A broken immigration system: the extension of the Title 42 immigration policy leaves many Cuban asylum seekers in crisis

After five years of saving money, Patri, from Havana, Cuba, was ready to make the trek to the United States. Cuba’s economic crisis has become so dire in the past few years, due to COVID-19. The cost of living has been steadily rising and there has been an increase in food shortages. In 2022, 2% of Cuba’s population left for the U.S. and Patri hoped to be one of them. She saved up the equivalent of 8,000 dollars. However, this was rendered impossible by the Supreme Court’s decision that extended Title 42’s immigration policy. Now if you are seeking asylum, as Patri is, from four countries, Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Haiti, you have to apply for a parole process. The process allows only 30,000 migrants to enter the U.S. per month and the qualifications are steep. You need to have a valid passport, pass a background check, afford the airfare, and have a sponsor with legal status who is already inside the U.S. that can help to support you financially. If you do not have a sponsor, as Patri doesn’t, you will be turned away at the border and forced to remain in Mexico for the time being. For many, this can be a death sentence, left vulnerable to theft, homelessness, and kidnapping for ransom. Despite these risks, many migrants make the trek anyway because they simply have no other alternative. The extension of the harmful Title 42 immigration policy by the Supreme Court and the Biden Administration leaves many Cuban asylum seekers in a crisis due to unreasonable restrictions. In response, the Biden Administration has put forth future policy changes to counteract the extension of Title 42 that will hopefully accomplish its goal of fixing the broken immigration system. 

What is Title 42? 

Title 42 is a U.S. law used in issues such as civil rights, public health, social welfare, and more. The government can use it to take emergency actions to keep contagious diseases out of the country. It was first used in 1929 during a meningitis outbreak to keep Chinese and Filipino ships from entering the U.S. and spreading the disease. The law was only enacted again in 2020 by then-president, Donald Trump, due to the global COVID-19 outbreak. However, Trump also used this law and its implications to turn away migrants from the border more quickly without having to consider their cases for asylum. Since this law has been put into effect in 2020, 2 million people have been barred from entering the U.S. 

The Trump Administration’s impact on immigration policy

Donald Trump’s campaign and presidency are defined largely by his harsh views and policies on immigration and enforcement.  There are 100 million displaced refugees in the world today, a number that only grew worse during Trump’s presidency. He reduced legal immigration into the United States by 49%. From 2016-2019, there was an increase in denials for military naturalizations by 54%. During his presidency, 5,460 children were separated from their families at the U.S.-Mexico Border. In 2017, he announced that he would dismantle DACA, Deferred Actions for Childhood Arrivals, which provides relief from deportation and work authorization for immigrants brought to America as children. He also tried to terminate TPS, Temporary Protected Status, a program that grants legal status – including work authorization and protection from deportation – to people from designated countries facing ongoing armed conflict, environmental disaster, or other extraordinary conditions preventing their safe return. Hate crimes against Latinos and Hispanics rose by 21% in 2018. By increasing his anti-immigrant rhetoric, he made the issue of immigration one of the top priorities in the 2020 election. 

The Biden Campaign’s immigration policy promises

Since immigration played a powerful role in the 2020 election, the Biden campaign put out extensive information on how he was going to help fix the immigration crisis if he was elected to office. He starts by evoking emotion in his plan by saying, “It is a moral failing and a national shame when a father and his baby daughter drown seeking our shores. When children are locked away in overcrowded detention centers and the government seeks to keep them there indefinitely.” He ultimately, flat-out states, “Trump has waged an unrelenting assault on our values and our history as a nation of immigrants. It’s wrong, and it stops when Joe Biden is elected president.” 

Biden states overall goals for immigration policy, such as modernizing the immigration system and welcoming immigrants into the community. However, since this election was about defeating Trump and reversing his policies, Biden created promises for his first 100 days in office. These include, “Immediately reverse the Trump Administration’s cruel and senseless policies that separate parents from their children at our border” and “End Trump’s detrimental asylum policies.” He wants to end the separation of families at the border by ending the prosecution of parents for minor violations since these are mostly used as scare or intimidation tactics. He said that he wants to restore asylum laws so they can actively protect people fleeing persecution. The Trump Administration put restrictions on access to asylum for anyone traveling through Mexico or Guatemala and those fleeing from gang or domestic violence. 

The economic crisis in Cuba

Why are there record numbers of migrants leaving Cuba for the United States? The number of migrants (200,000 in 2022) reflects percentages that haven’t been seen since the 1990s, and it's because Cuba is facing its worst socio-economic crisis since the collapse of the Soviet Union. There are daily shortages of food and medicine. There are regular power outages and last year during a protest against the government, the internet was switched off. Shortages of resources have culminated since 1962 when the U.S. trade embargo was imposed. To survive, Cuba has become reliant on earnings from international tourism and Cuban nationals working abroad. Due to COVID-19, the island was mostly closed off to foreign tourists and reduced visitor numbers by 75% in 2020. When Trump was elected in 2016, he reinstated longstanding travel and business restrictions between Cuba and the U.S., further closing them off from U.S. resources. He also reinstated Cuba to the list of state sponsors of terrorism, which obstructed the country’s access to international finance. 

In the last few years, resistance to the government has risen, partly due to social media and the internet. There are increased demands for political and economic change and for government officials to be held accountable. In 2021, there were massive Cuban protests that were fuelled by COVID restrictions and food and medicine shortages. Due to limited resources provided by the government, many were forced to turn to the black market. Many preferred to work for and sell on the black market because they usually made more money than a salary at a typical job to cover basic needs. The Cuban's ability to be resourceful and stretch themselves thin is running out and unless there is significant economic change, many more are bound to follow the 2% of the population that have already left in 2022. 

Impact of the continuation of Title 42 on Cuba and asylum seekers

The continuation of Title 42 could create an asylum crisis for many Cubans. An official from the Washington Office on Latin America, a human-rights nonprofit, estimates that people like Patri, without a sponsor, have no chance of crossing the border anytime soon. While she and many others wait in Mexico for their case to be heard, they would be risking dangerous conditions such as homelessness and kidnapping for ransom. Oftentimes, appointments for Title 42 expectations get booked as soon as they become available and people have to wait weeks to have their cases heard. 

Since there are so many restrictions, many Cubans are turning to more creative ways to migrate to the U.S. In 1994 there was a Cuban rafter crisis or balseros crisis where 35,000 Cubans migrated to the U.S. on makeshift rafts. They spent all their money on the materials to make a raft and row across the Gulf of Mexico to Miami, Cuba. After five weeks of riots, Fidel Castro announced that anyone who wanted to leave Cuba was welcome to do it without hindrance. However, President Clinton mandated that any rafters captured be detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. About 31,000 of those 33,000 were detained at the base while many others were lost at sea. Even though this process of immigration is risky and dangerous, many are worried that the balseros crisis will happen again. 

The extension of Title 42

On December 27th, 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court voted to keep Title 42 in place, allowing asylum-seekers to be turned away at the border, even though it would have expired at the end of 2022. It is now in place indefinitely after 19 Republican state attorneys general filed an emergency appeal to the Supreme Court to keep it in place. U.S. District Judge Emmet Sullivan ruled that Title 42 should expire at the end of this year because the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s implementation of this policy was “arbitrary and capricious.” While many, such as Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch, argued that the public-health justification of Title 42’s implementation has lapsed, they still voted for it to stay in place. Some Democrats, such as California Governor Gavin Newsom, think that if Title 42 is ended, the asylum system would break. White House Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre said in a statement that “Title 42 is a public health measure, not an immigration enforcement measure, and it should not be extended indefinitely.” Yet, the Biden Administration is complying with the Supreme Court’s Order and enforcing Title 42, offering no alternative to those trying to seek asylum on the border. 

However, there are steps in the right direction being made. In January of 2023, Biden issued an executive order restricting asylum applications on the U.S.-Mexico border for four countries, Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Haiti. As mentioned in the first paragraph, the qualifications for asylum applications are steep, including needing a sponsor in the U.S. that can sponsor you financially. If one goes to the border without a sponsor, they will be turned away and the “Remain in Mexico” policy under Title 42 will be in effect. This Executive Order talks about expanding legal pathways for safe, orderly, humane, and legal migration. This includes increasing humanitarian assistance to Mexico and Central America, expanding the parole process, launching an online appointment portal to reduce overcrowding and wait times at the border, and tripling refugee resettlement from the Western Hemisphere. Biden has also reopened the U.S. embassy in Havana for visa applications allowing some an official route to emigration to the U.S.

Conclusion 

After the extension of Title 42 by the Supreme Court, the  NGO, The Washington Office on Latin America, WOLA, gave a list of 5 reasons why Title 42 must end immediately. Title 42 was not designed to protect public health, it creates a discriminatory system because it targets four specific countries, it puts people in need of protection in danger, and it undermines the U.S. ability to promote a protection-centered response to regional migration. However, the foremost reason is that Title 42 is illegal. It denies refugees protection from life-or-death situations. The Biden administration expels around 2,500 migrants every day.  Section 1158 of Title 8 of the U.S. Code does not allow for the blocking of fundamental protection and safety of migrants seeking asylum. Instead of perpetuating and prolonging a broken immigration system, it would be beneficial to invest time and resources in other areas. This would start with restoring the right of all refugees to seek asylum at the border. Using a COVID-era policy is not a justification anymore to keep implementing this law. Another is ensuring humanitarian support for the migrants that are arriving while also coordinating the response of federal, state, and local organizations to make sure everyone gets the same resources and treatment. Finally, there needs to be improvements to the adjudication capacity and resources, as the wait time could be anywhere from 2 months to 1 year.  There is a shortage of lawyers at the border who have impossible caseloads. By increasing the number of public defenders at the border, due process can still be ensured in a timely manner. The US immigration system has been broken for decades. Every day we wait to fix or come up with a new policy, thousands of people fall through the cracks and succumb to the danger they are running from. The system needs to be fixed, for the sake of rebuilding our asylum process and the democratic values that the U.S. was founded on. 

How Grassroot Movements in Latin America can help influence the fight for Reproductive Rights in the United States.

Grassroots movements in Latin and South America, such as The Green Wave, have generated change and progress in reproductive rights by implementing modern human rights frameworks and emphasizing that criminalizing abortions does not stop them from happening. Hopefully and eventually, these movements will be adopted in the United States to help mobilize their grassroots movements to fight for reproductive 

rights by spreading awareness of the goals and methods of these groups. The United States Supreme Court’s recent nonadherence to stare decisis in the overturning of Roe v. Wade will not only have detrimental consequences for reproductive rights in the United States, but the whole world. Roe v. Wade was a landmark decision by the Supreme Court and was considered as an advocacy model for reproductive rights in many countries. In 2020 in the United States, the abortion rate was 1 out of 5 pregnancies ended in abortion. It is estimated that 20-26 states could outlaw abortions and reduce the number of resources and rights for someone who is pregnant. These new laws can then act as trigger laws for more reproductive rights reduction in more states. 

In 1970, an anonymous woman known as Jane Roe filed a lawsuit against the district attorney in Dallas, Texas, named Henry Wade. She wanted to challenge a Texas law making abortion illegal except if necessary to save a woman's life. She alleged that

the law was unconstitutional, vague, and did not protect her right to privacy. The main question that the Supreme Court had to answer: does the US Constitution recognize a woman’s right to terminate the pregnancy by abortion? 

Ultimately, the court decided that the Texas law was unconstitutional because the 14th Amendment of the Constitution has a due process clause which protects individuals against state action called the right of privacy. They decided that a person’s right to choose to have an abortion is within the right to privacy and that any other law that would prohibit abortion violates that right. 

However, in June of 2022, Dobbs v. Jackson was decided and overturned the decision of Roe v. Wade. This is because, in 2018, Mississippi legislators passed a law called the Gestational Age Act, which prohibits abortions after 15 weeks. The only licensed abortion clinic in Mississippi called the Jackson Women’s Health Organization filed a lawsuit that went all the way up to the Supreme Court. The ultimate question that they had to answer was is the Mississippi’s law banning abortion after 15 weeks unconstitutional? In the end, they would find that there is nowhere in the Constitution that gives a person a right to an abortion. The Supreme Court has broken from stare decisis in following a precedented and influential decision from 50 years ago. In the Majority Opinion, written by Justice Samuel Alito, he discussed the right to abortion as neither deeply rooted in the nation’s history nor an essential component of “ordered liberty.” 

What exactly is the United States’ history with abortion and reproductive rights? Unsurprisingly, the history is rooted in sexism, the patriarchy, and the idea that the American woman’s duty and sole purpose was to bear children. The first time that abortion was actually criminalized was in the mid-nineteenth century. In the 1850s and 1860s, doctors helped legislators pass anti-abortion laws to make it

illegal to have an abortion and to take birth control. And yet, even though all these new laws were passed criminalizing birth control, women started to take control over their bodies, pregnancies, and abortions. During this time period, many argued that too many native-born white women were terminating their pregnancies. Many people were afraid that if white American women stopped having children, America would be overrun by foreigners. Many were against the use of contraceptives as well, likening the women who used them to prostitutes. Some leaders of the anti-abortion movement were of the view that pregnancy and having children were women’s purposes in society. One of those leaders, named Horatio Storer, wrote “what a woman is in health, in character, in her charms, alike of body, mind, and soul because of her womb alone.” The ideal, white, American family was seen as one that had lots of children to carry on the ideal American society. When women started to unsubscribe from that idea, many anti-abortionists felt it threatened their society and way of life and left them open for an ‘invasion,’ if you will, of foreigners. It has only been since the 1960s that women could even think about getting access to a birth control pill. Even today, while more accessible than 50-60 years ago, birth control is still not as widely accessible as one might think. Now with the overturning of Roe v. Wade in Dobbs v. Jackson, many women in America are worried that more policies will follow that could make their accessibility to reproductive health resources even smaller. 

What about the rest of the world? A lot of times, when the United States makes policies about issues, other countries would try to follow it or model their policies on the United States. A region of the world that is very interesting to look at as a case study is Latin and South America. As the United States’ southern neighbors, a lot of what the US does affects them. As of this moment, there are only 6 countries in Latin and South America that have a ban on abortions. They are El Salvador, Haiti,

Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Suriname, and Nicaragua. In most of the countries where abortion is legal, they usually have one of two models: 

● The Grounds Model: this model is where abortion is criminalized except in certain circumstances. These could include when a pregnancy is the product of rape or if the pregnant person’s health will be at risk if they go through with the pregnancy. 

● The Mix Model: this model is used in countries such as Argentina, Colombia, Uruguay, and Mexico. It gives access to legal abortion 

resources and there are no specific circumstances or requirements to get one. 

The Grounds Model has been the most commonly used model in the Latin and South American regions for many years. However, due to increasing feminist activism there has been a rise in social movements in Latin America that have paved the way for their countries to move towards the Mix Model instead.. 

In the 1970s, an activist group started in Argentina called Abuelas de la Plaza de Mayo, or Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo as a result of the human rights abuses at the time. It was founded in 1976 with the goal of finding the children and grandchildren stolen and illegally adopted during the Argentine military dictatorship that occurred from 1976-1983. These children were stolen from Los Desaparecidos, or those who disappeared because they spoke out against the regime and its leaders. It is estimated that 30,000 people disappeared during the regime and at least 500 babies were taken from their parents while in captivity and given to childless military couples. This organization has made a lot of progress; since it was started, they identified thousands of bodies and relocated many of the missing children and reconnected them with their families. During their protests, Abuelas de la Plaza de Mayo wore white headscarves

on their heads which symbolized their right to know the final fate of their children and grandchildren. 

