France and the Presidency of the Council of the European Union

On January 1st, 2022, France took over the Presidency of the Council of the European Union. During difficult times, the country has been preparing for the presidency since 2017, but its agenda has had to be revised as the world continues to face ongoing challenges. France will be presiding for six months, until July 1st  2022. But with the French elections right around the corner, the future of the Council of the European Union remains unknown. Current French President Emmanuel Macron waited until the last day to become a formal candidate for the election, which will be held in April, just weeks from now. 

The last country to preside over the Council of the European Union was Slovenia. The country’s six months’ program was based around one common theme: resilience. Faced with the pandemic and a prolonged economic crisis throughout Europe, Slovenia developed a plan called “Next Generation EU”. This recovery plan was and still is an opportunity for countries that have suffered from the pandemic to emerge stronger, to transform their economies, to create jobs and opportunities. One of the main goals of Slovenia's Presidency was to ensure safety and stability in neighboring countries of the European Union, especially the Balkans. 

The Council of the European Union represents the interests of the 27 member states in respect to the European Commission and Parliament. Emmanuel Macron, French president since 2017, spoke on January 19 in a speech for the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union. The French president presented his objectives for the presidency of the Council of European Union to the European Parliament in Strasbourg, mentioning a reform of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, a new alliance between the European Union and Africa, the future of the Balkans or the relationship with Russia or the United Kingdom. 

The country is taking the presidency in difficult times, with the ongoing pandemic and challenges that nations across the European Union have been facing over the last two years. Additionally, the French elections are right around the corner, and Macron only recently became an official candidate for these elections, seeking a second term. However, the outcome of these elections remains a mystery, which leaves the future of both France and the Council of the European Union unknown. 

France has prepared its six-month program detailing the priorities and guidelines for the presidency of the Council of the European Union. The program for the French Presidency has three ambitions: a more sovereign Europe, a new European model for growth, and a humane Europe. The guidelines of the Presidency are in line with the work carried out by the Slovenian Presidency, as well as the broader framework of the Trio Presidency programme prepared with the future Czech and Swedish Presidencies.

Emmanuel Macron has expressed strong ambitions for this mandate, but his objectives and his detailed agenda could be disrupted by the Covid-19 crisis, the presidential election, and different global issues such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Indeed, the sanitary crisis in France is only now getting better, still hundreds of thousands of new cases appear every day. Vaccines being mandatory, the situation has improved and the country will soon be lifting the mask mandate, but citizens have expressed their discontent with the rules that were set up to mitigate the effects of the virus on individuals. Additionally, the elections, like any other elections, have created a tense situation in the country, as the future of France remains unknown. Many current candidates, such as Marine Le Pen and Eric Zemmour have created a lot of divide in the country, as their ideologies are very different from the ones of other candidates such as Valérie Pécresse, or the current French president, Emmanuel Macron. 

The first ambition of the program of the French Presidency is a more sovereign Europe. In a tweet, Macron shares “A sovereign Europe is first and foremost a Europe capable of controlling its borders.” The programme calls for a reform of the Schengen area, the aim is to strengthen this area and to “create a political steering of border control and an emergency support mechanism in case of crisis” as Emmanuel Macron stated in his tweet on December 9th, 2021. 

Protecting European borders will also allow for a greater control of the migratory crisis, and improve the asylum policy for the many refugees who seek safety in countries of the European Union. France also has the goal to strengthen relations with Africa, as it is one of Macron’s priorities since the beginning of this mandate. Additionally, this first ambition of France has the aim to build a stronger Europe, by its action for the prosperity and stability of its neighbors, in particular by its commitment to the Western Balkans, which follows the goal of Slovenia's presidency. 

The second ambition of the program of the French Presidency is a new European model for growth. Most countries in Europe have been greatly affected by the Covid-19 pandemic, which has created economic issues throughout countries in the European Union. France has set the goal to make Europe a land of production, to create jobs and opportunities for European citizens. This growth model aims to help countries get out of the current economic crisis that they may be facing or have faced over the last two years, helping them in their growth and development, to make Europe a land of prosperity and endless opportunities. 

The third and last ambition of the program of the French Presidency is a more humane Europe. Emmanuel Macron emphasized in its agenda the importance of having a Europe that works with one another, and that listens to the concerns expressed by its citizens through the Conference on the Future of Europe. Over the last few years, a variety of domestic and international affairs such as the economic crisis, the pandemic, or the migrant crisis have divided not only France, but Europe. For this Presidency, French President Emmanuel Macron set the goal of a humane Europe, that is committed to fighting discrimination and securing a future for the next generation.

While the program for the French Presidency has three ambitions, it also has a variety of priorities that the country would like to address throughout its Presidency. Its three priorities are: the introduction of a minimum wage throughout the European Union, the regulation of digital giants and the creation of a carbon tax on products imported into Europe according to their environmental impact.

President Emmanuel Macron said he's in favor of legislation on a minimum wage for all EU nations. Fair wages that ensure a decent standard of living are one of the principles of the European Social Charter. For France, the introduction of minimum wage is aimed at increasing living standards throughout Europe. The introduction of minimum wage will also enhance working conditions in Europe. Having a set minimum wage across European countries would also allow for more fairness, as every worker has the right to a fair wage that guarantees them a decent standard of living. 

The regulation of digital giants is another one of the priorities of France’s Presidency. Their priority will be economic regulation and accountability of digital platforms, especially in the face of hate speech, with legislation on digital services and markets. Economy Minister Bruno Le Maire said that “digital giants are not just nice companies with whom we need to cooperate, they are rivals, rivals of the states that do not respect our economic rules, which must therefore be regulated.” Regulating these digital giants will allow for terrorist threats, and hate speech to be limited, and regulated.

The last priority of the French’s Presidency is in regard to the environment. Their priority will be the creation of a carbon price at the borders of the European Union on imported products. The environmental crisis is an issue that every country is facing, it is a team effort to combat climate change. Through the creation of a carbon price, France hopes to help the environment in the long-run. 

Emmanuel Macron's relationship with the Council of the European Union is important now more than ever. The European Union is facing difficult challenges ever since Russia invaded Ukraine on Thursday February 24th. It has been the duty of Macron to take the role of a mediator in this conflict. He has talked with both Putin, Russia’s president, and Zelenskyy, Ukraine’s president. Over the last few weeks, Macron has demonstrated a great sense of diplomacy, as he attempts to initiate a dialogue on NATO’s role in Europe and Ukraine. Many have said that Emmanuel Macron may benefit from the situation in Eastern Ukraine. His diplomacy has benefitted him politically, he appears to have shown great strength as he and other world leaders are attempting to solve this conflict.

Emmanuel Macron’s agenda advocates for subjects that will be at the heart of the French presidential campaign, that is just a few weeks from now. As France is set to preside the Council of the European Union until July 1st 2022, the French elections are at the center of the attention, as they have divided the country now more than ever. With many candidates with differing viewpoints and the future of France remains unknown, and so does the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, that the country is presiding until July 2022, way after the elections have taken place. 

French president Emmanuel Macron is well aware of the challenges that he will encounter and has encountered while presiding the Council of the European Union. Three months is a very short amount of time to make a meaningful change, considering that we are unaware of what will happen with the presidency of the Council of the European Union  after the elections. 

The question of postponing the French elections by six months had arisen, as a means to not disrupt the presidency of the Council of the European Union, but Emmanuel Macron finally decided against it. A way to show his commitment to Europe in the middle of a presidential campaign. According to many, the French agenda is more than ambitious, but many wonder what will happen with the elections, if Macron is not reelected, it could change a lot of things, lead to new discussions, and affect the future presidencies of the Council of the European Union.

Like any other elections, the French elections have been tense, the final list of candidates was only recently finalized with a total of 12 candidates, the future of France and of Europe remains a mystery. Many fear that the next president will want to change things for the future, having opposing views with Macron, meaning that everything that France will have done until the elections will go to waste, especially future plans that Macron will have set up for future presidencies. 

French citizens are currently divided, as elections are just a few weeks away. As of March 4th 2022, 12 candidates have reached the 500 sponsorships needed to become an official candidate at the French presidential elections. President Macron had already reached the 500 sponsorships needed before he even became an official candidate. But many other official candidates had struggled to reach the 500 sponsorships needed. Indeed, Marine Le Pen, Eric Zemmour and Christiane Taubira were worried about not obtaining the 500 sponsorships. 

The 12 candidates for these french elections are: Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, Yannick Jadot, Marine Le Pen, Jean-Luc Melanchon, Philippe Poutou, Eric Zemmour, Valérie Pécresse, Emmanuel Macron, Anne Hidalgo, Nathalie Arthaud, Fabien Roussel and Jean Lassalle. These candidates are from different parties, but their ideologies have not divided France as much as Eric Zemmour or Marine Le Pen’s ideals have.  

Eric Zemmour and Marine Le Pen are two candidates from the far right. Marine Le Pen party called National Rally is a party that since its creation, is above all an anti-immigration party, which advocates a significant reduction in legal immigration and the protection of French identity, as well as stricter control of illegal immigration. Eric Zemmour, candidate from the far right party is called Reconquête. Both Eric Zemmour and Marine Le Pen have divided France by their ideologies that are very different from the ones of current French President, Emmanuel Macron. 

Marine Le Pen ran against President Macron during the elections in 2017. These two candidates have struggled to reach their 500 sponsorships, and many fear that there is a chance that they will be elected. This will not only divide France but also Europe, as their goals are very different from the ones set by the current agenda that has been set up for the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union. For example, one of the main priorities of the French agenda is to protect European borders and create stability in the European Union; however, Zemmour wishes to build EU border wall to fight undocumented migration. Many are opposed to this idea, as it could potentially create instability and further divide in the European Union. 

The elections will occur right in the middle of France’s Presidency of the Council of the European Union, with ministers and a president who will have to campaign at some point, an effective French presidency of less than 3 months is expected. If there is a changeover in May, the new President and its ministers will have to take over the current files on the fly, but this may lead to conflicts with the current agenda, other members of the Council of the European Union, and other nations.

France’s agenda for the presidency of the Council of the European Union is very ambitious and progressive. However, the uncertainty around the French presidential elections may give rise to more challenges, and discussions after the presidency is over. As of right now, the fate of France and the Council is in the hands of the French voters.

A New Far-Right: How Éric Zemmour Stole Votes and Media Attention from Marine Le Pen throughout the French 2022 Presidential Election

The 2016 US presidential election may feel like a bygone era after several tumultuous years, but in France an eerily similar situation appears to be playing out reminiscent of Donald Trump’s rise to power.

 A mere six months ago Marine Le Pen, leader of France’s far-right party, the National Rally, appeared to be in a strong position for the upcoming French presidential election, despite her presidential loss in 2017. President Macron’s image and stronghold appeared to be failing thanks to his inability to control the ongoing pandemic and resentment over his tax policies and stance on immigration, whereas Marine Le Pen had maintained her supportive base, and used Macron’s failures to instigate disdain against him, thus growing her base.  

Yet in a series of events not unlike former President Trump’s campaign to the White House, another far-right candidate, Éric Zemmour, has entered into the French political arena. By many standards Éric Zemmour is a man of contradictions and hypocrisy, who has used his career as a journalist and author to routinely attack modern day French society. 

Who is Zemmour 

The son of Algerian, Jewish immigrants, Zemmour grew up in Paris where he started his career working as a newspaper journalist, before switching to radio and television. Zemmour’s main success comes from skills as a television presenter and author. He has mastered the art of controversy, routinely making xenophobic, racist, or sexist remarks, and yet frequently avoiding the social judgement that comes with his many convictions and fines of racial hatred. 

Zemmour’s Jewish identity has not prevented him from making anti-semitic public statements and promoting false statistics in regards to French complicity with the Vichy Regime of World War II. During a segment on CNews (a French far-right TV channel), Zemmour falsely claimed that Vichy sought to protect French Jews throughout the War, despite there being no such evidence to support this statement. Zemmour appears to show no recognition or connection to the immigrant experience of his parents, notoriously claiming that unaccompanied migrant children were essentially “rapists” and “murderers.”  

Zemmour’s appeal stems from a variety of skills and political tactics that he has manipulated throughout the election process. His provocative statements have struck a chord with voters, similar to the way Trump won over support in 2016 by saying the unsayable. Additionally, Zemmour’s status as a public figure, not a former politician, has helped him present himself as an alternative to the routine figures seen within the French political system. As the son of immigrants, a Jew, and alumnus of the elite SciencesPo university Zemmour is able to navigate a variety of identities that he can use as a form of protection against criticism. His Jewish identity has enabled him to make antisemitic comments without fearing reproach, and his academic prowess has given him a seat at the table amongst the other intellectual elites of his generation. The complexity of Zemmour’s character and identity allows him to attract a variety of voters from diverse backgrounds, but his best trait according to French voters? He is not Marine Le Pen. 

Le Pen’s weaknesses

Despite bringing the National Rally Party into the French presidential arena, Le Pen has struggled to shake off the image that is routinely associated with her and her party. The French have become accustomed to the National Rally party, ever since its creation in the late seventies. Under her father, Jean Marie Le Pen, the party achieved political success, but it was known mostly for its scandals and provocative political tactics. Since taking over the party from her father in the early 2010’s, Le Pen has done her best to modernize the National Rally, even going so far as to change its name from the National Front to the National Rally. She lost badly to Macron in the final round of the 2017 presidential election, but France was still forced to admit she had taken the party to new heights. Yet for all her efforts Le Pen has been unable to shake the older image of the National Rally; her usage of modern far-right political issues, such as promoting anti-immigration discourse and populist sentiments have resonated with voters, but her party is still seen as it was during her father’s reign when the National Rally represented Holocaust denial and pension reform. Ultimately, Zemmour’s biggest advantage stems from the fact that he has no association with Le Pen or the National Rally party. He represents the new French far-right, and thus can use his clean slate as a tool for success. 

Throughout his campaign Zemmour has frequently either ignored or humiliated Le Pen. He has declared himself to be the only true far-right candidate, insisting that Le Pen has betrayed France by embodying the centrist right. He also exploited tensions within Le Pen’s own party by welcoming former National Rally figureheads to his campaign, such as Jérôme Rivière and Gilbert Collard who were former spokespeople for the National Rally. Marine Le Pen’s own father, Jean Marie Le Pen (who has a fractured relationship with her) has shown little family loyalty in an interview where he declared himself to be both sympathetic and supportive of Zemmour. The former leader of the National Rally also emphasized when he sees as an advantage of Zemmour: “The only difference between me and Mr. Zemmour is that he’s a Jew, so it’s difficult to qualify him as a Nazi or a Fascist…That gives him great freedom » Jean Marie Le Pen’s comment also acknowledges the inconfortable the truth that many have been reluctant to admit: Part of Zemmour’s success in being viewed as a legitimate far-right candidate is that his Jewish identity gives him a minority status that protects him from political and cultural reproach. Zemmour can be critized for racism, sexism, and xenophobia, but he does not have to deny associations of Nazism, unlike many other current and former far-right politicians who are known for their fascist associations. Le Pen is thus facing both the expected reality of a tense political election between rival candidates, but also dealing with the unexpected betrayal of her party members. 

Zemmour’s triumph over Le Pen also stems from the political image that he has artfully crafted throughout his campaign. Both Le Pen and Zemmour have frequently drawn upon figures from France’s past throughout their campaigns, as they paint the picture of a return to the time when France ruled the continent. Le Pen has frequently evoked the image of Joan of Arc, presenting herself as a modern savior of France. With a pension for historical myths and legends, Le Pen often emphasizes France and Joan of Arc as a historical symbol of Christianity and purity in a modern and corrupted world. However Zemmour has taken a more modern historical approach, modeling himself off another « hero » of French history: resistance leader and former president, Charles de Gaulle. 

Zemmour as De Gaulle 

Despite his far-right politics, Zemmour’s video announcement of his 2022 presidential campaign showed an intense correlation with Charles De Gaulle’s famous speech calling for the liberation of France during World War II. Zemmour declares his presidential bid in the video while reading into an old fashioned microphone while barely making eye contact with the camera. The imagery is intense and reflects the exact movements of Charles De Gaulle in his famous speech on resistance, recognizable all across France. Zemmour’s decision to portray himself as Charles de Gaulle may appear to be an unlikely choice, given the two men’s differing political viewpoints (gaullism, a mixture of populisc liberalism and conservatism versus Zemmour’s obvious populism), but by aligning himself with one of France’s most well known and well respected war time leaders, Zemmour is convincing viewers of his legitimacy. Zemmour has succeeded in aligning himself with historical figures in a way that Marine Le Pen has not. While Le Pen has sought to reshape France into its mythical past of glory and tradition, Zemmour has focused on celebrating contemporary concrete history - a tactic that has clearly resonated with voters.

Zemmour also models himself off of more recent leaders, such as Donald Trump. Although he possesses the sophistication and vocabulary that former President Donal Trump notoriously lacked, Zemmour’s speeches reveal similar themes to Trump’s. During a speech in December, Zemmour stated that “We are a great nation, a great people. Our glorious past presages our future. Our soldiers conquered Europe and the world!” He added later that, “we will be worthy of our ancestors. We will not allow ourselves to be dominated, turned into vassals, conquered, colonized. We will not allow ourselves to be replaced.” Through his speeches Zemmour reveals the same populist tactics that won over millions of Americans in 2016.

Uniting the far and center right 

Zemmour has also succeeded in ways that Le Pen has failed to do through his ability to unite the center and far-right. Thanks to his pedigree, educational background, and magnetism, Zemmour is able to establish himself as a legitimate intellectual and man of culture. He has the academic credentials that allow him to remain within the status quo, which is a useful tool when appealing to the more traditionally conservative and rigid center-right. Le Pen has never succeeded in this field, due to issues such as her gender, family history, and the national image of her party. However, thanks to the many aspects of his identity and political tactics, Zemmour can present himself as an antidote to the decades long tension between the far and center right. He offers voters on both sides the chance to unite for a populist candidate, because he can also guarantee center-right voters the promise of stability and status-quo that they are accustomed to. Zemmour has taken Le Pen’s weakest points and used them against her; in areas where she has failed, he has won. It is no wonder that the two candidates would have such strong feelings against each other. Earlier this month in an interview for Figaro, Le Pen accused Zemmour of attempting to “kill” the National Rally, depicting him as a man who seeks destruction along with victory. Yet her intense feelings on Zemmour also reveal a harsh truth for the National Rally: Zemmour has beaten Le Pen at her own game.

Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité...et “Un Passe Sanitaire?” How COVID-19 Vaccine Requirements Forced France to Reconcile its Values

The ongoing nature of the COVID-19 pandemic has forced nations across the world to examine their societal failings, as governments worldwide struggle to balance the need to protect their citizens with the need for personal freedom and a strong economy. While the United States experienced the ravages of the pandemic and the anger of its citizens early on, many European countries succeeded in holding the pandemic, and their citizens' tempers, at bay. France proves to be the perfect example of this phenomenon; the implementation of a strict lockdown policy, the “confinement” which closed businesses and schools, but also limited the periods in which individuals could be outside of their homes throughout the day, all succeeded in lessening the death toll compared with the United States and United Kingdom. 

However, the French government’s recent decision to implement vaccine requirements and vaccination proof has brought about tension and protest towards the government, previously unseen throughout the pandemic. For the first time, the French must question if their beloved national values align with the government’s actions. 

The “passe sanitaire” or French health pass is a compulsory health statement that proves the vaccinated status of an individual, or a negative COVID-19 test, within the past seventy two hours. The passe sanitaire also resembles similar “vaccine passports” seen across the world as both local and national governments attempt to achieve higher vaccination rates and protect their citizens. The passe sanitaire works in conjunction with France’s reopening plan for its economy and as part of the greater European Union’s border health control, a collaborative effort between EU member states to ensure that citizens are not bringing COVID-19 with them to various countries .  

Implemented for several reasons, the passe sanitaire has worked to increase the vaccination rates in France, through the establishment of the passe sanitaire as a ticket into everyday French life. A passe sanitaire is required for entry into restaurants, movie theaters, train and airplane travel, and the majority of public indoor spaces. French president, Emmanuel Macron, promised French citizens that vaccines would never become obligatory, with the exception of individuals in certain industries, however the pass sanitaire can feel obligatory since it serves as an entryway into French society. 

The French government’s decision to implement the pass sanitaire resembles other government’s decisions to create legislation that does not necessarily require vaccination, but “nudges” the population to receive the vaccine. Known as the Nudge Theory, this term describes how a population can be swayed to make decisions that are in their best interest through minor government reforms and policies that encourage citizens to make the choice that is in their best interest. By requiring a passe sanitaire to freely go about the activities of everyday life, the French government is nudging their population towards vaccination. 

The passe sanitaire can easily be described as a success. Since its implementation on July 12th 2021, vaccinations have increased dramatically, with over one million French citizens registering for vaccine appointments the day the passe sanitaire was announced. Vaccination rates rose dramatically in groups that were previously less likely to be vaccinated, such as adolescents and young adults. However despite the passe sanitaire’s success at achieving higher vaccination rates and imposing COVID-19 safety restrictions, the outlash and anger towards the government reveals that a deeper issue is lurking within French society. 

France’s famous revolutionary motto: Liberté, Égalité, et Fraternité (liberty, equality, and brotherhood) is a well known staple of French culture, so much so that evoking the phrase can appear cliché. However, the French mindset surrounding these three key pillars of society has shaped French values. Therefore, the implementation of the pass sanitaire can be viewed as a direct affront to this motto and the purpose it serves. 

Created in 1793 during the first French Revolution, the motto signified the end of the monarchy, the creation of French unity, and the establishment of democracy. The establishment of ‘Liberté’ drew from older notions of liberties, or the exemptions from rules or regulations certain groups within society could experience. Therefore liberty did not just signify freedom, but freedom from the choice to engage or not. Liberty did not just mean personal freedom, but also the right to exist in one's own space, away from the world at large, the acknowledgement of a separation between the individual and society. Maintaining this concept of liberty has been crucial to the French identity. Liberty is a dearly prized concept in French society, but according to a significant portion of the population the passe sanitaire is threatening to destroy French liberty and personal choice. Although the passe sanitaire does not make COVID-19 vaccinations a requirement, it does limit the participation of the unvaccinated in everyday life. Despite the obvious health benefits of the vaccine, at both an individual and national level, critics of the passe sanitaire believe that it threatens individual liberty and suggests the signs of a tyrannical government at work, which leaves the French with one obvious option: protest. 

Following the requirement of the passe sanitaire, hundreds of protests have sprung up around France, in all regions of the country as citizens gather in the streets from all sides of the political spectrum. The protests have remained largely peaceful, however they have revealed specific issues within French society and feelings toward President Macron that suggest a likely change in national interest towards the government.Widespread protests are not a new concept in France, and have played a role in the national identity since the original French Revolution, when the Bastille Prison was liberated by French citizens in 1789. The legacy of the event shaped French society for centuries to come, with monumental shifts in society and culture often happening as a direct result of protests. The protests and uprisings of 1968 turned into a cultural battle between Charles De Gaulle’s traditional French government and the anger of university students in Paris; these protests then transformed into national rallies, and the events of that year would witness a dramatic change in all levels of life, with government reforms, societal norms, and workers rights all undergoing massive development. The 1990’s saw successful results at the hands of French protesters when then prime minister, Alain Juppé, attempted to reform the French social security system, only to quickly back down after three weeks of protests.  More recently, the Yellow Vest movement in France has sparked strikes and protests against Macron’s pension reform and tax breaks for the wealthy, as rural pockets of France and poorer regions express outrage over what they believe are unfair benefits to urban elites. 

