The Implications of Türkiye and Brazil on Global Democracy

Fears of global democratic backsliding have become all but ubiquitous among international relations scholars, as complications emerge from fracturing in established democracies, such as the United States, and the rise of authoritarian powerhouses like China that offer an alternative political system for countries to consider. Are such fears warranted? Is democracy in retreat worldwide? To expand upon this discussion, this article will focus on two specific case studies of countries that could help forecast the future directions of democracy: Türkiye and Brazil.

This article will take a retrospective look at the political atmosphere in Brazil in the aftermath of Bolsonaro’s tumultuous 4 years in office, and a prospective look at the democratic outlook in Türkiye in the wake of the earthquakes and the forthcoming 2023 elections. In doing so, it will analyze what the domestic politics in these countries can tell us about what’s in store for global democracy.

Türkiye

Türkiye is in a crucial transition point, wherein the intersection of earthquakes, the general election, and the war in Ukraine could prove to have a ripple effect on democracy in Eastern Europe and beyond. Türkiye is facing a dire humanitarian crisis, with tens of thousands of casualties, billions of dollars in property damage, and millions of people being displaced, because of earthquakes in the region. The sheer scale of these earthquakes and the disruption of life that has ensued for large swathes of the Turkish population makes it pertinent for the AKP to address the immediate damage and mitigate the long-term effects to avoid adding insult to injury for Türkiye’s already struggling economy. With Türkiye’s elections mere months away, there’s little room for error, as resentment from a lackluster long-term response on Erdoğan’s part could jeopardize his bid for re-election. In that regard, the decision to call for elections a month earlier could backfire if the aftermath from the earthquakes isn’t addressed properly and lingers in the minds of voters when they’re casting their ballots.

The world is watching Erdoğan’s response intently, as it could prove to be a decisive moment for Western democracy and NATO unity. Another 5 years could embolden Erdoğan to consolidate more power, further endangering the already fragile system of checks and balances in place and eroding democratic institutions. Domestically, an emboldened Erdoğan could take past efforts to restrict the information available to the public one step further, through cracking down on dissent and curtailing the freedom of press, endangering a lifeline of any functioning democracy. Internationally, a successful re-election bid would provide Erdoğan with a concrete victory for him to tout as proof of the popularity of his policy, which he could use to justify further distancing from the West. Erdoğan’s intent and willingness to stall NATO operations is present and clear, it’s just restrained so he can gauge whether his base is receptive to it or not. Erdoğan’s refusal to let Sweden and Finland join NATO until he extracted concessions from alliance members was a clear example of this, and it could only be light work compared to what could happen if he wins re-election. A re-election would serve as validation for his foreign policy that promotes Türkiye’s self-interest above all else, including its NATO allies. The war in Ukraine is a test of Western resolve, and more pushback from Türkiye in NATO operations would only undermine the narrative of a cohesive unit that is committed to upholding international norms, and with it, Eastern European security.

Conversely, if Erdoğan’s election efforts are unsuccessful, a more democratic Türkiye could help NATO present a more unified front against Russia and put more pressure on countries such as Hungary and Poland to fall in line and undertake reforms to reinvigorate their democracies. If NATO’s greatest spoiler were to suddenly embrace cooperation with its fellow alliance members, it would send a clear signal to Putin that NATO is stronger than ever. Any desire Putin may have had to see whether NATO is bluffing about Article V commitments in the event of an invasion of the Baltics would be extinguished, effectively deterring further expansion in the region.

Furthermore, if Türkiye is on board with NATO operations, focus would be redirected towards two other members of the alliance that are struggling with democracy: Hungary and Poland. Without Türkiye to hide behind, Hungary and Poland would either fall in line with NATO initiatives, or risk being condemned by alliance members now that they’re in the spotlight. Hungary and Poland need not completely reform their democracies to be an asset for the alliance, nor should we expect them to, so long as they don’t stall NATO initiatives. Once Hungary and Poland are pressured into cooperation, NATO could reap the benefits of a more cohesive alliance, which would allow it to be more effective at accomplishing objectives across the board, but also would put autocracies on the defensive. In the absence of hurdles, NATO could pursue large initiatives that would make them more integrated than ever before. Further interdependence would strengthen NATO even more and allow it to take additional steps to promote democracy and condemn autocracy worldwide.

Brazil

Jair Bolsonaro ran on a platform that stoked nationalism among the populace by scapegoating globalization, gender minorities, and environmentalist efforts to protect the Amazon for the economic problems that the country was facing. By diving headfirst into the culture war, Bolsonaro was able to draw upon and weaponize the resentment brewing among the Brazilian public for his own political gain, a tactic that’s being increasingly used by politicians around the world.  Populists like Bolsonaro are able to tie people’s economic qualms to social issues, such as climate change and equality for members of the LGBTQIA+ community, areas which they may be underinformed or misinformed about, and use that confusion to steer them towards them. They identify that there is a problem that is causing dissatisfaction among the general public, pin the problem on something, and then argue that their policies can remedy the fabricated “cause” of the problem. By exploiting the ability to spread information quickly and the willingness of some to take this news at face value and without skepticism, Bolsonaro was able to win the Brazilian Presidential Election in October 2018.

Bolsonaro’s tenure was marked by repeated attempts to undermine democratic institutions, restrict the freedom of press, weaken the checks and balances in place, and was capped off with the promotion of unwarranted claims of electoral fraud. The installation of military officials into high-ranking government positions and efforts to close Congress and the Supreme Court sparked concerns of a return to Brazil’s military dictatorship. Then, in last October, Bolsonaro was unseated by former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in a run-off election, putting an end to his four years in office. Bolsonaro’s war on democracy was far from over, however, and was carried out by his supporters, who stormed the capital, calling for Bolsonaro to be reinstated as president, in an event that quickly drew comparisons to the January 6th insurrection. A cynic may look at these events over the past five years and be pessimistic about for the future of Brazilian democracy; however, Brazilian democracy’s perseverance through all of this offers reason for optimism, as it shows the resiliency of robust institutions in the wake of right-wing challenges.

