often used by outside observers as a basis for a monolithic representation of a de facto state’s political goals. While some observers argue that the conflict over Transnistria’s sovereignty is rooted in politicized regionalism, that representation of ‘Transnistrian regionalism’ ignores the heterogeneity of political beliefs within de facto states. In Transnistria, ethnic Moldovans are seriously underrepresented in parliament, hovering around 25% of the total representation. One such ethnic Moldovan, Grigoriy Marakutsa, held the post of speaker in the Transnistrian parliament for three consecutive terms, yet his support for Transnistria was rooted in a desire to maintain the elite position he occupied during the Soviet regime. Many former members of the former Soviet nomenklatura share this sentiment, yet the multifaceted foundations of their political beliefs are too often essentialized by external observers into an invented single Transnistrian belief. Finally, de facto states often valorize their wars of independence, using opposition to an oppressing ‘other’ as the basis for the national identities they construct. Such a valorization of war has significant political ramifications, for it promotes hero worship and perpetuates the power of militaristic leaders, such as Smirnov and many of his chief advisors. De facto states’ self-determination movements’ frozen statuses provide time for their governments to entrench popular political support through various means in order to justify their secession.

Beyond its foundations in popular support and public good delivery, sovereignty is also largely performative. Michael S. Bobick conceptualizes sovereignty as composed of both performances of state functions and performances amongst the plebiscite. These performances center on portraying functional democratic institutions, for democracy is widely used as a prerequisite for legitimacy by international institutions. Moreover, Kosovo’s internationally recognized sovereignty led Eurasian de facto states to believe that sovereignty can be earned through democracy and human rights promotion. In order to demonstrate the existence of such democratic values, Transnistria established the Che Guevara School of Political Leadership in 2005 to consolidate state ideology and train new democratic leadership. Transnistrian authorities also extensively utilized media in an attempt to construct a narrative of Transnistrian independence and win greater popular support. Additionally, numerous questionably legitimate websites administered by the Transnistrian government promoted Transnistria’s membership in a supposed “International Council for Democratic Institutions and State Sovereignty” and published propaganda in order to create the appearance of statehood. Examples of other former de facto states achieving international recognition after concerted media campaigns promoting their sovereignty, such as East Timor, encouraged Transnistria to work to replicate such success through state-run media campaigns. Transnistria further lauds its participation in multilateral organizations such as the Community for the Democracy and Rights of Nations (composed of Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh) as a basis for its independent sovereignty. In 2006, Smirnov joined the leaders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia on Russian TV to argue for the legitimacy of their claims of self-determination. Yet, while the members of the Community for the Democracy and Rights of Nations all recognize one another’s sovereignty, their claims are not supported by international institutions. The performative sovereignty enacted by the Transnistrian government illustrates the difficulty that de facto states incur in achieving international support for their self-determination movements.

While de facto states wait for international recognition, they must find new ways of justifying their independence. The Russian military played a key role in justifying such sovereignty, because its intervention in Eurasian de facto state’s struggles for independence inhibited the de jure states from achieving a decisive victory, thus providing de facto states with the necessary time to establish state institutions. Upon reaching a stalemate, de facto states channel large portions of their revenue into national defense in order to exert territorial control and establish their borders. After achieving territorial integrity, de facto states must demonstrate their ability to provide for their polity, and they enact this through economic development and welfare programs. In the post-Westphalian world of de facto states, corporations gain significant power because they allow de facto states to function through international commerce and enable third track economic diplomacy. The absence of any baseline for sovereignty and the difficulties that de facto states encounter seeking international recognition force them to resort to the various strategies discussed above to craft the appearance of legitimacy.

Reaction of International Institutions

International institutions cast de facto states into a pariah status, in which the conflicts that de facto states are party to are recognized but their own individual sovereignty is not. Michael S. Bobick elucidates that “From an international position of power, de facto states are dismissed as illegitimate rogues.” While Russia argued that international institutions who recognized Kosovo’s sovereignty must now also recognize the existing de facto states, institutions hesitate to provide de facto states such legitimacy. In 2006, the European Parliament adopted the Declaration on Moldova without a single dissent vote, which called for support for Moldova in mitigating the conflict with Transnistria and preserving territorial integrity. The European Union assigned a Special Representative for the conflict in Transnistria, yet their work bore no fruit and the conflict persists. The most significant step taken by an international institution came in 2009, when the Political and Security Committee of the Council of the EU endorsed a nonpaper Non-Recognition and Engagement Policy (NREP) towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Romanian scholar Alexandra Sabou describes how the policy is intended to allow Europe to interact with de facto states without providing them with recognition, clarifying that “The policy is built on two pillars: a legal one - the firm nonrecognition standpoint of the international community towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia and a civic one - the engagement with them in the framework of non-recognition.” Such action is detrimental to the eventual resolution of any of the conflicts over de facto states’ sovereignty, as it prolongs the current status quo. In 2010, Angela Merkel met the then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in Mesenberg, and the two nations agreed upon a memorandum calling for the establishment of an EU-Russia Political and Security Committee, and stipulating a 5+2 style negotiation to resolve the Transnistrian conflict. That same year, EU leaders at the French-German-Russian summit in 2010 arranged a reopening of negotiations after more than 6 years, which occurred in Vilnius and were followed by a second meeting in Dublin. Almost a decade after these meetings, no results emerged from such negotiations, predicating the necessity of a new approach to de facto states’ status by international institutions.

