The World Owes Haiti an Apology: The Perils of US Intervention

Via Picryl

The United States is a country that wears its values on its sleeve and thus takes it upon itself to carry the weight of the world on its shoulders. Upon its very birth, it stood upon a foundation of freedom, justice, democracy, fairness, and opportunity, principles that it proudly emblazoned on its seminal Constitution and that it immortalizes in its physical monuments. These are the traits that define the outlook of America’s history; these traits make up the hallowed, almost deified American Dream; these are the traits that Americans seek to embody at home and abroad. It is what distinguished early America from the antiquated and repressive monarchies that it sought to free itself from. Yet, travel to Haiti, a nation scarred by American intervention, and these traits will seem like a myth when ascribed to the U.S. Travel to Haiti, and it will seem like freedom and justice are in short supply.

Seemingly from its inception, the Caribbean country that makes up around one-third of the island of Hispaniola has been mired in a stubborn, unrelenting downward spiral of abject poverty, political instability, and despair. The reputation of being “the poorest country in the Western hemisphere” has clung to its national character for over a generation and supersedes any further conversation about Haiti. The irony is, Haiti was once the wealthiest colony in the entire Western Hemisphere. The juxtaposition between its former abundance and its current suffering can be explained by the legacy of colonialism and occupation, originally occurring under the Spanish, and later the French and American imperial projects. 

The story of Haiti’s contact with the West unfolds in a familiar way to its peers in the Western Hemisphere. Initial Spanish contact brought disease, which ravaged the indigenous populations, as the Spanish crown enacted the racial and economic hierarchy that facilitated its rule. Hundreds of thousands of Africans were trafficked onto the island via the Transatlantic Slave Trade. Amid weakening Spanish power, France laid claim to the Western part of Hispaniola, transforming the colony into an economic powerhouse fueled by cash crops like timber, sugar, and coffee. But in 1791, Haiti was struck by an intriguing turn of events: a massive slave revolt, led by the revolutionary and ideologue Toussaint L’Overture, proved an existential threat to French colonial rule. After thirteen years of brutal war, the former Haitian slaves successfully declared independence, in a land free from the tyranny, exploitation, and humiliation of slavery. This constituted the world’s first ever successful slave revolt to gain independence, and mirrored the effect of the “shot heard ‘round the world” so embodied in American ideals.

Yet, even from the outset of Haiti’s existence, America’s presence could be felt. Though early in the United States’s lifespan, the young nation had already demonstrated an interest in its peers in the Western hemisphere, in a foreign policy approach that would eventually culminate in the Monroe Doctrine. The U.S. supported the global isolation of Haiti during the Jefferson administration, maintaining its alliance with France and the global balance of power. However, the U.S. had its own vested interest in preventing the success of the Haitian Revolution: the Jefferson administration did not want the country’s own slaves to revolt following inspiration from their Haitian comrades, especially given its already tense racial politics. Of course, Thomas Jefferson and his peers would never admit that their approach directly contradicted the premise of universal rights and economic freedom, upon which they had fought a war with the British less than thirty years earlier. But from its very birth, Haiti was defined by the interests and potential aggression from foreign powers, a trend that would only continue. 

Shortly after Haitian independence, the French levied enormous debts upon Haiti, which it was forced to pay under threat of force, to make up for the lost wealth of French slave owners and landowners. This was a threat made to Haiti, which was already outgunned and underdeveloped due to the existential war it had just fought. Haiti was forced to take out loans from French banks to pay this debt, and then accrue additional debt from French banks to cover its original debt. So while France continued to profit from its former colony long after its occupation, Haiti was deprived of the essential income needed to develop infrastructure, education, and other systems needed for a stable government. Its rural farmland continued to supply cash crops, as its infrastructure and farming methods grew increasingly antiquated, and as its people languished for generations. Around World War I, the United States re-entered the picture. 

In 1915, the Wilson administration occupied Haiti, under the pretense of establishing stability (eventually a common refrain in U.S. foreign policy) after the assassination of their president. The Americans also wanted to curb growing French and German influence (owing to their debt policies and economic interests toward the nation, respectively) and prevent their intervention during this time of chaos. But instead of ensuring stability and lasting peace, American intervention was brutal, corrupt, and altogether scarring to the Haitian people. The U.S. seized Haitian economic assets and land, enriching American banks and government coffers while damning the Haitians to debilitating yet familiar exploitation. Yet more damning, perhaps, is how U.S. Marines killed 15,000 Haitians who rebelled against American rule, and made chilling examples of opposition leaders. 

Make no mistake: U.S. intervention was not welcomed by the Haitian people, and this pattern of U.S. occupation and profiteering in the name of democracy or stability can be found across the Western Hemisphere. Around the same time, the U.S. effectively forced the creation of, and profited greatly from, the Panama Canal; it replicated a similar model of Haitian occupation in Cuba following the Spanish-American War; a few years before its actions in Haiti, the U.S. had ended a bloody, years-long war for control of the Philippines. While the Americans would often establish infrastructure in the countries they intervened in, these institutions were often not accessible to much of the country’s poor majority. But more importantly, even if this infrastructure (roads, ports, the Panama Canal itself) immediately or eventually created value or otherwise brought economic or social success to a community, I would assert that that value is incredibly dwarfed by the value of a people’s self-determination, self-governance, and control over its resources. I would surmise that the Founding Fathers would be inclined to agree with that statement. For the United States, freedom, justice, stability, and prosperity were the shades under which it imposed its will and hegemony onto others, relegating smaller countries to the very fate that it had escaped from itself at birth, and leaving death and destruction in its wake. 

While formal U.S. occupation ended in 1934, its influence over Haiti continued to loom large–most notably in its control over Haitian finances lasting until 1947. As Haiti weathered the brutal dictatorships of François “Papa Doc” Duvalier and his son Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier during the 20th century, the United States propped up their regime in the interest of Cold War hegemony, especially after the Duvalier regime made concessions to Washington, including tax breaks for foreign companies and anti-communist alignment. Haitians continued to suffer violence, imprisonment, repression, and poverty on the part of the state; the cascading disasters of Haiti’s history had left the country’s systems in disrepair. All the while, a deep well of corruption continued to replenish the country’s elite, a chasm of inequality separating rich and poor. Haiti’s ongoing crisis only deepened after a devastating earthquake in 2010, a 7.0 magnitude wave of destruction that killed an estimated 300,000 people and displaced another million. This brings us to Haiti’s current conditions: after the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse, the nation has been overrun by gangs, who contend for control in the capital, Port-au-Prince. The actual government has lost much of its legitimacy following the aforementioned political turmoil, and the Haitian people are caught in the middle. A UN-backed intervention force, this time led by Kenyan police, has been dispatched, to minimal success.

What can we take from this? Again and again, even after Western colonialism and the Cold War, the United States’s intervention has damned Haiti to a fate it did not choose and did not deserve. American intervention was done in the interest of profit and hegemony, instead of the freedom and democracy that the country prides itself on. The common notion that Haiti’s current condition is the result of the failure of its people and the deep corruption of the country is, at best, reductive. Persistent foreign occupation and violence severely hindered the nation from creating strong institutions and infrastructure. Moreover, the support for illicit regimes (like the Duvalier dynasty) and the constant misappropriation of funds reinforce the vast inequality that Haiti experiences while preventing the socioeconomic mobility of the Haitian people, even given the country’s abundance. Indeed, many of the skilled and professional among Haiti’s population have migrated outward, many of them to the United States, where they are often the victims of xenophobic rhetoric. 

This fashion of American intervention was not just practiced in Haiti, though. It is a trend across recent American history, done in the interest of preventing communism or maintaining stability, but often ignoring the will and perpetuating the suffering of the people within. During the Arab Spring in 2011, as Egyptians rallied in the streets demanding freedom and self-determination, the United States continued to support the authoritarian Mubarak regime in the interest of regional political and economic stability until the final hour, once its collapse was all but inevitable. Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 was, in large part, a failure: Iraq today maintains an unstable democracy, and the U.S.’s actions created a power vacuum that left an easy entrance for the Islamic State, one of the most destructive terrorist groups of the 20th century. There are also examples where the U.S. didn’t intervene, but should have: the United States, “leader of the free world,” sat idly by as the Rwandan genocide saw the senseless deaths of hundreds of thousands. President Bill Clinton himself publicly recognized this mistake during a visit to Rwanda after the genocide. Time and time again, the United States did not stick up for its values. However, there is precedent for positive examples of U.S. intervention and peacemaking when there is political will. American involvement in Somalia in the 1990s, while originally invoking the infamous “Black Hawk Down” debacle, eventually pioneered a positive model of diplomacy. The peace process was aided by the measured stability induced by foreign involvement, remained in the country until the peace process was fully complete, and made use of local power brokers to bring agreements that were effective–all lessons that can be applied to the current situation in Haiti. 