Among the reasons to be sanguine about the outlook of Brazilian democracy is the durability of institutions. Brazil was only able to survive four years of constant attacks on democracy and an extravagant grand finale at the capital because of its durable institutions, which have been quick to adapt and respond to the attempts at unraveling the system. The Supreme Court’s consistent blocking of Bolsonaro’s undemocratic attempts to expand his power were complemented by Congress’ refusal to pass bills that condoned such behavior. The future looks bright for these institutions as Brazilians have elected a president who has shown a strong commitment to maintaining the integrity of them and working with them to achieve his efforts. Furthermore, the rejection of Bolsonaro’s particular brand of far-right populism by the masses is an indication of the strength of the movement against autocratic governance. The fact that Bolsonaro’s blatant disregard for the liberal international order and his anti-globalization, anti-environmental, and anti-immigrant stances were ultimately dissuasive to the Brazilian public is a win for liberalism and can inspire people worldwide to pushback against far-right populists. While skeptics might point to the recent election of far-right populists in other parts of the world, such as Giorgia Meloni in Italy, as a reason to be cautiously optimistic, or even pessimistic, about the future of global democracy, they underestimate the effect that experiencing a far-right populist presidency has on the strength of the resistance movement. In the United States, for example, a major reason that Joe Biden got 15 million more votes in the 2020 presidential election than Hillary Clinton got in 2016 was because of the resentment people had for the Trump administration—resentment that was only amplified by the administration’s incompetent response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Similarly, after experiencing 4 years of Bolsonaro’s abrasive style of politics, Brazilians reached the same conclusion, and there’s fair reason to believe that Italians will too, and that Italian democracy will emerge stronger than ever.

Closing Thoughts

This article sought to expand the conversation on democratic backsliding by examining the democracies of two powerful international players: Türkiye and Brazil. Turkish democracy is at a crossroads, and it’s likely that the road it embarks upon will depend on the Erdoğan administration’s response to the earthquakes. If the response is successful and receives public praise, it could allow Erdoğan to secure another term, which could spell the end of Turkish democracy. If the response is lackluster and receives continued scrutiny, then a challenger could unseat Erdoğan and revitalize Turkish democracy through pursuing domestic reforms to strengthen the institutions and increase cooperation with its NATO allies, bolstering European democracy in the process. Similarly, Brazil’s democratic resilience offers a case for optimism about the ability of democracy to persevere against right-wing power grabs. Brazil’s ability to withstand several massive shocks to the system indicates remarkable democratic resilience, and not only does Lula’s victory offer a beacon of hope for protestors around the world who are fighting to reverse democratic backsliding in their country, it provides optimism for democratic prospects in other countries, such as Italy. Ultimately, it’s time to look closely at Turkish politics and see if their democracy shares the same resilience as Brazil’s.

What the West Gets Wrong About Putin

After his 2001 Slovenia Summit with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, American President George W. Bush reiterated his belief that a constructive and productive dialogue between the U.S and Russia was possible. Per Bush, “We had a very good dialogue. I was able to get a sense of his soul. He's a man deeply committed to his country and the best interests of his country and I appreciate very much the frank dialogue and that's the beginning of a very constructive relationship.” As four consecutive American presidents have faltered in their stated efforts to improve relations with Moscow while simultaneously leading the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), it is evident that American policymakers underestimated the ambitions and capabilities of Putin. 

Through the invasion of sovereign states and interference in foreign politics, Putin’s Russia has undermined European confidence in NATO and democracy. In at least some regard, the blame lies at the feet of American foreign policy analysts, whose interpretations of Russia in the early post-soviet period were largely colored by predisposed attitudes about the country and who were too eager to project the idealism of the unipolar moment onto the past two decades. For a former KGB agent like Putin who conceptualizes and compartmentalizes threats, the world is a zero-sum game where the restoration of Russia’s prestige comes at the expense of the rest of the world. This push-pull dynamic of U.S. provocations and outright Russian bellicosity has shaped U.S.-Russian relations today and demands a new strategy.

The Pre-Putin Days

Understanding Putin’s geopolitical calculus requires studying U.S.-Russia relations in the era before he came to power. For Putin, the end of the Cold War was a formative experience. He has called the breakup of the Soviet Union and erosion of Russian power “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.”

When the U.S. came to power in this unipolar moment, as Charles Krauthammer among others would coin it, the U.S. was essentially the closest thing imaginable to a global hegemon and thus played a prominent role in the settlements of post- Cold War Europe. In particular, at the February 1990 meeting between American Secretary of State James Baker and then-Soviet Union leader Mikhail Gorbachev, Baker told Gorbachev that “there would be no extension of NATO’s jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the east” and agreed to terms that “Any extension of the zone of NATO is unacceptable.” As a former imperial power and superpower, the new Soviet leadership was petrified of a post-USSR world order in which the U.S. played a sizable role in Europe and challenged Russia diplomatically and militarily in Eurasia.. The U.S., meanwhile, wished to stabilize and securitize Europe without being overly adversarial toward Russia. These goals, not necessarily in contradiction of each other, have largely remained the same but the way each party approached achieving that means led to the thaw.

Presidents Bush and Clinton, two presidents who saw their duty as Commander-in-Chief as defending the international liberal order, sought a policy of “enlargement.” By bringing more countries into the democratic, U.S.-led order, the logic went that the U.S. could keep Europe from takeover by a resurgent revisionist Russia. Poland and a reunified Germany joined and they were followed by more than a dozen other states including Albania and Montenegro most recently. To this day, the door remains open to Ukraine as it is embroiled in a hot war with Russia over the Donbass. 

Presidents Bush and Clinton were presented with three real options for a post-Cold War NATO, as Benn Steil wrote: ignore Baker’s promise and expand NATO on the basis that Russia would always behave like the imperial Great Power it conceived itself, wait until Russia took concrete actions that infringed on the sovereignty of its neighbors (George Kennan’s position), or “expand NATO on the cheap,” figuring that the alliance faced no true enemy anymore. Bush chose the third position and Clinton continued the policy, despite the advice of Sam Nunn, the former senator of his own party, who argued, “Are we really going to be able to convince the Eastern Europeans that we are protecting them while we convince the Russians that NATO enlargement has nothing to do with Russia?” Nunn’s criticism gets to the root of the issue with Eastern European NATO expansion: while NATO has admittedly succeeded greatly in building an alliance of democracies and intervening to put an end to crimes against humanity in the Balkans, it would have had to be seen as legitimate by both the allies and Russia to avert violent resolution of disputes and it has failed to do so. The choice fundamentally was between isolating and building up against Russia in a fit of post-Cold War triumphalism and using America’s status as the sole superpower to urge Russia to behave like a responsible actor in exchange for being treated like one. Instead of isolating or cautiously integrating Russia, the United States made the well-intentioned but fatally flawed decision to ignore it.