Unlike many other western countries, the French frequently achieve tremendous success when protesting, at both a cultural and legislative level. The French government has routinely been brought to its knees by the outrage of the French citizens, which has allowed protesting to become a key part of national identity. Taking to the streets is a way to ensure societal change and to prevent the government from becoming an authoritative, tyrannical regime; protesting is not solely a way to demonstrate outrage, as is frequently the case in allied countries like the United States and United Kingdom, but to shape policy and norms. However, the statistics of the protests would suggest that the majority of French citizens either tolerate or support the implementation of the passe sanitaire. In a country that is known for protesting, the large crowds do not suggest the same national anger as would be the case in other countries. Instead, it appears that there is a growing understanding of the importance of the passe sanitaire as a necessity for daily life and to protect others from COVID-19.

Each protestor has their own reasons for protesting, however there are common shared sentiments. The overlying feeling of the protesters is worry and fear that the passe sanitaire will take away from the personal liberty awarded to each French citizen by ultimately forcing them to get vaccinated. The concept of forced vaccination goes against both the nature of an individual’s right to choose and the right to privacy when it comes to the government’s knowledge of their citizens' health. France is a notoriously private country, and this national value is witnessed in everyday aspects of French culture and law. The simple tradition of closing one's shutters or the government’s refusal to collect data on the racial breakdown of their citizens both reflect an immense desire for privacy. However, issues over personal liberty and privacy are not the only reason driving the French to protest.

The political anger expressed at the Yellow Vest protests towards President Macron and the French government has only grown, and now anger at the implementation of the passe sanitaire is directly targeted towards the government. There is a great distrust and suspicion over the government’s decision to implement the passe sanitaire, with protestors feeling as though the French government is using the passe sanitaire as a means of control, as democracy threatens to be replaced by tyranny. Frustration over the passe sanitaire has manifested itself into different formats, as witnessed in the many protests. The use of symbols from history as a tactic to shock and inspire onlookers is not new, but recent instances reveal that protesters in France are frequently linking the implementation of the passe sanitaire and Macron with Hitler. Images of President Macron’s face embossed with a Hitler-esque moustache or the pinning of a yellow star onto one's shirt suggest a deliberate attempt to connect modern events with historical ones. Despite the blatant offensiveness of these actions, as well as the lack of similarity between the COVID-19 pandemic and the Nazi Regime, the overall effect is haunting and upsetting, suggesting a deep anger towards the French political establishment. 

A quick analysis of the multitude of opinions held reveals the true complexity of feelings surrounding the passe sanitaire. The protestors at these events come from all sides of the political spectrum, from the far left to the far right, a sharp contrast from protests in the United States which are often strictly bipartisan. Interviews with protestors from all sides reveal one shared fear: the threat of authoritarian government policy and the loss of ‘liberté’. One protester, who defines herself as a libertarian and anti-fascist activist, expressed outrage over seeing fellow passe sanitaire protesters associate the vaccination requirements with anti-semitic symbols and carrying the flags of the far-right in support. However despite the shared anger over the health pass and the decision to take to the streets together, there is little unity between the two groups. A far left protester described the separation of the two groups, saying: “We already knew it, but it confirms that my enemy's enemy is not necessarily my friend…” The primary motivations of the far-left protesters appear to be fear over the threat of a tyrannical government, and fear that the far-right will dominate this movement and turn issues of vaccination into a political issue that will serve to benefit them in the upcoming presidential election. The motivations of the far-right also reveal issues with the threat of a tyrannical government, but these protesters are also critiquing the French government’s response to COVID-19 in general, and their frustration at Macron’s Centrist policies. Emmanuel Hirsch, a medical ethics professor lamented over the government’s issue with implementing the passe santiare in an interview with Le Monde. Hirsch claims that Macron did not properly reflect upon the implementation of the passe sanitaire, claiming that this initiative could have been used to create a larger conversation about rebuilding trust in the government and in science. Instead, the passe sanitaire has only served to deepen the tensions between powerful institutions and French citizens. 

The lack of unity at these protests reveal that the French protestors have yet to establish a clear position on the passe sanitaire, simply using it as a symbol to fight against their own personal complaints against the government. The passe sanitaire may indeed be limiting France’s concept of liberté, but the greater issue is one of distrust and fear towards the government, something a vaccine cannot fix. 

Italy’s Never-Ending Political Crisis: New Prime Minister, Old Challenges

Introduction

Italy, the European Union’s third-largest economy, is well acquainted with political uncertainty. Its crisi di governo are incredibly frequent, resulting in 19 different governments since the fall of the Berlin Wall, with each having an average lifespan of slightly over 18 months. No strangers to political restructuring, Italians have seen their fair share of snap elections, coalition construction, and new prime ministers.

This winter’s political turmoil followed this trend. The government of Giuseppe Conte collapsed following disagreements over the distribution of coronavirus relief funds. After Conte failed to patch together a new coalition, President Sergio Mattarella tapped a replacement: Mario Draghi, the former European Central Bank chief who famously promised to do “whatever it takes” to save the euro. His new government is unique, as University of Birmingham Professor Daniele Albertazzi notes, in that it includes almost all major Italian parties from both the left and right wings. They certainly don’t call him “Super Mario” for nothing.

But it also includes a roster of many ambitious politicians, all with their own divergent political motives. Amidst a pandemic that has claimed over 100,000 Italian lives at the time of writing and decimated the economy, Draghi radiates hope. However appealing and necessary he may be at the moment, including to a wider Europe, his success in forming a government likely does not end Italy’s persistent political minefield. Regardless, Draghi’s entry offers an opportunity to investigate the roots of Italian political discord and the challenges they pose for one of Europe’s most crucial countries.

Politics As Usual

The 2010s saw the end of longtime Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s controversial tenure and the shock waves of the global financial crisis, which devastated Italy. After a series of mainstream leaders, voters punished traditional parties in the 2018 parliamentary elections, instead favoring two populist Eurosceptic alternatives: the left-wing Five Star Movement (Italian: Movimento Cinque Stelle) and the far-right League (Italian: Lega). The resulting government chose Conte as prime minister, an unknown lawyer accepted by President Mattarella. Against the odds, Conte maintained his post through two governments — including by presiding over a second cabinet of erstwhile enemies Five Star and the Democratic Party — and maintained impressive approval ratings. The christened “people’s lawyer” seemed to be Italy’s new rising star.

The coronavirus pandemic only deepened public faith in Conte. But when it came time to oversee relief funds issued by the E.U., conflict brewed with a small party in his coalition: Italia Viva, started by former Prime Minister Matteo Renzi. The “Demolition Man,” as Italians know Renzi, lived up to his name by pulling his ministers, thus denying Conte his parliamentary majority and triggering his departure. President Mattarella, as Renzi likely wanted all along, tapped Draghi to move forward. Renzi may note that he owes this effective political maneuver to the fact that he hails from Florence like Niccolò Machiavelli; yet however successful he was, his low approval ratings suggest Italians see him as more of a dunce than a prince.

The ensuing unity government, buttressed by parties across the political spectrum, has fostered a sense of optimism among many. However, these parties and their leaders are rather strange allies, likely united more by opportunism than patriotism. This haphazard cast of characters presents a key challenge for Draghi: to keep all satisfied in perpetuity, even those who may find incentive to work against him. Like before, politics remains in flux, contributing to sustained unpredictability. Regardless of this, the new administration is a temporary boon: after some weeks of volatility, a nation enduring sweeping health and economic crises has regained leadership under an undeniably competent figure. But it remains to be seen if Draghi can maintain a dynamic enough presence to put an end to the constant infighting that has come to emblematize Italian politics, or if he even wants this role for long. Many of his new bedfellows have their own aspirations; likely, Draghi is just one more cumbersome step in the way toward political success. With an election set for early 2023 at the latest, it is conceivable that future maneuvers may imperil Draghi’s government before then and thus reopen the floodgates.

Five Star and PD: Changing Fates on the Left

The Five Star Movement’s (M5S) considerable victory in 2018 gave it the most seats in parliament. It was founded by comedian and blogger Beppe Grillo in 2009, famous for encouraging vulgar protests against the political class. More confounding is its ideological position; scholars Lorenzo Mosca and Filippo Tronconi find it does not fit neatly on the left-right spectrum, but instead advocates an “eclectic populism” of sorts. It has prioritized some key left-wing positions like strident environmentalism and a reddito di cittadinanza — a universal basic income — in combination with Grillo’s key ingredient: fury against the elitist, corrupt governing casta, which encompasses both domestic elites and external ones, like the E.U. While victorious at the polls, this stance made the transition into governance quite difficult. It has, albeit at different times, partnered with both the rightist League and its erstwhile enemy, the Democratic Party, as part of fractious coalitions.

Today it stands at risk of political implosion. At near 15%, M5S polls below the Democrats and two right-wing competitors. Its partnerships with other parties likely make it less authentic to many who supported it in a rage against the machine. When they asked their supporters online whether or not to back Draghi, a tepid 59% responded ‘sì,’ even with a question with wording some considered skewed to favor this outcome. On the day of voting to confirm Draghi’s government in parliament, at least 15 M5S members voted against him; more party defections have followed. Many cited working in coalition with Berlusconi as the final straw.

Even so, new elections would likely yield substantial losses. Thus the technocratic, establishment Draghi is a bitter pill to swallow, but digest it M5S must for now. (One development to watch is if Conte accepts offers to serve as a new party leader, which some polls suggest could revive M5S’s support.) Meanwhile, the center-left Democratic Party (PD) has reversed its fortunes since 2018, when it won the fewest number of votes in its history, and is now rising again in the polls. With Renzi having broken off for his personal Italia Viva project, the PD has again become a force that could improve its standing in the future. All three parties have joined forces with Draghi to govern. Whereas M5S is making a largely tactical move, PD and Italia Viva have a prime minister much more to their liking — for now at least. Draghi’s success and brand could also help rejuvenate theirs if he remains popular. 

Salvini and Friends: The Shadow of the Far Right

The right side of Italy’s political equation, on the other hand, includes some of the country’s most notorious politicians. The ubiquitous Matteo Salvini of the League is a far-right, Eurosceptic populist and immigration hardliner with a formidable social media following. As the former Minister of the Interior, he proudly denied boats carrying migrants from docking, contrary to international asylum principles. He also impressively helped to transform the League from a pro-northern, anti-southern regionalist party to a full blown right-wing populist outfit. Considering this political acumen and popularity, Salvini has certainly earned the title of “most feared man in Europe.”

His decision to back Draghi is a strategic one as well. The term ‘far-right’ has been an albatross around the League’s neck, and at the urging of some in parliament and a sizable northern moderate constituency, Salvini has chosen to downplay his Euroscepticism and support a mainstream government. The last time he saw an opportunity — albeit one that did not go quite as planned — to sink a government to consolidate power in a snap election, he did so. Salvini, without doubt, wants to be prime minister one day, and could bargain to collapse the government eventually if he smells blood. He would also have some allies to fall back upon. The right-wing Brothers of Italy (Italian: Fratelli d’Italia, FdI) has gained markedly in the polls, picking up much of any support Salvini has lost, claiming the title of Italy’s third most popular party at the moment. A consistent far-right option, party leader Giorgia Meloni could be a potential ally to Salvini, sharing his views on immigration, Islam, and other social matters. More than this, she has chosen to steer clear of joining Draghi’s government, allowing her to receive attention as the opposition and remain insulated from potential government controversy. The brash Berlusconi and his Forza Italia (FI) party have also reentered the limelight, granting support to Draghi.

For all the fears of a Marine Le Pen victory in France, Italy could very easily produce a far-right government in the hands of Salvini, with the backing of Meloni and Berlusconi. In the event of another shakeup, Salvini and Meloni likely fare well in elections and could be ready to form a replacement bloc. This is not to say the two do not also have reason to compete; if Brothers continues its growth and League remains on its current trajectory, their positions on the hierarchy could switch, rendering them Italy’s premier electoral competitors. Yet it is clear that Salvini’s ambition, which sometimes requires him to water down some positions and rhetoric, even those positions which have become integral to his identity, is not purely ideological. His will to power is clear.

Draghi’s Challenge and Italy’s Purgatory

“Why Italy wants Mr. Draghi is easy to see,” commented the Wall Street Journal Editorial Board, but “why Mr. Draghi wants the job… is a mystery for the ages.” It is true, premiers receive few thanks and suffer many headaches, as governing in Rome has not been easy. The last time a technocrat rode in on a white horse to “save Italy,” it was Mario Monti, who shepherded bitter austerity measures from 2011 to 2013. This time, explains Carlo Invernizzi Accetti of Foreign Policy, the E.U.’s coronavirus recovery aid will help Rome avoid this fate again, but this presents the challenge of how best to distribute it, a lesson Conte learned all too well. Draghi could be successful in reversing long-term decline in Italy’s economy using new stimulus, but could be constrained by entrenched obstacles and the need to satisfy his new allies as well.

Many politicos also favored Draghi in order to avoid new elections, which many see as an invitation for a right-wing, decidedly Eurosceptic coalition to enter government. But this is quite a double-edged sword. However successful he may be, selecting leaders in this fashion is an unsustainable strategy, as it simply pushes off inevitable consequences at the ballot box. Moreover, it can serve to shake faith in establishment politics. Continuing to push forth a chosen savior, technocratic figure when the going gets tough can create popular mistrust, fueling the rise of anti-establishment challenger parties. The potentially fractious nature of his coalition means that, beyond just governing, Draghi will need to hold together quarreling parties while also preserving his own political aspirations. Rumor has it he may hope to replace Mattarella as president in the coming years, for which he will need the continued support of parliament. 

What is clear is that Italian politics have become no simpler. Draghi may have calmed the waters, but sharks still circle. The party system fluctuates over the span of a few years, leading to rapid change, inconsistent fortunes, and inherently unstable compromise governments. Short-lived coalitions, however, have been endemic to Italy throughout its postwar democracy. But in an era where economic circumstances have changed, usual institutions are under duress, and the impacts of a global recession a decade ago continue to reverberate, Italy — and other European countries — suffer from this uncertainty.

Looking Abroad

Despite its large economy and cultural significance, Italy has a less prominent profile in European affairs than one might expect. As Karolina Muti and Arturo Varvelli at the European Council on Foreign Relations note, despite Italy’s rather consistent pro-European and transatlantic sentiments, “chronic internal instability tends to undermine its credibility and reliability in the eyes of both NATO and EU allies.” Increasingly though, Rome seeks a more outsized role in security, including by bolstering its military capabilities as part of a European framework and settling issues like the Libyan conflict on favorable terms. Draghi seems well positioned to bolster Italy’s profile within the E.U., given France’s Emmanuel Macron is concerned with his own reelection fight next year, Germany’s Angela Merkel is in the final year of her chancellorship, and the United Kingdom has sailed away. If successful, he could conceivably play a role in mitigating the dominant Franco-German partnership over the E.U. and reorient Rome as a renewed ally for Washington. In fact, there is reason to believe that U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration may be celebrating Draghi, especially as it looks to rejuvenate the transatlantic partnership.

Other European leaders also have reason to pray for his success. After all, the rise of Eurosceptic parties in Italy is hardly comforting and Draghi may well stave them off for long enough. The prospect of real reform in one of Europe’s most debt-ridden economies is also cause for cautious celebration. Last but not least, Italy is a founding member of the E.U. and a beacon of culture and history for the continent with untapped potential in the modern era. But the distinct possibility of a short-lived government dampens long-term hope. The favorable reception to Draghi is probably not sufficient to keep allies from fearing they may have to communicate with a new voice in Rome in due time. On the other hand, if Draghi manages to position Italy well during his tenure, it could provide an incentive for future governments to continue on a similar — or at least not totally dissimilar — path.

Conclusion

Draghi is clearly a capable leader for uncertain times in Rome. However, his arrival does not resolve the existing factors driving frequent turnover in Italy’s government. The party system fluctuates often, contributing to unpredictability and troubling discontinuity. Euroscepticism and populism have become part of mainstream politics, while the establishment increasingly relies on selected technocrats to hold together temporary coalitions. It is worth noting that Italy has long experienced this sort of turmoil, but modern trends like rising debt and shaken faith in the European project make them all the more worrying. If Rome could stabilize its politics, pursue fiscal reforms without resorting to austerity, and augment its role in foreign affairs, it could shake many of the stumbling blocks and fault lines which have grown to characterize its civic identity. Draghi certainly has his work cut out for him, but could begin to tackle these challenges if his premiership ultimately proves successful. Thus, the hope for Italy is not that he is simply triumphant, but that he is transformative.

The Child Welfare Fraud Scandal: Resignations of the Dutch Government

On January 15, the entire Dutch government resigned over a child welfare fraud scandal. Although Prime Minister Mark Rutte was the one who handed in the resignations, the Cabinet made the decision unanimously, and the officials accepted full responsibility for their mistakes. They concurred with the masses of parents and concerned citizens who brought the issue forward that their efforts to limit abuses of child care benefits led to widespread false accusations of tax fraud. Some families were told that they had to reimburse all of the benefits that they had ever received from the government, and these types of cases have caused extreme financial hardship for many families across the country. Although this was a large scandal with discriminatory and serious repercussions for numerous Dutch people, it seems that the Netherlands is not really in the midst of political uncertainty. When the results come in from the upcoming elections, some suspect that those in power will be relatively unchanged. 

The Dutch Government

In order to grasp the implications of these resignations, one must understand the leadership and political structures at play. The Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy, meaning that the Constitution regulates the monarch’s powers. While King Willem-Alexander is currently the head of state, it is generally accepted that Parliament — the House of Representatives — is the “highest political body.” It is also important to note that the word “government” often refers only to the executive branch, and Parliament is generally not included in that term. The Cabinet is part of the executive branch and composed of both ministers and state secretaries, and they make up the collective that resigned on January 15. The “actual decisions” on behalf of the government are made by the Council of Ministers, and the Council is chaired by the Prime Minister, who is appointed by the monarch. Mark Rutte remains as the Prime Minister with a demissionary status, and as aforementioned, he is the one who delivered the cabinet’s resignation to the King. 

The Child Welfare Scandal

The scandal emerged from the government’s efforts to prevent excessive abuses of the benefit system. The push was a result of the “Bulgarian fraud” issue that was uncovered in 2013, where the Dutch people discovered that Bulgarian gangs and migrants had made fake claims for childcare and housing benefits. About $120 million was involved, and the public began to grow worried about increases in immigration throughout the European Union. The massive fraud became a major point of concern, but in trying to respond to the scandal, the Dutch government unknowingly created a larger one.

The Childcare Act of 2005 provided money to low-income families in order to pay for daycare and babysitting. However, after the implementation of the Act, the Dutch government created a system for extra screening in 2012. The next substantive official action in the government’s mission to crack down on fraud was a provision in a coalition agreement, originating during Prime Minister Rutte’s first term. Afterwards, the government created a Fraud Management Team on May 28, 2013 which then established another coalition. The coalition lasted until 2015. The anti-fraud systems were designed in order to weed out those who did not actually qualify for the child welfare benefit, but once these systems were instated, they ended up being far more extensive and restrictive than the goals of the government’s original mission. Miniscule errors such as forgetting to sign a single line on a form led to accusations of fraud, and “these families were forced to pay the entirety of the benefits back, driving many families to bankruptcy.” Despite lesser public attention surrounding the butchered welfare systems, Finance Minister Frans Weekers resigned in 2014 due to the scandal. However, it was not enough to stop the negligence that has carried on.

As parents began to call for the resignations of the Dutch government, the world learned that 20,000 to 30,000 Dutch families were accused of fraud over a period of the past several years. An investigation into the government’s actions was launched, and a parliamentary report was generated as a result of that investigation. Some major condemnatory points were explicitly stated: “Fundamental principles of the rule of law were violated,” and there was “unprecedented injustice” involving a multitude of innocent parents and families. Accordingly, “at least 20 families are pursuing legal action against ministers who were involved in the affair, although it was announced that nobody in the tax office was being sued. The Cabinet accepted the conclusions of the report and acknowledged that they were some of the main people responsible, and Prime Minister Rutte called the report “hard as nails” but “fair.” There seems to be little contention outside of and within the government about whether or not to hold them responsible for negligence and extreme error.

Inequality in the Netherlands

The child welfare fraud scandal has opened the door to a further discussion of various inequalities in the Netherlands. As part of Article I of the Dutch Constitution, the text reads: “All persons in the Netherlands shall be treated equally in equal cases.” It also supposedly binds the government to “ensure that anyone who needs social security benefits will receive them.” However, this epic scandal serves as evidence that the law is not always adhered to, even in pieces of national legislation. The widespread and wrongful fraud accusations have furthered the current problematic economic disparities, and the parliamentary report explained that they have disproportionately affected immigrants as well as poor families. 

This scandal has increased the distrust between the Dutch people and their government, and there has been a call for more transparency. In May of 2020, the government asked public prosecutors to look into any possible discrimination in the years between 2013 and 2017. The results of this investigation have not yet been released to the public. Prime Minister Rutte also addressed the situation specifically, by calling the discrimination and rampant inequalities “unacceptable” and once again taking responsibility for his hand in it. He expressed that the government must make sure that nothing like that ever happens again, and his administration passed a resolution giving 10,000 affected families €30,000 each. Yet, the lawyer representing 600 victims said that this money had not yet been distributed. 

The Prime Minister, Political Parties, and the Upcoming Elections 

Prime Minister Mark Rutte was appointed by the King and sworn into office in 2010, and he resigned partway into his third term. He had a relatively reputable standing as a politician before this national scandal, occasionally being given the description of a “rule follower,” “a straight-shooter,” and other positive descriptors. This strong image is one of the reasons why the child welfare fraud scandal may have come as a shock to people across the world. 

While Prime Minister Rutte and the members of his Cabinet continue in politics with somewhat tarnished reputations, the opportunity for a change in Dutch leadership is approaching. The general election has been scheduled to be held on March 17, and there are currently three main political parties in the Netherlands: the Christian Democrats (CD), Labour (PvdA), and Liberal (VVD) parties. Voting happens through a “list system of proportional representation.” 

Prime Minister Rutte is the first Liberal in his senior position in 92 years, and one would likely think that his party would be significantly harmed by the ongoing benefit scandal. However, the center-right Liberal Party he represents has been polling extremely well, even after the resignations; they actually remain the number one party in the polls. This is probably not too surprising to those who know that mass resignations and this sort of political upset have happened before in the Netherlands — even recently. To get a sense of what may come in March, people can recall the political effects of 2006. Much like in the current situation, the full Cabinet stepped down, including the Prime Minister. Instead of a political flip, Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende continued in his position, ultimately serving from 2002 to 2010. Considering the combination of the polls and the events of 2006, it seems that the leaders in Dutch politics will be relatively unchanging in March, despite the massive scandal and admitted negligence on the part of the government. It may also help that the government took the blame for their actions, making them look like they are willing to be held accountable and will learn from their mistakes. 

In the Dutch government’s efforts to prevent abuses of the benefit system, Cabinet officials displayed negligence that led to discriminatory and harsh actions against a multitude of innocent families. The repercussions of the government’s crackdown on fraud were devastating — but many people do not anticipate a major shift in political leadership. The child welfare fraud scandal and the subsequent resignations of the top Dutch officials may not have as much of an impact as people would expect. At the moment, the political future of the Netherlands and the status of Dutch representation in the European Union seems relatively stable.

