Beyond Supply and Demand: Using Economic Principles to Explain Terrorism

Introduction

Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, a dramatic rise in the study of terrorism occurred in academia. Although recent actions by U.S. military and Treasury officials seek to deplete ISIS’ economic resources, little literature exists regarding the role of economics on the development and behavior of terrorist groups. This paper examines the economic motives of terrorist groups and proposes possible solutions to deter and prevent future terrorist attacks. The first section focuses on the economic causes of terrorism utilizing economic principles such as rational choice theory and self-interest. The second section uses market structure and club theory to examine the dynamics of terrorist group behavior. The third section of the essay explores the use of deterrents including welfare spending, offensive strikes, and restricting economic resources as means of both hindering terrorist organization growth and thwarting terrorist attacks.

Rational Choice Theory, Self-Interest, and Suicide Bombers

To better understand terrorists, this paper classifies them as rational actors who aim to maximize utility. Terrorism is a rational choice because the perpetrators weigh their decisions based on marginal benefit versus marginal cost. Terrorism, as described throughout the essay, is defined as “the premeditated use, or threat of use, of extranormal violence to obtain a political objective through intimidation or fear directed at a large audience.” Terrorists consider the possibility of a successful attack against the possible risk of an agent such as the government preventing the attack and detaining terrorist members. Terrorists also seek to maximize utility by inflicting the greatest possible damage at the lowest possible cost.

Academics may also describe terrorists as self-interested or present-aim actors to further explain their economic motives. The former is defined as considering one’s choice based on tradeoffs regarding cost, benefits, and resources, whereas the latter occurs when an actor successfully pursues their objective at the time of the attack. Present-aim terrorists do not consider possible tradeoffs and base their actions off the most efficient means of destruction possible. Present-aim terrorists claim non-monetary motives behind their actions and would substitute a reduction in income in exchange for more successful terrorist attacks. However, Juliet Elu’s article examining terrorism in Africa and South Asia disproves this idea. Based on the study’s comparison of nations’ GDP per capita and their rate of terrorist attacks from 1980-2004, a positive correlation exists between per-capita-income and terrorist attack rates. This relationship demonstrates that terrorists do not attack low per-capita-income nations due to the decreased economic opportunity, thus exemplifying the idea that terrorists act as self-interested actors.

Figures 1 + 2: Graphs illustrating the relationship between Africa and South Asian nations’ GDP per capita and their number of terrorist incidents from 1980-2004.

Although conventional wisdom may regard suicide bombers as irrational due to their inherently self-destructive actions, economic theory demonstrates their function as self-interested, rational actors who seek to maximize utility based on tradeoffs regarding benefits and costs. A positive correlation exists between suicide bombers and high amounts of human capital; the latter of which economists define as an individual’s skills or knowledge. This relationship is likely due to the increased marginal benefit a highly-intelligent terrorist provides to a terror organization. Despite the destruction of human capital due to the suicide bomber’s inevitable death, the action reaps a large amount of utility for the terrorist organization.

Suicide bombers are also more likely to attack an area with a large population density. Despite the initial explanation of choosing to target high-population dense areas due to increased damages, this decision remains rooted in economic theory. Utilizing this method of destruction provides a low-cost, high benefit means of destruction. The suicide bomber will likely inflict mass casualties due to the high-probability of success. Eli Berman, author of Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism, observes that the operation poses little cost in the form of risk due to the impossibility of the government detaining the perpetrator following their actions. Also, terrorist groups often delegate the role of suicide bomber to those least likely to defect. These members often possess large amounts of human capital and are highly likely to carry out the mission.

Market Structure, Economic Development, and Club Theory

A nation’s market structure may serve as a key factor in a country’s rise of terrorism. Terrorist attacks may occur due to the transition to a more advanced economy. Charles Boehmer and Mark Daube’s research posits a link between the rise of terrorism and the conversion from a clientele economy to a market-based economy. The former consists of an economic structure based on hierarchical values and the accumulation of influence, whereas the latter is based on contract law and perceived egalitarianism among all economic actors. This economic overhaul likely contributes to the rise of terrorism due to a perceived overthrow of social order. The economy no longer remains focused on hierarchy and all economic agents are equal. This situation may lead to social unrest, contributing to the rise of terrorism as a means of reestablishing previous socioeconomic values.

Despite the study’s evidence of a correlation between economic transition and the rise of terrorism, conflicting literature exists regarding the occurrence of terrorism in high and middle-income nations. Although the paper previously pointed out that Elu’s research developed a correlation between a country’s per capita GDP and its number of terrorist attacks from 1980-2004, a different data set yields disparate results. By analyzing data of 144 nations’ rates of terrorist incidents and GDP per capita from 1970-2000, Boehmer and Daube conclude that middle-income states are most vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Their study explains this result by noting that many middle-income nations recently underwent the transition from a clientele to a market-based economy, providing the potential for social unrest and the possible subsequent rise of terrorism. Also, Boehmer and Daube believe that terrorist attacks occur less frequently in high-income nations due to those states’ ability to create government programs to lessen social strife and reduce the incentives of forming a terrorist group. Although their analysis arrives at different conclusions than Elu’s work, neither study disproves the other due to the differences in their respective data sets.

Figure 3: Graph illustrating the correlation between 144 nations’ GDP per capita and their number of terrorist attacks from 1970-2004.

In addition to a nation’s market structure and level of economic development, club theory helps explain terrorists’ behavior. In the context of this paper, club theory denotes a group, particularly a radical religious organization, that provides goods through acts of charity. Terrorist organizations epitomize this idea by their offering of mutual aid in which individual members of groups such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad provide services to the families of organization members based on financial and political support. Groups that follow this model must avoid the free-rider problem, in which terrorists may not contribute to the group and receive services for free. However, this problem seldom occurs due to the demands terrorist organizations place on new recruits. Before receiving charitable services, potential members must sacrifice their time and assist others in the community. By providing a test of loyalty in the form of initial sacrifice, terrorist organizations address this economic issue and ensure that all members will contribute to the group at some point in their membership.  

Welfare Spending, Offensive Strikes, and Resource Deprivation as Incentives

Although the paper has focused on the economics behind terrorism, the subject can also be utilized to prevent both the rise of terrorism and future terrorist attacks. Many academics and policymakers propose welfare spending as a means of deterring terrorism. However, literature on the subject yields conflicting results, and the spending must be properly implemented and administered to achieve the desired outcome. The success of increasing spending on government programs to reduce terrorism is best demonstrated by the actions of Northern Ireland. Following the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, the UK and the EU provided grants to Northern Ireland in the form of peace money designed to fund public projects that aimed to reduce social inequalities between Catholics and Protestants.

Within five years, disparities between the two groups in terms of healthcare, education, and housing had been eliminated, which also correlated with a reduction in terrorist attacks. UK and Northern Ireland leaders credit local administration and oversight to the program’s success, which permitted the peace money to be directed to projects designed to reduce conflict between Catholics and Protestants while also helping to economically improve Northern Ireland’s cities.

However, welfare spending does not guarantee decreased terrorist activity. Schnellenbach notes that transferring wealth to communities that support terrorist organizations will likely result in increased financial contributions to the group. Ensuring proper fund implementation may prevent this problem. Money invested in public works projects designed to improve societal aspects such as public health and education will likely lower terrorist support. This concept remains true due to the use of incentives. Although providing funds to terrorist sympathizing areas may appear to reward terrorists, doing so may result in decreased support for the terrorist organization if local government oversees the money’s proper implementation. Local residents will be less likely to join a terror cell if economic conditions improve, as there would be little economic benefit to joining the terrorist organization.

Like the conflicting literature regarding welfare spending, academics also debate the efficacy of offensive strikes versus restricting economic resources as means of hindering terrorist attacks. Proponents of the former believe that government raids and preemptive strikes disrupt terrorist organizations and deter terrorists from committing attacks. However, countries seldom implement this strategy due to both the free-rider problem and information asymmetry. Offensive action often requires multinational cooperation and remains more difficult to implement than defensive strategies such as building a wall. The free-rider problem may occur due to one nation not participating in the anti-terrorist coalition yet benefitting from the efficacy of the offensive strike. Similarly, terrorists often know more about government actions than vice-versa, adding to the difficulty of offensive action due to the risk of the targeted group acquiring knowledge of the plan.

Peace economist researchers often recommend restricting resources to terrorist groups as a means of hindering attacks. Despite the conventional defensive strategy of protecting a nation’s assets, Intriligator suggests governments focus on raising the costs of terrorism by cutting off resources to terrorist organizations. This tactic increases the difficulty of terrorist organizations to acquire valuable assets such as money, weapons, and intelligence. This increased cost of terrorism may deter potential recruits from joining terrorist groups. Also, protecting a nation’s assets by increasing security in areas such as government buildings and major transportation hubs remains ineffective at thwarting terrorist attacks due to the concept of substitution. Rather than increase the amount of resources to commit an attack at a place of high-security such as an airport, terrorist groups will devote their efforts to attacking other areas of high-population density, such as train stations and city centers.

Conclusion

This paper examines the role of economics in terrorism through both terrorist actions and possible deterrents. Despite media coverage surrounding ISIS’ predominantly oil-based economy, utilizing economic ideas to model terrorist behavior remains important. Rational choice and self-interest help explain the behavior of individual terrorist, as demonstrated by the economics behind suicide bombers. Market structure and club theory act as means of explaining the actions of terrorist organizations. Also, the use of deterrents such as welfare spending, offensive strikes, and restricting resources function as possible solutions to prevent both terrorist attacks and the growth of terrorist groups. Further study is needed on the behavior of terrorist organizations outside of the Middle East. However, better understanding of the economics of terrorism may assist the United States in defeating the Islamic State by financially suffocating the group’s struggling economy in addition to coordinated military attacks.

Destruction of Public Space, the Right To The City, and Authoritarian Durability in the Middle East

Many authoritarian regimes in the Middle East are uniquely resilient in their ability to resist and pre-emptively stop change. The scholarly consensus generally resides in the understanding that these regimes operate under a rentierist modality. In essence, rulers make an inordinate amount of money from rents, such as oil. Rentierist states operate in one of two ways. Kuwait demonstrates “popular rentierism,” meaning the use of revenue for ostensibly benevolent reasons such as creating and maintaining robust welfare, healthcare and civil service agencies. Alternatively, as Bahrain showcases, rentierism can manifest in a more securitized approach, in which the state maintains such a powerful security apparatus that opposition to its rule becomes too costly for dissidents. Clearly, rentierism is a significant factor in the resiliency of Middle East regimes, but rentierist scholars overlook the importance of a population’s spatial dispersions. Merely reducing depoliticization to the effects of rentierism, while a credible lens, fails to explain why once cohesive societies atomize, a key component in the process of depoliticization.

To really understand why some Arab states did not succumb to the same democratic pressures of the Arab Spring we should apply Henri Lefebvre’s Le Droit à la ville, or, The Right to the City. If we intersect Lefebvre’s understanding of how cities foment a more cosmopolitan and democratic outlook with the pressures and effects of global capitalism, then we can illuminate the depoliticized nature of populations and why the oppositional wave of the Arab Spring failed to materialize in some parts of the Middle East.

Integral Components To The Story

Theorist David Harvey aptly defines the “right to the city” as the essential human right to remake ourselves through our experience with the social relations within a city. We become more dynamic– emotionally and in terms of our comprehensions– when we live in a more diverse space. The urbanite lives in a more vibrant, multifaceted, and complicated space than those who are more rural, typically resulting in a more cosmopolitan outlook. We can see this process manifest by examining spatial determinants of voting in the United States. Urban constituents tend to vote for Democrats, the more cosmopolitan and diverse of America’s two parties, while those in more rural areas tend to vote for Republicans, the more parochial and conservative party. The unavoidable social interactions between individuals in the city means that one cannot live in isolation of differing perspectives. Sooner or later, urbanites stumble into something like a Chinatown or other enclave, immigrants, or in general, people radically different from themselves.  These encounters are unavoidable, the spatial layout of the organic city mandates constant inevitable challenges to one’s worldview, generating a less hierarchical outlook more conducive to one of the fundamentals of Liberal democracy (that is, openness to those that are different).

The right to the city has an integral component: the existence of easily accessible public space within the city. The classic case of this in Middle Eastern politics is that of the Iranian bazaar. The bazaar is an engine of political dynamism. Key in the dissemination of information, wealthy bazaaris (the Iranian merchant class) who opposed the Shah’s control of the economy might facilitate the production of opposition leaflets, to be handed out by the Iranian city’s subaltern. The fundamental understanding of the bazaar as an entity that allows interaction without the stratification of class or gender is what the right to the city subsists upon. Overcoming intra-societal differences is the key benefit of the right to the city. These interactions generate a more open society that is comfortable and even happy with dynamic zeitgeists and political change. In this manner, the cosmopolitan urbanite self-energizes democracy. The urbanite becomes a more politically responsible member of society, and the sum of a more open society creates a more robust body politic.

Why, then, might these public spaces be destroyed, gentrified, or reimagined? One one hand, any authoritarian leader worth their salt will destroy engines of political dynamism, understanding that a powerful civil society is a threat. The problem with this method is that it is obvious. Aristotle famously stated that man is a political animal. Any rational individual fundamentally wants to participate in their society in a manner that will benefit the body politic. Creating barriers to political dynamism, such as the destruction of protest camps or the cordoning off of certain areas for inexplicable reasons are clearly not designed for the public’s benefit, but rather for that of the empowered. Without some type of reasonable rationalization for impediments to the right to the city the populace will see the effort for what it is, an authoritarian power grab. The alternative to this rather transparent endevor is to provide digestible reasons, often claiming the need for development or investment.

Herein lies the authoritarian intersection with the facts of global capitalism. One reality of capitalism is that it operates under the frontier mentality. The frontier mentality can be understood as the constant desire to seek new territories and constantly push boundaries with the ultimate teleology of expansion. Karl Marx most accurately pinpointed Capitalism’s frontier mentality,  contesting, “The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the entire surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexions everywhere.” Capitalism as a system always seeks new markets to exploit for profit; it is an inherently expansionist system. Understanding this key facet of capitalism is integral to comprehending the modality of destruction toward the right to the city and access to public spaces in the Middle East.

Succinctly, we can understand this destruction through the idea of financial conjuring and the economy of appearances. Financial conjuring is the process of imbuing natural resources, a city, a population, or essentially anything, with qualities that can be exploited for profit. So, for example, an important waterway, the Nile River, is integral to regional trade. Access to the Nile River is important to industries seeking to trade in the area. Landlords in Cairo will charge rent for businesses seeking a base of operation close to the Nile River. The Nile River is thus monetized and exploited for profit.

The other aspect of this is the economy of appearances. The economy of appearances should be understood as an entity’s mode of business attraction. Understanding that business is always seeking expansion, those in charge of property might make the property more appealing to business. Offering high-end shopping malls, grandiose motorways, movie theaters, worldwide food chains, etc, are key to attracting global business. Without an attractive location, employees will not want to settle and the space will not lure the same quality of worker (consider the attractiveness of Silicon Valley’s proximity to San Francisco). This is a fundamental process to global capitalism. While these relationships and processes generate significant amounts of money, they sanitize the city, replacing authentic public spaces with genuine histories with gentrified cookie cutter buildings and businesses. The bazaar, where one could intermingle with those beneath and above their class and purchase genuine products becomes the supermall, where one can shop at Brooks Brothers or eat at McDonalds.

Kuwait demonstrates how global capitalism depoliticizes a population through atomization, or, the disunification and individualization of the collective. At its founding, Kuwait was a port city. Travelers and traders would bring their own cultures, views, conceptions, products, spices, and foods. The intermingling of multitudes of identities manufactured a more open population. Of course, open populations are more receptive to democracy. They tolerate other views, appreciate similarities and celebrate differences while disavowing hierarchy. In a more open society, myriad identities do not cause democratic decay through the dissolution of semblances of unity. A more open society can celebrate these differences. The right to the city is the driver of this phenomena. Through the unavoidable interaction with differing ideas, a zeitgeist more amenable to democracy manifests.