The Haitian people have suffered for generations. The United States and the world owe Haiti an apology. But an apology is not enough. The United Nations, with the backing of the United States and other important countries, must make a concerted effort to re-establish stability and the basic functioning of the Haitian state. While this is a form of intervention, it is a necessary one to prevent Haiti’s continued misery. From there, these organizations must work with Haitians to create Haitian-led institutions; there is precedent for state-building like this within Haiti (with the Aristide regime) and outside of it (the re-establishment of the democratic Sierra Leonean government by UN and UK forces after the rebel takeover in 1996). But one thing must remain true: the next chapter of Haiti’s future must be written by the Haitian people.

A Deadly Profession: The Role of Journalism in Conflict Analysis and Resolution

Anna Politkovskaya, a Russian investigative journalist, is best known for her reporting on corruption and human rights abuses in Chechnya. She was shot in broad daylight in the lobby of her Moscow apartment building on October 7, 2006. In a CNN article titled, “Media Martyrs,” Anna Politkovskaya is put on a long list of reporters who have died working as journalists in the last 15 years. Her tragic story highlights a crisis around the world. According to NPR, the total of journalist deaths was almost 50% higher than in 2021. This is mostly due to the coverage of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, as well as violence in Latin America. Over half of 2022's killings occurred in just three countries, including Ukraine with 15, Mexico with 13, and Haiti with 7. This staggering report is the highest yearly number the Committee of Protecting Journalists (CPJ) has ever recorded for these countries since it began compiling data in 1992. In the recently released 2021-2022 Freedom of Expression report, UNESCO noted the deaths of 86 journalists last year, amounting to one every four days, up from 55 killings in 2021. The findings emphasize the serious dangers and vulnerabilities that journalists continue to encounter during their work and even once they go home. UNESCO Director-General Audrey Azoulay stated this problem as alarming, noting, “Authorities must step up their efforts to stop these crimes and ensure their perpetrators are punished because indifference is a major factor in this climate of violence.” UNESCO noted that nearly half of the journalists killed were targeted while off duty, while the rest were targeted while traveling, or while others were in their homes at the time of their killing. This report not only showcases the horrendous, dangerous conditions journalists must face during their work, but it gives a warning to us all about the perils of providing coverage and reporting to the population in times of conflict and widespread human rights crises. Journalists construct the foundations of healthy political societies with vital information. Their position is particularly important in areas of conflict, violence, and under repressive regimes.

According to the Freedom of Expression report, despite improvements in the past five years to limit risk, the rate of impunity for journalist killings remains high at 86 percent. Journalism continues to remain a deadly profession with nine times out of ten, the murder of a journalist is unresolved. From 2016 to the end of 2021,  UNESCO recorded 455  journalists killed for their work or while on the job. Murder is not the only crime for which journalists are at risk. Disappearances, kidnappings, detention, legal harassment, and digital violence all remain likely possible threats. While institutions and organizations continue to monitor these crimes, the increasing numbers since 2015 continue to be a cause for concern. Even more concerning, journalists are being killed outside of war zones, including half of the deaths that were documented last year were in the Latin America region, which is officially not in any conflict. With global insecurity and political instability, this is an indication of the disregard for democracy and could lead to an increase in censorship. It isn’t just other parts of the world in which this threat can be felt, with one killing of a journalist being reported in the United States in 2023 so far. Dylan Lyons, a Florida TV journalist, and a nine-year-old girl were fatally shot near Orlando, Florida. In 2021, there was a new global high in the number of journalists being imprisoned, with the total number reaching 293. This is another glaring red flag that could be detrimental to the global community, suppressing journalists to report on corruption and mistreatment. Commenting on this dangerous environment, the president of the Committee to Protect Journalists, Jodie Ginsburg, stated, “When you think about it, the killings and the imprisonments of journalists are just the tip of the iceberg. They're indicative of a much broader pattern of declines in press freedom more generally. We see thousands of journalists harassed online every day, and unfortunately, often that turns into offline, real-world violence, physical threats against journalists, and that's something we're seeing more and more.” Seeing this decline in democracy is accompanied by an undermining of democratic norms, the target is increasingly becoming journalists who can report on wrongdoing by leaders, organizations, and institutions. Additionally, UNESCO reported that over the past five years, press freedom has continued its downward trend across the globe with 85 percent of the world’s population experiencing a decline in press freedom in their country over the past five years. What would the world look like if the number of journalists continued to be in a downward spiral? Furthermore, what would the world look like if journalism became only censored, restricted, and blocked in times of conflict? 

The essential service mission of journalism is particularly vital in times of crisis, like reporting on wars and conflict zones, environmental and climate issues, natural disasters, and on public health emergencies like COVID-19.  This is why many countries under the curfews introduced under the pandemic recognized journalism as an essential service. Journalists are not only important in spreading the news to the international community, but journalists and media institutions can also help diplomats contact intended target audiences. When embassies, diplomats, and other international foreign affairs institutions invest in their media presence, they are awarded. The U.S. Embassy in Pakistan, for instance, has more than 200,000 followers on Twitter and more than 6,000,000 page likes on Facebook. Using social media, embassies can communicate directly with the local population and use the media landscape to their benefit. Journalism cannot now fully be understood or analyzed apart from globalization. This process refers to the intensification of social interconnections, which allows apprehending the world as a single place, creating an interconnectedness and greater correspondence. Using communication media, journalism can be studied to showcase social interactions, movements, and the intersection of identities. International media sources such as the BBC, CNN, al Arabiya, and al Jazeera have global reach, and as such have an "agenda-setting effect." This effect, as professor of Media and Public Affairs and International Affairs at the George Washington University Steven Livingston, explains, “revolves around the ideological components of political disagreements, and more specifically the way key actors in conflict seek to manipulate public perceptions of the disagreement. That is, actors in any conflict will seek to either minimize or exaggerate the conflict, depending upon their relative position of power.” The international media can sweep communities, drawing them together, and has the potential to influence governments and international organizations. This is seen in countless occasions and case studies, including when studying Cyprus. 

In conflict-affected communities, journalism has a crucial part in shaping the public’s perception and knowledge of a given issue, surrounding topics such as identity, conflict, and important peace efforts. When mediating a conflict abroad and at home, journalists do more than information reports, they also define, frame, deliberate, and promote it. Using Cyprus as a case study, a 2021 journal article titled, “Journalism in conflict-affected societies: Professional roles and influences in Cyprus,” highlights just how journalists define their roles and responsibilities. Disseminating political and military messages, journalists took part in the very creation of these messages for the public. Journalists on both sides of Cyprus articulated proficient roles that varied from monitoring the political and business elite, acting as watchdogs, promoting social change, and educating and informing the public about societal problems. When asked about professional roles, journalists on both sides of the island stressed that accurate reporting is a crucial part of their professional roles. In both communities across the divide, information, especially on the Cyprus problem, can be controlled and manipulated by the political elite and be shaped by outside interests. The journal research shows that journalists in conflict and post-conflict societies assume more comprehensive obligations than other journalists in democratic countries, and advocacy for peace is one of them. Journalists are more likely to adopt an active role in the resolution of the problem. When asked about it, in a 2019 personal interview, a journalist remarked: “If we lived in another society, one without conflict, then we could have answered this question differently, but we live in Cyprus and we have concerns about our future.” This underlines that journalists’ identities are not fixed but fluid and journalists struggle to find a balance between their professional role and their identities. Depending on the state of the conflict or the transition their communities are going through, journalists renegotiate and reproduce the meaning and role of journalism. They outline the potential to harness social change and change policy, informing the public and persuading the population. With the increasing number of targeting and deaths related to the field of journalism, the advocacy to promote journalists' individuality and press-related freedoms is pivotal in maintaining a transparent world. 

