Burkina Faso and the Resurgence of Coups in West Africa

nytimes.com

Towards the end of January, the Patriotic Movement for Safeguard and Restoration (MPSR) announced that the government and national assembly had been dissolved, and they had removed democratically-elected Roch Marc Kaboré from his position as president of Burkina Faso. Kaboré was detained and replaced by Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, an overnight curfew was implemented, land and air borders were closed, and the constitution was suspended for one week. A coup d’état had struck.

While this is the most recent one, a trend has emerged in the past year and a half as Mali, Guinea, and Chad have faced military takeovers. There is a resurgence of coups in West Africa, and the contributing factors are not adequately being mitigated. With the presence of everything from violent extremism to poverty, democratic institutions are struggling to stay alive in the region, and there has been controversy regarding international response. Moreover, discussion of this subject has been full of generalizations and blanket policy suggestions. Examining the coup in Burkina Faso can provide a deeper understanding of the circumstances in West Africa and why it is important to acknowledge each country’s distinct identity, advancing the global conversation surrounding intervention and aid.

Growing Violence in West Africa

The buildup to the coup in Burkina Faso was multifaceted, but a major reason for the overthrow was the rising threat from violent extremists. As with the 2020 coup in Mali—the one often seen as the trigger for the other military takeovers—many civilians thought that their government had failed to protect them. Since 2016, over 230 terrorist attacks have taken place in Burkina Faso. Last November, 53 people were killed after a gendarmerie post was attacked, which was “the worst strike on Burkinabe security forces in years.” Just one month later, a civilian militia trained by the government to contain insurgents was ambushed, and at least 41 members were killed. According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “violent events linked to militant Islamist groups” increased by 70 percent between 2020 and 2021 in the Sahel region, and the United Nations reported that almost 12,000 people were displaced within two weeks in December. There were at least 2,354 fatalities from the violence in 2021. 

Many believed that the government response was not enough, and the people of Burkina Faso made that clear. As gunfire erupted at Kaboré's residence and several of the country’s military barracks on the day of the coup, protests raged in the capital. The headquarters of Kaboré’s party was looted and set on fire, and people were tear gassed by police as hundreds marched through Ouagadougou. The events of this day showed what Damiba explicitly said in his first speech since taking power: the takeover was due to their former leader’s failure to stop attacks across the country. 

Repercussions Regarding Sanctions and Aid

A major player in how the world has responded to the coups is the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). After the coups in Mali and Guinea, ECOWAS responded by closing member states’ borders and imposing economic sanctions. However, these sanctions were highly controversial, in part because the affected economies were already poor. If the goal of these sanctions is to promote stability in the region, the long-term consequences may backfire. As explained by the International Peace Institute, the sanctions may be “necessary” but “counterproductive,” and the people whose lives could be altered the most would be marginalized groups in rural areas, those displaced from the violence, and unemployed youth. A large portion of the protestors on the day of the coup in Burkina Faso were showing up in solidarity with the affected population in Mali. 

While the possibility of sanctions remains and ECOWAS has warned of them, Burkina Faso has only been removed from the bloc thus far, and the African Union (AU) also suspended the country pending the reinstatement of the constitution. Additionally, while sanctions have not been imposed, the United States has paused $450 million in aid to Burkina Faso. The United States has been the largest international donor to the country, but U.S. law requires the suspension of non-humanitarian aid to countries where a democratically-elected government has been taken over unconstitutionally, and there is still much uncertainty regarding Burkina Faso’s path forward. Although the constitution has been restored now and MPSR ensured “the continuity of the state pending the establishment of transitional bodies,” those transitional bodies are yet to be established. 

In a more recent development, Burkina Faso may see a steep decline in aid due to the invasion of Ukraine. For example, the Norwegian Refugee Council spokesperson in West and Central Africa said, “Some donors have already indicated that they would proceed to a 70% cut of our funding to support operations in Ukraine…” Additionally, a regional advocate from Refugees International said that “Russia is one of the leading grain exporters in the world,” and more people in sub-Saharan Africa will be in need of emergency food assistance as the international community cuts ties with Russia. Finally, certain impacts of foreign aid on political stability as a whole are still debated, but time will tell whether the military government is able to successfully carry out their plans. 