Macron’s Ideal France: Free Speech or Blasphemy?

Muslims across many parts of the world remain in disbelief after hearing President of France, Emmanuel Macron’s  problematic comments in early October pertaining to characterizations of the Prophet Muhammad, which are considered blasphemous to Muslims, and calling Islam a religion that is in crisis all over the world today’ as he unveils plan to defend secularism. Comments as such have prompted wide-scale protests to occur in many Muslim countries ranging from Bangladesh to Turkey, with placards demanding an apology from Macron. However, it is critical to consider how this is not an isolated incident, but rather a pattern of characterizing the Prophet Muhammad and breeding fear and distrust, allowing anti-Muslim sentiments to manifest through censorship and gradual political repression of Muslims in France. This pattern thus has led to small and large scale terrorist attacks, perpetuating even more of a divide between Macron’s vision of secularism and tolerance and acceptance of Islam within the country. While another recent statement from Macron stated that he understands the frustration of Muslims over the displays of these cartoons, these words and the continuation of the Prophet being used as satirical relief simply does not demonstrate  the empathy needed for French and Muslim communities. The French in wanting to uphold secularist ideals have perpetuated a common belief that Islam is opposed to secularism and modernity, while an overarching argument held by Muslim communities argues that the Prophet Muhammad’s satirical presence is disrespectful and furthter contributes to the Islamophobia in France. This paper will breakdown a recent knife attack which prompted Macron’s comments earlier in October, the Charlie Hebdo publications of the Prophet, as well as the societal norms and legalistic steps that have reinforced anti-Muslim sentiments, concluding with what actions have taken in place thus far in Muslim communities across the globe and what practices must be implemented for substantial change to occur. 

Charlie Hebdo and Free Speech: 

Charlie Hebdo,  a left-wing, anti-establishment newspaper is part of a tradition of serious satire in France. While its publications have a reputation for mocking everything — powerful politicians, pop culture, religion — there has always been a particularity for lampooning Islam and Muslims, often with raunchy cartoons. The newspaper’s interest in depicting the Prophet has stemmed back to 2011 when it showed a cartoon of Mohammad and a speech bubble with the words: “100 lashes if you don’t die of laughter.” Despite the fact a firebomb was targeted at the publishing building, the company relentlessly went forth with reproducing the image with other caricatures in a special edition distributed with one of the country’s leading newspapers. Over the years, caricatures have varied in narrative, such as of the Prophet Muhammad wearing a turban in the form of a bomb; which could be easily interpreted as a direct attack on Muslims as a group and disregard for Islam. Many Muslims have objected towards any representation of Allah or Mohammad, or to irreverent treatment of the Quran, and such incidents have inflamed protests in the past, which have escalated to violent methods. 

Among Muslims who live in France to the French government, there has been a spectrum of opinions; whether to interpret these cartoons as offensive and Islamophobic or as an example of free speech and free media. Debates on freedom of expression are difficult exercises, often characterized by equivocation and self-contradiction. To answer the question if these specific publications are really blasphemy, it is quite simple: Mohammed is a well-respected figure among Muslims, who often perceive cartoons and other material critical of him as an attack on their Muslim identity. Along with a tradition of not depicting God or the Prophet, part of the offense may also come from the fact that the cartoons can appear explicitly designed to provoke. Thus, publications that print such cartoons may often be attempting to provoke an extreme response in order to make a statement about who belongs in European secular culture. At the time of the attack, the French government responded with an uptake in a military presence throughout the country along with comments made by the government that they are at war with radical Islam. 

Have Laws in France Helped to Alleviate the Situation? 

Prior to the publications in Charlie Hebdo and the nonviolent and violent responses it has invoked over the years, there have been protracted debates about the compatibility of Western values and Islamic ethos. I argue that the consideration of controversial policies continues a pattern of stigmatizing Muslims as a group within the country. One of the laws introduced in 2010, banning the “Niqab,” a full covering that some Muslim women choose to wear, only leaving the eyes exposed and can be fined up to 150 euros ($172). It is critical to note here as well that laws as such have not been excluded to just France. Countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands have passed similar bans on face-covering garments, thus displaying an overall apprehension towards specific religious symbols.  

The law perpetuated opinions that, from a security standpoint, it would not do anything, but rather infringe upon a person’s right to manifest their religious beliefs in a specific way. Not only did this hinder the  right to practicing Islam in a specific way, but there has been an increase in divisive rhetoric of “us versus them” among secular what right-wing consider “pure” French citizens and French Muslims who have citizenship. It is these Muslims living in France who categorize themselves as ‘French Muslims’ as their primary form of belonging, but an identification bolstered by ambivalent interpellation as, on the one hand, they are subject to suspect by members of the French nation under the policing and surveillance procedures of France's crackdown on Secularist ideals. People have recalled experiences of  receiving direct insults, threats and even physical violence towards them if they carried on wearing the full face veil. This sense of isolation among Muslims living in France also specifically comes from the fact that ministries of education have been more lenient with allowing other religious symbols, such as necklaces with the Star of David, etc. Not only has this created a divisive environment, but unrest and fear among Muslim Youth who are trying to uphold their religion’s beliefs and visions of their parents as well as assimilate in society. People narrate their experiences as being seen in a “negative light, feeling judged and an overall lack of trust” towards them. France, dating back to the colonial period has been for the most part more conservative than other countries. It sees itself as the heart of European secularism, hence immigrants are thrown the options of assimilation with the French system or isolation. 

Over the years, this has manifested as many immigrant families, specifically their children, feeling the brunt of rigid secularism. There has been a law since 1905 that separates church and state. The original objective with this law was to regulate religion, in this specific context, symbols attached to the Christian faith; projecting an overall notion that religious beliefs were inferior thinking and a form of alienation. The historicization of this law is generally rooted in the longstanding idea that faith should be confined to the home and not public and political matters, a tactic to promote supremacy of the state and state leaders. However, it is ironic to examine that while the intention of the law was to prevent social alienation, in a contemporary context it has justified behaviors in alienating people who wish to practice their religion publicly with peace and respect. There is a growing number of Muslims within France who feel that the bannings towards religious symbols are not done on equal terms, but are vocal representations of growing islamophobia in the country and the act of adhering to rigid and exclusionary ideologies as a scapegoat. Muslims don't often fit into this cookie-cutter model of what it means to be French, with the cultural and religious liberty of Muslims entrapped by the Western European set-up of institutions, thus positing a loss of respect and empathy for majority and minority communities within France. 

What is Being Done: The Muslim Community Steps Up 

The culmination of rhetoric represented through France’s legal fixtures, coupled with Macron’s comments over the years pertaining to Islam, and Charlie Hebdo have triggered a variety of responses from Muslims. On October 16th, there was a knife attack outside a French school in which a man of Chechen origin beheaded Samuel Paty, a teacher who had shown pupils the cartoons of the Prophet in a civics lesson, justifying that the pictures were examples of freedom of speech and expression. France has had multiple incidents of displaying cartoons of the Prophet, which are considered blasphemous by Muslims. In a statement this past Tuesday, Macron paid tribute to Paty, describing him as a “quiet hero” dedicated to instilling the democratic values within young students. Members of the Muslim community in France have consistently denounced the French government’s support of these cartoons being published and shown on a number of platforms and schools, describing them as going against the precepts of their religion. The upsurge of these recent most attacks have further charged the already anti-Muslim and anti-Islam atmosphere. 

The perpetuation of anti-Muslim rhetoric has prompted  further effort onpart of the Muslims in Europe to ascertain the impeccability of their community. While there have been bolder and violent responses, the other side of the spectrum shows protests as a means to legitimize the voices of Muslims. Protests with up to 40,000 people rallied in Bangladesh’s capital, Dhaka, and many other countries condemning Macron’s comments, so much as to wishing to boycott French products in their countries. Arguably, the mainstream complacency of Muslim voices was disrupted as the demand for active public visibility by them rises. The demand for equal representation and visibility in the public sphere by Muslim Europeans had brought conflicts of interest to the surface. These conflict of interests include a growing need among Muslim communities to defend themselves and the religion they practice; for others to recognize the respect every Muslim has for Prophet Muhammad, and an overarching consensus to not be looked upon as enemies of the European social fabric, but as friends, students, and neighbors; everyday citizens just like the next person. 

The Future of France: What Lies Ahead?

While there have been varied responses towards France’s position on the Charlie Hebdo cartoons to the upsurge of what is considered as a rise in Islamic radicalism in France, the path towards change must be addressed. European Muslims want to be assured that they are not marginalized, excluded or considered as second class citizens. Institutional and legal alienation must cease. In the backdrop of this, the potency of Muslim radicalism and the radical need to find social space to assert their voice will die a natural death, if the circumstances of socio-economic marginalization, dislocation, political and economic disenfranchisement are suppressed- if not entirely eliminated. There is potential to uphold a secularist ideal within France but still remain respectful of every majority and minority community. Islam remains a social capital tying up an estimated 30 million currently in Europe. Countries such as France have served as beacons of hope for Muslim refugees wanting to start new lives in their country, but as analyzed above, with a number of people who remain on a pendulum of creating a better life for themselves and their families and lingering feelings of alienation, isolation, and antagonization towards their beliefs. Muslims wish to settle permanently in Europe, with the vast majority wanting to live in peace, that European integration policies have been erratic and inconsistent and that only a tiny minority of Muslims are engaged in radical activities. The work of policymakers, then, is to figure out how to prevent these individuals from acting impulsively, on the basis of some unpredictable trigger. This can only be done if there is a motivation and sense of need to build belonging that will prevent extremists from feeling destructive. If they feel alienated from their society and feel they don’t belong there, then they can also feel that other people deserve to suffer or die, manifested through small and large scale terrorist attacks. If anything, differences should be celebrated among people, not highlighted in order to create tension and heightened polarization. The contribution to dialogue in order to cease these tensions is through education. Our generation plays a critical role in enforcing intermingling and true understanding and empathy among people in society regardless of race, gender, and religion. We need to promote the dignity and honor of those around us, to encourage interfaith dialogue, and understand others. We are all part of the larger journey to understand one another’s experiences and respect one another, but how and who we learn this from, has a great effect on our efforts. 

The Rise of the Far-Right in France: Understanding How National Rally Leader, Marine Le Pen, Has Used Tragedy of Recent Terrorist Attacks as a Political Weapon

In 2015, France was rocked by six deadly terrorist attacks, mostly notably the Charlie Hebdo attack and the November 13-14 attacks, that etched a permanent mark onto the nation’s psyche. Yet five years later, the effects of terrorism continue to plague France, demonstrated by the recent beheading of Samuel Paty, a french school teacher killed for showing his students a depiction of the prophet Muhommad in class, and the stabbings in a church in Nice just days later. 

Samuel Paty was a dedicated school teacher in Conflans-Sainte-Honorine who taught at a middle school in a suburb of Paris. Paty taught a class on freedom of speech and expression to his middle school students. During one of these lessons, he showed cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad created by the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo. Following this lesson, parents at the school expressed disapproval towards Paty’s actions, and posts on various social media sites were created to discuss Paty’s behaviour. Abdoullakh Abouyedovich Anzorov was an eighteen year old Muslim Russian refugee who learned of Paty’s actions through social media, and beheaded him with in the street. After murdering Paty, Anzorov was shot and killed by police. As a result of Paty’s murder, over ten people have been charged in connection to the crime. 

However, now France finds itself in a new predicament. As French President, Emmanuel Macron, struggles to hold the country together amidst both the COVID-19 pandemic and recent terrorist attacks, France’s political far-right is pursuing this terrorist attack as an opportunity to gain political support. 

Understanding the rise of the National Rally 

The National Rally (formally known as the National Front) is a far right political party headed by Marine le Pen in France, known for its controversy, racism, and xenophobia from their many critics. Now, the National Rally is using the recent terrorist attacks as a political tactic, hoping to gain voters who have turned away from Macron’s approach, following his widely criticized pension reform which led to intense protesting and riots. 

Although the National Rally has played a role in French politics for decades, its image and political success, in the form of electoral votes and political representation in government, has increased in recent years. First founded in 1972, by Jean-Marie le Pen, father of Marine le Pen, it was a party of disgruntled veterans, known for its anti-semitism, sexism, racism, and shared many similarities with former European fascist governments. The party formerly known as the National Front struggled to gain traction for decades, regarded by the French public as both a joke and a controversy; the party has been considered by many French citizens as an embarrassing example of a political group that cannot embrace the values that many French citizens prioritize, such as European integration within the European Union, equality for all French citizens, and immigration. Everything changed after Marine le Pen replaced her father as leader of the National Rally, ushering in a new era and image for the party. Under the guidance of Marine le Pen the party evolved from a national joke to a dominating player within French politics. 

Over time Marine le Pen reformed the party, leaving behind the Holocaust denial, sexism, and overt anti-semitism, replacing it with new issues: immigration, the eurozone, and a constant tirade against Muslims. Many of the former issues campaigned for by the party are now considered too far-right and too extreme; by focusing on more present issues that appear in current events, Marine le Pen has created a modern image and a party that fits into France’s current political climate. 

  Not only did Marine le Pen replace the party’s key issues, but she also adapted its political strategy, in an attempt to appeal to a broader audience. The National Rally worked to appeal to young people and women, two groups largely missing from its previous audience. The party found strongholds in rural areas and areas where unemployment is high and voters feel left behind by modern France, such as the Northern mining regions and the Southern coast of France. Studying the political psychology behind Marine le Pen’s supporters reveals that many of them feel ignored and betrayed by the modernization and urbanization of France. As cities such as Paris and Marseille become more diverse, there is an increasing sense amongst National Rally supporters that France is losing its “Frenchness.” A concept that manifests itself in the smallest ways, such as an interview at an event for the National Rally where supporters proudly explain that at this event they are only selling French crepes, no kebabs. As France becomes more diverse, there is a sense amongst some French voters that their identity and pride is being robbed from them, a sentiment that has propelled them into the arms of the National Rally. 

 The party’s creation of National Rally youth groups created a new generation of dedicated voters, devoting themselves to the party’s ideals. Fully embracing local politics allowed the party to achieve new ground. By using mayoral races to establish control in small cities across France, the National Rally has discovered how dominating the mayoral office in one small city will eventually lead to control throughout the region. The prioritization of local level politics has allowed voters to create strong ties to the party, something the National Rally has used to help them gain access to bigger positions. 

The 2017 French presidential election marked a defining moment for the party. Although Macron succeeded in his youthful and energetic campaign, the National Rally achieved unprecedented electoral success. Despite Macron winning by a large thirty point margin, the National Rally achieved 35% of the vote, demonstrating their success from a fringe political party to a serious mainstream one. Yet Macron’s optimism, and his ability to cast himself as an outsider and newcomer against the culture of elitism and nepotism that Marine le Pen represents, allowed him to succeed in the end. In contrast to Macron’s upbeat rallies that took a cue from Obama’s 2008 election campaign, the darker undertones of fear and anger in Le Pen’s rallies just could not compete. Yet most notably, Marine le Pen refused to back down following her defeat. She vowed to strengthen her party even more, through widening their ever-growing base and changing their tactics. 

In the three years following the 2017 presidential election Marine le Pen has held true to her promise. She officially changed the name from the National Front to the National Rally, echoing a further disconnect from the party of her father. The party also found success in the 2018 European Parliament elections, where the National Rally defeated Macron’s centrist party, winning 23% of the vote. With frustration over Macron growing, a pandemic with no end in sight, and an increase in terrorist attacks, Marine le Pen appears poised to dominate the political landscape in France. 

Response to terrorist attacks 

Following the brutal murder of Samuel Paty, President Macron gave a series of speeches that caused outrage across part of the world. Macron promised to use harsh measures against Islamic extremism. Macron’s administration has closed mosques and banned certain Islamic groups. In his speeches, Macron has referenced the importance of France’s laws and culture surrounding freedom of speech; he has also praised French secularism. Although his remarks garnered support amongst the French public, they have struck a chord with the Islamic world. 

In Turkey, President Erdogan claimed Macron has “lost his way,” leading to a diplomatic argument over Macron’s response. Meawhile Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Imran Kahn, reported that Macron chose "to encourage Islamophobia by attacking Islam rather than the terrorists." Outrage over Macron’s remarks has led to a boycott of French goods in Muslim countries throughout the Middle East and Asia. Anti-French protests have all seen an uptick, where images of Macron’s face are frequently defiled. 

Macron has also been criticized for alienating the almost six million Muslims currently living in France (the largest Muslim population in all of Europe). Reports of French Muslims feeling afraid and unwelcomed in their own country has fueled anger towards Macron’s recent statements and policies on terrorism. 

By far the most controversial aspect of Macron’s recent statements is his suggestion that Islam be enlightened so as to better fit into secular France. In recent years France has used their secular power to ban burquas worn by Muslim women. Now, Macron is pushing for more compromise amongst French Muslims, such as decreasing funding given to French Muslim communities. France is a proud secular country, one that sees separation of church and state as a marker of progress and modernity. While this statement has been regarded by some as simply an extension of French imperialism banning non-western practices, Macron claims that his remarks were misinterpreted; he was only only trying to prevent the radicalisation of Islam that was the motivator behind many recent French terrorist attacks. However, critics of Macron claim that their interpretation of Macron’s statement was correct based on Macron’s recent proposal to reform Islam in France. Macron’s proposals include dissolution of many French Muslim associations, a decreasing of funds sent to Muslim communities, and a certificate training programs for imams (a leader of Muslim worshippers). All of these policies are aimed at reforming Islam in a way that best suits French society, and to prevent the radicalization of Islam that is behind many recent terrorist attacks. 

Yet despite Macron’s response being harsly criticized by many across the world, it appears as though many French citizens resonate with his opinions following the murder of Samuel Paty. According to a poll of French citizens following Paty’s death by the Institute for Opinion and Marketing Studies in France and Internationally over 87% of French citizens believe that French secularism is at risk. Adding to that, 89% of French citizens believe the risk of terrorism is very high. Perhaps the most shocking results of this study found that 79% believe that Islam has declared war on France. The results from the survey also vary based on political party. Supporters of the National Rally showed much higher percentages in responses to the questions above. 

Marine le Pen’s Response

Knowing both the controversy surrounding Macron’s statements and the current opinion of the public, it has come at no surprise that Marine le Pen would use this tragedy to appeal to the French people. 

Marine le Pen has spent much of the last decade critiquing the role of Islam in France. She has made frequent pushes to end immigration for people from Islamic countries into France, notoriously stating, “We support putting a stop to immigration.” Le Pen has also been an outspoken critic of the burqa in France, showing disdain for any form of head covering worn by Muslim women. Following the attack, Marine le Pen proposed a ban on headscarves worn by Muslim women in public. 

In response to Paty’s murder, Le Pen declared that France was at war against Islam as an ideology, potentially hoping to draw in more supporters with her view of Islam as the enemy. Indeed, metaphors of war are now a crucial part of Marine le Pen’s vocabulary following Paty’s murder, which can easily be seen as a political tactic. Marine le Pen declared that France was in need of wartime legislation against the force that is Islam. Her statements are not new or suprising, but with every passing terrorist attack Marine le Pen can be seen eagerly speaking out against the dangers of Islam and immigration, two her of party’s most defining issues. However this time Marine le Pen’s response appears even more calculated, mostly likely given the upcoming election in 2022. 

A Chance for Victory 

After the National Rally’s shocking success in the 2017 election, and their wins in the 2018 parliamentary elections, many members of the National Rally believe that the 2022 presidential election will finally Fbring them the victory they so desperately want. Knowing this, it is impossible to view Marine le Pen’s recent statements and not see them as clever tactic, designed to sway voters who are already fearful over the dangers of terrorism and radical Islamists. 

Le Pen hopes to capitalize on the key issues within her party, Islam and immigration, and with recent terrorist attacks on peoples minds, these issues will most likely become crucial talking points throughout the election. Supporters of the National Rally have reason to believe in a victory for Marine le Pen. Macron has not proven himself to be the young, enigmatic leader he appeared as during his campaign. Economic issues, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Yellow Vest Movement in 2019, the series of protests against pension reform and widespread economic issues that have plagued France, have all damaged both Macron’s base and his popularity. Now, with anger over recent terrorist attacks that show no signs of stopping, Macron’s once charming charisma and centrist views look less appealing to French voters. Perhaps this time the National Rally’s views will appeal to the majority of French voters, leading to a victory for Marine le Pen in 2022. 

A Turning Point in the Fight for LGBTQ Rights in Poland: What Next?

Poland is quickly becoming the latest European nation facing a shift in regards to LGBTQ rights, with the government’s anti-LGBTQ rhetoric continuing after another election win, and an increasing number of emboldened activists organizing in opposition. The Polish government has come under criticism from the EU and other Western nations in recent months due to their increased vilification of the LGBTQ community. The Law and Justice Party (PiS) has been unafraid to point out what they call “LGBT ideology”: the notion that the LGBTQ community pose a threat to Poles, particularly families, and in turn changing their way of life. Going so far as to call this “ideology” more destructive than communism they have also given funding to six towns that embrace their own status as LGBT-free zones after the EU denied these towns grants from their municipal twinning program over the towns declarations. A “Stop Pedophilia” bill was introduced into the Sejm (Poland’s Parliament), aiming to change the criminal law code to criminalize the inclusion of sexuality studies or reproductive health in sexual education courses to minors and is being postponed indefinitely. The government has also used the state broadcaster Telewizja Polska (TVP) to promote their platform, but faced pushback with a recent ruling from the District Court of Warsaw banning the publication of “Invasion”, an anti-LGBTQ production posted to their official YouTube channel.

A vast majority of Poland’s government sanctioned homophobia is rooted in the Catholic teachings and their interpretations. In a 2018 Pew Research Center survey, it was found that 87% of Poles identify as Roman Catholic. Most also follow their Central/Eastern European counterparts in being more active in the Church and identifying as conservative. A number of Polish clergymen are vocal in their political stances on this issue, standing firmly against any progress in LGBTQ rights. In Krakow, Archbishop Marek Jedraszewski warned in a 2019 homily of what he described as a neo-marxist “new plague [...] not red, but rainbow,” referring to the rainbows usage as a symbol of the LGBTQ community. PiS has leveraged anti-LGBT Catholic doctrines as a rallying cry for this and other social issues, arguing that they are threats to the family and the Polish way of life.

The radical pro-LGBTQ campaigning spearheaded by Stop Bzudrom (stop nonsense) has gained attention this year for their more confrontational protest methods. For example, when vans associated with Fundacja Pro , an organization that drove vans around various cities with messages promoting a connection between homosexuality and pedophilia showed up in various Polish cities, Stop Bzudrom had damaged them earlier in June in an act of protest against their messaging. Activist Margot Szutowicz (commonly referred to by their first name), a member of Stop Bzudrom, was arrested in July by undercover cops but was able to be issued bail. On August 3, Margot was arrested again, along with Lania (no last name provided), another activist from the campaign, on the grounds of “insulting religious feelings and insulting Warsaw monuments” after placing rainbow pride flags on various monuments. Pushback to their arrest was widespread: multiple arrests were made after days of confrontational protests between police and protestors. On October 1, an attempt was made on a Stop Bzudrom activist to push them under a tram in Warsaw. 