There is no doubt that journalism is an essential, integral part of the international community. UNESCO’s work on monitoring and reporting on the safety of journalists helps keep this information accessible and able to be used in policy-making decisions, forming an integral component of the UN Action Plan on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity. Media organizations must be sure to adopt safety protocols, allocate enough resources to protect journalists, and ensure proper training of journalists. Deputy director of the International Press Institute, Scott Griffen, emphasizes the need for accountability, noting, "If some of these journalists were directly targeted, we need to start collecting the evidence for possible war crimes prosecutions." The need to be vigilant and prepared to adapt has never been more useful than now. With a public health crisis and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, journalism remains a critically ingrained part of humanity. If journalism is declining and persists to be as dangerous as it is heading, this says a lot about society and the future of everyone in the world. The voices of so many communities will increasingly become silenced, leaving a painful disregard for verity. 

Revisiting the Genocide Convention

The concept of genocide, as outlined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, is no longer useful and detracts attention and resources from other instances of systematic mass violence. In fact, the concept of genocide as we know it today, was not what Raphael Lemkin had originally conceived when he coined the term. Only four groups are protected under the convention: racial, ethnic, national, and religious groups. Other groups are excluded from protection including political groups. There are also no explicit prevention provisions within the Genocide Convention. The definition and conception of genocide as it currently exists allows us to pick and choose which acts of mass violence deserve the recognition that comes with labeling something a genocide.

There is a tendency to downplay instances of mass violence if they do not conform to the strict definition of genocide outlined in the convention. Taking away attention from mass atrocities because the victim pool is not homogenous or does not neatly fit into one of the four categories is cruel and dehumanizing. 

The Original Conception of Genocide

It would be neglectful to not begin this paper with a brief overview of Raphael Lemkin’s original conception of genocide. This is to honor his role in coining the term but to also demonstrate how different the current definition is from what he imagined and how that limits our understanding of genocide today. Lemkin coined the term genocide in 1942, but the bones of the concept were there as early as 1933. Lemkin’s report titled “Acts Constituting a General (Transnational) Danger Considered as Offences Against the Law of Nations” developed the precursor to genocide which he called “barbarity.” Barbarity was “acts of extermination directed against the ethnic, religious, or social collectivities whatever the motive (political, religious, etc.). Barbarity was unique in that the attacks were “carried out against an individual as a member of a collectivity” with the goal being to damage the collectivity. A second type of attack on a collectivity was known as “vandalism,” or cultural and artistic destruction. Lemkin saw individual cultures as contributing to a wider world culture that all humans were part of. His argument was that destroying a particular culture inflicted a loss on world culture. These two acts, barbarity and vandalism, violated the law of nations and therefore a multilateral convention criminalizing these acts was necessary. 

Lemkin coined the term ‘genocide’ in 1942, but it first appeared in print in his 1944 book Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. In Chapter 9, Lemkin defines genocide as “the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group.” The word is 

intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be the disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups.

Lemkin identifies two phases of genocide: destroying the “national pattern” of the oppressed group and then imposing the “national pattern” of the oppressor.

Lemkin’s definition highlighted different techniques of genocide in various areas. He identified eight techniques of genocide. The first was political, which included the destruction of local institutions of self-government and the imposition of the oppressing government. The second was social, which meant the overhauling of social structure through the forced deportation of intellectual leaders and the clergy. The third was cultural, which included prohibitions on speaking and printing in local languages, as well as strict control over cultural activities and artistic expression. The fourth was economic, which included lowering the standard of living, expelling groups from certain industries, seizing private property, and controlling the banking system. The fifth was biological, which was taking measures to prevent the group from reproducing like separating men and women, and also taking steps to actively reproduce the oppressing group. The sixth was physical, which Lemkin outlines in the following ways: “racial discrimination in feeding;” “endangering of health;” and “mass killing.” The seventh was religious, which included forcing people to renounce their religious affiliations and persecuting clergy. The last was moral, which meant creating an atmosphere of moral debasement by forcing oppressed groups to watch pornographic movies, to overconsume alcohol, and to gamble. In the end, the concept of genocide officially adopted in the convention only focuses on biological and physical techniques of genocide. 

It is important to note that Lemkin understood genocide as a process, not a singular event. Genocide was an attempt to destroy a nation, with ‘attempt’ meaning an “active social, political, or historical process set in motion intentionally” rather than a single act. Lemkin made sure to emphasize the role of the state in developing a genocidal policy over time through various laws, decrees, and administrative institutions that worked together to commit genocide. In this way, the apparatus of the state becomes a vehicle for genocide. 

Lemkin lobbied heavily for a UN convention outlawing genocide and in 1947, along with Vespasian Pella and Henri Donnedieu de Vabres, he created the first draft of such a convention, now known as the secretariat draft. I want to highlight two notable provisions in this draft that are not included in the final version. First, the protected groups are not just racial, religious, and national, but also linguistic, cultural, and political. Second, genocide can be biological, physical, and cultural. Cultural genocide included “forced and systematic exile of individuals representing the culture of a group;” “prohibition of the use of the national language even in private intercourse;” “systematic destruction of books printed in the national language or of religious works or prohibition of new publications;” and “systematic destruction of historical or religious monuments or their diversion to alien uses, destruction or dispersion of documents and objects of historical, artistic, or religious value and of objects used in religious worship.” Lemkin’s original conception of genocide was lost throughout the drafting process. Each draft after the secretariat draft looked less and less like his original vision and he was forced to decide what his priority was: definitions or prosecuting genocide. Ultimately, he chose to fight for the provisions that would establish an international criminal tribunal for genocide. In the end, the work Lemkin put into preserving his original conception of genocide would not produce tangible results until the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were created in the early 1990s.  

Specific Problems with the Genocide Convention

1. The Exclusion of Political Groups

The exclusion of political groups is one of the critical flaws of the Genocide Convention. The primary justification for the exclusion of political groups from the Genocide Convention is that people choose their political affiliation, but people cannot choose their race or ethnicity. This argument hinges on the idea that genocide is the targeting of a specific group solely because of some innate characteristic, but that is rarely ever the case. It is important to note, however, that nationality, religion, even ethnicity are not innate characteristics. While you are born into a nationality or religion, it is a choice to remain part of a national or religious group and we know that ethnicity is not an entirely biological phenomenon, but also socially constructed and ever-changing. “Groups formed on the basis of ‘religion’ or ‘nationality’ are in reality no more stable or permanent than groups formed on the basis of political affiliation” and “ethnicity can be shaped by political and economic factors as much as ancestry and inherited culture.” Extensive research has been done into why political groups were excluded from the initial drafting of the Convention (states wanted to be able to suppress political opposition, among other things), but as Beth Van Schaack explains, the exclusion of political groups is fundamentally at odds with the international human rights apparatus. 

Discarding political groups from the Genocide Convention created an internally inconsistent human rights regime, because other major international agreements include the category. The prohibition of crimes against humanity prohibits persecutions on ‘political, racial, or religious grounds.’ Likewise, the provisions of the Refugee Convention protect individuals from persecution on account of ‘race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.’ 

To solidify this point further, political persecution is a valid reason to seek asylum, which shows that political affiliation and expression, while not innate, is something worth protecting. Additionally, before the Genocide Convention was adopted, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution affirming that genocide is a crime under international law “whether the crime is committed on religious, racial, political, or any other grounds.” In sum, there is a history of political affiliation being a protected status under the international human rights regime that cannot be ignored. 

1. The Exclusion of Cultural Genocide

Culture is a fundamental part of identity, and its destruction not only harms that culture, but humanity as well. But the Genocide Convention does not reflect this. The first two drafts of the Genocide Convention explicitly stated that cultural destruction is a form of genocide. In the Secretariat Draft, the definition of genocide included provisions such as “forced and systematic exile of individuals representing the culture of a group;” “prohibition of the use of the national language even in private intercourse;” “systematic destruction of books printed in the national language or of religious works or prohibition of new publications;” and “systematic destruction of historical or religious monuments or their diversion to alien uses, destruction or dispersion of documents and objects of historical, artistic, or religious value and of objects used in religious worship.” The Ad hoc Committee Draft succinctly reiterated these provisions, defining cultural genocide as “any deliberate act committed with the intent to destroy the language, religion, or culture of a national, racial, or religious group on grounds of the national or racial origin or the religious beliefs of its members…” As mentioned in the previous section, fifteen years before the creation of the Genocide Convention, Lemkin explained how vandalism, defined as the “destruction of culture and works of art,” constituted an attack on a collectivity. “The contribution of any particular collectivity to world culture as a whole, forms the wealth of all humanity…Thus, the destruction of a work of art of any nation must be regarded as acts of vandalism directed against world culture.” The definition of cultural genocide in the first two drafts of the Genocide Convention is simply a generalization of the examples Lemkin used to describe the cultural genocide committed by the Nazis in France and Poland. 