This organization has inspired many pro-abortion activitst movements today in Latin and South America. For example, a women’s rights movement called The Green Wave wears green headscarves as a symbol of their protest and solidarity with each other. This organization started in Argentina and was directly inspired by the progress and change that Abuelas de la Plaza de Mayo has made in achieving its goals. The Green Wave has helped deliver groundbreaking change and progress in reproductive rights in Latin America. Through mass protests and keeping up the pressure on lawmakers, they have gotten the government to make major steps in decriminalizing abortion. They also have helped people break away from the stigmas of birth control and abortion and have raised general awareness around reproductive rights. Through their efforts, they have forced policymakers to make sure reproductive rights and access to resources are at the center of political debate and decisions. This grassroots movement’s influence has not only been confined to Latin America. It has spread throughout the world and people are seeing their success at making real change happen around reproductive rights. For example, in Poland, people protesting against abortion bans are using green scarves on their heads as a symbol of their right to reproductive autonomy. 

Grassroots movements such as The Green Wave are focusing their goals on trying to get policymakers to move their laws closer to compliance with international human rights obligations. The global trend recently with legislators is to try to expand access to legal abortion by including and following international human rights laws into the laws of their own countries and constitutions. A good example of this strategy is in Colombia; in February 2022, the Constitutional Court in Colombia decriminalized

abortion for up to 24 weeks of pregnancy. This is a historic step in reproductive rights and for grassroots movements. Their reasoning behind this decision came from the need to decriminalize abortion so that sexual and reproductive rights could be preserved. They noted the studies done by the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ESCR Committee) where they mention the right of all to enjoy the highest standard of health. 

The ESCR Committee has General Comment No. 14 and General Comment No. 22 which also played a role in Colombia’s decriminalization of abortion. These general comments talk about the right to health, equality, and freedom of conscience. By extension, the interpretation of these international human rights laws implies that denying women access to abortion is a form of discrimination that is in contrast with basic human rights. Colombia’s new policies and laws adhering to international human rights have influenced other countries in Latin America to do the same and now abortionservices have been included in health care systems all over Latin America due to the persistence and pressure of grassroots movements to make sure reproductive rights are a present topic in policy debates. 

In addition, grassroots movements have also emphasized to lawmakers how criminalizing abortions is not going to stop them from happening. Criminalization threatens the ability of women to get access to essential reproductive health care and resources. At the same time, it also increases inequality and discrimination. If a wealthy person has the resources to get an abortion, then the chances of deadly results are slimmer. The rate of unsafe abortions is four times higher and is increasing in countries with abortion laws that are restrictive and where abortion is criminalized. According to a study done by an organization in Colombia named La Mesa por la Vida y La Salud de las Mujeres says that only 1 to 12 percent of abortions are performed legally. This

implies that most women in Latin America getting abortions are doing so in unsafe conditions where their health could be at a much greater risk. Furthermore, many of the legal abortion clinics are located in major cities, which are unaccessible to many women. Women who live in rural areas already experience greater discrimination and marginalization and are now being put in an even more vulnerable situation. This is why grassroots organizations and movements are fighting for better access to clinics, information, and resources to obtain an abortion in safe conditions. The organizations are positioning reproductive rights as a social justice issue, the absence of which is a violation of women’s rights. By putting this topic into public conservation, they are helping everyday people and lawmakers think of circumstances and conditions that have not even crossed their minds. 

The main question here is: will the policymakers in the United States try to incorporate some of these strategies that grassroots organizations are implementing to help women get more access to resources for safe abortions and take steps to decriminalize abortions and birth control fully? Well, seeing how grassroots movements such as The Green Wave have already spread all through Latin and South America and have even gone to Europe, it is conceivable that these methods could be adopted by similar protest movements in the United States. By putting pressure on lawmakers and generally informing the public about abortion access and reproductive rights, these movements can make sure that these issues are at the forefront of political conversations and debates. On paper, the United States is a secular country, with very clearly laid out foundations for a separation of church and state.The model which protects the rights of women most is the decriminalization model, where abortion is recognized as an essential health care service that no one needs to be prosecuted for or die from. It is only when personal and religious beliefs are set aside and looking

toward movements are arguments that have worked for others that the United States can finally make progress in the realm of reproductive rights. 

Chile’s New Constitution Must Progress Past Its History Towards a More Egalitarian Society

On October 26th, 2020, the streets of Santiago, Chile erupted into celebration as the results of a momentous referendum were announced to the public. With almost all of the ballots counted, 78% of Chileans had voted in favor of re-writing the country’s Constitution, which has served as a lasting legacy of the right-wing dictator Augosto Pinochet. 

Chilean voters will return to the ballot boxes on April 11th, 2021 in order to elect 110 people who will be responsible for writing the new Constitution. With an estimated time period of 9 months to create the document, and the option of an extra three-month extension, the Chilean people will finally open a new chapter in their country’s history by April 2022 at the latest. It will be crucial for these elected officials to create a Constitution that encapsulates the diversity of the Chilean nation, addresses its drastic inequalities, and progresses away from the damaging methods of neoliberal governance that have marked its past. 

The 2020 plebiscite itself was the culmination of decades of civil discontent towards the current Constitution, written in 1980 under the military dictatorship of Augosto Pinochet. Pinochet headed Chile’s military government from 1974 to 1980 after leading a military junta that overthrew the country’s democratically-elected socialist president, Salvador Allende. Inaugurated in 1970, Allende began to restructure Chilean society in line with socialist values, democratic government, civil liberties and due process under law. His government took control of key mining and manufacturing sectors, as well as took over large agricultural estates to be used by peasant coalitions. Allende also implemented expansionary monetary policy in an attempt to redistribute wages and increase government spending on social programs, along with expropriating U.S.-owned copper companies, which created a tense relationship between his government and the U.S. Though successful at first, after a few years international influence against these policies led to hyperinflation, strikes, food shortages and rising civil unrest. Much of this government opposition was supported by U.S. President Nixon and the CIA, given U.S. strategic interest in the region as well as the context of Cold War ideological opposition. 

Allende’s policies had led to a period of economic retraction, but his government was given little opportunity to curb these effects as they were overthrown by a military coup led by Pinochet in September of 1973. The U.S. had been heavily involved in the lead-up to this coup, with Nixon authorizing $10 million for the covert operation against Allende, citing his government as a threat to democracy in Chile and Latin America. Mandated by Washington, the CIA attempted to bribe, coerce and blackmail Chile’s Congress and military to unseat Allende, launched an international disinformation campaign against him, and assassinated the chief of the armed forces, who was opposed to intervention in Chile’s democratic processes. 

Following this coup, Pinochet became dictator of Chile and immediately rounded up hundreds of Allende’s supporters to be tortured and executed. The U.S. offered military and economic aid to Pinochet, who they ironically considered the “savior of democracy,” and the CIA is speculated to have helped his government capture and execute dissidents - a total of 3,000 in his 17 years in power. 

With this U.S. involvement also came U.S. influence over the economic system that Pinochet implemented during his 17-year rule. This economic plan was created by a group of Chilean economists known as the “Chicago boys,” who were trained in free-market capitalist ideologies by notorious American economists Milton Friedman and Arnold Harberger. The Chicago boys’ plan was also developed alongside CIA collaborators. Under this model, the Chilean government would allow private enterprise to operate completely independent of government control. It became the first country in the world to implement such a model, and the effects on the nation have been drastic to say the very least. 

The model of perfect competition that the Chicago Boys envisioned did not become a reality in the Chilean context. Powerful monopolies crushed smaller producers and businesses as well as raising the prices for everyday consumers. Workers were not provided protection in negotiating their wages, unemployment skyrocketed, and wealth inequality reached an extreme. Educational institutions were also largely privatized, leading to lessening equality of opportunity among Chileans. The same principle applies to healthcare access. In other words, Chile’s upper classes benefited immensely from these reforms while the everyday worker suffered immensely, despite extreme economic growth for the country as a whole. This liberal economic model has remained in place, and over the years wealth inequality has remained extremely high, contributing to extreme civil unrest as seen in the violent protests in Santiago in fall of 2019. 

The Chilean Constitution of 1980, serving as their current Constitution, was largely created to help secure the implementation of these neoliberal economic ideals. Created only by a small group of lawyers loyal to Pinochet, its drafters knew that though Pinochet could not stay in power indefinitely, this Constitution would secure his legacy for future generations of Chileans.  This Constitution ensured that unfeasibly large majorities would be needed to challenge the neoliberal economic policies that the military dictatorship was implementing, outlawed left-wing political parties, and made the military the “guarantors” of the state. Presidential vetoes also required an overwhelming Congressional majority to overthrow, securing Pinochet’s position. Though the document was approved in a national plebiscite, it was considered widely fraudulent. 

Democratic rule in Chile was reinstated by a popular referendum to oust Pinochet in 1989, and Constitutional amendments have tweaked the constitution to allow it to function within  democratic regimes. Nevertheless, the Constitution was created to preserve the governing interests of right-wing dictatorship, leans towards a conservative interpretation of the law, and provides no formal protections or avenues for citizens to participate in political decisions. It also favors private property rights and entrepreneurship over human and social rights, such as healthcare, education, and worker’s rights. Additionally, any amendments to the document require a ⅔ approval in Congress, which is often difficult to solidify. All of these concerns go without saying that the Constitution itself was approved in a fraudulent, non-democratic plebiscite, yet it continues to represent people who are now able to participate in democratic processes. 

The irrefutable issues contained in the Constitution itself as well as the lack of legitimacy it holds over the Chilean people, on top of the economic inequality fortified by this Constitution, led the Chilean people to take to the streets in fall of 2019, demanding a new Constitution and increased social protection. Marked by extreme violence, destruction of property, and police repression, these uprisings marked a tipping point for the Chilean working class, who have long awaited a government which would secure their rights. 

As a response to these protests, in November of 2019 Chile’s National Congress signed an agreement to hold a national referendum that would rewrite the Constitution, if approved. Though originally set to take place in April of 2020, COVID-19 lockdowns delayed the plebiscite until October of 2020. With overwhelming approval, members of Chilean civil society as well as politicians have begun to contemplate what type of social and civil rights should be integrated into the new Constitution, and whether or not the economic legacy of the Pinochet era should be continued. Chileans will elect who will constitute the body who will write the Constitution in April of this year, and these members will have a year to produce their product. 

Interestingly, the small minority who opposed the Constitutional change in the first place was concentrated among the political elite. In a map of Santiago neighborhoods that went viral, the only ones to vote in a majority against the reform were the wealthiest neighborhoods in the city. It is evident, therefore, that the 1980 Constitution continues to secure the interest of these classes, and doing away with the document presents an opportunity to check the power of these classes and equally redistribute this power among the classes below. Thus, it will be crucial for the body who drafts the new Chilean Constitution to equally represent all sectors of Chilean society, in terms of class, race, gender, and other identities. 

In fact, measures to include diverse groups of policymakers in the drafting body have already taken hold. The drafting body itself includes a gender-parity requirement, meaning that Chile’s new constitution will be the first in the world to be drafted by an equal number of men and women. In addition, 17 out of 155 seats on the drafting body have been reserved for representatives of Indigenous communities, constituting a proportion just shy of the 13% of 7 million Chileans who identify as indigenous. Meeting this 13% representation should have been a non-disputable measure, yet these types of steps towards political representation in Chile have set a historic precedent which should become a global standard. This is especially true for post-colonial societies, which have tended to suppress the political participation of their indigenous populations. 

This representation will provide indigenous populations in Chile for a prime opportunity to not only represent their existence within the country, as the only Latin American country that has yet to officially recognize their indigenous population in their Constitution, but also to include Constitutional measures that will secure indigenous rights in Chile for centuries to come.

For example, water privatization is a key issue that has disproportionately impacted Chilean indigenous populations for decades. The 1980 Constitution, under Pinochet, enshrined the complete private ownership of water. After the democratic transition, water sanitation sources were also privatized. As a result of these efforts, Chile now pays the highest rates in Latin America for drinking water, which is owned primarily by transnational corporations. With indigenous populations located in some of the driest regions in the country, indigenous populations have been disproportionately affected by the privatization of water and land resources. 

Improvements in workers’ rights are also expected to be a key issue brought about by the Constitutional reform. All-encompassing privatization of industry has meant less regulation in terms of securing workers’ rights to collectively bargain and advocate for workplace safety in the country, so the new Constitution expects to see major reforms to the Chilean labor code as well. Private businesses will no longer be allowed relatively full autonomy in conducting their relations with workers, as they were in the past. 

Chilean Mayor of Valparaíso, Jorge Sharp, accurately described the pivotal opportunity that rewriting the Chilean constitution will provide the country in an interview with the Times: “Chilean neoliberalism isn’t just an economic policy. It’s become a way of conceiving life itself: social relations, cities, democracy, society, and the economy. Rewriting the Constitution is our chance to lay the foundations of a new society, a new state, and a new country.” 

With this Constitutional reform comes a momentous opportunity to remove the holds of neoliberalism from its roots, not just in Chile but in other Latin American countries which have been so profoundly disrupted by the unjust societal and economic structures brought about by it. Time will only tell whether the new Constitution will provide such progressive and necessary reforms, but representing Chile’s diverse populations in its drafting committee is a monumental step in the right direction. 

COVID-19 Increases Human Trafficking Risk in Latin America and the Caribbean Region

For the past decade, the Latin America and Caribbean region (LAC) has consistently ranked among the regions in the world with the highest rates of human trafficking, whether for purposes of forced labor, sex, or domestic servitude. The region as a whole therefore faces immense challenges in identifying cases of Trafficking in Persons (TIP), prosecuting offenders, and aiding victims. 

Despite these existing challenges, the region has also become the world’s epicenter for the COVID-19 pandemic. The economic, social, and welfare conditions that have accompanied COVID-19 have therefore dramatically increased the risks for current and potential TIP victims, leading thousands more people, and especially women and children, to fall victim to the internationally-recognized crime. 

According to a Sept. 23 BBC news article, as of Sept. 22 8.8 million cases of COVID-19 and 350,000 deaths had been reported in the LAC region. Brazil and Mexico, with the highest populations in the region, also lead with the highest numbers of reported deaths. In fact, Mexico and Ecuador occupy the number one and two spots for the highest COVID-19 mortality rates in the world, and 50% of the top ten countries with the highest mortality rates are LAC countries. 

In a region that was already lacking adequate social welfare nets and sufficient healthcare systems, COVID-19 outbreaks and their subsequent shutdowns have shocked the regional economy in an unprecedented manner. 

According to a July 2020 United Nations (UN) Policy Brief, prior to the pandemic, economic development in the LAC region faced severe structural limitations, including high income inequality, high levels of informality, and vulnerability to climate change. The crisis has resulted in the worst recession that the LAC region has seen in over a century, causing a 9.1% contraction in regional Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 

The UN brief also states that these conditions could push the number of people living in poverty in the region up by 45 million, to a total of 230 million, and the number of people living in extreme poverty by 28 million, putting many at risk of undernutrition. 