Similar action was taken on September 19, 2020, when an unknown group spray painted the Ministry of Education building with names of LGBTQ Poles who committed suicide. The public education system in Poland has been particularly contentious on this, with President Duda’s reelection campaign promising in their Family Card numerous anti-LGBTQ provisions, like banning education in schools, adoptions and others. Previous measures against an LGBTQ tolerance day were also quickly shut down by the government. 

The Polish government had responded to this criticism by deflecting the blame onto the growing opposition speaking out against their policies at home and abroad. A recent program by TVP said it was countries like Germany and the US, not Poland, persecuting the LGBTQ community, and the government has most recently been pointing to activist Bartosz Staszewski, who has become popular due to his installations of signs denoting LGBT-free zones across Poland, and vocal interaction with international media on this issue. 

PiS have also seen the push for LGBTQ rights as a threat coming from the EU. In July 2020, Polish justice minister Zbignew Ziboro stated his fear that ““There is a real risk that we may find ourselves in a situation where the EC (European Commission) will effectively force us to introduce the so-called homosexual marriages with the right to adopt children” Later in September, he responded again to the EU criticism, stating that various EU leaders and the European parliament sought “ to violate Polish democracy, through taking huge amounts of EU funds away from us, to blackmail us to force us to introduce changes in our social, cultural and educational lives." The EU has been critical of the PiS record on LGBTQ rights (albeit in a less assertive way) since the early years of Poland’s membership in the Union. However, some believe these statements from the EU are not enough, with Matt Beard of the international LGBTQ advocacy group AllOut saying that "the EU's words really need to be put into action". As issues regarding rule of law and decreasing civil liberties cause rifts between the Polish government, the EU and other nations like the UK and Canada, LGBTQ rights are becoming an increasingly contentious point between them.

Local leaders in this movement for LGBTQ rights remain cautious about what lies ahead. Polish LGBTQ activist Justyna Boloz said in an interview with Dazed that “the Polish Stonewall is yet to come.” Both conservative/Catholic groups and independent LGBTQ organizations are ramping up their efforts and show no signs of letting up. In a 2019 IPSOS survey of Poles under 40, “gender ideology and [the] LGBT movement”  was chosen by 31% of male respondents and 24% of total respondents, male and female, as the main threat to Poland (the climate crisis came in first). These numbers increase with younger men and PiS supporters. This growing negative perception of LGBTQ people and activism has also translated into violence targeting mass gatherings, like Pride marches. In the city of Lublin, a heterosexual couple was arrested for bringing a makeshift bomb to the city’s pride march in 2019. 

There are some who are more optimistic after recent developments. Teacher, writer and cultural researcher Marta Konarzewska said in an interview with Dazed that “Those who are fighting for freedom and autonomy now in Poland are very young, sometimes children. [...] and it’s these same people who are captured, detained, and punished by the police.” As PiS continue to frame homophobia through the lenses of family protection, Polish values and critiques of liberal democracy, there is a growing community of LGBTQ people and allies standing up to this prevalent rhetoric. A growing number of pro-LGBTQ activists are seeing opportunities with membership in organizations, and protests becoming more frequent with more international news coverage. Dangers to the LGBTQ community are present daily, from microaggressions to harassment and threats to safety simply by perceptions of queerness. This is a fact that cannot be understated, particularly to those in rural areas and in conservative strongholds. In spite of this, recent protests and international pressure over the past year have mobilized more Poles than before, particularly young people and those in urban areas. Broader issues, like the increasing urban/rural divide, the economy, and a brain drain of mostly young people leaving the country for work/education, have made the issue of LGBTQ rights a scapegoat for PiS. While PiS continues to dominate the upper chambers of government and President Duda prepares for his second five-year term, all eyes are on Poland as the fight for LGBTQ rights reflects the threats to the relatively new but already challenged Polish democracy.

Want to Close the Gender Gap in Finance? Start with Financial Supervisory Authorities

In 2018, during the buildup to an early November vote on the European Central Bank’s (ECB) next top supervisor, an influential member of the European Parliament implied that the candidacy of Sharon Donnery, deputy governor of Ireland’s central bank, owed its strength to Donnery’s gender as opposed to her qualifications. Whether this pronouncement contributed to Donnery’s subsequent loss to her male competitor is disputable. What the remark did achieve, however, was resurfacing the discussion about the relevance of gender balance in regional financial governance – a discussion that continued gaining prominence with Christine Lagarde’s appointment as the president of the ECB. 

In 2016, the European Banking Authority (EBA) – a regulatory body of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) responsible for overseeing the “integrity, efficiency, and orderly functioning” of financial institutions across the European Union – published a report on the diversity practices of European credit rating agencies and investment firms. The only ESFS document to address gender inclusivity since the System’s creation in 2011, the report scolded private financial institutions for the disproportionately low number of women on management boards. However, the EBA’s own track record in gender diversity has only contributed to the invisibility of half of Europe’s population in the financial sector.   

Women comprise only 27 percent of the membership of the EBA’s governing, appeal, and advisory bodies, a modest increase of 5 percent from 2018. This includes the Board of Supervisors, which makes all policy decisions of the EBA, and the Management Board, responsible for the administration of the EBA’s operations. This figure even applies to bodies mandated to promote and protect diversity. The Banking Stakeholder Group, a major EBA advisory group valuable due to the “variety of perspectives and expertise that its diverse membership brings to the table,” is less inclusive than its mission suggests: a mere eight of its thirty members are women. 

As EBA officials themselves stated in the 2016 diversity report, homogenous decision-making entities are susceptible to groupthink and herd behavior. In a major regulatory authority like the EBA, these two phenomena can make it harder to spot shortcomings in governance and risk management practices that drive financial systems into crises, as they did in 2008. Indeed, a recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) study of 115 countries found that a lower number of women in financial oversight institutions is associated with a poorer quality of supervision and overall banking stability. Despite its potential benefits, gender parity in financial supervision remains the least well-studied and well-documented dimension of financial inclusion globally, the study noted. 

However, whether the 2008 crisis could have been avoided if Lehman Brothers had been Lehman Sisters is not the question ESFS officials should be focusing on. More important, the current composition of the EBA boards hampers the implementation of the European Commission’s post-2008 crisis strategic agenda, within which gender equality is not only a driver for more effective decision-making, but also an affirmation of fundamental EU values. 

Addressing gender imbalances in ESFS decision-making bodies can be challenging due to idiosyncratic board selection processes. For example, the EBA’s male-dominated Board of Supervisors comprises the heads of the national banking supervisors from each of the 28 EU member states. The EBA, as well as the broader ESFS network, has no direct control over the gender composition of governmental financial sector regulators, which oftentimes fall under the authority of national central banks. There, an even grimmer picture of women’s representation emerges: men constitute 79 percent of members of key decision-making bodies and 96 percent of central bank governors in the European Union. 

Nonetheless, the EBA can still contribute to achieving a gender-equal Europe while avoiding infringements on national interests and prerogatives. Building on the experience of the European Central Bank in introducing an explicit diversity agenda, the EBA can set long-overdue gender targets for the Banking Stakeholder Group. Since the group consists of interested parties outside of national authorities, the EBA can influence the group’s gender composition without compromising the sovereignty of European states. The Joint Board of Appeal is another EBA body whose independent, if opaque, selection process provides an opportunity for better diversity practices. Clearly, the EBA has sufficient autonomy in appointing and approving members of some of its critical decision-making bodies. What it lacks is willingness to utilize that authority to ensure women are equally represented.

The EBA is the watchdog of the European banking sector. Its treatment of gender diversity sets a standard for financial institutions across the EU. Women’s lack of representation in authoritative oversight entities reduces the already low likelihood that gender equality will be prioritized on regional and private institutional agendas. Setting concrete gender targets for EBA decision-making bodies whose gender composition is not controlled by national authorities would be a needed step toward giving women voice in the formulation, implementation, and assessment of policies that affect both providers and receivers of services throughout Europe’s entire financial sector. 

As a regulatory authority with the power to shape the gender diversity practices of thousands of financial institutions, the EBA must lead by example and demonstrate a genuine commitment to inclusivity. Until it does so, its demands to increase the visibility of women in the private sector will seem at best unconvincing, and at worst insincere. 

What the West Gets Wrong About Putin

After his 2001 Slovenia Summit with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, American President George W. Bush reiterated his belief that a constructive and productive dialogue between the U.S and Russia was possible. Per Bush, “We had a very good dialogue. I was able to get a sense of his soul. He's a man deeply committed to his country and the best interests of his country and I appreciate very much the frank dialogue and that's the beginning of a very constructive relationship.” As four consecutive American presidents have faltered in their stated efforts to improve relations with Moscow while simultaneously leading the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), it is evident that American policymakers underestimated the ambitions and capabilities of Putin. 

Through the invasion of sovereign states and interference in foreign politics, Putin’s Russia has undermined European confidence in NATO and democracy. In at least some regard, the blame lies at the feet of American foreign policy analysts, whose interpretations of Russia in the early post-soviet period were largely colored by predisposed attitudes about the country and who were too eager to project the idealism of the unipolar moment onto the past two decades. For a former KGB agent like Putin who conceptualizes and compartmentalizes threats, the world is a zero-sum game where the restoration of Russia’s prestige comes at the expense of the rest of the world. This push-pull dynamic of U.S. provocations and outright Russian bellicosity has shaped U.S.-Russian relations today and demands a new strategy.

The Pre-Putin Days

Understanding Putin’s geopolitical calculus requires studying U.S.-Russia relations in the era before he came to power. For Putin, the end of the Cold War was a formative experience. He has called the breakup of the Soviet Union and erosion of Russian power “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.”

When the U.S. came to power in this unipolar moment, as Charles Krauthammer among others would coin it, the U.S. was essentially the closest thing imaginable to a global hegemon and thus played a prominent role in the settlements of post- Cold War Europe. In particular, at the February 1990 meeting between American Secretary of State James Baker and then-Soviet Union leader Mikhail Gorbachev, Baker told Gorbachev that “there would be no extension of NATO’s jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the east” and agreed to terms that “Any extension of the zone of NATO is unacceptable.” As a former imperial power and superpower, the new Soviet leadership was petrified of a post-USSR world order in which the U.S. played a sizable role in Europe and challenged Russia diplomatically and militarily in Eurasia.. The U.S., meanwhile, wished to stabilize and securitize Europe without being overly adversarial toward Russia. These goals, not necessarily in contradiction of each other, have largely remained the same but the way each party approached achieving that means led to the thaw.

Presidents Bush and Clinton, two presidents who saw their duty as Commander-in-Chief as defending the international liberal order, sought a policy of “enlargement.” By bringing more countries into the democratic, U.S.-led order, the logic went that the U.S. could keep Europe from takeover by a resurgent revisionist Russia. Poland and a reunified Germany joined and they were followed by more than a dozen other states including Albania and Montenegro most recently. To this day, the door remains open to Ukraine as it is embroiled in a hot war with Russia over the Donbass. 

Presidents Bush and Clinton were presented with three real options for a post-Cold War NATO, as Benn Steil wrote: ignore Baker’s promise and expand NATO on the basis that Russia would always behave like the imperial Great Power it conceived itself, wait until Russia took concrete actions that infringed on the sovereignty of its neighbors (George Kennan’s position), or “expand NATO on the cheap,” figuring that the alliance faced no true enemy anymore. Bush chose the third position and Clinton continued the policy, despite the advice of Sam Nunn, the former senator of his own party, who argued, “Are we really going to be able to convince the Eastern Europeans that we are protecting them while we convince the Russians that NATO enlargement has nothing to do with Russia?” Nunn’s criticism gets to the root of the issue with Eastern European NATO expansion: while NATO has admittedly succeeded greatly in building an alliance of democracies and intervening to put an end to crimes against humanity in the Balkans, it would have had to be seen as legitimate by both the allies and Russia to avert violent resolution of disputes and it has failed to do so. The choice fundamentally was between isolating and building up against Russia in a fit of post-Cold War triumphalism and using America’s status as the sole superpower to urge Russia to behave like a responsible actor in exchange for being treated like one. Instead of isolating or cautiously integrating Russia, the United States made the well-intentioned but fatally flawed decision to ignore it.

The Reality of NATO Enlargement

The claims of NATO expansion promoters are contradicted by the historical record. While they claimed that Eastern European countries that had been threatened before by the Soviets remained vulnerable in the post-Cold War era and needed to be welcomed into the alliance, Russia was incredibly weak in the 1990s. Secondly, while the world will assuredly never know whether Vladimir Putin was fully intent on pursuing an interventionist foreign policy in his own backyard before NATO enlargement, it can be noted that tensions grew after enlargement.

In reality, the expansion of NATO’s influence into the Balkans and the proposed bids to Russian neighbors represents an unnecessary and somewhat predictable strategic mistake. In its well-intentioned bid to establish a single Europe free from an Eastern threat and united in values and security, NATO isolated Russia. In extending membership and security guarantees to the weakest European states that would simultaneously be the most difficult to defend once Russia recovered, NATO left itself with two undesirable options. The first was to let Russia have what it wants and undermine the solidarity of the alliance in the name of not having a dog in the fight. The second option was to contest every Russian challenge and put NATO troops at risk over the status of countries that are either minuscule in size or internally rife with rising authoritarianism and corruption. Washington and Brussels could live with these contradictions because they never envisioned these security guarantees would need to be fulfilled. 

Eventually, however, Putin sought a more expansionist agenda. Two major strategic decisions by the U.S. and most of its European allies served as catalysts for deteriorating U.S.-Russian relations: the recognition of Kosovo’s independence in 2008 (Russia is the closest ally of Serbia, which continues to dispute Kosovo’s claim) and NATO’s Bucharest Summit, held that same year, which guaranteed future NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine. Both decisions crossed a red line for Moscow, as statements by Russian leadership made clear. Former Russian president Dmitri Medvedev, before the Russian war in Georgia, elucidated a clear position laying out Russia’s perception of greater European integration in Eastern Europe, calling Ukrainian and Georgian accession a threat to Russian security. At the same time, then-Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov argued that Georgian accession would “lead to another stage of confrontation.” In this way, what followed, in the form of Russian instigation of wars in Georgia and Ukraine, should have been foreseen by American officials. Putin was not as much a brilliant strategist creating chaos and disorder out of post-Cold War kumbaya but rather he was taking advantage of and responding to American foreign policy on the fly. Yet in its hubris, Washington added to its security burdens and provoked Russia while getting next to no benefit out of the enlargement. 

It is also worth noting that the democratizing benefit of NATO was widely oversold beyond Central and Western Europe. There has been a great worry among NATO watchers about democratic backsliding in several NATO powerhouses and some of the newer or proposed members from recent periods of expansion. Turkey, which has the second-largest military in NATO, is rated as Not Free by Freedom House for the first time in the history of the report as Recep Erdogan has concentrated his own power and persecuted political opponents. The country once billed by the U.S. as a model secular democracy in the Middle East and Southeastern Europe is now essentially a theocracy with more journalists imprisoned than any other country in the world. In Hungary, Viktor Orban has shuttered universities, promoted white nationalist theories about immigrants, criticized liberal democracy, and now made himself a dictator for the foreseeable future through a new law granting him authority to rule by decree. Montenegro, Ukraine, and Poland each struggle with corruption and have experienced recent democratic backsliding. With this, the very democratic solidarity at the root of NATO is endangered and NATO expansion did not stop any of it from occurring.

Russia has noticed, leveraging its relationships with Turkey and Hungary to exacerbate discord within NATO. Putin sees Orban and Erdogan as ideological allies in the campaign against the European Union and European integration writ-large, and the NATO alliance did not stop Putin from politically and financially supporting anti-democratic forces aligned with them. Nor did it stop Turkey from seeking closer military ties with Russia, through the purchase of S-400 missile systems despite bipartisan congressional urging. The acquisition of the S-400 system will presumably hurt NATO’s security cooperation. Turkey’s critical role in NATO has not stopped it from turning toward Russia.

Putin and Make Russia Great Again

Another point of contention between common narratives about Putin and the historical record is whether his aspiration to “Make Russia Great Again” is (a) the main motivating factor of his foreign policy and (b) actually achievable. “[Putin] came to believe that he had been chosen for a special mission—to save Russia,” Russian journalist Mikhail Zygar wrote in Time. To some, especially those of all political stripes who have spent the past half-century projecting their worst fears onto Russia whether justified or not, it may seem that Russia will always have an interest in maintaining authoritarianism at home and behaving like an empire abroad.

The problem is that that is not the only factor at hand, and Russian interests, imperial or otherwise, are no more immutable than those of any other country. As Rutgers-Newark professor and scholar of empire Alexander Motyl writes, “As anyone with an appreciation of Russian, or any, history knows, no state can pursue identical interests for the duration of its historical existence, because states and their surroundings are always changing… As a result, foreign policy becomes a function of geopolitics, national interests, and ideologies, but also of regime type, personality of the leader, historical timing, context, and many other factors.” Take the example of the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine. It may be that Putin authorized the action in part because he wanted to restore Russian prestige, but it is impossible to ignore that the Maidan revolution that ousted Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych made Ukraine politically unstable, and thus more vulnerable than ever before. At the same time, a revolution in his own backyard led by the populace would make any dictator sweat. Thus, Putin also saw the Ukrainian state as an easy target for expansion, wanted to send a message to the West that it was overextending its sphere of influence through NATO expansion, and wanted to assert his power in the face of regime vulnerability. In the end, it was not just ideology that motivated Putin, but also geography, the stability of rival states, and vulnerability at home, a more reactive, less ideological conclusion than the prevailing wisdom.

Furthermore, Putin’s Russia does not pose the existential threat that it once did to the United States. In a very real way, Putin has not and cannot “Make Russia Great Again.” Economic growth in Russia has slowed to a crawl, in part due to falling oil prices and inequality but also due to U.S. sanctions placed on Russia for its repeated abuses of human rights and international law. Its GDP is roughly the same as it was in 2008. While Russia has improved relations with several major players in international politics like China and Turkey, it still has very few real allies. Even among the few powerful countries with which it has good relations, such as Saudi Arabia and India, the United States has a serious claim to being a closer ally. In the same sense, since being kicked out of the G-8 for the intervention in Crimea and condemned widely for foreign assassinations, Russia has lost institutional power in recent years. Finally, militarily, Russia is relatively weak compared to its rivals. The European members of NATO alone spend four times as much as Russia on defense even as some of them fail to meet the suggested guideline of 2 percent of GDP and regional powers like Saudi Arabia and India, as well as the declining great power of France, all spend more on defense than Russia.

That is not to say that Russia is not going to continue to be an important consideration for policymakers. It is not to say that Russia will not continue to be a major player beyond its own region. Indeed, through its backing of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and facilitation of peace talks in Libya and Northern Syria, Russia plays a much larger role in the Middle East than China does. Furthermore, Putin has reoriented Russian foreign policy towards the region since the Arab Spring, regaining some of the lost diplomatic clout from the Crimea invasion. Instead of a pariah state that had been absent from the region since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Russia is now being treated by even its most ardent rivals as a major player in Middle Eastern affairs. This is because the Iraq War and the U.S. intervention in Libya projected a form of regime change politics and created instability that reduced Russian trust in the U.S. while the Arab Spring showed that popular democratic movements could change international politics, a notion the ever-cautious Putin feared would manifest in regime vulnerability. It is important to note this caveat to understand why dialogue with Russia and consideration of its interests will continue to be essential even if it is not as capable of projecting power as it once was.

A New Strategy

Though often made out by those on both sides of the aisle as a master grand strategist, Putin’s foreign policy successes can be better understood as ample improvised reactions to American policy at best and outright boom or bust gambles at worst. The Blob, as former Obama Administration National Security Council staffer Ben Rhodes derogatorily refers to the network of the governmental, think tank, and media foreign policy establishment has long projected its fears onto Russia, from the Cold War to Putin’s alleged quest for world domination. To them, Putin is a brilliant strategist with a coherent worldview synonymous with decimating the institutions of the post-Cold War international order. In their eyes, there is no democracy Putin and his cronies cannot hack, no U.S. ally he would not squeeze, and no border dispute he would not settle violently in his favor. This lens, while common for the reasons outlined above, is not entirely valid.

A new Russian strategy must be devised to account for this new perception of Putin’s worldview and capabilities. With 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons on either side of the negotiating table, war must be averted at any cost. To date, the American strategy has been too militarized and focused on competition rather than a more nuanced position that acknowledges that cooperation is necessary to reduce the nuclear threat and define the rules of the road, even as the U.S. must stand ready to call out Putin’s Russia when it violates international law and foments instability. The primary challenge in this strategy of getting to peace and disarmament for U.S. policymakers will be to determine where valid Russian interests cease and where realistic red lines must lie. 

A more coherent and nuanced Russia strategy would continue to reiterate that the former Soviet republics bordering Russia are entitled to their sovereignty under international law and Russian violations of that sovereignty will be condemned accordingly. Yet at the same time, the U.S. should make clear that it does not intend to expand its sphere of influence through NATO or other means up to Russia’s border. Georgia and Ukraine’s NATO bids should be withdrawn, as they only give greater credence to the conspiracy theory that NATO exists to encircle and isolate Russia, a theory that has drawn Russia to foment war in both of those countries. Concurrently, the U.S. and its allies must cooperate to ensure that Ukraine’s territorial integrity is preserved and Russia abides by the terms of the Minsk Protocol in Donbass. Finally, in Eastern Europe, Russia must not be rewarded for its reckless and illegal annexation of Crimea, which should not be recognized. Reckless land grabs have no place in 21st century Europe and international politics, and as long as this principle remains intact, the U.S. should not recognize the annexation. 

In Syria, Moscow’s support for Assad’s regime has brought great harm to the Syrian people. Unfortunately, U.S. military misadventures in the Middle East have validated the Russian view that Washington seeks to destabilize the region through destructive regime change wars. This view may be motivated by Russia’s own interests, but that alone does not discredit it. As such, the U.S. has to be willing to negotiate an enduring peace settlement that includes all of the various factions and ultimately dramatically scales back both the U.S. and Russian presences in the region, even if it means Assad controls a sizable part of the country.

The U.S. missed a major opportunity when it chose to prioritize NATO expansion over the Partnership for Peace, which included Russia and aimed to create trust between NATO and Russia. Furthermore, the Partnership for Peace was not just a military alliance, as it facilitated cooperation on science and environmental issues, disaster response, policy planning, and civil-military relations. The Partnership was uniquely able to thread the needle posed by Nunn between assuaging Russian concerns about NATO enlargement, supporting democratic values, and preparing aspiring members for consideration. In short, it reached beyond the alliance to forge trust between NATO states and non-NATO states. While non-recognition of the Crimea annexation would preclude readmission to the G7 for good reason, the U.S. should seek to build similar low-risk institutions like the Partnership for Peace that engage with, rather than isolate Russia to facilitate cooperation on non-security issues and reduce distrust on security issues.