Humanity clearly understands the importance of cultural preservation and appreciation. If we did not, UNESCO World Heritage sites would not exist, and museums would have nothing to exhibit. Culture gives life meaning and to destroy the culture of a particular group is to destroy the “social vitality” of that group, as identified by Claudia Card. She writes, “Social vitality is destroyed when the social relations—organizations, practices, institutions—of the members of a group are irreparably damaged or demolished.” Because culture gives groups social vitality, “When a group with its own cultural identity is destroyed, its survivors lose their cultural heritage and may even lose their intergenerational connections.” If people cannot participate in their culture because it was destroyed, life becomes devoid of meaning, leading to social death akin to physical death. “By limiting genocide to its physical and biological manifestations, a group can be kept physically and biologically intact even as its collective identity suffers in a fundamental and irremediable manner…the present understanding of genocide preserves the body of the group but allows its very soul to be destroyed.”

1. Forgets Prevention

The Genocide Convention as it currently exists fails to provide sufficient guidance on how states should prevent genocide, diminishing the utility of the convention as a legal instrument. For a crime like genocide, who implementation and methodology are constantly evolving, there simply needs to be more substantive explanation and guidelines for its prevention. Prevention is currently based on deterrence and the threat of punishment. But it is unclear how effective a deterrent punishment is. Preventing a genocide is a difficult task because the term tends to be retroactively applied via courts or independent fact-finding missions. The international community cannot prevent a genocide if it refuses to acknowledge one is happening and only do so after the violence has ended. Genocides can be prevented by understanding and mitigating the factors that are most likely to lead to genocide, a significant one being war. Prevention must be proactive and cannot be solely based on threat of punishment. 

Moving Forward

After highlighting a few problems with the concept of genocide, I want to offer a few alternatives. In terms of Genocide convention, changes are possible. Article XVI of the convention states “A request for the revision of the present Convention may be made at any time by any Contracting Party by means of a notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-General. The General Assembly shall decide upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such request.” All it takes is one state to request that the Genocide Convention be revised, and the General Assembly can decide where to go from there. Given that this convention is 75 years old, it is worth reevaluating its provisions given that the world has changed tremendously since 1948. Revisions to the convention can mean including cultural genocide and expanding the protection status to include political groups. Revisions can also make the prevention aspect clearer. While convincing states to make changes might be difficult, proposing revisions does no harm and can even bring greater attention to the issues with the convention. 

One of the problems highlighted earlier in this paper is the exclusion of political groups from the Genocide Convention. Beth Van Schaack offers a new way of thinking of the protection of political groups from genocide and that is through the norms of jus cogens. Jus cogens is the idea that there are certain peremptory norms in international law, norms that cannot be violated no matter the circumstances. According to Article 50 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 

a treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.

Examples of peremptory norms are the prohibitions on genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, torture, human trafficking, slavery, apartheid, etc. Van Schaack makes the case for applying the norm of jus cogens to protect political groups from genocide. “When faced with mass killings evidencing the intent to eradicate political groups in whole or in part, domestic and international adjudicatory bodies should apply the jus cogens prohibition of genocide and invoke the Genocide Convention vis-à-vis signatories only insofar as it provides practical procedures for enforcement and ratification.” Enforcement and ratification can be found in Article IX which says the International Court of Justice has jurisdiction over disputes between states about the interpretation, fulfilment, and application of the Convention (although there are several reservations to this article). Article VIII says that any party can call upon “the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action…as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide” or any enumerated acts.  

Conclusion 

There is a tendency to call instances of mass violence ‘genocide’ to garner attention and action from the international community because imbedded in the word is a certain gravity that necessitates action. The obsession with genocide makes equally grave crimes like crimes against humanity and war crimes secondary and something to settle for. This directs attention away from mass violence that is not genocide, leading to inaction and indifference. 

There are changes that can be made to reduce our obsession with genocide. Contracting parties can propose revisions to the Genocide Convention; the norm of jus cogens can be the legal framework by which we view genocides and mass violence in order to include historically excluded groups from the convention; and we can think diligently about the language we use to describe instances of genocide and mass violence and use the more inclusive phrase of ‘crimes against humanity.’ 

To be reiterate once again, this is not an argument for genocide denial or even the concept as a whole. Rather, it is an argument against the concept of genocide as it currently exists. The concept of genocide can be strengthened by the inclusion of other groups, cultural genocide, and more prevention provisions. 

A Deliberate Strategy

Introduction

On February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine, violating the UN Charter and creating the largest threat to European unity and security since World War Two. While the threat to European security is undeniable, the threat posed to international humanitarian law is equally alarming. In the year since the invasion, more than 8,000 civilians have been killed and 8 million Ukrainians have become refugees. As the war continues and Russia retreats from regions it once occupied, evidence of possible violations of international law is being discovered. 

While media coverage in the West has focused on alleged violations committed by Russia, that does not mean Ukraine is innocent. In the eyes of the law, Russia and Ukraine are equal and they are held to the same standards. Any breach of those standards, even once, cannot and should not be tolerated because any potential violation that is not investigated or prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law risks being repeated, either in Ukraine or elsewhere by states who watch how this war is being conducted and think they can do the same. Understanding the various alleged violations of international law that have been committed by both sides since the war began is critical if we are to not repeat them and if there is to be any measure of justice once this war is over. There are people still alive today who remember the horrors of World War Two, who remember what this world was like without the Geneva Conventions to regulate the conduct of war. 

History of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Tensions between Russia and Ukraine can be traced back to 2004 and the Orange Revolution. The revolution began in November 2004 after the second-round results of the presidential election proclaimed Viktor Yanukovych the winner, despite exit polls showing opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko in the lead. The elections were marked by widespread voter fraud and corruption in favor of Yanukovych, the Kremlin’s candidate. Russian election monitors had “validated” the results of the run-off and proclaimed Yanukovych the winner. However, the Supreme Court of Ukraine annulled the results of the first run-off and ordered a repeat of the vote in December. Yushchenko won comfortably, much to the chagrin of people in eastern and southern Ukraine, as well as Russia. Yushchenko’s victory was a setback for Russia’s plans to keep Ukraine within its sphere of influence. However, Russia got its way in 2010 when Yanukovych became president after Yushchenko’s term was riddled with infighting and he failed to integrate Ukraine with the West.

Yanukovych’s presidency did not last long before he was ousted during the Euromaidan Revolution in 2013 when protests erupted across Ukraine after he rejected a deal that would have led to greater economic integration with the EU. The protests spread across the country and Yanukovych fled to Russia in February 2014. A month later, Russia annexed Crimea, citing a duty to protect the rights and lives of ethnic Russians, who comprise a majority of the Crimean population. Not long after the annexation, separatist groups in Luhansk and Donetsk in eastern Ukraine declared independence from Ukraine. Russia supported the separatist groups in the war against the Ukrainian military, with some reports suggesting that Russian soldiers had crossed the border and were fighting alongside the separatists and that some shelling had come from inside Russia. 

In 2015, Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany began negotiating the Minsk Accords, with “provisions for a ceasefire, withdrawal of heavy weaponry, and full Ukrainian control of the regions.” However, the agreement and ceasefire collapsed, and fighting resumed. In October 2021, Russia began substantially building up its troop presence on the Ukrainian border, with over 100,000 troops stationed there by the end of the year. In early February 2022, Russia deployed troops to its border with Belarus, surrounding Ukraine from the north, east, and south. Finally, on February 24, 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and the war has only deteriorated: more than 71,000 alleged war crimes are being investigated by the Ukrainian authorities. 

International Law

After World War Two, the international community agreed that the conduct of war needed to be regulated or the atrocities committed during that time would be repeated. The Geneva Conventions, which are the foundation of international humanitarian law (IHL), are a set of four treaties and three additional protocols that regulate how states can wage war. One of the innovations of the Geneva Conventions is the concept of grave breaches, which are the most serious breaches of the law of war. Grave breaches are unique in that they are only applicable in international armed conflicts (e.g., the current Russo-Ukrainian war). There are articles common throughout the four conventions (the Common Articles) that describe what a grave breach is. Articles 50 and 51 of the first and second conventions describe grave breaches as “wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body of health, and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.” Article 130 of the third convention includes the previous language, adding that “compelling a prisoner of war of the right of fair and regular trial prescribed in this Convention” is also a grave breach. Finally, Article 147 of the fourth convention, building on the three previous articles, includes “unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a protected person of the right of fair and regular trial” and the “taking of hostages.” Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions are legally and colloquially referred to as war crimes, which must be prosecuted by the High Contracting Parties. 