As more people are pushed into poverty, many are forced to find additional sources of income to survive. This leaves many more people, and especially women and children, more vulnerable to TIP, which the region struggled to address even before the pandemic. 

Since 2000, the U.S. Department of State’s (DOS) Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons has released a yearly report which analyzes the state of TIP around the world by country and region, including the LAC. This report classifies countries into tiers based on their ability to combat human trafficking in accordance with the UN Palermo Protocol to Prevent, Supress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children. These rankings are identified based on the prevalence of trafficking in a country as well as domestic governments’ ability to identify and prosecute cases. 

Within the 2020 report’s country narratives, each country is classified among one of four tiers, depending on the extent of governmental efforts to meet the minimum standards of the U.S. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA). 

A country ranked at Tier 1 fully meets the TVPA’s minimum standards. If it ranks in Tier 2, the country does not meet the TVPA’s minimum standards, but is making significant efforts to comply with them. The Tier 2 Watch List signifies that the TVPA’s minimum standards are not fully met, and while the country is making efforts, trafficking is rising. Finally, if a country ranks in Tier 3, its government does not fully meet the minimum standards and is not making significant efforts to do so.

This year, the report’s regional analysis indicates that a majority of the Western Hemisphere, or 19 out of 31 countries (61%), rank within Tier 2 (Yellow). Comparatively, 19% of countries rank within Tier 1 (Green), 10% on the Tier 2 Watch List (Orange), and another 10% in Tier 3 (Red).

Even when the 2020 report analyzed 2019 trends pre COVID-19, the region was already struggling immensely to combat TIP. Adding the conditions of poverty and inadequate social welfare conditions into the mix, early evidence is already showing that the health and economic crises are leading to drastic increases in human trafficking throughout the LAC region. 

According to an August 19 America Magazine article, female sex trafficking, in particular, has largely increased in the region as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. Poverty, as well as confinement which has often led to amplified domestic violence, has led many young women in the region to leave home and struggle to find other sources of income. Many women are also forced into prostitution by their husbands, as well. Reporting cases of TIP has also become increasingly more difficult, given that police and courts have become much more inaccessible due to social distancing measures. 

In addition, the article emphasizes that though traffickers are more restricted in terms of movement across national borders, this can also make it more difficult to identify trafficking victims because they are not made as visible as they are no longer transported. The demand for webcam pornography has also increased by 30 percent with the pandemic, meaning that traffickers are now given virtual avenues for coercion and recruitment. Venezuelan refugees and migrants, in particular, are most vulnerable to forced prostitution and subsequently human trafficking. 

A recent UN Office on Drugs and Crime article also addresses a further challenge facing TIP  victims: support services for TIP victims across the region have been greatly reduced, and in some cases halted. In Colombia, however, authorities have attempted to move these counselling services online. 

Nevertheless, physical spaces for victims to take refuge and psychologically and physically recover are essential in ensuring that victims are not vulnerable to go back into trafficking. This is especially important when legal and criminal justice systems across the region were identified by the mentioned DOS report to be severely lacking in their ability to convict and prosecute traffickers. This means that while many victims may be removed from their situations, their assailants may still be at large continuing their crimes. 

Furthermore, labor trafficking and domestic servitude, especially among children, is expected to increase in the region as well. According to the June 15, 2020 ILO and UNICEF report “COVID-19 and Child Labour: A Time of Crisis, a Time to Act”, the global number of people in extreme poverty is projected to rise by at least 20% in 2020, largely as a result of COVID-19. With poverty comes increased rates of child labor, as households use every available means to survive. On a global basis, a one percentage point rise in global poverty levels tends to correlate with a 0.7 percentage point increase in child labor. 

These figures are exacerbated in the LAC region, in particular, as social protection nets are less widespread and lack proper implementation. Across the region, locked international remittances and an inability to migrate for work have led families into states of economic desperation. These circumstances promote a transition from formal employment sectors to informal ones, where children may be exploited for their labor. For those who are still able to work, they risk exposing themselves to COVID-19 and bringing the virus home to their families. 

All of these conditions leave children vulnerable to many types of TIP, including trafficking for the purposes of forced labor or domestic servitude. According to the mentioned DOS report, in Paraguay, for example, criadazgo is a form of child labor and trafficking in which rural families in desperate economic situations send their children to work for wealthy urban families. As  more families suffer to make ends meet, these forms of child trafficking are expected to become even more prominent. 

Exact figures on the extent of the impacts that the virus will have on TIP have not yet been released, and only anecdotal evidence exists from NGOs to show that these trends indeed exist. In the meantime, it is clear that COVID-19 has put possible and current TIP victims in the LAC region at great risk. 

Now more than ever, it will therefore be the responsibility of domestic governments to increase their mechanisms for identification of TIP victims, enforcement of laws against TIP, and prosecution and sentencing of traffickers. It will also be up to international organizations and NGOs to put pressure on these governments, as well as assist them in building their capacities to combat TIP in the age of COVID-19. While much of this work is already taking place, these institutions have a long road ahead of them in not only reversing the effects of COVID-19 on TIP, but working to eliminate TIP  in its entirety throughout the region.

Rise of the "Global South": Potential of Mercosur and Regional Organizations

Our world remains on the path of globalization in spite of the challenges posed by nationalism, extremism, xenophobia, coronavirus etc. Even in the particularly challenging times of a global pandemic, countries are persistent in maintaining their global connections and, in particular, economic ties, in order to continue benefiting from world trade and business opportunities.

Of course, it is undeniable that globalization, here defined as increased interconnectedness of the world politically, economically, and socially, can also lead to tension, marginalization, and increased levels of inequality in spite of greater economic profits. What bears witness to this is the fact that, although world poverty has decreased in the last decades, global levels of inequality kept on rising. 

Therefore, it is apparent that though there is potential within the current system, there is a need for a rearrangement, or better yet, a fresh perspective and an alternative to current operational mechanisms in order to address the downsides of the current track of globalization and allocate its benefits proportionately throughout humanity. 

One way in which the present state of inequality is manifested is through the very division of the world into the “global north” and the “global south” (terms which will remain under quotation marks due to their relativity and many connotations to be briefly elaborated on below). Whereas some countries have seen proliferation in democracy, human rights, a rise in GDP and standard of living, and deserved thus to be placed in the “developed nations” of the “global north,” others have suffered from political instability and economic uncertainty, which have landed them into the “global south.” 

The terms themselves point to the assumption that it is countries in the northern hemisphere, on the continents of North America and Eurasia that have prospered the most. Nevertheless, there are notable exceptions of Central America, North Africa and a good chunk of South Asia which are all considered to at least economically be south. Conversely, those states south of the equator, with the notable exception of Australia, are somehow condemned to particular challenges in further economic development under this “global south” definition. 

These terms may thus imply geographic significance, but the exceptions listed above point out to the fact that a country’s positioning from the equator cannot be quite directly linked to the country’s GDP. Instead, no one country or one particular group of people is doomed to failure as terms may imply. The matter is actually far more complex and it seems that the current system and institutional complexities of globalization are at play. Thus, the countries seen as most “developed” and suitable to compete in the current system are those that have well-established  markets and a well-arranged flow of goods. Those seen as best role models would be the US and the European Union which, not coincidentally, also happen to be major creators of the current global system. 

Countries of the South American continent, in particular, have not been given a significant role in the creation of the current globalized system, which is evident in the fact that none of the permanent UN Security Council seats belong to a South American state and that South American countries are certainly not in the top stakeholders in associations such as the World Bank. This means that trade and political systems dominating the current track of globalization are not based on these countries' values and interests, so political decisions and trade flows are likely not to be inclusive and reflective of the region's perspectives, instead disproportionately more benefitting what is seen as the “global north,” which in this way largely reinforces the status quo and maintains reliance and dependence of the south on the north. 

Regardless, there are still ways in which South American countries can advance their representation and role in the current system. One way that South American countries are increasing their competitiveness in the world market, which the current system necessitates, is by creating a strong regional body of their own, in likeness of that of the European Union, which was itself created in order to increase Europe’s competitiveness. 

This body is Mercosur, a South American regional organization formed in 1991 when Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay signed the Treaty of Asuncion which established political and economic union, thus creating a South American trading bloc. The Treaty of Asuncion emphasized the “importance of securing their countries a proper place in the international economy” and the Treaty, they concluded, “must be viewed as a further step in efforts to gradually bring about Latin American regional integration.” 

This treaty gave birth to Mercosur as an embodiment of that commitment and, though its success is staunchly debated, it remains a strong base for moving the integration of the region of Latin America forward, as an economic model of the “global south”  heading into the mainstream flow of globalization. This article will outline the challenges to the growth of Mercosur, as well as the potential and necessity of this organization for the future of Latin America and the so-called “developing world.” 

Mercosur’s historical trajectory: Challenges and Successes

Since its conception in 1991, Mercosur remains with only four members, which are the original founding members. This is also reflected in its logo featuring the four stars of the southern sky’s famous Crux constellation, and the South American continent, but with special focus and light shone on the permanent and founding members, thus bringing special attention and significance to the founding members. 

Venezuela had a brief flirtation with the group when it joined in 2012, but was suspended in 2016 due to the Maduro regime’s high levels of corruption and failure to comply with the group’s commitment to democratic values coming from the 1998 Ushuaia protocol on Democratic Commitment. Paraguay, one of the four founding members, was also ironically suspended from 2012 to 2013 due to doubts regarding its democratic stability, though this was seen as a political affair meant to allow space for Venezuela to enter, given Paraguay was the only center right government at the time that did not agree to accept leftist Venezuela. 

These events shed some light on a widespread problem of political stability of the organization given that the last decade saw political play and tension that led to these fractures. There is also tension coming from economic pressure between Argentina and Brazil, the two largest economies of the bloc, which further complicates things and often blocks Mercosur countries from expanding trade outside of their bloc and Latin America. 

This political instability and economic tension sheds light on the reason Mercosur is taking longer than the EU to integrate more members and connect the continent. There were, for example, attempts to create common currency similar to European euro, which would combine the Brazilian “real” and the Argentine “peso” to make the “real peso” (which also reaffirms who the two major players of the bloc are), but this idea is still debated and the countries remain worried of the risk of inflation that the region has witnessed too many times. 

This is not to say that Mercosur does not remain in many ways a revolutionary body in nature. It is the largest trading bloc of the region, worth roughly $3.4 trillion, followed by the Pacific Alliance, which includes Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, at about $2 trillion. Mercosur has also succeeded in naming Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, and Suriname associate members, which all have reduced tariffs in trade with the bloc, with Bolivia in the process of acquiring full membership. 

Furthermore, Mercosur’s decision-making body, called the Common Market Council, provides a high-level forum for coordinating political and economic policy, and its presidency rotates alphabetically to each full member every six months. While Brazil and Argentina remain in a competition for regional dominance, Mercosur manages to facilitate cooperation and balance, and has survived major stresses such as Brazil’s 1999 currency devaluation and Argentina’s 2001 financial crisis while remaining  the largest trading bloc of the region, which adds credibility to the organization. Aside from trade benefits, citizens of the four full member countries have the ability to travel, work, and live anywhere within the bloc without restrictions.  

Mercosur’s Present-Day Significance 

 Following the coronavirus outbreak, most Latin American countries instituted strict lockdowns and are still amongst the most affected countries of the world, with half of the top 10 countries with highest number of cases worldwide being in Latin America as of September 2020, even though Latin America comprises only less than 8.5% of the world population. 

The impact of these lockdowns on the regional economy is unprecedented, with massive spikes in regional unemployment rates. Brazi, in particular, is suffering a historic record with 50% of the population out of work, and projected reductions of 6% in GDP that could set the region’s growth back for a decade and exasperate the region’s structural challenges. 

While all of these economic challenges pose threats to promoting regional integration and creating a common currency,  regional integration may be a key factor in reviving South America’s broken economy. This type of integration will in fact be crucial in mitigating the challenges posed by the  pandemic, which call for a transparent, interconnected regional body where ideas, trade, investment, and innovation are well-facilitated, and where a high value is placed on political, social, and economic stability. 

These promoted values and mechanisms would directly confront the impacts of a pandemic that is drastically reducing investment and productivity rates, exasperating the usual regional challenges. Mercosur is currently positioned in a way that makes it very suitable for bringing as much of the Latin American region as possible to the negotiating table and facilitating greater cooperation, and this opportunity should not be missed in today’s critical period. 

Mercosur Going Forward

Another potential impact of Mercosur lies in its increased trade with countries outside of the bloc, with deals recently having been made with the  EU and Egypt. The deal with Egypt is into its fourth year and may encourage further trade opportunities between Mercosur and the Middle East. However, the deal with the EU, in spite of years of negotiation and drafting, is now being lagged due to Amazonian deforestation concerns brought about by France, which Brazil, on the other hand, sees as protectionist policies on behalf of France which often attempts to, through protectionist policies aimed at strengthening domestic production by avoiding competition and free trade, protect its own industries. 

Whether the protectionist allegations on behalf of France and the EU are true or not is less important than Mercosur’s position in this deal and the need of the “global south” to step away from dependence on the “global north.” It is important to note that, unlike the EU, Mercosur has begun its career not only as an economic treaty organization but has also included elements of political and social integration, as well as a clause relating to environmental protection. These policy elements add to the value and unique identity of Mercosur. 

In addition, in order to allow for the truly long-lasting, sustainable, and authentic development of Mercosur, the region, and the so-called “global south,” it is important that Mercosur remains aware and true to these foundational policies no matter the outside pressures. This is why deforestation of the Amazon is not justified and future deals should be focused on issues such as environmental safety as well as the rights of indigenous communities, which Mercosur should see itself as a key actor in protecting and putting forth.  In fact, the original 1991 Treaty of Asuncion mentions the “optimum use of available resources”  “preserving the environment,” as well as “economic development with social justice.” This is exactly the alternative vision and priority that the current globalized system needs in order to improve its trajectory and something Mercosur can and should pride itself in. 

One important deal currently being drafted, and of great importance to the southern hemisphere’s economic platform, is between Mercosur and Singapore that would cover a variety of issues, such as further easing trade barriers, boosting intergovernmental negotiation, providing space for e-commerce, supporting micro and macro enterprises, etc. Though this deal is also facing a delay, due to Argentina’s need to focus on the economic crisis at home ignited by the pandemic, the deal has huge potential due to Singapore’s immense experience in similar deals and its connection to Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) countries, which are another significant bloc of the “global south.”

Thus, cooperation between ASEAN and Mercosur is exactly the kind of increased economic activity between the countries of the so-called “global south” that this article is arguing for. This would gradually shift the focus of globalization from the “north” and allow for better worldwide integration, expansion and diversification of available perspectives on development in the mainstream climate of the international community. It is important, however, not to let the pandemic slow down the process, and actually understand the benefit that integration and cooperation during the pandemic can have in the long-term. 

