Women in Terrorist Organizations- Victims or Accomplices?

The role of women in terrorist organizations, particulary jihadist groups in the Middle East (the most notorious of which are the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, and the current governing force of Afghanistan, the Taliban) has been studied from a variet of perspecties, mostly focusing on their victimization. Terrorism is both a consequence and perpetrator of instability and violence, which, as is the case with most marginalized populations, affects women in particular. Women living under terrorist-controlled strongholds in the Middle East are brutally subjugated, forced into sexual and domestic slavery, forced to serve the organizations dominating them, and tasked with indoctrinating the next generation. When we consider the women who willingly join terrorist groups and engage in acts of terrorism such as suicide bombing, we more often that not only consider women in the West - to take one infamous example, Shamima Begum, who traveled from the United Kingdom to an Islamic State-controlled region of Syria and was charged with terrorism upon her return to the United Kingdom. However, plenty of women in the Middle East have willingly joined terrorist organizations, defying the “jihadi bride” trope which will be examined in more detail later in this article. In refusing to acknowledge the agency of Middle Eastern women - in the negative context, the agency to commit crimes and harm others, not just the agency to obtain an education or to start a business - we risk not only underestimating the security threat that women pose, but we deny ourselves the possibility of a more well-rounded and well-informed counterterrorism strategy and fail to fully comprehend the socio-political factors that both breed terror and inspire women to join the movement. 

Chief amongst those factors seems to be a well-documented feeling of a lack of agency on the part of many women who join terrorist organizations. As a Washington Institute study found, “one of the principle reasons these women can choose to take part in terrorism is to gain a sense of agency and power that they were never given in their communities through leaning into extremist ideology and accepting the new leadership roles opening up for women within those structures–even as these organizations treat them as second citizens and will even use women to generate revenue through sex trafficking.” In other words, women frustrated with a lack of agency viewed jihadism and joining terrorist organizations as a way to reclaim a sense of independence previously lacking. The emphasis on preserving a patriarchal system was part of a broader rejection of diversity that included the repression of racial and ethnic minorities. Put simply, those who tried to choose a life outside of the communal norm were seen as threats, an attitude that has suffocated the creative and productive abilities of women and, indeed the this region as a whole. What is relatively new is that some of the women who have lived through these traumas, especially those already exposed to a radical upbringing, increasingly see joining terrorist groups as a way of recapturing the agency denied to them by society. In a twisted way, some women respond to socially accepted oppressive traditions to women’s rights, as well as social pressures that encourage radical thoughts and definitions of self-sacrifice in the name of the sacred, by seeking agency through the most extreme performance of these 'values.' The fertile soil in which some women naturally harvest radical ideas stems from the lack of alternative ways to express their inner anger-turned-hatred. An interesting perspective to explore 

The BBC has warned of the dangers of falling into the habit of assuming women only join or are affiliated with terrorist organizations as ‘jihadi brides’.  ISIS’ capture of the Syrian city of Raqqa in 2013 led to a a shift in their online propaganda; not only were women actively recruited for traditional roles like wife and mother (which still remains their primary function), but as doctors, nurses, teachers, and administrators. “Notably, women were eventually given the responsibility to monitor compliance among other women, evident in the establishment of the all-female al-Khansaa police brigade. This adaptation by the Islamic State to changing circumstances was later reflected in the seventh edition of the group’s online propaganda magazine, Dabiq, which included a new section directly addressing women.”

One of the most vital roles that women play in terrorist organizations is that of a recruiter. As USAToday found, “Western women have also been highly effective online recruiters for young girls from their countries of origin. Teenage girls — justifiably skittish about conversing with strange men online — are likely to be less circumspect about communicating with someone of the same gender who holds allure by being slightly older, sharing their interests and confidences and conveying a sense of inclusion. Thus Hoda Muthana from Alabama recruited American girls, while Aqsa Mahmood from Scotland successfully recruited girls from Great Britain.”  Failing to recognize this can have deadly consequences, with the Washington Post stating “Extremist groups rely upon women to gain strategic advantage, recruiting them as facilitators and martyrs while also benefiting from their subjugation. Yet U.S. policymakers overlook the roles that women play in violent extremism—including as perpetrators, mitigators, and victims—and rarely enlist their participation in efforts to combat radicalization. This omission puts the United States at a disadvantage in its efforts to prevent terrorism globally and within its borders.”

The Washington Post summarized it best, saying that “Pull factors for joining a terrorist organization were a desire for a new environment, pride, support of a political cause, free education and training, image, and access to social and political roles. Push factors were deprivation, redemption and honor, revenge, romantic ties, family influence, commitment to an ideological cause, traumatic experiences, and protection of self and family.”

It has already been established in the literature on terrorism that a wide range of social, political, cultural, and economic trend contribute to the rise of terrorist organizations. Almost ironically, the global war on terror has both caused and strengthened many of these trends. By recognizing the veritable threat that female terrorist fighters pose, as well as the vital role that they play in terrorist networks and their strengthening, we can more holistically broaden our understanding of terrorism dynamics, and in doing so, our understanding of effective counterterrorism strategies.

The Islamic State- Beaten but Not Broken

In the early morning hours of February 3rd, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, the second leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, was killed in an American operation in northwest Syria. His death followed that of the organization's founder and self proclaimed caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2019. Al-Qurashi’s death is an important milestone in continuing the struggle against the forces of ISIS - yet it appears to have overshadowed the more significant events of the previous month. 

On January 20th, a truck in the northeastern Syrian city of Al-Hasakah suddenly veered towards the walls of the Al-Sina’a prison. It detonated, marking the beginning of a prison break at the largest detention camp of ISIS fighters in the world, and the largest and most complex operation of the organization since their territorial defeat three years earlier. 

The military defeat of ISIS and the loss of its territory did not mean the end of the organization's existence, despite the rhetoric and lack of attention paid by many Western governments. For the tens of thousands of the organization's fighters, there were few options. Many fought to the death, others attempted to slink away into unpopulated or barren areas to try and avoid detection - but thousands of fighters, along with their wives and children, were either captured or surrendered. These fighters have been held in a kind of purgatory - crammed into massive detention centers for years with no end in sight. 

The Al-Sina’a prison in Al-Hasakah was one of these detention centers and held an estimated  3,500 and 4,000 prisoners, all either ISIS militants or their children - some of whom were child soldiers. Al-Hasakah is under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces, a multi-ethnic - but primarily Kurdish - armed group seeking to carve out an autonomous zone in northwest Syria.

Al-Sina’a has long been infamous for holding both the former militants and their children (the so called ‘cubs of the caliphate’) in atrocious and inhumane conditions. The prison is overcrowded, with food, water, and medicine being in short supply. 700 of the prison's occupants are children, and their continued incarceration without charge or chance of rehabilitation is particularly problematic. 

Yet it's important to note that these conditions are not on account of the SDF’s cruelty but instead of a lack of resources. Of the 3,500-4,000 prisoners, only a quarter are from Syria. The diverse makeup of the prison population is representative of the global nature of ISIS' membership. Indeed, the continued presence of these multinational prisoners is due to the refusal of the rest of the world to repatriate their citizens who left to join ISIS. It is an underreported absurdity that the international community has abandoned the people of Syria and Iraq to deal foreign citizens. So these fighters are stuck, with their countries unwilling to bring them home and prosecute them. They have no chance at rehabilitation by rotting away in sweltering inhumane conditions surrounded by hardened terrorists. Without any program of rehabilitation, the militants remain ready and committed to their ideology. This situation is particularly unjust for the children of these prisons, imprisoned for the crimes of their parents, still surrounded by a hateful and twisted ideology.

Beyond its horrid conditions, Al-Sina'a has been commonly referred to as a "ticking time bomb" for an ISIS resurgence. Several months earlier the Aisyah, the police of Rojava, had intercepted an earlier attempt by ISIS to attack this very same prison. On January 20th, they were not so lucky. 