It is widely accepted that international human rights law (IHRL) is applicable during times of war and that principle has been affirmed by numerous international legal bodies. Even though states are technically allowed to derogate some of their responsibilities under IHRL, they are only allowed to do so “to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. The measures of derogation may not be inconsistent with the state’s other international obligations, such as those under IHL.” There are also certain human rights that are considered non-derogable, such as the right to life, the right to liberty and security, and freedom from torture and inhumane or degrading punishment. Crimes against humanity are the most serious breaches of international human rights law, including violations of non-derogable rights.

This is where international criminal law (ICL) becomes applicable. ICL applies to four broad sets of crimes: war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and the crime of aggression. These are the four crimes the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over, as outlined in the Rome Statute. The Rome Statute defines war crimes as both grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, as well as “other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict” such as intentionally targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure. The Rome Statute also has defined crimes against humanity as acts “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.” Examples of crimes against humanity include, but are not limited to, “murder, extermination, deportation or forcible transfer of population, imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty, torture, and rape, sexual slavery… and any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity.” Even though neither Russia nor Ukraine are state parties to the Rome Statute, war crimes and crimes against humanity committed on the territory of Ukraine are within the International Criminal Courts' jurisdiction because the situation was referred to the ICC by 43 state parties, and Ukraine lodged a declaration formally accepting the ICC's jurisdiction over crimes committed on the territory indefinitely.

Probable Violations of International Law

On October 18, the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine published a report detailing the findings of its investigation into events that occurred between February and March 2022 in the Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Sumy provinces of Ukraine. The Commission “has found reasonable grounds to conclude that an array of war crimes and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law have been committed in Ukraine since 24 February 2022.” Russian armed forces were responsible for the vast majority of war crimes and human rights violations. The Commission found that Russia most likely used explosive weapons indiscriminately in civilian areas, including indiscriminate attacks on residential buildings, schools, hospitals, and other buildings of non-military importance. Attacking civilian infrastructure not out of military necessity is a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions. Additionally, “The Commission found numerous cases in which Russian armed forces shot at civilians trying to flee to safety and obtain food or other necessities, which resulted in the killing or injury of the victims.” The Commission also found that “violations against personal integrity” were committed in the four provinces under Russian occupation. “These violations included summary executions, torture, ill-treatment, sexual and gender-based violence, unlawful confinement and detention in inhumane conditions, and forced deportations.” These are also grave breaches under the Geneva Conventions. Furthermore, the Commission found “a pattern of summary executions in areas temporarily occupied by Russian armed forces" including in Bucha, where over 400 people were executed during the month of Russian occupation. Many Ukrainian civilians were also illegally confined, tortured, and forcibly transferred to Russia. “Russian armed forces inflicted severe physical and mental pain and suffering upon the victims.” Sexual and gender-based violence was rampant with victims as young as 4 and as old as 83. Each of these crimes described by the Commission constitutes grave breaches under the Geneva Conventions and can be considered war crimes. 

Even though Russia is responsible for most of the violations of international law, Ukraine is not absolved of wrongdoing. The Commission also found evidence of war crimes committed by the Ukrainian armed forces. “The Commission has also documented two cases in which Ukrainian armed forces shot, wounded, and tortured captured soldiers of the Russian armed forces.” In the first case, between March 24 and March 26, Ukrainian soldiers deliberately shot three Russian prisoners of war while interrogating them. The second instance occurred on March 29 when a Ukrainian soldier shot an already wounded Russian soldier three times at close range. 

The Commission’s investigation was limited in scope. It only investigated violations of international law committed through March 2022. As more Russian forces began retreating, evidence of possible war crimes and other violations of international law have been reported. In September, the Ukrainian news agency, Ukrainska Pravda, reported that 447 bodies had been exhumed from a mass grave in Izium, Kharkiv Oblast. Most of the bodies are civilians and their exact causes of death will be investigated, although most show signs of violent death, and 30 showed evidence of torture. As stated above, attacking civilians is a war crime, and the evidence, in this case, speaks volumes, but it must be properly investigated for this to be definitively called a war crime. 

A Deliberate Strategy?

International law is clear, but it seems that every day the world discovers another possible war crime or another violation of human rights. This begs the question: why? Why violate the laws of war and international human rights law? The answer is different depending on which country you are asking about, even though the law is equally applied to both. "This equal application of IHL to both belligerents is particularly difficult to accept in the current situation, where Russia is the aggressor and therefore responsible for all human suffering in Ukraine, whether or not it results from violations of IHL and even when it is directly caused by Ukraine because even that would not have occurred if Ukraine had not to defend itself from the Russian invasion.” The answer to why Ukraine committed those two war crimes is very simple: self-defense. The extent to which committing war crimes is the best way to defend your country is questionable, but that is the reason. 

On the other hand, Russia appears to be violating international law as part of a deliberate strategy. In the months and days before the war, Vladimir Putin made a series of addresses to the nation. On July 12, 2021, Putin wrote an article titled “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” in which he wrote there is no historical basis for Ukrainian independence from Russia, that Ukraine is a product of historical Russia and as such owes its existence to Russia. In this article, Putin accused Ukraine of fratricide by forcing Russians to assimilate into Ukrainian culture to create an “ethnically pure Ukrainian state, aggressive towards Russia.” Ironically, Putin ends the article by stating “we respect the Ukrainian language and traditions. We respect Ukrainians’ desire to see their country free, safe, and prosperous,” but the only way to do that is by aligning itself with Russia.” 

Exactly eight months later, three days before the invasion, Putin addressed the nation, repeating the same sentiments on the historical unity of the two nations, and proclaiming that Ukraine “actually never had any stable traditions of real statehood.” On the day of the invasion, Putin's intention for Ukraine became clearer. He stated that Ukraine was perpetrating genocide against ethnic Russians. "The purpose of this operation is to protect people who… have been facing humiliation and genocide perpetrated by the Kyiv regime. To this end, we will seek to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine, as well as bring to trial those who perpetrated numerous bloody crimes against civilians, including against citizens of the Russian Federation.” Vladimir Putin’s thinly veiled eliminationist rhetoric is contrasted by the outright eliminationist rhetoric of Russian media pundits like Timofey Sergeytsev. At the beginning of the war, Sergeytsev called the Ukrainian masses “passive Nazis” and “accomplices of Nazism” and called for a “total lustration” of Nazis (i.e., the Ukrainian people and government). Sergeytsev, echoing Putin, wrote, “Ukraine, as history has shown, is impossible as a nation-state, and attempts to "build" one naturally lead to Nazism.” Any Russian citizen or soldier, reading these articles and listening to these speeches in the Russian state media echo chamber, would undoubtedly internalize this as the truth. Many Russians have: 74% support the military’s actions in Ukraine.

Russia has made it abundantly clear it does not recognize the existence of an independent Ukraine, going as far as saying that Ukraine is run by Nazis that need to be “liquidated.” To achieve this goal of demilitarizing and denazifying Ukraine, the Russian armed forces have been deliberately brutal towards civilians in the towns they occupied. For example, Germany’s foreign intelligence service, the BND, intercepted radio communications among Russian military personnel when they were north of Kyiv. One soldier said that they shot a person on a bicycle and another soldier said, “First you interrogate soldiers, then you shoot them.” Killing a civilian and prisoners of war are both violations of the Geneva Conventions.  Committing atrocities serves as a means to an end. By terrorizing civilians and committing gross violations of international law, Russia is trying to deter resistance and assert its dominance over the Ukrainian people. “Russia’s political goals in Ukraine lend themselves to violence against civilians, even more so after Moscow’s narrative shifted the motive for the war from liberating the Ukrainian population to cleansing it from “Nazi” elements.” Asserting control over the Ukrainian people can only be achieved by dehumanizing them to the point where they no longer have the will to fight back. 