In this way instead of continuing the current trends of environmental damage, sidelining of minority and indigenous groups, disregard for multilingualism and multiculturalism, and lack of concern for increasing inequality, there would come an age with a new perspective. Still, this can only be attainable if emerging economies of the so-called “global south,” and particularly so in South America, are able to stay true to their constitutional and regional agenda that, unlike northern counterparts, begin their focus with regard for these very issues. The “global south” has had time to observe and learn from mistakes or shortcomings of the current system which made it possible to have such holistic treaties as 1991 Treaty of Asuncion that made sure Mercosur actually positions environmental and social health as its priority where the EU and the US had to learn from their mistakes and are reluctant to, as stakeholders in the current system, take on a fully different base for the way they conduct business. Bolivia, a contender for membership in Mercosur, prides itself in being a plurinational state and actively recognizes historical injustices and works on maintaining its indigenous languages. If such examples remain prominent in the region, and are reflected in both text and actions, then the “global south” will provide a truly viable fresh perspective the current system needs. 

Conclusion 

Globalization continues to be challenged and it is certainly lacking even integration and provision of equal opportunity to citizens of the world in its current trajectory. Thus, greater integration amongst the countries of the so-called “global south” will allow for greater opportunity to be achieved in order to allow for diversification of major players in the global economy and political thought, allowing for more voices to be heard, including of those who have been largely on the losing end of the current neoliberal policies that govern the world as is the case with current “developing world of the global south.” Instead, the Latin American region and the “global south” as a whole can develop a system of support amongst the countries disadvantaged by the system and thus provide an alternative to what is positioned by those who are more likely to reinforce the status quo they benefited from.

To achieve this, it is important to turn to organizations such as Mercosur, that has already had some success in integrating the region, and make sure it addresses the political and economic instability, as well as increase its cooperation with other blocs of the “global south” aimed at political, economic, and social integration, such as ASEAN and the African Union and decrease dependence of the south on the north. These corporations would eventually begin to tip the balance of world trade, and allow these regions to promote economic equality and political independence on their own terms. 

However, it is important that these organizations use their advantage of being newer and able to offer a new view to global development and progress. Mistakes of the past, such as disregard to ecological and social health that has been an unfortunate and gruesome collateral product of the current track to globalization as spearheaded by the “global north,” should be avoided, and this are some of the hopes and still insufficiently explored potentials that emergence of a strong southern market would bring to the stage. 

The Future of the Inter-American Development Bank is in Trouble

The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) is rarely the world’s premier diplomatic spectacle. However, the recent election of the institution’s new incoming president proved to be yet another realm of conflict between the hardline administration of President Donald Trump and Latin American nations seeking greater autonomy over their own affairs. 

A Break with Precedent

Established in 1959 by the Organization of American States (OAS), the IDB has grown to include some 48 sovereign nations, with 26 of them borrowing states (which the bank lends to)  which primarily consist of Latin American countries.The IDB is the largest multilateral financier of the Latin America and the Caribbean region, and coordinates various policies to combat income inequality, climate change, and other challenges facing the continents.

Historically, the process of selecting a leader for the bank has been a compromise between the U.S. and the countries of the region. While the U.S. is endowed with 30 percent of the voting power in the assembly, the Latin American nations possess just over 50 percent of the voting power and it has been a long standing precedent that the president of the body is from Latin America (and the executive vice president is usually American). In fact, since the organization’s inception, the president has always come from a Latin American country. As Michael Shifter and Bruno Binetti write, “Selecting a Latin American as president has been a way of respecting regional autonomy and giving other governments involved a sense of ownership in the institution.”

In a Trump Administration preferring coercion to cooperation in the region, there has never been any place for this precedent. For example, in June of this year, without any prior consultation with IDB members, the White House announced that it intended to nominate Mauricio Claver-Carone to be the next president of the body. Not only would Claver-Carone be the first American president of the IDB, he also brings historically little experience to the table. Claver-Carone notably has zero experience in a federal central bank or even in the finance industry at all. He is neither an economist nor a politician, but rather a lawyer by trade, who has served as a lobbyist and member of the board of directors for the hard-right lobbying group Cuba Democracy Advocates and briefly as an adjunct professor at George Washington University. Claver-Carone’s complete history of governmental service adds up (chronologically) to a brief stint on the Trump transition team, a year as an adviser at the Treasury Department, five months as the acting U.S. representative to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), then finally less than two years as a Latin America advisor on the National Security Council (NSC). In comparison, the first president of the IDB- the Chilean Felipe Herrera- was a former finance minister of his country, general manager of its central bank, and Executive Director of the IMF before his election to the presidency (and he was later a nominee of the Salvador Allende government for United Nations Secretary-General). The second president, Mexico’s Antonio Ortiz Mena, led the Mexican social security office and finance ministry for almost two decades prior to his presidency. The two successive presidents served extensively in the private banking sector, and then later as central bankers or finance ministers (with Claver-Carone’s predecessor serving also as Ambassador to the United States of Colombia) before assuming the presidency. In addition to breaking the geographic precedent, Claver-Carone’s selection represents a clear break from the typical occupational profile of an IDB president.

These twin precedents- of Latin American heritage represented and relevant occupational experience- have long formed the backbone of this particular project of regional integration and multilateralism. It was in defense of these norms that this nomination was condemned by a plethora of different states with differing relationships with the United States, as well as dozens of former prime and foreign ministers and Obama-Biden Administration officials. The European Union and Canada called on the body to delay the vote until after the American presidential election, while Argentina, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru, and the majority of voting nations (but not vote share) opposed the nomination and sought to have it delayed indefinitely. Even the staunchly conservative government of Chile characterized Claver-Carone’s election as “clearly inadequate” and deemed his criticism of dissenting nations as needlessly “aggressive.” 

Domestically, while most Congressional Democrats have opposed the nomination (chiefly Sen. Patrick Leahy-VT ), Cuban and Venezuelan hardliners like Sen. Bob Menendez (D-NJ) and Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL) endorsed Claver-Carone. They were joined internationally by a myriad of Trump-aligned governments, including Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Guyana, Haiti, Japan, and Paraguay. In the end, Costa Rican and Argentine candidates withdrew and Claver-Carone won election to the presidency despite the strong opposition movement, which will surely loom even larger should Joe Biden win the White House in the middle of Claver-Carone’s allotted five-year term. 

What Would a Claver-Carone Presidency Look Like?

The IDB is by no means a perfect organization. Its financial support for the Camisea natural gas project in Peru, responsible for mass destruction of the Amazon and the violation of the rights of indigenous peoples, is one example of its service to private interests and manipulation by capital. A region long plagued by gross inequalities is now embroiled in a struggle with the twin terrors of the coronavirus and the climate crisis and cries out for public investment and aid. Claver-Carone’s proud embrace of the Trump Administration’s combative, belligerent, and punitive Latin American policy risks derailing these future aid efforts. As a public intellectual and an NSC staffer, he has been the face of a right-wing campaign to reinstate draconian  sanctions on Cuba on top of the existing U.S. embargo. This is in reaction to the Obama Administration’s “Cuban thaw” that broke with the strategy of punishment that has been condemned routinely by the United Nations and has deprived Cubans of vital medicine and food, all while enacting no political change on the island. At the NSC, Claver-Carone attempted to apply the very same “maximum pressure” tactics to the dictatorships in Venezuela and Nicaragua with similarly disastrous results. His exceedingly ideologically narrow conception of American interests and power in the region, as well as of the region’s problems, has amounted to punishment for punishment’s sake.

Within the context of the history of American intervention in the region, Claver-Carone’s appointment makes sense. But that is not a compliment. From the 1901 Platt Amendment that proclaimed legitimate the American occupation of Cuba by subjecting the island to permanent policy vetoes from the American sugar companies’ representatives in Congress to the Reagan Administration’s full-throated support for anti-communist death squads that committed war crimes in El Salvador and Guatemala, American foreign policy in the region has been weaponized without constraint on behalf of commerce. Fetishization of capitalism on America’s side has led the U.S. to betray its principles, compelling it to overthrow democratically-elected governments to create the so-called “banana republics” so that American produce companies could sell cheap fruit. Cold War groupthink led the U.S. to support “S.O.B.s” like Rafael Trujillo, Anastasio Somoza, Roberto D’Aubuisson, Augusto Pinochet, and Jorge Rafael Videla even as they presided over heinous massacres. The IDB was one of the last areas of U.S.-Latin America relations in which the U.S. reserved some degree of autonomy for the region, seeking to rule by consent, not coercion. Indeed, in negotiating the outlines of the IDB and its predecessor (the Inter-American Bank), the Roosevelt and Eisenhower administrations agreed to a substantial minority share of the vote and a concessional lending program in the IDB to counter any allegation of financial domination.Yet the Trump Administration, with its antiquated policy paralleling the Monroe Doctrine and forged by its former figurehead and Claver-Carone’s mentor, John Bolton, is dead set on instead turning the IDB into yet another sphere of American hegemony and rule by fiat.

A New Cold War? Or a Failure to Learn the Lessons of the First One?

Furthermore, Claver-Carone, Trump, and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo have made clear their intentions to turn the IDB and other Latin American fora into areas of protracted great power competition in a contrived “new cold war” with China. Since 2001, Chinese economic and political influence in the region has grown tremendously, in tune with broader trends of increasingly salient Chinese soft power worldwide. Chinese and Latin American officials have often exchanged visits while Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela have inked “strategic partnerships” with China in recent years. Some 19 countries, furthermore, are participating in the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which is centered around infrastructure investment. 

Trade between China and the region has increased from $17 billion to over $300 billion since 2002 while U.S. aid to the region, aside from a temporary increase during the Obama Administration, has largely declined. The Trump Administration, rather than helping the people of Haiti rebuild their infrastructure, ensuring the Colombian peace accord holds, or supporting anti-corruption efforts throughout the region, instead cut aid to Central American countries with large numbers of asylum seekers and threatened military action against Venezuela. Diplomatically, China is also seeking to isolate Taiwan internationally by persuading remaining Caribbean and Latin American countries that recognize Taiwan to flip. Panama, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador have all flipped from Taiwan to the PRC in recent years. 

While it is clearly true that China’s influence is growing in Latin America, the strategy of weaponizing the IDB in some sort of essential bipolar power struggle badly misreads both history and the present. It is important to note amid the discussion of a second Cold War that even in the first Cold War, a plurality of the region’s states were members of the Non-Aligned Movement, rebuffing both superpowers. Similarly, many Latin American countries today (like El Salvador, Mexico, and Brazil) prefer to maintain good relations with both Washington and Beijing. Urging them to take sides and reduce all ties with China is unlikely to work and needlessly antagonizes a fellow IDB member (in China) whose cooperation is necessary to combat the climate crisis, one of the most crucial tasks of the IDB. 

Specifically, during his campaign for the presidency, Claver-Carone argued that he would further capitalize IDB Invest, the private sector lending group for the bank. This focus on private sector investment, intended to counter the BRI and similar Chinese investments, works to strengthen private enterprise and compete with China even as governments of all stripes in the region cry out for public investment in public health infrastructure and social spending to combat inequality. This strategy would only further entrench inequality and extend the needless suffering of the region’s people to do little more than stick it to another member of the IDB whose cooperation on the principle issue of our time is necessary. 

Conclusion

Though the history of American intervention in Latin America and the Caribbean is checkered, previous administrations understood the need for Latin American autonomy as a prerequisite for the multilateral legitimacy of institutions created with the assistance of the U.S. Yet today in the name of America First, the Trump Administration, through the selection of Claver-Carone, has sought to assert American dominance. Yet if this dominance has to be imposed from the top down, by decree rather than consent, it may be vulnerable to organized resistance from within the organization.

Finally Being Seen as an Equal: Chinese Investments in Latin America

In the International Trade War between the United States and China, the two nations are participating in  a geopolitical race through different agreements such as foreign investment, loans, and trade agreements in order to secure their influence across the globe. While the United States and countries in Latin America always had some form of relations, the increasing dialogue between countries in Latin America and China may change the dynamic between the US and Latin America. One way China is attempting to improve its relations in Latin America is through the Belt Road Initiative, a billion dollar investment program which helps funds infrastructure projects to enhance Chinese soft power. With countries such as Chile and the Dominican Republic as members of this initiative, could this ultimately change how Latin American states conduct relations with the United States? Or do these relations with China indicate the start of a new era for Latin America?

The most prevalent way we see the improvement of relations between China and countries in Latin America is though  Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) which is a practice used by countries to expand their values and social practices in different regions of the world such as Latin America.  FDI is when an individual or a company owns 10% or more of either a stake in a company or a set amount of money overseas. Overall, there are three general forms of Foreign Direct Investments: horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate. Horizontal forms of FDI describe investors establishing branch offices in foreign countries. A vertical FDI is when business agreements from two foreign companies are made in order for there to be a mutually beneficial result. Lastly, a conglomerate FDI is when a firm makes an investment that is unrelated to their business. All three variations of Foreign Direct Investments regardless of what form they come in benefit receiving countries in some way shape or form. Beyond establishing foreign business branches or investments overseas, FDIs include the distribution of skills and new forms of technological infrastructure that receiving nations may not have original access to. This is one of the multiple benefits that can come out of receiving foreign direct investments from foreign firms.

Over the course of ten years, China has given foreign direct investments to countries in Latin America but have only seen the results of these investments in the most recent years. The sharp increase in investments over the course of the past five years has allowed China to see the benefits of investments from the past decade. The specific case of Chinese investments in Latin America shows the lengthy process it takes for foreign firms to see any form of benefit.

The development of new sectors allows for more investments from different firms to fund innovations. One example of how foreign firms are able to see benefits from their investments from an extended period of time is through the development of infrastructure. Out of the different ways in which foreign investments can help benefit a nation, the development of infrastructure is a prime example of how investments not only improve the quality of the life of individuals in a specific nation but the general economy as well.

Infrastructure gives the basic fundamentals for an economy to function off of. According to the Brookings Institute,  infrastructure is considered to be the “heart” of the economy. Economically speaking, infrastructure allows for the flows of goods to either be increased or at least maintained. Ranging from fundamentals such as paved roads to more complex infrastructures such as telecommunication systems, infrastructure is vital and essentially affects all aspects of production from the workers to the highest level of the firms. This being said, without an established and maintained infrastructure it only makes the economy fragile and unstable. For developing nations, increasing and developing new forms of infrastructure can be quite a challenge.

Although countries in Latin America recognize the importance of infrastructure and how it will benefit their national and regional economy, many countries are still facing several obstacles. Argentina, for example, has infrastructure as their top priority and created different policies which tackle transparency, preparation, and execution. By prioritizing the fundamental planning that is needed to build infrastructure, it gives the nation a higher probability for these projects to not only be completed in a timely manner but sustainable. On one hand, economies like Argentina struggle with the foundational planning, while other countries such as Colombia struggle more on the execution aspect of developing infrastructure. Within the planning of infrastructure projects, there is a percentage that represents the amount of risk involved in developing this new infrastructure. Another important value in the planning is the expected amount of time it will take for the project to be completed. Estimated predictions and high-risk percentages are Colombia’s biggest obstacle. Whether it is a high execution risk percentage or the projects not being completed in a timely order, Peru is in a similar position to Colombia where their biggest struggle is in the execution phase of infrastructure development.

A specific way Chinese foreign direct investment in Latin American nations has attempted to increase the development of infrastructure is through the Belt and Road  Initiative which is a program that attempts to make the world more regionally connected beginning with regional cooperation and then branching out this connectivity throughout different regions. This billion dollar initiative gives money to both developing and developed nations in order to either help begin new infrastructure projects or help finish old projects that were abandoned. Recently, countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have become members of this program and as a result of the new membership, countries such as Venezuela and Chile have been able to establish new infrastructure projects due to funding from China. Although the new inflow of money coming in has given Latin American countries new opportunities that were inconceivable at the time, they come at a high cost.