However, a timeline has been given for the transition of power in Burkina Faso, and it was announced a week after the invasion of Ukraine. Damiba was officially inaugurated as president back in February and a team of 25 ministers stood by his side, but it took until March for other plans to be released. On March 3, an economist and professor named Albert Ouedraogo was announced to be the interim prime minister, and the plan as communicated by the military government is for Damiba and Ouedraogo to work towards political stability for the next three years before hosting elections. 

International Response to the Coup

Countries in other parts of the world have also reacted to the coup, including France. Although France has been less involved in Burkina Faso than it has in some neighboring countries, Burkina Faso is a former French colony, and France has about 5,000 soldiers in the region. For years, France has been trying to halt militant attacks from extremists by sending in troops and working with the groups in power, but after the events of January, the country is in a tough place. After the takeover of Burkina Faso, President Emmanuel Macron said, "I would remind you that our priority in the region is to fight against Islamist terrorism,” but it should be noted that Macron has an upcoming election to think about. While he has already been reducing the number of troops in the area, if France takes any drastic measures, those actions would reflect on him.

Russia is also worth discussing, for reasons beyond the invasion of Ukraine. In Mali, the junta has relied on security from the Wagner Group, a paramilitary organization backed by the Russian government, and this group has been deployed in Libya and the Central African Republic as well. Reportedly, the leader of the coup in Burkina Faso was regularly in communication with the military leaders of Mali and Guinea, and twice, Damiba tried to convince Kaboré to use Russian paramilitaries. Kaboré refused, but with Damiba in power, the situation has shifted. 

Examining France and Russia’s current role in the region, counterterrorism and tension between the West and Russia were at the forefront of the conversation—but there is more at play. Some have said that “core political problems” are being ignored while foreign powers use West Africa to compete among themselves. In terms of Burkina Faso, the International Crisis Group surfaced the importance of addressing the social crisis in the north and the development deficit, as well as the pre-existing spread of corruption in the administration judicial system. Not every coup in the region can be solely blamed on violent extremism (although it is certainly a large factor in this situation) because the acceptance of democracy underlies the pattern.

The Need for Nuance

The chairman of ECOWAS and president of Ghana, Nana Akufo-Addo, called the coup in Mali “contagious” during the summit following Burkina Faso’s takeover. This implies that the coups are having a domino effect, or that they are modeled after each other. Notably, however, not every coup in West Africa stemmed from the violent extremists, but rather the interruption or prevention of democratic trajectories. Some, including Vice President of the US Institute of Peace’s Africa Center Joseph Sany, believe that conveying the idea of a coup contagion is problematic because it “absolves the world community” from assisting West African countries in creating democratic institutions. Fully attributing these coups to violent extremism could greatly affect the viability of international response.

On the other hand, Akufo-Addo did address the observed controversy over democracy, and he called for a collective response to the trend of coups in the region. Perhaps “contagious” is a fitting way to describe the pattern in West Africa, not because extremism is the overarching factor, but rather concerns about democracy. Panic generated from violence inevitably leads to critique of the present format and exploration of government systems, but while root causes are important to address, there does seem to be a connecting factor beyond violent extremism. 

Moving forward, those discussing coups in the West African region should be conscious of nuance while noting that there are major similarities. Talking as though each country is struggling for the same reason and attributing all of this to religious extremism interrupts how the international community responds to military takeovers in West Africa, and that way of thinking draws attention away from social issues, government/judicial corruption, poverty, and more. Particularly in terms of strategizing foreign aid, countries need to pay attention to both the situations of individual countries and the region as a whole.

The Gambian Crisis Three Years Later: A Retrospective

In late January 2017, two presidents were inaugurated. Donald Trump took over as the President of the United States on the 20th in front of a decently large crowd on the national mall in Washington. He would take charge of the world's most powerful military and largest economy in a turn of events that sparked fears of a rising autocratic government. One day later, on the other side of the Atlantic, long-standing President of Gambia Yahya Jammeh stepped down and allowed the democratically elected leader Adama Barrow to assume office. In contrast to the situation in Washington, the resolution of the Gambian crisis marked a major success for advocates of democracy, global governance, and peaceful conflict resolution. Using the Gambian Crisis as a blueprint, we can determine how the international community can support a similar democratic transition in the future.    

