Propagate By Poison: The Landscape of China's Rural-Urban Dichotomy

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For thousands of years, the agrarian heartlands were the very heartbeat of Chinese civilization. Writing years before the establishment of the first imperial dynasty and long before the industrialization of China, reformer Shang Yang deduced that harnessing the plow was the path to harnessing power in the context of the tumultuous Warring States era. His recommendation of “emphasizing agriculture and restraining business” to the Qin state passed down through the subsequent dynasties. Though Shang Yang’s reforms were a boon to Qin productivity, state wealth, and facilitated the establishment of the first Chinese empire, modern China has chosen to address its current challenges with a different approach. While the contrast between agriculture and business remains intact, the growing chasm between the rural and urban worlds may have more negative political ramifications than positive ones in the current Chinese political economy. 

Today, the People’s Republic of China’s wealth and power can be found concentrated on the coasts, which have rapidly developed since the 1978 implementation of an “open door policy” ushered in a frenzy of technology absorption and economic entwinement with the world market, marked especially by special economic zone development. Around this time, prevailing perceptions in China conceived the rural sector and the developed, urbanized one as rather disjointed, with economists and policymakers at the forefront of the Coastal Development Strategy envisioning an increased interdependence between the two spheres. The last phase within this roughly 20 to 30 year plan prescribed a leveraging of the wealth derived from industry to develop the agricultural inland areas. 

More than 30 years have gone by since this framework was first introduced, and the integration of urban and rural prosperity leaves much to be desired. Income inequality, disparity in education opportunities, and stark differences in market participation show the huge gaps that persist between the urban and rural worlds of the same nation. This sharp contrast is due largely in part to the Hukou system, a policy set by the central government under Mao in 1958, which local governments possess the authority to enforce today. Under this system, citizens must register their birthplace as their permanent residence and can only change this registration by obtaining a special permit. Local governments set numerous bureaucratic hurdles for would-be migrants to jump over in order to control demographics and human capital. Given that the typical direction of migration in China is from poorer, rural areas to wealthier, urban ones, newcomers to the metropolises have an especially onerous time obtaining permits, and therefore frequently find themselves barred from accessing public social support services and stalled in their quest for upward mobility. As a result, the polarization between urbanites and country-dwellers persists. 

Sowing Division Under Maoist Socialism 

Mao Zedong, a so-called son of the soil, led his army of peasants to victory against the Chinese Nationalist Party and ushered in an age of “Socialist Serfdom.” On an ideological level, Maoism is grounded in the quest for equality, in the destruction of the hierarchical feudal ways and days of old. In reality, the disenfranchisement of Chinese rustics is in many cases firmly rooted in Mao-era policies. As with many other facets of modern Chinese society, stepping out of the shadow cast by Chairman Mao’s legacy poses a serious challenge to untangling the political, economic, and social aggravations of this fissure. 

From the very beginning of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) rule, cities have been an exceptional pressure point on regime stability. For most of the Chinese Civil War, cities stayed loyal to the Chinese Nationalist Party, and before that, were largely beholden to foreign interests and exploitation. The CCP desperately needed to grab the reins of these hotspots of crime and dissension, and they perceived the influx of post-civil war migration as a key source of destabilization. Hence, while the immediate aftermath of the war saw the pattern of urban migration that one might expect in the wake of major upheaval, the CCP began to devote serious time and effort to taming both the urban and rural populations- typically by offering the former a carrot and the latter a stick. For example, the countryside was negatively affected by the implementation of the Unified Purchase and Unified Sale system in 1953 by the state setting the price at which it would buy the mandated quota of crops, which naturally came under market value. The government then distributed the purchased food in urban centers, lowering the cost of living there and thereby necessitating more stringent migration policies. Consequently, the hukou system came into effect in 1958, granting governments the power to control people’s movements. 

 The government promptly began to exercise its newfound powers by recruiting millions to work in the factories meant to fuel the Great Leap Forward. This leap landed with a faceplant, and tens of millions of workers were deported back to the countryside, where tens of millions of people subsequently starved to death. The consequences of this were not only that migration to cities became even more difficult, but also that rural areas were increasingly left to fend for themselves. Depressed by unemployment and all the social ills that entails, rural regions were mandated by Mao to dust themselves off and get to building infrastructure that would boost agricultural production. That surplus, of course, would be handed over to the government at cheap prices to then be exported overseas in order to fund industrial development. The Mao era undoubtedly exhibited urban bias, a bias which persists today. Back then, as is largely the case now, urbanites enjoyed many more public goods and social services than their rural counterparts, such as education, maternity leave, pensions, medical care, and housing assistance. Moreover, the welfare provided to urban residents was in no small part funded by the labor of farmworkers, as by some estimates, the practice of buying agricultural goods at low prices resulted in the government transferring around 534 billion yuan away from the rural sector between 1955 and 1985. 

It might be curious that for all the CCP is anxious about discontentment breeding regime instability and achieving social harmony, their long-held practice of neglecting the well-being of the rustics continues to drive a wedge in between the urban and rural populaces. But this is not without consequences; dissatisfaction on both sides has long driven protests and government insecurity, perhaps hinting at an overall pattern of poison from within. 

Seedlings of Social Unrest

So what about the reform era? Surely, the government after Mao’s death saw some improvement in the lives of farmers. And indeed, while fiscal policy did raise the price at which the government purchased agricultural goods, thereby benefiting rural areas, the government quickly caved to pressure from urbanites, who sought to maintain their relative advantages. As was the case under Mao, the CCP feared the political repercussions of disgruntled city-dwellers and thus resumed the pattern whereby urban citizens cowed the government into maintaining their higher standards of living. 

Even when the government chose to respond to political unrest with military action, such as in 1989 when inflation racked the urban cost of living to the point of protest, the follow-up included amendments to the economic policies in order to quell urban discontent. Furthermore, although the reform period is known for walking back the controlled economy model, pressure for urban protections led to fund transfers to subsidize struggling state-owned enterprises. 

For all that the reform period championed economic growth, the government considered it worthwhile to sacrifice economic efficiency in order to ensure regime stability. At the same time, the CCP greatly relies on its ability to deliver on economic outcomes in order to keep the peace. By centering the economic heart of China in urban centers, and devoting significant resources to keeping that heart beating, even at the expense of rural reforms, the government has trapped itself in an unsustainable cycle. With every turn of this cycle, the second-class status of rural citizens becomes more entrenched.

To better compare, consider the CCP response to rural outcry. In the 2000s, the government continued to take over land for urban development with an explicit lack of regard for local input, and these protests were punctuated with a 2010 demand to end the Hukou system. At the time, Premier Wen Jiabao had alluded to the possibility of dismantling the system, but when the government had to respond to the clamor by suppressing circulation of these sentiments, he quickly changed his messaging to suggest more moderate changes. 

Herein lies the tension between social stability and economic improvements. To some degree, the economy is an ever-growing vine attached to the tree of Chinese societal harmony. The vine enhances the outward vibrancy of the tree, bestowing a majestic weight, and to remove the vine would peel off the protective bark with it. And yet, cultivating the vine has allowed it to grow beyond the tree’s control, consuming the life force of its host. 

This Season’s Harvest 

While the economic risks the CCP continues to run by not addressing the growing gulf between rural and urban residents are surely troubling, it is important to acknowledge that the divisions Hukou creates have a human impact on real people’s hopes and dreams and happiness. Where someone lives and what industry they work in is part of a much greater story about what they call home. 

The families of those migrants who attempt to make it in the metropolises despite their rural Hukou status are left behind on one side of the river while their loved ones desperately try to swim across. This has led to the phenomena of “left behind children,” a vulnerable group of youths who are emotionally, mentally, and academically delayed while their parents attempt to escape rural poverty. As an earlier section mentioned Socialist Serfdom, whereby Chinese society under Mao saw the systematic treatment of rural residents as the underclass, it appears this lowest class has split off into an additional caste, made up of migrants. While they do not have the same privileges as urban Hukou holders, they do have access to the amenities of city living and in general enjoy higher standards of living compared to the countryside. This comes at the cost of the families they leave behind, as Hukou restrictions limit access to both childcare and quality education. It is estimated that 1 in 5 children in China are “Left Behind,” unable to see one or more of their parents for most of the year.  

On the flipside of this, the fallout from the Covid pandemic and the subsequent rise in youth unemployment saw numerous remarks made in the spring of this year regarding a push to return China’s youths to the countryside. Are we seeing the start of a new wave of “rustication”? President Xi has recently encouraged young professionals to focus on reenergizing rural areas, to convert their urban-bred talents into countryside innovation. The idea seems to have had a decent reception, with reports by the Chinese government of increased migration to rural parts leading to improved agricultural production and higher quality rural tourism. Social media has likely played a role in idealizing farm life, an Asian counterpart to the popular cottagecore aesthetic. However, the idyllic pastoral life is not at all like influencers portray, which the young rusticated urbanites soon discover. The comforts and economic opportunities of the city still hold considerable sway over someone’s choice of where to live, especially if that person is born with an urban Hukou and thus has greater options available. These accounts make it difficult to believe at face value CCP messaging about the great enthusiasm the youth supposedly have for rural life and reads more like an attempt to preempt social turmoil brought on by idle, disillusioned young people. The government’s decision to stop reporting the rate of youth unemployment altogether makes the whole narrative even more suspect. 

This sense of disillusionment is growing stronger especially in the housing market, which like many aspects of the Chinese economy is an incoming crisis of the government’s own making. The housing market remains a sector under immense government oversight if not outright control, and the current issues it poses is in no small part linked to the Hukou system. Hukou is an instrument with which the government can control demand, and this leads to neglect of the supply side. Moreover, poor property tax systems render them an inadequate means of adjusting housing prices. And of course, in spite of the difficulties the government sets in citizens’ ways, the advantages of living in a city are still much greater in many cases than the difficulties. Decades of urban bias have built myriad social services, and even for those migrants who do not have the urban Hukou status to take full advantage of welfare, having some benefits is better than none. Although, because of the aforementioned informal caste system, migrants tend to be relegated to renting, which comes with significantly fewer benefits than home ownership. Home ownership is made even more valuable by the fact that it often dictates who gets priority to send their children to the best schools. Sometimes, even the length of time a person has resided in a school district can give them the upper hand in admissions. 

In essence, the urban populace has been pitted against one another to fight for limited housing, but the government has made housing so necessary to access the full benefits of being an urban resident that demand climbs even as the fight becomes more fatiguing. The Hukou system ostensibly seeks to curb the demand, but in fact it only aggravates these various points of contention.

The housing crisis is a symptom of the Hukou system failing both Chinese citizens and the Chinese government. But while the former would likely be better off with the abolition of the system, the latter clings to any means of controlling its people. Some have suggested that the government simply does not know how to bring Hukou to an end without sparking an upheaval that would threaten the very stability it is trying to maintain, while others speculate that this is a sign of local governments flouting central government recommendations. Perhaps it is instead correct, if radical, to say that the system of Chinese government itself is unsustainable, constantly locked in desperate need to bolster prosperity and keep a leash on the beast it scrambles to feed.   

  With this understanding, the urban-rural divide is clearly antithetical to the themes of social harmony and cohesion that the CCP supposedly desires. And yet, to stay in power the CCP has had to exacerbate this divide time and again or risk its grip on power. It seems that this contrast is useful neither for economic efficiency nor for stability, and yet without it those goals could not stay afloat. There is a Chinese saying that warns not to drink poison to slake one’s thirst. The poison here is the polarization between the urban and rural worlds, while the Chinese government thirsts for authority and economic strength. 

Educational Policy is not enough to Address Rural Educational Inequity in China and the U.S.

It has been argued that cities are the future. In recent years, there has been an uptick in highly educated individuals moving from non-urban areas to America’s major cities. Scholarly, political, and social interest in theories about “brain drain” has infiltrated many interdisciplinary fields, analyzing why there seems to be an unspoken agreement among aspiring professionals that rural areas have no opportunity. As the U.S. and China begin competing for first place in what is appearing to become a bipolar international order and as the major cities in both these countries grow wealthier and more urbanized at breakneck speed, the question about what happens to rural areas is inevitably raised. In the contemporary context of increasingly urbanized international superpowers and a pandemic-shaken world, urban/rural educational inequity is becoming a concerning issue despite not receiving nearly enough attention from policymakers around the globe. In this piece, I aim to analyze the urban/rural educational inequities in China and the U.S. and explore whether or not Chinese and American educational policy with its current characteristics and limitations is the most effective solution for tightening the educational equity gap between urban and rural communities.

Since the Chinese market reforms began in the early eighties, China’s GPD has risen dramatically, making income inequality a major policy issue in addition to widening the equity gap between urban and rural students. Although China spends over ¥5.3 trillion ($837 billion) on education, the allocation of this money is inequitable. Cities with large populations like Beijing and Shanghai require more funding, but what does this mean for places like southwestern China’s Yunnan province, among other rural regions with widespread financial instability and suppressed financial mobility? Many would argue that the state of China’s education system is not poor, at least when compared to pre-market reform China. This line of reasoning can be supported by the data showing China’s adult literacy rate rising from 65% in the 1980s to 96% today. In fact, some policy progress has been made in recent years with China’s development of an economic modernization plan, signifying the country’s commitment to basic public education for all by 2035.

However, the problem with urban and rural educational inequity cannot entirely be solved by money. Income inequity between urban and rural provinces is inexplicably related to the problems faced by China’s rural schools. With financial mobility being near impossible in rural provinces, many parents migrate to China’s major cities for work, leaving behind a generation of children widely referred to by Asian studies and development scholars as the left-behind children. Many of these children, saddled with newfound household responsibilities instead of parental academic supervision, drop out of school after the compulsory nine years of public education. Thus, the “increasing intergenerational poverty trap” is strengthened. If China’s market reforms have only aided in widening the educational inequity gap, what kind of supplemental policy has the potential to achieve more equity for rural schools?

Tackling some of the core issues in which rural poverty is rooted is a good start. Beginning in 2011, China launched a nutrition improvement plan designed for compulsory education students living in crowded, poverty-stricken areas in rural China. With ¥52 billion being spent by the central government on nutritious meal subsidies for rural students and ¥100 billion being put toward the construction of rural school canteens, many would agree that educational equity progress is heading in the right direction. Data problematizes this assumption, showing that only an approximate quarter of the rural compulsory students enjoy this policy. This likely has to do with the government’s focus on compiling nutrition quizzes for rural students and advocating more strongly for the funding of nutrition training for teachers than the funding of rural jobs that keep students’ families from having to move to large cities in order to support their children. These strategies do not address integral educational inequity issues in China like the urban/rural college gap. Over 70 percent of students from China’s major cities attend higher educational institutions as opposed to under 5 percent of students from rural, lower-income areas. China’s GPD rise has caused these inequities to increase since China’s western rural regions are struggling to keep up with the increasingly rich and increasingly urbanized cities.

This same “wealth-inequity paradox” can be seen in the U.S. In fact, many of the challenges affecting rural education in China are shared by rural schools in the U.S. As major urban areas in the U.S. like New York and D.C. have become increasingly richer, while the poor are largely excluded from any kind of financial or social mobility, which can be brought about by access to quality education. Many of the inequities facing rural education in America can be linked back to institutional racism and segregated schools. Although rural Americans as a whole have gradually attained better education over the years, students of color have considerably lower rates of college enrollment and completion. Solutions are being proposed for tightening the equity gap between rural students of color and rural white students, such as Dr. Gerri Maxwell’s proposal of more after-school programs for rural students of color and putting more of an emphasis on social justice leadership in rural K-12 schools.

Researchers have also looked into the proposal of attracting and retaining faculty members of color as a way to provide rural students of color with mentorship, but this raises the question of whether after-school programs and mentorship are enough to achieve educational equity in a country scarcely instating any policies to address this issue. While China’s rural education policies have been arguably ineffective at producing any noticeable equity in its most poverty-stricken, rural regions and with the U.S. not fully addressing the unique needs of rural schools, education policy scholars are left with few answers as to how to achieve urban/rural educational equity without the funding and support of government policy. Scholars from both China and the U.S. have supported the idea of technology as a means to bring about meaningful and sustainable change to rural schools. However, only half of the rural children in China have the necessary undisrupted access to online classes, causing a serious increase in the Chinese education gap during the pandemic. This has much to do with the mere 56.2% of rural families who have internet access at home and the staggering 7.3% of students in Chinese villages who own a computer. This problem is shared by those in America, although not to the same extent, with 35% of rural students reporting that they often or sometimes have to do their homework on smartphones and 12% reporting that they often or sometimes have to rely on places with public Wi-Fi like fast-food restaurants to do their homework. This data problematizes the increasingly popular counter to educational policy effectiveness, which argues that technology’s effectiveness in addressing and combating educational inequity seriously outweighs policy’s effectiveness. If poor students in rural America and China are being excluded from the digital age, technology without efforts to make Wi-Fi more accessible is futile.

Reports from the Asian Institute of Research offer a holistic solution to the inherently multidimensional issue of education inequity in China. The report’s first countermeasure involves “vigorously develop[ing] the rural economy” as one of the preliminary steps in combating the rural education gap. Targeting alleviation of rural poverty is another goal of the Asian Institute of Research rather than specifically targeting schools with nutrition quizzes. An interesting point brought up in the report is the emphasis on improving the social support system of rural teachers and fostering a sense of belonging rather than nutrition training among other training efforts from the government. Many of these ideas are directly applicable to the rural education challenges going on in the U.S. Dr. Gerri Mitchell’s proposal of hiring more faculty members of color is immeasurably more achievable once these faculty members are given the social and professional support needed to enjoy a sustainable career in education as well as a sense of belonging, which is essential for teacher retention. The cyclical nature of rural poverty in the U.S. and China is driven by a myriad of causes, including institutional racism in the U.S., rural taxes in China, and the decline of industries that formerly sustained these regions in both countries. These driving forces prove that development policies would be much more effective in addressing the urban/rural educational inequity gap in the U.S. and China than educational policies alone.

These holistic, economy-focused policies will only work in accompaniment with government acknowledgment of the social determinants of learning. Similar to the social determinants of health, a prominent public health theory analyzing the ways in which one’s surroundings, identity, and lived experience contribute more significantly to their health than their individual choices, the theory of social determinants of education works to place more emphasis on the context of one’s surroundings, identity and lived experience over a school’s individual choices, a teacher’s individual choices, or a student’s individual choices. Specifically for a rural student, one’s social environment and community, economic stability, and physical environment and community are significant contributing factors toward their academic success. For a school, its physical environment and community are overlooked aspects of its success. Rundown schools in communities with failing job markets and economic instability are widespread in rural America and China. They cannot be fixed by educational policies alone but rather policies that address the reasons why these schools and communities are struggling in the first place. Overall, the work to end rural educational inequity in China and America begins with poverty-reduction policies.

Bodhissatva of Compassion: The Dalai Lama and the Convergence of Politics and Religion

Introduction

History is no stranger to the connection between religious and political authority. Whether one chooses to study the vast tomes of European literature or the oracle bones of ancient China, they will inevitably discover a clear link between rulers and the religions their subjects practiced. Multiple European monarchs were declared “Defenders of the Faith” for upholding the virtues of Christian exceptionalism, and although the Venice of today betrays the history of Catholic political coordination, the Papal States often directly influenced the political affairs of most European states whether Catholic or otherwise. Most Chinese rulers derived their power from the “Mandate of Heaven”—a justification both material and divine for the rule of the emperor—which spread in various capacities to additional Asian nation-states like Korea, Japan, and Vietnam. These examples are far from isolated, and they serve as only the most popularly known iterations of this “divine right of kings”. But while the monarchs of the Renaissance or antiquity might have recognized a clearer bridge between religious and political life, most modern states have adopted secular models of governance. Disregarding vocal evangelical or traditionalist voting blocs, most living in the developed world would be shocked to witness presidents, prime ministers, or governors  proclaiming themselves to be representatives of some spiritual presence.

Of course, there are always exceptions to the rule. Iran, officially the Islamic Republic of Iran, is a functional theocracy, having been established by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as a Shi’ite state. Iran’s constitution begins by lauding the god of Islam, dedicating all that follows from the start to “Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful.” The state of Iran exists, both intentionally and in practice, as an Islamic state, with a criminal justice system influenced heavily by sharia (Islamic) law and an inextricable link between political and religious life. Likewise, the aforementioned Holy See operates in a similarly theocratic manner, with the Pope possessing near-unilateral control of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches ex officio. Although the Vatican City technically operates as an independent, secular entity, its bylaws are almost directly decided by the Pope and the College of Cardinals. In both instances, Iran and the Vatican officially acknowledge the Ayatollah and Pope respectively as holy men who either directly or indirectly commune with the divine. Although these states are rare, they are far from nonexistant. Furthermore, these states often grant extreme power to the highest executive  official, allowing them not only to influence the faithful, but over the administrative system as well.

One of the leading deviations from this trend is the 14th Dalai Lama: Tenzin Gyatso. Born in 1940 shortly before the conclusion of the Chinese civil war, Tenzin has largely lived the life of a refugee, having fled from China in 1959 following the suppression of the Tibetan national uprising in Lhasa and remaining in India ever since. The path of Gyatso’s life has been a winding one, with his aims, goals, and intentions shifting as the political situation in Tibet and China itself has changed. Many know the Dalai Lama as a figure of personal spirituality and religious charity, similar to Mother Theresa in his achievements and contributions. To critics, his writings are commonly associated with the “lukewarm Buddhists” and  “dharma-hoppers” of Western Buddhism, encouraging a lifestyle free of obligation to one’s self or others and prevailing the “self-help book epidemic” of other faux-enlightenment figures like Joel Osteen. Despite this apathetic or outright scathing view of Gyatso, for Tibetan Buddhists and Chinese government officials, the nature of his position as Dalai Lama runs far deeper. In fact, it is quite possible that his life—and more importantly his death—could rock the very foundation of Tibet more than any individual alive today. Questions thus remain: what exactly is the Dalai Lama? Why did he need to flee in 1959, and why has he refused to return to his homeland? What are the political implications of his inevitable demise, for Tibet and elsewhere?