The Reality of NATO Enlargement

The claims of NATO expansion promoters are contradicted by the historical record. While they claimed that Eastern European countries that had been threatened before by the Soviets remained vulnerable in the post-Cold War era and needed to be welcomed into the alliance, Russia was incredibly weak in the 1990s. Secondly, while the world will assuredly never know whether Vladimir Putin was fully intent on pursuing an interventionist foreign policy in his own backyard before NATO enlargement, it can be noted that tensions grew after enlargement.

In reality, the expansion of NATO’s influence into the Balkans and the proposed bids to Russian neighbors represents an unnecessary and somewhat predictable strategic mistake. In its well-intentioned bid to establish a single Europe free from an Eastern threat and united in values and security, NATO isolated Russia. In extending membership and security guarantees to the weakest European states that would simultaneously be the most difficult to defend once Russia recovered, NATO left itself with two undesirable options. The first was to let Russia have what it wants and undermine the solidarity of the alliance in the name of not having a dog in the fight. The second option was to contest every Russian challenge and put NATO troops at risk over the status of countries that are either minuscule in size or internally rife with rising authoritarianism and corruption. Washington and Brussels could live with these contradictions because they never envisioned these security guarantees would need to be fulfilled. 

Eventually, however, Putin sought a more expansionist agenda. Two major strategic decisions by the U.S. and most of its European allies served as catalysts for deteriorating U.S.-Russian relations: the recognition of Kosovo’s independence in 2008 (Russia is the closest ally of Serbia, which continues to dispute Kosovo’s claim) and NATO’s Bucharest Summit, held that same year, which guaranteed future NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine. Both decisions crossed a red line for Moscow, as statements by Russian leadership made clear. Former Russian president Dmitri Medvedev, before the Russian war in Georgia, elucidated a clear position laying out Russia’s perception of greater European integration in Eastern Europe, calling Ukrainian and Georgian accession a threat to Russian security. At the same time, then-Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov argued that Georgian accession would “lead to another stage of confrontation.” In this way, what followed, in the form of Russian instigation of wars in Georgia and Ukraine, should have been foreseen by American officials. Putin was not as much a brilliant strategist creating chaos and disorder out of post-Cold War kumbaya but rather he was taking advantage of and responding to American foreign policy on the fly. Yet in its hubris, Washington added to its security burdens and provoked Russia while getting next to no benefit out of the enlargement. 

It is also worth noting that the democratizing benefit of NATO was widely oversold beyond Central and Western Europe. There has been a great worry among NATO watchers about democratic backsliding in several NATO powerhouses and some of the newer or proposed members from recent periods of expansion. Turkey, which has the second-largest military in NATO, is rated as Not Free by Freedom House for the first time in the history of the report as Recep Erdogan has concentrated his own power and persecuted political opponents. The country once billed by the U.S. as a model secular democracy in the Middle East and Southeastern Europe is now essentially a theocracy with more journalists imprisoned than any other country in the world. In Hungary, Viktor Orban has shuttered universities, promoted white nationalist theories about immigrants, criticized liberal democracy, and now made himself a dictator for the foreseeable future through a new law granting him authority to rule by decree. Montenegro, Ukraine, and Poland each struggle with corruption and have experienced recent democratic backsliding. With this, the very democratic solidarity at the root of NATO is endangered and NATO expansion did not stop any of it from occurring.

Russia has noticed, leveraging its relationships with Turkey and Hungary to exacerbate discord within NATO. Putin sees Orban and Erdogan as ideological allies in the campaign against the European Union and European integration writ-large, and the NATO alliance did not stop Putin from politically and financially supporting anti-democratic forces aligned with them. Nor did it stop Turkey from seeking closer military ties with Russia, through the purchase of S-400 missile systems despite bipartisan congressional urging. The acquisition of the S-400 system will presumably hurt NATO’s security cooperation. Turkey’s critical role in NATO has not stopped it from turning toward Russia.

Putin and Make Russia Great Again

Another point of contention between common narratives about Putin and the historical record is whether his aspiration to “Make Russia Great Again” is (a) the main motivating factor of his foreign policy and (b) actually achievable. “[Putin] came to believe that he had been chosen for a special mission—to save Russia,” Russian journalist Mikhail Zygar wrote in Time. To some, especially those of all political stripes who have spent the past half-century projecting their worst fears onto Russia whether justified or not, it may seem that Russia will always have an interest in maintaining authoritarianism at home and behaving like an empire abroad.

The problem is that that is not the only factor at hand, and Russian interests, imperial or otherwise, are no more immutable than those of any other country. As Rutgers-Newark professor and scholar of empire Alexander Motyl writes, “As anyone with an appreciation of Russian, or any, history knows, no state can pursue identical interests for the duration of its historical existence, because states and their surroundings are always changing… As a result, foreign policy becomes a function of geopolitics, national interests, and ideologies, but also of regime type, personality of the leader, historical timing, context, and many other factors.” Take the example of the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine. It may be that Putin authorized the action in part because he wanted to restore Russian prestige, but it is impossible to ignore that the Maidan revolution that ousted Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych made Ukraine politically unstable, and thus more vulnerable than ever before. At the same time, a revolution in his own backyard led by the populace would make any dictator sweat. Thus, Putin also saw the Ukrainian state as an easy target for expansion, wanted to send a message to the West that it was overextending its sphere of influence through NATO expansion, and wanted to assert his power in the face of regime vulnerability. In the end, it was not just ideology that motivated Putin, but also geography, the stability of rival states, and vulnerability at home, a more reactive, less ideological conclusion than the prevailing wisdom.

Furthermore, Putin’s Russia does not pose the existential threat that it once did to the United States. In a very real way, Putin has not and cannot “Make Russia Great Again.” Economic growth in Russia has slowed to a crawl, in part due to falling oil prices and inequality but also due to U.S. sanctions placed on Russia for its repeated abuses of human rights and international law. Its GDP is roughly the same as it was in 2008. While Russia has improved relations with several major players in international politics like China and Turkey, it still has very few real allies. Even among the few powerful countries with which it has good relations, such as Saudi Arabia and India, the United States has a serious claim to being a closer ally. In the same sense, since being kicked out of the G-8 for the intervention in Crimea and condemned widely for foreign assassinations, Russia has lost institutional power in recent years. Finally, militarily, Russia is relatively weak compared to its rivals. The European members of NATO alone spend four times as much as Russia on defense even as some of them fail to meet the suggested guideline of 2 percent of GDP and regional powers like Saudi Arabia and India, as well as the declining great power of France, all spend more on defense than Russia.