As stated earlier, 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons are in the hands of the U.S. and Russia. Those who huddled under desks during the Cuban missile crisis and those in the Obama Administration who worked tirelessly to approve the 2011 New START treaty that dramatically limited the deployment of strategic nuclear weapons by either side need no reminder of the danger of these weapons. Nevertheless, the George W. Bush and Trump administrations took dead aim at the various arms control and disarmament treaties governing these weapons. In 2002, the Bush Administration withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which limited the number of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems each party could possess. Russia responded by building up its nuclear capabilities. Last September, the White House officially withdrew from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which led to the elimination of almost 3,000 nuclear missiles. Even if the U.S. claim that Russia had been cheating on the deal was true, remaining a party to it would have been preferable because now Putin gets to tell the world that the U.S. cannot keep its word and that its interest in nonproliferation is not serious. Furthermore, with New START itself in danger of not being reauthorized (despite U.S. conclusions that Russia abides by the deal’s terms) by 2021, it is quite possible that there will be no legally binding limits on the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals for the first time in 50 years. Forty-five years of nuclear chicken was enough. The transparency and restrictions on proliferation and deployment instilled in these treaties reduce the likelihood of a third world war, and it is imperative that U.S. strategy prioritize getting back to the negotiating table.

Finally, Vladimir Putin’s kleptocratic authoritarian petrostate regime is as repressive as they come. The current president’s foreign policy is largely defined by his willingness to cozy up to dictators, including Putin himself. On the other end of the table, Putin has exported his particular brand of xenophobia, homophobia, all across Europe in the form of backing far-right parties and leaders like Orban. The U.S. has an obligation to support democracy and human rights through peaceful means in Russia and across Europe, as transparent, stable governments that can be held accountable by their voters make for good allies because they are sympathetic to the liberal worldview that benefits the U.S. and behave in predictable and rational ways. As Putin’s government bars his opponents from running against him, murders scores of journalists, and tortures LGBTQ people in Chechnya, the U.S., as the leader of the free world, must call him out and hold him and his cronies accountable every step of the way. 

While the last two decades of U.S. Russia policy has largely been characterized by a misreading of Vladimir Putin’s motives and capabilities that emboldened him, this new proposed Russia strategy builds upon the successes of the time period in arms control and the Global Magnitsky Act and reorients U.S. policy towards shared interests and challenges while condemning Russia’s many misdeeds. Russia may not be the imperial power some believe it to be, but its importance cannot be overstated in 21st century Eurasia and in international forums. To confront it when its actions demand it to be confronted and to cooperate and reduce tensions when changes in interests occur, nuance is essential. The status quo must go.

Moscow’s Mad Monk: Aleksandr Dugin and Eurasianism

When referring to the most influential figures within Russia, one would be hard-pressed to ignore the exploits of Grigori Rasputin. An infamous mystic, Rasputin’s esoteric allure would grant him unparalleled influence over the royal family, allowing him to fill ministerial positions with sycophants aligned with him at whim. A person prone to a similar charisma and cryptic prose of equal indirect power in contemporary Russia is that of Aleksandr Dugin, a man who has earned himself the monikers of “The Most Dangerous Man In The World,” “Putin’s Brain,” and, indeed, “Putin’s Rasputin.”

Beginning his political career with a prominent position in the nativist neo-Nazi group Pramyat from 1987 to 1989, Dugin would continue to augment his ideology with the anti-bourgeois rhetoric fostered by Soviet thought, eventually founding the National Bolshevik Party with novelist Ėduard Limonov in 1993. National Bolshevism, an ultranationalist strand of Marxism described by the Communist Party’s Young Left Front as “a bizarre mixture of totalitarian and fascist symbols, geopolitical dogma, leftist ideas, and national-patriotic demagoguery,” served to represent the synthesis of Dugin’s ultranationalist sentiments with his influence from the former Soviet Union’s Marxist and anti-bourgeois rhetoric. This set the stage for the Eurasian ideology and its distinctly chauvinist and illiberal nature.

Eurasianism, as posited by Dugin, argues that the twenty-first century will be defined by a conflict between the Atlanticists, referring to the thalassocratic liberal hegemony and world order espoused by the United States and its allies, and the Eurasianists, referring to the land-based powers, primarily referring to Russia, who reject such an order. This narrative of conflict has differed greatly from classical proponents of Eurasianism who have traditionally portrayed Romano-Germanic Europe as a unifying threat. Such a plan involves stoking anti-American nationalism among Japan, Germany, and Iran, the last of which is of particular interest with renewed Iranian-American tensions in the wake of Qasem Soleimani’s death. Additionally, a geopolitical issue integral to Eurasianism is that of Russia’s claim to Ukraine, a belief which had served to bolster Dugin’s following in the wake of Russia’s actions in Crimea and the Donbass. 

When directly countering the American liberal world order, Dugin’s Eurasian doctrine directs its followers “to provoke all forms of instability and separatism within the borders of the United States,” mentioning historical racial divisions as a promising wedge. To cement Eurasianism as a universally appealing alternative to liberalism, much of the Eurasian doctrine is rooted in elements of both Fascist and Communist thought due to neither “belonging to the spirit of modernity” and thus are free of its supposed corruption at the hand of liberal thought. In his primary ideological work, The Fourth Political Theory, Dugin summarizes this ideology as the rejection of “socialism without materialism, atheism, progressivism, and modernism,” instead focusing on the concepts of intense religious, ethnic, and national pride. These are the criteria by which Dugin believes facilitate “Dasein,” a term in Heideggerian existential philosophy used in the context of individual identity and personhood. Whereas the Eurasian movement allows Dugin appeal to the more hawkish of the Russian elite, the integration of the Fourth Political Ideology at its foundations has served to rapidly grow his following of the disillusioned through its incorporation of all radical fringes of the political spectrum. 

While the tenets of such an ideology and its revanchist ambitions might lead one to believe such a movement exists solely on the fringes of the Russian public and political spheres, many Russian figures prominent in such realms have offered Dugin’s philosophy not only acceptance but praise. During a 1999 interview, former Chairman of the State Duma and prominent early supporter of President Putin, Gennadiy Seleznyov, publicly advocated for Dugin’s work to be made compulsory reading in Russia’s school curriculum. Though the popularity of Dugin’s work has yet to make an impression on the Russian economic elite, one may also notice exceptions to this phenomena, such as the man’s amicable ties to retail mogul President of Russian Gold, Alexander Tarantsev, who greatly helped Dugin finance the publication of new editions of his work. 

Beyond the public sphere, the works of Dugin and the Eurasian movement have also made a lasting impression within one of the Russian government’s most formidable assets: its military. Lectures based on what would become Dugin’s magnum opus, Foundation of Geopolitics, have according to an uncontested claim by Dugin himself, been used as required reading for Russia’s General Staff Academy, one of Russia’s premier military learning institutions. This lasting impression of this Eurasianist Il Principe on Russia’s policy makers has not been lost on prominent scholarship. John Dunlop, a leading figure on the topic of post-Soviet Russian nationalism, further affirms this popularity by stating that there has “not been another book published in Russia during the post-communist period that has exerted an influence on Russian military, police, and statist foreign policy elites.”

Whilst the ideological characteristics of the Eurasia Movement and the Fourth Political Theory have made a relatively small impression on the Russian political and military sphere, the aforementioned geopolitical doctrine espoused by the movement have been viewed with great interest by Russian policy makers, helping carry both its military and ideological aspects into the mainstream. With this in mind, the threat of a successful execution of the Eurasian geopolitical philosophy by the Russian government would pose a twofold threat to the democratic ideals of the United States’ government and its people, and should thus be a priority for United States policymakers. 

One such area of which action is recommended to be taken is the countering of the aforementioned Eurasian strategy of sowing discontent through “encouraging all kinds of separatism and ethnic, social and racial conflicts, actively supporting all dissident movements-- extremist, racist, and sectarian groups, thus destabilizing internal political processes in the U.S.” This policy has seen itself come to fruition through the actions of entities associated with Russian soft power, the most infamous being the pro-Russian Internet Research Agency. The organization’s skill at dividing and conquering was made apparent in the U.S. Senate Select Committee On Intelligence’s Report On Russian Active Measures And Interference In The 2016 Election, where a plethora of attempts were made by the group to incite racial hatred among Americans. In fact, 66 percent of Internet Research Agency Facebook ads mentioning race in an inflammatory manner and one of the group’s proxy accounts designed to galvanize black police retaliation, titled “Blacktivist,” garnered a total of 11.2 million engagements on Facebook before promptly being taken down by the U.S. government after its Russian ties were revealed. The Eurasianist’s efforts to galvanize identity politics in the U.S. is not restricted to Black Americans, however, as figures such as Richard Spencer and Steve Bannon have both worked with and drawn inspiration from Dugin and his nativist vision. 

As Putin’s geopolitical maneuvers in Ukraine and Georgia continue to mirror one another, the United States must look towards another former Soviet territory at high risk of hybrid warfare with Russia frequently mentioned as an invaluable prospect for satellite states under “special status” under a Russo-Eurasian hegemony: the Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. In fact, defense strategists working on behalf of the United States Armed Forces have concluded that these Baltic nations are “vulnerable to low-level, hybrid, and full-scale attacks by Russian special operations and regular military forces deployed close to their borders,'' with little preventing increased Russian military and diplomatic pressure in the region. 

There indeed exist factors that facilitate such acts, such as the traditional cultural divides that also render the United States and Ukraine vulnerable to Russian soft power. This is especially dangerous in the case of the Baltic States due to their respective Russophone population “[relying] primarily on Russian origin media for information and entertainment,” rendering them susceptible to online information manipulation. Additionally, the impact of the Baltic States’ Russophone population losing faith in their government institutions would greatly shift public opinion and, eventually, the Baltic governments themselves away from NATO. This would effectively prevent direct American intervention in the event that the three countries withdraw from the military alliance. If the Baltic States allow Russia to alienate their native Russophone population, the latter would “not require a major effort to provide a pretext for Russian intervention should Moscow desire one.”

With this in mind, it is highly recommended that policymakers urge the social media industry to adhere to the solutions offered by the aforementioned Committee, which involve the promotion of increased interindustrial cooperation through the creation of “formalized mechanisms for collaboration that facilitate content sharing among the social media platforms in order to defend against foreign disinformation” as well as the offering of “notifications to individual users [that] should be clearly stated, device neutral, and provide users all the information necessary to understanding the malicious nature of the social media content or accounts they were exposed to.” This will allow those using such online platforms to know where the information they consume is coming from and identity possibly malicious intent. However, while social media companies have agreed to cooperate “on an ad-hoc basis,” it will take continuous and sensible cooperation if the IRA or its like are to be mitigated in the United States’ political system in the future.

In regards to an all-too-possible situation in which Putin will continue to mirror the Eurasian geopolitical agenda and eye the nations of the Baltic with pragmatic interest, Stephen Flanagan of the Rand Corporation recommends that the American Armed Forces work in cooperation with NATO personnel in the specialized training of the Baltic militaries. This includes in the fields of  “crisis management, civil defense, and countering … and ‘grey zone’ attacks,” areas of which the quantitatively diminutive Baltic militaries must excel in if they are to prevent Russian engagements in hybrid warfare. 

Taking note of the prospective problems concerning Russian manipulation of media, Ulrich Kuhn of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg believes that Russian hybrid warfare can be primarily mitigated through the funding of Russophone media within the Baltic States as opposed to Russia, spanning from traditional media outlets such as newspapers, television, and radio… [to] social media and internet resources.” This would effectively provide the Baltic States’ Russian-speaking population an alternative to complete dependence on Kremlin-influenced media, an alternative that presents itself as more cost-effective than an increase in NATO defense funding. 

Constitutional Amendments and the Future Political Course of the Russian Federation

Constitutional Amendments

On January 15, 2020, Russian President Vladimir Putin of Russia gave his yearly address to lawmakers. In his speech, Putin, without warning, proposed a series of changes to the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Some of the proposed changes include increasing the power of the lawmakers in selecting the Prime Minister and Cabinet-level positions. Currently, lawmakers only confirm the President’s nomination for the post of the Prime Minister and no other high-level post is subject to lawmakers’ confirmation. Under Putin’s proposed changes, lawmakers would have the power to nominate and confirm their choice for Prime Minister and other high-ranking cabinet positions. Furthermore, the President would not be able to reject the lawmakers’ choice.

Furthermore, Putin proposed putting a constitutional limit on the influence of international law in Russia. Essentially, Putin suggested that if international law was found to be in violation of the Russian constitution, then the international law would be nullified. In another law-related amendment, Putin floated the idea of increasing the power of the Constitutional Court. The proposed change would give the President the power to request that the Constitutional Court examine the constitutionality of any legislation before it is signed into law by the President. 

Additionally, Putin suggested two amendments that would change certain eligibility requirements that have to do with holding high office in Russia. First, the residency requirements would be increased for candidates for President from 10 to 25 years. Second, members of the Duma, the Federation Council, Ministers, and judges would be prohibited from having dual citizenship or other long-term residency documents of another country.

Some other notable proposals in Putin’s address included providing a guarantee that the minimum wage and pension will remain above the poverty line, prohibiting any future President from occupying the post of President for more than two terms, and strengthening the status and role of the Government Council.

In Putin’s speech to lawmakers, he stated that “these amendments do not fundamentally change the Constitution and thus, can be adopted by the parliament. However, I consider it right to hold a referendum on all suggested amendments and only after the results of the referendum adopt the amendments.”  However, despite rumors that a national referendum on the constitutional amendments will be held in May, as of now no details have been released. 

The proposed amendments constitute one of the largest domestic political events in the Putin era. However, following Putin’s address to lawmakers, another earthquake shook the Russian political scene. Dmitry Medvedev, Putin’s Prime Minister, announced his resignation. Medvedev’s resignation meant that the entire ministerial cabinet would also resign. Sources within the Russian government told Novaya Gazeta, a prominent Russian newspaper, that resignation of the cabinet was a complete surprise even at the highest levels of government. Medvedev stated that he considered his resignation to be the proper action in the context of Putin’s proposed constitutional changes.

Appointment of Mikhail Mishustin as Prime Minister

Immediately following Medvedev’s resignation, Putin appointed a new Prime Minister, Mikhail Mishustin. Mishustin was confirmed as Prime Minister on January 16 with a vote of 383-41. Previously, Mishustin was the head of Russia’s federal tax service since 2010 but he has not played a role in national-level politics until now. 

A comparison can be drawn between Mishustin’s sudden elevation to the national political sphere and Anton Vaino’s similar unexpected rise to prominence. In August 2016, Anton Vaino replaced long-time Putin ally, Sergey Ivanov, as the Presidential Chief of Staff. Before Vaino was appointed to this position, he was the head of Protocol, and before that he held a series of technocratic positions within the Russian government.  At the time of Vaino’s appointment, analysts noted that Vaino was known for his competence as a bureaucrat and that, unlike the man he replaced, Vaino had no independent power of his own. Vaino's appointment suggested that Putin was clearing ‘the old-guard’ out and replacing them with efficient technocrats who would be able to competently pursue his agenda without developing any sort of independent influence. 

Mishustin also has a technocratic background and is known for his competence. Before becoming the head of Russia’s federal tax service, he had a long career in a series of low-profile bureaucratic positions mostly relating to taxes. During Mishustin’s tenure as head of the federal tax service, he led an extremely ambitious modernization of Russia’s tax collection methods. He focused on digitizing the process of collecting taxes with the goal of increasing efficiency in order to increase overall revenue. The Federal Tax Service is now widely considered to be the most technologically advanced department of the Russian government. Mishustin’s efforts succeeded. Due to increased efficiencies, the total amount of taxes collected has risen 33 times faster than the rate of GDP growth. 

The parallels between Mishustin and Viano suggest that Putin appointed Mishustin to execute his agenda between now and 2024, as well as guarantee that whoever holds the post as Prime Minister could not challenge Putin before or replace him after 2024. 

Mishustin’s background as an efficient money-manager is also worth noting, particularly in light of some of Putin’s domestic political challenges. Sources close to Putin’s government told the Russian newspaper, Komersant, that the shakeup of the government could be related to budgetary issues facing Russia in recent years. Putin has proposed and instituted a series of ambitious social-economic initiatives which will require serious government expenditures. There has traditionally been resistance to these expenditures within some blocks of the government. When Andrey Isaev, a Duma Deputy, asked Mishustin where he planned to get the resources to fund the initiatives of the President, Mishustin simply replied: “The resources exist.” Overall, it seems that Mishustin, with his reputation as a technocratic problem solver, was brought in to execute Putin’s national projects without dissent.

Putin is Feeling Domestic Pressure

 Mishustin’s appointment as Prime Minister along with some of the language in Putin’s address to lawmakers could suggest that he is feeling the public’s call for the government to do more to raise living standards. At the beginning of his address, Putin stated that “today in our society, there has been a clear demand for change.”  Although Putin’s popularity according to the Levada Center (one of Russia’s only public opinion polling organizations) has been stable at around 69 percent since July of 2019, in recent years there has been a series of protest movements that have called attention to poor living and economic conditions in the country. 

In June 2018, the Russian government announced a proposal to increase the retirement age from 60 to 65 for men and from 55 to 63 for women. This proposal was met with widespread popular disapproval and protests erupted in over 80 different cities in Russia. In August of 2018, protests also erupted in cities across Northwest Russia after it was discovered that the government was building a massive landfill in an abandoned town northeast of Moscow. Waste from Moscow would be dumped in this landfill and there were fears among locals that this would lead to an ecological disaster. Additionally, in February of 2017 in response to a proposed increase in the taxes paid by truck drivers who drive on federal roads, Russian truckers went on strike for 10 days. These policy changes were proposed to raise revenues or decrease costs to the federal government. Since 2014, Russia has suffered under western sanctions and combined with the pressure of an aging population and significant expenditures on the modernization of the military, Russia finds itself cash-strapped. Putin’s appointment of Mishustin can be interpreted as an effort to improve Russia’s financial situation so that it can provide the services and benefits that the Russian populace desires. 

What Does This Reveal About Putin’s Political Future?

Putin’s current term as president will end in 2024 and it seems unlikely at this point that he will run for a fifth term. However, it is widely accepted that Putin has no intention of stepping away from politics or power come 2024. Thus, it has been expected for quite some time that Putin would find some way to ensure that he would maintain a position of power post-2024. 

The predictions regarding Putin’s possible methods to preserve his influence have varied dramatically. Some have predicted that Putin intends to become the President of a new country that would be formed by combining Russia and Belarus. Some have forecasted that Putin will follow Nursultan Nazarbayev’s, the former President of Kazakhstan, example of stepping down from the presidency but maintaining power by becoming chairman for life of the Security Councils of Kazakhstan. 

Regardless of the path that Putin takes, if the proposed amendments pass, the next Russian President will have significantly less power than the office has today. And many of the proposed amendments, like the following, could be used to centralize Putin’s power and ensure that no political opponents could challenge him. 

• Limiting the influence of international law: Russia has often emphasized that “western, democratic capitalism” is not the proper style of governance for every country. This constitutional change could codify this ideology and empower Putin even further to use authoritarian measures to maintain power. 

• Increasing the power of the Courts: The Russian court system is notoriously vulnerable to political influence. Freedom House gave the Russian court system a score of 1 out of a possible 4, stating that “The judiciary lacks independence from the executive branch, and career advancement is effectively tied to compliance with Kremlin preferences. The Presidential Personnel Commission and court chairmen control the appointment and reappointment of the country’s judges, who tend to be promoted from inside the judicial system rather than gaining independent experience as lawyers.” A more powerful court system that is easily influenced could be an ideal means for Putin to exert power after he moves on from the office of the Presidency. 

• The increasing residency requirements and prohibition of dual citizens: This measure helps guarantee that prominent Russian exiles cannot return and run for political office. Furthermore, this gives the Kremlin an excuse to disqualify individuals that have been educated, or spent extended periods of time in the West, and thus are more likely to hold liberal values, from seeking government jobs or elected positions. 

• Codifying a two-term limit for the office of the Presidency: This guarantees that no individual can acquire the same degree of long-term power to challenge Putin. 

What to Watch For

There are few times in recent memory that the political future of the Russian Federation has been as uncertain as it is now. However, there are a couple of overarching themes to watch out for in the coming weeks and months. 

• Putin will act to preserve his position of power: Any reforms proposed by Putin should be analyzed through the paradigm of Putin’s self-interest. To ascertain why the Government of Russia undertakes a course of action, examine how Putin could benefit.

• Prepare for unexpected changes in the Russian Government. Even the most attentive of Russia watchers were taken completely by surprise by the timing of this dramatic shakeup. Reports in the Russian press state that even the highest levels of the Russian government were unaware of these proposed changes. 

• Examine the backgrounds of the new ministerial cabinet members when they are announced. If the appointees have similar technocratic, low-profile backgrounds like Mishustin, this could indicate that Putin is attempting to further centralize power while also building a team that can deliver on Putin’s ambitious social-economic plans.

• Expect the Russian government to institute reforms with the aim of cutting costs and increasing the services provided to the Russian populace.

The Proliferation of Organized Crime Groups in Europe’s First “Narco-State”: A Look at Albania in the post-Cold War Era

“While organized crime is not a new phenomenon today, some governments find their authority besieged at home and their foreign policy interests imperiled abroad. Drug trafficking, links between drug traffickers and terrorists, smuggling of illegal aliens, massive financial and bank fraud, arms smuggling, potential involvement in the theft and sale of nuclear material, political intimidation, and corruption all constitute a poisonous brew.”

James Woolsey, Former Director of the CIA

In the early twenty-first century, the international community adopted a policy of indifference towards the Balkan peninsula after the United States (U.S.) successfully commandeered NATO-led military interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo to prevent the escalation of a conflict that threatened to “taint the post-Cold War world.” However, as democratic backsliding and rising nationalist-populist parties threaten to reverse European integration efforts, stability in the Balkans is no longer guaranteed. While a large number of European countries are currently experiencing calls for secession, the Balkans face a greater, more established threat: transnational organized crime. These organized crime groups (OCGs) have been operating in the Balkans since the Yugoslav Wars, and they continue to threaten states’ efforts to democratize and stabilize. As the “hub” for organized crime in the region, the impact of these groups is especially visible in Albania, whose accession to the European Union (EU) has been halted due to the proliferation of organized crime and group ties to the country’s economic and political systems. However, the question remains as to what conditions have enabled Albania in particular, and not another Balkan state, to become the regional hub for organized crime groups and the illicit drug trade in the post-Cold War era?

It is critical to understand why the situation in Albania differs from the other Balkan countries that also host a number of OCGs. The factors of analysis that will be used to examine the reasons for this difference include Albania’s poor social and economic conditions, the magnitude of political corruption, and the country’s porous border as a result of their geographic location. In addition to analyzing these factors, this piece will also examine the implications of the proliferation of organized crime in Albania, particularly as they pertain to the country’s potential for acquiring EU membership, and as well as the overall impact on both the Balkans and contemporary Europe.

Historical Context

The Balkans and Organized Crime

Comprised of twelve countries, including the states that made up the former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and Greece, the Balkans lie at the crossroads between Europe and the Mediterranean Sea, essentially serving as a bridge between Europe and Asia. While economically beneficial, this geopolitical location also makes the Balkans extremely susceptible to transnational criminal activity. Following the demise of the Soviet Union, the Balkan states were left politically weak, with no real governmental structure left in place. These conditions, paired with a fractured economic system, made the Balkan peninsula vulnerable to transnational organized crime groups.