Outlook for the Future

As the world nears three decades since the fall of the USSR, it is important to consider the ways that international actors may alter the status of de facto states. Nina Caspersen identifies four possible routes of action for de facto states seeking international recognition after Kosovo: If continuing to pursue independent sovereignty, states can shift their focus to great-power support, or maintain their strategies of earned sovereignty; if abandoning independent sovereignty, states can seek recognition as an autonomous region of their de jure state, or improve the status quo in their nations through international engagement. Transnistria remains steadfast in its resolve to achieve independent sovereignty, but the way that it attempts to achieve this sovereignty will depend on actions taken by Russia and the European Union.

Russia views de facto states as opportunities and is likely to continue to invoke every advantage it has to maintain the allegiance it enjoys from Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. The lack of significant international recognition led Abkhazia to pursue recognition from international apostate states, turning to nations such Russia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Nauru. The other de facto states are likely to follow Abkhazia down this path if international attitudes surrounding their sovereignty do not change. The Western perception of de facto states as ‘black holes’ damages potential collaboration between de facto states and the West, likely resulting in increased Russian collaboration. Transnistria plays an important strategic role for Russia following Moldova’s neighbor Romania’s entrance into NATO in 2004 and ascension to the European Union in 2007. These developments increased Russia’s interest in maintaining its relationship with Transnistria greatly, as the state now serves as a perceived buffer against  Western influence, and as an obstacle to potential NATO military action through the region. Russia’s support for de facto states is emboldened by the policy’s past success in Georgia and Ukraine. Russia will likely build new Forward Operating Locations for its military in the de facto states that it supports. De facto states themselves are now also emboldened to assert their sovereignty following Russia’s willingness to intervene on their behalf. This intervention is not limited to military action; in 2005, Russia flexed its economic muscle to support Transnistria, imposing a wine ban that caused Moldova to lose more than $180 million. Russia’s subsidization of Transnistrian pensions is also unlikely to end, given the affects that the marginal sum provides them, as Transnistrians now associate their independence movement with the Russian state and cultural sphere. The decades following the ceasefire in Transnistria fostered a symbiotic relationship between Transnistria and Russia, wherein Russia provides Transnistria with financial support and Transnistria provides Russian oligarchs with new business opportunities and Russia with heightened geopolitical power. De facto states also have the potential to join the Eurasian Economic Union, with Elizaveta Egorova and Ivan Babin hypothesizing that “Russia may amend the EEU with political and military agreements in order to tip the balance of power in the region in its favor and secure its borders.” Such economic integration would deepen the divisions in nations such as Moldova, with the disparate governments within Moldova aligning with different great powers. If de facto states continue to pursue their independence and European institutions continue to refuse to acknowledge their sovereignty, Russia’s geopolitical strength will increase.