Moving Forward

There is strong evidence both Russia and Ukraine have violated international law during this war. The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine found evidence of such violations, disproportionately committed by Russia. There is also evidence supporting that this is a deliberate strategy by Russia to assert control over the Ukrainian people. Atrocities do not happen in a vacuum, but when they happen, they must be documented and investigated with the utmost urgency and respect for the people harmed. There are currently numerous international and domestic investigations open, but investigations of this nature can take months, even years, to complete. The Commission of Inquiry needed seven months to investigate crimes committed in just one month. This war has lasted for over a year, so the world may not find out the extent of war crimes until long after the war has ended. This poses its own set of challenges. Witnesses could emigrate, evidence could be destroyed, and victims, who are severely traumatized, may need years before they can tell their stories. It is also highly improbable that Russia will cooperate with any investigation, seeing as it does recognize the authority of the International Criminal Court, nor does it recognize Ukraine as a sovereign nation. None of these challenges should deter the international community from investigating, documenting, indicting, and, hopefully, prosecuting these gross violations of international law. Europe has seen the ‘cleansing’ narrative before and it, along with the rest of the world, must set the precedent now that any crimes and violations of a similar nature in a similar context will be thoroughly investigated and prosecuted, lest they will be repeated.

Crumbs in the Breadbasket: A Global Food Crisis on the Horizon

In September 2022, Ukraine’s farmers began sowing winter wheat, rye, barley, and rapeseed with the echoes of Russian artillery and the smell of burning cities fresh in their minds. Many agricultural fields such as those in Ozera, Ukraine were cratered by rockets, flattened by tanks, and littered with the vestiges of war. Tractors started with no guarantee that Russia would respect Ukraine’s right to export grain from its Black Sea ports. Many of those who would be working in these fields were off fighting against the Russian military. Ukraine’s rich black soil and its seaports which give it access to international markets make the country a critical global agricultural exporter and is the reason why it is commonly referred to as “the breadbasket of Europe.” Unfortunately, Ukraine’s Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food anticipated the land dedicated to winter grain crops would decrease by up to 35 percent. The time and resources lost to Putin’s war not only threaten Europe’s food security but could cause a devastating disruption in global food distribution. The international community recognized this threat and has acted. In November 2022, Türkiye and the United Nations negotiated a deal to extend the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI), which assures Ukraine’s grain exports safe passage past Russian naval blockades, by 120 days. Although the BSGI took a critical step in staving off the worst consequences of a global food shortage, there is more to be done.

As the March expiration-date soon approaches, Russia has telegraphed that reupping the crucial deal will come with some foot-dragging. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Vershinin said during a February 13 interview that without the “real removal of sanctions restrictions on Russian agricultural exports,” the extension of the deal is “inappropriate.” However, this statement bends reality, because Western sanctions have not explicitly targeted Russian agricultural exports. Moscow has argued that blocks on its payments, logistics, and insurance industries are a “barrier” to the export of grains and fertilizers. The Kremlin seems to be using the threat of a global food crisis to further its own interests and weaken Ukraine’s economy.

Moscow is not too proud to hide its intentions. As a condition of the BSGI, joint teams from Ukraine, Russia, the United Nations, and Türkiye must inspect each ship to prevent the arrival or departure of unauthorized cargo and passengers. Ukrainian ship inspector Ruslan Sakhautdinov claims that his Russian counterparts systematically delay inspections by double and triple-checking fuel gages and scrutinizing crewmembers’ personal belongings. The practice has become routine and created serious backlogs. In October 2022, Istanbul’s typically beautiful sunrise on the Marmara Sea was littered with 165 cargo ships waiting for inspection. In January 2023, Ukraine exported 3.1 million tonnes of grain which fell far short of its 5 million tonne goal. In fact, the BSGI has not once met its goal since the deal was signed in August. October was the month that came closest to the target— when 194 ships were cleared for passage exporting 4.3 million tonnes of grain (compared to the 85 ships in January). October’s brief success was thanks to Moscow stepping away from the deal which in consequence allowed for the Ukrainian, U.N., and Turkish inspectors to work without the obstruction of their Russian colleagues.

One consequence is that, as the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service observed in January, “Ukraine farm prices remain low due to the increased stockpiles and decrease in export demand as some countries shifted to other suppliers.” Facing market volatility and lower expected returns, many of Ukraine’s wheat producers have made the calculation that it is in their best interest to plant fewer acres so that they aren’t stuck with silos of grain which can’t be sold. Russian farmers on the other hand have increased their grain production and exports since the war started. However, they don’t have the capacity to supplant Ukraine’s agricultural losses. Moscow has critically damaged Ukraine’s production capabilities and continues to undermine global food networks with threats to the BSGI.

Russia’s actions come as World Food Programme (WFP) boss David Beasley stressed at the Munich Security Conference that nonrenewal of the grain deal would be catastrophic for millions in Africa who are on the cusp of starvation. Beasley noted too that the initiative’s current grain flows have still not been sufficient for the needs of poorer countries that are reliant on regional exports.

Together, Ukraine and Russia constitute 12 percent of the global market share in calories. The most vulnerable countries to food shortages share some common characteristics. They typically (although not all applicable) are reliant on Ukrainian and Russian imports, are low-income, have active conflicts, and lack robust internal food distribution systems. Countries in the Middle East & North Africa (MENA), Central Asia, and Eastern Africa are most at-risk due to the Ukraine conflict. In the MENA region, Jordan, Yemen, Israel, and Lebanon are most vulnerable. Armenia (92 percent of its grain imports come from Ukraine and Russia), Azerbaijan, and Georgia are the most vulnerable Central Asian countries. In Eastern Africa, the countries with the highest reliance on Ukraine and Russian grain imports are Eritrea, Rwanda, Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, Kenya, Djibouti, Burundi, and Ethiopia.

The Brussels-based thinktank Bruegel in March 2022 following Russia’s invasion anticipated the global food implications of the conflict and forecasted three possible scenarios. In their worst-case scenario, Ukraine would need all of its grain for domestic consumption and exports fell 100 percent year-over-year. Thankfully this has not materialized and unless there is a dramatic turn in the war (possibly from Russian use of strategic nuclear warheads), this will scenario will remain a hypothetical. The second worst-case scenario would see Ukraine export half of its normal production. In the best-case scenario, Ukraine would export roughly 70 percent of its normal production. The current situation hovers in between the second-worst case and best-case scenarios. Although Ukraine exported 23.6 million tonnes of grain in the 2022/23 season (70.4% of its exports from the same stage the year prior), decreases in production will allow Ukraine to harvest only 51 million tonnes which is 59 percent of 2021 pre-war harvests.

High food prices also pose a danger to global food security. In the first stages of Russia’s War in Ukraine, food prices lept and the greatest costs were felt in low-income countries. For instance in August 2022, it cost Ayan Hassan Abdirahman— a mother of 11 children who lives in the capital of Somalia— twice as much as it did just months before to buy the wheat flour that she needs to prepare breakfasts. Increases in crude oil prices and disruption to Russian fertilizer exports have increased food production costs globally. These consequences are most visible in the ports of Brazil. The South American country is the 4th largest agricultural producer in the world and imports 85 percent of the fertilizer it requires— mostly from Russia. Sea ports across the country reached their maximum capacity due to growing stockpiles of imported fertilizer. Farmers were unable to purchase the products, delaying the sowing process, because the price of fertilizer became too expensive. In recent months, prices have decreased but are still roughly 150 percent more expensive than the 5-year average. The higher cost of production will result in higher food prices which would be unreachable from millions globally without international assistance.

WFP estimates that today 349 million people across 79 countries are facing acute food insecurity (which the Global Network Against Food Crises defines as when a person’s inability to consume food puts their life into immediate danger). This number rose nearly 200 million from pre-pandemic levels. 60 percent of the world’s malnourished populations live in areas affected by armed conflict which makes the successful delivery of food assistance more difficult. Food insecurity can be both begotten and beget violence with the notable examples of the 1789 French Revolution and the 2011 Arab Spring which were precipitated by historically-high food prices. Global food instability caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine would not only be a dramatic humanitarian catastrophe but could bring a massive destabilizing event to the world order.