That is not to say that Russia is not going to continue to be an important consideration for policymakers. It is not to say that Russia will not continue to be a major player beyond its own region. Indeed, through its backing of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and facilitation of peace talks in Libya and Northern Syria, Russia plays a much larger role in the Middle East than China does. Furthermore, Putin has reoriented Russian foreign policy towards the region since the Arab Spring, regaining some of the lost diplomatic clout from the Crimea invasion. Instead of a pariah state that had been absent from the region since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Russia is now being treated by even its most ardent rivals as a major player in Middle Eastern affairs. This is because the Iraq War and the U.S. intervention in Libya projected a form of regime change politics and created instability that reduced Russian trust in the U.S. while the Arab Spring showed that popular democratic movements could change international politics, a notion the ever-cautious Putin feared would manifest in regime vulnerability. It is important to note this caveat to understand why dialogue with Russia and consideration of its interests will continue to be essential even if it is not as capable of projecting power as it once was.

A New Strategy

Though often made out by those on both sides of the aisle as a master grand strategist, Putin’s foreign policy successes can be better understood as ample improvised reactions to American policy at best and outright boom or bust gambles at worst. The Blob, as former Obama Administration National Security Council staffer Ben Rhodes derogatorily refers to the network of the governmental, think tank, and media foreign policy establishment has long projected its fears onto Russia, from the Cold War to Putin’s alleged quest for world domination. To them, Putin is a brilliant strategist with a coherent worldview synonymous with decimating the institutions of the post-Cold War international order. In their eyes, there is no democracy Putin and his cronies cannot hack, no U.S. ally he would not squeeze, and no border dispute he would not settle violently in his favor. This lens, while common for the reasons outlined above, is not entirely valid.

A new Russian strategy must be devised to account for this new perception of Putin’s worldview and capabilities. With 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons on either side of the negotiating table, war must be averted at any cost. To date, the American strategy has been too militarized and focused on competition rather than a more nuanced position that acknowledges that cooperation is necessary to reduce the nuclear threat and define the rules of the road, even as the U.S. must stand ready to call out Putin’s Russia when it violates international law and foments instability. The primary challenge in this strategy of getting to peace and disarmament for U.S. policymakers will be to determine where valid Russian interests cease and where realistic red lines must lie. 

A more coherent and nuanced Russia strategy would continue to reiterate that the former Soviet republics bordering Russia are entitled to their sovereignty under international law and Russian violations of that sovereignty will be condemned accordingly. Yet at the same time, the U.S. should make clear that it does not intend to expand its sphere of influence through NATO or other means up to Russia’s border. Georgia and Ukraine’s NATO bids should be withdrawn, as they only give greater credence to the conspiracy theory that NATO exists to encircle and isolate Russia, a theory that has drawn Russia to foment war in both of those countries. Concurrently, the U.S. and its allies must cooperate to ensure that Ukraine’s territorial integrity is preserved and Russia abides by the terms of the Minsk Protocol in Donbass. Finally, in Eastern Europe, Russia must not be rewarded for its reckless and illegal annexation of Crimea, which should not be recognized. Reckless land grabs have no place in 21st century Europe and international politics, and as long as this principle remains intact, the U.S. should not recognize the annexation. 

In Syria, Moscow’s support for Assad’s regime has brought great harm to the Syrian people. Unfortunately, U.S. military misadventures in the Middle East have validated the Russian view that Washington seeks to destabilize the region through destructive regime change wars. This view may be motivated by Russia’s own interests, but that alone does not discredit it. As such, the U.S. has to be willing to negotiate an enduring peace settlement that includes all of the various factions and ultimately dramatically scales back both the U.S. and Russian presences in the region, even if it means Assad controls a sizable part of the country.

The U.S. missed a major opportunity when it chose to prioritize NATO expansion over the Partnership for Peace, which included Russia and aimed to create trust between NATO and Russia. Furthermore, the Partnership for Peace was not just a military alliance, as it facilitated cooperation on science and environmental issues, disaster response, policy planning, and civil-military relations. The Partnership was uniquely able to thread the needle posed by Nunn between assuaging Russian concerns about NATO enlargement, supporting democratic values, and preparing aspiring members for consideration. In short, it reached beyond the alliance to forge trust between NATO states and non-NATO states. While non-recognition of the Crimea annexation would preclude readmission to the G7 for good reason, the U.S. should seek to build similar low-risk institutions like the Partnership for Peace that engage with, rather than isolate Russia to facilitate cooperation on non-security issues and reduce distrust on security issues.

As stated earlier, 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons are in the hands of the U.S. and Russia. Those who huddled under desks during the Cuban missile crisis and those in the Obama Administration who worked tirelessly to approve the 2011 New START treaty that dramatically limited the deployment of strategic nuclear weapons by either side need no reminder of the danger of these weapons. Nevertheless, the George W. Bush and Trump administrations took dead aim at the various arms control and disarmament treaties governing these weapons. In 2002, the Bush Administration withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which limited the number of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems each party could possess. Russia responded by building up its nuclear capabilities. Last September, the White House officially withdrew from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which led to the elimination of almost 3,000 nuclear missiles. Even if the U.S. claim that Russia had been cheating on the deal was true, remaining a party to it would have been preferable because now Putin gets to tell the world that the U.S. cannot keep its word and that its interest in nonproliferation is not serious. Furthermore, with New START itself in danger of not being reauthorized (despite U.S. conclusions that Russia abides by the deal’s terms) by 2021, it is quite possible that there will be no legally binding limits on the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals for the first time in 50 years. Forty-five years of nuclear chicken was enough. The transparency and restrictions on proliferation and deployment instilled in these treaties reduce the likelihood of a third world war, and it is imperative that U.S. strategy prioritize getting back to the negotiating table.

Finally, Vladimir Putin’s kleptocratic authoritarian petrostate regime is as repressive as they come. The current president’s foreign policy is largely defined by his willingness to cozy up to dictators, including Putin himself. On the other end of the table, Putin has exported his particular brand of xenophobia, homophobia, all across Europe in the form of backing far-right parties and leaders like Orban. The U.S. has an obligation to support democracy and human rights through peaceful means in Russia and across Europe, as transparent, stable governments that can be held accountable by their voters make for good allies because they are sympathetic to the liberal worldview that benefits the U.S. and behave in predictable and rational ways. As Putin’s government bars his opponents from running against him, murders scores of journalists, and tortures LGBTQ people in Chechnya, the U.S., as the leader of the free world, must call him out and hold him and his cronies accountable every step of the way. 