In attempting to answer these questions, and others, I wish to explicitly state that I am neither Buddhist nor Tibetan, and my knowledge of the Dalai Lama and Tibet stem only from self-study. While I source my statements, I acknowledge that there is doubtlessly information which I have missed and cultural dynamics which may go over my head. However, in presenting this topic, I not only aim to educate readers about a niche concept within foreign policy, but also to provide an outsider, third-party account of the Dalai Lama affair.

Life After Death: Reincarnation and the Nature of the Dalai Lama

It is first important to understand the lineage of the Dalai Lama and how his divine nature manifests. Buddhism is, to most, a religion of “undesirable reincarnation”: meaning that individuals are trapped within the cycle of death and rebirth (known as samsara) until they achieve nirvana or spiritual enlightenment. Much of Buddhist scripture revolves around this process of samsara, with the centuries-old Bardo Thodol—known in the West as the Tibetan Book of the Dead—describing how an individual should and must react during death to achieve total enlightenment. Across the Middle East, East Asia, and Oceaniac islands, Buddhism has taken many shapes and forms, with various sects borrowing aspects of Christianity and Islam. Likewise, Buddhism has had a deep influence on the history and development of modern Hinduism, Jainism, and many other Central and South Asian religions, and has itself been influenced by these faiths. For example, the idea of dharma—or a virtuous life—is cited to have originally appeared in Hindu texts but was later adopted by Buddhists to mean following the doctrine of the Buddhist teachers.

Bearing this in mind, the various interpretations of Buddhism mean that certain denominations believe that individuals may consciously choose to continue the cycle of rebirth after achieving enlightenment for the purpose of guiding fellow Buddhists to achieve moksha (freedom from samsara). These tulka (or tulku singular) as they are known are not trapped within the cycle, but instead opt to reincarnate into another person in order to forever distribute their wisdom and understanding of nirvana. When applied to the Dalai Lama, this specifically refers to his status as tulku, a reincarnated host body of the bodhissatva (Buddhist teacher) Avalokiteshvara. Technically, no historically-accepted source confirms that Avalokiteshvara ever truly existed as all writings concerning his (or her in some accounts) life derive from spiritual sources. However, this wealth of textual accounts confirms at least that his status within the Tibetan school of Buddhism—known traditionally as a branch of Vajrayana Buddhism—has been long-revered, with a majority of Tibetan Buddhists accepting the Dalai Lama as the reincarnation of this divine figure. To some then, the nature of this high status might at first appear puzzling. Is Avalokiteshvara a human or god? As such, is the Dalai Lama then a human or god?

When asked whether being perceived as a divine figure was a burden or a blessing, the Dalai Lama responded that “It is very helpful.” This answer reveals a few layers of the Dalai Lama’s importance as both a religious figure and a political leader. On the one hand, given that Avalokiteshvara was an enlightened human who chose to continue samsara, their reincarnation means that the Tibetan authority derives from the material world. Furthermore, with Avalokiteshvara being described as originating from Tibet, this meant the ultimate authority of Tibet could only derive from a Tibetan. On the other hand, because Avalokiteshvara is simultaneously human and a mythical figure with divine background and seemingly-inaccessible levels of enlightenment, this means that the Dalai Lama is unique among modern theocratic figures in that he is essentially the reincarnation of a god. Thus, Tibetan political organization is somewhat similar to the aforementioned Chinese “Mandate of Heaven”. Decrees, policies, or wisdom revealed by the Dalai Lama cannot be questioned because they are officially the ordained words of a divine bodhissatva.

It should be noted that the process for revealing the next Dalai Lama has differed throughout the hundreds of years since the third Dalai Lama’s appointment in 1543. This Dalai Lama, Sonam Gyatso, posthumously appointed two predecessors to be his past lives and officially began the lineage of the Dalai Lama. From Sonam, an esoteric procedure was established, where the Dalai Lama, on his deathbed, would foresee the birthplace of his successor tulku. Traditionally, the dreams, visions, and predictions of other high lamas—that is to say the Dalai Lama’s spiritual and political advisors—additionally influenced this operation. Scholars have long commented on the unique dynastic relationship in the Tibetan case, since unlike elsewhere, the Dalai Lama was not based on genetic lineage. As the Dalai Lama has reflected, the process of choosing a Dalai Lama has an egalitarian and indirectly democratic manner of selection. Although some tulkus have originated from those coincidentally close to the high lamas who would have the final say in choosing the next Dalai Lama, most have come from humble beginnings. All have exhibited varying degrees of administrative competence and interpretation of their role as a governmental figure, and this is owed to all coming from different backgrounds and families.

The Dalai Lama and the CCP

All of this being said, a reader might now competently predict the widespread concern over the inevitable selection of the 15th Dalai Lama following the death of the reigning one. While Tibetans had worried for decades over the future of the Dalai Lama’s succession, the Chinese government made official in 2011 that the monastic process of selection would no longer be officially considered. Only Beijing would have the power to select another Dalai Lama, and any other successor candidates would not be considered. But why has the CCP directed intense attention toward the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation? How has the government justified this action, and how has the 14th Dalai Lama responded? More than anything, is there any substantial evidence to suggest that the Chinese government will follow through with its promises? Or are these simply empty threats that the CCP will allow to turn-over upon the passing of the current Dalai Lama?

First, an understanding of Chinese authority over Tibet is necessary to understand the two entitites’ relationship. China holds a long and arduous history with Tibet, but the modern administration over Tibet began in January, 1950, when the Maoist government—freshly in control of mainland China—declared that it would “liberate” Tibet from the yoke of the Dalai Lama. In fairness, there is worthwhile evidence to suggest that life under the Dalai Lama at this time was not beneficial for many Tibetans. As Sorrell Neuss from The Guardian argues: “feudalism and abuse in Tibetan culture has been conveniently forgotten.” From 1913 up to firm Chinese control over Tibetan affairs in 1951, many sources claim that the Drepung Monestary (the controlling monestary of Tibet) enforced a primitive system of serfdom which placed the Tibetan commoners into servitude for the state. A plethora of documented evidence exists which points to medieval-styled torture practices for those who disobeyed the high lamas, with criminals occassionally having their eyes gouged out or their arms forcibly amputated depending on the severity of the wrongdoing. As such, the arrival of the PLA in Lhasa in 1950 was not received entirely negatively, for although Drepung had raised levies against Chinese forces, many wished to see the government go.

Unfortunately, as current critiques toward Chinese rule reveal, the process of “Hanification”—that is, the ostensible ethnic migration and social change of non-Han Chinese territories—has been far from a net positive. Some credit should be given to the Chinese, as with any authoritarian state, in partially uplifting the conditions of the Tibetan people. At the time of occupation, life-expectancy was only 36 years and over 95% of the population was illiterate. Not only did this create a legitimately-sourced moral obligation to the Chinese, it allowed officials to express the factual shortcomings of the Dalai Lama’s rule. Shortly after its incorporation into the PRC, these failures and others were fixed by educating the population and introducing modern medicine to the region. Industrial development and the construction of novel infrastructure—from hospitals to paved roads—brought unparalleled levels of prosperity to the region. To its credit, China has continued to introduce the amenities and and pleasures of modernity to Tibet. As of 2021, the CCP had even pledged $30 billion USD to the development of a 435 kilometer (roughly 270 mile) long high-speed railway linked to Lhasa across the Tibet region.

But even under the USSR did literacy increase. As with the introduction of most authoritarian rulers—regardless of their race, ideology, or intentions—not all Tibetans gained from the occupation. The first to face drastic change were the Phala nomadic peoples of Western Tibet, who were furthest from Beijing’s grasp and had long enjoyed the freedom of their livelihood. Following an uprising in Lhasa in 1959—which formally drove the Dalai Lama and his supporters into exile—the CCP began a full-scale revision of the Tibetan way of life, including for the pastoral Tibetans of the west. Under the rogre (“mutual aid”) system, poor households—which included nomadic peoples unaccustomed to agriculture—were forced (often under threat of violence) into sedentary units to increase crop yields. This is only a glimpse into the way the CCP has drastically altered the lifestyle of many Tibetans, and not always for a net positive. As late as August, 2021, during a celebration of the CCP’s 70th anniversary of rule over Tibet, Beijing insisted on the Tibetan way of life being discarded to adopt a lifestyle more “Chinese in orientation.”

In practice, the consequences for refusing this “Chinese-oriented” lifestyle have been imprisonment, torture, and even death. One of the more notable victims of this refusal include Choekyi Gyaltsen, the 10th Panchen Lama—another theocratic figure who will be brought up later—who directly opposed Chinese rule. In response, Chinese authorities stripped him of all power, declared him an “enemy of the people of Tibet”, humiliated him (both verbally and physically), and forced him to disavow his faith in a public letter. Similar stories happened to hundreds to thousands of Tibetan Buddhists who refused to renounce their religion and heritage. This treatment has continued up until today, as human rights organizations continue to report a failure on behalf of Chinese officials to uphold freedom of religion, press, movement, and assembly. Materially, Tibetan protestors have repeatedly complained about the frequency of local Beijing-appointed officials simply disregarding Tibetan rights and property. Land-grabs are increasingly common, and numerous reports have surfaced of land being sold away for mining rights without small-scale owners’ permission. These mines have resulted in the desecration of Tibetan land and ecosystems, as improper lithium and gold mining have stripped the land of its former beauty. Clearly, the situation is a complicated one, with a variety of arguments for and against Chinese rule over Tibet.

Based on Prescedent: The Story of the Panchen Lama

What does this all mean for the Dalai Lama? Ultimately, aside from the abuses under the high lamas’ rule in the early-mid 20th century—during which Tenzin Gyatso was only a child and had no official power—it is clear that Chinese rule over Tibet is far from an objective good for all parties. But unfortunately, these reports are far from anything new for those interested in the history of human rights under the CCP. As this article from Helen Davidson at The Guardian makes evident, contemporary concerns over rights abuses in China are not only limited to Tibet, but also to Outer Mongolia, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and elsewhere. What is it about the Dalai Lama situation that makes it unique?

As stated previously, the biggest fear concerning the Dalai Lama as a political figure for Tibetan Buddhists, and specifically his cycle of reincarnation, is that the CCP is likely to tamper with the results of the process. As Krithika Varagur from Foreign Policy put it in her article “The Coming Fight for the Dalai Lama’s Soul”: “There is no question about this: There will be two candidates for the next Dalai Lama.” Considerations surrounding who exactly will succeed Tenzin Gyatso as Dalai Lama have farther reaching implications than the perception from most Westerners that the position’s opening will not matter in the grand scheme of things. After all, why would Buddhists or Hindus care about the death or abdication of a pope? But it is not only that his death will bring about a time of mourning for many Buddhists, but there is evidence to suggest that the Chinese Communist Party will interfere with the process by proclaiming their “own” Dalai Lama and raising him to support the state and its actions in Tibet.

One of thes best ways to illustrate the likelihood of this is to explain the series of events which surrounded the aforementioned 10th Panchen Lama’s succession following his death in 1989. To digress, the very circumstances surrounding his passing are looked at from some Tibetans with suspicion, as Choekyi Gyaltsen died of a heart attack aged 50 just five days after delivering a speech in which he stated that the “price paid for [Tibet’s] development has been greater than the gains.” Choekyi’s status as Panchen Lama—being the tulku reincarnation of the buddha Amitabha and effectively the second-highest position in the Tibetan Buddhist administration—left a vacuum similar to that which the Dalai Lama might  leave following his passing. As both Choekyi and Tenzin had long feared, two separate Panchen Lamas were discovered in 1995: Gyaincain Norbu and Gedhun Choekyi Nyima.

Gedhun was appointed first by the Dalai Lama as the official successor to Choekyi on May 14th, 1995. In one of the most flagrant examples of CCP corruption, Chinese authorities apprehended Gedhun Nyima and his parents just four days later, citing “concern” that the family might be kidnapped by “Tibetan separatists”. To this day, neither Gedhun Nyima nor his parents have contacted anyone outside of China, nor have they appeared alive in television appearances or documented journals. According to CCP officials, as of 2020, Gedhun is claimed to be living as a “college graduate with a stable job” and has refused to accept his ordained position, arguing that he was never the chosen candidate. Gyaincain—known by his religious name Qoigyijabu—was selected on December 8th, 1995, much to the chagrin of most Tibetans, especially those living abroad. As expected, Gyaincain has repeatedly upheld Beijing’s ideology and statements, condemning an anti-CCP protest in Lhasa in 2010, claiming that it was detrimental to national unity. More recently, Gyaincain expressed pro-socialist sentiment, urging Tibet to “sinicize” in order to modernize by embracing the PRC.

Thus, the story of the Panchen Lama’s succession stands as a bleak indicator of what could be to come for the Dalai Lama. Theories range wildly around the identity and current place of Gedhun Nyima. It is entirely possible that he is alive as the CCP insists, and it is equally possible that he and his family were unfortunately murdered by the government, as is the fate of many political prisoners in China. Some have theorized that, assuming Gedhun is alive, that he is being kept healthy only to deter the Dalai Lama or any other influential Tibetan authorities from proclaiming another Panchen Lama aside from Gyaincain. In the event that a new Panchen Lama was announced, Gedhun could be released to the world, exposing the “falsification” of divine Tibetan authority, and thereby undermining the Buddhist powerbase that exists in Tibet today.

 Concluding Remarks: What is to Come

There is no doubt that the Chinese Communist Party will directly influence and decide the next Dalai Lama. Since Beijing’s promise to retain heavy oversight over the process in 2011, the process of selecting another Dalai Lama is almost guaranteed to be heavily biased in favor of the CCP and the Chinese paradigm. The death of any theocratic figure poses deep, complicated questions for the future of their religious adherents. It is vital to understand that the entire future of an independent—or at least autonomous—Tibet may hang in the very balance should the CCP choose to rig the selection process, as they clearly have previously. The United States must support the self-determination of the Tibetan people, as well as demand freedom or at least the truth behind what happened to Gedhun Nyima. In fighting for the liberation of the Tibetan people from Chinese oversight, and in demanding the inevitable selection of the next Dalai Lama be fair and transparent, there is hope for Tibetan Buddhism to maintain its stability and for Tibetans to regain control over their culture and destiny.

The AUKUS Deal, China, and Nuclear Non-proliferation

The AUKUS deal is a security partnership involving Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It was announced in September, and its first project will be to provide Australia with a nuclear-powered submarine fleet. Although diesel-fueled submarines are useful, nuclear submarines can “remain submerged almost indefinitely” without a snorkel, and many suspect that one of the main purposes of this partnership is to offset the power of the Indo-Pacific region. However, while trying to get the upper hand, Australia would “have to become the first non-nuclear-weapon state to exercise a loophole that allows it to remove nuclear material from the inspection system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).” China’s perspective is that this will negatively interfere with the arms race, and other influential people involved in non-proliferation efforts worldwide have denounced the agreement. However, 60 percent of US residents do support the AUKUS deal due to national security, and the deed is done. The pact has been made, and Australia’s previous partnership with France for diesel-fueled submarines has ended. The only remaining steps are to prepare for the implications of actually delivering the fleet and be mindful about how other agreements may be compromised by this action.

Interests in the Indo-Pacific Region and Conflict with China

The European Union has strategized over the Indo-Pacific region for a long time. After the United Kingdom left the European Union, however, the U.K. reportedly did not consult with the EU about the AUKUS deal, and foreign policy has become alarmingly less unified. At the same time, it is obvious that the EU would oppose it with the U.K. having left because the agreement caused Australia to cancel a $40 billion submarine deal with France—the country that actually initiated European engagement in the Indo-Pacific. Regardless of opinion on the efficacy of the deal, however, this development also shows the increasing lack of coordination among the European Union, the United States, and allies. Gone are the days of a united front, despite there being an overall goal of non-proliferation.

Meanwhile, it has been four years since Australia’s then-prime minister Malcolm Turnbull declared they would “stand up” to China, the country that actually remains to this day their biggest trading partner. The relationship between China and Australia has also worsened since then, particularly due to the fact that the latter called for a global inquiry surrounding the initial outbreak of COVID-19 and China’s handling of the situation. While their trade relationship is still well, China has responded to Australia’s declarations with bans and restrictions on its goods. In the context of these tense relations, it only makes sense for Australia to be bracing itself in regard to China. 

In reviewing this analysis, it makes sense that the components of the AUKUS deal would be a priority for all parties. Yet, China has argued that those involved in the AUKUS agreement have a “Cold War mentality.” While the White House has disputed the idea that the AUKUS deal has anything to do with the Indo-Pacific region, China’s claims are not entirely unfounded, and there is no denying the substantial difficulties between countries—particularly in the aftermath of the Trump administration. Additionally, many have noted that specifically in regard to China, deterrence has worked relatively well with nuclear activity, and hanging onto mediocre agreements could be the best move as of current.

A Double Standard in United States Nuclear Foreign Policy

To zoom in on the United States, the country has a clear double standard in terms of nuclear technology and foreign policy. For a quick reality check, the U.S. has more nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines than China, and in terms of submarines as a whole, the United States has 68 while China has 12. In fact, the total number of submarines belonging to the United States is more than that of China, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and India combined. To top it off, in terms of use, “the United States and Russia each have deployed five times more nuclear warheads than Beijing possesses”—and it is known that the threat of China is one of the main reasons for this deal. Although power cannot be boiled down to submarines or even military resources in general, the importance of focusing on gaining an upper hand with nuclear technology versus focusing on non-proliferation is debatable, particularly in the following context. While boasting a strong fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, the United States has emphasized non-proliferation efforts yet also come into conflict with countries not considered to be allies over their refusal to cooperate with the United States’ wishes. 

Critics have been pointing out Washington’s hypocrisy over nuclear weapons for years. In 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry visited Seoul and said that “North Korea will not be accepted as a nuclear power.” President Barack Obama said the same year that Iran possessing a nuclear weapon at all is “a red line for us.” At the same time, the Obama administration was planning “to spend billions on upgrading nuclear bombs stored in Europe to make the weapons more reliable and accurate.” The United States has also tried to impose a number of sanctions on other countries for nuclear weapons over the years while it expands its own powers. Additionally, the Iran nuclear deal, or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was made official in 2015, but in 2018, President Donald Trump left the deal, furthering United States hypocrisy surrounding nuclear weapons. 

However, it is important to note that while looking at current statistics about the U.S. military versus the militaries of other world powers, projections for the future are concerning. Reportedly, the nuclear arsenal of China could triple by the year 2030, meaning 1,000 nuclear warheads would be in its possession. Beyond that, the Pentagon is troubled by the prospect of new technology, specifically how nuclear strategists in China are approaching “nontraditional arms,” and the launch of a hypersonic missile in July showed a design that was meant to “evade the United States’ primary missile interceptors, which can operate only in outer space.” While there is a clear double standard in terms of United States nuclear foreign policy, that does not mean that the U.S. should ignore or underestimate the chance of greater threats to come.

Overall Implications of the AUKUS Deal

The AUKUS deal is arguably counterintuitive to rhetoric flowing from the United States about non-proliferation. While the U.S. has sanctioned other countries, particularly ones in the Middle East, for working with nuclear materials, this new agreement will actively help close allies gain nuclear technology. Other countries may perceive the U.S. as hypocritical when observing through that lens. Additionally, although maintaining a strong military is critical in the context of current concerns, including China, a glimpse at U.S. resources indicates that pursuing more may be excessive. Moreover, focusing on the military when it comes to China may actually threaten the security of the United States. Defense analyst William Hartung who focuses on the economics of Pentagon spending argued, “Focusing on China is a good way to pump up the Pentagon’s already bloated budget—which is currently higher than the peaks of the Korean or Vietnam wars or the Reagan buildup of the 1980s—but it will not make us safer.” Consistently bolstering the resources of the United States military is not the way to deal with the flawed U.S.-China relationship. Putting such an emphasis on war can fuel the flames of a conflict.

Furthermore, the whole idea of the AUKUS agreement is debatable, but the most imminent worrisome situation is how the new Australian fleet will set a precedent. If Australia does end up with the nuclear fleet, it will end up becoming the first country without nuclear weapons to utilize a loophole allowing for them to take nuclear material from the International Atomic Energy Agency’s inspection system. As stated by James Acton from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “In the future, would-be proliferators could use naval reactor programs as cover for the development of nuclear weapons—with the reasonable expectation that, because of the Australia precedent, they would not face intolerable costs for doing so.” Since a major part of nuclear non-proliferation efforts is about enforcement decisions, as in, many policies currently in place are subjective to an extent, this sets a dangerous example for the future. 

Moving Forward With Strategic Stability Talks

While the AUKUS agreement is a questionable move, it is important to acknowledge that President Joe Biden has recently indicated after the virtual summit that the White House would like to hold “strategic stability talks,” and China’s President Xi Jinping expressed a willingness to participate in these talks. Concededly, the relationship between countries may not be strong enough to profit from formal negotiations, but alternative options have been explored; for example, the meeting of nongovernmental experts from each country has been put on the table. Although the particular method of discussion has not yet been clarified, the recent summit has opened the door to security measures that do not fully revolve around the military. The AUKUS deal may have thrown a wrench in non-proliferation progress by setting a dangerous precedent for nuclear possession, but the heightened tensions exacerbated by the agreement have been met with a response of cooperation.

China’s COVID Vaccine Diplomacy

Ever since January 2020 when the first cases of COVID were discovered in Hubei Province, China has had a significant role to play in the development and distribution of COVID vaccine doses. The public-private partnerships which joined the resources of the Chinese government with the manufacturing capabilities of the country’s pharmaceutical companies have allowed them to make speedy progress, and that has opened opportunities for providing global assistance during the pandemic. Indeed, China has made offers to a number of countries in a move that could be seen as a public service, a strategic play, or a combination of the two. The Chinese government has pushed one narrative, of course, but there is no denying that China has extensive room for growth in terms of soft power. China’s capabilities have increased its competitiveness with the West and opened doors to its expansion on the national market. Though, much of China’s COVID vaccine operations remain ambiguous. Firstly, there is uncertainty about the safety and efficacy of the country’s three vaccines. There is also confusion and a lack of transparency surrounding the vaccine research. There is skepticism about China’s follow through and what they may ask for in return. There are also the Chinese people who need to be cared for. China is acting on the center stage during this COVID pandemic, and there is no unified expectation from its spectators.