Recognizing that Kuwait’s more cosmopolitan society was a threat to authoritarianism, in that a society less inclined to support hierarchy would be less agreeable to limited political agency, Kuwait’s rulers initiated a major societal reorientation. Because Kuwait’s rulers had such a good understanding of the relationship between democracy and the right to the city, policies of de-urbanization and suburbanization were heavily enforced beginning in the late 1950s. At the same time, immigration rates spiked. Simultaneously, Kuwait’s parliament redefined its citizenship laws and narrowed citizenship requirements to approximately 30% of the population.  

The reasons for the massive influx of immigrants should be understood dialectically with discourses on Kuwaiti citizenship. To be a Kuwaiti citizen meant having a cushy position in the civil service or governing bureaucracy, excellent healthcare and education, and a guaranteed life of luxury. Kuwait’s popular rentierism was designed to superordinate a specific group of people–those with the capacity to influence politics– to depoliticize them. Kuwaiti citizens expected to live easy lives and to work white collar jobs. Additionally, an emphasis on living in the suburbs, with the space, the cars, and the tempered lifestyle as main attractors. As Kuwaitis suburbanized, they lost their right to the city. No longer at the mercy of forced interaction with those different, Kuwaiti citizens could live in their own bubbles. If Kuwaiti society was at one point a cosmopolitan molecule comprised of myriad atoms, suburbanization smashed the molecule into individual atoms. The result, of course, was a disunified and atomized collective of individuals where a cohesive body politic once resided.

Obviously, any healthy economic system needs blue collar jobs. Migrant workers were heavily recruited as Kuwaiti nationals left the city for the suburbs. Migrant workers moved to the city and lived in slums without many rights. Obviously, poverty and inadequate access to necessary resources beget crime. Migrant workers became associated with criminality by the increasingly more closed-minded Kuwaiti. The once cosmopolitan Kuwaiti now viewed the outsider as a potential threat rather than a chance to expand or challenge a worldview.

Spurring this change in mentality, Kuwait’s polity oversaw a destruction of public space. New emphasis on car ownership, a hallmark of suburbanization, forced roads to widen. Al-Safat, a center at which many smaller towns converged, was replaced by a traffic circle. Areas where disparate groups of individuals found commonality was transformed into a mechanism to control movement. Space around al-Safat became a nexus for parking lots. Likewise, urban “beautification” schemes were designed to modernize the city. Authentic working-class neighborhoods adjacent to bazaars and upper class spaces were eradicated and replaced with gardens or modern buildings. Any authenticity was lost in a guise to make the city a better place. In light of urban beautification, al-Safat’s parking lots were converted into a supermall. If we trace al-Safat’s history to its origins as a center of convergence to where it is today, we can begin to understand the “privatization of urban life.” To enter a mall, one must be a Kuwaiti citizen. To be a Kuwaiti citizen, one must have money. Essentially, the supermall is a center for consumption rather than a space for interaction.

Conclusion

In Kuwait, we have seen  the effects of capitalism as a depoliticizing agent. Once cosmopolitan Kuwaitis suburbanize and atomize only to return to the city that at one point had given them dynamism to find it a space for consumption. Indeed, the main rationalization behind this transition was the need to attract business and industry. Businesses and skilled workers flock to “developed” areas, Kuwait’s leaders would argue. Of course to the upper crust, the influx of foreign investment would benefit them. Landlords would collect rents and state owned enterprises would see new customers and business partners. Industry came at the expense of the authentic Kuwaiti neighborhood and public space. The result of this, however, was a disunified population less amenable to democracy and content with hierarchy so long as they could be satiated. Rather than orienting our understanding of depoliticized Middle Eastern populations around the two types of rentierism, we should understand the ostensibly benign process of urban development and the need to attract business as an authoritarian modality to cement power.

The Don’s Clash: The Huntingtonian Narrative in a Tumultuous Levant

“A unilateral decision made to draw lines in the sand, to undertake crusades, to oppose their evil with our good, to extirpate terrorism and, in Paul Wolfowitz’s nihilistic vocabulary, to end nations entirely, doesn’t make the supposed entities any easier to see; rather, it speaks to how much simpler it is to make bellicose statements for the purpose of mobilizing collective passions than to reflect, examine, sort out what it is we are dealing with in reality, the interconnectedness of innumerable lives, ‘ours’ as well as ‘theirs’.” -- Edward Said

The presidency of Donald J. Trump marks an arrival of initial uncertainty in American foreign policy towards the Middle East. While his campaign promises and inaugural address were clearly imprinted with ‘America First,’ the President’s nebulous worldview and policy contradictions have rendered his Middle East strategy ‘incalculable’ by many. Yet, if analyzed closely, Trump has expressed objectives in the region that give insight to the future of strategy in the Middle East and North Africa. The President’s policymaking will not be shaped by party affiliation or ideology, but rather an unorthodox perception of what defines a foreign policy ‘win.’  

Brookings Institution Senior Fellow, Thomas Wright, has deciphered Trumpian principles of policymaking. He has argued that the mystique surrounding Trump’s presidential policy is a false illusion; scholars, policymakers, and constituents should take him both literally and seriously. Wright asserted that the President’s views are “alien to the Foreign Policy tradition,” whereas instead of channeling a hawkish, conservative agenda, Trump harkens back to the 19th century with a strong commitment to mercantilism and isolationism. As in business, Trump will perceive the Middle East not through lenses of conflict alleviation or humanitarian work, but rather a treasure trove of financial ‘wins’ for the United States. This mentality can be explained with Trump’s detest of the international liberal order; despite the United States benefiting from post-war institutions and multilateral treaties in sectors of national security and diplomacy, these are invisible victories to which the United States carries much financial burden. If there is no immediate material or financial gain, American interest pivots. The President’s recent address to the Central Intelligence Agency proves such prioritization; Trump affirmed his devotion to the phrase, “to the victors belong the spoils,” and claimed American troops should have seized the Iraqi state’s oil supply before departing in 2011.

Yet, while deals and foreign policy ‘wins’ will guide the objectives of foreign policy, it will be the narrative of Samuel P. Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” theory that will embolden future crises. Under President Trump’s stewardship, the Middle East will undergo a drastic rhetorical transformation. Traditional power dynamics will remain — Syria will continue to confront an uncertain future, the Iranian-Saudi Arabian rivalry in the Gulf will continue to haunt sectarian division, many post-Arab Spring governments will continue to reconcile tumultuous political realities. However, a revived use of Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” theory will pour salt in the wounds of bleeding conflicts, aggravating terrorism’s fault-lines of Orientalism and interventionism.

The Tool of the ‘Clash’

In 1992, Samuel P. Huntington gave a lecture at the American Enterprise Institute, where he introduced the basis for one of the largest academic discourses in Middle Eastern studies: the “Clash of Civilizations.” The proposition culminated in a 1993 Foreign Affairs Magazinefeature, and a 1996 book: “The Clash of Civilizations? The Debate.” Huntington’s proposition that the future of the international system would not feature the “end of history” as Francis Fukuyama theorized, but rather a confrontation between the West — a troupe of ‘civilized’, Christian states — and Islam, a colossal religion he saw inimical towards non-Islamic cultures. Conflict, Huntington theorized from his armchair, was inherently cultural. War would transpire across the fault lines of civilizations, rooted in 20th century globalization. In the eyes of Mr. Huntington, The Cold War days of ideological tussles and nationalist fervor were well behind us, as it was now cultural peripheries that would characterize the slippery slope of international affairs.

While the scholarly community was quick to correct Huntington on the mischaracterization and generalization of a colossal religion juxtaposed with ambiguous ‘Western values,’ hawkish policymakers were just as eager to adopt Huntington’s thesis. After all, in a post-9/11 international order, the idea was easy to incorporate in the Bush administration’s foreign policy; the ‘clash’ was a convenient explanation of the sudden rise of extremist organizations claiming a jihadist battle against the imperial West. It is easy to dismiss the sectarian, demographic, and political complexity of the region with such a simple theory — categorizing a colossal, peaceful religion in opposition to the ‘West,’ whatever the West is.

But the ‘clash’ is only true if it is rhetorically made to be believed; mischaracterization is only reality when society makes it so. The danger of Huntington’s theory is not its context, but its capability to transform into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Those that yield power and influence can create an environment of either co-existing cultural peripheries, or civilizations caught in collision. The Trump administration will capitalize on the latter.

President Trump will not only use the Huntingtonian narrative as a framework in foreign policy, but as a tool. Juxtaposing the ‘West’ against a religion deemed a security threat dehumanizes and materializes the region, ripening the Middle East for harsher counterterrorism measures and cooperation with Russia in Syria. If Trump wishes to disassemble the pillars of the current liberal international order — multilateral organizations, such as the European Union and the United Nations, and free-trade deals, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership — Huntington’s theory will serve as a key mechanism in undermining globalism and putting America first. In the Middle East, this mentality will prioritize the West’s war with Islam above endeavors in democracy-promotion, human rights campaigns, gender equality, conflict alleviation, and even the Gulf oil trade.

A New Middle East

North Africa, the Levant, and the Gulf all remain in extremely precarious conditions. Many of their postcolonial lesions still bleed with conflict, political and institutional instability, and civil disunity. The failed democratic demands of Arab Spring protestors still linger in Tahrir Square, Avenue Habib Bourguiba, and Baniyas, with little chance of immediate re-emergence. Most notably, a once-isolated conflict in Syria has globalized into one of the largest refugee outpours since the Second World War, as well as a gargantuan power vacuum that has welcomed both forces of extremism and proponents of peace. To say President Trump is inheriting great disarray in the Middle East is an understatement — however, the president will prove selective in the crises he deems ‘winnable,’ using Huntingtonian logic to materialize gains and dehumanize conflicts.

The Rhetorical Battle Against ISIS

Aside from ‘America first’, Trump’s most notable campaign pledge to the American people was the eradication of Daesh, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. The Islamic State has proven its parasitic existence in Syria and Iraq’s power vacuum and potent in its ideological appeal across the globe. The organization’s notability is derived from its eccentricity; the Islamic State sets itself apart from traditionalist terrorist organizations, as their social media adeptness, territorial conquest, and recruiting techniques truly deem it a 21st century phenomenon. Trump is right to perceive the terrorist organization as a national security threat; the organization has killed nearly 1,400 people in over 90 attacksacross the world with frequent direct threats upon the United States, while operating a $2 billion war effort in the Levant.

However, the mechanism Trump has chosen to confront ISIS has been through rhetorical strategy rather than one of pure policy, using the “Clash of Civilizations” narrative by creating a social construct that blurs the lines between religious affiliation and terrorist fervor. The president has made a point in deviating from the Obama administration’s rhetoric, opting to use the phrase, “radical Islamic terrorism,” instead of “acts of terror.” The implicit choice to implement the word “Islam,” confirms Trump’s commitment to associate terrorist organizations with the a religion they misinterpret — a tactic to pose counterterrorism as a larger battle not between a government and non-state actor, but a duel between civilizations.

Such language is counterproductive in the battle against radicalized organizations in the Middle East. Characterizing the enemy as a cultural, incompatible entity is a cyclical tactic, as the same rhetoric is used in terrorist propaganda and recruiting mechanisms. Emile Nakleh, a former senior intelligence service officer and director of the Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program from the Central Intelligence Agency, has argued the avoidance of using “Islamic terrorism” is a strategic choice, as distortion of religious identity isolates necessary allies integral in the fight against terrorism.

Strategizing a New Syria

Trump’s navigation of Syria’s political vacuum will be increasingly transactional, isolating much of the humanitarian, political, and ethical entanglements that contributed to the conflict’s intractability. It has been made clear — through campaign rhetoric and the selection of cabinet members — that Donald Trump’s paramount objective in Syria is not ousting the Assad government, opposing Iran, nor rivaling Russia, but eradicating the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria from the Levant. In fact, Donald Trump perceives Iran and Russia as key partners in ousting the terrorist organization; he has erroneously stated that the Assad regime, Iran, and Russia were actively and effectively fighting ISIS in the region, when really, the forces were brutally striking separatist and moderate Sunni rebels, such as the Free Syrian Army and the Kurdish Peshmerga forces in attempt to secure the survival of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. In the process, an estimated death toll of 470,000 individuals have been counted in Aleppo under Russian-Syrian army bombings and series of chemical weapons attacks. The possibility that American policy will sacrifice deposing a regime guilty of innumerable war crimes in exchange for regional support in the fight against terrorism signals a pivot from the multi-faceted framework of the previous administration, to one that is purely politically strategic in its Huntingtonian campaign.

By framing the Islamic world as a civilization in and of itself, Trump isolates the humanitarian strife that the previous presidential administration and liberal institutions sought to recognize. Such a tactic was exemplified in the administration’s controversial executive order, “Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States.” The intentional ambiguity of the order’s language enabled the ‘clash’ to emerge in airports across the United States — refugees and visa-holders from seven predominantly Muslim countries were barred from entry, with the exception to persecuted Christians. While the order did not specifically reference Muslims, it still employed Huntington’s theory through intentional interpretation of Islam as a threatening ‘civilization,’ rather than religious identity. Uniformly casting Muslim refugees and immigrants under the broader guise of national security threats, Trump masterfully succeeded in using the ‘clash’ to his advantage.

Conclusion

The year 2017 presents many questions to both American constituents and the international community. The rise of right-wing populism in the West, the acceleration of kleptocracy in receding democratic governments, the transformation of Syria’s civil conflict into a globalized quandary, and the impending collapse of post-war, liberal institutions have begun to deconstruct what we know as the international liberal order. The largest phenomenon of last year was the presidential success of Donald J. Trump, who now occupies the most precious, precarious office in the world. Trump’s American presidency will create great reverberations around the international community, but will particularly shape and embolden a new Middle East. The contemporary Middle East will continue to confront its disarray; postcolonial recovery from imperial exploitation, manipulation of indigenous resources and identities, tension between nationalism and fallacious Sykes-Picot borders, and violent extremism. Just as in the past, American foreign policy will continue to struggle with the weighty complexity the Middle East presents them, but the adoption of Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” will only exacerbate the region’s conflicts, not alleviate them.

The Middle East and the U.S. Invasion of Iraq: What Does Theory Tell Us?

The study of international relations presents a multitude of opportunities to make sense of the world through a variety of lenses; each lens is a different theoretical perspective. Neorealism is time and time again regarded as the most useful theoretical perspective through which to understand the international relations of the Middle East. This paper argues that while neorealism is one of the most prominent theories through which scholars can make sense of the Middle East, it is not a total prescription. The discussion will address what neorealism is, the role it plays in understanding the Middle East, as well as the underlying weaknesses of the theory. Through a case study analysis, this discussion will highlight existing gaps in the neorealist interpretation of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and suggest additional theoretical perspectives to consider for understanding the international relations of the Middle East.

The theory of neorealism offers a framework for understanding the system of international relations by analyzing recurring patterns of state behavior and interactions among states. Coined in 1979 by Kenneth Waltz in Theory of International Politics, neorealism addresses the biggest issues in international relations, including, but not limited to war and the avoidance of war, power balancing and seeking, the death of states, security competition, and alliance formation. The effects of the structure of neorealism serve as the distinctive element between this theory and others.

Neorealism is best understood in two parts. The first is that of the ordering principle of the international system—anarchy. Anarchy in a neorealist context implies that there is no authority higher than the states; states are autonomous, individualist in origin, and embedded in a “self-help” system where the fundamental objective is survival. Involvement in the system of international politics is dependent solely on the state best serving its national interests. The problem Waltz associates with this line of thought is the need to conceive of an order without an orderer. The second part of the theory is in relation to the structure of international politics. Each state structure is definedby its distribution of capabilities, or power. According to neorealists, the structure of anarchy is exogenous to statehood. In other words, states seek to maximize their power relative to others, precisely because there is no higher authority. Therefore, the balance of power of the system changes as the distribution of capabilities of each state change. Despite this, there is a system of checks and balances in place that is useful for understanding the changes observed throughout history in alliances across the international political system.