The European Union’s approach to de facto states in the east has failed to yield any beneficial results, and thus a new approach must be adopted. The European Union failed to establish a policy towards post-Soviet de facto states until almost two decades after they emerged, and that latency provided Russia with an opportunity to edge European influence out. Sebastian Relitz, of the Institute for East and Southeast European Studies, aptly describes the differences in European and Russian actions towards de facto states, explaining that “While the EU struggles to find an effective policy of engagement, Russia is pursuing a policy of increasing economic, financial and political integration.” The EU generally follows the policy of improving the de jure state’s institutions, hoping that increased state capacity for the recognized states would allow them to reassert their control over the de facto states, yet the divisions that emerged from the protracted nature of these conflicts makes this approach infeasible. Although the European Commission’s EU-Moldova European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) Action Plan correctly characterizes the conflict as a serious regional security threat, the EU’s prioritization of a single Moldova impeded conflict resolution efforts. The ENP provides significant potential for the EU to leverage resources to promote collaboration with de facto states. Furthermore, the funding made accessible by the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) could be used to incentivize certain European Union objectives for de facto and de jure states, supporting not only economic and political development, but also conflict transformation efforts. While the European Union aimed to foster heightened economic interdependence between Transnistrian and Moldovan elites, the Russian oligarch’s control of Transnistrian infrastructure limits the depth of such new partnerships. The EU launched the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) in 2005, using funds from the ENPI to combat structural inadequacies, but EUBAM’s overemphasis on consolidating Moldovan and Transnistrian trade regimes obscures other important considerations necessary to resolving the conflict. The European Union must acknowledge the trade alliance between Russia and Transnistria and other de facto states that has developed after decades of EU non-recognition and focus on strengthening de facto states democratic institutions and infrastructures if it hopes to resolve their secessionist conflicts peacefully. With the failure of economic attempts to offset Russia’s regional power, the EU must either consider recognition or hard power intervention. Recognizing Transnistria and other de facto states would allow them to take part in European initiatives such as the EU’s Eastern Partnership, which works to expand the work of the ENP in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Such efforts may provide greater opportunities for de facto states to align themselves with Europe, but recognition remains a prerequisite for such opportunities to arise. If Europe continues to delay action on de facto states, the divisions between them and their de jure states will continue to deepen. During the Mesenburg negotiations between European and Russian leaders, European leaders explicitly expressed that they were “waiting for the Russian government to make the Transnistrian leadership flexible and more amenable to negotiation, which would signal Russian willingness to confirm its good will with practical measures,” yet this approach is a thinly veiled justification for European inaction. In the face of such destabilizing Russian actions, EU must adopt an approach that combines top-down institutional recognition of de facto state actors’ popularly supported claims of self-determination. Recent political changes in Tiraspol, such as the first two transitions of power in Transnistria’s history, present the EU with an opportunity to resolve the deeply ingrained self-determination struggles of de facto states, but in order to take advantage of this opportunity, Brussels must adopt a new approach to recognizing state sovereignty.

Conclusion

De facto states’ existence proves that non-state actors are a relevant and important part of international geopolitics, yet international institutions’ reactions to de facto states are rooted in antiquated Westphalian norms, eroding the power of actors such as the European Union in post-Soviet de facto states. Nine Caspersen encapsulates the necessary approach to de facto states’ existence, instructing that “rebels cannot be reduced to warlords and rebel-controlled areas should not be seen as areas where anarchy prevails.” The long time span of de facto states’ self-determination struggles results from the lack of a ‘hurting peace,’ as conceptualized by Ira William Zartman, for neither side of the stalemate incurs enough harm to motivate them to alter the status quo. The entrenched status quo enables de facto states to form their own functional state institutions, thus only further ingraining their ideas of independent sovereignty. International institutions’ lack of recognition for de facto states has serious implications, meriting a reconceptualization of the grounds for statehood. De facto states’ civilian populations’ ideological stances are commonly homogenized, stifling the minority opinions that exist within de facto states. Local political leaders in de facto states utilize their tenuous position to mobilize and maintain popular support founded on their existential struggle, thus damaging the health of democratic institutions in de facto states. Furthermore, the persistently ambiguous status of de facto states leads their populations to constantly reify their independence, depicting their de jure states’ populations as a cultural ‘other,’ marginalizing minority populations within de facto states and breeding unnecessary antagonism. Finally, the lack of recognition of de facto states by the European Union and other international institutions allows Russia to exert a disproportionately large geopolitical influence, through both hard and soft power actions. These hardships are not limited to Transnistria, but are instead present in all post-Soviet de facto states, and a new path must be theorized to preserve regional security for the time to come.

NATO À La Carte, And Other Ways France Tried to Resist American Hegemony

In his most recent book The World America Made, Robert Kagan offers an account of the peculiarities that characterize the world order led by the United States. Among the most outstanding of them is the unprecedented acceptance of American leadership. The United States never goes to wars without a handful of allies on its side: even the unpopular invasion in Afghanistan was eventually joined by more than forty nations. Moreover, states with no geopolitical stakes in the initiatives the U.S. takes support them out of mere belief in American commitment to human rights and democracy. Even the security dilemma was effectively defied by the U.S., claims Kagan, since America’s arms buildup in the 1980s and 1990s was accompanied by significant reduction in military capabilities in many world regions. The world portrayed by Kagan’s work depicts the U.S.’ having decisively won the “hearts and minds” of so many wealthy and powerful countries that the American order is nearly impossible to undermine. In the reality, however, there are many doubts about the necessity and legitimacy of American leadership. Apart from Washington’s long-standing rivals, such as China, Iran, and Russia, one of the closest and most powerful allies of the U.S., France, is accustomed to renouncing the American order, and has been doing so for decades. France’s uneasiness with U.S. preeminence was never pronounced enough to shatter the world order, let alone give a reason to coin France as a revisionist state. However, this persisting suspicion of American power coming from one of its most trusted partners has shaped France’s foreign policy, as well as French-American relations, in a few profound ways. Beginning with Charles de Gaulle’s call for a “Europe of Europeans,” Paris was oftentimes a reluctant and confrontational ally. This hesitancy to stand by U.S.’ side dispels any illusion about the cohesion of American order, which, at some point or another, has failed the test of legitimacy in the eyes of not only its rivals but its closest friends.