The Gambia is an incredibly small West African country that is surrounded by Senegal and is only about 10,000 square kilometers large, with roughly 2 million Gambians along the shore of the Gambia River. The Gambia's woes started in the late 17th century, with Britain and France exchanging control over the region until Britain made it a colony in 1856. It was then granted its independence in 1965.  Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara would serve as president from 1970 to 1994, when Jammeh, a military officer, would take power in a coup against the government. Jammeh took over from a corrupt, though incredibly democratic government that had taken some strides towards economic development. Despite only being the 168th largest economy, based around tourism and agriculture, Jammeh was able to suck the country dry over his 22 years in office. He would embezzle nearly $1 billion in public funds and illegal timber revenue during his reign, leaving the country severely underdeveloped. In 1993, just before Jammeh took over, the nation’s GDP per capita stood at $710 per capita. In 2016, the last year of his rule, it stood at $620 per capita.

Jammeh would also prop up his rule with what Human Rights Watch described in 2015 as a “State of Fear,” heavily featuring summary executions, disappearances, arbitrary detention, and torture against “journalists, human rights defenders, student leaders, religious leaders, political opposition members, judiciary officials, lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people, and security force personnel, among others.'' He governed with boastful claims and a cult of personality, once claiming that he could cure AIDS with magical powers as nearly 21,000 Gambians were left without necessary anti-HIV medication. The oppression of the Gambians was mostly ignored. The Gambia was and still is viewed by many nations and international actors as a strategically unimportant backwater, both in political and economic terms. Also, the outbreak of civil wars in nearby Ivory Coast, Liberia, and Sierra Leone drew regional and international attention away from his regime.

Things would come to a head on December 1st, 2016 when Gambians went to the polls for the presidential elections. Jammeh had won the last three elections, though they, according to the UN, featured “widespread rigging and voter intimidation.” Standing for the opposition was Adama Barrow, a former real estate developer who was largely unknown to the Gambian public and was a unity candidate selected by a previously fractured opposition. This unity and general anger at Jammeh lead to an electoral upset, with Barrow earning 45.5% of total votes, while Jammeh received 36.6 percent. As the results shocked the country, Jammeh would shock the country even further by offering his concession and congratulations to Barrow, saying “the Gambian people have spoken and I have no reason to contest the will of the mighty Allah,” promising “guidance on your transition and when selecting a government.” Jammeh would, however, quickly reverse course. On December 9th, Jammeh called for a new election, citing irregularities. Barrow would flee over the border to neighboring Senegal the same day. The stage was set for a confrontation that would determine the future of the country. 

The international community quickly took the side of Barrow. The most notable Barrow ally was the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a regional block which contains 15 states, most notably Nigeria, Ghana, and Senegal. Barrow was signed in as President on January 19th in the Gambian embassy at Dakar. The United Nations Security Council unanimously threw their support behind ECOWAS if Jammeh did not step aside, though emphasized the desire for a political resolution first. Thousands of western tourists evacuated and tens of thousands of Gambians would flee across the Senegalese border in anticipation of violence. Jammeh would, eventually, step aside. He resigned on January 22nd just before the ECOWAS intervention was scheduled to begin. He did not have much choice in the matter. The Gambian army only numbered about 900 soldiers. In contrast, the ECOWAS force significantly outnumbered them as well as assumed complete control of Gambia’s airspace and waterways. To make matters worse for Jammeh, Chief of Defence Staff Ousman Badjie announced that he would surrender against an ECOWAS intervention force. Barrow would take full power over the country on the 26th, and then the crisis was over.

Barrow has had mixed success in his nearly three years in office. The country's human rights record has improved, and Barrow was able to raise nearly 1.7 billion Euros at a May 2018 International Donor Conference. But corruption, poverty, and political gridlock have been roughly the same as they were when Jammeh was in power. While some of the blame lays on Barrow, some of the issues are caused by excess security spending and a high level of debt inherited from Jammeh. Even with the mixed record, the situation in The Gambia can only be described as a success for the international community. The international community was able to swiftly enforce the will of the people in a nonviolent fashion to remove an authoritarian and corrupt leader from office. But how was this model so effective, and could it be applied in future situations?