Neorealist theory can be used to understand the Middle East—a region of volatile politics and constant shifting of alliances to achieve a specific set of domestic economic goals. The historical record of the Middle East discloses four key areas of focus with regard to the origins of alliances. First, Middle Eastern states, as a part of the international system, face external threats. And, these threats most frequently are the cause of international alliances. Second, balancing is more common than bandwagoning. Balancing refers to the allying of states against prevailing threats; bandwagoning is defined as the alignment of states with the source of danger, or threat. Recognizing this, it is important to draw attention to the neorealist framework’s contention that as hegemons overextend themselves, their misuse of power provokes a balancing act against them. Third, states go beyond balancing against power to balance against threats. Simply put, in the same way that states are differentiated by how much power they possess, states are differentiated by the threats they emanate and those they overcome. Fourth, the likelihood of states joining forces is intensified as offensive capabilities and intentions increase. It should be noted that neorealist theory is not the first to draw attention to the study of alliances in the Middle East, particularly those founded in the premise of protection against threats. The Eastern Question, termed in 1820, refers to the study of the interrelationships between two unequal power systems: The European Great Powers and the Ottoman Empire. The Eastern Question is significant because the penetration of the Middle East’s involvement with Europe is understood to have affected the nature of politics in the region today. In a broader scope the diplomacy of the Eastern Question refers to the political considerations and strategic competition that reflects a self-help system characterized by the distribution of capabilities and national interests. As this analysis moves forward, the four key areas of the origins of alliances will be applied to the case study under examination—the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.

It must be clearly articulated that there are weaknesses pertaining to neorealist theory. Realism which predated neorealism serves as a foundation for the latter theory and contends that states are interested in security and the maximization of power. When applying this line of thought to the Middle East, one limitation is particularly evident: this is a misrepresentation of the region. This is true for two reasons. First, the Middle East’s geopolitics differ from other regions of the world, given its territorial vastness and proximity to natural resources. The ideological perspective used to understand Middle Eastern geopolitics, and what is often times called the “anti-hegemonic approach,” stresses examining the interests, as well as the social and political composition of the region and states. A perspective grounded in ideology is necessary for obtaining a holistic understanding of how Middle Eastern states and the people within them regardinternational relations and the choices they make.

Second, there exists a variety of cultural perspectives that have proven useful in analyzing the Middle East—something neorealism does not account for. A constructivist perspective makes evident that state behavior and interaction is based on cultures in the sense of ideas, norms, and experiences. In examining that neorealism emphasizes motives of national security, power, and resources, a certain blindness is made apparent: there are culturally embedded aspects to these motivations. This will be further explained when assessing the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. For now, the takeaway from this discussion of the remaining weaknesses in neorealist theory is that due to analytic uncertainty and varying conceptual weaknesses neorealism cannot fully explain the international relations of the Middle East.

To evaluate why neorealism is not a full prescription of the politics of the Middle East this analysis focuses on the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. The discussion will shift to an examination of the existing gaps that can be corrected by alternative international relations theories after illustrating the neorealist interpretation of the motivations behind the invasion. The complexity of the case study merits an analysis that engages critically with the scholarship of the politics of the region.

Principally, a brief history of the role of the states involved in this case study will aid in the interpretation of the theoretical perspectives outlined below. Iraq’s role and influence in the Middle East is rooted in geography given the state is at the crossroads of the two principal population fault lines in the region. Moreover, the demographics of Iraq are significant due to the fact that the state lies between its smaller oil-rich Gulf neighbors and Iran. Economically, Iraq’s oil reserves were among the top-five largest in the world prior to the U.S. invasion. Collectively, autonomy of the Iraqi state to secure dominance over its population and its interest in extending its power to project it onto the Gulf area was evident. Therefore, regardless of which theoretical perspective is being considered, this paper contends that the 2003 invasion was focused on breaking the domestic and regional autonomy of the Iraqi state.

The political instability of Iraq did not emerge overnight. In the years leading up to the invasion of the Iraqi state, the authoritarian Ba’athist government marked Iraq with a narrative of “exclusivity, communal mistrust, patronage, and the exemplary use of violence.” In August of 1990, Saddam Hussein orderedIraqi forces to invade Kuwait with the purpose of achieving nationalist goals. The U.S. viewed this encroachment as problematic and committed itself to reinstating the status quo in Iraq. As a means of achieving the status quo, the international political system sought to impose order and limit the Iraqi states’ capabilities. Two U.N. Security Council Resolutions are important—687 and 688, both of which forged international alliances, while rendering the most intense imposition of sanctions against one state in history. Saddam Husain’s failure to comply with these resolutions, among others, led the U.S. to assume a military role in the international political system. The U.S. invasion of Iraq was in an attempt to rectify one of the central drivers of instability in the Middle East.

According to neorealism, the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 can be interpreted as follows. As a global hegemon, the U.S. similar to any other state was in search of power and security. Given the recent events of September 11, 2001, the U.S. was in desperate need of avoiding decline. As a means of maintaining global hegemony, the U.S. demonstrated its will to use force by disregarding the lack of approval on behalf of the U.N. Security Council and invading Iraq in March of 2003.

The national interest for the U.S. of invading Iraq can be summed up with three objectives: territorial, economic, and military. In this case, the U.S. was interested in: (1) gaining regional military bases; (2) securing its access to oil resources; and (3) avoiding the nuclear proliferation of Iraq as a means of eliminating a prevailing threat to the U.S. and its allies. But there remain other interests that were of importance to the U.S. that led to the invasion of Iraq. The neorealist theory creates a gap, an inability, to explain these interests.

The reasons as to why neorealism is not a total prescription of the international relations of Middle East is twofold. First, there is a noteworthy identity politics component that led to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Second, in order to understand alliances in the international political system during this time, identity must be first considered. Alternative international relations theories will be useful for the discussion of the aforementioned reasons.

Identity politics offers a good starting point. The events of September 11, 2001 left the U.S. in a state of “vulnerability, victimization, and national desire for revenge.” These three aspects of national and cultural identity should be regarded as a part of the Bush Administration’s decision for the invasion. When these ideological influences are coupled with the Orientalist images that flooded the media after the September 11 attacks, it becomes clearer that the differentiating between Arab and Muslim states and assessing their immediate threat became less of a necessity and more of a tool of deception. What was believed as an imminent Iraqi threat to U.S. security attributed to the suspected evidence of the Iraqi state manufacturing weapons of mass destruction, resulted in the unveiling of a fallacy. If not of most importance, however, was President George W. Bush’s “vendetta against Saddam Hussein” and personal desire to be “greater” than his father ever was. As the Bush Administration constructed interests and threats to mislead public opinion, the identity politics of the U.S. prevailed—decisions were made on the premise of emotions, actions were taken on the belief in fabricated evidence, and the distribution of capabilities among states became a personal matter.

Second, to warrant the argument in the context of the international political system, it is significant to consider state identity in alliance formation; identity being a moot point in neorealist theory and alliances being at the core of the international political system and a pillar of neorealism. Critics of neorealism explain that while neorealism focuses on the capabilities of the state in determining alliance formation, it fails to consider state identity as a factor that shapes the choice of alliance partners. In particular, when it comes to strategic association in the interest of the state, a shared interest is simply not enough. Instead, it is a shared identity that encourages attraction and mutual identification. It is the “language of community rather than the contractual language of alliance” that captures strategic association. In the case of the Middle East, generally speaking, inter-Arab politics are driven by ideational rather than materialist forces, but more specifically in alliance formation.

Thus, it is the politics of identity, more so than the logic of anarchy, that offers a stronger conceptualization of which states are viewed as a threat to the security of other states. Neoconservative U.S. President George W. Bush, at the time of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, adhered to the principal that democracies fear attack from non-democracies. Therefore, when considering alliances and the identity politics of strategic association, neoconservative theory should be applied to the analysis of the U.S.’s invasion of Iraq; neoconservatism is a factor that contributed to the West’s perception of Iraq as a threat. While this consideration too is not a complete prescription of the international relations of the Middle East, it is a necessary point of contention when analyzing the international political system.

This essay challenges the notion that neorealism is considered to represent the most useful theoretical perspective through which to understand the international relations of the Middle East. At its root, neorealism is a competition of power among states in the international political system by which the ordering principle of anarchy explains outcomes in international politics. The criticism of this theoretical perspective is made clear—ideology and identity are disregarded. For while each state is autonomous, its demographic makeup, institutional policies, and national interests may vary in relation to other states. Each of these variables aid in the understanding of capability, and also action. To illustrate the diversity of the international political system, given that there are many explanations and variables regarding the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the discussion above emphasizes that one single analysis is not a total prescription due to gaps within a neorealist theoretical perspective. Theories such as constructivism and neo-conservativism, respectively offer an ideological and identity based approach to international politics and the actions of independent states within the system. In so far as the basis for international relations is to take into account multiple points of view; indeed, all situations will require a blending of theories and perspectives.

Al-Qaeda’s Looming Operational Comeback: Why al-Qaeda is Still More Dangerous Than the Islamic State

The Islamic State is currently the hot topic in regards to global terrorism, surpassing the infamous al-Qaida, and for good reason. Al-Qaeda has been slowly diminishing in power, and the death of key leaders, including such notable personalities such as Osama bin Laden, Anwar al-Awlaki, and Nasir al-Wuhayshi, as a result of United States drone strikes and special operations raids, have been a huge factor towards this. Also adding to the overshadowing of al-Qaeda is the fact that the Islamic State’s brand of violence is sensational and captures violence in a way that al-Qaeda hasn’t. While al-Qaeda has conducted its fair share of gruesome and public executions (mostly through recorded beheadings), the Islamic State has done that and much more. The violence of the Islamic State crosses boundaries, literally and figuratively. However, this status is temporary. Al-Qaeda is set to make a comeback once the Islamic State fails, and indeed the Islamic State’s failure is inevitable, leaving its legacy and existence short lived. Territory that was previously gained is now being lost at a steady pace, and the groups funding is becoming more and more difficult to find. The Islamic State’s recent and sudden rise to fame came very quickly, setting upon the global stage seemingly out of nowhere. Al-Qaeda, on the other hand, has been operational for almost 30 years, and its fame and notoriety was brought about through literally decades of determination and commitment. The very nature of the group as a whole has enables al-Qaeda to remain formidable, and because of this, al-Qaeda will again become the most dangerous international terrorist organization in the coming years.

First, it is necessary to acknowledge the histories of the two organizations and their relationship with each other. Al-Qaeda has its origins in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Osama bin Laden was one of many Salafist Jihadists who traveled to Afghanistan in order to fight with the Mujahedeen, a loosely organized affiliation of Jihadists all wishing to fight the Soviet invaders and the Soviet-supported Afghanistan government. Learning from his experiences from fighting with the Mujahedeen, bin Laden sought to permanently change the way Jihad was fought.

By targeting the Western nations that continue to prop up the corrupt or un-Islamic governments throughout the Middle East, the “Far Enemy” (as bin Laden referred to them) would eventually lose interest in meddling with Middle Eastern affairs and withdraw their support from the governments there. The “apostate” governments that plagued Muslims throughout the world would inevitably fall, paving the way for another great Islamic Empire and a new political order, akin to the global political environment of the 7thcentury. His answer on how to make this happen was the creation of a small, elite force of Jihadist fighters who would conduct the necessary attacksthat would help topple these governments. In 1988, bin Laden gathered his followers from the Mujahedeen and created al-Qaeda, which literally translates to “the base,” referring to their Salafist ideological desire to return the Muslim world to a political order based on what they view as Islam’s fundamental roots. It wasn’t until the mid-1990s that bin Laden refocused al-Qaeda to start conducting attacks solely against Western targets.

The Islamic State has its origins as a Jordanian militant jihadist organization by the name of Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, or JTJ. The group was founded in 1999 by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who later focused the group’s attention to Iraq after the U.S invasion in 2003. Zarqawi, already an associate of bin Laden from their time together in Afghanistan, eventually pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden and officially changed the group’s name to al-Qaeda in Iraq, or AQI. This new partnership allowed al-Qaeda to more effectively organize and conduct attacks as part of the growing insurgency in Iraq.

It wasn’t long, however, before friction between the two groups began to arise, despite Zarqawi’s pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda. Severe ideological differences and conflicts began to plague the relationship soon after the alliance was formed. Bin Laden wished for Zarqawi to focus solely on attacking government and Western targets in Iraq, particularly the United States. However, Zarqawi insisted on creating a massive sectarian conflict in Iraq by targeting “apostate” Shia Muslims as well. While not completely counter to his own ideology, bin Laden thought that this tactic was counterproductive to the more immediate goals of the organization and would eventually lead to a drop in popular support.

In January 2006, Zarqawi initiated the merger between AQI and another large insurgent faction, the Mujahedeen Shura Council, which was itself a collection of various Sunni militias. The merger greatly increased AQI’s capabilities and manpower, but also made the group an even larger target. The following June, Zarqawi was killed by a U.S airstrike. The previous leader of the Mujahedeen Shura Council, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, and an Egyptian born al-Qaida veteran, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, both took over as the new leaders of AQI and renamed the organization the Islamic State of Iraq, or ISI. When they were both killed in the same U.S ground operation in April 2010, a prominent yet reserved jihadist named Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took over, taking on the daunting (and increasingly dangerous) role of keeping the group functional and focused despite huge setbacks. Soon after the Syrian Civil War broke out in 2011, ISI expanded operations into Syria as well, changing the name of the organization once more into the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS, with al-Baghdadi declaring himself the Caliph, the sole authority of Islam on earth. It was in this expansion that Al-Baghdadi’s leadership conflicts within al-Qaeda reached a climax. Al-Zawahiri, the successor to bin Laden, cut all ties with ISIS after al-Baghdadi refused to disband the organization and fall in line behind the al-Nusra Front, the primary al-Qaeda organization operating in Syria. In response, al-Baghdadi declared al-Nusra as yet one more enemy to be fought.

Aside from ideological disparities, operational differences also played a role in the rift between the two organizations. Al-Qaeda remains focusedon targeting the Far Enemy and striving for collective unity amongst jihadist groups, hoping that this will lead to the eventual collapse of corrupt apostate regimes. The Islamic State, on the other hand, views itself as a leader among other jihadist organizations and seeks to obtain actual territorial ground and exert influence organically while directly targeting apostate regimes on the battlefield.

This involves not only a more conventional kind of warfare, but also extremely sensational violence to set itself apart from other jihadist groups. Shia Muslims, Yazidi’s, Christians, and other ethnic and religious minorities were all victims (and still are) of this new approach, suffering a brutal genocide that plagued any territory under ISIS control. Multitudes of Iraqi government workers were executed. Thousands of captured Iraqi soldiers were blindfolded, marched to a field, and massacred all at once. Suspected homosexuals were forced to leap off of multiple story buildings. Women were shot in the street without hesitation for suspected prostitution, or even for merely wearing red, and were tortured for breastfeeding in public. Minority women, when they weren’t killed with their families, were sold into sex slavery. Children were crucified for taking pictures or having phones. A captured Jordanian pilot was locked in a cage and set on fire. All of these atrocious incidents and more are confirmation of the truly outstanding sensational violence that distinguishes ISIS from other like-minded groups. Even al-Qaida, a group which infamously conducted the single most sensational act of terrorist violence the world has ever witnessed on September 11th, 2001, were put off by these practices and admonished them for being too extreme.