Money that is given to countries from the BRI is similar to a loan in which they need to be paid back in some way. In many instances for Latin America, countries have negotiated for alternative forms of repayment. Ecuador, for example, has negotiated to give China about 80% of their revenues from oil as a form of repayment. Another way Latin American countries have attempted to repay these loans is by taking out more loans which creates a vicious cycle of repayment. It is not clear whether or not many of these newly created projects have been completed, but there are special cases such as in Ecuador where these projects are currently abandoned due to the lack of labor and thorough planning. If there are such high negative costs to these risky loans which do not confirm any infrastructure project why continue?

It is the mere principle of the bilateral negotiations between the Latin American nations and China that make Latin American countries such as Chile and Ecuador to be so willing to agree to such risky terms.  It is worth noting in 2008, China promised the governments of Latin America that they would “treat each other as equals.” This distinction of being recognized as an equal nation is a term that cannot be found in US political documents.

During a time of conflict between the United States and China, Latin America geopolitically was attractive as well as a significant location for both nations. For the United States, more mutually beneficial negotiations between them and Latin American could have possibly secured even more support than already existed. While China, on the other hand, can take advantage of the dependent relationship between the US and Latin America to forge new relationships that do not have a hierarchical underlining to it. With more and more nations joining the Belt and Road Initiative, the United States must realize that Latin America no longer the country it once was. If the United States wants to maintain the relationship or improve upon the relationship they have with countries in Latin America, the United States must be mindful of these contemporary relations and what could become of it. Whether it is revisiting old agreements that have not changed or creating new agreements, if the United States ignores the situation between countries in Latin America and China then countries in Latin America could be looking at their new loyal partner.

Bolsonaro and the Far Right’s Arrival in South America

Introduction

In modern day studies of geopolitics and international relations, South America unfortunately lingers on the global backburner in comparison to regions such as Eurasia and the Middle East/North Africa (MENA). After centuries of colonialism and imperialist control by Western nations, many perceive South America as an underdeveloped continent with little political power.  This belief stems from racist rhetoric and inaccurate assumptions. While many countries within South America are not considered “developed” in the eyes of the Western world, this is due to years of political and economic destabilization by the west. Perhaps this very history of Western meddling provided the right conditions for a growing far-right movement, which has steadily been gaining traction in several South American countries. At the end of October 2018, Brazil, South America’s most populous country, elected the far-right candidate Jair Bolsonaro as president. Believers in democracy and human rights defenders alike were shocked and dismayed in his election, and fear for the changes that Bolsonaro will inevitably bring to the continent, and their lasting implications on relationships with other countries and the geopolitical balance.

Political History and Legacy of Brazil

Brazil, unlike the majority of South America, was claimed as a Portuguese colony from 1500 until its independence in 1822. One of Brazil’s most distinguishing sociopolitical features is its long established  history with slavery. Beginning in the sixteenth century, Brazil was noteworthy for having brought over more African slaves than would ever reach North America; in total, Brazil imported half of all the slaves that crossed the Atlantic Ocean. Brazil was the last Western country to abolish slavery, in 1888, more than two decades after the United States did. The social repercussions of the slave trade meant that Brazil became a heavily ethnically mixed nation, with significant intermingling of African, indigenous, and Portuguese populations. While it may expected that a sizable mixed race population would foster societal equality and tolerance, to this day Brazil remains a deeply unequal society, especially in regards to the intersections of race and socioeconomic status. The roots of Brazil’s unequal society largely stem from a failure to restructure society post-slavery. Freed slaves were left without land, money, or education, and centuries later millions of their descendants continue living with these same circumstances. In the modern day, Afro-Brazilians make up two thirds of the 60,000 annual victims of crime and two thirds of the prison population. After the eradication of slavery, Afro-Brazilians often still worked in modern forms of slavery, which was not outlawed until 1995. Contemporaneously, most instances of modern slavery and forced labor occur in rural areas, often in industries tied to environmental destruction, such as the logging industry. In 2016, the Global Slavery Index estimated that there were over 300,000 people in conditions of modern slavery on any given day.

In addition to the brutal and bloody legacy of Brazil’s slave trade, corruption also plays a large role in Brazil’s political history from colony to present day. Like many other South American countries in the 20th century, a military dictatorship ruled Brazil from 1930 to 1945. After less than two decades of democracy following 1945, the military once again intervened in 1964, overthrowing the leftist Goulart administration, and established Castelo Branco as the newest dictator.  Following Branco’s regime, military governments ruled Brazil until 1985, and the country had its first democratic presidential elections in 1989. In the 21st century, Brazil’s many presidential administrations were marred by corruption and scandal, and a growing distrust in the Worker’s Party which had been in power for several decades. Both “Lula” da Silva and Dilma Vana Rousseff were criticized for reckless spending and corruption during their respective administrations. However, under these Workers’ Party-backed administrations, the government made combating and assuaging hunger and poverty one of their top priorities. On a social level, Brazil’s rural vs urban struggles also take on another dimension when considering the debate regarding the use of natural resources and sustainability. In present day, there exists little to no data on peoples living in the Amazon rainforest and little regard for their residency in the region.

Brazil’s society, like many around the world, found itself at a crossroads during its most recent election, with its people divided between leftist and right-wing movements. The left wing of Brazil’s politics has become fragile, weakened by widespread corruption, while the right came out as the party of reason, calling for the restoration of order at any cost. With Bolsonaro’s recent election, Brazil is waiting to see just how high the cost of order will be.

Bolsonaro’s Rise and Popularity

After suffering the frustration and betrayal of several leftist governments ending with corruption charges, a 2016 poll found that Brazilian society as a whole had become more conservative, with 54% of the respondents shifting their social and justice beliefs to the right. As a whole, this has been accompanied by a growing movement of conservative Christianity, both in the public sphere and in the national legislature. Later during the same election cycle, public-opinion polls demonstrated that one in three Brazilians would look favorably upon a military intervention to oust the leftist government. It is important to know these facts in order to properly contextualize the environment in which Bolsonaro’s administration was born.

Jair Bolsonaro is a figure that is mostly known to the Western world as a “tropical Trump.” In actuality, Bolsonaro’s political history and infamously controversial statements may prove him to be a much larger threat to democracy in the Southern cone. Bolsonaro rose in the public consciousness by serving as a seven-term congressman after his military career. During his congressional tenure, Bolsonaro became known as a hardlined believer in law and order, and for some of his more inflammatory statements. Beginning with Brazil’s military and dictatorial history, Bolsonaro gained attention for saying in 1999 that he believed the dictatorship should have killed 30,000 more people. Additionally, Bolsonaro became known for several misogynistic, homophobic, and racist statements, over the course of several years. Since the beginnings of his political career, Bolsonaro has established himself as an extreme member of the conservative party, with many cautioning his neo-fascist ideas.

Once Bolsonaro publically entered the presidential race, he advertised himself as the candidate who would defend democracy and uphold the constitution. To help him achieve these goals, Bolsonaro promised his policies would focus on relaxing gun laws, reducing state involvement in the economy, and leaving the 2015 Paris Agreement. Bolsonaro entered the race as the candidate of the Social Liberal Party (PSL), an anti-establishment party known for their combination of social conservatism and pro-market policies. Bolsonaro’s running mate, Mourãu, hinted that Bolsonaro’s administration would go as far as to redraft the 1988 constitution, taking away representative input, in order to stack the Supreme Court. One of Bolsonaro’s key campaign promises was to help address the growing violence in Brazil. Unlike most countries, Brazil’s biggest threat to national security is not terrorism, but the heavily growing homicide rate within cities, especially in the favelas. In 2017 alone, Brazil broke its own homicide record, with a 3% uptick in murders, resulting in the murder of 63,880 people. Bolsonaro promised to face security issues with no-nonsense iron fist policies, such as relaxing gun control laws, allowing police more freedom to use violent tactics, and employing military forces to occupy the notoriously violent favelas. In Brazil, the drug trade and the resulting war against drugs further contributed to a nation-wide increase in violence.

Bolsonaro’s supporters mainly come from the more conservative members of society, as well as those who have felt betrayed by the Workers Party (PT), including the middle class, small business owners, independent professionals, members of the police, and armed forces. While some poorer populations were motivated to support Bolsonaro due to the worsening public security situation, the majority of Bolsonaro’s supporters are the rich and educated-- members of society whose voices are seldom silenced. Many members of Brazil’s upper-middle classes and elite have been fueled by class hatred, aimed at the PT. Echoing the dictatorial roots of Chile, Bolsonaro’s chief economic advisor (also hailing from the University of Chicago) promises to focus on privatization, a policy very popular with financial markets as well as media representatives. Many political analysts have cautioned that much of Bolsonaro’s rise to power has followed traditional steps towards establishing a fascist regime; Bolsonaro has threatened political opponents, activists, and labeled leftist organizations as terrorist organizations.

Spread of Far Right Movements in a Post-Trump World

In a post-2016-election world, it has seemed like there has been an outcropping of far-right movements all over the Western world. In the last decade, new right-wing movements have combined neo-Nazi groups with traditional free-market conservatives. Under the Trump administration, right-wing political rhetoric, often stemming from the president himself, has begun to normalize these ideologies. In Western Europe, this same rise in right-wing thought is not necessarily attributed to the working-class’s response to the economic state, rather, according to Liz Fekete, it stems from reactionary prejudice surrounding the war on terror, and its resulting increase in refugee presence. In the last decade, Europe has experienced several stunning terror attacks, from the attack on the Charlie Hebdo offices to last year’s attack on an Ariana Grande concert. These attacks, often attributed to young people of color, have led to a distrust in the growing immigrant population, and a resurgence of xenophobic and islamophobic attitudes. In many European countries, the uptick in immigrant populations has led to stricter policies, including media censorship and frequent raids on left-wing organizations. The purported stress on welfare states  brought on by an increase in immigration into Europe left many joining right-wing thinkers in criticizing the policies and norms as laid out by socialist states. As with the United States’ 2016 election, many who voted for right-wing parties did so out of frustration with the leftist parties and their governments.

Bolsonaro’s election is not only notable within the context of its impact in Brazil, but also the entire continent. His election seems to mark the arrival of the far-right wave into the Southern cone, after its spread to countries like Germany, France, and Sweden. Bolsonaro’s far right policies have two simultaneous effects: threatening Western-established democracy and following the Western neoliberal order. However, for some, fascism spells good business. Some Canadian and American businesses suggested that Bolsonaro’s presidency creates good business opportunities within the resource, finance, and infrastructure sectors.  As outlined in his campaign promises, Bolsonaro has promised to considerably weaken environmental regulations in the Amazon and also privatize government-owned companies. While Bolsonaro’s administration presents a threat to democracy throughout South America, for many Western nations, fascism pairs nicely with neoliberalist economic policies.

Conclusion

Bolsonaro’s election was met with strong emotions from members of Brazil’s left and right wings. Throughout Brazil’s recent election cycle, Bolsonaro quickly gained notoriety for his offensive statements involving women, the LGBTQ+ population, and Afro-brazilians. Since its very inception, Brazil has been a socioeconomically unequal society, with racial and class tensions existing to this day. Brazil’s swing to the right is due in part to the population’s disappointment in the Worker’s Party, but also has much to do with rising inequality and violence in the country. Bolsonaro’s election means Brazil now joined the ranks of the United States, Hungary, and the Philippines in its election of a right-wing populist leader. Based on Bolsonaro’s campaign rhetoric, Brazil’s newest president exhibits a commitment to erase what the left-wing sees as years of progress towards a more democratic and socialist society. Analysts concerned with human rights within South America argue that Bolsonaro’s administration poses a great threat to democracy within South America, as well as human rights concerns for Brazil’s indigenous populations. The world will see if these fears manifest into reality when Bolsonaro takes power beginning in January of 2019.

Youth as a Catalyst for Change in Nicaragua

“SOS Nicaragua” the autoconvocados, or self-organized, yell in protest across Nicaragua. College students are organizing nationwide protests in order to change their country’s leadership. Millennials are taking the lead in hopes of bringing serious reform and reversing President Daniel Ortega’s policies. In April, Ortega implemented a social security policy that would reduce benefits for retirees and increase taxes on workers. Since then, the Nicaraguan government has faced backlash. The autoconvocados garner support from the majority of people in the country, despite the authoritarian response exhibited by the Ortega government. During the last election, he banned the main opposition party. He continues to maintain control over the military, the media and most branches of government. Nicaraguan university students want to end government repression, fearing that push Nicaragua will join Venezuela in being one of the only two Latin American countries to regress from democracy.

The first wave of student protest called for democratic change and an end to the recent government policies. These protests culminated in the deaths of several students, who were killed by Ortega supporters that found the students call to action threatening to an already weakening Ortega regime. A civic insurrection followed as furious citizens responded. Journalist Kyra Gurney explains in the Miami Herald that:

“Few could have been psychologically prepared for the violence the Ortega administration has unleashed on the protesters. The intensity of the demonstrations, and the response from government forces, have come as a surprise for many in Nicaragua, which in recent years has been a relatively safe, stable country. The Ortega administration has denied responsibility for the killings, blaming criminal groups and characterizing the protesters as right-wing gangs.”

According to the Organization of American States (OAS), 1,337 have been wounded, 212 killed and 507 arrested since the protests began. This does not include several undocumented kidnappings and murders. These clashes that began in April mark the deadliest protests in Nicaragua since its civil war ended in 1990.

The United Nations condemned human rights abuses perpetrated by pro-government forces. While the UN released a statement claiming that “The UN is available to assist national dialogue efforts to strengthen the rule of law, respect for human rights and the peaceful resolution of differences,” international attention on the situation is lacking.

The United States, which has a history of intervening in Nicaragua’s internal political affairs, should help mitigate the crisis by discussing options to grant asylum and place sanctions on high ranking Nicaraguan officials. Manuel Orozco characterizes the situation well, writing in the New York Times that “Mr. Ortega has shown that he responds only to pressure. In response to the demonstrations, he rescinded the social security plan that triggered the protests, and he freed some of the demonstrators who were jailed. The pressure must be sustained.” The lack of international uproar does not help the civilian agenda calling for stronger democratic institutions and early elections in 2019. The U.S. should enforce the Global Magnitsky Act- an American law used to punish people around the world for human rights violations - to further sanction members of Ortega’s business inner circle who sponsor his political agenda. This could apply to election commissioners who aided Ortega throughout fraudulent elections. Greater sanctions on individuals can aid the peaceful transfer of power in all branches of government.

Nicaraguans are afraid to leave their homes to protest because of the chance that they will be targeted and imprisoned. The Roman Catholic church is working to build peaceful coalitions to mitigate street riots. Following peace talks between student organizers, the Catholic Church and the government, the social security policy was amended. However, this does not make up for the restrictive path the government is continuing the follow.

Nicaraguan students remain committed to political change. Kyra Gurney explains the capabilities of the student movement as such:

“Despite their lack of preparation, however, the students have managed to keep their new bunker running smoothly. Each one of the roughly 900 students living at the university which they have occupied as a main base for their protests, which normally has about 40,000 students, has a specific task based on his or her major. The medical students run makeshift clinics. The law students document human rights violations and communicate with local human rights groups. The economics students administer the meager and financial donations.”