Global Assistance from China

Last May, Chinese President Xi Jinping allocated large sums of money to about 17 vaccine projects and gathered 22 firms and research institutes to get to work. With this devotion to overcoming the pandemic that killed so many and initially tarnished China’s reputation, China has committed to delivering about half a billion doses of vaccine to over 45 countries. These countries are low and middle income, and they are struggling to meet their demand due to the costs and requirements of Pfizer, Moderna, and the like. One difference between these Western vaccines and China’s, for example, is that the latter do not require ultracold storage; standard refrigerators are sufficient. This alleviates the problem of transporting mass amounts of vaccines to areas without substantive infrastructure. Many low and middle income countries see China’s offer as more cost-effective and distributable than the other vaccines. 

Although the Chinese government rejects the phrase due to its negative connotations, this global assistance has been called “vaccine diplomacy.” Many suspect that China’s actions are less of a public service than they are a political move, and the Associated Press relayed “concerns about what China might want in return for deliveries.” It is not yet clear what China expects from the countries they have pledged to help, but no matter the intention, China has a lot to gain from this circumstance. 

China’s Competition with the West

China’s primary gains from assisting low and middle income countries are in regard to competing with the West. Assisting Serbia and Hungary, for example, is a “geopolitical victory in Central Europe and the Balkans.” This will give China greater economic influence in the region. This diplomacy is also about showing China’s advancements and proving that they can keep up with the United States. Foreign Affairs quoted a Chinese virologist who said that China is “not lagging behind the United States as far as the technology is concerned,” and the research is being conducted in public-private partnerships. President Emmanuel Macron of France said that China’s vaccine diplomacy was “a little bit humiliating” for the West, and to top it all off, the Chinese government is pushing rhetoric and theories about how COVID did not originate in the country and American vaccines are unsafe. China is attempting to establish itself as the world leader in COVID response.

Additionally, China’s involvement in COVAX (COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access) compels the World Health Organization (WHO)to approve vaccines that were developed in China. This is because China has committed to buying a certain amount of vaccines, and they have the option to choose Chinese brands. If the WHO permits the use of China’s COVID vaccines, COVAX may order these vaccines for developing countries, therefore expanding China’s market share. Some estimates predict that COVID vaccines may bring more than 10 billion dollars in sales. COVID vaccine diplomacy is a way for China’s pharmaceutical companies to broaden their scope. 

Joining COVAX is also a way that China is leading in comparison to the United States because former President Donald Trump chose to give up the opportunity for soft power that China has been pursuing. He refused to join COVAX, and he refused to offer vaccine aid to any country — including allies of the U.S. Foreign Affairs viewed the United States’s action — or inaction — as a nationalist path, yet they also pointed out that this play only bolstered China’s benefits from vaccine diplomacy. While the Biden administration has since joined COVAX, China has already been able to make major strides in distribution pledges and gain influence. If former President Trump had just joined COVAX from the beginning, it is possible that the low and middle income countries that China has been collaborating with would have had a more difficult decision. Instead, the concerns about the safety and efficacy of China’s COVID vaccines have been overlooked by these countries due to their major lack of options.

The Safety and Efficacy of China’s COVID Vaccines

China has developed several vaccines, but there are concerns about how safe and effective they are. One of the vaccines, Sinopharm, is reportedly 79 percent effective. CanSino is reportedly 65 percent effective. There is a significant amount of variation in research about the Sinovac vaccine, and it could be anywhere from 50 percent to 91 percent effective. Although the Sinopharm, CanSino, and Sinovac vaccines seem to have their benefits, this should be put in perspective. Although the three vaccines developed by the Chinese seem to have their benefits, these efficacy rates are significantly lower than the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines that are 95 percent and 94.1 percent effective, respectively. To be fair, while Dr. Anthony Fauci said that he would like a vaccine to be at minimum 75 percent effective, the minimum requirement for a vaccine to be approved by the Federal Drug Administration is only 50 percent. The main issue here is about whether or not these percentages are even on the nose. 

This issue has arisen because information about the Chinese vaccine studies is difficult to come by. None of the three Chinese companies have released their late-stage clinical trial data to the public, and multiple requests to interview have been declined by the vaccine companies. If China cannot deliver, Beijing will not gain much from the pledges it has made. As stated by the Associated Press: “China’s vaccine diplomacy will be only as good as the vaccines it is offering, and it still faces hurdles.” 

Honoring Promises and China’s Own Population

Western vaccine makers are not alone in their struggle to meet production goals; there is widespread concern that China may not be able to follow through with the commitments they have made in a timely manner. As aforementioned, Chinese vaccine makers have not been the most transparent, and the public only knows a bit about how production levels are thus far — but what is known does not paint a good outlook. For example, Sinovac production levels reached only half of its intended manufacturing capacity in January.

It is unclear if China will be able to deliver on its promises, and shipments have already been delayed and fallen short repeatedly. In Southeast Asia, the region which has been promised the most vaccine doses, it is predicted that mass immunization will take until at least 2024. Revealingly, China has promised many countries in Southeast Asia priority access to the Chinese vaccines. Moreover, there is uncertainty about how the Chinese government will proceed with juggling their vaccine diplomacy on top of taking care of their own people. There are 1.4 billion people in China, and its COVID vaccine makers have been consistently coming up short. China has a goal to vaccinate only 40 percent of its population by the end of July, and at the beginning of March, “China had committed more than ten times as many doses overseas as it had administered in China,” according to Foreign Affairs. 

China has been a prevalent actor in the development and distribution of COVID vaccine doses. Although the Chinese government has denied that they are participating in “vaccine diplomacy,” they have made moves to help them restore their reputation, pull ahead of Western competition, and expand China’s share in the international vaccine market. However, while the public-private partnerships in the creation and manufacturing of Chinese vaccines jump-started the country’s scientific and diplomatic successes, their gains have been threatened by their shortfalls on pledges made to low and middle income countries in need of vaccine doses, and there remains uncertainty about the safety and efficacy of each Chinese vaccine. On top of that, China has not yet delivered much for its own citizens. There is significant uncertainty surrounding China’s vaccine diplomacy that will unfold in the coming months.

Regional Cooperation Prospects: The Case of ASEAN

  In spite of border closures and efforts to isolate during the pandemic, we continue to live in an interdependent and connected world. Supply chains are globally intertwined, families transcend borders - even continents - and it remains the global imperative to continue communicating and collaborating in order to address the concerns of the pandemic. This is why regional organizations remain an important way to ensure cooperation and integration across borders. One such organization, ASEAN, was established on August 8th of 1967 in Bangkok by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, these countries were joined by Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia. As with most regional bodies, ASEAN’s formation was principally motivated by trade, but the mission goals of the group soon expanded to include regional integration, promotion of social growth, regional security, and sustainable development. The organization steadily grew to develop partnerships throughout East Asia, Oceania, as well as Western countries such as the EU, Canada, and the US through the ASEAN Regional Forum. 

            Overall, the organization has enjoyed a continuous and relatively stable existence ever since its formation and has come a long way since having a 5-article proclamation of its formation. Its terms of membership, mission statements, goals, and spheres of interest are increasingly complex and ever-expanding. However, this does not come without its limitations. The organization has also been criticized for being too loosely connected and not sufficiently involved in promoting equal growth, peace, and stability as it claims to be doing. These challenges to its mission are strong to this day. The pandemic and recent political developments throughout the world calling for a rise in authoritarianism and a halt in international cooperation only threaten to further destabilize and discredit ASEAN in spite of its great potential as a regional body. In order to maintain its credibility and success, as well as improve its future prospects, ASEAN should focus on political and socio-cultural collaboration more intensely, which it already has a basis for in its Charter as of 2008. Additionally, the body should look up to uphold the ASEAN Community ideals, and it should strive to increase and diversify its economic collaboration to include countries in other world regions, such as those in Africa and Latin America. Emphasizing the political and socio-cultural aspects of its mission will strengthen the currently fragile regional feelings of unity and trust in ASEAN as a regional organization and even an authority, while its expansion of economic interests to include those of other state actors and regional organizations throughout the Northern and Southern hemispheres would increase its trade and collaboration prospects, as well as help increase ASEAN’s independence from its traditional trading partners, allowing it more agency and choice.

Current Challenges

            ASEAN has enjoyed more than half a century of existence as an organization and a regional economic and somewhat socio-political body. Major challenges accompanied it throughout this period. After all, virtually all of its members are facing the complicated consequences of colonialism and have to operate within the post-colonial context in which they are left to struggle to model largely western model of a nation state. The region has suffered intrusion from the British, the French, the Dutch, the Portuguese, the Spanish, and later on Imperial Japan. The Philippines also found itself under US occupation. The great socio-cultural diversity in the region was largely left unaccounted for in the colonial era and following decolonization efforts after WWII. This colonial heritage leaves Southeast Asian states to simultaneously navigate processes of state formation and regional cooperation through ASEAN. This is a very unique context and a unique situation; and given these postcolonial circumstances under which ASEAN was formed, it is a grand success that it remains as operational and effective as it is today. On one hand, colonial experience, as well as the threat and presence of foreign influence during the Cold War, can be attributed as major factors in the decision of original members to finally unite in 1967 and then also work towards regional security cooperation on top of economic collaboration. However, these very circumstances also raise many uncertainties and questions. 

The region has experienced increasing turmoil in the last century. Vietnam and Cambodia have seen major political upheaval during and after the Cold War, Indonesia has faced numerous man-made uncontrolled forest fires and other environmental catastrophes, and Myanmar remains in a contentious political situation following a coup in early February of this year. ASEAN has been criticized internationally for failing to address these concerns beyond merely mentioning or acknowledging them in its committee sessions throughout the years. This is due in part to its emphasis on respect for sovereignty and fear of disturbing the forces of nationalism that came out as a logical response to the state formation process in the post-colonial world. Disturbance of this delicate balance ASEAN is currently maintaining with sovereign and national governments would inevitably lead to its destruction. ASEAN did, however, manage to more comprehensively address the issues affecting the region through its Charter signed in 2007 that went into effect in 2008. The Charter is now emphasizing the organization’s commitment towards accountability, protection of human rights, and democratic freedoms throughout its member states. This is a legally binding agreement demanding the member states’ commitment to these ideals and there are serious repercussions were these not to be abided by, including suspension of member privileges, sanctions, and even expulsion from the organization. However, more serious advances have been criticized and largely opposed by some member states. As such, ASEAN remains limited in its ability to actually act on its stature and appropriately address deviation from the unanimous charter. Addressing nationalist concerns means the organization must be heavily dependent on consensus and consultation on every major decision. 

ASEAN Community 2015 is another way in which ASEAN is looking to increase its legitimacy. The idea of ASEAN Community is grounded in the foundational ideal of ASEAN to increase regional cooperation and a sense of community among Southeast Asian states. It contains three pillars being in order: Political-Security Community, Economic Community, and Socio-Cultural Community. The member states have agreed to increase its cooperation across the three sectors for the purpose of greater cooperation, but it is no coincidence that the pillars are listed in that order. The organization prioritized addressing mutual concern for sovereignty of the region and, most importantly, each nation state as the primary goal, with traditionally accepted economic or trade interests as the second goal, and the idea for a socio-cultural pillar was thrown in briefly afterwards at a suggestion by the Philippines. This illustrates a major organizational flaw which is a lack of concern for actual socio-cultural community building, even though precisely this pillar may have unique potential to address the nationalist sentiments and bring the change from bottom up instead of from top down, resulting in a more sustainable socio-political makeup of the region in the future. 

Prospects for the Future

            The organization remains exposed to various challenges. Just over the first few weeks of February, following the military coup in Myanmar on February 1st of 2021, there have been multiple calls to call emergency sessions to address the crisis and appropriately handle those in violation of the Charter in order to ensure bloc members abide by the principles of the ASEAN Charter “including the rule of law, good governance, democracy, human rights and constitutional government.” Concerns over environmental issues as well some trade questions, such as protections on the palm oil industry, remain important questions generating distrust and fueling the nationalist cause. 

However, ASEAN is not without any way to address these challenges. The Charter and the ideals of the ASEAN Community contain legally binding principles and mechanisms to ensure accountability, rule of law, and ultimately more cooperation and integration in the region. The idea to include more socio-cultural initiatives to go along with the plans for regional integration is also there, and only needs to be more acknowledged and given more attention and significance. After all, it must be seen as paramount to promote appreciation for diversity, but also recognition of tolerance and regional unity on a socio-cultural level as a way to move towards creation of a more comprehensive ASEAN member state, and even potential future ASEAN citizen identity. In case of the European Union, as important as trade prospects were to found and maintain the core of the union, cultural initiatives such as Eurovision, and student exchange programs such as Erasmus, were quite necessary to ensure creation of a European identity, and Europe still has a long way to go. ASEAN could greatly benefit from creating similar region-wide outreach initiatives in order to move forward from the current situation of largely disjointed, self-interested members. This would also strengthen the civil society and thus improve prospects for democracy and regional stability. 

            Lastly, the region remains dependent on its traditional trading patterns. Its unity here is very important in order to allow it to take full advantage of the rivalry seen amongst Japan, China, and the United States looking for trade partners within the region. However, the region could also benefit from looking further outwards and establishing more substantial economic ties with like-minded regional blocs across the globe, such as ECOWAS and Mercosur. In fact, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, Singapore was to implement its free trade agreement with Mercosur. This would exponentially increase cooperation between ASEAN and Mercosur, and drastically increase the already present $3.5 billion in trade exchange between the two. COVID-19 pandemic has slowed down this progress and potential for a sort of interregional cooperation, but developments in this area are interesting and it will be exciting to see what effect increased collaboration across these particular regional groups will bring. 

ASEAN has seen its share of successes and challenges, but it is undeniable that it has decades of experience in norm-building and community promotion within the region, and it remains the most comprehensive example of cooperation in the region. Its charters and proclamations, as challenged as they may be through continued political turmoil throughout the region, still remain proud examples of hope and potential for greater regional integration in Southeast Asia. For this reason, it is instrumental to continue looking forward and ensure the organization takes advantage of its strengths and improves upon its shortcomings to provide for a more united and strengthened Southeast Asia.

Trump’s Legacies in China: Lessons Biden Can Learn

Introduction

President Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from international institutions, and subsequently the international arena, has left rising powers such as China to undermine the liberal world order. The US has classified China as a revisionist power on the basis that China is exploiting global rules and norms in favor of its own interests over the interests of others. Yet, President Trump’s approach towards China does not prevent China from taking advantage of the US and will have long lasting implications for the future of US-China relations. Before President Trump, disagreements between China and the United States over trade, human rights, and cybersecurity already existed. President Trump’s strategy towards China did not resolve these issues but exacerbated existing conflicts and created new problems. President Trump’s attempt at holding China accountable for taking advantage of the US economy, intellectual property, and institutions have pushed the two countries to the brink of war. With Joseph Biden winning the 2020 US Presidential election, American allies, scholars on US-China relations, and citizens of both countries are paying close attention to what President-elect Biden’s approach to China will look like. Based on the current tensions between the US and China, it is likely that the confrontational approach of President Trump will continue under Biden. The enduring implications of President Trump’s foreign policy towards China has lessons in which President-elect Biden can learn and develop a more effective way of dealing with the superpower.

Lessons Biden Can Learn From 

Lesson #1: Trade disputes can be resolved by economic tools other than tariffs, and trade agreements should address structural issues.

President Trump has regularly prided himself on the fact that he is a businessman and believes his skills will help the US gain a competitive advantage over China in trade. In the summer of 2018, Trump began his lengthy trade war with China by imposing tariffs on thousands of Chinese manufactured products. Before the trade war, the Chinese economy was already showing signs of slowing economic growth. Therefore, the trade war further impacted China’s economy. The tariffs that Trump imposed significantly impacted Chinese manufacturers who saw a decline in exports to the US by more than 12%. The trade war exacerbated China’s existing sluggish economic growth and forced smaller businesses to exit the market. 

Despite the negative impact of the tariffs on China’s economy, the real evaluation of the trade deal Trump negotiated with Beijing is whether it benefits the American people. Trump’s trade war has received much criticism from economists and scholars who argue that the cost outweighs the benefits. US consumers who have to pay higher prices for imported goods are taking the brunt of the high tariffs. A study conducted by Moody’s Analytics estimates that the trade deal has caused the US to lose more than 300,000 jobs and reduced US GDP by 0.3% in just one year into the trade deal. The US is not a price setting country which means that the tariffs did not lower the world market price of imports. In other words, the impact of higher tariffs is fully passed on to US consumers and businesses. Tariffs are not the best economic tool in dealing with China. For instance, Tom Giovanetti, president of Institute for Policy Innovation, argues that a more effective way of dealing with trade disputes with China is to use the World Trade Organization and other international economic institutions to pressure them. President Trump either did not get consider or understand the impact of tariffs on American people and firms before he enacted the tariffs. Another downside to tariffs in the trade war with China is that it does not address the structural issues that are behind the origin of China’s economic expansion. For example, Ana Swanson and Alan Rappeport explain how cybersecurity issues such as hacking are linked to trade and remain unsolved in Trump’s trade deal with China. Another issue Swanson and Rappeport bring up is the failure of Trump to address China’s currency manipulation and subsidization of goods by the Chinese government which allows the “cheap goods to flood the United States.” Without addressing the structural issues linked to trade, the US cannot stop China from taking advantage of the global economy. Therefore, the lesson that Biden should take away from Trump’s trade negotiations with China is that a successful trade deal should consist of effective methods that do not involve tariffs and address structural problems associated with China’s unjust economic practices.

Lesson #2: Multilateralism is one of America’s best tools for addressing transnational issues.

US democracy and the US-led liberal order is under threat due to the Trump administration. During Trump’s presidency, he withdrew the US out of several international institutions thus abandoning multilateralism and the spread of US democracy. Some of the international organizations Trump has pulled out of include the Paris Agreement, the UN Human Rights Council, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The most important implication of Trump’s unilateral “America first” approach is allowing revisionist powers such as China to shape the international rules and institutions that the US once founded. 

As seen in China’s creation of the Belt and Road initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank, China’s goal is not simply to surpass the US in the global economy, but to replace the US-led liberal world order. Therefore, the more crucial conflict between the US and China is over ideology. The ideological nature of the conflict makes it more important to emphasize multilateralism as a way to counteract China’s threat to the liberal world order. William Moreland, a research analyst at the Brookings Institution, explains that the three main dimensions to multilateralism are “measured collaboration on shared challenges, revitalize to provide for deconfliction and crisis off-ramps, and compete selectively both with existing institutions and via new ones to better defend democratic values against authoritarian rivals.” In other words, multilateralism creates a support system of similar ideologically based countries. Although Trump rejected multilateralism on issues such as the environment and economy, in the past year, he has started to restore friendly relations with allies in Europe to address cybersecurity challenges Western countries face from Chinese tech companies such as Huawei. Some cybersecurity challenges that China poses include state-sponsored espionage, threatening and monitoring dissenters abroad, and intellectual property theft. President Trump’s efforts in persuading European countries to divest from China’s 5G network and technology companies have been successful so far. For example, Britain, Germany, and Sweden are countries who have most recently succumbed to President Trump’s pressure to not use Chinese technology. As more countries join the US-Europe front to halt Chinese tech, China will eventually run out of markets to sustain Chinese tech companies and be forced to play by global rules and norms. In the aspect of cybersecurity, President Trump has started an effective multilateralism campaign to address challenges with Chinese tech. However, President Trump’s multilateralism ignores a core aspect of US values which is human rights. President Trump has ignored China’s human rights violations against the Xinjiang Uyghur population, due to a “fear of jeopardizing trade talks with Beijing.” By upholding one aspect of the liberal world order at the expense of human rights is contradictory and can undermine the coherence of the ideologies that created multilateralism in the first place. During President-elect Biden’s campaign for the presidency, he made remarks vowing to “renew trust in American international engagement and leadership” which will restore disbanded international agreements and strengthen existing multilateralism with US allies. Biden’s track record on emphasizing American leadership in the international system and continued cooperation with US allies will help the US restore core democratic principles that were undermined during the Trump administration. 

Lesson #3: Rash decisions lead to misperceptions about the opponents actions and escalate tensions between the two countries. 

China is the world’s second largest economy next to the US and is projected to surpass US GDP in around a decade. There exists a debate within the field of international economics about whether China will actually surpass the US since there are signs that its economy is slowing down. Despite the debate between scholars on whether China will be able to sustain its rise, however, facts show that China is projecting its influence and coercing regions such as Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In other words, the US is no longer in an asymmetrical power relationship with China. 

As the power dynamic between the US and China shifts from an asymmetrical relationship to a symmetrical relationship, there needs to be a change in the US approach towards China. The US is no longer in a more powerful position to make China subordinate to the US. China has responded to the US’s attempts to avert China by mimicking US actions against China. This places the US and China in a tit-for-tat strategy. An example of the tit-for-tat strategy playing out in US-China relations recently is President Trump’s order that restricted Chinese graduate students and researchers from attending American universities this past summer. Beijing responded to President Trump’s order by similarly, restricting and detaining US academic scholars and journalists in China. The initial provocation started by President Trump led to an escalation of US-China relations into a “hostage diplomacy” scenario. President Trump’s decision to detain and exclude Chinese graduate students and researchers sends a message to Americans to view “Chinese students as perpetrators of espionage and intellectual property theft.” President Trump’s action merely shifts the blame on Chinese academic scholars which for the most part is not involved in problems involving China’s economy, human rights, cybersecurity, etc. President Trump’s short-sighted decision to block students fuels xenophobia and does not answer the underlying issues of intellectual property theft by China. China responded to President Trump’s order to restrict Chinese students and researchers by initiating similar threats against US researchers and journalists which instantly escalate the existing conflict between the two countries. Therefore, as China’s power becomes just as compelling as the US, the Biden administration’s foreign policy towards China needs to emphasize decisions that can help achieve long-term goals as opposed to short-term reactionary decisions. Long-term preventive measures also have the benefits of being able to negotiate with China beforehand to prevent retribution of an action on the US. 