When the French-American alliance was born in 1778, it was born out of parallel self-interest, not shared ideals. More than two centuries later, the two countries’ self-interests remain similar, and their cooperation in military, political, and intelligence areas are strong. Yet, it was not always consistent. U.S.-French relations went through several major crises that unsettled the Western alliance and showcased France’s persistent frustration with being subordinate to America. During the Cold War days, President Charles de Gaulle’s vision of a Europe led by Europeans instead of Americans created an additional divide, and this time within the Western block. An unparalleled initiative undertaken by de Gaulle to withdraw French troops from NATO and expel NATO forces from France shattered confidence in the Alliance’s ability to counter the Soviet military. De Gaulle, however, saw NATO primarily not as a defense mechanism against the USSR but as a “hated symbol of U.S. hegemony.” Distancing from it was a way to emancipate France from American influence and pursue an independent foreign policy. The General’s decision to demand the removal of NATO headquarters from Paris forced the relocation of 100,000 U.S. and NATO personnel and over one million ton of supplies and equipment – perhaps the least of the problems America was facing in dealing with France at the time. The four immediate successors of de Gaulle did not deviate from his foreign policy, and Paris remained partially withdrawn from the Alliance for forty-three years. When Nicolas Sarkozy, one of France’s most pro-American leaders, did choose to reverse the de Gaulle’s decision and return to NATO in 2009, the elite and media opposition to the alignment with the United States and rapprochement with NATO was still strong.

But before France returned to NATO as a full-fledged member, it made several attempts to undermine the organization’s influence on the continent, which ultimately undermined American power. After the disappearance of the U.S.’ main geo-political rival with the collapse of the USSR, France revived its calls for a European security system built free of American influence. As hesitant as the French were to endorse NATO’s expansion that was initiated by the U.S., they had little ability to counter it. What the could do is endorse proposals that countered NATO’s enlargement. France waged what Marie-Claude Plantin of the University of Lyon calls a kind of “guerrilla warfare” against any changes to strengthen American influence in the region. Plantin, in her book The Future of Nato, describes how the French government initially voiced opposition to initiatives as moderate as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, due to a belief that it to be a political tool for Americans to exercise control over Europe. During his term, French President Mitterrand chose the Western European Union as the organization to counter U.S. military monopoly in the region. Eventually, Franco-German units, later joined by Belgium, Luxembourg, and Spain, were supposed to form the nucleuses for an independent European military force, but it later became evident that the U.S. military predominance and, consequently, NATO, could not easily be uprooted. After failing to shift focus from NATO to the EU/WEU tandem, Mitterrand attempted to Europeanize the North Atlantic Alliance. This undertaking, too, had little success, and the French leadership was compelled to accept NATO’s primacy in the matters of European security. 

Today, the United States and France are undoubtedly long-standing allies with many interests and values. Nevertheless, what created major divides between the two countries in the past were principal disagreements over important international issues.. These divides not only disrupted the bilateral relationship between the two nations but also shattered confidence in one of the U.S.’ most important military alliances. While clashes of interest between rival powers are natural, such turbulences in a relationship with what many see as a traditional American ally are more alarming. Even though President Macron and President Trump now appear to be on the same wavelength about French-American relations, it was American unilateralism and arrogance that have always ignited French dissent of U.S. foreign policy – and the current administration appears to be susceptible to both. Macron’s pragmatism, for now, outweighs traditional geopolitical uneasiness with which France treats its relationship with the U.S., but as Kagan remarks, the wide acceptance America enjoys should never be confused with “helpless tolerance of U.S. predominance.” French historical resistance of American hegemony was ever hardly an attempt to drastically rewrite the rules of the game, yet it is not to be discounted as mere whims of French nationalism, or ego clashes of presidential regimes. If the U.S. is interested in preserving its primacy, it should keep an eye on its friends as much as on its enemies. Ultimately, the world America made might not have rivals powerful enough to undermine it, but does it have admirers enthusiastic enough to sustain it?