First, it is important that international consensus in favor of intervention is reached quickly and delivered forcefully. The best way to achieve this international consensus is to shift the focus from large global bodies such as the UN Security Council to smaller regional organizations such as ECOWAS. Since there are fewer states in a regional body consensus is far easier reached there as compared to global bodies with far more stakeholders involved. The case of the Gambia shows that if the regional body is willing to take on the burden of intervention and peacekeeping, global bodies like the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) will quickly approve the mission. This is because they don't want to take on the burden of these types of missions, so an opportunity to punt the responsibility will be quickly taken. This holds for areas that are viewed as strategically unimportant by the west, such as The Gambia, where this type of crisis more frequently occurs. Also, this shift would lead to a less hierarchical world order. The era of non-African nations trying to govern Africans from the UNSC would diminish, and the idea of “African Solutions for African Problems” would finally take hold.   

Second, there must be an exit strategy for the dictator. No one will relinquish power if they feel that their life would be threatened if they did. In contrast with most comparable situations, ECOWAS was civil with Jammeh. The former president is in exile in Equatorial Guinea, with most of his ill-gotten wealth. The final agreement guarantees “the dignity, respect, security and rights of former President Jammeh.” Some might question the morality of such a clause. It can be argued that we are letting human rights abusers off the hook for their crimes. But if immunity isn't guaranteed, then the abusers would never peacefully relinquish power. Less death and destruction is always the best outcome, even if justice is not fully served. Most likely it wouldn't have been served either way as most dictators don't let themselves fall into enemy hands alive. Take two case studies in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Tunisia let its old dictator, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, take exile in Saudi Arabia without facing justice. Libya’s dictator, Moammar Gaddafi, got hit with an arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court. On paper, Libya got the better deal. While Tunisians would never get justice for the crimes committed against them, Libyans would. This is not how things panned out. Tunisia would become one of the only democracies to emerge out of the Arab Spring, in part because it was free from the influence of its old leadership. In contrast, Libya collapsed into an incredibly violent state of anarchy and civil war, with Gaddafi dying at the hands of rebels before he ever faced a courtroom or true justice. Libya's fate was at least partially caused by Gaddafi's unwillingness to surrender in the face of a near-certain life sentence at the Hague.          

Third, the security services are the key. One of the main reasons Jammeh resigned was because his army was unwilling and unable to defend his rule. When the army deserts the dictator, two things become true. First, the intervention is given near-guaranteed success because they face no opposition. Second, the amount of death and destruction in the country will be significantly lower as the transfer of power becomes significantly more peaceful. The question of how to get the army to desert depends on the situation. One of the best ways would be to exploit the political nature of militaries in much of the developing world. Promises of additional power and some measured support to military leaders could make all the difference in the world. Another, as was the case in the Gambia, is the deployment of overwhelming force. Militaries have historically surrendered in the face of overwhelming opposing forces rather than face certain death. This is because the decision to surrender is usually one made out of self-preservation. We saw this in The Gambia, with the Gambian military refusing to fight against the far superior ECOWAS force. Regardless of how it is achieved, flipping the military should be the priority. It is the founding pillar of the state. Take it out and the state cannot stand.

The case study of The Gambia does, however, have its shortcomings. First, Barrow has not fully transitioned the Gambia away from the issues that plagued Jammeh's regime. This cannot be fixed using the model of regional interventionism since the people will have already chosen their leader. The advantage still lies in the comparative. Even if Barrow isn't great, he is far better than Jammeh. Besides, leaders chosen domestically in elections are inherently more sustainable than leaders pick in other ways because they must have had popular support to be elected. Second, this model of regional intervention must require the region to want to intervene. The Gambia was in some ways unique because it was situated in a region that has experienced an upswell in democratic norms and a desire for legitimate governance. Combine that with Jammeh's regional unpopularity and ECOWAS has a strong motive to intervene. The Gambia is also so politically and economically small that there is no chance of major destabilization in the region or world. It is unknown whether the lessons learned in The Gambia can apply to the far more economically and politically important Egypt, for example.     

The successful resolution of The Gambian crisis heralds a potential new method of international governance and stability. A world where each region manages its internal security with global support and consent. A world where an attack on the will of the people in one country is an attack on the will of the people in all countries in the region. A world where the action is quick, peaceful, and decisive. It would certainly be a brave new world, one that will only exist if the nations of the world learn the lessons of the smallest nation in the least developed continent on the globe.