Adapting to Change in the New Era of US-China Relations 

By the time President Trump leaves the Oval Office, US-China relations will not be where it was previously. The change in US-China relations is not only due to decisions President Trump made during his presidency, but also the evolving nature of China and its relationship with other countries. The confrontational foreign policy approach President Trump has employed on dealing with China helped make clear China’s intentions and the problems the incoming administration needs to address. However, President Trump’s way of dealing with China has also led to a decline in US engagement in international agreements and organizations. Therefore, there needs to be a better strategy to address China’s unjust practices. Decisions based on short term reactionary impulses will not solve the underlying issues China presents because it undermines certain pillars of US foreign policy (i.e., human rights) for economic or political advantages and lacks long term preventive measures. 

The incoming Biden administration needs to be aware of the evolving nature of China and other countries. The actions that were taken during the President Trump administration or previous administrations are not going to be effective in dealing with China in a new international environment. An adaptive strategy that acknowledges China’s rise, but also addresses the violations and challenges China poses for the US in terms of sustaining its international competitive edge and democratic values is necessary to effectively deal with China. During Trump’s presidency there was an attempt to establish superiority and contain China which has colonialist overtones and can exacerbate the existing tensions between the two countries. The new administration’s goals with China should not be one that emphasizes dominating China, instead it should be one that focuses on establishing preventive measures and addressing China’s existing misconduct and foster a more cooperative relationship based on common goals. The US and China are the two largest countries in terms of GDP and representatives of the two opposing ideologies in contemporary times which makes it more important for a new strategy that is focused on long-term preventive measures and foster a favorable atmosphere for cooperation.

Is China a Friend or Foe?

China has acquired an increasing amount of power, beginning in the 1950s, allowing it to become a globally recognized economic and militaristic powerhouse. China’s military has become increasingly aggressive in East and Southeast Asia while simultaneously promoting economic growth to accomplish the widespread acceptance of their global influence. Increased militarization in the South China Sea and Taiwan will induce a rivalry between China and the United States (U.S.) as China maintains their position as a competitor for global influence with the expansion of their Belt and Road Initiative. 

After World War II, as tensions increased between China, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia, China began seeking the opportunity to occupy islands and define maritime boundaries. The dispute over territory became increasingly complicated because the introduction of the U.S. as a presence in the area challenged China as a regional power. China used the nine-dash line as a justification for claiming a large section of the South China Sea. The long-practiced presence of Chinese fishing in this area resulted in the self-asserted assumption that this section of the South China Sea was Chinese territory. China has a historical claim over the islands and the sea, stating that it was established before the implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), even though they ratified the convention. The nine-dash-line largely overlapped with claims by Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei. Not only has China expanded their naval capabilities, but they also dumped sand and cement on numerous reefs to create man-made islands that would house military bases. China did so with the intent to counter other nation’s claims to territorial control in the South China Sea and take advantage of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which states that 200 nautical miles off the shoreline is the exclusive area for a country's economic use. Countries in their exclusive economic zones have "sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources." China's main interests in the sea include accessing oil and gas deposits, as the seabed is a potential energy supply corridor.

China's aggression in the South China Sea is influenced by their history and current narrative regarding western involvement. Throughout the Century of Humiliation, China was exploited and overpowered by western nations. In an effort to overcome a period of history that, to China, symbolized their weakness, the nation became more assertive in places with territorial disputes such as the South China Sea. China's narrative consists of the idea that the U.S. is seeking to contain China as a rising power. China firmly believes that third parties, including the U.S., should not be involved in the dispute because it is not their direct concern.

The U.S. perspective on the dispute promotes the defense of Southeast Asian nations, benefits of trading, and promotion of international law. The Obama Administration demonstrated this perspective by strengthening allyship and security ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and promoting Freedom of Navigation Operations patrols. The United States continues to reject China's nine-dash line and its claims over the island, stating that it will defend the Philippines if China attacks them militarily. To ensure that China abides by the law, the U.S. additionally patrols the sea to defend international law and the rights to sail freely within international waters. The South China Sea is an important commercial trading route for the U.S., who is struggling between the desire to leave China unprovoked and prevent them from bullying their allies. Generally, the American public does not view China favorably either. In 2019, 60 percent of Americans viewed China negatively, while 24 percent believed that China is an increasing threat, and 81 percent believed that China's increasing military power is negative for the U.S. The U.S. must act with a clear strategy in mind because the South China Sea dispute has the potential to turn into a full-fledged war. If the U.S. does not have a military presence in the South China Sea, China could be further encouraged to increase aggression in other territorial disputes such as Tibet and India. 

Increased patrolling of the sea, however, can make the U.S. look like an aggressor, legitimizing Chinese militarization. The U.S. must recognize the economic risks, considering China is in a trade war and also one of their significant trade partners. The U.S. should aim to maintain stability within the region and promote negotiation, communication, and cooperation without causing interference that demonstrates aggression and western dominance. One recommendation is for the U.S. to continue its support for Southeast Asian allies by providing equipment, sea surveillance and coast guard infrastructure to build their maritime capacity. To counter China’s overwhelming presence in the region, the U.S. must increase defense cooperation with India by jointly conducting military exercises. Helping allies, especially the Philippines and Vietnam, allows these countries to defend themselves from China's aggression and balances power in the region. By doing so, the U.S. would increase security in the South China Sea, preventing military conflict and balancing power between Southeast Asian countries and China.

In the 1970s, China began to embrace globalization, international trade, and foreign direct investment. In 2013, President Xi Jinping announced the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) during a visit to Kazakhstan, which allowed China to expand its regional influence and locations outside of the region, such as Africa, Central Asia, and parts of Europe. This multi-trillion dollar infrastructure project intends to create an economic belt and maritime "silk road" that connects China to over sixty countries in Eurasia and Africa. The BRI aims to fund infrastructure projects such as highways, railways, sea ports, airports, and oil refineries. 

Though the BRI will help underdeveloped countries, it also contains negative aspects that can simultaneously hurt the countries by ensuring their inability to repay their debts, which would prolong China’s control of their projects. Since its launch, China has been accused of putting countries into "debt traps.” The BRI has made project deals with numerous smaller economies; the most prominent and controversial one is Sri Lanka's. From 2009 to 2014, China financed almost five billion U.S. dollars on projects in Sri Lanka, including ports, roads, bridges, railways, an international airport, and a coal-fired power station. This loan, however, came at an interest rate of 6 percent and 8.8 percent, respectively. Other multilateral banks and national banks, such as Japan's, typically offered interest rates of 2-3 percent. The project was suspended due to legal issues over land, the project's financing, and environmental effects. Ravi Karunanayake, Sri Lanka's Minister of Finance, stated "'We mean business when we say we want clean, transparent, good governance... perhaps Chinese companies had to be corrupt in the past, but if they do that now they will be disqualified," showing China’s corrupt practices throughout the implementation of the BRI. The Hambantota Port project has sparked controversy within Sri Lanka because of China's "debt trap," along with the fear of China using the port for military purposes. Hambantota was historically a Sri Lankan naval base, but was built into a port and is now controlled by China. The port is under a 99-year lease to China Merchants Port Holdings for $1.12 billion, causing Sri Lankan citizens to rally against the BRI, fearing that China would use the port for military purposes to gain more influence on Sri Lanka as well as get closer to India, China's rival.

The BRI benefits countries with poor infrastructure and does not necessarily make China a "foe" of the U.S., but because China’s spread of regional and global influence challenges that of the U.S., they are still competitors. In terms of the U.S., one such policy recommendation is to increase foreign direct investment in regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa where the BRI has a strong presence. United States government agencies such as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) must continue to encourage and assist U.S. private businesses to invest in high-risk countries through its political risk insurance. OPIC has launched a “Connect Africa" investment initiative, which encourages "forging deeper ties with Africa and the world, through investing in physical infrastructure, technology, and value chains," and helps stimulate economic growth of developing countries, all while competing with the BRI. Having OPIC, a private U.S. business, invest in undeveloped countries may foster trust between the two. The U.S. would not directly invest or give loans to the country's government, which would block the potential opportunity for the U.S. to entrap such countries, as China has done with the BRI. 

Free trade agreements encourage economic growth in underdeveloped countries by allowing them to increase their trade opportunities. For example, if the textile industry in Sub-Saharan Africa was not limited by trade restrictions, the U.S. could promote economic growth in African countries while simultaneously benefiting themselves. The U.S. could additionally establish a free trade agreement with India, China’s rival in the region, who they have a positive relationship with. The Better Investments Utilization Leading to Development Act, established in 2018 by the Trump Administration, seeks to join OPIC with the newly established USIDFC. USIDFC aims to bring private capital to underdeveloped countries, make the U.S. a more "competitive leader on the global development stage,” and benefit underdeveloped countries without getting the state directly involved, which could negatively affect the countries.

China's increasing aggression toward Taiwan directly interferes with the unofficial ties that the U.S. has with Taiwan, creating tensions between the U.S. and China. The U.S. has recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) since 1979, but the U.S. still has unofficial relations with Taiwan through the Taiwan Relations Act, which outlines the commitment of the U.S. to protect Taiwan from the PRC if they were to attack militarily. In 2019, the U.S. sold $2 billion worth of Abram tanks to Taiwan, a move to which China has responded negatively by threatening sanctions and stating that the U.S. should remove military involvement in Taiwan. In 2018, China approved delivery of the Russian S-400 surface-to-air missile system with the capacity to reach Taiwan. The PRC has additionally deployed approximately 1,600 missiles on the Taiwan Strait and practiced military exercises near Taiwan. One such policy recommendation in this case has to do with the continued sale of arms to Taiwan from the United States. If China ultimately attempts to forcefully overpower Taiwan, Taiwan must be militarily prepared and receive support from the U.S., who can increase Taiwan’s defense research and development in order to compete with that of China’s. 

Overall, China must be viewed by the U.S. as a "foe" because its use of force in territorial disputes creates instability in the nearby region and tension with the United States. China certainly must be viewed as a competitor in the field of global economic influence and as a "foe" pertaining to military aggression. China is spreading its influence internationally through the use of force in territorial disputes and by taking advantage of underdeveloped countries through the BRI. China is challenging the current international order by competing with the U.S. for global dominance, showing a complete lack of compromise and assertive attitude, and earning their title as a competitor.

Brazil Takes Off as Washington-Beijing Trade Dispute Grows

Despite working to meet a December 15th trade agreement, dubbed “Phase I,” President Trump has repeatedly threatened to increase the levied tariffs on Chinese imports should one not be reached. United States (U.S.) Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer explains that Phase I only includes about 35 percent of the total trade discussion with China. Despite Washington and Beijing inching closer to an initial agreement, the world’s two largest economies maintain tariffs on a combined total of more than half a trillion dollars of goods, with rates ranging from 5 percent to 30 percent. The tariffs continue the Trump Administration’s critique of China and its trade practices with the United States. 

In 2018, trade of goods and services between the two countries (two-way trade) totaled US$737.1 billion, with total exports valued at US$179.3 billion and total imports valued at US$557.9 billion. Such values put China as the U.S.’ single largest trading partner by total traded goods and services. Despite this, President Trump has maintained his harsh critique of the Chinese, fulfilling a campaign promise to combat China’s alleged unfair trade practices. As the U.S.-China trade dispute wages on with both sides retaliating with additional tariffs, Brazil —namely Brazilian farmers— have emerged as beneficiaries of the confrontation.

Chinese Trade with Brazil

Since the beginning of the trade dispute in 2017, Chinese firms have been shifting to Brazilian agriculture products. For Instance, Brazil passed the U.S. as the world’s largest soybean producer and exporter as a result of the increased demand from China—a demand increase of more than 20 percent. Brazil’s dominance in soybean production was not unforeseen; in fact, between 2011 and 2018, the overall production of the crop in the country has nearly doubled to 119.3 million metric tons and is expected to reach nearly 129 million metric tons by 2027. Since President Trump began his anti-China trade rhetoric, Brazilian soybean exports’ value swelled by US$13.86 billion, while American farmers will be left with an unwanted “record high level of ending stock,” as exports to China will be one-third of what they have been for the last few years. As a result, competitive Brazilian farmers have directly benefited from the trade dispute, while American farmers have truly felt the negative effects of the trade dispute. While Beijing and Washington work on finding common ground to settle their trade dispute in Phase I, Brazilian officials remain confident that they can retain the increase in trade. 

While trade between Brazil and China has a lesser two-way trade value than that of the U.S. relationship, Brazilian trade with its Asian counterpart has increased by 170% within the last decade, to nearly 100 billion dollars, according to Brazil’s Ministry of Economy. During the same period, trade between the U.S. and China grew by only 68 percent. China has been Brazil’s largest trading partner, ahead of the U.S. for nearly a decade. To further emphasize Chinese engagement with Brazil, 2017 Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Brazil was US$19.5 billion, comprising 31.9 percent of the total global FDI destined for Brazil; in contrast, Chinese FDI in the U.S. was valued at US$39.5 billion, more than double of that in Brazil. However, Brazil was the largest recipient of China FDI in South America. As tensions between the U.S. and China unravel as a result of the trade dispute, Chinese firms have looked at other markets to import necessary products from. One beneficiary of this market exploration is Brazil. The South American nation, home to nearly 210 million people, has experienced a direct increase in two-way trade and improved diplomatic relations with China. However, Brazil’s recently elected president made some in Beijing uneasy about China’s relations with Brazil.

Bolsonaro’s Evolving Chinese Trade Rhetoric

Despite China’s investments in Brazil, President Jair Bolsonaro had been a harsh critic of Chinese investors. In October of 2018, the same year Bolsonaro was elected with an 11 percent margin, the then-president-elect warned, “what we need is to become aware that China is buying Brazil, not buying in Brazil, it is buying Brazil.” Importantly, Brazil’s president is often referred to as the “Trump of the Tropics,” for his similar rhetoric on social, political, and economic topics, including his critique of China. In a March 2019 speech at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Bolsonaro’s Minister of the Economy, Paulo Guedes, went on to state that “Temos um presidente que adora a América,” translating to “We have a president that loves America.” 

However, President Bolsonaro’s criticism of his Chinese counterparts has not dissuaded new investments in the country. In fact, according to the Brazilian Ministry of Planning, Development and Management (now a division of the Ministry of Economy) from 2016-2018, Chinese firms announced 11 greenfields and 38 brownfield investments, a total investment value of US$19.4 billion. Greenfield investments, defined as a form of FDI, is when a firm establishes operations in a foreign company and constructs new facilities. Alternatively, brownfield investments are considered as an operational expansion of a company in a foreign market, normally seen as the expansion of an existing facility. Such investment activity indicates a long-term commitment on the part of Chinese firms to invest in Brazil. Despite President Bolsonaro’s previous rhetorical repudiations of Chinese investments, the country is actually drawing closer to China, its largest trading partner. 

Notably, the Brazilian-Chinese relationship has changed as President Bolsonaro altered his tone with China. In October, while the U.S.-China trade meetings dragged on, a Brazilian delegation including the president visited multiple countries in Asia, most significantly China. There, President Bolsonaro not only made amends with his Chinese counterparts regarding the remarks he made during his campaign trail but also signed two trade protocols and outlined strategic growth in the relationship. He went on to assure that the Brazilian and Chinese governments are "completely aligned in a way that reaches beyond our commercial and business relationship.” Preserving such a relationship is crucial to the Bolsonaro Administration, which inherited a sluggish economy with high unemployment and inflation. 

Thus far, the administration has worked diligently to position Brazil more competitively on the global stage by pushing reforms in the areas of pension and tax, easing government regulation in select industries, and negotiating foreign trade agreements with individual nations and economic unions. All these initiatives ultimately pushing for economic liberalization. In the meantime, Brazil will be the beneficiary of the U.S.-China trade dispute as escalations make a final resolution between the two countries more difficult. 

Moving Forward

While Brazil’s new government is at the center of domestic and international controversy, that parallels the political polarization in the U.S., the government has taken proper economic initiatives to stimulate its sluggish economy. By proposing and passing vital reforms, Brazil has an opportunity to catapult its industries to the world stage and develop one of the “world’s most closed big economies”. The government has already announced two of the country’s largest trade agreements in its history between MERCOSUR, the European Union, and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), valued at nearly US$22 trillion and US$1.1 trillion, respectively.

China’s agricultural purchases in Brazil and direct investment have also contributed to the necessary fundamental changes and economic opening that is needed in Brazil. However, it is important that Brazil holds its neutrality in the trade dispute between the U.S. and China, as noted by Vice-President Hamilton Mourão in a meeting last month with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing. While China is Brazil’s largest trading partner by value, historically, the U.S. imports a greater amount of higher value-added products, such as aerospace and heavy machinery products. While this may be true in the past, China’s new-founded interest in diversifying its investments in Brazil, beyond purchasing low value-added goods, could reshape political ties, as already slightly seen with Bolsonaro’s revised rhetoric. 

Until then, Brazil will continue to silently draw itself closer to China amidst the Washington-Beijing trade dispute and push necessary reforms to develop its domestic industries to a formidable global competitor.

The Chinese Approach to Strategic Thought Through the Game of Wei Qi

The game of chess has long been associated with strategy and the art of statecraft. Indeed, during the 1972 World Chess Championship in the midst of the Cold War, such emphasis was placed on the match that former chess champion Garry Kasparov would later recount that the subsequent American victory “was treated by people on both sides of the Atlantic as a crushing moment in the midst of the Cold War.” With the 20th century now a mere chapter in our history books, the dissolution of the Soviet Union has left a new player on the world’s chessboard: China. This time, however, the United States (U.S.) does not have the privilege of having its rival playing the same game. No longer can a game theory approach to geopolitics be viewed purely in terms of chess. To truly examine the Chinese approach to politics, we must examine the roots of their cultural interpretation of strategic thought, known as the ‘shi’ (勢), through their own game of strategy--Wei Qi--colloquially referred to by the rest of the world as ‘Go.’ 

Despite it being the basis upon which Chinese military and political strategy has been historically built, the Chinese concept of shi has remained untranslatable to the English language. The U.S. military, however, has long taken an interest in demystifying the concept, with the Department of Defense describing the term in their 2002 Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China as the “potential born of disposition…that only a skilled strategist can exploit to ensure victory over a superior force.” Sun Tzu, a famous ancient Chinese strategist and attributed progenitor of the concept of shi, added nuance to this definition through his allusion to the concept in his treatise, The Art of War, another piece of Chinese heritage that can help in understanding Chinese strategic thought. In his magnum opus, Sun Tzu refers to shi as the ability to “[make] the enemy move… by creating a situation to which he must conform.” With both ancient and contemporary interpretations taken into account, we can confidently presume that the essence of shi derives from a strategic advantage created through the manipulation of the environment and changing circumstances, a technique heavily utilized in the game of Wei Qi.

Appearing as early as 400 BC in the works of Confucius and speculated to have been practiced for millennia earlier, the game of Wei Qi is a game of unparalleled historical and strategic value. It’s viewed as a practical simulacrum of Sun Tzu’s aforementioned military treatise, Art of War as well as being one of the four arts historically seen as necessary for Chinese scholar-officials. The game involves two players strategically placing colored stones on a square grid for the purpose of surrounding and capturing the opponent’s stones whilst also preventing them from doing the same. A player’s stones are not required to be placed adjacently, often resulting in multiple attempts of encirclement across the board occurring simultaneously.

Chess, a hallmark of Western strategic thought and game theory, has always placed a heavy emphasis on relative strength and hierarchy. Dr. David Lai, a professor at the American Strategic Studies Institute, notes that the effect of this mindset has been just as detrimental to the U.S. as it has been beneficial, noting that while it has led to Americans “[tending] to pay more attention to the balance of military power in conflict situations,” the emphasis placed on total war leads the player “[becoming] overly aggressive so that he will stretch his force thin and expose his vulnerable parts in the battlefields.” This single-minded desire for victory is no doubt a doctrinal product of Carl von Clausewitz, a Prussian military strategist known for his seminal military treatise On War, arguably the Western equivalent of Sun Tzu’s work and incontestably as influential. In his work, Clausewitz extolls the importance of a proverbial “center of gravity” in warfare, wherein a single, watershed battle, will  always be the deciding factor in a war. The strategic thought developed from thinking in terms of shi and Wei Qi, however, could not be more different. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was no doubt correct in his belief that, “if chess is about the decisive battle, Wei Qi is about the protracted campaign.”

Contrary to chess’ uncompromising emphasis on the order of command and complete decimation of the enemy, Wei Qi is played in such a way that multiple offenses occur in various areas of the board, forcing the player to examine the situation holistically and contradict  Clausewitz’s center of gravity and, by extension, Western military theory. In the same vein, speed and relative power in Wei Qi is of little importance since each stone is equal in value. In the context of military strategy, this often encourages a protracted war since the game cannot be won immediately upon the death of a single, valuable piece. With these radically different methods and goals in mind, one can see these differences in priorities take shape in China’s military and foreign policy. 

One can see an exemplary instance of Wei Qi and, subsequently, shi coming into practice during one of the most pivotal moments of Chinese history, the Chinese Civil War.  During this time, Communist Chinese forces would often be surrounded due to the superior manpower of the Chinese Nationalist forces, an occurrence that would be described by Communist soldiers as a “[campaigns] of encirclement and annihilation.” This would often result in a counter-encirclement in which Communist forces would retreat in the hope that, “while the retreat was in progress and contact with the enemy broken or sporadic,” they would be able to deny Nationalist forces an encirclement. Eventually, as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) turned the tide of the war in the wake of Japan’s withdrawal from the mainland, their increasingly aggressive retaliatory offensives resulted in a situation “in which the previous Communist and Nationalist roles were reversed,” with the PRC now adopting encirclement tactics as soon as they were in a position to do so. This dance of encirclement and counter-encirclement performed by Nationalist and Communist forces is not unlike two types of stones on a Wei Qi board, wherein the only way to prevent an enemy from surrounding and removing one’s pieces is to maneuver  past the enemy until the time is ripe to respond in kind. The founder of the People’s Republic of China, Mao Zedong, is known to have related the popularity of this doctrine to the game of Wei Qi himself in his 1938 treatise, Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan, wherein he would go on to state that the “campaigns and battles fought by the two sides resemble the capturing of each other's pieces, and the establishment of strongholds by the enemy and of guerrilla base areas by us resembles moves to dominate spaces on the board.” 