The ISIS attack was sudden and intense. The first car bomb cleared the way for an ISIS cell to rush into the prison, bringing arms to the prisoners, who had been ready and rioting for their comrades - an indication of the complexity of the operation - before they raided the prison armory. What followed was the beginning of a brutal week of urban warfare. Fighting raged for days as the SDF, with air support from the American led-international coalition, mobilized troops to confront the sudden and massive insurgency. The residents of the Ghweiran neighborhood of Al-Hasakah, where the Al-Sina’a prison is located, found themselves in the midst of a ferocious battle. Approximately 45,000 people were displaced on the first day of fighting alone. It also appeared that the SDF had prematurely declared victory at times - after the battle had been declared over, a new ISIS pocket would either be found in door to door sweeps or would suddenly open fire on SDF forces. When the dust truly did settle, close to 500 militants and escapees were killed, with close to one hundred SDF fighters and prisoner workers dying as well. Worryingly, it is still unclear how many members of ISIS were able to escape. 

Though the battle ended with the defeat and capture of the prisoners and their would be liberators, it is frankly too early to conclusively call this operation a victory against the ISIS. It is still unknown who the escapees are and if high level leaders may have been able to disappear and rejoin their organization's insurgency. Notably, experts worry about the attack’s implications. It is a clear propaganda victory for ISIS, demonstrating that they still have the capability to stage large, complex, and deadly operations. This attack was also not an isolated event. On the contrary, the last few months have seen a resurgence in ISIS' activity in both Iraq and Syria. When this prison break is viewed with the proper context - that of an emboldened ISIS willing and able to operate a cross border insurgency - the implications are worrying.

Which leads to the question - what is to be done? Multiple conditions must be addressed in order to remedy the underlying problems that led to this attack. More significant aid must immediately be distributed to the people of Iraq and Syria that are responsible for ensuring hardened ISIS veterans remain behind bars. Assistance should provide for both more humane conditions for prisoners as well as address the ability for inmates to properly repatriate back into normal society. In the case of the SDF in Rojava, the issue of Turkey must be addressed as well. Turkey has been hostile to the Kurdish-dominated SDF since its inception. This hostility can be seen in both the Turkish invasions of Rojava as well as in the allegations that Turkey had bombed SDF reinforcements on their way to the Al-Sina’a prison. Continued Turkish aggression towards the SDF in Rojava only serves to pull resources away from the detention of ISIS fighters and produces the instability that allows for the ISIS to continue to fester.

In the long term, the international community must come to terms with the fact that they cannot merely wash their hands of their own civilians and must repatriate the foreigners that joined ISIS. The presence of thousands of foreign fighters held in detention camps in Iraq and Syria is not a viable solution. Only with the action of the international community can this issue be truly resolved. In the future, these attacks will continue to occur unless these changes are made. The rest of the world needs to begin to repatriate their citizens and must stop delegating the task to the people of Syria and Iraq. If nothing is done, the prospects of an ISIS resurgence remain high and the future of northern Syria looks bleak.

Shedding Light on the “Prison-to-Jihad” Pipeline: Islam, Radicalization, and Terrorism in French Prisons

Since the Islamic State’s creation in June 2014, France has witnessed the most terrorist related violence across all of Europe and the United States. Brookings’ scholars McCants and Meserole recently published a landmark study identifying Francophone status as the biggest determinant for whether European countries experience Sunni radicalization and violence. These two data points highlight the continued risks posed by violent extremist organizations (VEOs) to the government of France and its citizens. Terrorism in France is too often wrapped up in conflicting narratives of nationalism, Islam, and immigration. Far-right candidate Marine Le Pen frequently used the trope of Middle Eastern refugees seeking to unleash violence against France in the name of Islam, a narrative that secured her one-third of the national vote in the 2017 presidential elections. Yet the overwhelming majority of recent terrorist attacks haven’t been carried out by refugees, but by French citizens socialized in the country’s secular schools. Moreover, a wide variety of groups have engaged in terrorism across France since the 1800s, including Basque, Breton and Corsican separatists, pro- and anti-Algerian independence movements, the far-left Action Directe, the far-right Organisation Armée Secrète, neo-Nazis, and more recently, Islamic extremists. Islamic extremists, as defined by the University of Maryland’s National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), engage in the violence in the name of a faith-based ideology in order to impose strict regulations on social life, though they often lack even rudimentary religious education. In the case of Islamic extremism in France, this violence is particularly anti-state, as the French government’s strict interpretation of secularism, or laicite, results in heavy restrictions on Islam in public spaces. Yet the roots of radicalization lie in specific social processes which take place at the individual rather than community level. While Muslims in France, and overlapping African and Maghrebi immigrant populations, face state violence and widespread economic discrimination, the overwhelming majority continue to reject violence and extremist ideologies. Prisons offer a clearer view of this complex relationship between government policies, Islam, radicalization, and terrorism. If authorities are to effectively dismantle radicalization networks in prisons, they must create targeted rehabilitation programs, end isolation of suspected radicals, empower Imams as independent authorities, and avoid securitizing entire populations who face continued discrimination.

Race and identity in the French criminal justice system

French pundits consistently highlight prisons as “incubators” for radicalization. The government estimates that 1,400 radicalized inmates currently reside in prison, 300 of whom are serving sentences for terrorism charges. A major blind spot for security services comes not from convicted terrorists, but from petty criminals who are radicalized while serving their sentences and who carry out attacks upon leaving. Notable former inmates charged with crimes like petty theft, drug possession, and larceny include Mohammed Merah, perpetrator of the 2012 Toulouse attacks, Mehdi Nemmouche of the 2014 Brussels Jewish Museum attack, and the assailants from the January 2015 Paris attacks, Amedy Coulibaly and Cherif Kouachi. Countering violent extremism (CVE) policies must, therefore, highlight both convicted terrorists and inmates more broadly susceptible to radicalization, despite clear indicators.

Hardline ideologies in French prisons exist alongside more broadly followed religious practices, namely Islam, which plays a major role in inmates’ social networks. Islam spread rapidly across the prison population in the 1970s with the spread of Tablighi, a movement within Sunni Islam which emphasizes piety. At first, prison authorities welcomed this trend and its stabilizing effect on prisoners, as it weakened the influence of organized criminal groups. It was only in the 1990s, during the Algerian Civil War and the growth of Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) cells across France, that prison officials began securitizing Islam, resulting in greater surveillance and the use of isolation on Muslim inmates. Currently, more than 60 percent of inmates identify as Muslim (almost 40,000 inmates total), despite making up only 12% of the general population. One reason for this overrepresentation stems from the failure of integration on the part of the government, as explained by sociologist Moussa Khedimellah. Many Muslim inmates come from banlieues, segregated neighborhoods predominantly populated by immigrant communities, with few opportunities for higher education or employment. Arrest rates in these neighborhoods far surpass the national average. While the government is prohibited from collecting statistics on race or religion, French Muslims, mostly from Arab or African descent, are estimated to comprise the majority of those arrested on drug charges, especially for marijuana. Another potential reason for the skew is widespread institutional violence directed towards France’s Arab and African population. The state of emergency passed in the aftermath of the November 2015 Paris attacks saw wide-scale police repression targeting French Muslims, with tens of thousands targeted with random searches and online surveillance, and thousands more subjected to house raids. Economic and political discrimination create additional issues. French Muslims are reportedly 400% less likely to receive a job offer than their Catholic counterparts, even when controlling for education and skill level. Second and third generation citizens with Arab and African surnames are told to change their names when submitting job applications. As a result of this widespread discrimination, charismatic “influencers” in prisons have little difficulty persuading inmates about the perceived irreconcilability of French identity and Islam when they can easily draw on lived experiences of institutional Islamophobia and the openly racist and violent discourse of political groups like the French National Front.

While the linkages between impoverished banlieue and radicalization are appealing, a closer look at recent attacks shows a more nuanced picture. In fact, while some attackers like the Kouachi brothers fit an expected pattern of fragmented social networks, poverty, barriers to employment, and repeat criminality, other attackers emerged from middle-class, secular families with access to education, like Coulibaly. Moreover, the average French citizen traveling to Iraq or Syria to fight for the Islamic State is increasingly white, middle-class, and occasionally female. France must address the rampant economic and social exclusion facing Arab and African populations in banlieu neighborhoods but should do so without the pretense of addressing the root causes of radicalization, which are far more nuanced. While difficult conditions certainly shaped the path to radicalization for some notorious individuals, the fact remains that the overwhelming majority of ‘banlieusards’ are not taking up arms against the French state. Therefore, while environmental factors can serve as stressors to sensitize an individual to radicalization, the unique social process that place in prisons requires a closer look.