Aside from the Middle East, the Islamic State has been able to successfully conduct attacks throughout Europe. The multiple deadly attacks in France and Belgium illustrate the Islamic State’s goal of also targeting the Far Enemy. However, there is a key distinction to be made here. Al-Qaeda’s reasoning for targeting the West is ultimately more political than the motivations for the Islamic State. While al-Qaeda attacks the U.S and Europe in order to convince the West to stop attacking Islam and meddling in Middle Eastern affairs, the Islamic State’s motivations are more religious in nature and are actually meant to provoke the West into persecuting and attacking Muslims, which they believe will create the conditions necessary to bring about the prophesized apocalypse. Regardless, both motivations and strategies rely on only a small number of operational cells and radicalized lone wolves.

Attempting to wage a conventional war means that the Islamic State must be able to capture and hold territory, as well as maintain a continuous source of funding. Although the Islamic State has the ability to directly tax residents in its territory and have its own oil trade thanks to its seizure of strategic oil fields, these sources of funding hinge on the Islamic State’s ability to hold territory for a prolonged period of time. So when land or cities are lost, so is funding. And with the exception of early successes, the Islamic State is quickly losing its grip on important territory. Pressure from the U.S-led coalition airstrikes and special operations actions, as well as the gaining momentum and successes of the Iraqi Army and Kurdish forces, are slowly dwindling the Islamic State’s control. As territory continues to be lost and resources run dry, the Islamic State will have to revert back to unconventional warfare. Members will go underground, blend back into society, and continue to plot deadly terrorist attacks. Recent trends show that this is already beginning to happen.

Since al-Qaeda is already operating in the underground realm in many of the same regions as the Islamic State, it is able to take advantage of an already established and effective operational flow, which itself is boosted by the decreased competition due to the Islamic State’s decline. To fund its operations, al-Qaeda relies primarily on international donors, ransoms, charity scams, and other miscellaneous financial crimes. While this may not add up to much, al-Qaeda’s decentralized nature actually limits the fallback from this, as many al-Qaeda cells depend on personal relationships and other forms of self-funding. As Islamic State fighters continue to face both operational and financial defeats, many of them will eventually gravitate towards al-Qaeda and take advantage of its willingness to work with other groups, involving themselves in these underground networks. Over time, they will eventually commit and defect back towards al-Qaeda.

Not only that, but al-Qaeda is doing more to win the “hearts and minds” of the Muslim population. This is best exemplified by the drastically different approaches the two organizations have taken in operations across the Middle East. When the Islamic State was destroying ancient Syrian temples and smashing timeless pieces of art, the al-Qaeda affiliated al-Nusra Front opened up a “Relief Department,” helping to provide food, healthcare, and even children’s playgrounds to the Syrian people affected by the civil war. When al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, acquired an additional $100 million through a bank robbery in Yemen, they used the money to improve the infrastructure and eliminate taxes for the Yemeni citizens living under their control.

Al-Qaeda could have very easily invested that money to fund a large sensational attack, as the Islamic State has done, but instead used it to improve the lives of Muslims. Al-Qaeda recognizes the value of winning the hearts and minds of people who may be wary of giving support to an overt terrorist organization. The Islamic State, on the other hand, is largely in the practice of mass executing those who do not immediately pledge support and allegiance to their self-proclaimed Caliph.

Despite recent operational hindrances, al-Qaeda strives on and remains determined to conduct attacks around the globe, and is seeing some successes. Operations in the Arabian Peninsula are ongoing and successful. AQAP has successfully been exploiting the current conflict in Yemen with little to no resistance, while also continuing to build public support as a legitimate source of governance in an otherwise unstable country.

Operations in Syria are steadfast, despite constant engagement with multiple formidable opponents including the Islamic State, the Syrian Government, various Syrian rebel groups, Iranian-backed militias, and Russian and American airstrikes. The al-Nusra Front has displayed excellent organization as well as operational and logistical prowess at a level that the Islamic State fails to match, and exhibited the ability to attract support and cooperation from groups who do not necessarily agree with its ideology.

In Africa, new surges in recruitment and a violent wave of attacks in Libya and Tunisia show an increase in capabilities and gaining momentum in the region. Al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda affiliated organizations, such as al-Shabaab, are conducting a steady stream of attacks on government officials throughout other parts of Africa, particularly in Somalia and Kenya. Competition with Islamic State affiliated organizations, such as Boko Haram, is existent but dwindling as the Islamic State loses its ability to send support to such factions. Al-Qaeda has even begun to exhibit limited cooperation and pooling of resources with Boko Haram and al-Shabaab, further increasing their own capabilities.

Al-Qaeda’s structure and strategy has always been decentralized, especially since 9/11. This poses operational challenges, but the group has been able to overcome them despite leadership failures. It also serves as a strength, and helps the group maintain longevity. Unlike the Islamic State, al-Qaeda has never attempted to claim an exclusive authority on global Jihad, but rather seeks to act as a unifier of jihadist groups towards a common goal. Some of these groups, like AQAP or AQI, currently use or have used the “al-Qaeda” brand name. Others, such as al-Shabaab, do not, and were even instructed by bin Laden not to adopt the name, as an attempt to avert Western attention.

Another example of this is when al-Zawahiri sanctioned Jabhat al-Nusra’s official split from al-Qaeda as part of a deliberate global strategy. Operationally, this split did nothing. The relationship still exists and al-Qaeda still functionally acts as a supporter to Jabhat al-Nusra, which has recently rebranded itself and changed its name to Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. This was done purposefully as an attempt to thwartinternational attention since it is no longer “officially” linked to al-Qaeda.

However, because of the rebranding, other small groups that are fighting the Syrian government may now be more willing to create pacts and align themselves with the group. This complements the already existing attitude among these Syrian groups that the al-Qaeda affiliated organization is much more inclusive, cooperative, and easier to work with than the Islamic State. This speaks towards the heart of and truly exemplifies al-Qaeda’s broad global strategy: unify jihadists everywhere in order to effectively dismantle the apostate regimes. The Islamic State’s more forceful and conquering strategy is starkly different.

As ISIS falters and loses credibility as the mantle of global Jihad, al-Qaeda will jump at the opportunity to reap any benefits to be had. Financiers, foreign fighters, and radicalized recruits will begin to turn their attention towards al-Qaeda once more. Al-Zawahiri certainly isn’t as charismatic or adept a leader as bin Laden, but the decentralized nature of the organization limits any direct fallout from this. Al-Qaeda has essentially transformed itself into a series of loosely organized movements fighting under the al-Qaeda name. And because of the broad disposition of al-Qaeda’s ideology, nearly every independent movement is able to align itself with al-Qaeda very easily.

The United States and its allies have mostly focused efforts on the Islamic State, and while they maybe haven’t completely ignored al-Qaeda as a threat, it certainly seems that way. While this is understandable, it’s also a mistake. Al-Qaeda has benefited from the distracted attention generated by the obnoxious activities of the Islamic State. The Islamic State certainly remains a critical threat to stability in the Middle East and U.S interests abroad, but it is al-Qaeda that remains the greater danger against the United States homeland. Their determination to strike at the Far Enemy, their willingness to pool resources and cooperate with other terrorist groups, and their projected growing capability to do so, puts al-Qaeda in a prime position to strike.

The Islamic State is indeed an extremely violent organization and remains a serious threat to global security, and deadly attacks in France, Belgium, Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan, and elsewhere are testament to its determination to wage Jihad despite setbacks on its home front in Iraq and Syria. However, the future of the Islamic State looks bleak. The Islamic State is extremely intolerant of other jihadist groups if their ideology differs in any measure, and seeks to be the sole authority of Jihad, and therefore sees themselves as the only legitimate Jihadist group. Not only is this very polarizing (you are either part of the Islamic State or you are their enemy), but it eliminates the possibility of forging important alliances. This is crucial if they wish to grow and make significant expansions outside of the Middle East (and even so within the Middle East). If the momentum from the U.S-led coalition and the Iraqi Army holds, the Islamic State will continue to lose territory, popular support, resources, and manpower. Without any allies to turn to, the more moderate-leaning Islamic State fighters and leaders will take what resources they have left and eventually find their way back towards al-Qaeda and its affiliates (specifically Jabhat Fatah al-Sham), creating an even stronger and more robust al-Qaeda organization.

Al-Qaeda has been operational for almost 30 years, despite fighting two separate and prolonged wars against two different superpowers and their allies across the globe, as well as major leadership deaths and failures. As an organization, al-Qaeda isn’t going anywhere, and only seeks to benefit from the dismantling of the Islamic State. Its continued determination to strike at the Far Enemy makes this expectation even more concerning.

The Turkish Question; An Emergence of Opportunity in the Levant In The Moment of Turkish Instability

“A nation which makes the final sacrifice for life and freedom does not get beaten.” – Mustafa Kemal Atatürk

The world watched with trepidation as military tanks rolled through the streets of Ankara the night of July 15th. Within a matter of hours, soldiers once loyal to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan took the Chief of Military Staff hostage, attacked both the Turkish parliament and intelligence headquarters, exchanged gunfire in Taksim Square with loyalist forces, and commandeered media channels to announce a victorious overthrow of Erdoğan’s government. Or so it seemed.

Turkey is no stranger to military coups d’etat, having experienced four successful instances since 1960. President Erdoğan has also withstood barrages from political opponents throughout his 14-year hold on power. It has been assessed that the frequency of these strikes against the Turkish government have been somewhat of an experimental tradition in Turkey; a protection and preservation of Turkish democratic principles against minacious leaders. That said, the residuum of July’s attempt has demonstrated to the Turkish citizens President Erdoğan’s Achilles heel—a loose grip on the reins of power—and has tightened his grip on Turkey with government and military purges, a long-awaited military campaign in Iraq and Syria, souring the relationship with the European Union, agitating relations with the United States over the extradition of rival Fethullah Gülen, and a strategic pivot towards Russia in a burgeoning joint-military and energy partnership. These policy tasks in just the two months following July 15th have brought scholars and analysts to question whether the light of the once-heralded beacon of Eurasia will dim or brighten under Erdoğan’s tighter hold on power.

In this analysis, I will assess the questions that have been and should be asked during this moment of Turkish instability. These enquiries will assess Turkey’s position moving forward into a post-purge state after nearly 58,000 Turkish citizens have been deposed of their positions, as well as the country’s standing on the international stage and in regional institutions. The aftershock of Turkey’s political earthquake has proved consequential—–to the United States, the European Union, the Kurdish people, and of course, the Turkish constituents. While the achievement of internal stability will continue to ebb and flow, I predict the country will converge as a theater to play out geopolitical conflicts, and where invested actors will exploit opportune interests—particularly of the United States’ struggle in the Levant.

Purging for Prepotency; Erdoğan’s Grasp on Government

On July 15th, the Turkish nation awoke to a government shaken by force and a leader rattled by such events. In a widespread expulsion so colossal that many have considered it to be pre-conspired, Erdoğan imprisoned over 7,500 soldiers, 118 generals and admirals, 3,000 members of the Turkish judiciary, 1,500 state ministry staffers, and 100 intelligence officials. This widespread purge of lingering governmental opposition did not halt at the state level, but even seeped into the Turkish educational sector, religious institutions, and media outlets; 21,000 private school teachers, 1,577 university deans, and 100 journalists were dismissed. Of these, 9,000 remain in custody. This leaves all facets of the Turkish government and public services overwhelmingly understaffed across all fields and professions. This “counter-coup” signifies a newfound tenacity that will characterize a new era of the Erdoğan administration—one that will flex its muscle of control at home, while exercising defying the wishes of the West and appeasing the East.

Strongman rule is not new under Erdoğan. Since becoming Prime Minister in 2002, Erdoğan has been controversial in his pursuit to institute and champion political Islam in a traditionally secularpolitical system, initiating a slew of experimental reforms that exacerbated the political differences between Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), the Justice and Development Party, and other Turkish institutions of democracy. This development necessitated political partnerships, such as the alliance with a Sunni clerk, Fethullah Gülen, the founder of the Hizmet movement. Such a movement swept the nation with a message of religious tolerance and moderate policies of educational immersion and national service, prompting many followers of Gülen to become civil servants in Erdoğan’s administration. But political convenience steered the AKP, and a growing schism between Erdoğan’s political Islam and Gülen’s cultural Islam emerged, resulting in Gülen’s flight to the United States due to a rumored deposition plot and a governmental declaration deeming Gülenists a terrorist organization. In Erdoğan’s political reality, such political adversaries and connivances are commonplace—an intrinsic perspective that become intertwined with Turkey’s foreign policy platform abroad.

The NATO Question

This phenomenon has brought a series of questions to the assemblies, podiums, and cabinets of governments and regional organizations across the international system. The Turkish moment has not been taken lightly in the global order. Turkey’s relative instability, Erdoğan’s autocratic tendencies, combined with the geopolitical and strategic goldmine of Turkey’s location, is an important policy issue leaders will face in the next year.

In the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Turkey stands as the second-largest military in membership, and serves as host to 24 NATO military bases. Even before July 15th, Turkey’s membership had been criticized of its failure to uphold the principles of the Treaty’s first preambulatory clause that mandates members have “stable democratic systems, pursue the peaceful settlement of territorial and ethnic disputes, have good relations with their neighbours, show commitment to the rule of law and human rights, establish democratic and civilian control of their armed forces, and have a market economy.”

Erdoğan’s policies have had a dangerous downward trajectory in protecting constituents’ human rights, with intense discriminatory policiestowards ethnic minorities and a reputation for quashing freedom of expression and assembly. Erdoğan’s discriminatory policies towards the Kurdish people, an ethnic minority dispersed throughout Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, have been reported to infringe on the rights and lives of the Kurdish people, including disproportionate charges on the basis of supposed “terrorist motives.”

Yet despite the series of perceived violations, the July 15th attack on the Incirlik air-base has become a fulcrum for NATO’s concerns about the Turkish military’s durability and their adherence to the treaty. The Incirlik base has been an invaluable asset in both the U.S. European Command and U.S. Central Command, as well as the anti-ISIS coalition’s fight in Syria and Iraq. The base is a bulwark  in assisting air defense missions and generates significant intelligence cooperation with NATO allies, especially the United States. The base’s operations against Daesh were shut down as well as its commercial power and airspace the night of the attempted coup. Along with a five-day power outage, ten Incirlik officers and their commander, General Bekir Ercan Van, were detained in suspected coordination with anti-Erdoğan soldiers. While the base has regained power and operations have recommenced, the events of July 15th will continue to call into question NATO’s reliance on the security of their own bases in Turkey and cause NATO members to second-guess Turkey’s strategic capability under such an unstable political system. An air base forced to operate with backup generators while continuing to wage war against Daesh without access to their airspace is an inept one, which will pressure NATO into rethinking their reliance on Turkey.

This shift in relations between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Turkey is not equivalent to suspension or expulsion, contrary to the arrayof experts calling for the removal of Turkey as a NATO member. In fact, there is no official process or protocol of discharge regarding a member state within the NATO structure. Even if the organization were to establish a mechanism of expulsion, Turkey is too great a strategic treasure for such a consideration; Turkey is perched in the crossroads of the East and West; between NATO and its adversary, Russia, and between the Middle East and Europe.

The Turkish Moment Bears Inestimable Opportunity

How will the North Atlantic Treaty Organization deal with an incalculable Turkey? One scenario will involve maneuvering, rather than containing, Turkey’s recent shift towards Russia. Both countries recently struck a renewed energy and military partnership in St. Petersburg, after a chilled six months of stalled relations and sanctions. Moreover, NATO members can either reinforce strained relations by deterring Turkish European Union candidacy and further deliberation surrounding the question of Turkey’s NATO membership. Alternatively, NATO could incorporate the recovered Turkish-Russian relationship into their fight against Daesh in Syria and Iraq. Many have perceived this renewed alliance as a betrayal of Turkey’s responsibilities to NATO, as well as an example of Russian encroachment upon a vulnerable political system and paranoid leader. Yet, I argue that this is not a lost cause, but rather an unwonted opportunity.