As the world slowly transitions from a unilateral American-dominated international system towards a multilateral world order, American policymakers would do well to realize that there is often more than one game of strategy being played. There are a multitude of possible solutions that may serve to reconcile this shift in tactical norms with the United States’ traditional Clausewitzian strategic thought. One such proposition, put forward by former U.S. Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, involves encouraging U.S. policymakers to master the game of Wei Qi themselves. This recommendation was based on the belief that the flexible thinking developed through the game would serve to ameliorate the traditional rigidity--and thus perceived weakness--of American strategic thought whilst also augmenting the United States’ traditional advantages of “strength, capabilities, ingenuity, and American spirit.” This advocation for doctrinal synthesis is further reinforced by the conclusions of Dr. David Lai, a professor at the Strategic Studies Institute. Dr. Lai likened China’s flexibility and the United States’ rigid hierarchy to the yin and yang, two opposing forces in Chinese culture that create balance through their reconciliation. There are, however, those who oppose this consensus and express skepticism towards attributing all of China’s strategic initiatives to a mindset influenced by Wei Qi and the concept of the shi. 

One such case is that of Lauren Dickey, a research analyst under the CNA corporation’s China-Indo-Pacific Division, who arguesthat the U.S. must “move away from a reliance upon cultural traditions as a causal link between Chinese strategic thought.” Dickey instead believes that the Chinese are merely pursuing a policy of realpolitik and that any connection between such policy and the Chinese culture is a misattribution. Nonetheless, the general consensus does imply that the game of Wei Qi has the possibility to yield invaluable insight into the Chinese concept of shi and, subsequently, China’s unique strategic methodology.

China's Belt and Road Initiative: Is it Truly Neocolonialist?

During a visit to Kazakhstan in 2013, President Xi Jinping proudly announced the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This multi-trillion-dollar infrastructure project seeks to create an economic belt and maritime "silk road" that connects China to over sixty countries in Eurasia and Africa. The BRI aims to fund infrastructure projects such as highways, railways, seaports, airports, and oil refineries. Since its launch, China has been accused of enforcing neocolonialism through the BRI. By using the Hambantota Port and Colombo Port City project in Sri Lanka, I will argue that although China may have demonstrated neocolonialist intentions, partnering countries are equally responsible when making BRI project deals and can combat neocolonialism through negotiation. To expand off that, this piece argues that the BRI is not so much an example of neocolonialism as it is economic regionalism. 

The Belt and Road Initiative could potentially economically integrate several developing countries in the Asian region and beyond. But what's in it for China? The policy goals of the initiative include enhancing communication between foreign governments, implementing hard and soft infrastructure, strengthening cultural ties, and promoting regional cooperation. Hard infrastructure includes building transportation, networks and power grids, while soft infrastructure includes creating regulatory standards and trade deals. Cultural ties refer to sustaining intellectual and cultural exchanges, as well as tourism. The BRI would economically integrate countries within the Asian region by having fewer trade tariffs and standards for China when trading goods with partnering countries.

Because the concept of neocolonialism is interpreted in numerous ways, it is essential to first define it. The first Prime Minister and President of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, argues that neocolonialism has emerged as a substitute for traditional colonialism, where hegemonic powers exploit developing countries as colonies. Neocolonialism occurs when the economic and/or political system of an independent state is manipulated by another state. In other words, an outside state gains control over another state through "economic and monetary means," In neocolonialism, a state gaining economic control through the banking system or private industry is the start of foreign control over government policy. Nkrumah claims that because of this, the outside state uses the neocolonial state for exploitation rather than genuinely developing the state.

It is widely discussed that the BRI is neocolonialist because of its infamous "debt trap." A debt trap is a form of predatory lending in which a borrower is not able to pay their debts, so they continue to borrow until it becomes a cycle. It is often caused by high-interest rates. Akshan DeAlwis, John Jay Scholar at Columbia University, argues that the economic goals of the BRI are a facade, and by using the debt trap, China would be able to establish a military presence in the Asian region. DeAlwis further discusses non-economic factors of the BRI. He argues that China is trying to exert dominance through this opportunity to destroy local economies. DeAlwis also mentions the "String of Pearls" theory, which proposes that China is planning to develop overseas naval bases along the Indian Ocean to expand military forces in order to become a regional global power quicker than its rival power, India. 

China has made several deals with Sri Lanka through the BRI, and the two most prominent projects are the Hambantota Port and the Colombo Port City Project. These projects have demonstrated that partnering countries are equally responsible when making deals with China.

It is important to acknowledge that the host country is also responsible for its actions when making deals with BRI projects. In China's Asian Dream, author Tom Miller visited Sri Lanka to discuss China's involvement in projects under the government of Mahinda Rajapaksa, who went out of power by the January 2015 election. From 2009 to 2014, China financed almost $5 billion in ports, roads, bridges, railways, an international airport, and a coal-fired power station. This $5 billion loan, however, came at a high interest rate. Other multilateral banks and national banks, such as Japan's, typically offered lower interest rates. Ravi Karunanayake, Sri Lanka's Minister of Finance, stated that the high-interest rates by China's banks came from corruption on China's part, but also Mahinda Rajapaksa's corrupt regime of the past. Once Maithripala Sirisena's administration took over in 2015, it made sure to hold China accountable for its actions by suspending the Colombo Port City project. The project was suspended due to legal issues over land, the project's financing, and environmental effects. Karunanayake clearly states "'We mean business when we say we want clean, transparent, good governance... perhaps Chinese companies had to be corrupt in the past, but if they do that now they will be disqualified.'" When current President Sirisena visited Beijing, he blamed the previous regime for the issues that Chinese banks faced with the projects. Sirisena's administration renegotiated loan repayments with Chinese banks, lowering the interest rate and including additional environmental protections. 

China's neocolonialist intentions and the String of Pearls theory can be disproved by Sri Lanka's Hambantota Port project on the southeast coast of Sri Lanka. Dr. Natalie Klein, author of Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea, states that the Hambantota port is a commercial port and that BRI deals are commercial deals and loans, emphasizing that there is a difference between a commercial port and a military base. Klein continues to argue that the coastal state in which the port resides in is the one who has authority, regardless of who operates the port. This law has been established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). China cannot move forward with its projects without the acceptance of the host country. Therefore, Klein believes that no matter how big foreign investment is in a port, the coastal state still has control. 

The Hambantota Port project has sparked controversy within Sri Lanka because of China's debt trap and the fear of China using the port for military purposes. Hambantota was historically a Sri Lankan naval base but has switched into a port that has been built and now controlled by China. The port is under a 99-year lease to China Merchants Port Holdings for $1.12 billion. Because of this, there have been rallies conducted by the Sri Lankan public, fearing that China would use the port for their military to gain more influence on Sri Lanka as well as get closer to India, China's rival. Despite popular fears, the port deal has a clause that clearly states that the port cannot be used for military purposes. Additionally, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe's office stated that the Sri Lankan government has informed China that they are prohibited from using the port militarily, as the port is still under the control of the Sri Lankan navy.

 Sri Lanka has planned to create economic opportunity and jobs back to Colombo, its capital city. Through the BRI, the Sri Lankan government made a deal with the China Harbour Engineering Company to construct a $1.4 billion Port City development. The Colombo Port City would be used as an urban center for residential and commercial use. Bendix further explains that the China Harbour Engineering Company aims to add about 17 billion gallons of sand along the coast of the city, which has sparked concern from the Sri Lankan government due to environmental issues. Because of this concern, the project was suspended in 2014 by Prime Minister Ranil Wickramasinghe. Though this angered the China Communications Construction Company, the project's investor, the Sri Lankan government, and the China Communications Construction Company were able to continue the project after new environmental protections were implemented. The China Harbour Engineering Company had to obtain a permit to dredge about 3 miles out the coastline and at a depth of slightly less than a mile, and the company was not allowed to dredge near reefs and fishing grounds. Last, the company had to put aside $7 million in reparations to fishing associations considering the project's economic cost to local fishermen.

Stepping aside from Sri Lanka, the BRI has demonstrated a sense of cooperation when creating policies for the initiative. Many of the BRI's core tenants are consistent with international rules that have been written into the United Nations (UN), Group of Twenty (G20), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and other international and regional organizations. Additionally, China signed about 170 cooperation documents with 150 countries and international organizations. The BRI also promotes financial connectivity by supporting the Guiding Principles on Financing the Development of the Belt and Road with 27 countries. Lastly, the People's Bank of China co-financed more than 100 projects in 70 countries and multilateral development institutions, which involves numerous nations acting together. 

After analyzing two of Sri Lanka's significant BRI projects, it can be concluded that the BRI is not so much neocolonialism, rather it is economic regionalism. Economic regionalism pertains to the liberalization of trade between neighboring countries in the same geographic region. The most important tenet of trade liberalization is economic interdependence, which intertwines national markets, making countries wealthier and raising the cost of war with their trade partners. Amitav Acharya, a scholar and author of The End of American World Order, discusses the emergence of regionalism within the changing international system. He states that emerging powers, such as China, take part in the world of interconnectedness and interdependence by focusing on initiatives based on infrastructure and economic strategy rather than trade and political strategy. Local and regional initiatives like the BRI are the future to this international system. 

China's President Xi Jinping spoke against protectionism in a 2017 speech in Davos, and Chinese policymakers, such as current Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs He Yafei, have also spoken in favor of globalization. Additionally, in a 2016 Pew Survey, 60 percent of the Chinese public thought that being involved in the global economy is positive. On April 25 to 27 of 2019, President Xi Jinping held the second Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, welcoming leaders from 37 countries and delegates from 150 countries. President Xi Jinping discussed concerns raised by the United States over the BRI, trade, and infrastructure. He additionally addressed China's commitment to open its economy, enhance the interests of partnering countries, and implement environmental protection to BRI projects. China has made an effort to calm the fears of nations like Sri Lanka and the United States, advocating for economic liberalization and more particularly regionalism, as it would most strongly connect the Asian region. After decades of being closed off from the world, China has opened itself up to connect with neighboring countries and promote trade and infrastructure development, which benefits not only China but its neighbors as well. 

Huawei and 5G in the Tech Cold War: China vs the United States

Although the White House publicly stated they oppose a government-lead deployment of a national 5G network, they reportedly considered it for over a year. The gravity of this idea —a federal takeover— sheds light on the current situation: China appears to be ahead of Silicon Valley on this technology. 5G is “a type of wireless networking infrastructure designed for fast connectivity of self-driving cars, virtual reality, the internet-of-things, and other technologies that are emerging after the smartphone-centric 4G era we’re currently in.” This means that whichever country leads 5G will dominate the technology sector and benefit from the economic and national security advantages that come with it. The strongest supplier of 5G technology is Huawei, a Chinese telecommunications company which has been doused in controversy since its beginning, and one that should be an important part of trade talks between the United States (U.S.) and China.

In the 1990s, the company made its first big deal with the People’s Liberation Army. Next, India intelligence agencies placed Huawei on a watchlist in 2001 for allegedly supplying the Taliban. When Huawei attempted to buy part of the U.S. company 3COM in 2007, the United States Congress blocked the deal due to security concerns. This was followed by the launch of an FBI investigation regarding possible violations of U.S. trade sanctions in Iran. In 2009, British spy chiefs “reportedly briefed ministers that Huawei hardware bought by BT Mobile could be hijacked by China to cripple the UK's communications infrastructure.” In security briefings by British company Vodafone, backdoors and other flaws were found in Huawei’s equipment. Huawei tried to buy the Sprint network and build a national wireless network for emergency services in the U.S., but both requests were denied by the United States government. A United States investigation surrounding Huawei and ZTE concluded in 2012 that neither company “cooperated fully with the investigation” and “the risks associated with Huawei’s and ZTE’s provision of equipment to U.S. critical infrastructure could undermine core U.S. national-security interests.” At about the same time, Australia blocked Huawei from its National Broadband Network and a Huawei CFO was linked to Skycom, a firm that offered HP equipment to Iran despite U.S. sanctions. Information leaked by Edward Snowden revealed that the U.S. National Security Agency hacked Huawei in order to spy on them through Operation Shotgiant, which was allegedly successful. In 2018, bans on certain Huawei products were implemented in several countries, including Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. Chief financial officer and the CEO’s daughter, Meng Wanzhou, was arrested by Canadian officials with plans for extradition to the United States and a court date set for September.

On the other hand, Huawei does not concede that they are a security concern or that they are undermining the United States. In an open letter to the Obama Administration, the company claimed that “the allegation of [Chinese] military ties rests on nothing but the fact that Huawei’s founder and CEO, Mr. Ren Zhengfei, once served in the People’s Liberation Army.” Additionally, Mr. Zhengfei stated in 2015, “of course we support the Chinese Communist Party and love our country. But we don’t compromise the interest of other countries. We comply with the laws of every country we operate in.” In an attempt to further show the company’s commitment to fight corruption, he cited their “confess for leniency” program: employees that came forward with violations before a certain deadline would receive leniency, while cases uncovered afterwards would be turned over to Chinese authorities. Furthermore, Huawei openly encouraged the United States to come forward with any evidence of its accusations.

This year is full of new developments. More countries banned certain Huawei products, major Silicon Valley companies cut ties, and the United States formally charged the company with thirteen crimes. These charges include violating United States sanctions on Iran but “prosecutors convinced a federal judge that releasing too much [evidence] would pose a risk to national security and other governmental concerns.” Clearly, this is bigger than just one company. The Wall Street Journal described these charges as just “the latest to accuse the Chinese government or Chinese companies of stealing intellectual property from U.S. firms through a combination of cyberattacks, traditional espionage and other means.”

Continuing down this path toward a “digital iron curtain” will negatively impact both China and the United States by limiting their access to necessary technological components, but the trade war is rapidly escalating. President Trump issued an executive order which restricted U.S. tech purchases, raised tariffs from 10 percent to 25 percent on $200 billion worth of goods, and the government added Huawei to a blacklist. President Trump stepped back by stating that American companies can once again sell to Huawei since “the companies were not exactly happy that they couldn’t sell because they had nothing to do with whatever it was potentially happening with respect to Huawei,” but it is unclear whether the U.S. will be able to purchase components from Huawei in the coming years. 

These tech tensions are shaping up to be a ‘technological cold war’ and the potential to alleviate the issues through trade talks seems rough. A Chinese government advisor said that the United States requested “enormous [amounts], even hundreds” of legislative modifications and an advisor to the Chinese State Cabinet explained that “China and the U.S. have fundamentally contradictory attitudes as to what would be a good deal.” Additionally, President Trump seems to think that China is desperate after experiencing what he claims was “the worst year they’ve had in 27 years.” However, as analyst Michael Ivanovitch notes, “nobody seemed to notice that the Chinese were laughing all the way to the bank with $137.1 billion of surpluses on their U.S. trades.” Although a trade deal could potentially benefit both countries and may be the only feasible solution, China does not think it is worth meeting the lengthy list of demands by the United States. 

On the other hand, editor-in-chief of the Chinese newspaper Global Times, Hu Xijin, mentioned that he expects in-person talks to come soon. Reuters reflected that the “Global Times is not an official mouthpiece for the Communist Party, though its views are believed to at times represent those of its leaders.” Despite conflicting expectations, perhaps the U.S. and China will be able to collaborate and end the turmoil that “upended” the markets.

The Huawei allegations prove that 5G stands at the forefront of international relations and a tech cold war between the U.S. and China is imminent if trade negotiations regarding 5G fail. Instead of considering aggressive government intervention with the private tech sector, such as nationalizing a 5G network, the United States should focus on strengthening diplomatic relations with China to make a deal that both countries can benefit from. Both sides need to be prepared to meet in the middle in order to prevent a much bigger conflict.

No Warm Welcome: Siberian Animosity towards Chinese Economic Activity

As a nation of 1.4 billion people, it is not hard to decipher why China’s ambitions and potential influence in neighboring Siberia, an area home to a shrinking population of about 25 million, has long been a cause of concern for Russians. This imbalance is expected to increase with time, as China’s quickly expanding economic and political clout continues to eclipse a Russia suffering from economic and demographic stagnation. Despite this, there is no end in sight to increasing ties between Beijing and Moscow, leaving many local Siberian anxieties unconsoled. For policy makers in both capitals, it should be obvious that failure to address these concerns is politically dangerous and economically unsustainable.

The most vocal resistance to Chinese ventures in Siberia manifests in the area surrounding Lake Baikal, the largest freshwater lake in the world by volume, which garnered Chinese interest due to an appetite for water across the border. This demand prompted Russia’s agriculture minister, Aleksandr Tkachev, to propose diverting some of the region’s river water to China in 2016, which has more recently taken the form of either bottling the water or developing a pipeline to pump it into the province of Xinjiang. As the lake occupies a special place in the minds of many Russian people, and serves as an important part of their national patrimony, it was no surprise that the proposals motivated around a million people to sign a petition against the plans and sparked protest against them this past month. These actions were eventually successful in deterring the project from being carried out, although there is reason to believe that backtracking on the part of the Kremlin may have damaged prospects for Chinese foreign direct investment to Russia overall. It is important to note that a great deal of recent Sino-Russian economic cooperation is due to Western sanctions placed on Russia since 2014, after which the nation turned eastwards to mitigate its losses. Failure to elicit confidence in the face of its smaller pool of international investors, and the Chinese in particular, will certainly pose issues for the nation’s economy.

With this in mind, it comes as no surprise that this is just one of a multitude of Chinese-involved economic projects in the region. It is also not the only one that has drawn local tension, as anxiety over Chinese forestry projects and real estate consumption have also become quite pronounced. Due to the close proximity and vastness of Siberia’s forests, Russia is China’s premium supplier of timber, and the Chinese forestry business’ presence in the area has only grown over time. In an effort to mitigate Russian tariffs put in place in 2007, much of the industry decided to migrate to Russia itself and establish sawmills there. In 2008 there were 152 Chinese forestry companies located across Russia, but by 2018 this number jumped to 564. While this has lead to the conception that China is destroying the Siberian environment in a manner similar to what they have done domestically, the fact that significant numbers of Chinese migrant workers have also accompanied the industry’s trek, and only Chinese equipment is used in the work, has not helped with local perceptions.

There has also been serious resentment towards wealthier Chinese purchasing property on the banks of Lake Baikal, and some constructing hotels and resorts there. This has similarly lead to petitions for government action against what locals have called an “invasion” or a Chinese “yoke” (a reference to medieval Mongolian invasions), specifically with the intent to ban the sale of real estate to Chinese citizens in certain parts of the region. This frustration comes, in part, due to the fact that the constructions are often illegal, and that the Chinese often act with seeming impunity.

Frustration towards these kinds of practices are something that can lead to backlash, negating potential benefits for both Beijing, Moscow, and Siberian residents. That being said, it would be wise of China to actually deal with these concerns. This means employing more local workers rather than relying on Chinese labor, as well as bolstering the local economy in general by using Russian equipment and facilities. Strict adherence to local laws, especially environmental regulations, is vital, especially in culturally important landmarks such as Lake Baikal. This also includes replanting trees in accordance with logging agreements, and ceasing to log in protected forests. Although perhaps good for domestic advertisement, local Siberian anxieties would be largely calmed if Chinese tourist agencies refrained from exhibiting Lake Baikal as a former Chinese territory, and if they made a greater commitment to reducing pollution and utilizing Russian-owned resorts and services.

The Russian government must also take serious steps to alleviate these grievances, as many across Siberia blame the Kremlin and business-oriented oligarchs for being permissive of China’s actions. While Russia’s current geopolitical difficulties have limited its bargaining power, it should remain keenly aware of its own interests and sovereignty. Moscow should never hesitate to enforce its own laws when it comes to illegal logging and construction, as public backlash has also shown that a failure to do so can damage long-term economic potential. This comes as failure to address fears over immigration recently prompted the entire Siberian Sakha Republic to ban migrants from 33 fields of work. Considering the ethnic animosity that has already begun to simmer towards the Chinese due to temporary migrant workers, it is not unreasonable to consider that similar decisions could be made elsewhere in the region if this continues.

Russia’s east has always been in need of economic development, and in many ways the rise of China could prove a blessing for the people who inhabit Siberia. However, one-sided resource extraction and disregard for cultural concerns is certainly not a viable way to undertake this task. If this continues, trust in the Russian government will continue to plummet, regionalism will likely experience an ascension, and long-term prospects to use China as an economic substitute for the West in the face of sanctions will suffer. A positive path forward can be determined by choices made in Moscow and Beijing, but it would be wise to remember that the people of Siberia do have a say in the region’s future.

The Two Poles: The ‘Rise’ of China and U.S.-China Trade Relations

The U.S.-China trade war reads like a poorly written political script: leaders spew vigorous polemics at each other, denounce policies made by the other while adopting those same policies, and take flawed actions that actually only hurt their own citizens. What the script reveals at the end, however, is not a scene where the protagonist flies off happily ever after in a grand resolution. Instead, the story continues indefinitely, causes a global downturn, alienates allies, and establishes a dangerous precedent of divorcing sound trade policy from foreign policy.

With the recent round of trade talks aimed at resolving the trade dispute between the United States (U.S.) and the People’s Republic of China (China) coming to an end, both sides have expressed that “new progress” was made and the talks were “constructive.” However, what these conciliatory comments ignore is the fact that the crisis was first brought about as a result of misunderstanding economic concepts and neglecting international dynamics. While the U.S. is home to the largest economy in the world, its growth is marred by superficial and unsustainable policies—such as the recent levying of tariffs—that will likely prove to be long-term detriments to the U.S. economy. This trend is best captured in U.S.-China trade relations, recently stained by hostile trade policies that assumes a U.S.-China trading partnership made decades ago while ignoring sound economic and foreign policy.