The “Prison to Jihad Pipeline”

Most literature supports the idea that prisons, under certain conditions, can serve as potent incubators for radicalization. Across the Middle East, prisons hosted numerous jihadist figures, including Al Qaeda notables Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and ISIS founder Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Spanish, British, Belgian, and French prisons have all produced terrorists socialized during their detention who went on to carry out major acts of terrorism. Given the varying quality of life and style of detention across these different countries, radicalization is likely an individual process of socialization exacerbated by broader environmental stressors. Prisons offer unique opportunities for ideological indoctrination. The combination of emotional shock, isolation, and the need for social belonging push many prisoners to turn to moral frameworks or spirituality during their incarceration. Sociologist Farhad Khosrokhavar explains prison radicalization as a multi-stage process. Often, vulnerable inmates enter prison on minor charges and have little to no religious education. Once in prison, highly charismatic individuals will approach them and offer them a sense of belonging, beginning a gradual socialization process. The ideology used is designed to push individuals out of existing social isolation by giving them a worldview that is both empowering and highly intolerant, one that is especially attractive to those who already hold anti-state views. Once the relationship is established, the influencer uses a combination of violence and social norms to create a social network. These groups can outlast prison sentences, and connect former inmates to other extremists across Europe, and even with VEOs around the world. This radicalization process is seen clearly in the cases of Merah and Coulibaly. Both grew up in mostly non-religious households, and as a result of repeated experiences with criminal networks and the French justice system, came into contact with charismatic convicts who socialized them to violent, anti-state ideologies. This process of socialization continues to produce terrorists within the criminal justice system, and requires a strong policy response.

The general French state’s response to terrorism, informed by waves of domestic terrorism in the late 20th century, established a system that easily arrests and convicts suspects by casting a broad net over any individuals remotely linked to terrorist networks. While this allows a whole-of-network approach and can theoretically preempt terrorist attacks, it also solidifies otherwise weak links between terrorist networks and larger illicit economies present in banlieues. For example, the trabendo criminal networks present among first and second generation Maghrebi communities are mostly unconnected to terrorism, yet are frequent targets during mass arrests targeting potential terrorists, creating new linkages. Salah Abdeslam, the only surviving perpetrator of the November 2015 Paris attacks, managed to evade capture for over 150 days using social and family networks tied to the drug trade in the suburbs of Brussels. The very same ISIS cell involved in the attacks previously worked with petty criminals and drug dealers to recruit fighters for ISIS. While terrorism ought to be treated as a law enforcement issue, the government’s current approach is to broad and risks strengthening ties between otherwise unaffiliated criminals and terrorist cells. Moving beyond this approach would require greater intelligence gathering to target individual suspects, as well as broader policy shifts in urban development and limited drug legalization to weaken existing illicit economies.

Beyond arrests, the French approach towards deradicalization within prison focuses on more on sentencing than rehabilitation, an approach which undermines the potential for effective deradicalization programs. Over the last decade, in light of high profile attacks committed by former inmates, the government adopted several new approaches. First, prison officials gained an increasing power to overrule prisoner rights, notably the right to privacy, in the name of security. With the creation of a new Bureau of Prison Intelligence, prison officials can now wiretap phones, place hidden cameras, and examine electronic communications, using tools previously only available to intelligence services. Second, the government launched a new program designed to separately target “influencers” and inmates in the process of being radicalized. The program involves a higher ratio of wardens to prisoners, with staff trained in psychology, sociology, Islam, and history. Inmates are offered theatre workshops, debate seminars, and courses covering subjects ranging from legal studies to Japanese literature. These programs are intended to last six months, after which the inmate is released into the general population under close supervision by prison staff. Beyond prisons, the government has attempted to passed new laws to counter radicalization within schools, by better communicating the reasons for laicites to faith communities, teaching more colonial history in classrooms, and encouraging Arabic language courses within public spaces, although these have proven politically unattractive with conservative voters. This combination of policies seeks to deradicalize individuals through a variety of tools, which combat root factors in marginalized populations, engage with individuals along the path of radicalization, and isolate individuals deemed “too far gone.”

Results so far have been mixed. While the combination of isolation targeting influencers and robust CVE engagement with those at risk of radicalization has reduced the number of reported incidents of radicalization in prisons, analysts warn against premature declarations of success. In fact, many argue that influencers are now more hidden than they were in the past, as the policies have not stopped radicalization but rather pushed it further underground. This mirrors the government’s crackdown on hardline Imams in the early 2000s. One unintended consequence of this policy was that radicalization moved underground into social spaces where it couldn't be monitored or challenged by the government or community members. Another policy, the construction of dedicated isolation facilities for radicalized inmates, poses numerous problems. First, radicalization is difficult to measure and this sort of segregation results in pious inmates being lumped in with hardened extremists. Second, isolating radical prisoners from the general population risks pushing them furthers their radicalization, as they lose exposure to information beyond their personal beliefs and that of prison officials. Finally, this move risks empowering more radical cells amongst convicted terrorists. When the UK established such a special segregated unit in 2005, it put members of Al Qaeda, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and smaller Algerian outfits in the same unit. The result was a book, Limatha Intasarna (Why We Were Victorious), written by one of the inmates, collecting lessons from different inmates on military and organizational tactics, which was then smuggled out of prison for distribution to VEOs worldwide. Isolating radicals in special units may give the appearance of greater security, but simply enforces existing hardline ideologies and reduces the chance for radicalization to be challenged through a marketplace of ideas with other prisoners. However, the higher staff-to-inmate ratios and opportunities for education are promising, and show strong results in other countries where they are already deployed.

Beyond the potential backlash produced by isolating high-level influencers and radicalized inmates from the general population, these programs fail to fully interact with the environmental stressors that make inmates vulnerable to radicalization. One major issue in French prisons is the lack of faith services available to Muslim inmates. Research points to the crucial role that Imams can play in counter-radicalization efforts, as they can use theological arguments to dispel extremist ideologies. Yet as of 2008, only 100 Imams serviced France’s 200 prisons, compared with 480 Catholic, 250 Protestant, and 50 Jewish chaplains. More broadly, general debates about religion are heavily stifled by France’s strict interpretation of secularism, or laicite. In stark contrast to the United States, which bans government interference in religion, French laicite places strict restrictions on religious displays in public, notably in schools. Yet the country’s strong Catholic roots ensure that, to some degree, these restrictions target French Muslims to a greater degree than any other group. What debates do occur within prisons, are often undertaken by underpaid Imams and Islamic scholars who are vetted by authorities.  The strict regulations placed on their sermons by officials limit their ability to engage with radicalized inmates and result in their image as a tool of the state. As a result, radicalized inmates avoid contact with them, out of suspicion or fears of being punished for interacting with them. The government ought to empower Imams with more resources and independence, in order to create strong voices in prisons which can mediate between prisoners and officials, and counteract the power of influencers.

In addition to empowering religious figures, French prisons must better support the freedom of Muslim inmates to express their faith while serving their sentences, as current restrictions on gives additional ammunition to influencers. While Muslim prisoners can forego pork products, true halal meals are not an option in most prisons. Christian inmates receive special gifts from family members for Christmas, but Muslim inmates don’t receive the same on Ramadan. French authorities can significantly weaken “influencers” by enforcing religious requirements in line with standards established by the European Court of Justice and the United Nations. These include, among other things; defined halal menu options, alarm clocks to indicate prayer times, access to Korans, flexible dinner schedules to accommodate for fasting during Ramadan, the provision of soap and water at prayer spaces, and the right to meet with spouses in a private room. Religious accommodations in line with international standards can only serve to weaken influencers, and is crucial to promoting human rights in prisons.