While the last two decades of U.S. Russia policy has largely been characterized by a misreading of Vladimir Putin’s motives and capabilities that emboldened him, this new proposed Russia strategy builds upon the successes of the time period in arms control and the Global Magnitsky Act and reorients U.S. policy towards shared interests and challenges while condemning Russia’s many misdeeds. Russia may not be the imperial power some believe it to be, but its importance cannot be overstated in 21st century Eurasia and in international forums. To confront it when its actions demand it to be confronted and to cooperate and reduce tensions when changes in interests occur, nuance is essential. The status quo must go.

NATO À La Carte, And Other Ways France Tried to Resist American Hegemony

In his most recent book The World America Made, Robert Kagan offers an account of the peculiarities that characterize the world order led by the United States. Among the most outstanding of them is the unprecedented acceptance of American leadership. The United States never goes to wars without a handful of allies on its side: even the unpopular invasion in Afghanistan was eventually joined by more than forty nations. Moreover, states with no geopolitical stakes in the initiatives the U.S. takes support them out of mere belief in American commitment to human rights and democracy. Even the security dilemma was effectively defied by the U.S., claims Kagan, since America’s arms buildup in the 1980s and 1990s was accompanied by significant reduction in military capabilities in many world regions. The world portrayed by Kagan’s work depicts the U.S.’ having decisively won the “hearts and minds” of so many wealthy and powerful countries that the American order is nearly impossible to undermine. In the reality, however, there are many doubts about the necessity and legitimacy of American leadership. Apart from Washington’s long-standing rivals, such as China, Iran, and Russia, one of the closest and most powerful allies of the U.S., France, is accustomed to renouncing the American order, and has been doing so for decades. France’s uneasiness with U.S. preeminence was never pronounced enough to shatter the world order, let alone give a reason to coin France as a revisionist state. However, this persisting suspicion of American power coming from one of its most trusted partners has shaped France’s foreign policy, as well as French-American relations, in a few profound ways. Beginning with Charles de Gaulle’s call for a “Europe of Europeans,” Paris was oftentimes a reluctant and confrontational ally. This hesitancy to stand by U.S.’ side dispels any illusion about the cohesion of American order, which, at some point or another, has failed the test of legitimacy in the eyes of not only its rivals but its closest friends.

When the French-American alliance was born in 1778, it was born out of parallel self-interest, not shared ideals. More than two centuries later, the two countries’ self-interests remain similar, and their cooperation in military, political, and intelligence areas are strong. Yet, it was not always consistent. U.S.-French relations went through several major crises that unsettled the Western alliance and showcased France’s persistent frustration with being subordinate to America. During the Cold War days, President Charles de Gaulle’s vision of a Europe led by Europeans instead of Americans created an additional divide, and this time within the Western block. An unparalleled initiative undertaken by de Gaulle to withdraw French troops from NATO and expel NATO forces from France shattered confidence in the Alliance’s ability to counter the Soviet military. De Gaulle, however, saw NATO primarily not as a defense mechanism against the USSR but as a “hated symbol of U.S. hegemony.” Distancing from it was a way to emancipate France from American influence and pursue an independent foreign policy. The General’s decision to demand the removal of NATO headquarters from Paris forced the relocation of 100,000 U.S. and NATO personnel and over one million ton of supplies and equipment – perhaps the least of the problems America was facing in dealing with France at the time. The four immediate successors of de Gaulle did not deviate from his foreign policy, and Paris remained partially withdrawn from the Alliance for forty-three years. When Nicolas Sarkozy, one of France’s most pro-American leaders, did choose to reverse the de Gaulle’s decision and return to NATO in 2009, the elite and media opposition to the alignment with the United States and rapprochement with NATO was still strong.

But before France returned to NATO as a full-fledged member, it made several attempts to undermine the organization’s influence on the continent, which ultimately undermined American power. After the disappearance of the U.S.’ main geo-political rival with the collapse of the USSR, France revived its calls for a European security system built free of American influence. As hesitant as the French were to endorse NATO’s expansion that was initiated by the U.S., they had little ability to counter it. What the could do is endorse proposals that countered NATO’s enlargement. France waged what Marie-Claude Plantin of the University of Lyon calls a kind of “guerrilla warfare” against any changes to strengthen American influence in the region. Plantin, in her book The Future of Nato, describes how the French government initially voiced opposition to initiatives as moderate as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, due to a belief that it to be a political tool for Americans to exercise control over Europe. During his term, French President Mitterrand chose the Western European Union as the organization to counter U.S. military monopoly in the region. Eventually, Franco-German units, later joined by Belgium, Luxembourg, and Spain, were supposed to form the nucleuses for an independent European military force, but it later became evident that the U.S. military predominance and, consequently, NATO, could not easily be uprooted. After failing to shift focus from NATO to the EU/WEU tandem, Mitterrand attempted to Europeanize the North Atlantic Alliance. This undertaking, too, had little success, and the French leadership was compelled to accept NATO’s primacy in the matters of European security. 

Today, the United States and France are undoubtedly long-standing allies with many interests and values. Nevertheless, what created major divides between the two countries in the past were principal disagreements over important international issues.. These divides not only disrupted the bilateral relationship between the two nations but also shattered confidence in one of the U.S.’ most important military alliances. While clashes of interest between rival powers are natural, such turbulences in a relationship with what many see as a traditional American ally are more alarming. Even though President Macron and President Trump now appear to be on the same wavelength about French-American relations, it was American unilateralism and arrogance that have always ignited French dissent of U.S. foreign policy – and the current administration appears to be susceptible to both. Macron’s pragmatism, for now, outweighs traditional geopolitical uneasiness with which France treats its relationship with the U.S., but as Kagan remarks, the wide acceptance America enjoys should never be confused with “helpless tolerance of U.S. predominance.” French historical resistance of American hegemony was ever hardly an attempt to drastically rewrite the rules of the game, yet it is not to be discounted as mere whims of French nationalism, or ego clashes of presidential regimes. If the U.S. is interested in preserving its primacy, it should keep an eye on its friends as much as on its enemies. Ultimately, the world America made might not have rivals powerful enough to undermine it, but does it have admirers enthusiastic enough to sustain it?

Why the World Needs NATO

If one follows today’s geopolitical conversations, they are likely to notice that the current world order is being questioned by politicians and citizens across the world, most recently in the United States and the United Kingdom. Multilateral organizations and trade agreements are not functioning, with their costs over weighing their benefits.

One such organization, which has been persistently questioned, is NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO has been in existence since 1949 and it is an organization worth examining. In order to understand the importance of NATO, one must analyze its impact on European security, its adaptability to 21st century challenges and its significance to the U.S. In this essay, I explore how NATO enlargement contributed to security in Europe and how NATO has been restructured to meet 21st century challenges. In the end, I examine how the organization contributed to U.S. defense post 9/11 and even today.