A Primer on the U.S. Trade Deficit

On the trade balance, Adam Smith once wrote that “[it’s] unnecessary to lay extraordinary restraints upon the importation of goods from those countries with which the balance of trade is supposed to be disadvantageous. Nothing, however, can be more absurd than this whole doctrine of the balance of trade.” Trade deficits occur when a country imports more than it exports. In macroeconomic terms, a country’s exports minus its imports is equal to savings minus investment. In the wake of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 and tariffs levied against products such as steel, aluminum, and other Chinese goods, the U.S. trade balance has reached unprecedented levels, widening to $891.3 billion. Trade imbalances with China account for almost half of that number, rising to $419.16 billion for 2018. But analyzing these numbers in a vacuum as some are apt to do risks adopting the same flawed reasoning that has led to U.S.-China tensions.

Multiple elements can influence the trade deficit, such as more government spending, the exchange rate of the dollar, and a growing economy. In the U.S. context, the stability and size of its economy encourages increased purchases of American assets, appreciating the dollar. As the dollar strengthens, foreign goods become cheaper to purchase and American consumers buy more and save less. In the shadow of weakening global growth, financial and trade conditions internationally have contracted while the consumer-driven U.S. economy continues to expand, contributing to the deficit. Additionally, increased government spending over the past several years has also widened the deficit.

As economist Martin Feldstein notes, it often becomes politically expedient to blame the trade deficit on unfair practices adopted by foreign governments. While it may be correct to assert that governments such as China do engage in improper economic activities, constraining those countries’ access to U.S. products or markets will not drastically change the trade balance. This may be considered a legitimate negotiating strategy, but a belligerent trade policy that adopts this fallacious attitude damages important country relations and harms domestic consumers, making the costs greater than the benefits.

Trade deficits are not inherently bad nor are they good. It’s important to note that sustained imbalances can harm the economy, such as contributing to slow growth and destabilizing financial bubbles. A larger trade deficit provides a challenge in increasing employment and sustaining economic growth. However, the U.S. has experienced remarkably low unemployment rates and consistent economic growth.

In a two-country scenario, large trade deficits can lead to irreversible damage to the U.S. economy. However, despite what some may believe, no country exists in this bilateral sphere. To identify trade imbalances--such as the one between the U.S. and China--as the greatest economic issue is to incorrectly identify the appropriate factors influencing the economy and country relations.

Historically, due to its size and influence, the U.S. may have operated in a global environment closer to the zero-sum world that the Trump administration has painted a picture of. However, the international terrain has shifted, with China possessing more market power and global impact.

The ‘Rise’ of China: What’s the Alternative?

Over the course of 2018, the Trump administration imposed tariffs on at least $200 billion of U.S. imports, with tariff rates ranging from 10 percent to 25 percent. Targeting strategically significant industries, such as steel and goods important to China’s “Made in China 2025” program, this marks the first U.S. trade war seen since the 1930s. President Trump cited unfair terms of trade, the large trade deficit, and discriminatory trade practices by China as the primary reasons behind the recent trade policies. In response to this, several countries, notably China, have levied retaliatory tariffs on at least $121 billion of U.S. exports.

Written in the shadow of these recent tariffs, several studies assert that U.S. consumers are hit hardest by trade tariffs. Economist David Weinstein found that, in the wake of the trade tariffs recently implemented, the full incidence of those tariffs has been passed through to domestic consumers. In an effort to mitigate this, the Trump administration has encouraged Americans to switch to alternative suppliers, believing that if Americans do this, the burden of $200 billion of tariffs against Chinese goods will be paid only by foreign firms. However, if this was possible, it would have happened already. In the short-term, Americans cannot find viable alternatives to the competitive goods that China producers offer.

This suggests that over the past decade, a shift in the global economy has occurred, affording more market power to Chinese firms. As International Monetary Fund data indicates, China currently makes up 19.18 percent of the world’s GDP (in Purchasing Power Parity) in comparison to the U.S.’s 15.01 percent. Additional Chinese geopolitical strategies through the use of markets, infrastructure, and foreign aid continue to strengthen the country’s position in the global community. These actions are what has led some to comment that China is on the ‘rise.’ To use this fearful expression is a misnomer that ignores the fact that China and its influence has always been present on the global stage. However, similar to what President Trump is espousing now, China has historically looked inwards instead of outwards. The change in China’s current international strategy and their increasing presence has prompted a reactionary and protectionist response from the U.S., perpetuating an already weakening U.S. presence.

Driven by substantial economic growth over the past several decades, Chinese producers have become key contributors in the global supply chain created by globalization, further solidifying their position in the global economy. As the investment bank Morgan Stanley comments, “the integration of supply chains both domestically and globally has meant that any trade measures implemented on a single country or sector will likely ripple outward to other regions and sectors.” Action taken in one corner of the world affects the entire world. This economic and political shift in China’s market power and its trade partner ‘elasticity’—meaning that there is increasing market power for Chinese producers and a growing array of markets able to substitute for the U.S.—allows producers to avoid importation prices and instead push a majority of the burden towards U.S. producers and consumers. The U.S. remains the largest economy in the world but stands a close second in production. Poor trade, economic, and foreign policies have allowed other countries, such as China, to inch closer to surpassing the U.S. in influencing the complex web of global supply chains.

Hostile trade and economic policies implemented by the U.S. risk alienating trading partners significant to the U.S.’s economic and international presence. Economic structures and relations form the body that social and political institutions dress. While the validity of those economic structures is a topic that deserves its own lengthy discussion, the reality is that the emergence of economic substitutes to the U.S. weakens its already lackluster presence in the international community. Similar to what countries in the past have done, China is simply capitalizing on the U.S.’s weakening international presence and is pushing towards a softer expression of power to increase its influence. The trade war instigated by the U.S. against China and other countries risks solidifying this.

Divorcing Trade Policy and Foreign Policy  

In the report “Beyond the Water’s Edge” by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, researchers found that many U.S. Congressional members appeared to “view trade issues as distinct from foreign policy.” While it appears to be a concession to the conflict between domestic and international policies, the Trump administration has adopted this perspective, furthering global tensions and diminishing the U.S.’s influence.

Even though the Trump administration asserts that the U.S. economy has been running at a deficit for far too long, the U.S. has underpinned multilateral global policy cooperation efforts since World War II as a result of that deficit. A tightening of trading policy harms not only the global economy but the U.S.’s international status.

The U.S. economy currently provides a majority of liquidity to the world economy while simultaneously driving demand. This has contributed to the large trade deficit as discussed in the previous primer on the trade deficit. Ruchir Sharma, head of emerging markets and chief global strategist at Morgan Stanley Investment Management, argues that by maintaining the deficit and consequently its position as the de facto reserve currency, U.S. international borrowing costs are lowered and its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth is heightened. The dollar has served as the most popular global reserve currency and, as Council on Foreign Relations’ James McBride and Andrew Chatzky contend, as the “primary tool for global transactions.” Because it is the de facto reserve currency, other countries use the dollar as the primary currency in their foreign exchange reserves and some even peg their own currencies to the dollar. These reserves are used in the global economy during transactions and investments. Because of these reserves, U.S. influence in the global economy and greater international stage remains profound.  

By pretending that trade policy and foreign policy doesn’t exist in conjunction with each other, the U.S. risks placing itself in the economic and political vacuum it’s created. This directly stems from a fundamental misunderstanding of economic dynamics and how it relates to international relations.

Looking Forward

It’s been said before: the ‘rise’ of China is threatening the current global order. In the wake of increasing tensions between previously friendly countries, China is becoming a more legitimate alternative to an often hostile and unpredictable U.S. administration. Instead of lashing out with poor policies that perpetuates this--such as levying harsh tariffs, backing out of the now defunct Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and swelling the budget deficit--the U.S. should focus on reaffirming economic relationships with those they have marginalized. While there are trade-offs inherent in every economic action taken, multilateral trade deals such as the TPP can be used to counter China’s growing influence without estranging countries who have depended on the U.S. in the past. But while these approaches are legitimate in their prescription, such suggestions imply that a rising China is dangerous to the U.S.

Somewhere far back in the annals of history, someone once convinced us that a unipolar world was the only viable goal for countries. However, the U.S. should reject the notion that the international stage is a pragmatic game of chess with antagonists standing at opposite sides of a board. Most—though they may not admit it—are tired of this narrative or, rather, they should be tired of it. The U.S. should engage with China, join its international initiatives, and continue to establish itself as a leader standing among leaders. If the U.S. is attempting to influence China and its policies, working alongside China instead of against it is the best approach the U.S. can take. Hostile trade and diplomatic policies only succeed in alienating those closest to us and entrenching stereotypical narratives about those who are not. Beyond a ‘rising’ China, the most effective foreign policy that the U.S. can adopt is to engage in multilateral endeavors and strengthen its relationship with other countries through positive economic and international agreements.

Separating trade policies and international relations is a fallacy that disrupts the global economy. Trade policies should affirm relationships with other countries, forcing those countries and individuals to work together for mutual goals. Failing to acknowledge this--or ignoring this--isolates the U.S. and strains global dynamics. The U.S. is still the largest economy in the world and wields immense power in the international community. To implement policies that act as if this isn’t true lacks a depth of understanding and causes the U.S. to become smaller on an already crowded global stage.

An administration that clings to the tattered sleeve of a vacuous economic practice devoid of international context runs the risk of further weakening its position in the world. The Trump administration has made reducing the U.S. trade deficit a key policy position, looking at the global economy through two-dimensional lenses. However, hostile policies ignore the multidimensional nature of foreign policy as facilitated through economics. Instead of implementing policies that could better global relations, the administration has established itself among elitist economists and politicians who are either ignorant or feign ignorance in order to achieve ideological goals. And yet, somehow, the U.S. still hasn’t managed to lessen its trade deficit.

Note

Because there are topics mentioned deserving of their own discussion, this article only seeks to understand and explain the misconstruction of economic elements and the failure to incorporate those elements holistically into international relations. It’s important to acknowledge those subjects that have not been elucidated upon in order to continue having conversations about these issues. There have been several subjects that have been offered in the context of the discussion that have not been appropriately expanded upon:

This article does not seek to specifically only comment on the veracity of trade policies such as tariffs, but instead examines the economic dimensions in which these policies exist and the theoretical failures that have followed. For example, the usage of the dollar as a de facto global reserve currency supports U.S. influence in the international community. However, the article did not ask whether or not that influence has been correctly wielded.

The article does not comment on the geopolitical strategies adopted by China. While often accused of using ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ to gain power, some would assert that these policies offer alternatives to monopolistic initiatives that are arguably an extension of neocolonial practices.  

Finally, the article does not comprehensively comment on the impact of a large trade deficit and liberal trading policies. These policies and practices create positive benefits for consumers, such as contributing to lower product prices, higher overall standards of living, and so on. However, these same policies have arguably led to the consolidation of capitalism and the crystallization of inequality, environmental degradation, etc.

How Should the U.S. React to the South China Sea Dispute?

What is the South China Sea Dispute?

The South China Sea dispute is one of the most significant and intense territorial disputes in the world today. It first emerged after World War II when China, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia seeked to occupy islands in the South China Sea. As decades passed, the dispute became increasingly complicated as more nations, including the U.S., and various complicated factors came into play.

There are two forms of disputes occurring in the South China Sea. The first dispute is over territory. Nations including China, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam have territorial claims over various islands, rocks, and reefs around the South China Sea. The second dispute involves maritime boundaries. This dispute includes all territorial actors and Indonesia. The argument between these actors pertains to how to divide the sea itself. Each nation has different claims over different areas, and the major issue of the dispute is that these claims largely overlap with each other.

The South China Sea is seen as a valuable provider of a variety of resources. In 2015, the South China Sea has been accounted for 12% of the global fish catch, and home to more than half of the world's fishing vessels. These fisheries officially employ about 3.7 million people and many more unofficially. The South China Sea is estimated to be rich in oil and gas deposits as well, though there is no clear data on the matter. The area beneath the sea is potentially valuable, as it is an important energy supply corridor.

There are numerous territorial claims in the South China Sea. China and Vietnam have previously made and continue to make claims over the islands (including Scarborough, Paracels, and Spratly Islands) within the South China Sea, while Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Brunei have claims over the water surrounding the islands. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) does not abide by claims that violate the limits of a state's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The EEZ states that 200 nautical miles from the shoreline is exclusive area for a country's economic utilization. Countries in their exclusive economic zones have "sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources." Vietnam claims it has actively ruled over the Paracels and  Spratly Islands since the 17th Century. The Philippines claim sovereignty in the Scarborough Shoal (or Huangyan Island in China), which is located 100 miles from the Philippines and 500 miles from China. Malaysia and Brunei claim territory that falls within their EEZs, as defined by UNCLOS. Malaysia additionally claims a small number of islands in the Spratlys.

One of the most important things to keep in mind about the South China Sea dispute is that much of the argument is over rocks and reefs rather than legally defined islands under international law. If a rock or reef legally becomes an island, it means that it would have its own EEZ. In order for a rock to be classified as an island, it must be able to sustain human life on it to engage in economic activity. A reef does not belong to anyone because it belongs to the sea bed. However, if a state has rights to a seabed, it is able to manipulate the reefs. Since 2015, China has been dumping sand and cement on numerous reefs to create man-made military bases on islands, in order to expand their sovereignty further into the South China Sea. China uses the "cabbage" strategy to layer on "civilian, paramilitary, and military protection" amongst the islands. The "salami-slicing" tactic additionally pertains to China slowly gaining control over land, sea, and air space in the East and South China Seas.

In the past, there have been many incidents where fishing boats and ships of opposing nations have sunk each other. Most recently, a Chinese maritime surveillance vessel sank a Vietnamese fishing boat in March 2019. The fishing boat was sailing near the Paracel islands, which China has most control over, before the Chinese vessel pursued the fishing boat and shot at it with a water cannon. The fishing boat hit a rock and sank but the five fishermen were rescued by another Vietnamese fishing boat. The area in which the fishing boat sank is currently being disputed between China, Vietnam, and Taiwan, with each claiming that their sovereignty over the islands were violated by this incident. The cause of the incident is still not clear, with Vietnam claiming that the Chinese vessel rammed the boat.  

China Perspective

China's claims in the South China Sea are largely historical. China has created the nine dash line, which was taken from a 1947 map. The nine dash line represents what China believes should be the boundary of its territory, which essentially encompasses most of the South China Sea. The nine dash line largely overlaps with the claims of Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei. China's reasoning for the nine-dash line is that Chinese fishermen have been active in that area for centuries. China believes that its historical claim over the islands and sea was established before the implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), despite having ratified it. Therefore, China has been exerting "constant diplomatic pressure to either revise international law or gain a special exception to it, where China's ancestral claims would be recognized by all."

The Century of Humiliation, lasting from 1842 to 1949, was a time in China's history when the country was exploited and overpowered by western nations. The strive to overcome a period of history that, to China, symbolizes their weakness, has made the nation more assertive in the South China Sea. This includes expanding naval capabilities and using the man-made islands to build military bases on as an strategic advantage.

China's narratives say that the US is seeking to contain China as a rising power. It opposes the U.S.'s naval presence in the area, one of the reasons being that it is encouraging the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to stand its ground on their claims and their opposition of China. China firmly believes that third parties, including the U.S., should not be involved in the dispute because it does not directly concern them.

U.S. Perspective

The Obama Administration has previously stated that the U.S. has interest in the South China Sea and that nations should make claims on it as long as they abide by UNCLOS standards. The Obama Administration additionally made a commitment to "pivot" to Asia and strengthen allyship and security ties with ASEAN. It is an important "test of American leadership" to try to defend allies in the region amongst the growing aggression of China. The U.S. has stated that it will defend the Philippines in a potential clash against China; however, at the same time, the Philippines does not want to get dragged into a potential war between the U.S. and China. The U.S. rejects China's nine-dash line and its claims over the island, but because it does not have any interest in the islands, rocks, and reefs in the area, the U.S has verbally stood in a neutral position over the dispute. Currently, the Trump Administration doesn't seem to have a long-term strategy for the issue like Beijing does. Recent policies have tended to contradict each other, turning to isolationism because being the "policeman" of the world is too costly while simultaneously wanting a stronger military presence in the sea. As of now, there is no sense of direction due to conflicting statements.

On the other hand, the U.S. still seeks to patrol the sea because of its commitment to defending international law and the rights to sail freely within international waters. The South China Sea is also an important commercial trading route for the U.S. One of the US's strategies has been to promote Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOP's) to reiterate the international law of the sea. This strategy, however, has been ineffective because it has intensely harshened China's salami-slicing or cabbage strategies instead of reducing them. The U.S. is in a tight spot because it doesn't want to further provoke China but at the same time does not want China to bully its allies. Because of this, the U.S. continues to patrol in the area.

What Should the U.S. Do?

The U.S. needs to act with a clear strategy in mind, because the South China Sea dispute will only evolve as time goes on. If the cards aren't played right, this dispute has the potential to turn into a full-fledged war. The U.S. needs to keep in mind that if it doesn't have a military presence in the South China Sea, then China will take advantage of it. If the U.S. shows that it is okay for China to make claims in an aggressive manner, China could be more likely to be aggressive in other territorial disputes such as Tibet.

On the other hand, how can the U.S's military presence in the region truly be justified? The U.S is not a direct player in the game, so increased patrolling of the sea (such as FONOPs) can make them look like an aggressor and will only allow for China to legitimize its militarization in the islands. The main mission of a FONOP is for the US to assert its power when it believes that other nations are restricting freedom of navigation and dismissing international law and norms. FONOPs are questionable because they have no real, detailed justification and sometimes are conducted by U.S. warships and bombers, which can make the operation look aggressive. There are also economic risks to consider, being that China is a significant trade partner to the U.S and the two states are currently engaged in a trade war. The U.S. can hold Beijing accountable by placing economic sanctions on trade and creating tighter restrictions on business between the two states, but this could also further provoke China.

In my opinion, it is in the best interest of the United States to keep its commitment to its partners and allies, such as the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia. The U.S. must build up its maritime capacity building by providing equipment and support in sea surveillance and infrastructure support to coast guards. Additionally, the US should continue selling more military weapons to Taiwan or increase defense cooperation with India as an indirect way of helping. Helping allies in the region benefits nations to defend themselves against China's aggressiveness and helps balance the power rivalry. It is essential that the U.S. commits to multilateral institutions like ASEAN in the region to prevent a potential war with China. Whichever way the U.S. reacts, the aim should be to maintain peace within the region and promote negotiation, communication, and cooperation without interfering in a way that demonstrates aggression and western dominance.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative and America’s Response

In the last 30 years, China’s economy has developed at a record breaking pace. According to the CIA, in 2015 92 countries counted China as their largest trading partner compared to only 57 countries counting the United States at the same rank. China has gone from the world’s largest recipient of World Bank loans in the 1980s and the 1990s to, in recent years, loaning more to developing countries than the entirety of the World Bank. China’s economic rise has supplanted the nation as a pillar of leadership in a globalized world, and China has only accelerated its dramatic rise to superpower status with its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The initiative seeks to ambitiously launch long-term land and maritime transport links between China, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. With Italy becoming the latest and largest nation so far to join China’s BRI, the United States be cognizant about the BRI’s potential to elevate China’s economy to new heights and should strengthen economic alliances with nations that are increasingly looking to China as a major development partner.

Global Scope

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs envisions a set of maritime and land-based economic routes that links China to 71 countries in Central Asia, Europe, Africa and South Asia. Touted as “the most significant and far-reaching initiative China has ever put forward” by Wu Jianmin, member of the Foreign Policy Advisory Committee of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, the BRI includes infrastructure projects like the Yiwu-London railway and a bridge over Croatia’s Mali Ston Bay to strengthen economic and non-economic elements of China’s relationship with recipient countries.

The majority of the funding for the Global Belt and Road Initiative will come in the form of loans, meaning that if the recipient country cannot pay back its loans the Chinese government could own the infrastructure projects they are funding. While some posit the BRI as a challenge to the “liberal international order” the United States has pioneered over the last fifty years, China facilitating more trade, especially in developing nations, reduces the likelihood of interstate conflict and war. Even if war is less likely under a system where China is a leading partner with most of the important economies of the world, the United States realizes that it will be difficult to impose the will of the United States, like sanctions and counterterrorism measures, on countries that are now economically dependent on China. Chinese government sources maintain that the One Belt, One Road is compatible with the five principles of peaceful coexistence as laid out in the United Nations Charter: mutual respect for sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. Xi Jinping stated that these connectivity networks across Africa, Asian, and European continents are likely to tap market potential, promote investment and consumption, create job opportunities, enhance cultural exchanges, and enable trust, harmony, peace, and prosperity. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also believes that One Belt One Road will accelerate the development of western Chinese provinces that lag behind eastern China industrially and infrastructurally. The Chinese consensus rejects notions that China plans to take complete control of existing global financial institutions as the United States did with the Marshall Plan immediately following World War II; Chinese sources in the Global Times delineate between the Marshall Recovery Program that excluded pro-Soviet European countries and the Belt Road Initiative which welcomes all countries to join regardless of their allies, their doctrine, or their past relationship with China.

In the last decade, Chinese foreign policy began to utilize soft power as a method to obtain economic and political goals, and cooperation rather than coercion as a foreign policy tool by China should concern a United States that has traditionally been the world’s foremost hegemon. Soft power scholars believe that because China has such a drastically different government from most of the Western world and developed economies, it has difficulty shifting the international narrative away from its focus on issues of human rights and repressive political system. While previous attempts at Chinese soft power, like Confucius Institutes which have been accused of compromising academic integrity, and Chinese think tanks, that rarely endorse ideas differing from official Chinese Communist Party ideology, recipient countries typically embrace Chinese grant aid. The most effective manner in which China can spread soft power and spur other nations to work towards China’s goals is through what the BRI claims to do, addressing economic needs of developing countries. A Singaporean senior foreign policy official explained that China’s appeal to Southeastern Asian nations over the United States comes from gifts like multibillion-dollar investment aid packages.