President Vladimir Putin has provided military support to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, a policy fundamentally divergent from the United States and its allies, there has been rare proof of limited western-Russian cooperation against Daesh bears fruit. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254 established a tentative timeline that incorporated U.S., Russian, and foreign cooperation, urging “all states to use their influence with the government of Syria and the Syrian opposition to advance the peace process.” A failed 48-hour ceasefire sought to accomplish just that, brokered between the United States and Russian forces in Syria that attempted humanitarian assistance and civilian evacuation for nearly 275,000 people without the disruption of strikes from the Syrian government, Free Syrian Army, Syrian Democratic Forces, and foreign forces. The violation of the ceasefire and the continuation of airstrikes in Aleppo has emerged as a strained point of contention for the United States and Russia in both militaristic and diplomatic spheres. But cooperation is still a necessary feat in Syria, even after animosity between the two superpowers. The Obama administration extended a hand to Moscow this past year, with a proposed air campaign combatting Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, formally the al-Nusra Syrian branch of al-Qaeda, in addition to joint air-strikes expunging Daesh from its stronghold in Raqqa. From the established Russian front in Northwestern Syria and Turkey’s northern position, the United States and its allies could arrange a strategic operation that targets Daesh from its western stronghold in Palmyra to the East in Markadeh. No individualized military effort could accomplish such a feat in the region.

Russia’s position in Syria is one of immense strength and, while the United States’ presence has been felt in the Levant, Putin has greater leverage with Iran and the dormant Syrian government. Scholars Gordan Adams and Stephen Walt have advocated this as well, reiterating that no single power can defeat Daesh nor establish political stability in Syria. A united international coalition against the Islamic State continues to flounder without Russia’s presence, and will continue to as the Levant unravels into political pandemonium. Yet collaboration does not guarantee Assad’s deposition from power, just as cooperation with Erdoğan does not ensure Turkish avoidance of attacking Kurdish Peshmerga fighters in Syria and Iraq. It will be the United States’ responsibility to make the precarious decision whether to take a sensitive, but necessary step in their fight against Daesh.

Conclusion

This past summer, Turkey became a Eurasian flashpoint that marked a new wave of uncertainty towards the cohesion of their political system, the dependability of their military and NATO membership, and the respect of their constituents as a democratic institution. These questions will persist, as Erdoğan enforces his paranoia through stringent reforms and purges of officials. The entry of Turkey into the war against Daesh too sends a message of strength; President Erdoğan strives to grip power tightly as his administration recovers from an ill-fated coup attempt against him.

Yet while the global order has reason to lament over a clear shift in Turkish foreign policy, the moment of Turkish instability presents as many opportunities as it does challenges. A renewed energy and joint-military partnership struck between Erdoğan and Putin in St. Petersburg can serve as an opened door to the United States and NATO allies in their fight against Daesh in the Levant. International coalitions against the terrorist organization have proven weak and lacking in unity, and while the scarce cooperative efforts between the two hegemonic powers have not yielded success, U.S.-Russian collaboration could be the key to securing the Levant from Daesh.

Understanding The Bellicosity of Israel’s Defense Policy

Israel is a state that inspires passionate debate, particularly surrounding its use of force, or, more specifically, its willingness to use violent force as a first option, as they perhaps most controversially did at the start of the Six-Day War. In early June of 1967, Israel responded to Arab troop build-ups with an effective pre-emptive strike against Egyptian airfields, launching what is now known as the “Six-Day War.” International law, however, is murky on whether or not pre-emptive strikes are legal.

What could explain this bellicose military policy? Israel is far from a universally-accepted state, and thus has little political capital to spare on controversial military endeavors. This article proposes that the most fruitful way to comprehend the military policies of Israel is to utilize the theory of Constructivism. When using the lens of Constructivism, outsiders can peer into the Israeli, and Jewish, zeitgeist. The roots of Israeli military policy are found in the ways in which Jews, and thus the Israeli military establishment, understand certain threats. Due to the threat perception of the Israeli military establishment, the international system is viewed as a Realist one, suggesting that existential threats can only be circumvented through the accumulation of power, and the willingness to use it. While it is beyond the scope of this article to either defend or criticize Israeli bellicosity, reaching a peaceful solution to the cleavages plaguing the Israel versus Palestine paradigm is dependent upon understanding the zeitgeists of all involved factions.

Constructivism: Understanding Israel’s View Of Threats Through Stories, Violence, and Oppression

Constructivism is a theory of international relations positing that international actors “construct” their own identities and realities. The experiences, stories, and history of a people create a shared identity and a perceived context around different situations. In the political sphere, these constructed identities and perceptions synthesize to generate policies. To a nation, such as Israel, that possesses a history and identity imbued with persecution, less severe threats, such as a one-off stabbing, are viewed existentially, demanding decisive and oftentimes, destructive, action.

One example of Constructivism’s usefulness as an explanatory tool concerns the different attitudes toward intra-European war during the 1900s. Prior to World War II, war in Europe was the product of intense nationalism, realpolitik and imperial ambitions. After the horror of World War II shocked European society, new initiatives to integrate European states ensued because Europeans realized that they could not continue on such a destructive and divisive path. The constructed realities of nationalism and the subsequent warmongering gave way to the new realities of a fully-integrated community of European nations with the establishment of the European Union, forming a new body politic. The change from frequent wars to a genuine attempt at perpetual peace in Europe is best understood through Constructivism. An appreciation of different viewpoints and zeitgeists provides us with an explanatory model of an actor’s actions.

Understanding Israel’s actions in 1967 is predicated on acknowledging the recent and painful history of Jews and how it informs the state’s military policies. The modern Israeli state is an ideological project, one created to provide a safe space for the Jewish people to prosper away from the existential threats that have historically tended to plague them. One of the fathers of Zionism, Theodore Herzl, promulgates in his famous pamphlet, Der Judenstaat (translated literally: The State of The Jews), notions of anti-Semitism as hatred of the Jews as a nation, not a religion or culture. In other words, to the wave of 1800s anti-Semites, Judaism was a biological race, not simply a religion. This new wave of hatred peaked with the Holocaust, in which the Nazis systematically murdered approximately six million Jews (as well as millions of others).

Yet, the Holocaust was not the only instance or type of recent anti-Semitism Jews experienced. Consider the Kishinev Pogrom of 1903, in which drunken rioters murdered 49 Jews and destroyed the Jewish quarter. In 1905, rioters killed or wounded 66 Jews and looted 125 Jewish owned homes and businesses in the Dnepropetrovsk Pogrom. The Dreyfus Affair in 1894 highlighted a less violent form of anti-Semitism, in which implicit biases against Jews forced the perception that they were inherently treasonous criminals. Jewish-French army captain Alfred Dreyfus was falsely accused and punished for revealing sensitive information to Germany. In 1893, Karl Leuger founded the anti-Semitic “Christian Social Party,” and became the mayor of Vienna. Leuger and the Christian Social Party’s political success brought anti-Semitism into the mainstream of political thought, normalizing extreme individuals such as Georg Ritter von Schonerer, who held a young Adolf Hitler as an ardent follower. The synthesis of anti-Semitic politics with the encouraged violence of the pogroms created a seriously inhospitable atmosphere for Jews. Yet, Jews were not altogether unaccustomed to such antagonism and, in many ways, the stories created in the time preceding this new race based anti-Semitism helped to inform the ways in which Jews, and eventually Israelis, perceived threats.

Several Jewish holidays either commemorate or mourn Jews who overcame or succumbed to genocide, diaspora, and enslavement. Purim, Passover, Sukkot, Hannukah, and Yom HaShoah are all concerned with different, and violent, events in Jewish history. The synthesis of the stories with the all-too-recent memories of oppression and genocide in the 1800s and 1900s facilitates the view that any threat is an existential threat to either the Jewish identity or Jewish lives.

Purim is a holiday that celebrates the defeat of Persian Prime Minister Haman. Haman had ordered all of the component nations living in the Persian Empire to bow to him, and when the leader of the Jews, Mordechai, refused, Haman sentenced all Jews to death. The emperor of Persia, however, was married to a Jew (unbeknownst to him), and when this information came to light, Haman was executed. According to this story, ancient Jews had successfully circumvented their genocide through strategic planning and clever manipulation of court politics.

Passover concerns the escape of Jewish slaves from Egypt. As the story goes, Egypt had enslaved Jews for many years, forcing them to build pyramids and lavish palaces for the Pharaohs while living in squalor. Moses, who eventually became one of the Jewish leaders, brought a message to the Pharaoh from God. When the Pharaoh refused to emancipate his Jewish slaves, God sent ten plagues, culminating in the deaths of Egyptian first-born sons. After the Pharaoh’s son died, he freed the Jewish slaves (only to chase them through the desert immediately after). Jewish slaves were able obtain freedom through the use of overwhelming force in the form of plagues. In the aftermath of Jewish emancipation from Egypt, the former slaves wandered the Sinai desert for 40 years, living as nomads. This diaspora is remembered through the holiday Sukkot, in which Jews are encouraged to sleep and eat in huts covered in branches in remembrance of their stateless history, placing further emphasis on the need for a home in which Jews may permanently and safely live.

Hanukkah commemorates the success of a violent guerrilla movement, called The Maccabees, over the Syrian-Greek Seleucid Dynasty, who ruled the land that became Israel. The Seleucids attempted to Hellenize the Jews, converting them to their religion and destroying Jewish holy places, especially the Grand Temple in Jerusalem. Antiochus, the leader of The Seleucids, was wary of an indigenous guerrilla movement and sent a general named Apolonius, along with (roughly) 40,000 soldiers, to eliminate the threat. Judah, the leader of the Maccabees, responded defiantly, stating “Let us fight to the death in defense of our souls and our Temple!” Eventually, and against all odds, the Maccabees won, restoring the Temple to its original glory. In this case, the desire to preserve the Jewish identity against either overwhelming odds or the threat of forced assimilation called for a fierce and incredibly brutal defense.

Yom HaShoah is both the day of remembrance for Jewish victims of the Holocaust, as well as a celebration of Jewish resistance to the genocide. On Yom HaShoah, all activities in Israel are centered on spreading knowledge about the Holocaust. Entertainment programs are canceled in favor of interviews with survivors, businesses are closed, and two sirens, one at 11 am and one at sundown, calls for complete silence throughout Israel. The Israeli educational system, perhaps wishing to assign a more hopeful message to the holiday, discusses two forms of Jewish resistance against the Nazis: Passive resistance insofar as many Jews retained their Jewish identity throughout the Nazi’s rule; and active resistance such as the Warsaw Uprising (which shares the same date as Yom HaShoah). The dual focus on the preservation of Jewish identity as well as active resistance highlights the ultimate goal and primary method through which Israel intends to survive as a state: preservation of its Jewish character and a fiercely resilient and resolute defense.

The recent cases of anti-Semitism, such as the pogroms, Holocaust, and legal discrimination, mixed with the stories told every year during holiday gatherings promotes the perception that unless Jews take matters into their own hands, they will be at the mercy of those that wish to do them harm. The product of these experiences promotes three beliefs, first: threats are everywhere; second: most, if not all, threats are existential; and third: the only way to survive in the face of these threats is through the strength and military power of the Israeli state. Famous Israeli general Ehud Barak stated, “Until the wolf shall lay with the lamb, we’d better be wolves”, providing a key insight into how Israeli’s view and understand threats.

Israel, as a state founded by Jews, views the international system in a way that is largely informed by the experiences and realities Jews faced throughout history. As Barak stated, Israel views itself as a lamb, neither inherently violent nor bellicose, but surrounded by threatening wolves nonetheless, suggesting that Israel should become more wolf like, willing to strike decisively to continue as a state.

This understanding explains the events of the Six-Day War, in which Israel attacked Egypt first. Although this might ostensibly make Israel the aggressor, consider Israel’s viewpoint of the situation. Egypt announced hostility to Israel; set its military to its highest alertness level; expelled UN emergency forces from the shared Sinai Border; strengthened its forces on the same border; closed the important Straits of Tiran to Israeli ships; and fomented a more favorable balance of power by signing alliances with Iraq, Jordan, and Syria. To a state created by people with the shared history of subjugation and near destruction, this seemed to be a serious threat for the continued existence of Israel. The response to these threats was a swift and decisive attack, in which 90% of Egypt’s air force was suddenly destroyed without warning. A similar attack was also conducted in Syria. The aftermath of the surprise attacks provided Israel with a prodigious air advantage, and allowed them to capture the Gaza Strip and West Bank in three days. What was perhaps the most powerful and overwhelming alliance in the history of the Arab world was completely defeated in six days as a direct result of Israel’s threat perception and military policies.

The Israeli perception of threats promotes a view that the international system is a Realist one. Realists believe first that the international system is anarchic, in that there is no real central authority to regulate the actions of the state. Second, Realists believe states cannot be entirely sure of the actions of other states, which creates uncertainty and requires significant strategic planning. Finally, the way to ensure continued existence against such uncertainty is through power. States strive to be more powerful than other states because that is deemed the only way to deter unpredictable threats. Israel’s Realist understanding of the international system mandates an assertive defense policy.

Conclusion

Israel is a state mainly populated by Jews, who through stories and myths as well as all too recent memories of anti-Semitism and genocide, perceive the world as an inherently threatening and dangerous place. This zeitgeist is translated to the Israeli defense policy, which continually focuses on a twofold strategy centered on accruing and developing the newest technology and assertive and decisive responses to threats. While bellicosity certainly has its drawbacks, international condemnation, civilian casualties and accusations of warmongering chief among them, Israel feels the need to assert itself in such a way as to ensure its survival. The policies of the Israeli military are directly informed by the Jewish reality. The synthesis of these experiences and stories creates a hypersensitive threat perception, explaining the decisive actions and refusal to be bullied we saw enumerated in Israel’s pre-emptive strikes in 1967.

A Tale of Two Governments: How American Politics Affects Iranian Politics

On November 8th 2016, millions of Americans will flock to their local polling places. Voters will be faced with choices for the senate, house, local elections, and of course, the presidency. While the conversations dominating the American political sphere are largely focused on the economy, healthcare, immigration, and ISIS, the party who gains control of American politics will also be well placed to craft a foreign policy that will have an immense effect on the political, economic, and cultural path of another country, Iran.

The main cleavage separating the democratic and republican parties regarding Iran is whether America, and the world, should open up or to continue imposed isolation. The lack of political consensus regarding Iran is reflected by the American population, which also holds a mixed view on the debate. The Iran nuclear deal further intensified the argument about the two possible paths, and will likely serve as a hot button issue in the general election. A democratic win in November means continued support for the agreement. Continued support for the agreement will empower both moderating voices and loud reformers in Iran, while a return to forced isolation due to a Republican win will continue to empower the hardline conservatives and radicals. Iran’s politics, economy and culture, oddly enough, is quite dependent on American politics.

The Iranian Political Context

Following former Iranian Supreme Leader Khomeini’s consolidation of power after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, three main factions eventually emerged. Reformers, conservatives (who can also be split into two factions, neo-conservative and pragmatic), and the hardliners constitute the political identities in the officially party-less state. The current state of the balance of power between the three main factions can best be explained by policies implemented immediately following the 1979 revolution regarding families. Iranian hardliners, as well as many conservatives have a demographics problem, called the youth bulge.

The youth bulge was brought on by calls for young and large families during the brutal Iraq-Iran war. Large families would contribute more soldiers and material benefits to the war effort. The residual effect of this policy, however, was an ever-growing youth population, and a shrinking middle aged and elderly population. The youth were required to make sacrifices during and after the war, often being compelled to join Basij groups or to join the Iranian paramilitary force, the Revolutionary Guard. In turn for this sacrifice, young Iranians were promised jobs, security, healthcare, and education. This “Iranian dream” can be seen as analogous to the American dream, if a person works hard, they should expect to see success.