While it seems tempting to dismiss NATO as obsolete, the organization’s structure is necessary to resolve rising challenges. NATO is able to create collaborative spaces for countries across Europe and beyond to discuss terrorism and cyber security. Without the cooperation of NATO the resolution of security challenges would be slower and less effective.

NATO History and Enlargement

In 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was created in the midst of fears of Communist expansion. In 1948 the Soviet Union sponsored a coup in Czechoslovakia overthrowing its democratic government and replacing it with a communist one. The United States and Europe, fearing further destabilization in Europe, crafted a joint security agreement, which came to be known as NATO. This agreement was meant to protect European allies from Soviet invasion. The creation of NATO signaled an important shift of U.S. foreign policy because for the first time since the 1700s the U.S. tied its security to that of its European allies.

Today, NATO is a political and military alliance, consisting of 28 member states. Politically, NATO promotes democracy and encourages cooperation on security issues. Militarily, NATO manages crises that would pose a threat to the security of member states. Such crises can be humanitarian, political or military. Article 5 of NATO’s Washington Treaty stipulates that an armed attack against one or more of the member states is an attack against them all. Member states agree that if such an attack occurs, they will assist each other to restore security.

The promise of collective defense has prompted many countries in Europe to seek NATO membership. The conditions placed for membership in NATO created a more peaceful Europe. The criteria for joining NATO spans across military and political dimensions. The membership action plans prepared for countries who want to join NATO are a process by which current members can review the progress of potential members in meeting the necessary conditions which encapsulate five areas: political economy, defense, resources, security; and legal issues. The political economic conditionality is that countries must have a democratic system of government, have good relations with their neighbors, show commitment to human rights and have a market economy. The defense section encourages countries to strengthen their military so they can contribute to collective defense and the resource section focuses on increased funding for defense. The security and legal sections require protection of sensitive information and bringing national legislation in line with the alliance.

The settlement of disputes with neighboring countries is a pivotal condition for joining NATO. Current member states do not want to inherit the territorial conflicts of new member states. These conflicts can turn into wars and can trigger Article 5, forcing member states to defend new members in conflicts that could have been prevented. Through its conditions for membership, NATO plays an integral role in mitigating potential disputes in Europe by encouraging countries to settle these disputes peacefully. In order to join NATO, for example, Hungary gave up territorial claims in Romania. NATO also encourages the strengthening of democratic institutions across Europe by placing an emphasis on stopping corruption and stopping maltreatment of minority groups. These contributions to the security of Europe must not be overlooked when debating the validity of NATO.

Adaptability to 21st Century Problems: Terrorism and Cyber Security

While NATO began as a defense mechanism against the Soviet Union, the organization has restructured itself to meet the challenges of the 21st century such as terrorism and cyber security.

In an effort to ease the transfer of information between Middle Eastern states and NATO, NATO established the Mediterranean Dialogue. The Mediterranean Dialogue members are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. The annual Work Program of the dialogue includes seminars and workshops focused on border security, small arms and light weapons as well as consultations on terrorism. The annual program also includes an invitation to representatives of the Dialogue countries to observe NATO military exercisesand attend courses at the NATO School in Germany and the NATO Defense College in Rome. The Mediterranean Dialogue is the main instrument available for these Middle Eastern countries to coordinate on shared security concerns.

Through the NATO Training Cooperation initiative, NATO also created a “NATO Regional Cooperation Course” which is a strategic course focused on security challenges faced in the Middle East. The course links issues of importance in the Middle East with the international community. The course is open to officers of the rank of Brigadier General, Colonel, and Lieutenant Colonel as well as civilian officials. It is geared toward Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Initiative member countries.

The Mediterranean Dialogue and the strategic courses focused on the Middle East show the flexibility and necessity of NATO. NATO has moved away from its original mandate to recognize the rising challenge of terrorism and it has created a space to deliberate best solutions for not only countries in Europe but also in the Middle East. Without NATO, the level of coordination on combatting terrorism across countries and continents would be difficult to realize.

After a Russian linked cyber attack on Estonia in 2007, NATO also implemented a cyber defense capability, which did not exist previously. Through cyber defense initiatives, NATO seeks to prevent the theft or damage of software, hardware or information from computers. In 2014, NATO members agreed that cyber defense is part of the core task of collective defense committed to by NATO. In 2016, member states added cyberspace as an operational domain for NATO, in addition to sea, air, and land. Through its cyber security initiative, in 2017 NATO will define targets for countries to implement their own national cyber defense capabilities. Through the Smart Defense Initiative, member states work together to develop cyber security capabilities that they could not afford to create or procure on their own.

Through its cyber security program, NATO protects its own systems but also helps member states develop their own protection. NATO officials recognized the importance of cyberspace in today’s world and developed innovative ways to integrate it into their defense mission. Again, without NATO the sharing of information and innovative ways to combat threats would be more costly and difficult. NATO is then necessary because it has the ability to unite countries across Europe and beyond to meet rising challenges. NATO is not outdated, as it has proven able to incorporate new global threats into its already established structure to find solutions.

NATO and the U.S. post 9/11

Another reason why NATO should not be dismissed as unnecessary is the defense the alliance provided to the United States after 9/11. Despite persistent criticism that NATO allies are free riders by America’s president elect, the only time the collective defense article of NATO was invoked was in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.

After an October 2nd, 2001 briefing, NATO’s political decision making body agreed that if an attack was directed from abroad against the U.S, it would violate Article 5. NATO agreed to eight measures to support the United States in its fight against terrorism. These measures included an increase of intelligence sharing between the member states and a provision of capabilities for countries that may be subject to terrorist threats. NATO countries also agreed to provide over flight clearance for U.S. flights related to anti- terrorism and to provide access to ports and airfields.

On the request of the U.S., NATO launched its first ever anti-terror operation, Eagle Assist from October 9, 2001 to May 16, 2002. Seven NATO aircraft patrolled U.S. skies in order to prevent any planned attacks by air.

On October 26th, 2001, the Alliance launched Active Endeavor from Naples, Italy. Under this mission, naval forces were sent to patrol the Eastern Mediterranean and monitor shipping to detect terrorist activity, including illegal trafficking. Active Endeavor also offers escorts to ships passing through the Straits of Gibraltar, between Spain and Morocco. In 2004, the operation was extended to monitor the whole Mediterranean Sea and to analyze regional shipping patterns in order to target suspicious activity. This NATO operation has both enhanced security and commerce in the Mediterranean region. After 9/11, NATO contributed to the defense of the United States and continued to support America in the fight against terrorism.