If France seeks to break the prison to jihad pipeline, it ought to move beyond discourses which securitize broad segments of the population and empower moderate voices in prison indirectly, by giving Imams more support and autonomy, while ensuring that prisoners can freely practice their faith. While targeted support for prisoners at risk of radicalization can provide positive outcomes, it should be done in a manner that doesn’t fully isolate them, at risk of cementing hardline views. Finally, the prison debate should force a broader discussion in French society about the treatment of Muslims in general, with an emphasis on economic inclusion and genuine police reform.

The Mirroring of the Two 9/11s

The infamous images of hijacked airplanes hitting the World Trade Center’s twin towers are etched into the minds of every American old enough to remember the morning of September 11th, 2001. The terrorist attacks of that day spurred a decades-long war in the middle east and heightened tensions surrounding what it really meant to be an American. 9/11 is a date known all around the world, but rarely does the world talk about the first violent 9/11 that occured in Chile. Whereas the United States’ 9/11 was the doing of jihadist groups, Chile’s 9/11 was a government military coup. The morning of September 11th, 1973, the military began to bomb La Moneda, the presidential palace. By the end of the day, the president, Salvador Allende, was dead, and Chile’s government transformed from a burgeoning socialist democracy into a bloody military dictatorship that would last seventeen years. Both 9/11s have eerie similarities beyond their dates; the two events can trace their origins to the Cold War, and the United States’ desire to prevent the spread of communism.

The Cold War and the Creation of the Taliban

With the creation of the Truman Doctrine, stopping the spread of communism became one of the United States’ biggest foreign policy focuses. During the Cold War era, the United States’ geopolitical strategies throughout the world were aimed at curbing the slowly spreading reach of the Soviet Union. Beginning in the late 1970s, the Soviet Union attempted to gain control over Afghanistan, first invading the country in 1979, and later establishing a puppet regime in Kabul. Afghanistan’s complex history and ethnic diversity made it difficult for a country-wide takeover, and as a result, the Soviets’ invasion carved out pockets of the country where power was divided between the control of communist forces and Afghani rebels. The Soviets’ attempt to take over the country was met with significant resistant from locals, especially from Muslims who felt that the communists atheist beliefs threatened the practice of their religion. These resistant groups later developed into mujahideen groups, consisting of Muslim rebels. One of the largest forces supporting the mujahideen groups was the CIA.

After failing to prevent Iran’s Islamic revolution, the United States viewed Afghanistan as a key player in the middle east region, and was intent on not letting it fall into red hands. Thus, the CIA created rebel training camps in Pakistan where they trained Afghani muslim rebels, including Osama bin Laden. The United States, along with other anti-communist allies, allocated funds to help arm Afghani rebel groups in their fight against communist forces. The Reagan administration armed the mujahideen with anti-aircraft missiles, breaking previous policies against supplying rebels with American-made weapons. From the underbelly of the CIA training camps, the beginnings of what would later become the Taliban emerged . Michael Rubin of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, explained that following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States left Afghanistan, creating “a policy void in which radical elements” would flourish. The Taliban quickly conquered areas of southern Afghanistan, gaining power and support, viewed as an alternative to the conflict created by territorial control by rival mujahidin forces. The Taliban took control of the Afghan government, under a platform promising peace, disarmament, and a return to Islamic values. Later on, Osama bin Laden came to the aid of the Taliban, providing a few thousand highly trained soldiers, and creating the foundation for the alliance between al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

Neoliberalism and the rise of socialism in Chile

While much of the spread of the Cold War was occuring on the eastern continents, the United States quickly became aware of a communist wave gaining momentum in South America. Prior to the rise of the Unidad Popular, Chile’s left wing party composed of socialist and communist groups, Chile had been one of the first nations to wholeheartedly embrace the neoliberal policies laid out by the Bretton Woods System and the Washington Consensus. Historically, Chile had always suffered from great classism and vast inequality gaps between socioeconomic classes. Once neoliberal policies were implemented, these inequality gap only grew larger, also widening social tensions between the wealthy American-educated upper class, and the lower class dwelling in campamentos on the outskirts of the city. Free market reform was heavily supported by the political-economic elites in Chile, whose wealth would only further increase from foreign trade, but in the long run, neoliberal policies led to high unemployment and the banking collapse of 1982.

Social and economic tensions played out across Chile’s three main political parties, the Unidad Popular, la Democracia Cristiana, and the Partido Nacional. These societal tensions took center stage during the 1970 elections, and as a result, Salvador Allende, running as the Unidad Popular’s candidate” won the presidency with 45% of the popular vote, establishing the first democratically elected socialist government. Allende promised the nationalization of Chilean resources, income distribution, and agricultural reform, all changes that appealed heavily to the lower class who suffered under neoliberal economic policies. While Allende was popular with the lower class, the Unidad Popular lacked a majority in congress, creating a major obstacle in accomplishing his administration’s policy goals. One of Allende’s first steps towards transitioning Chile from a democratic state to socialism was to nationalize the copper mines, Chile’s largest export. One year into his administration, the worldwide price of copper fell, causing the deterioration of the economy. While Allende did not come to power through a revolution, the United States saw him as a threat, due to his close friendships with Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, as well as his staunch defense of the Cuban Revolution.

The morning of September 11th, 1973, Santiago woke up to the sounds of machine guns, and soldiers marching towards La Moneda, as part of an American-backed military coup. By the end of the day, General Augusto Pinochet had poised himself as the head of the new military dictatorship, and Allende had taken his own life rather than surrender himself to the military. Backed by the United States, Pinochet sought to eradicate any and all traces of socialism in the country. Under his leadership, Operation Condor was created. This alliance of right-wing dictatorships included Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Brazil. With the aid of the United States, Operation Condor launched a campaign of political repression, targeting socialist and communist leaders and sympathizers throughout the continent. Additionally, US interests in the region were represented by the Chicago Boys, a group of economists trained at the University of Chicago. While working with Pinochet’s regime, the Chicago Boys helped to once again revert the Chilean economy to its previous neoliberal practices. Throughout Pinochet’s seventeen year long military dictatorship, an estimated 1,198 people were disappeared, with hundreds more being subject to torture, and political executions.

The United States’ indifference in the face of the human rights violations committed under Pinochet’s regime is a topic rarely discussed. The United States’ involvement in the military coup reached far beyond simply supporting Pinochet in the name of preventing the spread of communism. In one of the more infamous cases, it came to light that the CIA trained the head of the DINA, Pinochet’s secret police force. Manuel Contreras oversaw the DINA, whose operations were responsible for the torture and disappearances of thousands of political enemies. Contreras also claimed that at Pinochet’s request, eight CIA agents came to Santiago with the intention of helping to organize the structure of the secret police. The United States humored the brutality of Pinochet’s dictatorship, a small price to pay for one less communist state. After evidence arose that Pinochet’s DINA was responsible for the assassination, in the middle of DC,  of a former Chilean diplomat, public outcry around the world largely condemned the actions of the military dictatorship, but the United States took no concrete steps to sever its ties with the regime During the mid 80s of the Reagan administration, foreign policy advisors and analysts began to feel frustrated at Pinochet’s refusal to return Chile to its former democratic state. Pinochet had served his purpose in eradicating communism, and in 1988 US officials pressured him to hold a plebiscite, where he was succeeded by a member of the democratic christian party.

In Chile, the implications of the military coup still resonate to this day. Under Pinochet’s regime, basic human rights were violated, and the entire country lived under a reign of terror for seventeen years. During the dictatorship, many right wing supporters praised Pinochet for his quick improvement of the economy, while the poor suffered. Pinochet’s regime focused on destroying the informal campamentos that surrounded Santiago, instead forcing the poor to move into conventillos, where multiple families were crammed into small homes. Not only did this forced migration destroy the social fabric of the campamentos, but it also decreased sanitation and nutrition standards for many of Santiago’s urban poor.