The internal reaction to the Islamic Revolution, however, can largely be blamed for the Iranian government’s inability to provide this reality to young Iranians. Sanctions levied by America or by other countries with America’s backing placed severe burdens on the Iranian economy, environment, and general ability to function as a member of the world community. Because of this, Iranians looked inwards, either blaming their own government, or outwards, blaming America and other countries viewed to be antagonistic.

The Rafsanjani and Khatami presidencies highlight one response to outwards pressure. Both presidencies are marked by moves to somewhat liberalize society (resolving a major grievance of many Iranian youth), open economically, and to engage in discussion with both foreign countries as well as to resolve issues internally through discussion. Rafsanjani, who was much more the pragmatic conservative than the fervent reformer, re-engaged in diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, economic privatization and development was encouraged in a Five Year Plan, and lifted some cultural restrictions, such as allowing fraternization between unrelated men and women. Khatami, who was Rafsanjani’s cultural minister, continued many of Rafsanjani’s policies, as well as emphasizing civil law, the importance of civil society, introducing language to legitimize Israel’s claim to existence and to call for an open dialogue between Iran and America.

This pragmatic conservative and reformist response to outwards political pressure, however, was swiftly undone with the election of Ahmadinejad in 2005. After allowing for some foreign and cultural détente and economic liberalization, the hardliners quickly realized that their place in Iranian society would be endangered with a continuation of these policies. Hardliners in Iran faced the decay of their core cultural and political tenants, and thus moved to return to the pre-reform Iran. After ostensibly moving to help the youth and disenfranchised, why would this pro-reform momentum stop?

To put it bluntly, the reforms failed to reach their full effect. The main cause for this can be directed to two problems: the conditions produced by outward sanctions; and an internal backlash at a changing Iran by the clerical and hardline establishment. Although the Iranian economy is actually quite diversified , sanctions prevented full integration into the world economy, which meant that exports were kept to a minimum. The Iranian economy may have been internally diverse, but the inability to export goods and services to some of the worlds largest markets, such as America and Europe, meant that Iran would never quite exceed a certain level of economic success. This meant that jobs and resources would be scarce, dampening the enthusiasm for reformist politics.

Secondly, an internal backlash facilitated by Iranian hardliners and conservatives meant that even with popular support, the tenability of reformist politics may not have actually been as robust as some would believe. After Khatami’s success in 2000, pro-reform publications were closed, intellectuals and journalists were jailed, security forces and members of the Basij assaulted students at the University of Tehran, and political and judiciary oversight organizations were banned by the constitutional watchdog the Guardian Council. Khatami never put up much of an effort to stop the backlash, demonstrating his inability to direct Iran towards a major change.

After the enthusiasm for reform was significantly dampened, President Ahmadinejad came to power in 2005. Ahmadinejad was the immensely popular former mayor of Tehran. Furthermore, Ahmadinejad came from a certain background that made him more appealing to the culturally conservative poor, as well as to certain military institutions. Ahmadinejad was a commander in the Revolutionary Guard, Iran’s major paramilitary force. Framing the reformist politicians as morally bankrupt and economically self-interested, Ahmadinejad easily came to power. In the aftermath of the election, however, Ahmadinejad began to appoint former Revolutionary Guard officials to important political posts, highlighting his view that politics should be one in the same with the standard bearers of the Islamic Revolution.

In 2009, Ahmadinejad retained power in a widely disputed election, in which he was accused of voter fraud by several different important figures in the reform movement. Despite the large protests plaguing urban centers throughout Iran, Ahmadinejad retained power. Following reelection, Ahmadinejad would hurt relations with Arab states by endorsing the Arab Spring uprisings, hurt relations with the West through inflammatory comments about Israel and the Holocaust, and mismanaged the Iranian economy and political system, often arguing with his advisors and superiors as well as undertaking pet projects and needless reforms that distracted from improving the failing Iranian economy.

The constitution of the Islamic Republic requires that presidents cannot serve more than two consecutive terms. After Ahmadinejad served his second term, a new zeitgeist swept the country, demanding a return to competent and moderate rule. Hassan Rouhani, an establishment yet pragmatic member of the conservative faction, won the election with a promise to return Iran back to its pre-Ahmadinejad path. Perhaps the most significant of all of Rouhani’s accomplishments is the hotly debated Iran Nuclear Deal. As in America, Iranians too have a mixed reaction to the agreement, with some seeing it as a capitulation to the West and others seeing it as a fair trade off in order to secure Iran’s economic security. Nonetheless, the deal is still present, signaling Iran’s intent to join the world community and to secure its future.

We can see, then, that there are two main discourses on what Iran’s purpose should be. Some in Iran believe that Iran should be the standard bearer of the Islamic world, while others hold a less parochial view, recognizing the importance of existing as a member within the inter-country community. When one faction gains too much power, a reactionary current takes hold of the Iranian zeitgeist. Too much liberalization and integration results in a rapid snapback to the revolutionary fervor of politicians like Ahmadinejad and groups like the Basij and Revolutionary Guard. On the other hand, the Iranian youth are highly educated and underemployed, which is a recipe for political change if they are not satiated. A pattern has emerged, and the budding détente between Iran and the West might tip the balance of which political current maintains its power.

Democrats, Republicans, and Iran’s Future

Republican presidential front runner believes that the Iran Nuclear Deal is so bad, it is almost like it was constituted that way on purpose. On the other side of the aisle, Democratic front-runner Hilary Clinton claimed that it was unrealistic to get a better deal, arguing that it was the best possible compromise for both parties. Within those two instances, the different American paths towards Iran are demonstrated; one towards a gradual opening of relations, and another towards an immediate return to the last several decades, which, ironically, parallel the Iranian approach.

The Republican plan is to “undo” the agreement, returning to the previous sanction regime and to continue America’s forced isolation on Iran. Who would this help? And who would this hurt? By forcing Iran to return to its previous internalized nature, it is likely that groups such as the Revolutionary Guard and the hardline clerics will be empowered. A common theme in authoritarian regimes is to paint an outside actor as an enemy of the state. Iran has long been a pawn in a greater geo-political tool by outside powers, which is reflected by an important theory accepted by the Iranian polity called Gharbzadegi, which translates to a “Westoxification,” essentially meaning that Iran (and, indeed, the Muslim world) has been corrupted by the West through its imperial pursuits. Continued forced isolation will push Iranian politics down this path, increasing internal and external tensions, and empowering the extreme elements within the country.

The Democratic plan, on the other hand, will have the opposite effect. Through easing the path towards economic integration, the highly educated yet underemployed youth will see new economic opportunities, facilitated by an influx of foreign investment, which will provide new avenues for employment. The Iranian reformist movement, along with the pragmatic conservatives, could see a new wave of enthusiasm as the quality of life within Iran slowly improves. Furthermore, integration between countries tends to have a moderating effect. Foreign investment would be hard to come by if a corporation owned by the Revolutionary Guard would likely embezzle it. Efforts to improve the infrastructure and accountability of Iran’s economy would increase, as new opportunities to seek outward investment present themselves.

For two countries ostensibly at odds, it is a humorous irony that the politics of one can have such a large effect on the politics of another. When Americans go to the polls this November, they should remember that they are likely not only choosing who they want to lead their country, but also, the path that Iran will follow. A vote for a continuation of the long held policy of sanctions and forced isolation could mean a strengthening of the hardliners and a suppression of the moderators and reformers. A vote for a change in policy and the beginnings of a real détente could mean the reformers and moderating voices could finally get the break they have long needed. The future of Iran stands at a crossroads, much like that of America, a vote for one party over the other will have a wide range of effects, and could push Iran towards true reform or towards a consolidation of extremist politics. 

Will Doves or Hawks Fly? An Analysis of Democratic Policies in the Levant

In 2011, the streets of Cairo were teeming with political, financial, and religious fervor—with Egyptian President Mubarak at the root of discontent. Young protesters led by the Muslim Brotherhood and pro-democratic groups such as the “Tamarod” movement, took to Tahrir Square to oust a dictator representing three decades of Egyptian strife under secular autocracy, a militant ruling party, and economic strain. While uncertainty loomed in Tahrir Square, discord loomed in the White House Situation Room. Obama and his administration were bereft of time—with the choice of opting for “the right side of history” with young, pro-democracy protestors, or with a decades-old status quo embedded in the Mubarak regime. Answering the pleas of his advisors, President Obama chose to support the rebels. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton—the current 2016 Democratic Presidential frontrunner -- unsuccessfully advocated siding with Mubarak based on the rationalization that supporting an unstructured, youthful revolutionary movement would not be any less than naïve. The rebels represented change and renewal, but Mubarak represented years of American investment, relative stability, and guarantee of U.S. access and provision.

Such a decision is congruent with Clinton’s so-called “hawkish” foreign policy agenda—yet scholars, critics, and constituents alike are still scratching heads in regards to Clinton’s strict theoretical framework. Many point to former First Lady, Senator, and Secretary of State as an oscillation between neo-conservatism and liberalism in international affairs. Clinton’s opponent, Vermont Senator Bernard Sanders, staunchly falls within liberalism, yet is misunderstood in his policy projections. In the largest and arguably, most historic presidential election this country will witness, the media machine has detracted voters from dissecting Hilary’s ideological direction or Sander’s exact foreign policy agenda. In this piece, I seek to dissect Clinton’s and Sanders’ theoretical identities and visualize their policies in the most precarious geopolitical hotspot of the 21st century: the Levant region.

Neo-con, Realist, or both? Assessing Hillary’s Ideological Conundrum

Advisor Jeffrey Bader once remarked that Clinton is “not an ideological person, she’s a deal-maker.” The ambiguity that surrounds the exact identity of Clinton’s foreign policy has been the subject of widespread speculation in this election. Her extensive record appears to be a conjectural blend of realist, idealist, and neo-conservative policy selections. As a New York Senator, she voted yes for intervention in Iraq. In her “pivot to Asia” as Secretary of State, she sought a role for the United States in territorial disputes in the South China Sea. She has angered Jewish voters when she has remained neutral with Israeli-Iranian tensions, while acknowledging Israel’s pivotal role as an American ally in the Middle East, and even proposing support of Iranian democratic attempts at a 2016 appearance at AIPAC. Public perception has suggested that Clinton reflects all three ideological identities of realism, liberalism, and neo-conservatism. Yet, when we arrange her record comprehensively, we will discover that Clinton is unapologetically neo-con in every crease and corner of the fabric that is her foreign policy agenda. Clintonism will champion hard power over soft, politics of preconditions, shoe-leather diplomacy, and operating from a position of strength. Is Hillary the next Kissinger? No, but expect a hybridized version of Kissinger, Kagan, and Robert Gates. Hillary will exemplify her appreciation of using clout of diplomacy, but realizes militarized strength may be necessary to sit parties at the table in the first place.

To compare the Democratic candidates, one must comprehend Clinton’s appreciation for statecraft abroad, while Sanders focuses on the American state itself; external reformation runs divergent to internal reconstruction. Clinton and Sanders both exercise caution when flexing their foreign policy muscle, yet differ in nature. Clinton sees the military as a valuable mechanism, while Sanders sees it as a potential deterrent. Clinton practices caution in the calculation and execution of hard power initiatives, keeping her cards close to her chest. Yet in retrospect, she keeps a maximalist thirst for an American militarized footprint across the world. Secretary of Defense Gates recalls Clinton favored 40,000 boots on the ground when he advised 30. After all, Clinton’s education in the world of foreign policy began not in her tenure as Secretary of State or even as First Lady, but as a freshman New York Senator on the Committee on Armed Services, where she developed a great appreciation for American military capability. Sanders on the other hand, is more cautious in foreign policy. He voted against intervention in Iraq and champions that decision as representative of his strong anti-interventionism. Many have compared Clinton’s foreign policy as a continuation of the Obama Administration, such as non-intervention in Syria, but in fact it is Sanders that would replicate “skeptical restraint” best. While critics have pointed to Sanders as immature in foreign policy and avoidant of the topic altogether, they must explore Sander’s liberal logic of policies he has already presented on debate floors across the country. To understand Sander’s global strategy is to understand his domestic platform. His policies abroad are anchored to his economic strategy to alleviate collegiate debt, combat Wall Street, and improve social welfare programs; the United States cannot pour money into carpet-bombing the Islamic State that drains taxation at home, nor expend resources fighting for democracy in Iran or Egypt when democratic ideals are endangered at the expense of the corporate machine.

Visualizing the Levant

The Levantine region of the Middle East has become characterized by regenerative, endless conflicts, ruptures in the ethnic and religious foundations, and proxy interests intersecting in Iraq and Syria. Civil wars are incubated within civil wars—spurred initially by democratic fervor and devolving into foreign manipulation of rebel factions to install puppet leadership. These conflicts are consequential; it is fuddled, it is not simplistic enough to characterize with theory alone. A presidential candidate who claims to contextualize a policy strategy in all corners of this conflict is lying, but a candidate that can produce a doctrine America can commit to, is integral in the Democratic race. Senator Sanders has accomplished this, publicly advocating commitment to non-intervention in the Middle East. Clinton’s stance tethers its “globocop” approach to combatting the swath of violent non-state actors, bloodthirsty dictatorships, proxy interests battling from the Gulf, and militarized “aid” from China and Russia. To Clinton, Putin has no business fighting in Syria. To Bernie, neither does the United States.

Clinton mutually supports an Israeli state and Palestinian forces, yet shies away from the high dive board when pursuing the hunt for a two-state solution like presidential predecessors have done, believing the timing is not ripe in 2016. Senator Sanders additionally will pivot towards the acknowledgement of the right for a Palestinian solution, playing what he called an “even-handed role” in the interaction between Israelis and Palestinians. While Sanders is Jewish, he has shied away from proclaiming himself a Zionist. Sanders has proven to be tactical when approaching the Palestinian question; he wholeheartedly supports the Israeli right to exist, but does visualize an emerging landscape of a new Middle East. Does this make Sanders a realist on Israel? Possibly. It is not clear whether Sanders will pursue a two-state solution, but it’s clear he will not isolate the Palestinians, as have previous administrations. With both candidates, the world will see an American presidency that will re-balance its allegiances in the Gaza Strip.

The question of Syria has deeply characterized the foreign policy agenda of the Obama Administration, and will quite possibly plague the remainder of the twenty-first century. The Syrian Civil War is a tumultuous blend of civil war, proxy interests, terrorism, and underlying cultural and religious tensions—remnants of colonialism and the 1917 Sykes-Picot Agreement. Both Sanders and Clinton understand that any future policy decision in Syria should represent the American people’s aversion to intervention, yet nips the humanitarian strife in the bud. Such a policy has posed presidential politics in a state of flux; Senator Ted Cruz advocated carpet-bombing campaigns, Trump called for the elimination of local gas sources, and many other candidates have called for the eradication of ISIS before approaching the Syrian Civil War. To evaluate the stances of the two Democratic frontrunners, one must first question what beast the candidates will encounter first: Assad or ISIS? Clinton has chosen ISIS, opting to place a larger American presence in the region, surpassing Obama’s authorized 50 Special Operation Troops. The former Secretary of State has advocated the preparation and training of Syrian Sunni and Shiite rebels to fight in Syria, believing they would be a “psychological boost to the opposition” that would back American enemies into a dark corner. Mrs. Clinton sees it necessary to unite under a common international enemy, and then seek regime change with the dismantling of Assad in Damascus. Senator Sanders, on the other hand, has chosen to avoid what he calls a “never-ending quagmire” between American boots on the ground and ISIS fighters, and additionally has not supported a no-fly-zone in Syria. Clinton’s threaded short-term strategies starkly contrast with Sander’s isolationist long-term vision of the struggle with ISIS. While Clinton sees it necessary for the American struggle to incorporate international cooperation, Sanders finds it necessary for the fight to be a globalized one. Sanders has called for an international coalition to combat the Islamic State, emulating the Jordanian King Abdullah's plan to build a coalition of Muslim nations on the ground, while remaining international powers carry airstrike campaigns and economic measures to cut off the blood-flow of the Islamic State.