NATO and U.S. Today

NATO continues to support the U.S. by facilitating military operations through logistical support. For instance, in 1991 NATO supplies and bases were used by the U.S. led coalition to force Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. Today, the Incirlik Air Base in Turkey is used against ISIS in an operation not conducted by NATO. Without NATO, the U.S. military would need to craft separate bilateral and multilateral agreements in order to facilitate the use of bases and equipment from its European allies. Such agreements might even need legislative approval so U.S. military operations would be slowed down.

Since the United States’ political and military agendas may not be acceptable to some countries, NATO also exists as a channel through which to sidestep potential bilateral tensions. In 2003, the United States proposed sharp cuts to U.S. forces in Germany after persistent German opposition to the Iraq War. Although Germany did not deny access to American bases during the war, the German government announced that it would not recognize the validity of a war against Iraq without United Nations approval. At the time the Pentagon said that the withdrawal of troops had nothing to do with German opposition to the war. Yet, American officials showed a preference for stationing troops in places that approved of the unilateral invasion of Iraq. The multilateral nature of NATO operations decreases this type of tension. European allies are much more likely to approve military operations that are multilateral, and therefore such diplomatic tensions as the ones, which arose after the invasion of Iraq, can be avoided.

Conclusion

While it seems tempting to dismiss multilateral organizations, NATO is an organization worth maintaining because of its adaptability and practicality. NATO managed to reimagine itself from an organization designed to promote democracy to one which combats terrorism and cyber warfare. Additionally, NATO facilitates the sharing of information across borders and access to bases and equipment around the world.

Moving forward, we must recognize that defense spending is a valid concern about NATO, but also acknowledge that the same levels of spending cannot be duplicated across countries. While the cost sharing within NATO can be renegotiated, there are also alternative methods to ensure that defense spending is maintained without burdening member nations. Recognizing their own tightening budgets, NATO countries have figured out innovative ways to share the costs of defense spending. The Nordic Defense Cooperation is one organization, made up of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. The organization works on cost sharing and developing joint solutions. Defense cooperation agreements between countries not only save money but are also a space for more information sharing and potential innovation.

Whether through cooperation agreements or re-negotiating contributions, NATO allies must move forward to create an organization that is equally valuable to all members. Throughout this process, however, leaders in Europe and the United States must reflect on the importance of NATO to the security of Europe, the United States and even the Middle East. Only after such reflection will the world understand the importance of multilateral agreements such as NATO.

The Turkish Question; An Emergence of Opportunity in the Levant In The Moment of Turkish Instability

“A nation which makes the final sacrifice for life and freedom does not get beaten.” – Mustafa Kemal Atatürk

The world watched with trepidation as military tanks rolled through the streets of Ankara the night of July 15th. Within a matter of hours, soldiers once loyal to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan took the Chief of Military Staff hostage, attacked both the Turkish parliament and intelligence headquarters, exchanged gunfire in Taksim Square with loyalist forces, and commandeered media channels to announce a victorious overthrow of Erdoğan’s government. Or so it seemed.

Turkey is no stranger to military coups d’etat, having experienced four successful instances since 1960. President Erdoğan has also withstood barrages from political opponents throughout his 14-year hold on power. It has been assessed that the frequency of these strikes against the Turkish government have been somewhat of an experimental tradition in Turkey; a protection and preservation of Turkish democratic principles against minacious leaders. That said, the residuum of July’s attempt has demonstrated to the Turkish citizens President Erdoğan’s Achilles heel—a loose grip on the reins of power—and has tightened his grip on Turkey with government and military purges, a long-awaited military campaign in Iraq and Syria, souring the relationship with the European Union, agitating relations with the United States over the extradition of rival Fethullah Gülen, and a strategic pivot towards Russia in a burgeoning joint-military and energy partnership. These policy tasks in just the two months following July 15th have brought scholars and analysts to question whether the light of the once-heralded beacon of Eurasia will dim or brighten under Erdoğan’s tighter hold on power.

In this analysis, I will assess the questions that have been and should be asked during this moment of Turkish instability. These enquiries will assess Turkey’s position moving forward into a post-purge state after nearly 58,000 Turkish citizens have been deposed of their positions, as well as the country’s standing on the international stage and in regional institutions. The aftershock of Turkey’s political earthquake has proved consequential—–to the United States, the European Union, the Kurdish people, and of course, the Turkish constituents. While the achievement of internal stability will continue to ebb and flow, I predict the country will converge as a theater to play out geopolitical conflicts, and where invested actors will exploit opportune interests—particularly of the United States’ struggle in the Levant.

Purging for Prepotency; Erdoğan’s Grasp on Government

On July 15th, the Turkish nation awoke to a government shaken by force and a leader rattled by such events. In a widespread expulsion so colossal that many have considered it to be pre-conspired, Erdoğan imprisoned over 7,500 soldiers, 118 generals and admirals, 3,000 members of the Turkish judiciary, 1,500 state ministry staffers, and 100 intelligence officials. This widespread purge of lingering governmental opposition did not halt at the state level, but even seeped into the Turkish educational sector, religious institutions, and media outlets; 21,000 private school teachers, 1,577 university deans, and 100 journalists were dismissed. Of these, 9,000 remain in custody. This leaves all facets of the Turkish government and public services overwhelmingly understaffed across all fields and professions. This “counter-coup” signifies a newfound tenacity that will characterize a new era of the Erdoğan administration—one that will flex its muscle of control at home, while exercising defying the wishes of the West and appeasing the East.

Strongman rule is not new under Erdoğan. Since becoming Prime Minister in 2002, Erdoğan has been controversial in his pursuit to institute and champion political Islam in a traditionally secularpolitical system, initiating a slew of experimental reforms that exacerbated the political differences between Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), the Justice and Development Party, and other Turkish institutions of democracy. This development necessitated political partnerships, such as the alliance with a Sunni clerk, Fethullah Gülen, the founder of the Hizmet movement. Such a movement swept the nation with a message of religious tolerance and moderate policies of educational immersion and national service, prompting many followers of Gülen to become civil servants in Erdoğan’s administration. But political convenience steered the AKP, and a growing schism between Erdoğan’s political Islam and Gülen’s cultural Islam emerged, resulting in Gülen’s flight to the United States due to a rumored deposition plot and a governmental declaration deeming Gülenists a terrorist organization. In Erdoğan’s political reality, such political adversaries and connivances are commonplace—an intrinsic perspective that become intertwined with Turkey’s foreign policy platform abroad.