Historically, organized crime in the Balkans was facilitated by means of “Balkan routes” which ran primarily through Turkey, Greece, Italy, and Bulgaria. Through the use of these routes, transnational criminals were able to smuggle illegal drugs like heroin and marijuana, and now also cocaine and human beings, to other European countries such as Austria, Hungary, Poland, and Germany, among others. The outbreak of war in the Balkans in the 1990s increased smugglers’ use of these routes, as smuggling became a “survival strategy” for citizens who required basic supplies, as well as for groups like the Kosovo Liberation Army, who needed weapons and ammunition in order to fight. As a result of war-time smuggling, criminal profits made during the conflicts translated to political power in the post-war period. This led to corruption and the establishment of criminal structures in the Balkan countries’ political systems, such as the judiciary, the bureaucracy, and various state law enforcement agencies.

Albania as the “Hub” for OCGs

However, while transnational OCGs threaten the entirety of the Balkan countries, Albania is especially vulnerable to this type of clandestine criminal activity. Regarding the centralization of organized crime, Albania serves as the main hub, acting as both a “producer country” and as a “distribution node” for groups such as Hellbanianz. According to the U.S. Department of State’s 2018 Strategy for International Control of Narcotics, “Albania produces and exports a significant amount of marijuana [and] is a transit country for Afghan heroin and cocaine,” making it one of the fastest-growing threats in contemporary Europe. As the primary exporter of cannabis in the region, Albanian OCGs take advantage of the historical “Balkan routes” that were used by smugglers and ensure the safe transportation of their products by placing “Soldiers” and “Capos” along the route to ward off public inquiries. The U.S. State Department also describes Albania as home to “rampant corruption, weak legal and government institutions and weak border controls” where drug trafficking and smuggling are among the top sources of revenue.

Factors of Analysis

Poor Social and Economic Conditions

Albania’s economy has experienced significant growth since the end of the Cold War. However, underlying social issues still prevent the country from achieving further economic success, the greatest being a lack of job opportunities. This can be attributed to the period between 1996-97 when the Albanian economy was besieged by a series of financial pyramid schemes. Despite enjoying success after transitioning to a market economy in the post-war period, Albania’s new economy was rudimentary and unstructured. This weak financial system enabled pyramid schemes to be carried out. A form of fraud, pyramid schemes are a way to make money based on the recruitment of investors, who are drawn in with the promise of high returns. The more investors involved, the more levels reached in the “pyramid” until eventually there are no more investors, profits are lost, and the system is rendered unsustainable. 

In Albania, the proliferation of these schemes was detrimental to social and economic growth. Once schemes began to collapse, riots ensued as an estimated 800,000 individuals lost their money, leading to the acquisition of approximately $13.3 million in illegal proceeds. While knowledge about the true nature of pyramid schemes later reached the masses and people became more careful about where they invested their money, the impact of these schemes in the late 1990s set the stage for financial failure in an economic system that had a weak foundation. 

The legacy of these pyramid schemes enables the success of OCGs in modern-day Albania because they are often cited as the reason for the lack of employment opportunities, which OCGs then use as an argument to draw people in to commit criminal acts as an alternative means to make money. Compared to the greater Euro Area, where unemployment rests at 7.5 percent as of October 2019, Albania has an extremely high national unemployment rate, recorded at 12 percent in December 2019, and an even higher youth unemployment rate, which averaged out at 20.9 percent in the second quarter of 2019. The country’s unemployment rates, paired with an aging population and high levels of emigration to Greece and Italy, help contribute to the phenomenon known as “brain drain,” which occurs when highly-trained or intelligent people leave their home country in search of better opportunities and a life outside of widespread poverty. This is where the impact produced by OCGs is the greatest, as these groups flourish in fragile states where post-conflict conditions ensure weak governance, poverty, and inequality. Albanian nationals who are living in poverty and are unable to find jobs are drawn to the idea of making fast cash through the illicit drug trade, which only serves to further the success of OCGs and perpetuate their existence in society.

Political Corruption

Coined “Europe’s first narco-state,” which the International Monetary Fund defines as a state “where all legitimate institutions become penetrated by the power and wealth of the illegal drug trade,” political corruption is key to the success of organized crime groups and the growth of the illicit drug trade in Albania. Corruption was rampant in the highest levels of government in the capital of Tirana under former Prime Minister Enver Hoxha until his death in 1985, and that trend persists today under Prime Minister Edi Rama, who, along with other government officials, is said to be in collusion with drug traffickers. According to the Independent Balkan News Agency, cocaine gangs such as the “Avdyli group” successfully rigged Albanian elections in 2016 by engaging in vote-buying for the mayor of Durres, a major port city in the country. Additionally, allegations that ties between OCGs and government officials influenced 2017 parliamentary elections in Albania were verified in a three-year-long study, which found that 20.7 percent of Albanians were offered favors in exchange for their vote. In Albania, which is said to be the most corrupt Balkan state by the Corruption Perceptions Index, the best way to secure people’s votes is by paying them in the cash that is generated by the drug trade. This enhances the level of top-down corruption that occurs in the public sector, of which drugs and OCGs play a participatory role, and allows Albanian government officials to perpetuate unorthodox practices. Rudina Hajdari, a member of the Assembly of the Republic of Albania, summarizes the issue in Albania:

“Young Albanians feel angry and cheated by the government. We have seismic, mind-blowing problems with corruption. When drugs came into the picture, so much cash was flowing that it actually shook the national currency. Money dictates our country’s decisions, and as that money is provided by drug cartels-to individual politicians, and to all political parties-anyone fighting corruption hits big hurdles.”

This exchange of dirty money for votes helps to ensure job stability of politicians who wish to remain in office and perpetuate the cycle of corruption from which they are benefitting. Saimir Tahiri, former interior minister under Prime Minister Rama, resigned in May 2018 amid investigations into his culpability regarding drug trafficking charges and accusations of corruption, of which he was later found guilty of abuse of office. As interior minister, Tahiri was responsible for the conduct of elections. A corrupt official in this position is detrimental to Albanian politics, as elections are more susceptible to the demands and desires of the politician in charge rather than to the votes of the people. The implications for Albania’s democratic government are therefore greater if this corruption and criminal association between politicians and OCGs have infected the rest of the political system.

The effects of this systemic interaction between corruption and OCGs are seen by Albania’s slow progress towards attaining EU membership. Serbia, another Balkan state that yearns to join the EU, is also facing halted progress due to corruption and poor human rights practices. If Serbia, who is ranked as being less corrupt than Albania, cannot be accepted into the EU without intense negotiations, then Albania’s chances of becoming a member in the near future are slim. While Tirana has made impressive progress towards eradicating organized crime and was granted candidate status in June 2014, the influence of OCGs and the illicit drug trade are still prevalent in many areas of the country. 

The overall rampant corruption and lack of government stability highlight the degree to which the illicit drug trade, through which OCGs operate, is intertwined with Albania’s democratic system. The high level of government corruption not only hinders Albania’s ability to adequately address the ingrained nature of OCGs, but it also impedes the country’s efforts to join the EU, membership that could improve their international standing as well as boost their economy. With an upcoming presidential election in 2022, continued reports of criminal groups infiltrating the government to gain political power do not bode well for Albania, the country’s EU ambitions, nor the rest of the Balkans.

Ideal Geographic Location

Externally, Albania’s unique geographical position at the crossroads between eastern and western Europe enables OCGs to take advantage of both the country’s land and maritime borders to facilitate the transportation of drugs to the rest of the Balkans and greater Europe. Located in the Western Balkans, Albania shares a land border with Montenegro, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Greece, and Italy, and a maritime border with the Adriatic Sea. While other Balkan states such as Croatia and Bosnia also have access to the Adriatic Sea, the sea is heavy utilized by criminal groups in Italy who allegedly have ties to OCGs in Albania in particular and are either bringing drugs to them or picking drugs up. As a narcotics hub, Albanian OCGs have also formed connections with other organizations in Latin America, Central Asia, and Western Europe as a result of easy access routes. These connections allow Albanian OCGs to operate successfully and continue to challenge both Italian and Turkish traffickers even when maritime operations run by local law enforcement attempt to stop them. 

Internally, Albanian OCGs have a strong presence in the port cities of Durres and Vlore where a majority of business occurs and there is established financial infrastructure. The locations of these cities, along the western coastline of the Adriatic Sea, help contribute greatly to smuggling efforts. In February 2018, Albanian law enforcement seized 613 kilograms of cocaine that was concealed in a shipment of bananas headed to Durres from Colombia, a market value of $219.96 million. The use of these port cities as stops in a longer distribution line that connects countries and continents highlights the global reach of these OCGs and the interconnectedness of their relationships with one another. Albania’s particular location makes it an ideal location distribution-wise and source-wise for many OCGs given the wide range of options that can be taken to disseminate the product, whether that be drugs or human beings, to other areas of the world.

Conclusion: Lessons for the Balkans and the EU

Albania’s role as the epicenter of organized crime, and subsequently the illicit drug trade in the region, is a problem pertinent to both the Balkans and the entirety of Europe. Currently, the EU is in the midst of another wave of enlargement, of which it hopes to integrate the remaining Balkan countries in a controversial move according to current member states. Infamously known as the “Colombia of Europe” due to the prevalence of drugs and organized crime in society, Albania’s weak economic system and high level of political corruption, which are aided by their strategic geopolitical location, make it extremely susceptible to the influence of OCGs and makes it even more difficult for them to acquire EU membership. While Albania has made significant progress towards internal reformation, including partnering with the EU to strengthen judicial cooperation and destroying cannabis farms, Albanian OCGs have simply evolved and adapted their methods in response to government actions. This is visible in a report disseminated by the U.S. Department of State, of which the agency concluded that “The Government of Albania made no significant progress toward thwarting money laundering and financial crimes in 2018” despite substantial efforts, and the country still remains extremely vulnerable to money laundering due to corruption and OCGs.

However, the biggest takeaway regarding the proliferation of OCGs in Albania regards what their behavior means for the rest of Europe. While organized crime is not exclusive to Albania and the Balkans, Albania’s existence as the regional “hub” for organized crime and their role as a facilitator for the transnational drug trade should be of great concern to the Albanian government, the Balkans, greater Europe, and even the West. The willingness and ability of Albanian OCGs to successfully cooperate with rival criminal groups in Latin America, Central Asia, and Western Europe demonstrate the scope of the problem, as the desire for profit-making now exceeds the groups’ feelings of rivalry and competition. The global reach of these groups is shared by other OCGs in Europe, which can impede institutional efforts to better the community, a problem that the EU is facing amidst the Brexit debacle and upcoming Parliamentary elections.

Going forward, Albania should keep working on internal structural reform despite the amount of time it will take to fully eradicate the problem. In this case, organized crime groups will continue to pervade every element of society within Albania unless the government amps up its efforts to fight corruption, prevent the perpetuation of unorthodox practice, and boost the economy by investing more in other countries and exporting more products to create more employment opportunities. By engaging more with other regional economies, Albania’s own economy could experience growth and prosper, which would help improve the lives of the country’s impoverished citizens and deter them from joining these OCGs in the first place.

Irish and British Relations post-Brexit

When former Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson succeeded Theresa May as British Prime Minister in July of 2019, his first commitment to the House of Commons was to fulfill the October 31st Brexit deadline regardless if there was a deal or not. Four months later, instead of this promise being met, British Parliament has until January 31, 2020 to agree upon a deal that will be approved by the European Union (EU). While members of Parliament still hold contention regarding proposed provisions in Johnson’s revised Brexit deal, a subject in both May’s and Johnson’s plan that has held constant significance is the role of the Republic of Ireland and the counties in Northern Ireland that are a part of the United Kingdom. 

The long history between the three regions that lead to the thirty-year period of political turmoil known as “The Troubles” resulted in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. Although this tension can date back to the 12th century, the major key players of these tensions were the nationalist and unionist parties. A significant point in the history of the two feuding parties was the Government or Ireland Act implemented shortly after the Irish War of Independence. This act allowed Northern Ireland to operate as a self-governing region that was a part of the United Kingdom and not the Republic of Ireland. 

The divide between the two opposing groups was also visible in the political parties that dominated the political landscape of Northern Ireland. More specifically, the Ulster Unionist Party, a political party that was mostly comprised of Protestants,  instilled different measures to ensure that local political power would remain within the party. Some of these measures included gerrymandering and discrimination against the nationalist individuals. The individuals that were discriminated against attempted demonstrations fighting for equal rights, which quickly escalated by bringing  different military forces into the picture in an attempt to try and stabilize the situation. The presence of three different military forces, the Irish Republican Army, the Irish National Liberation Army, and British Army within the conflict zones of the border only deteriorated the issues regarding  injustice interments and shootings. 

After almost 30 years of political turmoil between these two areas in Ireland, a peace agreement was reached in 1998 which declared the northern counties of Ireland to be a part of the United Kingdom unless there was a majority vote to reunify the two areas. All of the provisions written into the agreement primarily established an equitable government that would prevent things such as gerrymandering from occurring and created institutions that work to foster peace and cooperation between Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, and Great Britain. 

The specific provisions of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement allowed for Northern Ireland to remain a part of the United Kingdom and coexist peacefully with the rest of the public. The agreement has four main pillars which politically establishes the rule of law for Northern Ireland and how for the northern counties interact with each other. The four main pillars are the following; devolution, power-sharing, designation, and a three-strand approach to dealing with peace and cooperation. Although there are other provisions enumerated within the agreement, all of them address  the central theme of peace where the government of Northern Ireland will constitute a power-sharing system. This means that  there are two ministers, one from each of the dominating political parties. In addition to top officials needing to identify with a specific political party, all members of parliament must identify with some political to ensure equality. This is another rule to ensure that all members of parliament remove any form of policy that could disenfranchise a group of individuals. 

Additionally, another important provision worth mentioning is the demilitarization of the border towns of the northern counties such as Londonderry/Derry. Heavy militarization occurred within these towns between all military fronts. Finally, the last two significant provisions of the Good Friday Agreement centralized on creating institutions which foster cooperation among the feuding regions. Institutions such as the British-Irish Council and the British Irish Intergovernmental Conference are just some of the institutions that were created from the agreement to ensure there is cooperation between all three parties. 

With both Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland being members of the European Union, there is no border or border checks  between the Republic of Ireland and northern counties that are a part of the United Kingdom. As members of the European Union, the benefits stretched beyond economic and political integration. In terms of the Irish and Northern Ireland conflict, EU membership indirectly promoted cooperation between the two regions. One way the benefits of both areas being a part of the EU is reflected through the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The lack of distinctive border between the two regions allows for goods and services to be easily transported. To place this into perspective, the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, a border that was once highly militarized, is now a soft border that has no militarization but instead, a simple sign which states that you are either entering or leaving a specific area. The lack of a border allowed for the process of reconciliation and peace to go at an accelerated pace. Economically, the lack of a border has lead to economic integration and benefits. The lack border has allowed for trade, businesses and labor to move very freely between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Much of the progress made, however, could be destroyed under new provisions put forth by Johnson in his proposed Brexit deal.

With the likelihood of a deal being reached by the extended deadline of January 31, 2020, provisions regarding the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland will jeopardize both the political cooperation between Ireland and Northern Ireland but the economic relations between Great Britain, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. In the original Brexit deal created by May, there would be no barrier between Northern Ireland and the Republic. This lack of any form of border allowed Great Britain to have a very close relations with the republic of Ireland without the supervision of the European Union. In Johnson’s edition of the Brexit plan, a customs and regulatory border would be established between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, which means that goods from Great Britain entering Northern Ireland would be subjected to EU import taxes. Overall, provisions within the new Brexit deal do not fully take into account significant provisions that were made in the Good Friday Agreement.

Policy Recommendations

In order to maintain the peace that was built between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, there should be increased conversation between three general players: the British Parliament, the Northern Ireland Parliament and the Republic of Ireland. When considering the thoughts of any amendment to the new plan, having the voice of both Northern Ireland and Irish ministers present within these meetings will ensure that the values behind the Good Friday Agreement are upheld and not jeopardize. It is crucial for the voice of both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland to be present because if not the alternative possibilities which undermine the  Good Friday Agreement could destroy the decades of work for Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland to be cooperating under one island. 

The Battle Over Language Policy in Russia and Former Soviet Republics

The role and rights of minority languages around the world is part of a growing area of human rights law. Article 4, Section 3 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities argues that “States should take appropriate measures so that, whenever possible, persons belonging to minorities may have adequate opportunities to learn their mother tongue or to have instruction in their mother tongue”. Russia is one battleground for minority linguistic rights. In the various semi-autonomous republics inside of Russia, the changing environment for minority language education has brought up issues of autonomy from the federal government of Russia and the central government's growing influence within the semi-autonomous region. In the independent former Soviet republics, the pushback against the Russian language reflects fears of “Russification” while establishing their language as a bellwether for national identity. Latvia provides a notable example of this, where, while taking different stances, their concerns over identity, linguistic rights, and Russia’s more aggressive approach to cultural influence beyond its borders create parallels. Going forward, language and other cultural elements are set to become more important to minorities as Russia’s semi-autonomous republics see autonomy as more than political, and countries on Russia’s border become more concerned about their own sovereignty through Russia’s soft power tactics. 

There are over 35 languages other than Russian recognized as official languages in Russia. These are the languages of the various republics inside Russia. The republics are able to declare their own official language, institute their own form of government and formulate independent policy that secure these republics' autonomy and preserve their unique ethnic identities.  However, this policy of relative autonomy has come under assault in recent years. In 2018, Russia passed a law that limited the amount of time per week that classroom time could be dedicated to minority languages. Furthermore, the 2018 language law made all language instructions optional except for Russian. Public reception has been mixed, with those inside the autonomous ethnic republics seeing the state’s push to further Russian identity as a threat to their own. Ethnic Udmurt sociologist Albert Razin committed self-immolation in protest over the new language law, quoting Soviet poet Rasul Gamzatov with a sign saying ““If tomorrow my language will be forgotten, I am ready to die today.” This brought the issue to national prominence, with many Udmurts and other ethnic minorities supporting Razin’s cause, and Kremlin advisor Valery Tishkov continuing to argue for Russian language superiority. The law has also brought up broader issues of ethnic identity, the importance of autonomous republics, and how language interacts with the local and national politics affected by this law. For example, a lawsuit filed in Tatarstan regarding the claimants unwillingness to learn Tatar, instead preferring Russian on identity-based terms, was rejected. However, in an interview with TRT World, a seventeen-year old from Dagestan argued that “This law is a threat to this linguistic diversity” and that the law “put limits on our education and deprive[s] us of studying our own language.” This shows a divide inside the ethnic autonomous republics, between those who prefer to learn and study the language of their ethnic group, and those who are willing to assimilate into the broader Russian identity. The Council of Europe noted that “The greater emphasis on the Russian language and the uniform approach to educational reform have weakened the position of minority languages ​​in the education system” and advocated for education that is bilingual/multilingual, and greater involvement of minorities in affairs related to their cultures and cultural autonomies. 

In Latvia, recent legislation doubled the amount of Latvian-taught classes in minority Russian schools to 80 percent of classes. Latvia has a sizeable Russian minority population, and Russia has made efforts to re-engage them with the Russian state and further emphasize Russian identity within the population. Russia’s OSCE envoy, Alexander Lukashevich called plans to increase Latvian language usage in classrooms a“discriminatory policy with the goal of forced assimilation of the Russian-speaking population.” Furthermore,previous legislation reducing Russian language education has set the stage for a potential domestic divide in Latvia’s “two-community society.”

Russian minority political parties, in Latvia,  have framed this as a human rights issue, similar to the arguments of the ethnic minorities facing linguistic repression inside Russia.For example, European Parliament MP Tatjana Zdanoka called on the European Commission to further protect linguistic minorities, using the Lisbon Treaty to argue that countries “who act[s] against the rights of persons belonging to minorities (including linguistic rights) act[s] against the core values of the European Union.” In 2018, three different UN Special Rapporteurs expressed concern on the pushes to “Latvianize” the Latvian education system. They referred to Articles 19 and 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, along with other international human rights documents, to express their concern over possible legal and human rights violations targeting the Russian minority population. The Latvian government has justified their actions by focusing on broader issues of national identity and societal harmony. The most recent Education Law was brought up to the Latvian Constitutional Court, where the Court stated that “every person living in Latvia should be able to understand the Latvian language to participate fully in the life of a democratic society” and that “the state must support the preservation and development of the individuality of ethnic minorities within the framework of a unified education system, promoting the development of the identity of a common democratic society.”

Additionally, school autonomy is a right that schools inside the Russian republics have enjoyed for years, but has been threatened in recent years. Latvian schools for Russian minority students have also seen this threatened through educational policies over the last 15 years. Beginning in 1992, the Latvian government has ordered Latvian to be the primary language in all levels of education. This has varied over time, with new laws ranging from Latvian-only education in public education, to loosened guidelines after protests in 2004 which led to minority high schools teaching up to 40 percent of their curriculum in a minority language. One primary argument that proponents of minority language education use is that the education system’s Latvianization would “cause irreparable damage to national minority schools” due to rising inequality as a result of less allocated resources. Russkiy Mir, a Kremlin-backed organization promoting the Russian language, paralleled their situation in Latvia to the ongoing situation in Ukraine, arguing that it is a violation of human rights and “very disturbing that in the Baltic republic, Russophobia is becoming more and more intense, and the authorities act according to the same scenario as Kiev, where the ruling regime purposefully destroys everything Russian.”

The Latvian government, however, has justified their actions by focusing on the need for a stronger national identity in order to prevent internal strife between the two main ethnic communities as fears of Russian influence become more prevalent. International observers have continued to voice concern, and have generally gone against the stance of the Latvian government and its justification for the increasingly restrictive policies. In Freedom House’s 2019 Freedom of the World Report, Latvia’s score on academic freedom went down one point, with the organization noting the reason for the demotion being the most recent education policy changes, saying that “the measures [are] generally viewed as targeting Russian-language instruction”. Allowing these linguistic divisions and restrictions to continue inside Russia, while simultaneously criticizing similar practices by neighboring countries and former Soviet states, is hypocritical on the part of the Russian government. While calling on European human rights bodies to show concern on Latvian policies is valid, ignoring their own policies of linguistic repression makes their argument much more questionable.

The various laws outlined above show a clear desire by Russia to use the Russian language as a first step towards establishing influence inside the country’s various semi-autonomous republics that have, since the beginning of the Soviet Union, preserved their ethnic identity and culture through their separation from the larger Russian state. Latvia, on the other hand, seeks to affirm official national identity based upon the language of the ethnic majority in the state, at the expense of their Russian minority. The criticism of policies and practices that limit the freedom for linguistic minorities to use their mother tongue should not be selective. The protection of their language in day-to-day usage, education and official recognition is a right enshrined by the United Nations, and cannot be twisted for nationalist pursuits. Russia has echoed concerns of human rights observers to restrictive language policies against Russian minorities in Latvia and Ukraine, but has echoed the same rhetoric of maintaining a single, unified national identity across a linguistically diverse population. Doing so has put minority languages under threat, and must be seen as a threat to personal rights of minority populations. As both Russia and Latvia continue their push towards identity formation through nationwide language policies in education and the public sphere, we must continue to frame and shame any policies that threaten one's ability to communicate and learn their native language, and promote ways to balance cultural and linguistic diversity in all areas of society. 

Managing Multilingualism: Preserving the Linguistic Plurality

The reality of the current world is that, though there are a few dominant languages such as English, Spanish, or Arabic, oftentimes not even a country’s borders will accurately reflect the diversity of humanity’s linguistic heritage. Even though the world is defined by nation-states, there are minorities in virtually every state who often speak distinct languages that need to be cherished in order to show respect for their culture and preserve an entire way of thinking. To address the representation of the less dominant languages within their states, different states take different approaches; however, these laws are often not enforced properly and some languages are still left ignored. Even in today’s liberal world order, which should encourage political and public representation, these languages are tragically seeing a decline in public representation and the number of speakers. Thus, it is beneficial to examine and improve upon the laws currently existing to regulate the inclusion of minority languages and work towards making a more inclusive, diverse, and unified society. 