By maintain opposition despite a lack of resource, young Nicaraguans can inspire other youth movements in repressive countries around the world. In an effort redefine their country’s future, students have used social media as an outlet to broadcast the atrocities occurring across the country, since most public broadcasting is censored by the government. Autoconvocados are active in the diaspora as well. Nicaraguan-American citizens are organizing small rallies across the United States and pressuring their politicians to draft bills to sanction multiple Nicaraguan entities. This step is the first of many in hopes of garnering greater international attention while shaping a more stable and democratic Nicaragua.

Building Influence: Chinese Infrastructure Investment in Latin America

As China’s economic power grows, the Asian giant is extending its reach around the globe. While the country has maintained strong economic ties with Africa since the early 2000s, it has also recently ramped up trade and investment in Latin America. Chinese president Xi Jinping has agreed to double bilateral trade with the region to $500 billion and increase investment to $250 billion over the next decade, according to various deals signed with Latin American countries in 2015. Currently, China is the largest trade partner of three of the leading economies in the region: Brazil, Chile, and Peru. These countries, along with the rest of Latin America, mostly export primary goods and natural resources; copper, iron, oil, and soybeans account for 75 percent of the region’s exports to China. In addition to trade and investment, Chinese loans to the region have also increased from $7 billion in 2012 to $29 billion in 2015.

This investment in Latin America often comes in the form of large infrastructure projects aimed at improving transportation and better connecting the region to lower costs for Chinese imports. As the U.S. is turning its back on relations and trade with Latin America, most prominently exemplified by protectionist calls to end NAFTA and thus free trade with Mexico, China has recognized an opportunity to supplant the U.S. as the extra-regional hegemon. However, this is not due to China’s goodwill and altruism towards the region, but rather an opportunity to control global trade flows through Chinese owned transportation links, and reduce costs of trade to Asia. This is an ambitious goal, and although China has made promises of increased investment and signed deals for large infrastructure projects, it is uncertain if the plans will actually come to fruition.

Considering China’s own domestic politics, it is no surprise that the country favors trade and investment with left-leaning Latin American nations. The former Kirchner administration in Argentina had several deals with China, including plans for a nuclear plant, a satellite tracking station, and a $1 billioncontract to buy Chinese fighter jets and maritime patrol vessels. When current center-right president Macri came into office, he said the deals made under Kirchner would be reviewed and may face rejection, however after five months of internal review, the Argentine government successfully ratified the contracts. China has also loaned $65 billion to Venezuela since 2007, more than any other country in the region. China has a growing need for energy, and Venezuela mainly pays back the loans with oil. However, the current economic crisis in Venezuela could mean that the country may not be able to supply enough oil to China or pay back the loans, and so China announced in late 2016 that it would no longer issue new loans to Venezuela.

Chinese loans and investment are particularly appealing to Latin American countries since they rarely come with political and economic conditions or other requirements, such as implementing austerity of structural adjustment programs. Unlike loans from Western international institutions such as the IMF, Chinese loans have no (apparent) strings attached. Following the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, countries that sought relief from the IMF were required to implement structural adjustment policies that imposed austerity measures as a condition of the loans. This resulted in a “lost decade”of economic growth for the region, during which living standards and growth both plummeted. Considering this history with lenders from Western-dominated international organizations, China has found the ideal opportunity to shape Latin America for itself by investing in infrastructure, and, in return, gaining cheap access to the primary and natural resources needed for its booming population and industry sector. Two examples of the largest infrastructure projects currently proposed in Latin America are the Nicaraguan Canal and the Twin Ocean Railway.

Nicaraguan Canal

The Nicaraguan Canal, approved by the government in 2014 with a goal date of completion in 2020, is China’s alternative to the historically U.S.-controlled Panama Canal. The proposed design would stretch 178 miles between the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans, running across the southern portion of the country, through Lake Nicaragua. It is estimated to cost $50 billion, and Chinese businessman Wang Jing (who owns HKND, the company responsible for developing and building the Nicaraguan Canal) is the only known investor in the project.

Photo: The Guardian

It remains unclear whether or not the Chinese government is directly involved in the planning or implementation of the project. Further complicating matters is Nicaragua’s diplomatic recognition of Taiwanese independence. Every Central American country, excluding Costa Rica, is politically aligned with Taiwan. However, China refuses formal diplomatic ties with any country that recognizes the island as a separate nation. But Taiwan has little to offer Central America, and as China’s economic and political power grows, Nicaragua and its neighbors are likely to shift diplomatic ties to the mainland.

Regardless of the Chinese government’s involvement, the current project is facing setbacks due to Wang’s reported loss of 85 percent of his personal wealth in a stock market crash, which he was using to fund the canal. Additionally, the construction of the canal has faced scrutiny and backlash for its effects on the communities in the surrounding area. It is estimated that about 30,000 people will be displaced due to construction of the canal. HKND has a compensation budget of $300-$400 million, or up to $13,300 for each displaced person. This has not stopped opposition from affected communities, however, and the last two years have seen more than 80 protests against the Nicaraguan government and HKND. These demonstrations have occasionally turned violent, and there have also been reports of arbitrary detainment of protesters. Additionally, concerns have been raised over the environmental impact of the project, including the pollution of Lake Nicaragua, the largest source of fresh water in Central America, which currently supplies water to over 80,000 Nicaraguans.  

The construction of a Nicaraguan Canal would give China access to a shipping route across the geopolitically strategic isthmus without having to pass through the Panama Canal. This would lower costs dramatically for Chinese imports, since tariffs and fees for trade through the Panama Canal have tripled over the past five years. It would also give China unprecedented access to the region, with control over how both their imports and exports are traded. Like the revenue the U.S. gained from the Panama Canal, China, or at least the overseeing company HKND, could also profit from other nations paying fees to ship goods through the canal. Nicaragua, too, would benefit economically from increased trade in the region and probable shared profits with China.

While the canal is likely to be economically advantageous for both countries, its environmental and social impact could prove insurmountable. The construction has already faced setbacks due to environmental concerns, and, amid questions about funding, the Nicaraguan canal seems increasingly unlikely, at least in the near future. There has not been much additional construction since ceremoniously breaking ground in 2014.

Twin Ocean Railway

Another ambitious project proposed by China is a transcontinental railway stretching from Brazil’s Atlantic coast to Peru’s Pacific coast. As with the Nicaraguan canal, this railway would facilitate movement of goods and greatly reduce trading costs for China. There are two possible routes for the railroad: one running directly from Brazil to Peru along a northern corridor, and one that passes through Bolivia further to the south. The latter, dubbed the Twin Ocean Railway, follows a more direct route and would cost about $13.5 billion to build, stretching over about 3,700km. The former is estimated at an untenable $60 billion, and would be over 1,000km longer, measuring 5,000km from start to finish. If the project moves forward, it is likely to be built along the more feasible Twin Ocean Railway corridor.

Photo from: Inter American Dialogue

This marks a win for Bolivia, who has been in discussions with China, Peru, and Brazil about being included along the route since 2014, following the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding creating a trilateral working group on the railway that did not include Bolivia. The landlocked country of Bolivia, which has the lowest GDP per capita in South America, has been looking for a way to access the sea since Chile annexed part of its territory on the Pacific coast in a war during the 1870s. The opportunity for Bolivia to once again be connected to seaports via a major trade-based railway could provide a much-needed boost to the economy.

Like the Nicaraguan Canal, the railway project has also been met with criticisms of possible environmental degradation and threats to local communities. Some of the route passes through delicate Amazon ecosystems, and it is projected to expose up to 600 remote indigenous communities that have never previously had contact with other societies. Current Peruvian president Pedro Pablo Kuzynski has also raised concerns that the railroad will be too environmentally harmful to build.

Looking Ahead

The Nicaraguan Canal and the Twin Ocean Railway are two impressive megaprojects, which, if completed, would underscore China’s economic influence abroad, and help to further cement its role as a global economic power. However, both projects are far from completion. In addition to their environmental and community impact concerns—which could halt the projects in and of themselves—many questions have been raised about their economic feasibility and long-term success, especially given China’s track record with similar endeavors in the region.

The Twin Ocean Railway’s aims are very similar to those of the InterOceanicatranscontinental highway, which also incorporated Brazil. The project began in 2006, however it was never fully completed, and the parts that were finished are not entirely structurally sound. Today, it remains a collection of unfinished, damaged, or impassable sections of highway, with no further construction or completion date in sight. Another Chinese company signed a contract with Brazil in 2011 to build a soy processing plant valued at $2 billion; however the proposed project site remains an empty field. Plans for a different railroad to be built by a Chinese company in Colombia in 2011 never materialized, along with another train project that failed in Venezuela. Given China’s history with these other infrastructure projects, it is entirely possible that the Nicaraguan Canal and the Twin Ocean Railway could end up in a similar situation – never completed or, at best, only partially built and then abandoned.

In addition to the projects that were never finished, other contracts have been pulled due to allegations of corruption between host governments and China. A rail project worth $3.7 billion slated for Mexico in 2014 was terminated after a public outcry due to evidence that the deal benefitted allies of Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto. Additionally, a recent scandal in Bolivia revealed that the government awarded almost $500 million in no-bid contracts to a single Chinese company, raising concerns about unlawful special privileges. China’s record of not completing projects or engaging in shady contracts could sour relations with the region and foment public skepticism about foreign infrastructure investment, deterring future opportunities for China to grow its economic influence and for Latin America to develop valuable infrastructure and trade links.

Investment in large infrastructure projects in Latin America could be monumental for China’s economic influence and ever-expanding soft power, while at the same time offering sizeable benefits to many Latin American economies. However, Chinese firms must overcome their previous shortcomings and actually make progress on constructing these projects in a socially and environmentally responsible manner. Transcontinental trade and transportation links are largely missing from the region, and these proposed projects would provide much needed connections not only among neighbors, but also to Asia and the rest of the world.

A False Sense of Democracy: Dilma Rousseff as a Scapegoat in Brazil

As Dilma Rousseff steps down from her position as the first female President of Brazil, some speculate that this is a victory for democracy and a step in the right direction. The removal, instigated by an impeachment trial and shrouded by rumors of corruption and fiscal violations, comes after a two-year process headed by the former president of the Chamber of Deputies, Eduardo Cunha. Rousseff was the primary choice of former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a man now facing corruption charges of his own. And at the time, she had taken up the mantle as leader of the leftist Workers’ Party, her election proving to be an enormous exercise in democratic election.

By appearances, Rousseff is being brought down from a legacy of corruption during a period of significant economic turmoil and a lack of consistent popularity—so what’s the issue? Perhaps this victory is only a superficial one; although Rousseff is not a pure or innocent figure in this mess, she is hardly the larger culprit—and what does it mean for the future when the bigger criminals in the game are the ones orchestrating the legal efforts?

A Troubled Foundation

Although Rousseff’s election was democratic, it was hardly a unanimous event. According to a Huffington Post account of the vote, she won with 54.5 million votes of the 143 million possible; however, competition against candidate Aécio Neves of the Brazilian Social Democratic Party lost her roughly another 50 million votes. According to that same report, if one accounts for abstentions, blank, null, and protest votes, as well as those voting for Neves, then Rousseff did not win by a majority at all.

At the same time these voting numbers were taking place, Brazil was under the impression that, following Rousseff’s term, the Workers’ Party would continue to see dominance in the 2018 campaign of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, who is Rousseff’s predecessor and arguably one of the biggest icons of the Workers’ Party. 2014 has since passed, however, and the situation is far darker. Currently, Lula da Silva—affectionately known as Lula—is now the subject of his own investigation. Federal prosecutors have filed corruption charges against him on several accounts, and in particular corrupt kickbacks and donations in relation to the Brazilian oil giant, Petrobras.

Lula and Rousseff have quite a bit in common when it comes to problems with Petrobras. Prosecutors in Lula’s case claim that he did not pocket illegal funds during his presidency, but rather gave it to oil executives, Workers’ Party leaders, and lawmakers, all with the intention of sustaining the strength of the Party. Rousseff, on the other hand, has claimed that the nature of her impeachment is uncalled for, and akin to a coup; her crime was a series of budgetary tricks to hide the growing economic deficit. These allocations amounted to some $11 billionborrowed from state banks to fund social programs associated with the Workers’ Party.

Rouseff’s involvement with Petrobras is a bit more complicated, and requires a timeline. Rousseff was chairman of Petrobras between 2003 and 2010, when plenty of the corruption in Petrobras recently revealed by Operation Car Wash took place. Operation Car Wash, pursued by Brazilian law enforcement to pursue and discover bribes in R$6.2 billion, is currently leading to massive internal upheaval in Brazil as dozens of significant figures are implicated. In the larger picture, Rousseff’s fall is far, but she is one of many.

Behind the Curtain

The question is not whether or not Dilma Rousseff has done anything wrong—that is almost certainly true. Although her impeachment rests on the grounds of her decisions surrounding budgetary reallocation, Petrobras’s vast corruption allegations also largely took place under her purview. What makes the impeachment trial tenuous, and subsequently makes its value and contribution to the advancement of democracy questionable, is the driving force behind it. The face of the impeachment trial thus far has been Eduardo Cunha, an evangelical Christian radio commentator and former speaker of the lower house. Accompanying Cunha is Mr. Michel Temer, the interim president and former vice president of Rousseff, a member of the centrist Brazilian Democratic Movement Party.

Since his vigorous assault of Rousseff’s qualification to retain her position, Cunha has faced legal charges of his own. The lower house of Congress in Brazil, of which Cunha is a former speaker, has since voted to expel the lawmaker on the grounds of graft charges. The vote was perilous to Cunha, coming in at 450 to 10; this sudden change means that, amongst other things, Cunha will lose the legal privileges of a federal legislator and can now face imprisonment. Mr. Temer, meanwhile, has so many ties to Rousseff and the Workers’ Party that he already stands on a perilous edge, and holds approval ratings as low as Rousseff’s due to his conservative inclinations and racial biases.

In fact, the men who have accompanied Mr. Temer in his rise to power have already begun to resign: his anticorruption minister and his planning minister, ironically, have forcibly resigned due to allegations that they attempted to use their powers to stifle investigations surrounding Petrobras and Operation Car Wash. Mr. Temer is technically set to hold his position for the duration of Rousseff’s original term, through 2018, but with the increasing scandal it is unclear if he will stay in power.

But Wasn’t This Democratic?

Brazil’s current situation is representative of a few things. The first, that when a state has a significantly diverse population, multiple candidates, and a voting populace who also submits null or blank votes in droves, the democratically elected candidate is not necessarily always the one that the greatest majority of the state actually desired. Now, this is as much a criticism on the system as it is the behavior of the people. Voter apathy is nothing new, though—nations around the world who identify as democratic regularly contend with the struggle to elect the most largely desirable and representative candidate, and to combat issues such as voting numbers, turnout, and legitimate nominations (i.e., null votes over fake names, fictional people, etc.). Brazil’s situation is critical because, amidst these democratic struggles, hidden layers of corruption are constantly shifting and maneuvering to take control of resources.