Although the situation seems overwhelming, many policymakers and groups such as the Consortium of International Agricultural Research Centers (CGIAR) propose solutions to systematically reduce the risks and consequences of a global food crisis. CGIAR emphasizes the importance of reliable, real-time data analyses of food and input price volatility which can inform appropriate international and national policy responses. Governments must provide their farmers with targeted subsidies for productivity-enhancing inputs, machinery, fertilizer, and energy costs to increase yields in low and medium productivity environments. International assistance must be provided to low-income countries so that the higher costs of inputs is not passed onto consumers. Governments should invest in sustainable crops which require less water than wheat and barley and can better survive climate shocks such as quinoa and seaweed. However, not all policy responses are made equal and many government interventions could worsen the situation. Experts recommend that countries should avoid sanctions and export restrictions on food and fertilizer products and refrain from hoarding or panic buying input-products. This is not a crisis of anyone but Vladimir Putin’s making, yet it is incumbent upon the international community to make comprehensive policy solutions so that the world’s breadbasket can hold enough for everyone.

Demystifying International Courts: The True Challenges to Justice

After two world wars, peoples from around the world have come together to ensure that civilians are no longer be at the mercy of the whims of states. However, there remain major challenges to peace to this day. The modern concern comes, not from a lack of capacity for international cooperation in conflict prevention and resolution, but rather from an inability to get great powers to comply with international regulations and a lack of understanding among states that the goals of international courts are in establishing a fair, judicial system worldwide.

The two world wars changed perspectives on interstate warfare. The lack of regulations for maintaining at least some regulation of conflict led to enough casualties to make all the great leaders sit down and make an entire separate organization committed to maintaining peace. First came the League of Nations, and then, after its obvious lack of success, the United Nations. The presence of these international institutions was revolutionary and continues to remedy otherwise devastating conflicts. Yet even that is not enough. While countries, through the UN, agree to maintain peace and universal respect for human life, they all keep their respective sovereignty and the UN can under no conditions interfere with internal affairs. While the UN is a perfect place to gather and resolve international conflicts before escalation, civil wars and aggression by non-state actors remain highly plausible and a major security risk in the post-WWII era.

Major failures of the UN’s conflict prevention rhetoric are evident in genocides which occurred even after WWII, notably in Rwanda and Yugoslavia. This prompted international community to see an urgent need for action. The International Tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia were created to ensure the victims received some peace of mind knowing that the perpetrators were punished. Though the idea of war crimes were first established and agreed upon multilaterally at the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, agreeing to these labels and determining what is and is not a crime may be more challenging. Each country aims to protect its citizens, which prompts it to reject outside judgement for its past crimes, for the sake of protecting its sovereignty. Yet recent history shows persistent attempts to regulate warfare and punish tragic practices. American President Abraham Lincoln established the Lieber Code during the American Civil War, a set of rules to attempt to regulate warfare through protecting civilians, property, condemning the practice of taking prisoners of war, engaging in prisoner exchange among others. The 1847 Brussels Declaration borrowed heavily from the Lieber Code, but was never adopted by major nations. The Hague Conventions saw some progress, though a coalition of countries led by Germany ensured that none of the protocols were binding. The Geneva Protocol followed WWI and added prohibitions regarding the use of mustard gas and other chemical weapons. However, making all these rules and definitions universally accepted and fully binding was virtually impossible. After the Nuremberg Trials, however, everyone, even non-signatories to previous conventions, agreed to commonly accepted rules of warfare, including the protection of civilians and attacks only with a prior warning. Obviously, as mentioned earlier, none of this was enough to prevent future genocides. After the International Tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia showed success in gathering evidence, apprehending suspects, and even sentencing at least major government and military officials, there was hope for an apprehensive, mutually agreed upon and, most importantly, enforceable international legal system. This led to the Rome Statute of 1998, a more formal recognition of war crimes, which also took into account the events of Rwanda and Yugoslavia which served to create the International Criminal Court (ICC), a legal body with jurisdiction over certain international crimes. For international law, this is revolutionary as rules of warfare are finally enforced. Conflicts can be regulated, and even prevented, and no civilian would unjustly die or suffer the effects of mindless bloodshed.

However, as states can always claim their sovereignty and lean on exceptionalism, the Rome Statute saw no ratification in either Russia or the United States, and the ICC has no support from the United States, China, or Russia. The ICC saw some success in its operation and is to this day engaging in resolving the Ugandan conflict of early 2000s, and has settled to address four major breaches of war code: crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, and most recently added (in 2018) the crime of aggression. Even with an organized structure, transparency (trials can be viewed online), and support from most states, none of the world’s major militaries are official parties to the court. This creates limitations. First, the ICC, the only body capable of punishing war criminals worldwide, can do virtually nothing to punish incidents of violent crimes executed by these states as all of them are on the UN Security Council and any investigation into a non-party to the ICC must be referred to by the Security Council. This renders it impossible to punish either U.S., Russian, or Chinese officials as they would, being members of the Security Council, have to agree to the investigation into their internal affairs. On top of this, the absence of these major powers means that the credibility of the court is in danger and it is only a matter of time before other states party to the court begin feeling manipulated by international bodies. Especially in the eyes of the nationalists, this can be seen as a way to keep the smaller states in check and ensure they remain powerless and at whim of bigger states who, free from any pressure of the ICC, can use this rhetoric to diminish the court’s credibility.

Backlash against international institutions is on the rise. One can only imagine what impact dissolving the ICC would have on the balance of nations and retaining at least some sense of civility and international emphasis on peaceful conflict resolution. Even the country of origin of the Lieber Code, the US, is very closed off to the idea of greater involvement. The fact that the crime of aggression, which outlaws invasions and war in general (aside from some conditions of course), was added to the already short list of crimes, did not make the situation any better since major powers such as the US, Russia, and China find comfort in having and using their military capacities. On the other hand, smaller countries, especially the ones who, unlike major states, have agreed to let go of some of their sovereignty and allowed international institutions in, became more viable to rise of nationalism and exceptionalism of their own and giving up on the international courts.

One clear example is the concern voiced by many African countries that the cases brought to the ICC are exclusively focused on the African continent and are thus only another example of neocolonial tendencies of the developed world. Given that every single one of the cases currently in the ICC are pertaining to African nationals, their concerns are very much confirmed in reality. Of course, the goal of the ICC is not to punish countries, but rather to aid the national court systems in prosecuting their wartime governments, so the argument that the western governments are focused on improvement of the domestic African justice has some merit to it. This does not mean that the African countries have no reason to be upset and Reuters, among others, explains that the Kenyan government has in fact announced the desire of the African Union members to withdraw from the ICC due to the concern that the court is deliberately targeting African leaders.

Increasingly nationalist, ethnocentric European countries are also likely to show a more formal rejection of the court. While the EU is supportive of the ICC, there are increasing levels of suspicion against both the EU and the ICC, showing another fundamental threat to this court’s existence. Unlike the US, the EU fully supports the ICC, but this question remains highly sensitive to the desires of dominant national parties. With people such as questionably acquitted Vojislav Šešelj, Serbian ultranationalist, having been released from the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia and having openly insulted and made fun of the international court that inspired the ICC, as reported by Balkan Insight, there are even more threats to destabilization of domestic and international politics, as well as discreditation of the ICC.

It is obvious that this highly valuable international institution is facing threats. Some ways to mitigate this threat and improve its credibility, thus providing for a more stable, just international community, would be a wider acceptance of the ICC in the entirety of the UN Security Council to ensure that the court really does have universal jurisdiction, as Russia, US, and China are currently neither signatories nor ratifiers. On top of this, educational programs are lacking-countries that do experience “intrusion” by the ICC should also be provided technical support to provide necessary education and media coverage that explains the value  of the sacrifice of sovereignty for the sake of this higher purpose, which would reduce the risk of a nationalist backlash and make the court stronger and better understood.

Legal and Human Rights Abuses of the Obama Administration’s Drones

The Obama administration has largely abandoned one of the most vital elements of governmental responsibility in lieu of national security. The protection of human rights has become an afterthought in the wake of the administration’s foreign policy on drones since President Obama took office in 2008. Although the government will not confirm or deny any specific casualty numbers, independent research groups have found that as of 2014, the United States had carried out at least 400 drone strikes since Obama took office, killing upwards of 2,600 people. From 2009-2012 the Obama administration carried out at least 239 covert drone strikes, a significant increase from the 44 strikes approved under George W. Bush. These strikes violate not only international human rights law, but international humanitarian law--the laws of war--and are the cause of increasing international legal scrutiny against the United States, as well as civil outrage across the world.