National vs. Official Language

A number of states have different laws pertaining to the designation of an official language and a national language. The main distinction to be made between the official and national language is that the official language is the language often mandated by a state’s founding documents and the language used in government and official proceedings, as well as one expected to be used as a definite lingua franca among speakers of different languages in that society. The national language, on the other hand, is the language spoken by the majority, and it has come to be identified as a national symbol of a certain group of people to be a more general legal description of a nation. Depending on the composition of a state’s culture and population, the relationship a country should have towards its national and official language(s) should preserve unity and peace of the society while also appreciating and promoting its potential for linguistic plurality. 

One National and Official Language 

France is one country that, although it is seeing an increase of speakers of different languages residing within its borders, is still reliant on French as both its national and official language. This is not only stated in the Constitution but also reinforced through the Toubon Law of 1994, which came as a response to the increasing use of English. This law dictates that all government documents, education, and advertisements must be in French; thus the French language is seen as a defining aspect of the country and the nation and is largely necessary in order to navigate around one’s daily life. However, publishers are still allowed to publish their work in any language they wish, commercials may be translated into French through footnotes, packaging can have translations in other languages, and the laws mandating French in the public sphere are not to infringe on the private life. Thus, there is not a need for an absolute use of French; however, the fact that French must be ever-present and is both the official and national language makes it more difficult to maintain the use of other languages, as children are exposed to French in school and media and do not need to rely on any language their parents are potentially using as much. This leads to the loss of the language in the long run. The existence of French as an ever-present language, on the other hand, makes it unifying in nature, as it is agreed that this is one language everyone would use to express themselves. This approach provides cohesiveness to society as everyone can understand each other and feel a sense of belonging in France. 

French still has this purpose in a number of African countries as well, where it is not always a national, but often at least the official language used to unify the speakers of different languages living in the same country. This is the case in Rwanda where Kinyarwanda may be the national language, but French is used for official purposes. This may lead to French eventually overpowering and becoming the national language as well as the official, as it has happened in countries such as Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo, as noted by Faingold in “Language rights and language justice.” A similar destiny beheld countries like Costa Rica and Venezuela, where Spanish became both national and official because of the pressure to have a unifying language without sufficient regard for how that would reflect on the number of speakers of other languages. While this approach may be ideal when it comes to the creation of national unity through language, it can prove to be very aggressive and detrimental towards other, often pre-colonial languages of the region, thus reaffirming the status quo of the post-colonial world.

Regional Languages

Spain is an example of a country that has one national and official language, Spanish. However, unlike neighboring France that has French as its national and official language and does not emphasize the integrity of regional or minority languages, Spain’s autonomous regions of Catalonia and Basque Country allow an elevation of Catalan and Basque to languages of greater regional importance. Whereas France does not have these autonomous regions and does not prevent people from publishing in their own language, the autonomous status of Catalonia, as Cultural Policies and Trends explains, dictates translation of government documents into Catalan. This makes it easier to live within a region majorly composed of the speakers of Catalan with the use of Catalan in daily life and in public spaces such as schools, TV programs, stores, public transportation, etc. This designation of a language other than the main Spanish has contributed to the maintenance of--and even an increase in--the number of speakers of Catalan and Basque and has also led to much hostility. Constant pushes against the autonomy and linguistic freedom assigned to these regions persisted in the history of Spain, especially during the area of the dictator Francisco Franco, who wanted to see a more unified and traditional Spain. This heritage led to violent protests and a political atmosphere that we can see to this day in Catalonia. Therefore, such designation of regional rights allowing the use of a certain language more extensively does allow, as Cultural Policies and Trends outlines, public representation of the language, such as on the street and in the news and government, and has a key role in preserving the number of speakers of the language; however, it also threatens to lead to disunion and a lack of cohesiveness and inclusivity in the long term as intolerance blooms on all sides and common ground is lost.

Absence of an Official or National Language

The U.S. is an example of a state without an official or national language. In the U.S., the Constitution makes no mention of the official language and all languages are legally regarded as equal; a person born in the United States could theoretically live a normal life without ever learning the dominant, de facto English. Although the dominantly-spoken English may not be required on TV or in schools, such as the case in France with French, English is still spoken by the majority of the US population. Knowledge of English is also one of the requirements when taking the citizenship test, which is one of the ways someone is designated as an “American”, so it could be argued that it is the national language. English is also necessary to obtain many jobs or participate in higher education. However, the absence of an official requirement of English makes it easier to request translations of official documents, allows for the participation of a greater amount of people in the economy, and makes it possible for many non-English or bilingual schools to exist, which supports children trying to maintain fluency in different languages. Additionally, the complexity of the U.S. identity prevents English from defining the national identity of a U.S. citizen, so it is lacking some components of a national language, especially compared to the French language which is not only the most spoken language in France but also has a long tradition of bonding society. 

This does not guarantee that the society will remain cohesive, as not having a unifying language leads to, as CNN points out, a questioning of how the national identity is defined. It also contributes to the problem of segregation, as immigrants either assimilate into the dominant English over time or are perceived as the other when they choose to only live alongside speakers of the same language and are unable to easily communicate their thoughts to English speakers. While the potential for otherization and self-segregation coming from this lack of an official unifying language is a reason for concern, by not having a national or official language the U.S. has the privilege of not being forced to follow the tragedy for multilingualism that was the empire of Spain. The Spanish Empire aggressively imposed a monolingual society upon a multilingual nation, which to this day leaves many nations struggling to protect the rights of speakers of minority languages. Instead of centralizing English and tragically recreating the linguistic experience of the Spanish empire and early English colonization, America should rather focus on using the linguistic fluidity offered by the Constitution, which did not label a national language, in order to create a society that is inclusive towards speakers of all languages, and try to restore the lost and forgotten native languages of North America. 

Other nations, such as Mexico, do not cite an official language and actively protect the language rights of minorities, including the many indigenous languages that are largely under threat now, as Faingold explains. This arrangement comes from the fact that, unlike in France, there is no need to protect the language of the majority as Spanish is dominant and not threatened, and the problem is rather ensuring the rights of the indigenous people, which is a model that the US could follow. While English and Spanish are the dominant languages of the Americas, the nations of the Americas should focus on separating themselves from the politics of a language equating a nation, which is often predominant in Europe and the “Old World”, and focus on using their inherent diversity to create a national identity that incorporates fully speakers of all languages.

Official Language with Provisions for Minorities

India is famous for being multiethnic and multilingual, but it also claims constitutionally that Hindu is used officially to unify the diverse provinces and allow for the cohesion of the many ethnicities. Unlike France, it allows many provisions to the variety of minority groups, and unlike Spain, it does not necessarily restrict this to regions to prevent partitioning. In practice, this means that schools are able to instruct in many different languages and there is freedom on how things are commercialized. Publications on the national level could also be in different languages. On the other hand, the higher education and courts operate in Hindu or English, due to the colonial heritage. This means that speakers of languages other than Hindu or English are at a great disadvantage when it comes to acquiring higher education and succeeding in “higher” levels of society. As Sharma observes, this translated into a decrease in publications in languages other than Hindu and English and a decrease in speakers of the minority languages as Hindu and English are necessitated for success in the society. This reduction in multilingualism in India is concerning, as the country is supposed to be priding itself in its very multilingual nature. 

Multiple Official and National Languages

Switzerland is a country that relies on German, French, Italian, and Romansch, and all except for Romansch have equal status as the official and national language. This means that government documents and proceedings, schools, TVs, and daily life, in general, could happen in any of those languages, and the majority of people are at least bilingual, so the system works. However, this not only makes taking off with Swiss airplanes very long as the welcoming and instructions are said in all languages but also, for some countries such as India, can result in a confusing, impossibly time-consuming translations. While the Swiss model is something to consider (and something that is also followed in multinational organizations such as the EU), it has its drawbacks of requiring reforms in the education system and huge investments in translations in order to also ensure that the society remains cohesive. 

Conclusion

To conclude, in a situation where many languages are spoken in a small area, it appears the easiest and most realistic approach is to have one lingua franca in order to ensure cohesiveness. However, this should not mean that all public affairs should occur only in one language. It would be especially dangerous for maintaining the number of speakers of a minority language, and thus ensuring that the language survives, to take the language outside of schools, TVs, and stores, as this most often leads to alienation of young generations from their mother tongues and reaffirms the domination of colonial heritage. Perhaps the idea of having one official language (so that there are grounds for mutual understanding), no national language (so speakers of all languages are seen as constituents of that nation and an inclusive environment is maintained), and many provisions to minority languages, especially when it comes to educational opportunities, so that the number of speakers is maintained, proves to be the best track of thinking in order to achieve a more just, welcoming, united, and tolerant society in the future.

Can One Business Ownership Model Profoundly Shape Country-Level Wealth Distribution?

The face of global economic inequality has changed greatly since the 1970s. Up until the early 2010s, the most common way to conceive of disparities in income was by referring to countries as “developing” and “developed,” or “low-income” and “high-income.” However, this binary distinction has largely turned obsolete in the past decade. Nowadays, although clear cross-national differences do undoubtedly persist, the most dramatic gaps in income exist not so much between countries as they do within states. Despite the phenomenal technological and economic progress achieved transnationally, not everyone has been able to reap the benefits of that progress equally.

Parallel to the worldwide evolution of the very nature of economic inequality was a shift in the corporate world that prompted commentators to refer to the 2010s as a “golden age of employee ownership.” A rise in the number of businesses totally or significantly belonging to their employees, through direct individual share ownership, indirect employee ownership trusts, or a combination of both, amounted to 17.2 percent in 2017 and 18.5 percent in 2018 in the United Kingdom (UK) alone. More than 60 percent of the total company conversions to employee ownership in Britain happened in the past seven years. About half of United States (U.S.) workers currently have a stake in businesses through employee shares, company stock, or profit-sharing, which includes 20 percent of private-sector workers having some form of ownership in the companies employing them. Although data availability on employee-owned businesses outside the UK and the U.S. is limited, such corporate giants as Danone in Southeast Asia, Huawei in China, and Mondragon in Spain are opening up to or are already fully embracing the idea of employee ownership.

Aside from being an increasingly widespread business model trend, employee ownership is an area of rare and overwhelming partisan consensus in the U.S. In a 2019 General Social Survey (GSS), 72 percent of Republicans and 74 percent of Democrats said they prefer working for an employee-owned company over one that is owned by investors or the government. Distinguished Professor Joseph Blasi (Rutgers University), who designed GSS questions in collaboration with Professor Richard Freeman (Harvard University), elaborates on the remarkable convergence of opinions on employee ownership:  “Democrat or Republican, female or male, black or white, union or non-union, a majority of respondents said they prefer to work for a company with employee share ownership. It is rare to find such a national consensus on anything.” Some unambiguous benefits must be at play here for one business model of moderate prominence to invoke such broad popular support.

There are, indeed, advantages commonly associated with employee ownership. According to the National Center for Employee Ownership based in Oakland, California, employee-owned companies lay off fewer workers, experience higher rates of growth, and pay higher wages than their conventionally owned peers. Researchers from the City University of Hong Kong and Villanova University, Pennsylvania, find that employee ownership had a small but significant impact on overall firm performance of over 1,500 European companies in 2006-2014.

Empirically proven productivity and performance advantages aside, many expect employee ownership to bring benefits beyond the economic realm. From its earliest stages, a transfer of a company’s shares to its workers is oftentimes motivated by ethical concerns. Mark Constantine, co-founder and CEO of Lush, a natural cosmetics shop, cited his worry that his business can be taken over by a firm that does not share Lush’s values when commenting on his decision to consider an employee ownership model, which Lush ended up adopting. Julian Richer, founder of home electronics retail Richer Sounds, admitted that his motivation to transfer ownership to the company’s workers was “one of morality.” Ethical arguments in favor of employee ownership are not groundless: the first-ever study on the impact of employee ownership on lower- and moderate-income workers. conducted in March 2019 by the Rutgers Institute for the Study of Employee Ownership and Profit Sharing, the study’s findings suggested that this ownership model has the potential to significantly narrow racial and gender income gaps in the future.

This brings us back to the discussion of global intra-country income inequality: Can employee ownership move beyond making founders of companies feel good about themselves after the noble deed of transferring their shares to workers? Is it within the capacities of this ownership model to provide a solution to wealth disparity? Empirical evidence on this front is mixed. The Rutgers Institute finds that, while employee ownership does generally help improve family economic stability and financial security, most of the workers who own a stake in their companies are male and high-income. Nevertheless, workers of color who do participate in employee ownership stock plans (ESOP) in the U.S. tend to do far better financially than the national average--American Latinx ESOP employees, for example, are 12 times more wealthy than the median Latinx employee. Meanwhile, staggering income gaps persist among white and black women participating in ESOPs, whose wealth on average amounts to $225,000 and $55,000, respectively. These figures demonstrate that employee ownership does not seem to be a panacea for income inequality, and its success in closing the wealth gap has so far remained mixed – at least in the U.S.

A growing body of scholarship has focused on describing and explaining unequal returns from employee ownership programs. Edward J. Carberry of the University of Massachusetts Boston used the results of a survey involving over 40,000 employees in fourteen U.S. companies to show that women and African Americans benefit less from profit sharing and gainsharing employee ownership generates, compared to their male and white counterparts. This is consistent with existing patterns of occupational segregation, work devaluation, and discrimination. Since groups with lower levels of discretionary income, such as women and racial or ethnic minorities, have fewer opportunities to invest in ESOPs, they will benefit less from such plans. What is more striking, however, is the finding by Carberry suggesting that, on average, women receive less value from all types of ESOPs than men, even when controlling for occupation, education, and income differences. This suggests a worrisome propensity of employee ownership to further magnify unequal wealth distribution – the exact opposite of what its enthusiastic supporters expect it to do. 

Considering this evidence, policymakers should be more cautious about granting unconditional support to expanded employee ownership across all industries. In light of Carberry’s findings, predictions about the growing popularity of ESOPs hardly resemble promises of an inevitable triumph of inclusivity and fairness in the corporate world. Policymakers’ confidence in the ability of ESOPs to eradicate existing structural impediments to economic equality should not be blindly unquestioning. It is true, as the Rutgers Institute’s study demonstrates, that the average worker in an employee-owned company is financially better off than the average worker in a conventionally owned company. However, evidence shows that ESOPs are not the holistic vehicles of social justice that some commentators portray them to be. Instead, ESOPs replicate, with alarming similarity, patterns of nation-wide unequal wealth distribution among men and women, white workers and workers of color, and other demographic groups. Before further government support is offered to companies wishing to transform themselves into employee-owned enterprises, policymakers need more convincing evidence of the capacity of this ownership model to produce meaningful redistributive outcomes. 

Therefore, when it comes to income inequality mitigation and the creation of organizational cultures of fairness, employee ownership follows the same stratification patterns as conventional ownership models. Instead of creating a qualitatively different system of equal access to economic opportunity, evidence indicates that this model can actually reproduce dissimilar wealth distribution outcomes among different demographic groups. Despite its undeniable benefits, such as improved worker motivation and preserved founding values of companies, employee ownership as it stands today is not a cure for income disparities caused by gender, racial, or ethnic dimensions. With the topic becoming more and more salient as a growing number of firms choose to offer their workers a share in the business, more attention should be diverted to examining whether this business model can do more harm than good by exacerbating--instead of eliminating--the existing economic disadvantages that women and minorities face. 

Great Power Competition in Ukraine

The conflict between the Ukrainian government and Russian-backed separatists, which started in 2014 in Eastern Ukraine, has killed approximately 12,000 people, maimed a least 27,000, and displaced about 1.3 million people. However, over the last five years, with the exception of the occasional news cycle, Ukraine stayed out of the collective consciousness of the public of the United States (U.S.) until September 2019. A whistleblower report informed the public that the President of the United States may have used his office to pressure the Ukrainian government to investigate a leading political Rival. 

Suddenly Ukraine was on the lips of almost every talking head in the country. Judging by how many U.S. lawmakers still use the literal Russian translation of “The Ukraine” in public remarks, it is likely that many policymakers also haven’t thought too much about Ukraine over the last five years. Nonetheless, the lack of public attention doesn’t negate the fact that Ukraine has been on the frontlines of a Great Power Competition—Russia and China are both pursuing strategic objectives in Ukraine. Understanding precisely what these great powers’ objectives are in Ukraine and how these regional objectives fit into the global outlooks of these states is critical. This understanding enables the prediction of future actions of these states on both a regional and global level. 

Frozen Conflicts and Russian Grand Strategy 

Russia, in both its 2009 and 2016 national defense strategy, has stated that it views the eastern expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the positioning of NATO troops ever closer to the Russian border as a direct threat to the country’s national security. After the rapid eastern expansion of the NATO alliance in the 1990s and early 2000s, Russia developed a strategy to block certain countries from integrating into the Trans-Atlantic alliance. In both Moldova and Georgia, Russia was able to successfully leverage the separatist tendencies of ethnic minorities in the respective states to create frozen conflicts. Until these frozen conflicts are resolved, the prospect for European Union (EU) or NATO integration remains dim. 

These autonomous entities, which are generally unrecognized at the international level, would not survive without Russian patronage. In 2015, The Guardian reported that 70 percent of the separatist’s entity in Moldova, Transnistria, the national budget came in the form of Russian aid. In the case of Georgia, in September 2019, Putin publicly expressed his continued support for the separatist regions which included the allocation of funds to provide for the modernization of the entities’ armed forces of the separatist republics of Georgia. However, this relatively modest level of support has significantly complicated the EU and NATO aspirations of two former Soviet republics–in the case of Moldova, it’s been 27 years and for Georgia, it’s been ten years. 

The Utility of a Frozen Conflict in Eastern Ukraine

In the case of Ukraine, the line of contact that represents the de-facto border between the separatists and the Ukrainian government has been relatively stable since 2016.

The conflict is now characterized by low-intensity trench warfare, sniper attacks, artillery barrages, and the occasional skirmish. It is in Russia’s interest to keep this conflict unresolved. Although Russia denies that it has military assets deployed on Ukrainian soil (which many investigative reports have conclusively debunked), Russia makes no secret of the economic and political support that it provides to the breakaway regions. No official numbers exist regarding the exact amount of aid that Russia sends to the separatist regions, but Western analysts estimate that Russian aid to these regions amounts to 2 billion USD annually. This figure is less than .01 percent of Russia’s GDP—which, for Russia, is a relatively small price to pay to achieve a major geopolitical objective. 

As long as this conflict remains unresolved, significant complications will persist regarding Ukrainian aspirations to join the transatlantic security apparatus. The implicit threat of the conflict in the east of Ukraine going from frozen to very hot will hang over any move by Ukraine to become a more integrated member of NATO. Russia desires to maintain this tripwire to Ukrainian integration into the West, and thus will continue economically supporting the separatist regions and will work to sandbag any efforts to fully resolve the conflict. 

For instance, Volodymyr Zelensky, the former comedian-turned-president of Ukraine, during both his presidential campaign and his time as president, has been a strong proponent of undertaking public diplomacy campaigns in an attempt to convince the residents of the separatists’ regions that they would be welcomed back into Ukraine. Furthermore, in his inaugural speech in May of 2019, he stated that “for years the government [of Ukraine] has done nothing to in order for them [the Russian separatists] to feel Ukrainian. They are not strangers, they are ours, they are Ukrainian.” However, Russia seeks to discourage the residents of the separatists’ republics to think of themselves in any way Ukrainian because that could eventually lead to a resolution of the conflict. Thus, in an attempt to solidify a non-Ukrainian identity in the separatist republic, in April of 2019, Russia distributed Russian passports to the residents of the breakaway regions. While these types of small provocations rarely make it into the Western news cycle and garner very little attention, they further solidify the frozen conflict in Ukraine. In the near term, expect Russia to sponsor similar actions, particularly if any progress is made in negotiations that could lead to a resolution of the conflict. 

When states that border Russia start to strategically align themselves with centers of power independent of Moscow, Russia feels threatened. Although Russia will most likely attempt to avoid open conflict in dissuading its neighbors from aligning with other powers, they will not shy away from using their less-then-war playbook to achieve their strategic objectives. For instance, if Central Asian states start to reorient themselves towards China (as a result of China’s far-reaching Belt and Road Initiative), and if this reorientation reaches a tipping point, one could expect Russia to undertake a similar strategy as it has in the Caucuses and in Eastern Europe. 

China: Belt and Road Initiative, Trade, and Access

Unsurprisingly, China has made inroads into Ukraine via its Belt and Road Initiative, as China envisions Ukraine as a major transit hub that can deliver Chinese produced goods to the EU market. In fact, government officials and businesses of both countries have proposed ambitious infrastructure projects to make this vision a reality. In August 2018, during a roundtable of officials and experts from Ukraine and China, the group unveiled the concept for an 1100 kilometer high-speed rail line in Ukraine. It is important to note, despite the unveiling of this plan and many like it, very few projects have actually been started. Thus far, the Belt and Road Initiative in Ukraine remains largely an abstract concept instead of a concrete project. 

However, the growing trade relationship between Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital, and Beijing is very real. In 2018, Ukraine’s single largest import partner was China. Ukraine imported 7 billion dollars worth of goods from China in 2018—only the EU exported more goods to Ukraine that year. Furthermore, in the first half of 2019, China became the 3rd largest destination for Ukrainian exports. Although the EU is still undoubtedly Ukraine’s most important economic partner, China has cultivated its economic relationship with Ukraine quite quickly. 

This budding trade relationship with Kyiv allows Beijing access to the Ukrainian goods that it most desires: weapons. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), China was the largest customer for Ukrainian arms in 2018. To note, China is not acquiring mere old soviet weapons stocks that have been rusting away in warehouses since the 90’s – they are acquiring high-tech aerospace technology. 

Ukraine was a critical part of the Soviet defense industry and much of the infrastructure and human capital are still present to this day. According to Michael Carpenter, an arms control expert at the Atlantic Council, Ukraine “is blessed with extraordinary human capital: world-class engineers, designers, and top-notch universities that feed qualified science and engineering graduates into the job market.” The Ukrainian military-industrial complex has the exceedingly rare capability to produce high-tech helicopters and jet engines from start to finish. Although China has made incredible advances in aerospace technology, it still struggles with the production of high-precision equipment like jet engines.  For instance, China’s fifth-generation fighter, the J-20, is currently outfitted with a Russian engine because China’s engine development program for the fighter has been plagued with problems. Fundamentally, China has a high demand for this Ukrainian technology and know-how and, since 2014 when they dramatically cut their arms sales to Russia, the Ukrainian military-industrial base needs the customer. 

Traditionally, China has acquired this type of quality military technology from Russia. However, after Russia meddled in the 2016 U.S. election, the U.S. Congress passed the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act  (CAATSA). This law allows the United States to enact sanctions against any entity that does business with the Russian defense sector. In September 2018, Washington used this authority to sanction China in response to China’s acquisition of Russian fighter jets and missile systems. Arms acquisitions from Ukraine are also not subject to CAATSA, making Ukraine an even more attractive supplier for China. Furthermore, there is the possibility that Moscow ceases supplying Beijing with military technology if the Sino-Russian relationship becomes more competitive. China has a strategic interest in retaining and expanding its access to the Ukrainian military-industrial complex. 