Eduardo Cunha’s position as a leader in Rousseff’s impeachment immediately calls it into question not only because of possible political machinations (rather than simple integrity-based questioning), but because Cunha himself is a culprit of corrupt dealings. And although Rousseff has made mistakes, her errors are by no means the most damaging—she is but a fish in the sea, so far as corruption in Brazil is concerned. However, the time for questioning the validity of Rousseff’s impeachment is past; Mr. Temer has taken up her seat, so to speak, and now the future of Brazil is in question, particularly given the fragility of its economy.

The curiosity here is that this has all been regarded as democratic. If we define democracy in general terms, in that it promotes majority rule with prioritization of values such as justice and liberty, and a representation of equal minority rights, then it is hard to say that any of this has really been democratic. By numbers, it is exciting to say that a country with 143 million eligible voters engaged in a democratic election to vote for a woman to be president. However, the reality is far more complicated: Dilma Rousseff was the pre-selected choice of former president Lula de Silva, a man who had championed the Workers’ Party, a larger body that has dominated much of Brazilian politics over the last decade. That Rousseff won, then, was no real shock; although she clearly had competition, it would be foolish to say that she won standing on her own two feet, or that her efforts were purely her own.

Furthermore, Mr. Temer’s failure to name a single woman or Afro-Brazilian to his cabinet of ministers, as well as his own recent legal troubles—having been found guilty of violating campaign finance limits—is hardly a nod in the right direction either. Rousseff did not have a significant or decisive victory, but it seems unlikely that Mr. Temer would be president at all had he not succeeded based on the claims afforded him as vice president. What ought to be a purification of corruption from the leading ranks of Brazil is instead a very tired case of ‘more of the same’.

The trouble with Brazil’s corruption is not simply a question of judgment by the people, a case of apathy in the voting populace, or even any grand exercise in stealth by corrupt financiers in the biggest companies in industries such as oil. Rather, the issue is that the degree of corruption, and its incessant presence, is practically old-hat to the people of Brazil. Rousseff’s impeachment and Operation Car Wash ought to be a sigh of relief felt around the world, and particularly amongst the Brazilian people, but it is not. There is a sense of complacency amongst those in charge in Brazil where corruption is concerned, and those who might claim to feel relief that Rousseff is on her way out are only fooling themselves—Rousseff’s absence offers no real relief, because her impeachment solves very little in the grand scheme of things.

The very man who urged on Rousseff’s impeachment has undergone his own trial, and the man who has replaced her as president has also been convicted of a campaign finance crime that makes it illegal for him to even attain the presidency via proper election. It is, in some ways, a stroke of luck for Temer that these circumstances came to be.

That Dilma Rousseff was caught borrowing funds to support social programs that largely benefited the poor so early into her presidency is simply unusual in a country where corruption so often goes unnoticed. Petrobras’s belated investigations, and Rousseff’s implications in it, are just one example of that chance likelihood. And although arranging funds for social programs seems altruistic—if altruistic politics are an accepted concept—the method behind the actionwas certainly illegal. Rousseff borrowed money from public banks, such as the Banco do Brasil and the Caixa Econômica Federal; this type of loan is illegal according to fiscal responsibility law in Brazil. Why? These loans can, unfortunately, be used to manipulate public accounts—which, on a governmental scale, can be critical. What does seem to ring true is that, by allowing Rousseff to be the face of this slew of anti-corruption efforts, people are being potentially misled as to the intentions of the government. The implication here is that Rousseff is not a political heavyweight being brought to justice; she is, instead, a scapegoat to distract from everything else happening around her. Men like Temer and Cunha are not rare finds in Brazilian politics, after all—they are entirely typical.

Where Is This Coming From, and Where Are We Going?

Corruption is hardly new in Brazil, both internally and concerning its international reputation. Ultimately, although Rousseff did make a mistake, it is important to note that her impeachment is not a victory against corruption. That false sense of security some may sense—though it is important to note that disillusionment is no stranger to the Brazilian people—is at the cost of incredible political maneuvering. Rousseff was left vulnerable by the Petrobras investigations, as well as economic downturn, and opposition such as Cunha saw a golden opportunity to take her down, as well as the Workers’ Party, from the leading position.

When a majority of Brazilian Congress is facing corruption charges, it is foolish to assume that good intentions rest anywhere in between. A problem with dynasties is that people can rest too much confidence in the value of a name. For example, it seems likely that former president Lula, when he backed Rousseff, put too much confidence in his own national affections, as well as the strength of the Workers’ Party, rather than on Rousseff’s genuine qualifications as president. This possibility is certainly plausible, given that Rousseff’s primary previous experience is with Petrobras, not with major governing. Furthermore, intimate reflection on her characterreveals further problematic qualities unsuitable for a tense position: “her blustery arrogance, her refusal to listen to even her closest aides and her apparent inability to understand just how much trouble she was in, right to the very end.” In many ways, Rousseff was a downfall waiting to happen in Brazilian politics.

If one considers the number of corruption charges in current government, as well as the sheer depth of it all, it is hard to see a cheery future. These problems are not new to Brazil, but the intensity of the spotlight on them is something newer: people go on trial, yes, but often are able to get by under-punished and unnoticed. It may not be the case this time for everyone, which is not a perfect outcome, but is certainly a step in the right direction. Corruption itself is not the most critical concern for Brazilians, but its outcomes are—the people face economic peril, governmental incompetence, and with the current leadership of Mr. Temer, racial tensions. In a country wrought with complicated racial diversity based around notions of equality dating back to the colonization of the New World, and economic tensions between extremely divided classes, it is hard to see a future that doesn’t put the endurance of corrupt politicians to the ultimate test.

The Candidates and Latin America: Policy in our "Backyard"

Ahead of the 2016 presidential election, questions on candidates’ foreign policy positions have mainly focused on the Middle East, with tough debates surrounding ISIS, the Iran nuclear deal, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Second and third in line for candidates’ foreign policy concerns seem to be the growing economic influence of China and Russia’s political aggression. Although hailed as the United States’ “back yard,” Latin America is merely a blip on the foreign policy radar this election season. However, three issues regarding Latin America have been widely discussed by most (if not all) campaigns: Immigration reform, normalizing diplomatic relations with Cuba, and NAFTA. The candidates’ stances on the issues vary, not only between political parties but within them as well.  

Immigration

With an estimated 11 million undocumented people living in the U.S., immigration is no small issue. The two parties are vehemently divided on the issue of immigration reform. Democrats often promote a “pathway to citizenship,” while Republicans tend to favor securitization of the (southern) border.

As the son of a migrant from Poland, Bernie Sanders proposes an immigration policy that emphasizes justice and human rights to keep families together and protect workers from exploitation. He plans to build on the Obama Administration’s immigration reforms by expanding the DACA and DAPA programs. Sanders will not wait for Congress to act, instead he has said he will take executive action within the first 100 days of his administration. Sanders specifically addresses the flow of unaccompanied child migrants, primarily from the Northern Triangle – Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. While it reached a peak in 2014, the U.S. is still dealing with the repercussions of the massive influx of tens of thousands of unaccompanied children. Sanders condemns the deportation of these children, amid reports that children who are returned to their home countries are being killed by the same gang-incited violence they fled.

Hillary Clinton also supports comprehensive immigration reform. Her proposed immigration plan includes creating a pathway to citizenship, closing family and private detention centers, and upholding President Obama’s previous executive orders on immigration reform. Clinton also plans to provide deportation relief for DREAMers, DAPA candidates, and to “extend those actions to additional persons with sympathetic cases.” As a senator, she cosponsored the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act. Although Clinton mainly addresses the legal aspects of immigration reform, she also emphasizes that immigration is a “family issue” and wants to work to keep law-abiding immigrant families together.  

The current GOP front-runner, Donald Trump, proposes the radical and improbable solution of building a wall to seal the border with Mexico. Trump also plans to make Mexico pay for it, by refusing to process remittances from relatives and friends in the U.S. Trump states, “ It's an easy decision for Mexico: make a one-time payment of $5-10 billion to ensure that $24 billion continues to flow into their country year after year.” According to experts, the proposed 2,000-mile wall would be the largest infrastructure project in the U.S. since President Eisenhower’s highway program. While Trump estimates the cost at about $10 billion, it could actually cost up to $25 billion and would take until the end of his first term to complete. It is also unclear if it is feasible or even legal to halt remittances. To make matters worse, Trump has also come under fire for racist comments, equating Mexican immigrants with gang members, drug traffickers, and rapists.

In keeping with reductionist immigration reform, Ted Cruz states on his campaign website that “he will stop illegal immigration.” Not only that, but he also plans to build a wall across the southern border, as well as triple border security, and implement a biometric tracking system. Although his campaign does not delve into details, a biometric tracking system would likely include collecting the fingerprints of every foreigner who entered or exited the country. Congress passed a biometric tracking bill shortly after 9/11, but the Department of Homeland Security has maintained that the program is too costly and impractical. A preliminary study found that it would cost up to $6.4 billion to install the system just in all air and seaports, which would not even track the 79% of migrants who enter the U.S. over land.

The more center-leaning GOP candidate, John Kasich, fails to mention immigration on his campaign website. Even more vexing, Kasich has changed his position several times, even within the campaign season. In June 2015, he stated at an Iowa forum that undocumented immigrants who otherwise follow U.S. laws should have a pathway to obtain legal status. However, he also added that this legal status should not lead to citizenship, although that may have to be part of a compromise. Later, he told an Ohio newspaper that he does not support any legal status for undocumented immigrants, and he wanted to end birth right citizenship.

The Democratic candidates are proposing massive reforms, which will greatly improve the current system and provide desperately needed services to millions of migrants and their families. However, it will likely be extremely tough to get these reforms through a gridlocked Congress. On the other hand, the Republic candidates’ plans are either non-existent or so preposterous that they might as well be non-existent, as they will likely never bear any semblance of reality.

Cuba

President Obama’s actions to normalize relations and lift the embargo against Cuba have become major topics in most candidates’ foreign policy proposals. Since the process began in December of 2014, Cuba has been removed from the State Sponsor of Terrorism List, the U.S. Embassy in Havana has been re-opened, and direct mail flights have been re-established. On going efforts are working to lift the trade embargo and allow to greater freedom for Americans wishing to travel to the island.

Sanders has long supported the normalization of relations with Cuba, however, his stance is nuanced. In an interview from 1985, Sanders commends Castro’s socialist reforms to improve access to universal health care and education. While Sanders has expressed hope that Cuba move towards a more democratic system of governance, he has also emphasized the need for the U.S. to respect Cuba’s sovereignty. This last statement is evident of Sander’s non-interventionist position, and he has often criticized the U.S.’s habit of toppling left-leaning regimens in Latin America (from 1898 to 1994 there were at least 41 U.S. interventions in the region – an average of one every 28 months). More recently, in 2014, Sanders traveled to Cuba to discuss human rights, trade, and health care as part of an official U.S. delegation.

Clinton’s position has slowly shifted from her time as First Lady to her more recent position as Secretary of State for the Obama Administration. As First Lady, she supported the 1996 Helms-Burton Act, which President Bill Clinton signed into law, that prevents the embargo from being lifted until Cuba fulfills certain requirements, including fair elections, freeing political prisoners, and uncensored press. In her 2008 presidential run, she maintained her position of opposition to lifting the embargo, however she added a caveat, stating, “As president I would be ready to reach out and work with a new Cuba government, once it demonstrated that it truly was going to change that direction.” Then, as Secretary of State, Clinton recommended that Obama reconsider the embargo, as it “wasn’t achieving its goals.” In July of 2015, Clinton made a speech in Miami, a highly symbolic location due to the number of Cuban immigrants living there, in which she declared, “The Cuba embargo needs to go, once and for all.” Hillary’s changing position on Cuba could be the result of a progression in thought, though it may also just be an attempt to court Latino voters.

Although not entirely clear or detailed on his position, it appears that Trump is not opposed to the normalization of relations, stating, “Ultimately, it’s going to be good.” However, in the same interview, he went on to express that, “we could have had a better deal, a much stronger deal,” though he does not reveal what a stronger deal might entail. Other Republican candidates have criticized Trump, as they generally oppose lifting the embargo and normalizing relations with Cuba.

Despite his Cuban heritage, Cruz strongly opposes normalizing relations with Cuba, especially if the country remains under the Castro regimen. During the GOP primary debate in Miami, Cruz stated that he would reverse Obama’s actions and re-break diplomatic ties with Cuba, a “nation that hate[s] us.”  He has also promised to block the appointment of a U.S. ambassador to Cuba, a necessary step in re-establishing diplomacy between the two countries. Currently the ambassador is serving in an “acting” role since the U.S. re-opened the Havana embassy in July of 2015. Cruz’s plans would set a dangerous precedent for U.S. foreign policy and damage relations in the region.

Kasich has not outlined a definitive position on Cuba thus far in the campaign. However, as Representative he voted against two measures in 2000 that would reduce the economic and travel embargoes. In an interview in February, Kasich responded to a question on breaking diplomatic relations with Cuba by stating, “Well let’s see where we are when I come [into office] and what the administration has done…I think [the Obama Administration] made a big mistake because I think Cuba needed to do something. Why are we always reaching out?...They keep demanding things so I don’t understand what the administration is doing.” It seems only time will tell what his final stance is.

The candidates express varying degrees of enthusiasm for normalizing relations with Cuba. Clinton and Sanders would build on the Obama Administration’s policy, while Cruz would break ties once again, severely damaging the budding diplomatic relations. In keeping with their lack of foreign policy experience, or even interest, Trump and Kasich have said little on the issue.

NAFTA

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), enacted in 1994, is a multilateral agreement between the United States, Mexico, and Canada to increase economic cooperation. NAFTA has been highly controversial. Critics say it causes job losses in the U.S. and unfavorable working conditions abroad. Supporters respond by saying it will actually help create jobs and spur economic growth across the region. Currently, most experts conclude that NAFTA has been net positive for the U.S., although it has failed to deliver on the big promises made in its early years. Furthermore, it is difficult to distinguish the direct effects of NAFTA on economies in the wake of globalization and increased technology use.

Sanders strongly opposes NAFTA, blaming it for increased poverty in Mexico, loss of jobs, and an influx of undocumented migrants in the U.S. His plan is to rewrite trade deals such as NAFTA to promote fair trade in lieu of free trade. Sanders has been consistent in his position, stating in a debate in early March, “I was on a picket line in the early 1990s against NAFTA, because you didn’t need a Ph.D. in economics to understand that American workers should not be forced to compete against people in Mexico making 25 cents an hour.” While Sanders’ draconian interpretation of NAFTA may be a bit exaggerated, a fair trade agreement would likely be more beneficial for the American worker than the current free trade model.

Clinton has a complicated history with trade deals. She supported NAFTA as the First Lady during Bill Clinton’s Administration. As a Senator, Clinton supported free trade, as long as it “can increase living standards and foster…economic development for all parties.” In 2007, during her first presidential run, she remarked that NATFA was a mistake because it did not deliver on many promises that were made in 1994, which is mostly true. As Secretary of State, Clinton embraced free trade with the beginnings of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) – which she has since turned against. Her stance as a current presidential candidate has been fuzzy; she does not openly support NAFTA and other free trade agreements, but she does not decry them as middle-class and job destroying plans, either. This is another case of questioning whether Clinton’s change of heart is due to gradual belief progression, or, as is likelier in this case due to her sudden turn against TPP, an attempt to round up votes.