9/11’s Impact and Legacy in the United States and its Foreign Policy

Exactly 28 years after Chile’s military coup, American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center at 8:46am. By the end of the day, the terrorists’ actions killed 2996 people. Shortly thereafter, Osama bin Laden, founder of al-Qaeda, stepped forward to claim responsibility for the attacks, claiming that “it was confirmed to [him] that oppression and the intentional killing of innocent women and children [were] a deliberate American policy. Destruction is freedom and democracy, while resistance is terrorism and intolerance.” Thus, the American  “war on terror” was launched with the Bush administration vowing not to end until every terrorist group was defeated. Under the guise of battling terrorism, the United States invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, from 2001-2006. Now, almost two decades since the 2001 terrorist attacks, US troops still remain in both countries.

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 impacted the United States in more ways than just in simple casualties and injuries. After decades of enjoying its position as the hegemonic world leader, the United States felt vulnerable for the first time, shedding the illusion that its power  was untouchable. In response, strong pro-American, nationalistic sentiments flooded the country, appearing in everything from renaming french fries to freedom fries to the increasing popularity of the American war hero movie genre. The aggression with which the United States launched its counterattack in Afghanistan was met with widespread hostility towards the west. Since 9/11, the U.S. government has spent more than $7.6 trillion on defense and homeland security, in addition to implementing policies like the Patriot Act, aiming to make America safer against the threat of terrorism.

The Two 9/11s and the Construction of Memory

In both Chile and the United States, the legacies of their respective 9/11s persist  to this day. In Chile, there still exists much social division in regards to public opinion of the dictatorship. Outside of the classroom setting, the dictatorship is a taboo subject, with most reluctant to admit their past support of Pinochet. Many Chileans still support Pinochet, emphasizing the good he did for the economy, while glossing over the atrocities committed under his regime. Other former supporters claim that they had no idea that the tortures and disappearances were anything more than rumors. In the many years since the end of the military dictatorship, relatives of the disappeared and tortured have led the human rights movement in the country. Many NGOs dedicate their time to helping to secure evidence of torture and killings, in hopes to bring forth charges against the responsible parties. While many continue fighting to know what happened to their loved ones, others have fought to repress this knowledge. The Bachelet administration fought to lift the 50 year “veil of secrecy” over the testimony heard by the National Commission on Political Prison and torture. Bachelet’s bill was hotly contested, with supporters urging the disclosing of detention sites, and the identities of over 30,000 torture victims. For family, the failure to lift the veil was devastating. Because the identities of many of those who participated in the torturings and killings are still unknown, these individuals continue to enjoy military benefits and pensions. It is undeniable that the dictatorship forever changed the landscape of Chilean society, instilling a chilling sense of terror over the entire country, that to this day still leaves its trace.

Just seventeen years after the United States’ own 9/11,  the marks of the terrorist attacks still appear on everything from pop culture to the attitudes of Americans towards foreigners, and vice versa. The surge in American nationalism unified many Americans, while at the same time gave rise to a growing sense of islamophobia throughout the western world. In 2001, 93 anti-Muslim related hate crimes were reported to the FBI. Strong nationalism gave way to strong anti-Muslim, anti-terrorist sentiments. Additionally, research showed that post-9/11, Americans’ preferences for media changed, with most movie-goes now being more likely to prefer films that do not require much cultural engagement. While xenophobic beliefs seemed to have had reduced gradually over the years, they have seen a resurgence in recent years due to anti-Muslim remarks made by then-candidate Trump throughout the duration of the 2016 election cycle. Recent studies have shown that in 2016, anti-Muslim hate crimes actually surpassed those reported in 2001.

Conclusion

With both the Chilean and American 9/11 events, their origins can be dated back to the Cold War and the United States’ anti-communist doctrine. While the two events may seem unrelated at first glance, their roots and aftereffects mirror each other. In both countries, many suffered human rights violations as a result of events that took place in 9/11. In the present day, both Chile and the United States have undergone political shifts towards the right, with the respective administrations of Piñera and Trump. In both countries, the younger generations have shown strong leftist tendencies, fighting to question the beliefs of the right-leaning administrations. While Chile’s 9/11 can oftentimes be mistaken as a long-ago part of the nation’s history, today people still remember that it has many consequences. Recently, the Chilean minister of culture was forced to resign after old Facebook posts of his resurfaces, where he had called the National Museum of Memory and Human Rights leftist propaganda that failed to accurately represent the dictatorship. Even now, many people within Piñera’s administration have faced criticism for their past support of Pinochet. Defenders of human rights urge the importance of preserving national memory in both countries, sparking many conversations surrounding how exactly the respective 9/11s should be remembered and represented for generations to come.

Book Review: Writing the War on Terrorism, Richard Jackson

Book Review: Writing the War on Terrorism. Richard Jackson. Manchester: University of Manchester Press, March 2005. 240 pp. £15.99

Richard Jackson’s Writing the War on Terrorism is a useful study into American political discourse surrounding terrorism and counter-terrorism but ultimately self-defeating in simply trying to argue against the dominant narrative with its own idea of the truth, and ineffective in its proposed alternatives. In mapping the power relations between the dominant and non-dominant discourses, Jackson argues that “the ‘war on terrorism’ is now the dominant political narrative in America,” and is thus “highly successful” in both generating consent for U.S. military campaigns and normalizing militaristic counter-terrorism practices (pp. 2). However, Jackson’s critique of the “war on terrorism” fails to address the underlying power structure he himself cites, and which marginalizes alternative discourses. Furthermore, Jackson’s broader thesis—that such a discourse was not inevitable, but rather strategically deployed—and corresponding alternatives do not necessarily imply greater protection for human rights.

Jackson solves two important puzzles for post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy debate. First, he identifies the specific language of the “war on terrorism.” The “war on terrorism,” according to Jackson, consists of a multi-layered discourse which constructs the attacks on 9/11 as an act of war which victimized America; the “enemy” terrorists as an intrinsically inferior, barbarian “other;” the threat of attack as all-encompassing across time and space; and military aggression as a “just war” (pp. 31, 61, 96, 122). Jackson suggests these attacks were deliberate—although sometimes hyperbolic—constructed elements of the discourse, aimed to generate an artificial political consensus for both domestic policies, like the PATRIOT Act, and military operations abroad, such as the Iraq Invasion (pp. 181). He further suggests these linguistic instances are part of “a dialectical relationship between” language and policy, which thus explains the explicit and implicit worldviews embedded in U.S. policymaking (pp. 24). In fact, labelling the debate itself as pertaining to terrorism, not “a long-running cycle of violence and counter-violence between the American government and al Qaeda” decontextualizes the 9/11 attacks in favor of a political narrative that enables the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan (pp. 43). The utility in Jackson’s work here lies in its locating U.S. political discourse. In other words, citizens understandably want to know and understand their national leaders’ positions. Therefore, Jackson usefully holds contemporary U.S. policymakers accountable for the conscious and unconscious, explicit and implicit meanings they fix to the 9/11 attacks, terror actors, the threat of terror, and military warfare through their use of language.

The second achievement in Jackson’s work lies in his mapping the relations between discourses, therefore explaining the characteristics of the “war on terrorism,” as well as its dominance over alternative foreign policy discourses. To that end, Jackson relates the dominant discourse—“the war on terrorism”—to alternative discourses, “such as pacifist, human rights based, feminist, environmentalist, or anti-globalization discourses,” of which he provides several examples (pp. 19). For example, Jackson argues that, whereas the war on terrorism created “a myth of exceptional grievance,” an alternative discourse could have “emphasized solidarity with victims of violence in other countries” (pp. 37-38). However, to the extent that “the public debate uses mainly the language, terms, ideas, and ‘knowledge’” of the war on terrorism, it dominates the proposed alternative solidarist discourse (pp. 19). If citizens deserve to know what their national leaders believe, then they also deserve to know how much weight those beliefs hold in the current U.S. political discourse. Clearly, because the language a discourse (re)produces leads to specific policy outcomes, identifying the elements of the discourse of the “war on terrorism” and its relation to other discourses indeed represents a useful achievement in Jackson’s work.