Looking Towards The Future

The presidential strategies in Syria best reflect two very contrasting tones set in the Levant region. Clinton’s neo-conservative approach and foreign policy chops will utilize hard and soft power to promote democratic, American ideals in fluctuating political systems. Under a Clinton administration, Hawks will predominately fly over the Levant—a product of the former Secretary of State’s step-by-step strategizing, teaming diplomatic strength with military muscle to accomplish infrastructural stability and political peace in the Levant. Sanders will, by contrast, engage the global arena in coalition building and aversion to on-the-ground intervention. His foreign policy decisions will reflect that of his domestic platform, illustrating the Senator’s long-term vision of a cooperative and welcoming United States in the international community. As Levantine conflicts have begun to pour into the political, economic, and cultural borders of Turkey, the Balkans, and Europe, the world holds its breath as candidates assemble policy projections for such a delicate region. While running within the confines of the Democratic Party, this race is showcasing candidates that will envision two very different faces of the Levant Region in the next four years to come. Doves may fly, but under the shadow of hawks.

Saudi and Iranian Manipulation of Sectarian Violence as an Incubator for an Emerging Balance of Power

The history of man is the history of crimes, and history can repeat. So information is a defense. Through this we can build, we must build, a defense against repetition.

—Simon Wiesenthal

The theory that history repeats itself has never been truer than in the Middle East. In a region that has always been what strategist George Friedman calls a “geopolitical flashpoint,” 2016 has started to become reminiscent of 1979. This past January, the House of Saud beheaded a Shi’a Sheikh, Nimr al Nimr, prompting Iranians to take to the streets and torch the Saudi Arabian embassy. Saudi Arabia, just like in 1988, has strangled relations with their Iranian neighbor; and both states have embarked on a power-grab. Iran has incited the Kingdom’s Gulf neighbors with Shi’a minorities – most notably, the Houthis in Yemen – to liberate themselves from their Sunni leaders. Across the Levant, North Africa, and the Gulf, the gloves have come off and the two powerhouses have conducted interventionist strategies, funded terrorist organizations, propped up dictatorships, and manipulated religious fervor – all to fuel a sectarian conflict in this winner-takes-all game.

Many scholars and critics have deemed the violence in Syria as a turbulent power vacuum. They are correct; a witch’s brew of dictatorial greed, decades of religious persecution, cultural and religious landscape at odds, and vulnerable economic conditions have produced one of the largest conflicts since the conclusion of the Second World War. We have come to know this conflict as an open invitation for foreign intervention. But many perceive Syria and Iraq as the second chapter of the Cold War, a stage for Russia and the United States to carry out countering strategic interests through proxy warfare. I will argue that this perception is clouded. The regional sectarian violence is really a theatrical showdown between two regional rising stars: Iran and Saudi Arabia, who puppeteer such violence to incubate a new balance of power in the Middle East, where Iran's rising power unhinges Saudi hegemony.

Questioning a Balance

In international relations, balance of power theory endures, yet is seldom experimented upon. If Kenneth Waltz saw the Middle East today, he might consider it a picturesque representation of anarchy. The competitors view themselves as custodians of Islam, vying for control in a region that has lacked a consistent multipolar power dynamic. Hans Morgenthau deems that the balance of power is a “perennial element” in international relations, regardless of the “contemporary conditions” of the international system. Many scholars are looking to the Middle East as a hub that places traditional realpolitik back in business -- and see that play out between the power plays between Tehran and Riyadh.

In the balance of power, states use various mechanisms to balance. There is equilibrium of power that mandates states adjust accordingly; when one makes gains, the other must outmaneuver to re-balance the scales. In the Middle East, however, the mechanisms of balance of power differ from those in the West. States do not necessarily focus on power plays amongst one another, but rather on what scholar Stacie Goddard calls the “dynamics of collective mobilization” and struggles for influence among political communities. To manipulate the balance of power in the Middle East, states must first establish one – something both Tehran and Riyadh have done through decades of military, economic, and religious expansion. States’ mechanisms to achieve regional power are not as simple as the West’s, and concentrate primarily on the nationalization and expansion of crude oil industries, leveraging their control of regional institutions (like the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the United Arab League) tapping into the anger of the Sunni-Shi’a divide, feeding nationalist fires, vying for huge arms deals with Western countries, and competing for great powers’ good graces. Saudi Arabia and Iran have been at odds over the region’s balance of power, moving levers to advance their position and hollow out a decaying power structure.

Exploring Historical Ramifications

Is some of this sectarian violence a motive that truly reflects the interests of both states, or a sway of rhetoric?  Before looking forward to understand these possibilities, we must reflect on the history between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Regional supremacy in the Arab World has been a strategic goal of Iran since the days of the Shah and since the al-Saud family’s rise to power. While these objectives are not new, the opportunities to achieve them are. The weakened governments in Iraq and Syria, the dormant Shi’a minority populations under Saudi-supporting leaders, and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action under the International Atomic Energy Agency all bolster Iran’s hopes to spread its influence in the Arab World, and incentivize Saudi Arabia to halt them in their steps.

Since the rule of the House of Saud, Sunni Wahhabism has thrived in Saudi society today and dictates the shape of its foreign policy. When the Crown Prince Saud came to power in 1953, he seized the opportunity to enhance the state’s presence in international trade. The years that followed introduced OPEC in 1960, the OIC in 1969, ownership of Aramco in 1980, and founded the GCC in 1981. Throughout this period, the Saudis learned the importance of dollar diplomacy and economic mastery. The 1990’s saw the al Sauds using the American relationship to advance their position and maintain stability in neighboring states by, for example, requesting American intervention in Kuwait in 1990. But it was in 2011 when the state of the union began to evolve for Saudi Arabia. The Arab Spring struck a chord with the al Sauds, prompting the government to ban public protests by Shi’a minorities in the East, to crack down in neighboring Bahrain, and to violate several international human rights obligations. Post Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia has sighed relief in maintaining regional control, yet looks upon their neighbors with caution.

Shi’a Islam has always been a key fixture in Persian society in Iran, and for centuries. But it was in 1979 when the Shah was exiled and the Islamic fundamentalist, Ayatollah Khomeini rose to power, spreading messages of anti-Americanism, call for the Shah’s extradition, the infamous Hostage Crisis at the United States Embassy in Tehran, and attempting to thread Shi’a Islam and nationalism together. It was during the 1980’s when Iran closely aligned itself with Russia, pushing the United States in the direction of the Saudis -- establishing a dynamic that served as the ‘status quo’ until the twenty-first century. The United States introduced the first round of sanctions against Iran in the 1990s, with oil and trade sanctions justified by an alleged support of terrorist organizations. The second wave began in the early 2000s, with the IAEA suspicious of uranium enrichment programs and a United Nations investigation, continued with the 2005 discovery of Iran’s violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Just in 2015, the international community has reached a long-awaited Joint-Comprehensive Plan of Action with the Iranian government on limiting the state’s nuclear production facilities through inspections.

The Middle East’s balance of power crucially shifted in 1979. The Iranian Revolution exacerbated Western-Iranian tensions and swung the United States to the side of the Saudis. The decades that followed saw the rivals compete for foreign alliances and play their animosity out through calculated measures, such as attacking embassies in 1988, cutting diplomatic relations in 1989, and carrying out small proxy wars in neighboring conflicts, such as Bahrain, Yemen, Iraq, and of course, Syria.

Sectarianism as a Political Sheath

Today we are witnessing the second phase of this tense relationship come to fruition. This has been accomplished through both states’ angering sectarian factions. Farea al Muslimi, an analyst, states, “All the sectarian rhetoric is becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy for these regimes who love to play the sectarian card.” In 1991, Iran and Saudi Arabia resumed diplomatic relations, and both nations experienced a relatively friendly period until the American intervention in Iraq in 2003, where Saudi Arabia perceived Iran manipulating Shi’a militants with the defeat of the Ba’athist Regime. Scholar Brendan O’Neill claims that “much of the bloodshed in Syria is an expression of the Saudi-Iranian battle for the vacuum created by the post-Cold War,” and this rings true when applying balance of power theory.

When the Arab Spring was alive and well, Iran perceived these uprisings as precious opportunities to support Shi’a minorities in neighboring Gulf States, while Saudi Arabia saw it necessary to defend them. I say this because in 2011, Bahrain experienced attempted revolution with the return of Shi’a activist Hassan Mushaima – believed collaborate with Iran – and popular demand for a republic. Days later, Saudi Arabia and the GCC sent military-transport vehicles into Bahrain to stop the uprising in its path. But this is a two-way street. One can see Iranian attempts for influence across the region through the funding of terrorism and revolutionary missions. In Lebanon, Iran has funded the Shi’a terrorist organization, Hezbollah. In Palestine, Iran has been linked with Hamas. In Bahrain – a 61.3% majority Shi’a country under Sunni leadership – it has been hinted Iran encouraged Shi’a citizens to protest al Khalifa’s leadership. In Yemen, Iran funded the Zaidi Shi’a rebels, called Houthis, in a successful attack upon the Yemeni government and President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, forcing him to flee in February 2015. Saudi Arabia followed up with aggressive airstrikes to defend their custodianship of Sunni Islam and purview of their southern neighbors. In Syria, both powers vie for influence among the sectarian divide, with Iran deploying their elite Revolutionary Guards to defend the Alawite Assad Regime and allegedly pour $9 billion into the war effort. This cat and mouse game has molded Iran into of a regional risk-taker and Saudi Arabia into a vulnerable monarchy, cornered and cautious of its neighbors, yet ready to defend those loyal to Sunni religiosity.

Yet, if one singular event turned this cold war between Tehran and Riyadh hot, it has been the Iranian nuclear deal. The inclusion of Iran in the international community is a fundamental threat to Saudi Arabia’s status quo, a status quo backed by a series of American administrations and supplemented through an expensive oil trade that ensured Saudi Arabia a strategic advantage over Tehran. The relationship with the United States has been integral in striking a truly unipolar balance of power in the region, and both states understand that. Saudi Arabia, along with the rest of Gulf countries, knows too well the historical lesson that a weakened relationship with the United States leaves them at the doorstep of their foes. A long-standing ally of the United States, Saudi Arabia feels “betrayed, and now they feel like they must do something, even if it’s the wrong thing.” Riyadh sees the Iran nuclear deal in zero-sum terms and has calculated a more aggressive strategy against Iranian presence in the Gulf, further enhancing this rivalry. To mask this insecurity, Saudi Arabia has been buffering its defense systems. Riyadh has established a 34-member military campaign against terrorism, with states such as Qatar and Pakistan, an alliance that alienates Iran, Syria, and Iraq, despite sharing a common enemy: ISIS. Saudi Arabia’s aggressive foreign policy leaves it vulnerable in the region. Its friends in the Gulf have prompted questioning, its reliable allies in the Levant have frayed under the spark of revolution, and Iran has broken the status quo.

Manipulating the Threads of Sectarianism

For these two regional powers, the logic of driving such a hard-lined sectarian agenda lies in maintaining domestic stability. Escalating sectarian tensions does not only establish a state as a custodian of its religious sect, but also attempts to promote nationalism among citizens.  As has been the case of stirring nationalism at home, foreign threats have also assisted in this pursuit. ISIS – while a threat to national security – has furthered nationalism, especially within Iran. ISIS has deemed itself the true representation of Sunni Islam and has persecuted Shi’a militants, governments, and civilians as a result. While ISIS brands itself as Sunni, it has been a clear-cut national security threat in Saudi Arabia. Yet, Saudi Arabia has tried to catapult itself into the role of commander in an Arab operation against the Islamic State. While it has shared success in isolating Iran, it has garnered several problems in its organization. First of all, Saudi Arabia has named the mission, “The Islamic Coalition,” yet has isolated important Muslim-majority states in the region, such as Syria and Iraq.

When the Kingdom executed al Nimr and ceased diplomatic relations with Iran – a calculated public relations strategy – it expected GCC states to follow their lead. Thus far, only Bahrain and Sudan have cut relations with Tehran, and the United Arab Emirates has promised to “downgrade” their relations with the Persian state. Yet the remaining series of the Saud family’s allies have remained – an unflinching demonstration of shifting confidence between traditional alliances.

Theorizing for the Future

Saudi Arabia and Iran’s rivalry in the region will certainly not alter the global power balance, but it will establish a new dynamic in a region. Looking forward, there are many reasons for Saudi Arabia to be cautious, as there many opportunities and bellicose maneuvers for Iran to seize.

When applying balance of power theory to Middle Eastern sectarian violence, one will realize that two powerhouses are not only tapping into existing ancient Islamic lesions, but also adopting a religious persona that compromises any political exhaustion of the Arab Spring and a fraying political system of dictators. Moving forward, government officials and citizens should be concerned that a rivalry between the two giants will give the Islamic State more leeway to operate and execute their objectives. In addition, the deteriorating relations will deter the momentum of the Syrian Peace Process, and establish an undercurrent of tension that will undercut whatever diplomatic resolution comes to fruition.

Through this we can build, we must build, a defense against repetition.

Saddam Hussein: Was He the Totalitarian We Were Led to Believe?

Introduction and Operationalization

In 2002 State of the Union address, then-President George Bush accused three states of forming a new “axis of evil.” Saddam Hussein, then leader of Iraq and a member of the “axis of evil,” soon became one of the United States’ chief enemies. In order to juxtapose the United States with Iraq, much of the American political discourse framed Saddam Hussein as a totalitarian leader. Dr. Ahmed Chalabi, a member of the three-man council leading the Iraqi National Congress, an opposition group to Hussein’s Ba’ath Party, labeled Hussein a totalitarian. However, as Peter Grieder notes, one of the criticisms of totalitarianism as an effective model to understand government is that it is often used as a normative label. Much of the rhetoric surrounding the use of totalitarianism as a label is itself politically charged and used to generate a specific response, making it difficult to understand exactly how accurate of a label it is.

Before exploring the efficacy of totalitarianism as a model for understanding Hussein’s government, some explanation of the term must be given. Friedrich and Brzezinski’s definition of totalitarianism will be used for this paper. For Friedrich and Brzezinski, totalitarianism has six components: An official ideology geared toward a perfected state of mankind that demands complete adherence; a mass party led by one person; a system of terror, which could be physical, psychological, or both; a monopoly of control by the government of all means of mass communication; a similar monopoly of control by the government of the military and weapons; and finally, a centralized command economy. Their definition, Grieder notes, achieved consensus in scholarly circles. Friedrich and Brzezinski’s definition is used because it reaches an appropriate equilibrium between specificity and generalizability. Theories in political science are usually too specific or not specific enough, but Friedrich and Brzezinski’s theory is balanced since it allows for unique examples within the regime of study, but is also broad enough to allow comparative analysis. Thus, it presents the best model to assess the extent to which the Hussein regime could be considered totalitarian.

Totalitarianism is a very specific system of governance. Many states that are labeled as totalitarian are, in fact, authoritarian. Because totalitarianism is a political extreme—meaning that it is the zenith of authoritarianism—and thus requires total adherence to Friedrich and Brzezinski’s formula, it is imprecise to place that moniker on regimes that do not meet all its requirements. The two regimes that are most often correctly labeled totalitarian, Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union, met all of these requirements. Hussein’s regime, however, did not. Although Hussein’s government comes quite close to totalitarianism, its allowance of private gun ownership precludes it from truly being totalitarian. Despite the fact that Hitler only removed the right to gun ownership from “undesirables” and Stalin also allowed private gun ownership for hunting and self-defense, the extent to which other totalitarian institutions were utilized more than made up for this. Hussein, on the other hand, never had a military as strong as Nazi Germany’s, and never had a security apparatus as robust as the Soviet Union’s. Therefore, Hussein’s regime can correctly be called near totalitarian, rather than truly totalitarian.