The NATO Question

This phenomenon has brought a series of questions to the assemblies, podiums, and cabinets of governments and regional organizations across the international system. The Turkish moment has not been taken lightly in the global order. Turkey’s relative instability, Erdoğan’s autocratic tendencies, combined with the geopolitical and strategic goldmine of Turkey’s location, is an important policy issue leaders will face in the next year.

In the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Turkey stands as the second-largest military in membership, and serves as host to 24 NATO military bases. Even before July 15th, Turkey’s membership had been criticized of its failure to uphold the principles of the Treaty’s first preambulatory clause that mandates members have “stable democratic systems, pursue the peaceful settlement of territorial and ethnic disputes, have good relations with their neighbours, show commitment to the rule of law and human rights, establish democratic and civilian control of their armed forces, and have a market economy.”

Erdoğan’s policies have had a dangerous downward trajectory in protecting constituents’ human rights, with intense discriminatory policiestowards ethnic minorities and a reputation for quashing freedom of expression and assembly. Erdoğan’s discriminatory policies towards the Kurdish people, an ethnic minority dispersed throughout Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, have been reported to infringe on the rights and lives of the Kurdish people, including disproportionate charges on the basis of supposed “terrorist motives.”

Yet despite the series of perceived violations, the July 15th attack on the Incirlik air-base has become a fulcrum for NATO’s concerns about the Turkish military’s durability and their adherence to the treaty. The Incirlik base has been an invaluable asset in both the U.S. European Command and U.S. Central Command, as well as the anti-ISIS coalition’s fight in Syria and Iraq. The base is a bulwark  in assisting air defense missions and generates significant intelligence cooperation with NATO allies, especially the United States. The base’s operations against Daesh were shut down as well as its commercial power and airspace the night of the attempted coup. Along with a five-day power outage, ten Incirlik officers and their commander, General Bekir Ercan Van, were detained in suspected coordination with anti-Erdoğan soldiers. While the base has regained power and operations have recommenced, the events of July 15th will continue to call into question NATO’s reliance on the security of their own bases in Turkey and cause NATO members to second-guess Turkey’s strategic capability under such an unstable political system. An air base forced to operate with backup generators while continuing to wage war against Daesh without access to their airspace is an inept one, which will pressure NATO into rethinking their reliance on Turkey.

This shift in relations between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Turkey is not equivalent to suspension or expulsion, contrary to the arrayof experts calling for the removal of Turkey as a NATO member. In fact, there is no official process or protocol of discharge regarding a member state within the NATO structure. Even if the organization were to establish a mechanism of expulsion, Turkey is too great a strategic treasure for such a consideration; Turkey is perched in the crossroads of the East and West; between NATO and its adversary, Russia, and between the Middle East and Europe.

The Turkish Moment Bears Inestimable Opportunity

How will the North Atlantic Treaty Organization deal with an incalculable Turkey? One scenario will involve maneuvering, rather than containing, Turkey’s recent shift towards Russia. Both countries recently struck a renewed energy and military partnership in St. Petersburg, after a chilled six months of stalled relations and sanctions. Moreover, NATO members can either reinforce strained relations by deterring Turkish European Union candidacy and further deliberation surrounding the question of Turkey’s NATO membership. Alternatively, NATO could incorporate the recovered Turkish-Russian relationship into their fight against Daesh in Syria and Iraq. Many have perceived this renewed alliance as a betrayal of Turkey’s responsibilities to NATO, as well as an example of Russian encroachment upon a vulnerable political system and paranoid leader. Yet, I argue that this is not a lost cause, but rather an unwonted opportunity.

President Vladimir Putin has provided military support to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, a policy fundamentally divergent from the United States and its allies, there has been rare proof of limited western-Russian cooperation against Daesh bears fruit. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254 established a tentative timeline that incorporated U.S., Russian, and foreign cooperation, urging “all states to use their influence with the government of Syria and the Syrian opposition to advance the peace process.” A failed 48-hour ceasefire sought to accomplish just that, brokered between the United States and Russian forces in Syria that attempted humanitarian assistance and civilian evacuation for nearly 275,000 people without the disruption of strikes from the Syrian government, Free Syrian Army, Syrian Democratic Forces, and foreign forces. The violation of the ceasefire and the continuation of airstrikes in Aleppo has emerged as a strained point of contention for the United States and Russia in both militaristic and diplomatic spheres. But cooperation is still a necessary feat in Syria, even after animosity between the two superpowers. The Obama administration extended a hand to Moscow this past year, with a proposed air campaign combatting Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, formally the al-Nusra Syrian branch of al-Qaeda, in addition to joint air-strikes expunging Daesh from its stronghold in Raqqa. From the established Russian front in Northwestern Syria and Turkey’s northern position, the United States and its allies could arrange a strategic operation that targets Daesh from its western stronghold in Palmyra to the East in Markadeh. No individualized military effort could accomplish such a feat in the region.

Russia’s position in Syria is one of immense strength and, while the United States’ presence has been felt in the Levant, Putin has greater leverage with Iran and the dormant Syrian government. Scholars Gordan Adams and Stephen Walt have advocated this as well, reiterating that no single power can defeat Daesh nor establish political stability in Syria. A united international coalition against the Islamic State continues to flounder without Russia’s presence, and will continue to as the Levant unravels into political pandemonium. Yet collaboration does not guarantee Assad’s deposition from power, just as cooperation with Erdoğan does not ensure Turkish avoidance of attacking Kurdish Peshmerga fighters in Syria and Iraq. It will be the United States’ responsibility to make the precarious decision whether to take a sensitive, but necessary step in their fight against Daesh.

Conclusion

This past summer, Turkey became a Eurasian flashpoint that marked a new wave of uncertainty towards the cohesion of their political system, the dependability of their military and NATO membership, and the respect of their constituents as a democratic institution. These questions will persist, as Erdoğan enforces his paranoia through stringent reforms and purges of officials. The entry of Turkey into the war against Daesh too sends a message of strength; President Erdoğan strives to grip power tightly as his administration recovers from an ill-fated coup attempt against him.

Yet while the global order has reason to lament over a clear shift in Turkish foreign policy, the moment of Turkish instability presents as many opportunities as it does challenges. A renewed energy and joint-military partnership struck between Erdoğan and Putin in St. Petersburg can serve as an opened door to the United States and NATO allies in their fight against Daesh in the Levant. International coalitions against the terrorist organization have proven weak and lacking in unity, and while the scarce cooperative efforts between the two hegemonic powers have not yielded success, U.S.-Russian collaboration could be the key to securing the Levant from Daesh.