American Concerns

The BRI drew disdain from the West due to Chinese willingness to pump money into dictator-run countries, like Zimbabwe, Niger, Angola, and Burma, that have poor human rights records without aid conditionality of changing authoritarian government practices.  Despite America’s enormous military strength and reputation as the pinnacle of innovation, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) represents an concerning trend to Americans that the BRI follows. They are both noteworthy international financial structures that include many trusted American allies but exclude United States financial hegemony. The AIIB also supports the idea that American financial institutions are ill-equipped to adequately deal with the rapid rise of developing Asian economies. South Korea, a long-term ally of the United States, turned to China as its most important trade partner to rival Japan. The decision of President Trump to go behind South Korean leadership to meet with Kim Jong-Un and end large-scale joint military exercises with South Korea has also strained relations. As the United States finds themselves no longer alone as the sole superpower in the world, many American allies experience internal contradictions and friction within one another that complicates their relationship with the United States. Contrasting preemptive military interventions into Iraq and Afghanistan that have incensed regional conflicts and made American visions of “global peace, security, and stability” seem insincere, the official Chinese ideology behind the BRI is to sponsor peaceful infrastructure and economic development. China’s discourse of “peaceful development” may ultimately win the hearts of nations that grow wary of the Americanized doctrine of “security.” Herrero and Xu uncover that the Belt and Road Initiative would drastically reduce both railway and maritime costs for trade between European Union countries, especially landlocked countries, who are historically American allies.

The BRI is critical to transforming China’s self-identity from an East Asian country to a central country of Asia that includes the North, South, and the West; this reinvigorates China’s image into a world superpower that rivals the United States. What will drastically improve Chinese soft power is the feature of the BRI that allows for an open and inclusive commerce involving countries along the route that are not China, as introduced by Xi Jinping in the 2015 Boao Forum. The BRI fosters a new era of Chinese economics and foreign policy that encourages intensive cooperation and builds on win-win diplomacy endorsed by Deng Xiaoping throughout the 1980s and 1990s to ensure a peaceful environment where China could grow economically.

At best the BRI benefits every country that is willing to partake in a mutually beneficial trade arrangement and at worst the BRI is a nefarious, ideological plan to win over American allies and whose economic benefits are conditional on political requirements and military cooperation. Either scenario should be concerning towards the American policymakers who wish to solidify America as the world’s foremost economic hegemon. Western officials also worry that Chinese development money undermines governance standards of lending institutions like the World Bank, especially if that money goes towards China’s own companies or environmentally damaging projects. The argument that the Belt Road Initiative will better account for the experiences and interests of emerging economies than existing financial institutions like the World Bank does not necessarily need to be true to worry American policymakers either; the AIIB and BRI may bolster China’s global reach as a complement to existing financial mechanisms. Funneling money towards infrastructure, business, and educational opportunity throughout Western China can help assuage relations with China’s ethnic minorities, which takes away a key talking card by Western governments about China’s alleged human rights violations.

Effectiveness of American Countermeasures

In 2015, the BRI was expanded to encompass 70 percent of the global population and 55 percent of the world’s GDP. In 2015, China allocated a $40 billion fund solely dedicated towards funding almost 900 BRI projects, but recently China was estimated to increase total investment on BRI projects to $1.2-1.3 trillion by 2027.

American countermeasures emerged from China’s recent and rapid expansion of infrastructure. Rising anxiety in the American government about China’s assertive development abroad led to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo laying forth the “Indo-Pacific Economic Vision” to combat China’s rise. Pompeo also elucidated President Trump’s Indo-Pacific counterstrategy with a trilateral investment agreement among the United States, Japan, and Australia. The Indo-Pacific Economic Vision will funnel money into Southeast Asia through the US International Development Finance Corporation, which doubles the global spending cap for loans private companies can use for development projects to 60 billion USD. Pompeo’s language was far less combative and aggressive than Vice-President Mike Pence’s language in 2018 at the Hudson Institute that stressed a Chinese campaign undermining support for “our nation’s most cherished ideals.” Pompeo even offered an avenue for collaboration for China when stating “our Indo-Pacific vision excludes no nation.” Brian Hook, Pompeo’s senior policy advisor, implied that American efforts to expand US technology exports to the region and store energy resources by developing infrastructure would ensure “that America’s model of economic engagement is the healthiest for nations in the region.” These American initiatives still do not even scratch the surface of the billions of dollars of investments China is transferring into Southeast Asia.

The American response to the Belt Road Initiative under the Trump administration has flirted with bolstering ties with relevant allies in the Asian-Pacific region and has taken issue with China’s economic interactions with other Asian countries. While there are little doubts in the international community about America’s ability to uphold military commitments, investment in Southeast Asian countries could strengthen America’s image as upholding economic and political alliances especially after trust among Southeast Asian countries dwindled after President Trump incurred a withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The Trans-Pacific Partnership was an opportunity for the United States to strengthen its trades relationships with relevant Southeast Asian countries in the pivot against China, and the AIIB represents China’s largely successful response to the TPP with major economies like Brazil, India, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom joining membership.  In July of 2018, the American government also streamlined funding to prevent the termination of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, an agency that offers political risk insurance and financing towards American companies interested in international development projects. Representative Ed Royce (R-CA) labeled Chinese development assistance as “predatory development finance models” citing the specific example of China acquiring a major port in Sri Lanka due to Sri Lanka’s inability to pay back China’s loans. Royce’s quarrel with China has more merit than it used to; Chinese loans are nearing up to 5 percent when they used to only be 2.5 percent.

The Belt Road Initiative can also be seen as proof that China is deeply cognizant of America’s “pivot” to Asia, implying a stronger commitment US military, trade, and development assistance to American allies to counterbalance China’s rise. Major General Qiao Liang stated that the BRI is a “hedging strategy against the eastward move of the U.S. pivot to Asia.”

Conclusion

Despite Chinese sources proclaiming altruistic goals, the BRI is first and foremost a tool to promote Chinese economic development by heightening exports, enriching access to natural resources, and providing support to domestic industries that experience overcapacity within China’s economy. China also stands to benefit from strengthening ties with Central Asian autocratic governments that have an abundance of energy resources and to reduce tensions among China’s western ethnic regions. China would not undertake such a grandiose project if it did not have the potential to propel China into the world’s most important economic power.

It is hard to deny that the BRI does provide China a valuable avenue in shaping the preferences of other nations in a manner that benefits China. Chinese sources will under-exaggerate and Western sources will exaggerate the difficulty of the BRI’s profitability with many nations that have underdeveloped economies, high levels of corruption, and limited knowledge on the project. The United States should also feel more at ease at the fact that coercion of nations involved in the BRI would result in political counterculture that would denigrate China’s soft power and destroy Xi Jinping’s new ideal for China.

While the American military is by far the most formidable force in the world, American supremacy of the economic realm is more at question currently than it has since before the Bretton-Woods Institution. The Institute for China-America Studies, China’s only DC based think-tank, argues that the West’s best option regarding the BRI is simply to accept and attempt to shape the potential $1 trillion bestowed upon the geo-economic stage. Either option of joining the BRI as a partner and using America’s premier economic influence of the last 50 years to exert political ideologies or remaining outside the BRI but bolstering economic and political support to Asian Pacific allies in our pivot against China is preferable to questioning the value of our alliances. Any approach by the Trump administration that ignores trends of globalization and free trade, like abandoning multilateral trade deals or questioning burden-sharing in alliances, is doomed for failure.

Finally Being Seen as an Equal: Chinese Investments in Latin America

In the International Trade War between the United States and China, the two nations are participating in  a geopolitical race through different agreements such as foreign investment, loans, and trade agreements in order to secure their influence across the globe. While the United States and countries in Latin America always had some form of relations, the increasing dialogue between countries in Latin America and China may change the dynamic between the US and Latin America. One way China is attempting to improve its relations in Latin America is through the Belt Road Initiative, a billion dollar investment program which helps funds infrastructure projects to enhance Chinese soft power. With countries such as Chile and the Dominican Republic as members of this initiative, could this ultimately change how Latin American states conduct relations with the United States? Or do these relations with China indicate the start of a new era for Latin America?

The most prevalent way we see the improvement of relations between China and countries in Latin America is though  Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) which is a practice used by countries to expand their values and social practices in different regions of the world such as Latin America.  FDI is when an individual or a company owns 10% or more of either a stake in a company or a set amount of money overseas. Overall, there are three general forms of Foreign Direct Investments: horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate. Horizontal forms of FDI describe investors establishing branch offices in foreign countries. A vertical FDI is when business agreements from two foreign companies are made in order for there to be a mutually beneficial result. Lastly, a conglomerate FDI is when a firm makes an investment that is unrelated to their business. All three variations of Foreign Direct Investments regardless of what form they come in benefit receiving countries in some way shape or form. Beyond establishing foreign business branches or investments overseas, FDIs include the distribution of skills and new forms of technological infrastructure that receiving nations may not have original access to. This is one of the multiple benefits that can come out of receiving foreign direct investments from foreign firms.

Over the course of ten years, China has given foreign direct investments to countries in Latin America but have only seen the results of these investments in the most recent years. The sharp increase in investments over the course of the past five years has allowed China to see the benefits of investments from the past decade. The specific case of Chinese investments in Latin America shows the lengthy process it takes for foreign firms to see any form of benefit.

The development of new sectors allows for more investments from different firms to fund innovations. One example of how foreign firms are able to see benefits from their investments from an extended period of time is through the development of infrastructure. Out of the different ways in which foreign investments can help benefit a nation, the development of infrastructure is a prime example of how investments not only improve the quality of the life of individuals in a specific nation but the general economy as well.

Infrastructure gives the basic fundamentals for an economy to function off of. According to the Brookings Institute,  infrastructure is considered to be the “heart” of the economy. Economically speaking, infrastructure allows for the flows of goods to either be increased or at least maintained. Ranging from fundamentals such as paved roads to more complex infrastructures such as telecommunication systems, infrastructure is vital and essentially affects all aspects of production from the workers to the highest level of the firms. This being said, without an established and maintained infrastructure it only makes the economy fragile and unstable. For developing nations, increasing and developing new forms of infrastructure can be quite a challenge.

Although countries in Latin America recognize the importance of infrastructure and how it will benefit their national and regional economy, many countries are still facing several obstacles. Argentina, for example, has infrastructure as their top priority and created different policies which tackle transparency, preparation, and execution. By prioritizing the fundamental planning that is needed to build infrastructure, it gives the nation a higher probability for these projects to not only be completed in a timely manner but sustainable. On one hand, economies like Argentina struggle with the foundational planning, while other countries such as Colombia struggle more on the execution aspect of developing infrastructure. Within the planning of infrastructure projects, there is a percentage that represents the amount of risk involved in developing this new infrastructure. Another important value in the planning is the expected amount of time it will take for the project to be completed. Estimated predictions and high-risk percentages are Colombia’s biggest obstacle. Whether it is a high execution risk percentage or the projects not being completed in a timely order, Peru is in a similar position to Colombia where their biggest struggle is in the execution phase of infrastructure development.

A specific way Chinese foreign direct investment in Latin American nations has attempted to increase the development of infrastructure is through the Belt and Road  Initiative which is a program that attempts to make the world more regionally connected beginning with regional cooperation and then branching out this connectivity throughout different regions. This billion dollar initiative gives money to both developing and developed nations in order to either help begin new infrastructure projects or help finish old projects that were abandoned. Recently, countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have become members of this program and as a result of the new membership, countries such as Venezuela and Chile have been able to establish new infrastructure projects due to funding from China. Although the new inflow of money coming in has given Latin American countries new opportunities that were inconceivable at the time, they come at a high cost.

Money that is given to countries from the BRI is similar to a loan in which they need to be paid back in some way. In many instances for Latin America, countries have negotiated for alternative forms of repayment. Ecuador, for example, has negotiated to give China about 80% of their revenues from oil as a form of repayment. Another way Latin American countries have attempted to repay these loans is by taking out more loans which creates a vicious cycle of repayment. It is not clear whether or not many of these newly created projects have been completed, but there are special cases such as in Ecuador where these projects are currently abandoned due to the lack of labor and thorough planning. If there are such high negative costs to these risky loans which do not confirm any infrastructure project why continue?

It is the mere principle of the bilateral negotiations between the Latin American nations and China that make Latin American countries such as Chile and Ecuador to be so willing to agree to such risky terms.  It is worth noting in 2008, China promised the governments of Latin America that they would “treat each other as equals.” This distinction of being recognized as an equal nation is a term that cannot be found in US political documents.

During a time of conflict between the United States and China, Latin America geopolitically was attractive as well as a significant location for both nations. For the United States, more mutually beneficial negotiations between them and Latin American could have possibly secured even more support than already existed. While China, on the other hand, can take advantage of the dependent relationship between the US and Latin America to forge new relationships that do not have a hierarchical underlining to it. With more and more nations joining the Belt and Road Initiative, the United States must realize that Latin America no longer the country it once was. If the United States wants to maintain the relationship or improve upon the relationship they have with countries in Latin America, the United States must be mindful of these contemporary relations and what could become of it. Whether it is revisiting old agreements that have not changed or creating new agreements, if the United States ignores the situation between countries in Latin America and China then countries in Latin America could be looking at their new loyal partner.

Antarctic Cooperation: Challenges and Benefits to American Foreign Interests

Multinational cooperation plays an essential role in shaping the field of international relations. Throughout the years, countries have been trying to overcome and understand each other’s differences and create bilateral and multilateral partnerships. Nowadays, in Europe, Asia, North and South America, Africa, and Australia, nations have various sets of rules and regulations that all actors must abide by. Those commonly established principles make the cooperation within the continents safe and transparent, as those processes are usually overseen by the international organizations. Nevertheless, there is still one giant and geopolitically significant continent that is left out from the general attention: Antarctica. As the world’s coldest and hardest to reach continent, Antarctica has been attracting scientists and explorers from all around the planet for decades.

Countries, as a result of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, have been granted a right to share and use the continent for “peaceful purposes only.” This means that no nation is capable of owning the whole icy land, it is common by the rule of international law. The Antarctic Treaty requires nations to use the icy continent according to the following principles: “Freedom for scientific research,” “International scientific exchange shall be promoted,” and “Territorial claims shall be held in abeyance while the Treaty is in force.” The United States (US), as one of the most developed nations, has been studying Antarctica since December of 1955 when the first American base, McMurdo Station, was established on the continent.

As time went by, the US and other members of the Antarctic Treaty furthered their influence in Antarctica by increasing the number of research bases and advancing their own infrastructural features on the continent. Additionally, nations have been increasing their budgets, related to the South Pole research and exploration. The United States certainly has national ambitions and goals in Antarctica, benefits that America might not be willing to split with others. However, because of the extreme weather conditions, logistical hardships, and other shared problems, the US, together with other nations, will be better off cooperating with one another within Antarctica despite the political issues, mistrusts, and resource nationalism of the current global order.

Opportunities of Antarctica

The South Pole region is one of the most unexplored parts of our planet that possesses a great amount of material, scientific, and other types of opportunities yet to be utilized. Therefore, the United States together with other nations can get more out of the icy continent by making the Antarctic partnerships with each other. Nonetheless, while cooperating, nations in Antarctica may or may not still act with respect to their own interests and this commitment uncertainty could make the cooperation perspectives less likely. Hence, by being clear about the sharing process of goals and gains that arise from collaborations, countries will be able to have far more trust in one another and eventually achieve significantly more objectives.

The article “The Fight to Own Antarctica” that was written by Benedict Mander and Leslie Hook in the popular publication Financial Times informs the reader that Antarctica has a lot to offer and the issue of sharing the findings may bring up a number of possession related matters between the countries. The authors highlight that “At stake is the last pristine continent, one that contains the world’s largest store of freshwater, huge potential reserves of oil and gas and the key to understanding how quickly climate change will impact the world through rising sea levels.” This excerption has a relatively pessimistic and competition implying message, which is a relevant concern, based on the current global order and long-determined relationships between the world’s most powerful nations. Nevertheless, the same statement may be interpreted as evidence for a different viewpoint. Antarctica has so much to offer that nations will benefit from cooperating and can eventually advance their exploration and gains from the icy continent’s enormous potential. America is capable of leading the common work and cooperation, which eventually can contribute to strengthening the US hegemonic future.

Furthermore, by working together with other preoccupied nations, the United States will get more information and a broader picture of a highly contemporary problem as climate change. Thus, by having a superior comprehension of this issue, nations will be able to orient the essential solutions to the existing causes of the climate change and the primary matter of global warming.

Competitors on the Continent

Our planet has been a gigantic arena where nations compete for resources, power, control, and usually act in pursuit of their own interests rather than the common good; ergo, with its resources and overall potential, Antarctica may become a new battlefield for the world’s leading countries. Nowadays, there are a lot of skeptics of the Antarctic Treaty saying that the agreement needs to be modernized in order to meet the demands of current global order and implement additional regulations on the agreement signing countries.

The Financial Times authors in their Antarctica related article introduce the Royal Holloway, London University’s professor Klaus Dodds, who raises the principal question about the icy continent. The online publication provides an interview excerpt: “Resources have always been the big trigger,” says Professor Dodds. “Once you get more explicit about resource exploitation, then you raise the troubling issue of who owns Antarctica. That’s the issue that haunts the Antarctic Treaty, and the Treaty System more generally.” This concern is not random and has been one of the key talking points of the Antarctica conversations, debates, and international meetings. Professor Dodds does not mention any countries, however, it is clear that the race for resources and other Antarctic prospects might erupt between nations with the most influence in the region, which are the United States, Russia, and China. Therefore, even if America follows all the rules and favors the cooperative way of diplomacy in Antarctica, the US will not have any other option but to join the contest when Russia or China begin the resource race. In that case, we may see the Antarctic Treaty countries form clusters, bilateral groups, or act solely and eventually any likelihoods of multilateral cooperation in Antarctica would be extremely hard to work through.

It is vital to note that countries such as Great Britain, Australia, Norway, Argentina, Chile, France, and many others are also crucial actors in Antarctica with their research bases and various influence giving aspects. Moreover, since the Antarctic Treaty was signed, more and more nations have been developing their technological, logistical, and monetary capabilities and can now join the scene. Whether it will be a cooperative or competitive scene has to be decided by the nations themselves, though it is understandable that the Antarctic Treaty will need to be updated according to the current global standards and preoccupations.

Prospects of Collaboration

Cooperation in Antarctica will most likely benefit the countries with less industrial and technological capabilities on the continent, yet this partnership will also make the nations with significant powers in the region much better off. The United States, as one of the leading players in Antarctic explorations and studies, is and should strive for the cooperation with other countries, especially if such interaction can bring the American side certain optimistic outcomes. The academic article, published in the scholarly periodical The Polar Journal by Georgetown University professor Christopher C. Joyner, touches upon the significance of Antarctica for the United States in scientific, astronomical, and geopolitical ways. The author also mentions the importance for America of the science-related partnership. He argues that “The United States government strives to undertake opportunities for cooperative scientific research to understand Antarctica and other global physical and environmental systems.” Additionally, the writer calls the American efforts a “major national interest.” This statement clearly shows that the United States is open towards various research-related partnerships on the icy continent.

Moreover, the American authorities view the scientific investigations and potential knowledge, gained as a result of Antarctic research, as a vital matter for the whole country. Consequently, by collaborating with other nations in Antarctica, the United States and its researchers will be able to make new scientific advancements, and as Christopher C. Joyner suggests, acquire valuable information to understand the world we live in. The US supports the Antarctic cooperation in pursuit of the scientific discoveries and is willing to create bilateral or multilateral partnerships with other nations on the continent. However, competition between the partner countries is the obvious issue that arises and needs to be addressed, while talking about the prospects of Antarctic cooperation and potential steps that must be communicated along the way.

Real Obstacles

The process of Antarctic cooperation is not easy to commence and even more difficult to stick to; ergo, the matter of trust is vitally important with relation to the partnership formation activities on the continent. Like most situations, cooperation cannot exist without trust between the global actors. Nevertheless, it gets tricky when you have to rely on the collaborator who you have been competing with for a long time. In the article “The WikiLeaks Arctic Cables,” published in the Polar Record, Professor Klaus J. Dodds analyzes and publicizes the confidential American foreign relations records that were obtained and distributed by WikiLeaks. Those documents reveal a great number of conversations, assignments, and exchanges of advice between the State Department of the United States of America, diplomats, and embassies around the globe. The primary reference point of those records is the situation in the Arctic among the North Pole countries. This peer reviewed publication talks about the present issue, related to mistrust of the US and other NATO nations towards Russia, as one of the active leaders in the areas of Arctic research, territorial control, and resource extraction. As a result, such North Pole matter can be compared with the possible course of events in Antarctica.

The author also references the WikiLeaks website and writes, “Under the heading of ‘New WikiLeaks revelations shed light on Arctic oil “carve up”’ it rallied against the ‘new revelations’ by the whistle blowing website WikiLeaks that show how the scramble for resources in the Arctic is sparking military tension in the region, with NATO sources worried about the potential for armed conflict between the alliance and Russia… .’” The publicity of these revealed records did not benefit the United States or its allies. Moreover, American competitors, primarily Russia and to some extent China, among others, got valuable insight information that concerns the NATO countries’ activities, preoccupations, plans, and talks about the North Pole region. The WikiLeaks publication shows that in the Arctic, neither the US and its allies trust Russia or any other potential adversary, nor can the Russian Federation trust their counterparts. This conclusion can also be empirically devoted to other regions of the planet and Antarctica is one of them. Consequently, based on these materials, a reliance-building process between the three strongest Antarctic nations will demand a great amount of diplomatic work and time.