Regime Analysis

The first of the six points is that a totalitarian regime will establish an official ideology geared toward a perfect state of mankind that demands its subjects’ complete adherence. Hussein’s party subscribed to Neo-Ba’athism, which is a splinter faction of the socialist, secular, and pan-Arab Ba’ath party. After the original Ba’ath party split in 1966 due to factionalist infighting and ideological differences, it began to seize power in Iraq. Iraqi Neo-Ba’athism, which is also called Saddamism— the ideology followed by Hussein—stipulates that Arab states should look to Iraq as the leader of the Arab “nation;” and invokes militarist and nationalist rhetoric and policies. It diverges from traditional Ba’athism by placing a single state as the leader of the Arab “nation,” as well as rejecting notions of class conflict, arguing that Arab states do not have similar class structures to the West. Lastly, Saddamism maintains a strong link between ancient Mesopotamian civilizations and modern Arab nationalism. Political dissidence in Saddamist Iraq was crushed; Hussein frequently orchestrated brutal purges and jailed political dissidents on often-imagined charges. At one point, Hussein gassed the Kurdish village of Halabja in 1988, killing 5,000 and injuring 10,000, all on suspected beliefs of disloyalty. When considering Friedrich and Brzezinski’s first point of totalitarianism, Hussein forced adherence to a supremacist political ideology, which demands a perfected Arab world, so it applies.

The second point of totalitarianism, that there is a mass party led by one person, is also true of Hussein’s regime. Although the Iraqi Ba’athist party had leaders before Hussein, once he came to power, the party was completely controlled by the dictator. A coup orchestrated by Hussein in 1968 installed him as vice president, which he used to develop a robust national security apparatus. In 1979, Hussein won an internal power struggle over his brother, allowing him to come to the presidency, after which he instituted the first of his purges. From this point onwards, Hussein led the Iraqi Ba’athist party, frequently purging opponents within government as well as ethnic and cultural minorities in Iraq to further consolidate power. Two other states that can be considered totalitarian, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, instituted frequent purges of undesirables to allow further consolidation of power around a single leader, such as Hitler or Stalin. Purges as tools of political consolidation, are frequently used by totalitarian leaders, and allow for one person to lead the mass party. Friedrich and Brzezinski’s second point of totalitarianism applies to Hussein’s regime as well.

The third point, that a totalitarian state possesses a system of state led physical and/or psychological terror is true for Hussein’s regime. The common facilitator for state led terror is a secret police force. The Iraqi Intelligence Service, also called the Party Intelligence (which is important to know because it demonstrates the allegiances of the secret police), was Iraq’s version of the secret police. The Party Intelligence orchestrated the Dujail massacre, killing between 142 and 148 Shiites in a reprisal attack for an assassination attempt against Hussein by Iranian backed militias. The massacre at Dujail was but one of many state sponsored attacks against civilian populations. Totalitarian leaders frequently play up biases among ethnic groups to help facilitate purges and state attacks. The Nazi party blamed Jews for Germany’s problems, and state intelligence services like the Gestapo would take them to concentration camps. Stalin would call his enemies capitalists or traitors to the communist cause, and would murder them. In Iraq, the major cleavages were along ethnic and religious lines, between Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis. Hussein would plan and would execute state attacks on Shiites and Kurds in order to sow fear into the minds of the population. The third point of totalitarianism, state sponsored terror, also applies.

The fourth point, a state monopoly on means of mass communication and media was present as well under Hussein’s regime as well. Article 36 of the 1990 Iraqi constitution stipulated that the national government, led by Hussein, had the right to prevent production or dissemination of anything harming “national unity” and the “objectives of the People.” Freedom of the press was nonexistent under Hussein, and the state possessed the right to both pre-hoc and post-hoc prevention and cancelation of materials they found disagreeable. This is a strategy used by totalitarian regimes to eradicate civil society. With weakened press, entertainment, and scholarly sectors, materials critical of Hussein’s regime would not be allowed to exist. By preventing alternative discourses on Iraqi politics, Hussein could spout his propaganda, indoctrinating the population. The sole news network under Hussein was the Iraqi News Agency, which functioned as a propaganda tool for the regime. According to a 2002 report by the United States’ Department of State, “The government restricts severely freedoms of speech, the press, assembly, association, religion, and movement.” By preventing people from freely expressing themselves, Hussein’s regime could spread their political ideology unimpeded, further allowing the regime to maintain total control. The fourth point of totalitarianism, government control of mass communication applies to Hussein’s Iraq.

The fifth point of totalitarianism, a state monopoly on weapons and soldiers, somewhat breaks with the trend in this analysis. While the military was controlled and used as a tool of state oppression, individuals were curiously allowed to possess firearms. According to a 2003 New York Times report, “Most Iraqi households own at least one gun.” Totalitarian leaders, by definition, possess monopolies on force; otherwise they could be contested violently. Hussein’s regime allowed households to own a firearm for self-defense, breaking lockstep with his other more totalitarian policies. Logically, a person attempting to establish a totalitarian regime would not want widespread individual gun ownership, but Hussein likely would have wanted individuals to own guns to deter invasion by his enemies, such as Iran or the United States. So, in one way, this could be seen as a nationalistic tool. On the other hand, however, Hussein is lucky an armed uprising did not occur to the extent that he could have been overthrown.

This paper takes the position that private gun ownership presents a flaw in connecting Hussein’s regime to totalitarianism, as it left political stability up to the ability of the regime to carefully maneuver itself politically. Additionally, Hussein’s totalitarian institutions were not nearly as robust as other totalitarian regimes. The Party Intelligence could hardly be compared to the Soviet Union’s secret police force, the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs, and Hussein’s propaganda machine lacked its own Goebbels. While other totalitarian regimes allowed gun ownership, Hussein’s totalitarian institutions lacked the robustness to deter and prevent real armed opposition, and thus, gun ownership precludes true totalitarianism in this case.  

The other aspect of the use of force in Hussein’s regime was the role of the military. The military under Hussein’s regime, expectedly, was under his direct control. The most important part of the military under Hussein was the Republican Guard, which constituted the elite paramilitary troops of the Iraqi Army. Formed in 1969 as the Presidential Guard, the role of this organization was to maintain state stability against perceived internal and external enemies, essentially, guaranteeing Hussein’s regime power.  A report from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy labeled the Republican Guard as an integral structure in Hussein’s regime.

Point five of totalitarianism only half applies. The military institutions necessary for a successful totalitarian regime were present, but Hussein’s allowance of private gun ownership prevents his regime from truly reflecting this aspect of totalitarianism.

Point six, the final point, stipulates that a totalitarian state runs a command economy; in other words, a highly centralized, state run economy. According to a 2003 report from ReliefWeb, a human rights organization, Hussein’s economy was a highly centralized command economy. Nationalization of oil, prohibitions against foreign ownership of businesses—leading to state owned enterprises as the primary form of big business in Iraq—and high tariffs on foreign goods were all policies implemented by Hussein’s regime. Because the state runs the economy, individuals are inherently linked to and dependent on the state, helping to strengthen and maintain the low levels of personal agency of the regime’s subjects. By weakening individual agency, political opposition is limited. Command economies allow the totalitarian leader to build high levels of capital for their endeavors, and prevent political opposition. Hussein used his command economy policies to reach these goals. Point six, that is a command economy, applies to Hussein’s government.

Conclusion

By using Friedrich and Brzezinski’s conceptual framework for a totalitarian government, we can say that Hussein’s regime is more “totalitarian lite,” rather than a completely totalitarian system. Iraq under Hussein met most of the requirements laid out by Friedrich and Brzezinski: The ideology advocated for an ideal state and opposition to said ideology was crushed; the Iraqi Ba’athist party was led by Hussein once he swiftly gained power and not relinquished until the United States invaded Iraq; a state led system of terror facilitated by state intelligence agencies was present; the state heavily censored forms of media and communication, and ran the only legitimate avenues for media and communication; while there was no monopoly on guns, the state did have its own paramilitary force and was in control of the rest of the army; and there was a command economy. If it were not for provisions allowing for private ownership of guns, Hussein could be considered a true totalitarian leader; instead, he should only be taken as a brutal dictator.

You Don’t Know What ISIS Wants

In August of 2014, James Foley, an American journalist, became the first American casualty in the current conflict with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Executed by beheading in a propaganda video distributed to a global audience via YouTube, Foley would quickly become a common name in foreign policy circles. His brutal execution would catalyze a strong American response which has surpassed, according to a report from CNN in early December of 2015, 20,000 missiles and bombs fired from American ships, warplanes, and drones, according to a report from CNN in early December, 2015. Within the American political scheme, there is a near unanimous fervor suggesting that a fight must be taken to ISIS in Iraq and Syria. In his final State of the Union Address, President Obama asked Congress to pass a new Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) to provide legal grounds to wage war against ISIS, and some Republican leaders, like Speaker Paul Ryan, have agreed. Naturally, there is disagreement on how that fight should take shape; Republican Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell opposes an AUMF, but still believes that there should be a robust military response to the ISIS threat. But there has been an unusual development occurring in the rhetoric surrounding America’s response to ISIS. It has appeared that, overnight, politicians across the globe became experts in counterterrorism, psychoanalysis, and Islam. Since joining the fight against ISIS, Americans across the nation have become worried that our actions might be exactly what ISIS wants us to do.  ISIS, a vast network of fighters that has assembled supporters from West Africa to the Caucuses, is a complex organization with many goals and desires. We do not know their intentions, and shaping U.S. policy on ideological prejudices prevents realistic policy discussions from taking place.

We must wonder, how do so many people have such a firm grasp on what terrorists located over 6,000 miles away from the United States desire? Countless media pundits have written opinion pieces in dozens of respectable newspapers and journals claiming to know what ISIS wants and exactly how they want to achieve their goals. Politicians have begun to claim that their political opponents are potential allies to the terrorist group. An article ran in liberal news blog ThinkProgress entitled “Trump’s Muslim Ban Is Exactly What ISIS Wants.” Several days later, Democratic presidential frontrunner and former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated in the December, 2015 Democratic debate that Republican frontrunner Donald Trump was “becoming ISIS’s best recruiter” and that “They are going to people showing videos of Donald Trump insulting Islam and Muslims in order to recruit more radical jihadists.” Aside from Politfact’s conclusion that Secretary Clinton’s statement was purely false, they raise important points regarding the ongoing rhetoric used to discuss ISIS.  President Obama urged the nation during his State of the Union to not buy into the belief that ISIS “[does] not threaten our national existence. That is the story ISIL wants to tell.” Senator Ted Cruz, a leading Republican candidate for President, issued a statement in November 2015 after the deadly attacks in Paris, France that left over 100 dead and over 300 seriously injured, that ISIS “will not be appeased by outreach or declarations of tolerance,” advocating a much more forceful avenue against the terrorist group. There are many conflicting opinions as to what ISIS truly wants, and while this debate rages on, the capacity for American leadership in the efforts against ISIS fades.

In response to cries of racism and Islamophobia, Queen Rania of Jordan said in March of 2015 that there was “nothing Islamic about [ISIS].” This is rhetoric repeated in the U.S. by throngs of people, tending to be on the American political left. Following Queen Rania’s logic, attempting to find the long-term goals of the new “State in Iraq and Syria” should be relatively simple. All states, at some level, have the inherent goal to perpetuate their own existence and provide for (at least some of) their people. This non-Islamic state has done a relatively poor job at that theologically bereft goal through its rejection of participation in the international order.   A modern state would interact with other states by establishing embassies and attempting to achieve diplomatic recognition. Although ISIS has actually begun minting new coins to replace America’s “capitalist financial system of enslavement” according to a piece in Vice News, coupled with a vast bureaucracy governing issues from leisure to education as detailed in a December, 2015 profile in the Guardian, it has not attempted on any level to engage with the world resembling any level of modernity.  If the motivations of ISIS were absolutely devoid of Islamic theology, however unreflective it is of mainstream Islamic theology, the established Islamic State should then resemble any modern state.

De-Islamizing ISIS has several pointed political goals, chief among them, to disaffiliate the 1.6 billion global Muslim population from the several tens (or hundreds) of thousands of extremely radicalized fighters in ISIS-held territory. This goal is unabashedly noble in intent; however, its adherents practice a veiled form of Islamic apologism. Shadi Hamid with the Center for Middle East Policy headquartered in Washington, D.C., wrote in a November, 2015 Op-ed, “There is a role for Islamic apologetics – if defending Islam rather than analyzing it is your objective…. But if the goal is to understand ISIS, then I, and other analysts who happen to be Muslim, would be better served by cordoning off our personal assumptions and preferences.” Hamid makes a sound point; it seems that those who caution against potential actions against ISIS seem to have their own political preferences line up with “what ISIS wants.” For example, a non-interventionist who opposed both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars likely believes that anti-Muslim rhetoric is what ISIS wants, whereas an American right-winger possibly believes that accepting 10,000 refugees fleeing Syria is a form of capitulation and will allow for ISIS elements to slip into the United States undetected. Both perspectives tend to fail to listen to actual ISIS rhetoric which often focuses on Islamic scripture and tradition from the 7th and 8th centuries. While it is true that Dabiq, ISIS’s English-language magazine, does often share snippets of American politician’s speeches in its regular section “In the Words of the Enemy,” it barely amounts to a footnote in the larger context of ISIS propaganda.

Radical movements in the past few decades have shared an unintended unholy alliance with the philosophical left. Bits and pieces of videos created by al-Qaeda’s Osama bin Laden share much of the same rhetoric as used in post-colonial scholarship, focusing fire on the imperialist powers of the global West, for example by noted scholar Noam Chomsky. Academics and bloggers have hounded on the messaging that people should be wary of viewing Muslims as the enemy as it potentially only feeds into ISIS’s supposed rhetoric.  Proponents of this ideology are often those who believe that calling ISIS by its Arabic equivalent Daesh. The final issue of Dabiq in 2015 was titled “Just Terror,” showcasing that brutal terrorists likely do not pay attention to what names they are called in American media, since they seem to be quite content with being viewed as terrorists.

America’s military responses to external threats should be informed by experienced military and counterterrorism experts. People often overestimate themselves when it comes to complex geopolitical issues.  The sketch comedy show, Saturday Night Live, has mocked ISIS several times, but recently poked fun at the uninformed American understanding of ISIS. In its 2015 Thanksgiving episode, cast member Aidy Bryant played Aunt Kathy, the blissfully unaware family member who claims to have “seen an ISIS” in the grocery store and is very grateful that her governor rejected Syrian refugees, who are all supposedly “ISIS in disguise.”  We all have an Aunt Kathy in our families. We likely listen to an Aunt Kathy-like figure from the left on television being interviewed on MSNBC or as the stock-liberal on Fox News. My own mother stated her belief that ISIS did not want Americans to go to Times Square for New Year’s celebrations so that we might live in fear. The newly elected Mayor of Philadelphia Jim Kenney claimed that the January 9th attack by a self-professed ISIS supporter on Philadelphia Police Officer Jesse Hartnett had nothing to do with Islam and “does not represent the religion in any shape or form or any of the teachings.”

For the past several years, Americans have been hearing an uninformed or semi-informed debate take place around “what ISIS wants” as it becomes muddied, it seems more like what “America wants.” Sun Tzu teaches us that it is crucial to “know your enemy,” but he believed that it was equally important to know oneself in order to win battles. The politicized rhetoric over ISIS’ desires prevents a thoughtful policy discussion from taking place.  Our political leaders should take measured actions without regard for “what ISIS wants,” as it is likely untrue and otherwise irrelevant to American interests in the region. ISIS propaganda videos have professed a basic ISIS belief that America and other Western powers want to initiate another round of crusades in the Holy Land: a claim that most Westerners would dispute.  But as scary as it may be, we should come to terms that we do not “know what ISIS wants” short of what they tell us. And so far, they have told us that their goal is singular: to establish an Islamic caliphate.  In 2016, ISIS-watchers should make a collective resolution to stop wasting time discussing the (non)theological aspects of the terrorist organization and return to proposing sound policies to defeat another one of America’s enemies.