However useful Jackson’s mapping of the discursive landscape may be, though, his central critique of the dominant discourse and his proposed alternatives ultimately fail to interrogate the underlying power structure of U.S. policy discourse itself. He further fails to propose clearly effectual alternative discourses that could potentially lead to less emphasis on security, that problematically curtails civil liberties and problematically constructs those responsible for the 9/11 attacks as irrational, hateful, and fundamentally opposed to “our way of life.” Jackson critiques the “war on terrorism” in suggesting that U.S. policymakers deliberately exploited the fear caused by the attacks on 9/11 to represent terrorists as irrational, hateful savages, and the U.S. as alternatively victimized and justified in violating human rights both domestically and abroad (pp. 181). But this relates only to the “war on terrorism” discourse itself, not the system of unequal power relations that oppresses and marginalizes alternative discourses. Jackson proposes a clear “normative commitment to positive social change” in his book, as did Bush and other top leaders in proposing to protect “our way of life” from a perceived terrorist threat (pp. 25, 47). The Bush Administration might have had dubious intentions, but then Jackson’s intentions seem similarly untrustworthy, given the lack of credible external sources to validate them. After all, his alternatives explicitly seek to supplant “the war on terrorism” as the hegemonic discourse without seeking to eradicate or fundamentally alter the discursive power structure that allows hegemonic discourses to marginalize subaltern discourses in the first place.

Jackson’s proposed alternatives read more as self-defeating writings of post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy than ones that could radically alter the U.S. political landscape. This is further evidenced by the ineffectiveness of Jackson’s alternatives in protecting human rights. For example, Jackson proposes constructing the 9/11 attacks as criminal acts, not acts of war (pp. 40). However, to the extent that, for example, the War on Drugs and the systematic police brutality against black Americans rely exclusively on discursive constructions of criminality, Jackson’s alternative does not necessarily imply greater protection for human rights in their resultant policies. Jackson’s claim that the “war on terrorism” was not inevitable, moreover, ignores the specific institutional contexts and modalities through which the discourse was constructed (pp. 107). For instance, the near religious-like zeal with which Republican policymakers vindicated the U.S. defense budget for years before the attacks likely played a role in the intentional framing of the 9/11 attacks as an act of war, yet the alternatives Jackson suggests downplay the ways in which these institutional thought processes manifest themselves in discourse by claiming that such discourses were not inevitable (pp. 38). Essentially, in both his critique of the dominant discourse and his alternatives, Jackson contradicts its own premise that dominant discourses result in negative outcomes by marginalizing subaltern discourses.

On the one hand, Jackson’s work locates the dominant discourse’s place within U.S. political climate and its relations to other discourses. This serves an important and useful explanatory function in holding national leaders responsible and informing the public on their positions. On the other hand, however, Jackson ultimately defeats his work’s central tenet, as his alternatives seek to supplant the “war on terrorism” as the hegemonic discourse without addressing the underlying structure of discursive power relations itself.

Bibliography

Jackson, Richard. 2005. Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics, and Counter-Terrorism. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Beyond Supply and Demand: Using Economic Principles to Explain Terrorism

Introduction

Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, a dramatic rise in the study of terrorism occurred in academia. Although recent actions by U.S. military and Treasury officials seek to deplete ISIS’ economic resources, little literature exists regarding the role of economics on the development and behavior of terrorist groups. This paper examines the economic motives of terrorist groups and proposes possible solutions to deter and prevent future terrorist attacks. The first section focuses on the economic causes of terrorism utilizing economic principles such as rational choice theory and self-interest. The second section uses market structure and club theory to examine the dynamics of terrorist group behavior. The third section of the essay explores the use of deterrents including welfare spending, offensive strikes, and restricting economic resources as means of both hindering terrorist organization growth and thwarting terrorist attacks.

Rational Choice Theory, Self-Interest, and Suicide Bombers

To better understand terrorists, this paper classifies them as rational actors who aim to maximize utility. Terrorism is a rational choice because the perpetrators weigh their decisions based on marginal benefit versus marginal cost. Terrorism, as described throughout the essay, is defined as “the premeditated use, or threat of use, of extranormal violence to obtain a political objective through intimidation or fear directed at a large audience.” Terrorists consider the possibility of a successful attack against the possible risk of an agent such as the government preventing the attack and detaining terrorist members. Terrorists also seek to maximize utility by inflicting the greatest possible damage at the lowest possible cost.

Academics may also describe terrorists as self-interested or present-aim actors to further explain their economic motives. The former is defined as considering one’s choice based on tradeoffs regarding cost, benefits, and resources, whereas the latter occurs when an actor successfully pursues their objective at the time of the attack. Present-aim terrorists do not consider possible tradeoffs and base their actions off the most efficient means of destruction possible. Present-aim terrorists claim non-monetary motives behind their actions and would substitute a reduction in income in exchange for more successful terrorist attacks. However, Juliet Elu’s article examining terrorism in Africa and South Asia disproves this idea. Based on the study’s comparison of nations’ GDP per capita and their rate of terrorist attacks from 1980-2004, a positive correlation exists between per-capita-income and terrorist attack rates. This relationship demonstrates that terrorists do not attack low per-capita-income nations due to the decreased economic opportunity, thus exemplifying the idea that terrorists act as self-interested actors.

Figures 1 + 2: Graphs illustrating the relationship between Africa and South Asian nations’ GDP per capita and their number of terrorist incidents from 1980-2004.

Although conventional wisdom may regard suicide bombers as irrational due to their inherently self-destructive actions, economic theory demonstrates their function as self-interested, rational actors who seek to maximize utility based on tradeoffs regarding benefits and costs. A positive correlation exists between suicide bombers and high amounts of human capital; the latter of which economists define as an individual’s skills or knowledge. This relationship is likely due to the increased marginal benefit a highly-intelligent terrorist provides to a terror organization. Despite the destruction of human capital due to the suicide bomber’s inevitable death, the action reaps a large amount of utility for the terrorist organization.

Suicide bombers are also more likely to attack an area with a large population density. Despite the initial explanation of choosing to target high-population dense areas due to increased damages, this decision remains rooted in economic theory. Utilizing this method of destruction provides a low-cost, high benefit means of destruction. The suicide bomber will likely inflict mass casualties due to the high-probability of success. Eli Berman, author of Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism, observes that the operation poses little cost in the form of risk due to the impossibility of the government detaining the perpetrator following their actions. Also, terrorist groups often delegate the role of suicide bomber to those least likely to defect. These members often possess large amounts of human capital and are highly likely to carry out the mission.

Market Structure, Economic Development, and Club Theory

A nation’s market structure may serve as a key factor in a country’s rise of terrorism. Terrorist attacks may occur due to the transition to a more advanced economy. Charles Boehmer and Mark Daube’s research posits a link between the rise of terrorism and the conversion from a clientele economy to a market-based economy. The former consists of an economic structure based on hierarchical values and the accumulation of influence, whereas the latter is based on contract law and perceived egalitarianism among all economic actors. This economic overhaul likely contributes to the rise of terrorism due to a perceived overthrow of social order. The economy no longer remains focused on hierarchy and all economic agents are equal. This situation may lead to social unrest, contributing to the rise of terrorism as a means of reestablishing previous socioeconomic values.

Despite the study’s evidence of a correlation between economic transition and the rise of terrorism, conflicting literature exists regarding the occurrence of terrorism in high and middle-income nations. Although the paper previously pointed out that Elu’s research developed a correlation between a country’s per capita GDP and its number of terrorist attacks from 1980-2004, a different data set yields disparate results. By analyzing data of 144 nations’ rates of terrorist incidents and GDP per capita from 1970-2000, Boehmer and Daube conclude that middle-income states are most vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Their study explains this result by noting that many middle-income nations recently underwent the transition from a clientele to a market-based economy, providing the potential for social unrest and the possible subsequent rise of terrorism. Also, Boehmer and Daube believe that terrorist attacks occur less frequently in high-income nations due to those states’ ability to create government programs to lessen social strife and reduce the incentives of forming a terrorist group. Although their analysis arrives at different conclusions than Elu’s work, neither study disproves the other due to the differences in their respective data sets.

Figure 3: Graph illustrating the correlation between 144 nations’ GDP per capita and their number of terrorist attacks from 1970-2004.