In 2008, when Obama took the oath of office, few would have associated the young President with the term “targeted killings,” but these often clandestine counterterrorism operations have become one of the most prominent and controversial characteristics of the Obama administration’s reign. To date, the United States is known to have carried out targeted killings using drones in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen. Many of these operations have breached international human rights and humanitarian laws, have violated certain articles of the United Nations Charter, and are arguably infringing on the national sovereignty of the states in which these strikes are conducted. While drones have supposedly been effective in targeting specific militants that the Administration claims could not have been killed without their use, the large civilian death toll violates human rights so gravely that it renders the policy morally unfeasible, no matter its reported efficacy.

International humanitarian law, also known as the law of war, applies to all states in armed conflicts, or any state in conflict with an armed non-state actor. For an attack to be lawful, it must discriminate between combatants and civilians and “the expected loss of civilian life or property cannot be disproportionate to the anticipated military gain of the attack.” While all attacks that cause civilian deaths violate the laws of war, attacks that target civilians, are indiscriminate, or cause disproportionate civilian casualties do violate these laws.

The Obama administration’s drone strikes have frequently violated one or more of these stipulations. Obama has asserted that the United States strikes only when it has “near-certainty” that no civilians will be harmed. However, a Human Rights Watch investigation of seven U.S. drone operations in Yemen found clear violations of international humanitarian law in two attacks, one of which killed 14 militants and 42 sleeping citizens. The Obama administration evidently contradicts its position that it resorts to targeted killings by drones only when civilian lives are almost certainly safe from harm. “The U.S. says it is taking all possible precautions during targeted killings, but it has unlawfully killed civilians and struck questionable military targets in Yemen,” said Letta Tayler, senior terrorism and counterterrorism researcher at Human Rights Watch. The second unlawful strike identified by Human Rights Watch killed 12 civilians coming home from the market. The other five drone strikes targeted cars in a wedding procession, killing 12 men and wounding 15 others. Although the Obama administration may claim otherwise, the undoubted awareness of civilian loss of life suggests the indiscriminate nature of these attacks.  Each attack was indiscriminate and caused disproportionate civilian loss of life—each of these attacks represented violations of international humanitarian law.

These unconscionable acts of unmitigated violence are not going unnoticed in the states in which they are perpetrated. Terrorist organizations are growing each day, likely in response to the violence caused by American drone strikes. Malala Yousafzai, 18-year-old Nobel Peace Prize winner and survivor of a Taliban assassination attempt, spoke to the Obama administration about the drone strikes in her home country of Pakistan. She claims that drone strikes only cause more violence: “I expressed my concerns that drone attacks are fueling terrorism. Innocent victims are killed in these acts, and they lead to resentment among the Pakistani people.”

While the law prohibits states from targeting civilians, individuals “directly participating in the hostilities” are not legally immune from state aggression. This condition has multiple interpretations, and the United States seems to be exploiting this fact. Human Rights Watch claims, “It is generally accepted to include not only persons currently engaged in fighting, but also individuals actively planning or directing future military operations.” But the United States may be using an “overly elastic” definition of an individual who may be lawfully attacked during an armed conflict, according to Human Rights Watch. A November 2012 drone strike in a military town in Yemen killed an alleged al-Qaeda recruiter in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), even though recruiting activities alone are not sufficient legal grounds under the laws of war to target someone for attack, because recruiters themselves are not the ones carrying out attacks that can be considered “imminent threats.” While Obama’s policy guidelines state that the U.S. conducts strikes only against individuals who pose an “imminent threat to the American people,” and when capture is not feasible, the administration has evidently not been accountable on either of these standards.

The Peshawar High Court (PHC), the highest judicial institution of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, one of the four Pakistani provinces, ruled in 2013 that the United States drone strikes in Pakistan breached national sovereignty, were in violation of provisions of the Geneva Conventions and the UN Charter, and were in “blatant violation of Basic Human Rights.” Article 2(4) of the UN Charter strictly prohibits “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state…” The PHC determined the United State violated Pakistani sovereignty based on this Article, taking into account opposition to the strikes by the president of Pakistan, the prime minister, his cabinet, and parliament.

The court cited 1,449 civilian deaths and 335 civilian injuries since 2008 in the North and South Waziristan, concluding that the majority of individuals killed have been civilians. The PHC referenced provisions of the Genocide Convention as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to legitimize their rulings that these killings violated the laws of war. A further legal opinion given by international legal authority Francis Boyle determined that the "murderous drone campaign is both widespread and systematic and thus qualifies as a crime against humanity that verges on genocide.”

The United States has, moreover, failed to meet its international legal obligations in its lack of transparency and accountability in regard to drone strikes. According to the European Court of Human Rights, “There must be a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its results to secure accountability in practice as well as in theory, maintain public confidence in the authorities’ adherence to the rule of law and prevent any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts.” The lack of transparency does not just give the U.S. a negative international standing, it is against UN policy. Article 51 of the UN Charter states that “measures taken by Members in the exercise of [their] right to self-defense…be immediately reported to the Security Council.” The United States has not made any such report. Unmasking the secrecy surrounding the program and enforcing accountability, especially where civilian casualties occur, is crucial both morally and legally. That the Obama administration has prioritized a stringent, often excessive foreign policy on counterterrorism over basic human rights is abhorrent.

Beyond its violations of the laws of war, the United States' use of drones does not conform to international human rights law, which is defined in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a state’s duty to respect, protect, and fulfil human rights. Particularly sidestepped by the Obama administration is the legal obligation under this Declaration to “protect individuals and groups against human rights abuses.” In recent years, and in response to human rights groups and other pressures, the U.S. has succeeded in reducing the proportion of civilian casualties to militant casualties. However, because of increased operations the total number of human rights violations by civilian deaths has showed no significant decline.

The use of drones for targeted killings does have certain advantages. Drones can help minimize civilian casualties in comparison to manned aircraft operations, and can have enhanced surveillance capabilities that, in theory, allow for a more thorough and accurate strike. But the use of drones, as has been demonstrated in the U.S., can be “hampered by poor intelligence or local actors’ manipulation.” There are also no safeguards in place to ensure that these attacks are completely lawful and appropriate. According to a Justice Department white paper from 2011, any person, including any citizen of the United States, can be targeted and killed if an “informed, high-level official” believes that person poses an “imminent threat of violent attack” and capture is not “feasible.” Citizens of the U.S. have fallen victim to this unbridled display of power, including Anwar al-Awlaki, former al-Qaeda propagandist and United States citizen, who was killed in Yemen in 2011. The 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force Act (AUMF) played a major role in the decision to target and kill al-Awlaki, and this law is as broad as it is controversial. The AUMF is not bound by geographic or temporal limitations, raising many questions about the safety of Americans within the United States. If the Obama administration believes an individual is acting against the United States, regardless of citizenship, location, or time of involvement with an anti-American force, that person is subject to being targeted and killed. Al-Awlaki was the first known U.S. citizen deliberately targeted and killed by an American drone strike, but he may not be the last. The administration’s official policy is that the AUMF should “ultimately be repealed” but does not support its immediate repeal.

The Justice Department white paper that outlined the ability to attack does not disclose who qualifies as a high-level official, what information is necessary to be considered informed, or what qualifies as evidence for a targeted attack to take place. The paper also does not outline the exact definition of an imminent threat. These holes in policy represent only some of the many transparency and accountability violations that are needed in order for the United States’ drone strikes to be considered legal on the basis of international humanitarian law.

The Obama administration has targeted and killed more militants that it believes to be threats to national security via drone strikes than any other administration. Yet this administration has also killed more innocent civilians through drone strikes than any other. These attacks have turned families in Pakistan, Yemen, and several other states into “terrorist sympathizers” and have fueled more anti-American sentiment than ever before. The United States has violated both international humanitarian law and international human rights law in these attacks, setting a dangerous precedent that promotes an abusive foreign policy, while simultaneously undercutting its ability to criticize others’ ability to exercise similar attacks.

The administration’s use of drone strikes has been exceptionally opaque, with covert missions as the norm rather than the exception. No pre-strike or post-strike assessments of civilian harm have been confirmed or presented to the Security Council as mandated by the UN Charter, fostering a dangerous custom without investigation or accountability. No meaningful safeguards against abuse or error currently exist, propagating human rights violations with each strike. Human rights have become an afterthought in the wake of the Obama administration’s foreign policy on drone strikes. It is time to ask the crucial question, “Are we creating new terrorists faster than we can kill them?”