In order to protect this interest in the short term, China will most likely continue various public diplomacy and investment efforts with the goal of developing good-will among the Ukrainian citizenry. In the past, China has gifted 50 ambulances, 50 search-and-rescue vehicles, and provided 137 million dollars for medical equipment to regional hospitals. These types of “hearts and minds” campaigns make it easier for China to grow its influence in Ukraine without provoking a negative reaction from everyday Ukrainians. 

In addition to public diplomacy efforts, China may use more direct means to protect its image and popularity in Ukraine. For instance, in early October Ukrainian media reported that a number of high-profile members of president Zelensky’s political party had been pressured by Chinese agents to act against Ukrainian civil society groups supporting the pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong. This type of interference in domestic Ukrainian politics could become more common as China increases its influence in Ukraine.

Moreover, China will most likely seek to invest in and develop the Ukrainian arms industry. In June 2019, a Chinese firm with connections to the Chinese government bid to buy a 50 percent stake in Motor Sich for 100 million dollars above market price. Motor Sich is one of the largest defense contractors in Ukraine that produces engines and employs over 30,000 Ukrainians. China can be expected to continue attempting to gain control over these types of Ukrainian companies in order to ensure its access to these firms’ products and to potentially acquire the technological know-how of these companies. 

On a strategic level, China, like Russia, has an interest in keeping Kyiv from fully integrating into the EU and the transatlantic community. The EU has enforced a moratorium on arms sale to China since 1989 in response to Tiananmen Square. If Ukraine were to join the EU or even make moves towards EU ascension that would require Kyiv to align its foreign policy to Brussels—to include the restrictions of arms sales—China would push back. Most likely, Beijing would attempt to leverage its economic influence that it is developing in Ukraine to lobby Ukrainian leaders to keep a degree of distance from Brussels. Therefore, much like Russia, China has a strategic interest in keeping Ukraine neutral. However, it is very unlikely that China would ever support or recognize the Russian-separatists in Ukraine in order to achieve this goal. China has a strict policy of not recognizing the breakaway regions of other countries for fear of emboldening any number of separatist movements in China itself. 

Overall, China is concerned with access—access to goods, access to markets, and access to resources. The case of Ukraine illustrates how China goes about quietly acquiring and then protecting this access. 

Implications for Ukraine

Traditionally, when discussing the geopolitical situation in Ukraine, commenters have underscored the supposed divide between the Russian-speaking east and the Ukrainian-speaking west, the implication being that Ukraine is a divided country. However, in the 2019 elections, Zelensky ran a campaign that attempted to rise above the east/west divide.  Although Zelensky spoke mostly Russian (as he is primarily a Russian speaker) during the election, he still emphasized the importance of the Ukrainian language—identity politics was not the focus of his platform. Instead, he focused on formulating a series of ambitious reforms that would seek to clean up Ukrainian politics, make the country more business-friendly, and simplify the bureaucracy. Zelensky’s campaign was successful and he won support that transcended the traditional east/west divide. Ukraine is not nearly as divided as many pundits portray. 

Zelensky has expressed support for Ukrainian ascension to the EU and has stated that he believes that the Ukrainian people should vote in a referendum to decide the future course of the country. Concerningly, as demonstrated, outside powers have distinct interests in keeping Ukraine from undertaking the EU ascension process. Moreover, these outside powers also have levers they could push that could seriously complicate any referendum.  If this referendum takes place, it is pertinent to remember that Moscow wants to halt western encroachment and it will capitalize on its influence over the separatist republics to accomplish this strategic goal. China, on the other hand, will seek to preserve its access to Ukrainian goods, know-how, and markets, and will leverage its growing soft-power tools to protect these interests. 

The Dangers of Mirrored Thinking: CAATSA Sanctions

Since the 1990s, the United States (U.S.) has employed various sanction regimes at an increasing rate in order to accomplish its foreign policy objectives. After Turkey’s October incursion into Northern Syria, U.S. policymakers immediately started pushing for the introduction of new sanctions against Turkey. Included in the Turkey sanction bill that passed the House of Representatives on October 29, 2019 was a provision to impose a previously defined set of sanctions called Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). However, the specific CAATSA sanctions provisions that Turkey would be subject to are extremely ineffective in accomplishing U.S. foreign policy goals and could actually increase the influence of Russia. The root of the ineffectiveness of CAATSA sanctions is “mirrored thinking,” as U.S. policymakers automatically assume that other states “think” like the U.S. The case of CAATSA sanctions serves as a warning to policymakers to avoid the analytical trap of mirrored thinking in future policy decisions. 

CAATSA Overview

In 2017, Congress passed CAATSA with sanctions targeting North Korea, Iran, and Russia. For each country, CAATSA lays out a separate justification for sanctions and the specifics of the sanctions differ for each country. Thus, CAATSA is effectively three sanction regimes folded into one. However, despite the fact that the targets of CAATSA sanctions differ for Iran, North Korea, and Russia, CAATSA universally implements secondary sanctions on targeted entities.

Per country, CAATSA created a list of persons and entities that are directly targeted by sanctions. Secondary sanctions direct the U.S. Treasury Department to also sanction any persons or entities that partake in “significant” transactions with listed persons or entities. Secondary sanctions on Iran and North Korea are not revolutionary, however, whereas Iran and North Korea are relatively isolated from the international business community, Russia is not. European businesses have significantly more ties to Russia than they do to North Korea or Iran and thus, are more likely, whether intentionally or unintentionally, to do business with a CAATSA targeted entity. Sanctioning a European entity could lead to complications between Washington and Brussels. Thus, the imposition of secondary sanctions on Russia has the potential to weaken U.S. partnerships. 

The Russia-specific sections of the CAATSA legislation state that Congress implemented the sanctions to respond to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, cyber intrusions, and human rights violations, and codifies many existing Russia sanctions programs. In addition, CAATSA Section 231E added provisions that target the Russian Defense and Intelligence sectors. Russian arms exports account for a predominant portion of the country’s technology-intensive exports and are one of the main avenues by which Russia integrates with the global economy. Therefore,  CAATSA sanctions targeting the Russian military-industrial complex are supposed to have a chilling effect on the sales of Russian arms and defense technology. This would theoretically degrade the economic health of the Russian military-industrial base and decrease Russia’s ability to expand its sphere of influence through arms deals. However, the effectiveness of the policy is predicated on the assumption that Russia leverages arms sales to create close ties with states and that Russia is attempting to generate a profit from arms sales. This assumption stems from the U.S. usage of arms sales but does not acknowledge the fact that Russia employs arms sales differently. 

U.S. Use of Arms Deals in Foreign Policy

It is no secret that the United States is the largest arms exporter in the world. In 2018 alone the U.S. made 136 billion dollars in arms deals. According to the U.S. Department of State, “Arms sales and defense trade are key tools of [U.S.] foreign policy.” The vast majority of analysts agree that the purchase of an advanced U.S. defense system creates an extraordinarily strong incentive for the recipient country to preserve a close relationship with the U.S.  For instance, a single U.S. cooperative defense program, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), involves 46 percent of the global economy and ensures that the states purchasing the JSF will be largely dependent on maintaining stable relationships with the U.S. to competently sustain the jet over its projected 50 year lifespan. The U.S. sells arms to make other states dependent on the U.S. in order to preserve their national security. 

In addition, promoting interoperability between the U.S. military and militaries of ally states has been a long-standing goal of U.S. arms sales from administration to administration. In 2014, the Obama administration released a directive stating that one of the primary goals of U.S. arms sales was increasing interoperability capabilities. The Trump administration’s public rhetoric focuses on the benefits of arms sales to the U.S. economy. However, in the Trump administration’s April 2018 National Security Presidential Memorandum Regarding U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, the importance of promoting interoperability is still highlighted. Administrations understand that increasing interoperability results in an increase in ease by which the U.S. can project its military power. 

U.S. planners understand that the outcome of any great power confrontation will hinge on the ability to gather, analyze, and disseminate information quickly. Allies that use U.S. compatible technology enable the U.S. military to easily incorporate the allies’ military assets into the broader U.S. information network. Jonathan Caverley of the U.S. naval war college highlights that “Interoperability among networked drones from multiple countries will likely play an enormous role in future “informationalized conflicts.” Interoperability results in increased lethality, therefore cultivating interoperability through arms sales remains a priority of U.S. foreign policy. 

CAATSA-style sanctions decrease the effectiveness of arms sales to build strong bilateral relationships and to cultivate interoperability. One can imagine that significant disincentives to buy U.S. arms would arise if China were to impose CAATSA- style secondary sanctions on U.S. arms sales. If that were to occur, the primary partners of the U.S., such as the UK, France, Australia, and Germany, would surely continue to purchase U.S. arms. However, states which the U.S. is trying to court might be dissuaded from purchasing arms in the quantity required to produce a dependent relationship and create interoperability capabilities with the U.S.. Thus, CAATSA sanctions would be effective against the U.S.—but Russia’s use of arms sales in its foreign policy is fundamentally different. 

Russia’s Use of Arms Deals in Foreign Policy

Russia’s primary objective of arms sales is to support its image as a first-rate, global power, promote the creation of a multi-polar world, and keep the Russian military-industrial base employed. 

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russia is the second most prolific seller of arms in the world (the most prolific is the U.S.). This is a point of pride for Russia. In a public meeting of the Commission for Military Technology Cooperation with Foreign States, the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin stated: “The arms market is complicated. Competition in this sector is very fierce. That Russia is the world’s second biggest arms and military hardware exporter is thus all the greater an achievement. I think it is an important indicator of our country’s industrial, technological, scientific, and political capabilities…. Russia has a time-tested reputation as a top-class producer of the most sophisticated military hardware.” Furthermore, Russian equipment is less expensive than U.S. arms and that is also a point of pride for Russia. For instance, in February of 2019, the Defense Minister of Russia, Sergey Shogiu, bragged that “Our foreign colleagues realize that our weapons are hundreds of times cheaper than the systems deployed to be used against us. And that does not apply only to the US missile defense system.” Russia’s arms sales enhance Russia’s prestige abroad and, arguably, more importantly, helps cements the perception of Russian power in the collective consciousness of the Russian citizenry.

Furthermore, Russia does not necessarily make money from its arms exports. It has been widely documented that Russia will provide loans to states who are cash strapped but looking to buy Russian weapons. A high-profile example of this policy is Turkey’s purchase of Russia’s advanced anti-air missile system—the S-400. This acquisition has an estimated value of 2.5 billion dollars, and 55 percent of this purchase is being financed via a Russian loan.  Additionally, in 2018, Russia issued a 200 million dollar loan to Armenia to finance the purchase of anti-aircraft and radar systems and, in 2013, Bangladesh was issued an 800 million dollar Russian loan in order to purchase Russian training jets. The chance of Russia actually seeing profits from these sales are relatively low. However, this is the trend for the entire military-industrial complex in Russia—Russian production of weapons is not profitable and thus requires state-funded subsidies. The export of arms that are financed by Russian loans is just another way to subsidize Russia’s military-industrial complex. These foreign arms sales keep the Russian military-industrial complex, which employs over two million Russians, operating. Keeping production lines running guarantees that Russia will have a domestic source of arms. Moreover, the two million Russians that are employed in the military-industrial complex and the oligarch owners of these firms provide stable political support to Putin’s government. 

Moreover, Russia’s sales of arms are opportunistic and do not represent any concerted effort to form tight alliances with the states who purchase Russian arms. In 2018,  there was significant media coverage of China’s participation in Russia’s Vostok-18 military exercises. Combined with China’s purchase of S-400’s, many analysts suggested that there was a deepening strategic partnership between China and Russia. Despite appearances, in Vostok-18 Chinese forces only represented one percent of the troops involved. Despite the fact that Chinese and Russian officials might state that arms sales and joint exercises symbolize a growing strategic relationship, actions speak larger than words and so far, Russian-Chinese cooperation has been quite superficial. But, the appearance of Russia creating interoperable capability with any state gives the appearance that Russia is forming an alternative to the western-dominated international system. This promotion of a multi-polar world is referenced many times in Russian foreign policy. Arms sales contribute to the appearance that Russia is creating this alternative system regardless of the actual imperial effects.

How Russia Can Leverage CAATSA Sanctions

As demonstrated, Russia’s geopolitical use of arms sales differs significantly from how the U.S. employs arms sales. Due to these differences, Russia is actually able to leverage CAATSA sanctions to advance its foreign policy objectives—chiefly, the promotion of a more multipolar world. 

Although, as discussed, Russia does not always seek to build close partnerships with other states, it is always looking to undermine other countries’ partnerships. A world where the overall cooperation between states is lower than it is today is inherently more multipolar—an objective of Russian foreign policy. When the U.S. sanctions, or even threatens to sanction another state, the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and the state being targeted is strained—and thus, a step is taken closer towards the realization of Russia’s objectives.

The case of Turkey’s acquisition of Russian arms highlights this “partnership degrading” characteristic of sanctions. Turkey's purchase of Russian made S-400s has resulted in a significant straining of the U.S.- Turkish relationship since Turkey announced the acquisition in December of 2017. Turkey is a NATO ally and the prospect of the United States unilaterally sanctioning Turkey was met with profound dismay by many foreign policy experts. As a result of Turkey’s acquisition of Russian arms, the U.S.  kicked Turkey out of the F-35 consortium (a major U.S. effort in developing closer strategic partnerships with other states) and there has been the talk of even reevaluating Turkey’s membership in NATO.  It is important to note that this tension arose before Turkey’s incursion into Northern Syria- which has even further degraded the U.S.- Turkey relationship. 

Russia was counting on its sale of weapons to undermine the Turkish-U.S. relationship. Russia was therefore willing to make concessions during this arms deal to help achieve this goal. Included in Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400’s were significant technology transfer provisions. These provisions will enable Turkey to maintain the S-400’s independently from Russia. Moreover, this technology transfer, in the future, will enable Turkey to domestically produce an analogous missile system. Thus, the technology transfer provisions negate the “dependency” building characteristics of arms sales which is critical to the way that the U.S. uses arms sales. Furthermore, as noted previously, Russia provided a loan to Turkey to finance 55 percent of the S-400 purchase (decreasing the likelihood that Russia will see a profit from the deal), and Russia also promised to expedite the delivery date of the missile system. The sale of S-400’s does not create a basis for a long-lasting partnership between Russia and Turkey and is not profitable for Russia. However, the sale of S-400’s raised the profile of the Russian arms industry which contributes to the image of Russia as a great power (this effect of arms sales happens regardless of CAATSA sanctions), and in large part because of the threat of CAATSA sanction, there was a significant chilling in the U.S.- Turkish relationship. 

The Perils of Mirrored Thinking

The case of CAATSA sanctions demonstrates how foreign policy can stumble when policymakers transpose their own policy-making paradigms onto the leaderships of other states. Sanctions can be a valuable tool for policymakers; however, not all sanctions regimes are created equal. To craft an effective sanctions policy or any policy in general, policymakers must have a clear understanding of the policy’s goals and how the state that is being sanctioned will react. U.S. policymakers wanted to push back on what they perceived to be Russia’s expanding influence. Because the U.S. gains such a great deal of influence in its own export of military equipment, U.S. policymakers projected that limiting Russia’s ability to sell arms would be an effective way to counter Russia. However, as demonstrated, Russia applies arms sales in its foreign policy very differently than the U.S.. Thus, CAATSA sanctions on Russia’s military-industrial base do not degrade Russia’s ability to project power, but if anything, enhances it. 

Putin vs. the People: The Next Generation of Russian Activism

Since June of 2019, thousands of young Russians have been detained for participating in unsanctioned protests in Moscow. These protests aren’t like the Women’s March or the school strikes in the United States; they are generally unauthorized, meaning every individual who attends the demonstration can lawfully be arrested by the authorities. The stakes are higher, and desperation emanates from the massive, chanting crowds. The very air crackles with anticipation as thousands of Russian citizens all collectively think the same life-changing thoughts: the authorities are no longer our friends, and revolution is near. 

Although these protests seem to have sprung out of nowhere, the tensions in Russia have been mounting for a long time due to the changing political climate. One of President Vladimir Putin’s most outspoken political opponents, Alexei Navalny, has been railing against corruption and political repression since 2008. He often spends short amounts of time in prison for arranging and attending unsanctioned protests. He has attempted to run for elected positions numerous times, including the Presidency, but has been prohibited from candidacy on several occasions due to convictions related to his activism. He has also, like many of President Vladimir Putin’s other political rivals, fallen mysteriously ill while in custody. As a political activist he is known for criticizing the authorities on various social media platforms, like Twitter and YouTube, and has been named one of the “most influential people on the internet” by Time magazine for his massive following, which has allowed him to connect with and mobilize young activists throughout Russia.

These young activists are the basis for the anti-government protests happening in Russia. They hail from the generation that was born during or after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Some of them are students as young as sixteen years old, while the majority are college students and young professionals who, wanting to have a say in the future of their country, walked into a voting booth and were faced with the realization that their votes and their voices are being ignored by the authorities. 

According to a federal law passed in 1999, “On the Election of Deputies of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation,” candidates do not have to be affiliated with a recognized political party, such as United Russia (Putin’s party) or the Communist Party (the second largest party in the Federal Assembly, Russia’s legislative body), in order to run for elected positions. However, many candidates who have attempted to run for positions both at the local and presidential level as independents or affiliates of one of United Russia’s opposing parties have had their registration rejected. In order to be registered for the election, candidates must petition for signatures from their constituencies. Once they have received the correct number of signatures, they must register their petition with the authorities, who verify the signatures and declare the candidate’s legitimacy. Despite collecting the minimum number of signatures, most of the candidates running in opposition to United Russia have had their registration denied on the alleged grounds that the signatures had been “faked.” 

These incidents of alleged corruption are also occurring during a time of political change. The approval ratings of the current ruling party, United Russia, have dropped to a historic low: just 32 percent of Russians stated that they approved of the party in 2018. Many pro-government candidates chose not to run under the United Russia banner, afraid that affiliating with the party would negatively affect their chances of winning the election. Additionally, a Russian media startup “Proekt” reported that opposition and independent candidates were slated to win nine of the 45 Moscow districts in the local elections on September 9, according to polls. United Russia has been accused of outright corruption by many critics, including Navalny, and their image as the ruling party continues to worsen as wages stagnate, the middle class shrinks, the retirement age increases, and more Russians fall below the poverty line.

Although the younger generation of Russians have been outspoken in their desire for change, the corruption of the ruling party doesn’t just hurt the youth: older Russians feel the political and economic strain as well. According to an international Pew Research study, older generations are more likely to vote in elections than younger generations. They are, however, less likely to protest and become politically active than their younger counterparts. The study also links social media usage and political activism, stating that social media users are more likely to speak out on a broad range of political issues than people who do not use social media. The new generation of Russian activists support these findings, as growing up with the internet and cell phones has made it easier for them to utilize social media.

Many of the young Russians protesting and making their voices heard do not remember the fall of the Soviet Union, and they resent the fear and hesitation that older Russians feel when it comes to political change. It isn’t uncommon for older Russians, when asked about changing the leadership of the current administration, to reply, “If not Putin, then who?” They remember the time that immediately followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union (often referred to colloquially as “The Crazy Nineties”) in which the crime and unemployment rates skyrocketed as corruption and gangs gained control of the new country’s fledgling economy. They were surprised on New Year’s Eve in 1999 by former Russian President Boris Yeltsin announcing that he was leaving and was to be replaced with a young man that hardly anybody knew: Vladimir Putin. They recall how, after Putin took office, the economy started flourishing again and the crime rates started falling as more and more people found decent-paying jobs. Most importantly, older Russians remember the tendency for political activism and opposition to be crushed under the heel of the authorities, both before and after the fall of the Soviet Union.

Perhaps that’s why, despite being their age, the young Russian activists aren’t afraid to get their hands dirty in the fight for democratic freedoms. In a late-July protest in 2019, hundreds of protesters were arrested for participating in an unsanctioned demonstration. Dozens of others were brutalized by the police force, who had stood idly by until the climax of the protest. Live videos of the protest were streamed on Twitter, and video footage of the brutality and arrests have been seen by millions of people internationally. Two parents were threatened to have their children taken away by the authorities after being photographed and recognized at a protest, with “child endangerment” being cited as the primary cause of concern. Yet the younger generation continues to protest and put their lives and safety on the line. By ignoring the will of the authorities and showing up en masse to demonstrate their rights, young Russians are testing the boundaries of the permissible use of violence and stating their dedication to individual rights and democracy.

The very presence of state violence is nonetheless disconcerting, especially because the amount of protests and backlash from authorities is disproportionate to the importance of the most recent elections. Local councils have little power, and the elections for these positions are less important than elections for the Federal Assembly or the presidency. As such, the authorities should not be as concerned about the candidates and the protests as their actions have indicated. The authorities’ uneasiness may manifest from their slipping grasp on power as evidence of their corruption leaves United Russia’s approval ratings lower than ever. Consequently, this struggle to retain power over Russian citizens will, over time, result in a change in the way authorities respond to protests and demonstrations: either the demonstrations will have the intended effect and liberal reform will be put in place or conservative reforms will result in more and more people being arrested for speaking their minds. Should the latter outcome transpire, then United Russia will have an even more difficult time convincing Russian citizens--and the rest of the world--of their legitimacy.

Moreover, Vladimir Putin’s own approval rating is at risk if he allows any kind of conservative reforms to repress the rights of Russian citizens. Once at an all-time-high of 89 percent in the summer of 2015, his approval rating has since taken the plunge down to 68 percent. This number is still quite high, but the rather large dip in approval indicates the Russian public’s frustration with the government’s decisions. If he is able to quell the angry public, distance himself from United Russia and retain his approval rating, then Vladimir Putin could be in power for a long time. However, to do so, he’d have to ensure that the authorities’ response to protests and demonstrations remains proportionate, if unfair and illiberal. 

Should Vladimir Putin lose his control of Russia’s political sphere, then he wouldn’t be the first Eastern European leader to be deposed in this millenium. After all, Russia isn’t the only post-Soviet state experiencing massive protests and political upsets. Anti-government protests and activism have been sweeping through much of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, including Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and Moldova. Just like the protests in Russia, most of the activists are students and young adults who came of age after the fall of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the activism in these countries has been majoritively successful. After the violent regime change in 2014, young Ukrainians created powerful political networks, and now Ukraine has the youngest government in Europe. Activists in Kazakhstan, previously having their right to assembly deeply oppressed by authorities, now openly and loudly gather for unsanctioned anti-government demonstrations. Little by little, the young, post-Soviet generation of political activists are changing the political landscape in their own countries.

It’s difficult to say where the new surge of political activism in Russia will lead, as there are many groups that all want different things. Some simply want to wrestle power away from corruption and place it back into safe hands; others want the entire political system dismantled and rebuilt from the ground up. As more young people begin to realize that they can turn their discontentment into action, the latter option seems less and less far-fetched. Although nobody can say for certain what the future holds for Vladimir Putin and his ruling party, it’s possible that, once the political atmosphere in Russia has reached its highest intensity, something very small could lead to the upheaval of Russia’s longest-standing president. The old, Soviet generations will no longer be leading the Russian Federation--the young, tired, angry, educated, politically active young people will.