In addition to a nation’s market structure and level of economic development, club theory helps explain terrorists’ behavior. In the context of this paper, club theory denotes a group, particularly a radical religious organization, that provides goods through acts of charity. Terrorist organizations epitomize this idea by their offering of mutual aid in which individual members of groups such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad provide services to the families of organization members based on financial and political support. Groups that follow this model must avoid the free-rider problem, in which terrorists may not contribute to the group and receive services for free. However, this problem seldom occurs due to the demands terrorist organizations place on new recruits. Before receiving charitable services, potential members must sacrifice their time and assist others in the community. By providing a test of loyalty in the form of initial sacrifice, terrorist organizations address this economic issue and ensure that all members will contribute to the group at some point in their membership.  

Welfare Spending, Offensive Strikes, and Resource Deprivation as Incentives

Although the paper has focused on the economics behind terrorism, the subject can also be utilized to prevent both the rise of terrorism and future terrorist attacks. Many academics and policymakers propose welfare spending as a means of deterring terrorism. However, literature on the subject yields conflicting results, and the spending must be properly implemented and administered to achieve the desired outcome. The success of increasing spending on government programs to reduce terrorism is best demonstrated by the actions of Northern Ireland. Following the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, the UK and the EU provided grants to Northern Ireland in the form of peace money designed to fund public projects that aimed to reduce social inequalities between Catholics and Protestants.

Within five years, disparities between the two groups in terms of healthcare, education, and housing had been eliminated, which also correlated with a reduction in terrorist attacks. UK and Northern Ireland leaders credit local administration and oversight to the program’s success, which permitted the peace money to be directed to projects designed to reduce conflict between Catholics and Protestants while also helping to economically improve Northern Ireland’s cities.

However, welfare spending does not guarantee decreased terrorist activity. Schnellenbach notes that transferring wealth to communities that support terrorist organizations will likely result in increased financial contributions to the group. Ensuring proper fund implementation may prevent this problem. Money invested in public works projects designed to improve societal aspects such as public health and education will likely lower terrorist support. This concept remains true due to the use of incentives. Although providing funds to terrorist sympathizing areas may appear to reward terrorists, doing so may result in decreased support for the terrorist organization if local government oversees the money’s proper implementation. Local residents will be less likely to join a terror cell if economic conditions improve, as there would be little economic benefit to joining the terrorist organization.

Like the conflicting literature regarding welfare spending, academics also debate the efficacy of offensive strikes versus restricting economic resources as means of hindering terrorist attacks. Proponents of the former believe that government raids and preemptive strikes disrupt terrorist organizations and deter terrorists from committing attacks. However, countries seldom implement this strategy due to both the free-rider problem and information asymmetry. Offensive action often requires multinational cooperation and remains more difficult to implement than defensive strategies such as building a wall. The free-rider problem may occur due to one nation not participating in the anti-terrorist coalition yet benefitting from the efficacy of the offensive strike. Similarly, terrorists often know more about government actions than vice-versa, adding to the difficulty of offensive action due to the risk of the targeted group acquiring knowledge of the plan.

Peace economist researchers often recommend restricting resources to terrorist groups as a means of hindering attacks. Despite the conventional defensive strategy of protecting a nation’s assets, Intriligator suggests governments focus on raising the costs of terrorism by cutting off resources to terrorist organizations. This tactic increases the difficulty of terrorist organizations to acquire valuable assets such as money, weapons, and intelligence. This increased cost of terrorism may deter potential recruits from joining terrorist groups. Also, protecting a nation’s assets by increasing security in areas such as government buildings and major transportation hubs remains ineffective at thwarting terrorist attacks due to the concept of substitution. Rather than increase the amount of resources to commit an attack at a place of high-security such as an airport, terrorist groups will devote their efforts to attacking other areas of high-population density, such as train stations and city centers.

Conclusion

This paper examines the role of economics in terrorism through both terrorist actions and possible deterrents. Despite media coverage surrounding ISIS’ predominantly oil-based economy, utilizing economic ideas to model terrorist behavior remains important. Rational choice and self-interest help explain the behavior of individual terrorist, as demonstrated by the economics behind suicide bombers. Market structure and club theory act as means of explaining the actions of terrorist organizations. Also, the use of deterrents such as welfare spending, offensive strikes, and restricting resources function as possible solutions to prevent both terrorist attacks and the growth of terrorist groups. Further study is needed on the behavior of terrorist organizations outside of the Middle East. However, better understanding of the economics of terrorism may assist the United States in defeating the Islamic State by financially suffocating the group’s struggling economy in addition to coordinated military attacks.

Al-Qaeda’s Looming Operational Comeback: Why al-Qaeda is Still More Dangerous Than the Islamic State

The Islamic State is currently the hot topic in regards to global terrorism, surpassing the infamous al-Qaida, and for good reason. Al-Qaeda has been slowly diminishing in power, and the death of key leaders, including such notable personalities such as Osama bin Laden, Anwar al-Awlaki, and Nasir al-Wuhayshi, as a result of United States drone strikes and special operations raids, have been a huge factor towards this. Also adding to the overshadowing of al-Qaeda is the fact that the Islamic State’s brand of violence is sensational and captures violence in a way that al-Qaeda hasn’t. While al-Qaeda has conducted its fair share of gruesome and public executions (mostly through recorded beheadings), the Islamic State has done that and much more. The violence of the Islamic State crosses boundaries, literally and figuratively. However, this status is temporary. Al-Qaeda is set to make a comeback once the Islamic State fails, and indeed the Islamic State’s failure is inevitable, leaving its legacy and existence short lived. Territory that was previously gained is now being lost at a steady pace, and the groups funding is becoming more and more difficult to find. The Islamic State’s recent and sudden rise to fame came very quickly, setting upon the global stage seemingly out of nowhere. Al-Qaeda, on the other hand, has been operational for almost 30 years, and its fame and notoriety was brought about through literally decades of determination and commitment. The very nature of the group as a whole has enables al-Qaeda to remain formidable, and because of this, al-Qaeda will again become the most dangerous international terrorist organization in the coming years.

First, it is necessary to acknowledge the histories of the two organizations and their relationship with each other. Al-Qaeda has its origins in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Osama bin Laden was one of many Salafist Jihadists who traveled to Afghanistan in order to fight with the Mujahedeen, a loosely organized affiliation of Jihadists all wishing to fight the Soviet invaders and the Soviet-supported Afghanistan government. Learning from his experiences from fighting with the Mujahedeen, bin Laden sought to permanently change the way Jihad was fought.

By targeting the Western nations that continue to prop up the corrupt or un-Islamic governments throughout the Middle East, the “Far Enemy” (as bin Laden referred to them) would eventually lose interest in meddling with Middle Eastern affairs and withdraw their support from the governments there. The “apostate” governments that plagued Muslims throughout the world would inevitably fall, paving the way for another great Islamic Empire and a new political order, akin to the global political environment of the 7thcentury. His answer on how to make this happen was the creation of a small, elite force of Jihadist fighters who would conduct the necessary attacksthat would help topple these governments. In 1988, bin Laden gathered his followers from the Mujahedeen and created al-Qaeda, which literally translates to “the base,” referring to their Salafist ideological desire to return the Muslim world to a political order based on what they view as Islam’s fundamental roots. It wasn’t until the mid-1990s that bin Laden refocused al-Qaeda to start conducting attacks solely against Western targets.

The Islamic State has its origins as a Jordanian militant jihadist organization by the name of Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, or JTJ. The group was founded in 1999 by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who later focused the group’s attention to Iraq after the U.S invasion in 2003. Zarqawi, already an associate of bin Laden from their time together in Afghanistan, eventually pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden and officially changed the group’s name to al-Qaeda in Iraq, or AQI. This new partnership allowed al-Qaeda to more effectively organize and conduct attacks as part of the growing insurgency in Iraq.