Trump also opposes NAFTA, as he believes it is destroying the U.S. manufacturing industry. In an interview in which Trump was asked how he would respond to an American car company that wished to open a plant in Mexico, he stated that he would charge the company a 35 percent tax on each product that was then sent back into the U.S. However, this measure directly violates NAFTA and disregards the fact that only Congress can establish separate tax rates. In a separate interview, Trump said, “I am all for free trade, but it’s got to be fair.” This statement under scores his lack of basic economic knowledge, as free trade, by definition, cannot be constrained by measures to make it “fair.”

Cruz’s positions on NAFTA and free trade have been murky. At press time, he has not given a position on NAFTA, and has only vaguely expressed opposition to the Trans Pacific Partnership.

Although he has not said much on this issue during his presidential campaign, Kasich voted for NAFTA as a Congressman in 1993. He has not spoken at length on the issue, but Kasich currently supports free trade, and also maintains that many American jobs are the result of free trade.

Conclusions

 The foreign policy positions of the candidates represent a large range of experiences, interests, and perceptions. Clinton, having served as Secretary of State, is by far the most qualified candidate. However, her record in Latin America is stained by revelations that she played a role in the 2009 Honduran coup d’etat. Sanders remains fervently committed to his ‘diplomacy first’ and non-interventionist beliefs, and often connects foreign policy with reducing inequality and promoting social services – two core points of his domestic campaign. Trump’s proposals are either outlandish or half-baked, and there seems to be no moderate middle ground in sight. Similarly, Cruz’s views are both simplistic and extreme, and he would not hesitate to turn back the clock to the 1950’s on the U.S.’s relationship with Cuba. Finally, Kasich leaves much to be desired in the realm of foreign policy, and, really, in his campaign in general. It seems that the only issue the candidates might be able to agree on is their condemnation of NAFTA, which, in reality, is not the catch-all to blame a stagnant economy and loss in industry jobs on that they want it to be.

Reproductive Rights and Violence against Women in Latin America: Spotlight on Paraguay

As the pro-choice versus pro-life debate surrounding abortion continues in the United States, the status of reproductive rights in Latin American remains highly restricted. The politically conservative and predominately Catholic continent generally restricts access to contraceptive and family planning services, and denies abortions except when the mother’s life is in immediate danger.

The cultural and legal taboo of abortion is exemplified by the tragic case of an eleven-year-old Paraguayan girl who gave birth in 2013. According to Amnesty International, the girl was taken to the hospital by her mother in April, when she was then only ten-years-old, and was found to be 21 weeks pregnant. The father of the child is alleged to be the girl’s own stepfather, who raped her on several occasions. An international outcry among human rights groups and pleas from the girl’s mother to terminate the pregnancy proved unsuccessful. In Paraguay, abortion is restricted only in cases of serious danger to the mother’s life. The girl carried the pregnancy to full term, and was placed in a center for young mothers. The girl’s mother has been arrested and charged with negligence, despite reporting the sexual abuse of her daughter in 2013. Her stepfather has been arrested, though he denies the allegations, and it is unclear whether he will face time in prison.

This case hinges on the fact that, despite the girl’s young age, doctors ruled that she did not face immediate physical danger from carrying the pregnancy to full term, the only permissible reason for abortion under Paraguayan law. However the risk of maternal death in Latin America is four times higher among girls under sixteen years of age than among women in their twenties. This is due to complications of underdeveloped reproductive organs and physical immaturity among younger girls. Paraguay’s record for maternal and reproductive health is troubling, especially in comparison to regional, albeit more developed, neighbors.

The maternal mortality rate is extremely high, with 132 deaths per 100,000 live births, compared to 22 in nearby Chile and 14 in the United States. Infant mortality is in the double digits, at 18 per 1,000 live births, compared to a rate of seven in Chile and six in the United States. Instances of infant and maternal mortality are even more likely among younger mothers. It is crucial that women have access to quality health care to reduce these rates--especially family planning services and prenatal care.

Contraceptive prevalence in Paraguay was 79 percent among married women ages 15 to 49 in 2008. While 79 percent represents relatively good access, there are many problems with this indicator. First, it only includes married women. Most statistics regarding contraceptive prevalence only measure married populations, making it difficult to estimate prevalence among single, or cohabiting populations. This is a group that has an arguably higher demand for contraceptives because they are not in a traditional union that signals a readiness to settle down and have children. This group may also face greater stigma and challenges in obtaining and using contraceptives. This indicator also does not include access or availability of emergency contraception, such as the “Plan B” pill, which is often outlawed in Latin America. Finally, this indicator does not capture girls younger than fifteen who are likely survivors of rape and sexual assault, such as the eleven-year-old girl mentioned previously. In order to address the contraception needs of a modern and diverse population, better indicators must be developed to uncover and close the gaps. Survivors of sexual assault and rape should be offered every possible option -- including emergency contraception and abortion, or pre-natal care if she chooses to continue the pregnancy.

The measures of physical health determined by Paraguayan doctors in evaluation of eligibility for an abortion do not take into consideration the mental health of these mothers, who may be victims of rape and sexual assault. According to Amnesty International spokesperson Guadalupe Marengo, in the case of the Paraguayan girl, “the physical and mental repercussions of continuing with…high-risk pregnancy could be devastating and are akin to torture.” The World Health Organization finds that violence, including sexual violence, by an intimate partner is related to higher instances of injury and death, depression, alcohol abuse, sexually transmitted infections, unwanted pregnancy, and low birth-weight babies. Among women in Paraguay who had experienced partner violence in the past twelve months, 68 percent reported severe anxiety or depression and 14 percent had considered or attempted suicide.

Systematic denial of quality health care services and reproductive rights in Paraguay is related to the larger crisis of violence against women. Violence against women is a form of gender-based violence and “refers to any act that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual and psychological harm to women and girls, whether occurring in private or in public.” It is a not unique to Paraguay, and plagues societies all around the globe. Sexual violence can cause unwanted and unintended pregnancy leading to devastating results if women cannot access health care that prioritizes their psychological and physical health, as well as their quality of life.

It is estimated that one in three women ages 15 or older in Latin America has experienced physical or sexual violence in their lifetime. Most of these transgressions are not committed by strangers in dark alleyways, but rather by men who have close relationships to the survivor. In Paraguay, prevalence of intimate partner violence is highest among girls aged 15 to 19, and this trend is fairly consistent across Latin America. The 20 to 24 age bracket also experiences high levels of intimate partner violence. As can be seen, violence against women starts disturbingly young. Among women ages 15 to 24 who have had sexual intercourse, 2.2 percent reported that their first experience was forced or rape, and 14 percent reported that their partner “convinced them.” Power inequality dominates young women’s intimate experiences, and it persists throughout their lives.

According to a report by WHO/PAHO, almost 8 percent of women in Paraguay reported unwanted sexual intercourse with a partner out of fear of what he might do if they refused. Even more troubling, only 12 percent of women sought help in dealing with sexual assault from police, a hospital, a religious group, or a women’s organization. The most common reasons women did not seek advice or assistance were that they “thought she could solve it alone,” “shame,” and “fear of retaliation.” These last two responses are indicative of the social stigma placed on survivors of assault. Women who seek help or report the crime often face humiliating questioning by officials who do little to investigate. Perpetrators then benefit from high levels of impunity. Cases of sexual assault are frequently characterized by victim blaming and “he-said-she-said” adage. Although Paraguay’s parliament passed a law against domestic violence in 2000, it does not outline avenues for justice by including criminal repercussions. Without proper institutional support and policies that act in the survivor’s best interest, it is unlikely that assault reporting will increase and impunity will be reduced.

As stated previously, limited reproductive rights and violence against women is not unique to Paraguay. The situation is similar across the Americas. Latin America has the highest rate of maternal death (an estimated 2,000 women annually) from attempting to obtain an unsafe abortion. Only three regional bodies-- Cuba, Uruguay, and Mexico City-- permit abortions within the first term of pregnancy for any reason. On the other hand, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and Chile prohibit abortion under all circumstances, including risk to the mother’s life, rape, and unviable fetus. El Salvador has come under scrutiny for imprisoning women who have miscarried naturally, under allegations that they induced an abortion. In Honduras, it is even illegal to provide women with information about emergency contraception (which does not terminate an already fertilized egg) and abortion. Millions of women experience physical and sexual abuse each year across the region, with high rates of impunity and few options to bring their abuser to justice.

The case of the eleven-year-old Paraguayan girl who was denied an abortion is just one example of the perils of allowing violence against women to persist while systematically stripping them of their right to chose how, when, and if they have children. Regardless of an individual’s view on the morality of abortion (which is outside the scope of this article), it is morally unquestionable that women should be provided with quality healthcare that prioritizes their health and wellbeing, as well as resources for support and justice in the case of rape or assault. Paraguay, along with the rest of the region, should work to improve the lives and health of its women by introducing effective legislation that condemns gender-based violence, and providing resources for women to control decisions about their bodies and health.

Brazil’s Trilemma

Brazil is facing a challenging economic, political, and social landscape. The economy is expected to contract by 3 percent this year and the real, Brazil’s currency since 1994, has depreciated sharply against the dollar. Standard & Poor’s, the U.S. credit-rating agency, has downgraded Brazil’s investment-grade credit rating to “junk” status. Unemployment has also increased, with 100,000 formal jobs disappearing each month. Current president Dilma Rousseff is facing impeachment proceedings, a corruption scandal, and her approval rating has sunk to single digits. Ahead of the 2016 summer Olympics in Rio de Janiero, water pollution remains a significant challenge, and social tensions are heightened over accusations that the government has funneled spending away from social programs and into building Olympic infrastructure. This grim economic situation combined with unraveling political and social situations sets a difficult course for Brazil in the coming year.

Although a shift away from the dominant policy paradigm of state capitalism, in which industry is privatized but still heavily influenced and guided by the state, seems unlikely due to long-standing precedent and nationalism, Brazil’s economic performance is probably going to get worse before it gets better. Fiscal discipline is needed to lower the deficit, reduce inflation, and restore confidence in the real, but this will likely result in further deterioration of the social and political situation because these unpopular economic measures will be undertaken with little outside support. Brazil’s penchant for state capitalism is evident in cases like Petrobras, an oil company; Banco do Brazil, a bank; and key electric providers, such as Electrobras. These formerly state-owned companies have been privatized and the majority of share holdings have been sold off, yet the state has retained enough minority shareholdings in ways to reinforce the state’s influence over the industry. Ironically, shares of these companies were originally sold off in order to balance the budget. However, the persistence of state influence in these companies has made investors wary. Although complete privatization of the industries may help restore confidence for investors and boost the economy, Brazil’s nationalist sentiments are unlikely to allow this to happen. Petrobras represents a major source of revenue and is a symbol of state pride. Brazil is unlikely to let this industry slip entirely from its grasp, no matter the economic situation.

Under the administration of leftist President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (affectionately called “Lula” by his constituents) from 2003 to 2011, Brazil thrived. When Lula first came to office, the economy was in peril amid fears that Brazil would default on its debt. Thus, Lula cut government spending and raised interest rates in order to stabilize the economy and achieve a fiscal surplus. It worked. He then implemented a three-pronged economy policy: fiscal surplus, inflation targeting, and a floating exchange rate. In addition to these macroeconomic stabilizers, Lula focused on improving the microeconomic situation of Brazilians. This emphasis on social welfare ushered in the Bolsa Famila conditional cash transfer program, which provided money to female heads of households for sending their children to school and making sure they receive vaccinations. Consequently, 36 million Brazilians were lifted out of extreme poverty and the middle class expanded rapidly during Lula’s two terms in office. Additionally, real wage increases, expansion of credit, and increased employment all contributed to the rise in living standards witnessed by Brazilians. Those living in the historically poorer eastern side of the country, women, and ethnic minorities especially benefitted from these social programs. The economic success of this era stuck with Lula’s Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT, Portuguese for Worker’s Party) and helped ensure the election of the party’s successor, President Dilma Rousseff.

However, Dilma has been unable to translate Lula’s policies into a healthy economy. We see an attempt to achieve a fiscal surplus, with a target of 1.2 percent for this year, according to the Economist. Although Brazil has since recovered from a period of hyperinflation, inflation still remains at 10 percent, higher than the regional average with the exceptions of Venezuela and Argentina. Finally, a floating exchange rate means that the market is left to set an efficient rate, but for Brazil’s faltering economy this results in a depreciating real. Brazil has officially entered recession, and the economic outlook is poor. Congress is struggling to make necessary budget cuts while also facing limited borrowing options due to the credit rating downgrade. Furthermore, microeconomic growth and social spending have stagnated.

Brazil’s weak economy is complicated by problems in the political and social spheres. The country faces a multitude of hazards including jarring inequality, social unrest, and corruption.

Protests erupted in 2013 over increased bus fares, and quickly devolved into violent clashes and strikes over general discontent with the government. Reforms promised by Dilma in an attempt to appease protesters never materialized, and the social unrest continues. More recently, Brazilians have taken to the street to call for President Rousseff’s impeachment and protest Olympic spending and the economic crisis. Government funding and resources have increasingly gone towards building World Cup and Olympic infrastructure instead of towards affordable housing, roads, and other necessary provisions for the Brazilian people. Furthermore, although social programs like Bolsa Familia helped reduce extreme poverty, inequality remains a prominent characteristic of the Brazilian economy. The Gini coefficient (a measurement of inequality with a score of 0 representing perfect equality and 100 representing perfect inequality) of Brazil stands at 52.9, according to the World Bank, while most South American countries average a coefficient between 40 and 50. The disparity in income equality in Brazil is clearly observed in the favela slums that surround urban centers, where violence and crime are rampant and the rule of law is incredibly weak.

Politically, Brazil is headed for crisis, with President Rousseff at the center of it all. She is currently facing impeachment proceedings for violating Brazil’s budget laws, although we are unlikely to see a definitive outcome of these proceedings until spring of 2016. Arguably worse, she is also at the center of a corruption scandal enveloping the PT party, in which politicians are accused of accepting $4 billion in bribes in exchange for unfairly improved contracts with Petrobas. Corruption is not new in Brazilian politics. In fact, the Mensalão vote-buying scandal during the Lula administration resulted in the resignation of several top advisors. However, due to the economic success of Lula’s term, it barely made a dent in his popularity and he went on to be re-elected in 2006. Dilma, on the contrary, has not been blessed with the mask of a healthy economy, and this corruption scandal is further eroding her legitimacy as president.

Brazil faces a trilema of economic, political, and social crisis. The current economic policy is unsustainable, as it is failing to produce the successful results it once did under the Lula administration. Digging the economy out of recession, reducing inflation, increasing employment, and restoring faith for international investors must become priorities. Furthermore, attention must also be paid to the microeconomic situation in Brazil. The government can no longer push aside the social problems plaguing Brazil, as inequality, violence, and crime create vulnerability, which economic instability only exacerbates. Political crisis also mutually reinforces economic and social problems, as investors become unwilling to invest in a politically unstable country and social unrest is fomented. Significant --and likely painful-- institutional reforms are needed to fix the economy, keep politicians accountable, and improve the social situation in Brazil.