Coexisting in Peace

        It is hard to deny that the United States views other powerful countries, such as China and Russia, as evident rivals because of the decades long competition for global hegemony, resources, and political ideas. However, Antarctica is an immensely different kind of location, as it is impossible to be in power and thus, cooperation has a lot less obstacles. Taking the Antarctic Treaty into account and the possibility of gaining benefits through mutual assistance, the United States should not worry about the threat from other nations. The Global Politics report titled “The Option for U.S.–China Cooperation in Antarctica” by Senior Research Fellow Dean Cheng, highlights that the Antarctic matter is not a zero-sum game and there can be multiple winners as a result of the cooperation on the icy continent. The report was published through The Heritage Foundation website and looks at the prospects and American interests from the United States-China cooperation in the Antarctic region. Cheng makes it clear that China is currently one of the biggest actors in Antarctica and will be advancing its influence in future. Beijing is spending more money in the field of South Pole research and Cheng emphasizes it by giving the information about the new Chinese base, which at the time of the report writing (2014) was close to be completed. The researcher affirms, “Once completed [the research station], it will give China one of the largest Antarctic presences. With its Antarctic budget growing from $20 million to $55 million, China clearly has the wherewithal to expand its presence even further.” By increasing the Antarctic exploration spending, China confirms its plans to stay in the South Pole region.

Throughout his report, Cheng stresses that Chinese efforts and advancements in Antarctica does not make the United States or other nations worse off, but rather that there are a lot more resources being spent in that region. So, by having China as a collaborator or a part of a partnership group, the Antarctic Treaty members, especially the United States, will be able to utilize far more joint means as opposed to working alone. Cheng through multiple examples and reasoning, emphasizes that in the South Pole region, cooperation, even with rival nations, has no particular threat for America. Cheng ends his report by concluding that “Consequently, like cooperation in the Gulf of Aden, the Antarctic is an area where the U.S. and China have much to gain through greater cooperation and little to lose. Antarctic cooperation is therefore well worth exploring, to help improve bilateral ties without infringing upon either side’s core interests.”

In his report, Cheng makes it clear that it is necessary to take into account the variation in location when talking about the national and foreign interests of the United States. Thus, relationships between China and America may be quite rival in area, such as South China Sea, Africa, or South America; nonetheless, the affairs in a place like Antarctica may be contrasting. This conclusion may also be used with correlation to Russia and other nations that are not considered allies of the United States. Ultimately, as long as America does not see any particular danger with regards to the Antarctic cooperation, benefits from future partnerships will exceed the possible disadvantages that combined efforts may present.

New Value of the Continent

Antarctica is not owned by anyone and can be freely used by humans in accordance with international law and the Antarctic Treaty; as a result, people all over the world should have equal access to the continent in years to come. While tourism in Antarctica is relatively new in the South Pole area, it is a growing activity. Visitors nowadays are willing to pay large sums of money to experience this pure and magnificent place, that only a small percentage of people have ever been to. An article in Financial Times by Leslie Hook and Benedict Mander reports,

“For most tourists — who pay between $10,000 and $100,000 for a trip — visiting Antarctica involves stepping off the boat at just a handful of highly regulated landing sites. But there are loopholes in the system, such as private yachts that flout permitting rules, as well as a growing number of tours that involve activities such as kayaking or skiing.”

The price, conditions, and available infrastructure of such Antarctic tourist journeys makes it extremely hard for the majority of people to go and visit the continent. Even though, Antarctica is undoubtedly difficult to get to and even more difficult to stay on, people are still capable of making constant progress as technology and our wealth of knowledge advances. Tourism on the icy continent is no different. Hence, this progress can be accelerated by creating new Antarctic partnerships and cooperating groups that will focus on the the processes of getting the general public in and out from the continent. In that case, nations can share experiences or focus on what they have comparative advantage in doing. It is vital to state that the United States may end up collaborating with nations that have a long and not always pleasant history with America and vice versa. As the authors of the article indicate, “The US, Russia and China all have critical infrastructure in Antarctica to aid their global positioning systems.” As the statement implies, the three countries have the dominant positions on the icy continent. Thus, it is logical to assume that for the United States, cooperating with Russia, China, or even both countries can bring the most benefits.

Yet, this potential can have a huge obstacle in its way. Significant political and cultural differences between the three nations, heated by the recent US-China trade arguments and Russia’s condemned behavior on the international arena, may primarily resist and blockade the bilateral or multilateral cooperation in Antarctica between America and the two Eastern countries. However, if the United States, through various diplomatic and scientific channels, were able to negotiate the initial South Pole cooperation deals with its two rivals, the future of humankind may see the totally unexpected outcome. Ultimately, with combined efforts, the overall travel experience, cost, and Antarctic’s own infrastructure can be drastically improved, making the Antarctic tourism more affordable and enjoyable. Also, such cooperation will improve the logistics of Antarctic research, which can upgrade the conditions scientists live and work in.

Nonetheless, the Antarctic Treaty members should also pay close attention to the environmental aspects of their future activities on and around the icy continent. Thereof, it will be essential to connect the future discoveries and progresses with new regulations, agreements, and international “manners”. The Antarctic nations will have essential tasks in the years to come: making the icy continent more accessible for travelers and reducing the environmental risks and problems.

The Antarctic cooperation is a field of international affairs that has not been thoroughly studied yet. Nonetheless, with the extraction of resources, advancement of sea level research, space observations, and Antarctic tourism development, countries will become more and more interested in the icy continent. Eventually, in spite of the different aims, cultures, governmental contradictions, and political hostility, the nations will be able to benefit from the bilateral and multilateral partnerships in Antarctica. Consequently, the United States with its capabilities and interests should not miss out on this opportunity. Moreover, America has all the resources and global recognition to become a leader in promoting, organizing, and maintaining such cooperation. By interacting in the logistic, touristic, infrastructural, and scientific fields, the world’s nations can make much greater progress together than separately. Nations like China and Russia may not be allies to the United States and are usually looked at as rivals.

Nonetheless, with combined infrastructural and other efforts, as well as by letting Antarctica shape new relationships, the cooperation on the South Pole continent is nothing but possible, even between completely different nations. The Heritage Foundation researcher Dean Cheng states that, “U.S.–China cooperation in Antarctica is a positive, admittedly limited, opportunity.” America, by leading and contributing to the partnerships in Antarctica will not only strengthen its own positions and advance its own progress on the icy continent, but will also create an example of a successful cooperation for other countries, which will ultimately benefit the whole humankind. Additionally, relationships and experiences that will be built in Antarctica can become a moving force for similar cooperation in other regions of the planet, making global affairs less hostile and more genuine.

The Role of the Law of the Sea in the East and South China Sea Arbitration

For years, many of the most disputed debates within the international world have included water. Many people have even questioned whether the next world war will be about water and the shortages humans face, as a whole. To this regard, many international disputes regarding water have surfaced to greater importance, especially with the realization that climate change is impacting the world far greater than was once believed. This climate change trend has sparked what can be considered more drastic measures taken by the neighboring states in the Asian-Pacific region. Japan, China, Taiwan, the Philippines, and the Korean Peninsula are all major states impacted by adverse political and economic effects in the area, and all have disputed their contested areas for centuries. These disputes can be traced back to a time of imperialism and expansion of empires, spanning the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, World War II defeats and Cold War geopolitics, adding complexity to claims over the islands. Whether Japan is losing its fisheries and access to sustainable diet, or to China creating new islands, the coastal states in this region are starting to lack the cooperation they had when economic zones were created. Likewise, sovereignty has also been placated within this economic zones. Thus, the modern day disputes that have risen, especially with the United States pivot towards the region, have concluded a more complex understanding than just legal components of international law, climate change, and economic territorial zones.

A way to solve territorial disputes, linked to political and economic crisis, is to arbitrate between the parties, and in this context, it usually involves an international organization as a mediator. To understand how the arbitration occurs in the Asian-Pacific region, the specific outlines of the Law of the Sea need to be primarily understood within the context of the South China Sea. Most recently, in the Permanent Court of Arbitral Tribunal in The Hague between China and the Philippines, the court clarified many historic rights that have been claimed, that set a precedent for the rest of the South China Sea. The Tribunal stated that under UNCLOS (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: “there is no legal basis for any Chinese historic rights within the nine-dash line.” This is important because this dashed line (which has also been known as the ten-dash and eleven-dash line), has been claimed by the Republic of China (Taiwan), and thus the People’s Republic of China (China), which was claimed to allow a majority controlled portion of the South China Sea. The difference between this space and another geographic location are based in three factors. First, China has begun to build artificial islands with military-ready landing strips… in an area where there is still legal deliberation occurring for contested area, and claims to land that they do not have. Second, there are four other countries and the territory of Taiwan that are also claiming contested territorial claims to the area, which would definitely lead to more disputes between surrounding fishing, environmental impact and blames, military strategy placement, and more. Third, there are major ecological, environmental, and physical changes that have occurred in the area due to rising populations, state demands to sustain these populations, and unchanging demands per population metric.

The situation in the South China Sea has unduly caused stress on the environment in the area and thus, has created a major problem for the populations of animals, plants, insects, and others in the area. Non-state actors, such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), have researched and issued statements regarding the environmental impacts of these arbitrations. They claim that “total fish stocks in the South China Sea have been depleted by 70-95 percent since the 1950s and catch rates have declined by 66-75 percent over the last 20 years [even though] The South China Sea is one of the world’s top five most productive fishing zones, accounting for about 12 percent of global fish catch in 2015 [with] more than half of the fishing vessels in the world operat[ing] in these waters, employing around 3.7 million people, and likely many more engaged in illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing.” This poses an enormous problem for the sustainability of the area, both for the populations of the countries surrounding these waters, and also for the environment.

The populations of the coastal areas in the region have already begun to complain, citing shortages of food, limited diversity of species, and increased water temperatures. A well-known indicator of ocean climates, stress, and temperatures are coral systems. Corals are large bodies of cellular organisms that build on each other, and specifically, in the Asian-Pacific corridor, are known as the ‘Coral Triangle.’ This Triangle is located within the main dispute of the South and East China Sea areas. Already, major coral systems, valued at up to $100 million annually, have begun to die off. Without corals, and consistent monitoring of these systems, which is difficult to conduct with off-shore welling, building of islands, and general overfishing, the economic and sustainable benefits of these creatures will diminish. Coral ecosystem impacts are only the beginning of biological degradation that have impacted the legal system and the people, and is incredibly important to focus on.

Lastly, on the South China Sea relations, the Tribunal, which had previously ruled against Chinese historical rights also created other legal thresholds and jurisprudence. Although young and being developed, the jurisprudence of international courts is moving swiftly in the actions taken by Asian nations. Specifically and most recently, the Tribunal issued a ruling on what qualifies as an island for the first time in its history, saying “To qualify as an island, a geographical feature in its natural condition needs to be able to sustain ‘a stable community of people’ and economic life.” Since the claims made by China in the  China-Philippines area were deemed not islands, the Tribunal deemed them rocks, and rocks are incapable of ‘generating their own exclusive economic zone (EEZ).’ Which means, there is no legal basis for any entitlement by China, and by governing maritime law, the long-disputed Spratly Islands chain, or Scarborough Shoal, rather “rocks,” are under Philippine-bound EEZ territory. By declaring the Spratly Islands to be rocks, the Tribunal was able to validate the Philippines’ EEZ territory without delimiting any boundaries, which the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction, and thus, any interferences violates the Philippines’ sovereignty as a nation. These major statements in the maritime law community have ‘made waves’ in terms of understanding what an island is, what a rock is, how geographical settlements can be disputed, and what kind of jurisprudence is created for future Tribunal arbitrations.

Now, understanding the maritime law situation in the South China Sea allows for an understanding in the East China Sea. The East China Sea has a very similar occurrence. This large fishery-dispute within Asian waters have spanned Chinese intervention and claims. Understanding both of these Seas arbitrations is understanding that China is the second-largest economy, and the fastest-growing economy, that needs to support its populations, its economic and military might, and its political power. With 5.3 trillion USD trade dollars annually passing through the South China Sea and East China Sea, 11 billion barrels of oil, 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and with 90% of Middle Eastern fossil fuel exports projected to go to Asia by 2035, it is evident why the trading strengths and force of the East China Sea are imperative not only to China, but Japan and Korea. The economic powerhouses of the region have a lot to lose if international courts do not rule in their favor, and if their military strength is not strong enough to counter their opponents. The power projection from building islands, to increasing fortification, to possible losses in trade deals is monumental. At the moment, the East China Sea legal arbitrations are developing and in dispute; however, further policy actions can be found throughout various non-state organizations and international legal institutions.

The larger impact of the Asian-Pacific region from a non-national security standpoint is imperative in understanding why the situation affects the rest of the world. In a recent Congressional Research Service report, it was strictly defined that “claims of territorial waters and EEZs should be consistent with customary international law of the sea and must therefore, among other things, derive from land features. Claims in the [South China Sea] that are not derived from land features are fundamentally flawed.” This specific report further develops how the legality, or rather illegality, of many nations within the region, not just China, may be found at fault for their actions. The tragedy of the commons incurring due to climate change issues, overfishing, and environmental degradation has caused an even larger concern, and a push towards legal arbitration. Overall, this corridor in the world, which is only a small example of the many regions that are experiencing similar water issues, is of high importance, and one that should not be about competing claims; rather, the South China Sea and the East China Sea arbitration disputes are a larger example about peace and stability in the region.

Building Influence: Chinese Infrastructure Investment in Latin America

As China’s economic power grows, the Asian giant is extending its reach around the globe. While the country has maintained strong economic ties with Africa since the early 2000s, it has also recently ramped up trade and investment in Latin America. Chinese president Xi Jinping has agreed to double bilateral trade with the region to $500 billion and increase investment to $250 billion over the next decade, according to various deals signed with Latin American countries in 2015. Currently, China is the largest trade partner of three of the leading economies in the region: Brazil, Chile, and Peru. These countries, along with the rest of Latin America, mostly export primary goods and natural resources; copper, iron, oil, and soybeans account for 75 percent of the region’s exports to China. In addition to trade and investment, Chinese loans to the region have also increased from $7 billion in 2012 to $29 billion in 2015.

This investment in Latin America often comes in the form of large infrastructure projects aimed at improving transportation and better connecting the region to lower costs for Chinese imports. As the U.S. is turning its back on relations and trade with Latin America, most prominently exemplified by protectionist calls to end NAFTA and thus free trade with Mexico, China has recognized an opportunity to supplant the U.S. as the extra-regional hegemon. However, this is not due to China’s goodwill and altruism towards the region, but rather an opportunity to control global trade flows through Chinese owned transportation links, and reduce costs of trade to Asia. This is an ambitious goal, and although China has made promises of increased investment and signed deals for large infrastructure projects, it is uncertain if the plans will actually come to fruition.

Considering China’s own domestic politics, it is no surprise that the country favors trade and investment with left-leaning Latin American nations. The former Kirchner administration in Argentina had several deals with China, including plans for a nuclear plant, a satellite tracking station, and a $1 billioncontract to buy Chinese fighter jets and maritime patrol vessels. When current center-right president Macri came into office, he said the deals made under Kirchner would be reviewed and may face rejection, however after five months of internal review, the Argentine government successfully ratified the contracts. China has also loaned $65 billion to Venezuela since 2007, more than any other country in the region. China has a growing need for energy, and Venezuela mainly pays back the loans with oil. However, the current economic crisis in Venezuela could mean that the country may not be able to supply enough oil to China or pay back the loans, and so China announced in late 2016 that it would no longer issue new loans to Venezuela.

Chinese loans and investment are particularly appealing to Latin American countries since they rarely come with political and economic conditions or other requirements, such as implementing austerity of structural adjustment programs. Unlike loans from Western international institutions such as the IMF, Chinese loans have no (apparent) strings attached. Following the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, countries that sought relief from the IMF were required to implement structural adjustment policies that imposed austerity measures as a condition of the loans. This resulted in a “lost decade”of economic growth for the region, during which living standards and growth both plummeted. Considering this history with lenders from Western-dominated international organizations, China has found the ideal opportunity to shape Latin America for itself by investing in infrastructure, and, in return, gaining cheap access to the primary and natural resources needed for its booming population and industry sector. Two examples of the largest infrastructure projects currently proposed in Latin America are the Nicaraguan Canal and the Twin Ocean Railway.

Nicaraguan Canal

The Nicaraguan Canal, approved by the government in 2014 with a goal date of completion in 2020, is China’s alternative to the historically U.S.-controlled Panama Canal. The proposed design would stretch 178 miles between the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans, running across the southern portion of the country, through Lake Nicaragua. It is estimated to cost $50 billion, and Chinese businessman Wang Jing (who owns HKND, the company responsible for developing and building the Nicaraguan Canal) is the only known investor in the project.

Photo: The Guardian

It remains unclear whether or not the Chinese government is directly involved in the planning or implementation of the project. Further complicating matters is Nicaragua’s diplomatic recognition of Taiwanese independence. Every Central American country, excluding Costa Rica, is politically aligned with Taiwan. However, China refuses formal diplomatic ties with any country that recognizes the island as a separate nation. But Taiwan has little to offer Central America, and as China’s economic and political power grows, Nicaragua and its neighbors are likely to shift diplomatic ties to the mainland.

Regardless of the Chinese government’s involvement, the current project is facing setbacks due to Wang’s reported loss of 85 percent of his personal wealth in a stock market crash, which he was using to fund the canal. Additionally, the construction of the canal has faced scrutiny and backlash for its effects on the communities in the surrounding area. It is estimated that about 30,000 people will be displaced due to construction of the canal. HKND has a compensation budget of $300-$400 million, or up to $13,300 for each displaced person. This has not stopped opposition from affected communities, however, and the last two years have seen more than 80 protests against the Nicaraguan government and HKND. These demonstrations have occasionally turned violent, and there have also been reports of arbitrary detainment of protesters. Additionally, concerns have been raised over the environmental impact of the project, including the pollution of Lake Nicaragua, the largest source of fresh water in Central America, which currently supplies water to over 80,000 Nicaraguans.  

The construction of a Nicaraguan Canal would give China access to a shipping route across the geopolitically strategic isthmus without having to pass through the Panama Canal. This would lower costs dramatically for Chinese imports, since tariffs and fees for trade through the Panama Canal have tripled over the past five years. It would also give China unprecedented access to the region, with control over how both their imports and exports are traded. Like the revenue the U.S. gained from the Panama Canal, China, or at least the overseeing company HKND, could also profit from other nations paying fees to ship goods through the canal. Nicaragua, too, would benefit economically from increased trade in the region and probable shared profits with China.

While the canal is likely to be economically advantageous for both countries, its environmental and social impact could prove insurmountable. The construction has already faced setbacks due to environmental concerns, and, amid questions about funding, the Nicaraguan canal seems increasingly unlikely, at least in the near future. There has not been much additional construction since ceremoniously breaking ground in 2014.

Twin Ocean Railway

Another ambitious project proposed by China is a transcontinental railway stretching from Brazil’s Atlantic coast to Peru’s Pacific coast. As with the Nicaraguan canal, this railway would facilitate movement of goods and greatly reduce trading costs for China. There are two possible routes for the railroad: one running directly from Brazil to Peru along a northern corridor, and one that passes through Bolivia further to the south. The latter, dubbed the Twin Ocean Railway, follows a more direct route and would cost about $13.5 billion to build, stretching over about 3,700km. The former is estimated at an untenable $60 billion, and would be over 1,000km longer, measuring 5,000km from start to finish. If the project moves forward, it is likely to be built along the more feasible Twin Ocean Railway corridor.

Photo from: Inter American Dialogue

This marks a win for Bolivia, who has been in discussions with China, Peru, and Brazil about being included along the route since 2014, following the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding creating a trilateral working group on the railway that did not include Bolivia. The landlocked country of Bolivia, which has the lowest GDP per capita in South America, has been looking for a way to access the sea since Chile annexed part of its territory on the Pacific coast in a war during the 1870s. The opportunity for Bolivia to once again be connected to seaports via a major trade-based railway could provide a much-needed boost to the economy.

Like the Nicaraguan Canal, the railway project has also been met with criticisms of possible environmental degradation and threats to local communities. Some of the route passes through delicate Amazon ecosystems, and it is projected to expose up to 600 remote indigenous communities that have never previously had contact with other societies. Current Peruvian president Pedro Pablo Kuzynski has also raised concerns that the railroad will be too environmentally harmful to build.

Looking Ahead

The Nicaraguan Canal and the Twin Ocean Railway are two impressive megaprojects, which, if completed, would underscore China’s economic influence abroad, and help to further cement its role as a global economic power. However, both projects are far from completion. In addition to their environmental and community impact concerns—which could halt the projects in and of themselves—many questions have been raised about their economic feasibility and long-term success, especially given China’s track record with similar endeavors in the region.

The Twin Ocean Railway’s aims are very similar to those of the InterOceanicatranscontinental highway, which also incorporated Brazil. The project began in 2006, however it was never fully completed, and the parts that were finished are not entirely structurally sound. Today, it remains a collection of unfinished, damaged, or impassable sections of highway, with no further construction or completion date in sight. Another Chinese company signed a contract with Brazil in 2011 to build a soy processing plant valued at $2 billion; however the proposed project site remains an empty field. Plans for a different railroad to be built by a Chinese company in Colombia in 2011 never materialized, along with another train project that failed in Venezuela. Given China’s history with these other infrastructure projects, it is entirely possible that the Nicaraguan Canal and the Twin Ocean Railway could end up in a similar situation – never completed or, at best, only partially built and then abandoned.

In addition to the projects that were never finished, other contracts have been pulled due to allegations of corruption between host governments and China. A rail project worth $3.7 billion slated for Mexico in 2014 was terminated after a public outcry due to evidence that the deal benefitted allies of Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto. Additionally, a recent scandal in Bolivia revealed that the government awarded almost $500 million in no-bid contracts to a single Chinese company, raising concerns about unlawful special privileges. China’s record of not completing projects or engaging in shady contracts could sour relations with the region and foment public skepticism about foreign infrastructure investment, deterring future opportunities for China to grow its economic influence and for Latin America to develop valuable infrastructure and trade links.

Investment in large infrastructure projects in Latin America could be monumental for China’s economic influence and ever-expanding soft power, while at the same time offering sizeable benefits to many Latin American economies. However, Chinese firms must overcome their previous shortcomings and actually make progress on constructing these projects in a socially and environmentally responsible manner. Transcontinental trade and transportation links are largely missing from the region, and these proposed projects would provide much needed connections not only among neighbors, but also to Asia and the rest of the world.