It wasn’t long, however, before friction between the two groups began to arise, despite Zarqawi’s pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda. Severe ideological differences and conflicts began to plague the relationship soon after the alliance was formed. Bin Laden wished for Zarqawi to focus solely on attacking government and Western targets in Iraq, particularly the United States. However, Zarqawi insisted on creating a massive sectarian conflict in Iraq by targeting “apostate” Shia Muslims as well. While not completely counter to his own ideology, bin Laden thought that this tactic was counterproductive to the more immediate goals of the organization and would eventually lead to a drop in popular support.

In January 2006, Zarqawi initiated the merger between AQI and another large insurgent faction, the Mujahedeen Shura Council, which was itself a collection of various Sunni militias. The merger greatly increased AQI’s capabilities and manpower, but also made the group an even larger target. The following June, Zarqawi was killed by a U.S airstrike. The previous leader of the Mujahedeen Shura Council, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, and an Egyptian born al-Qaida veteran, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, both took over as the new leaders of AQI and renamed the organization the Islamic State of Iraq, or ISI. When they were both killed in the same U.S ground operation in April 2010, a prominent yet reserved jihadist named Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took over, taking on the daunting (and increasingly dangerous) role of keeping the group functional and focused despite huge setbacks. Soon after the Syrian Civil War broke out in 2011, ISI expanded operations into Syria as well, changing the name of the organization once more into the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS, with al-Baghdadi declaring himself the Caliph, the sole authority of Islam on earth. It was in this expansion that Al-Baghdadi’s leadership conflicts within al-Qaeda reached a climax. Al-Zawahiri, the successor to bin Laden, cut all ties with ISIS after al-Baghdadi refused to disband the organization and fall in line behind the al-Nusra Front, the primary al-Qaeda organization operating in Syria. In response, al-Baghdadi declared al-Nusra as yet one more enemy to be fought.

Aside from ideological disparities, operational differences also played a role in the rift between the two organizations. Al-Qaeda remains focusedon targeting the Far Enemy and striving for collective unity amongst jihadist groups, hoping that this will lead to the eventual collapse of corrupt apostate regimes. The Islamic State, on the other hand, views itself as a leader among other jihadist organizations and seeks to obtain actual territorial ground and exert influence organically while directly targeting apostate regimes on the battlefield.

This involves not only a more conventional kind of warfare, but also extremely sensational violence to set itself apart from other jihadist groups. Shia Muslims, Yazidi’s, Christians, and other ethnic and religious minorities were all victims (and still are) of this new approach, suffering a brutal genocide that plagued any territory under ISIS control. Multitudes of Iraqi government workers were executed. Thousands of captured Iraqi soldiers were blindfolded, marched to a field, and massacred all at once. Suspected homosexuals were forced to leap off of multiple story buildings. Women were shot in the street without hesitation for suspected prostitution, or even for merely wearing red, and were tortured for breastfeeding in public. Minority women, when they weren’t killed with their families, were sold into sex slavery. Children were crucified for taking pictures or having phones. A captured Jordanian pilot was locked in a cage and set on fire. All of these atrocious incidents and more are confirmation of the truly outstanding sensational violence that distinguishes ISIS from other like-minded groups. Even al-Qaida, a group which infamously conducted the single most sensational act of terrorist violence the world has ever witnessed on September 11th, 2001, were put off by these practices and admonished them for being too extreme.

Aside from the Middle East, the Islamic State has been able to successfully conduct attacks throughout Europe. The multiple deadly attacks in France and Belgium illustrate the Islamic State’s goal of also targeting the Far Enemy. However, there is a key distinction to be made here. Al-Qaeda’s reasoning for targeting the West is ultimately more political than the motivations for the Islamic State. While al-Qaeda attacks the U.S and Europe in order to convince the West to stop attacking Islam and meddling in Middle Eastern affairs, the Islamic State’s motivations are more religious in nature and are actually meant to provoke the West into persecuting and attacking Muslims, which they believe will create the conditions necessary to bring about the prophesized apocalypse. Regardless, both motivations and strategies rely on only a small number of operational cells and radicalized lone wolves.

Attempting to wage a conventional war means that the Islamic State must be able to capture and hold territory, as well as maintain a continuous source of funding. Although the Islamic State has the ability to directly tax residents in its territory and have its own oil trade thanks to its seizure of strategic oil fields, these sources of funding hinge on the Islamic State’s ability to hold territory for a prolonged period of time. So when land or cities are lost, so is funding. And with the exception of early successes, the Islamic State is quickly losing its grip on important territory. Pressure from the U.S-led coalition airstrikes and special operations actions, as well as the gaining momentum and successes of the Iraqi Army and Kurdish forces, are slowly dwindling the Islamic State’s control. As territory continues to be lost and resources run dry, the Islamic State will have to revert back to unconventional warfare. Members will go underground, blend back into society, and continue to plot deadly terrorist attacks. Recent trends show that this is already beginning to happen.

Since al-Qaeda is already operating in the underground realm in many of the same regions as the Islamic State, it is able to take advantage of an already established and effective operational flow, which itself is boosted by the decreased competition due to the Islamic State’s decline. To fund its operations, al-Qaeda relies primarily on international donors, ransoms, charity scams, and other miscellaneous financial crimes. While this may not add up to much, al-Qaeda’s decentralized nature actually limits the fallback from this, as many al-Qaeda cells depend on personal relationships and other forms of self-funding. As Islamic State fighters continue to face both operational and financial defeats, many of them will eventually gravitate towards al-Qaeda and take advantage of its willingness to work with other groups, involving themselves in these underground networks. Over time, they will eventually commit and defect back towards al-Qaeda.

Not only that, but al-Qaeda is doing more to win the “hearts and minds” of the Muslim population. This is best exemplified by the drastically different approaches the two organizations have taken in operations across the Middle East. When the Islamic State was destroying ancient Syrian temples and smashing timeless pieces of art, the al-Qaeda affiliated al-Nusra Front opened up a “Relief Department,” helping to provide food, healthcare, and even children’s playgrounds to the Syrian people affected by the civil war. When al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, acquired an additional $100 million through a bank robbery in Yemen, they used the money to improve the infrastructure and eliminate taxes for the Yemeni citizens living under their control.

Al-Qaeda could have very easily invested that money to fund a large sensational attack, as the Islamic State has done, but instead used it to improve the lives of Muslims. Al-Qaeda recognizes the value of winning the hearts and minds of people who may be wary of giving support to an overt terrorist organization. The Islamic State, on the other hand, is largely in the practice of mass executing those who do not immediately pledge support and allegiance to their self-proclaimed Caliph.

Despite recent operational hindrances, al-Qaeda strives on and remains determined to conduct attacks around the globe, and is seeing some successes. Operations in the Arabian Peninsula are ongoing and successful. AQAP has successfully been exploiting the current conflict in Yemen with little to no resistance, while also continuing to build public support as a legitimate source of governance in an otherwise unstable country.

Operations in Syria are steadfast, despite constant engagement with multiple formidable opponents including the Islamic State, the Syrian Government, various Syrian rebel groups, Iranian-backed militias, and Russian and American airstrikes. The al-Nusra Front has displayed excellent organization as well as operational and logistical prowess at a level that the Islamic State fails to match, and exhibited the ability to attract support and cooperation from groups who do not necessarily agree with its ideology.

In Africa, new surges in recruitment and a violent wave of attacks in Libya and Tunisia show an increase in capabilities and gaining momentum in the region. Al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda affiliated organizations, such as al-Shabaab, are conducting a steady stream of attacks on government officials throughout other parts of Africa, particularly in Somalia and Kenya. Competition with Islamic State affiliated organizations, such as Boko Haram, is existent but dwindling as the Islamic State loses its ability to send support to such factions. Al-Qaeda has even begun to exhibit limited cooperation and pooling of resources with Boko Haram and al-Shabaab, further increasing their own capabilities.

Al-Qaeda’s structure and strategy has always been decentralized, especially since 9/11. This poses operational challenges, but the group has been able to overcome them despite leadership failures. It also serves as a strength, and helps the group maintain longevity. Unlike the Islamic State, al-Qaeda has never attempted to claim an exclusive authority on global Jihad, but rather seeks to act as a unifier of jihadist groups towards a common goal. Some of these groups, like AQAP or AQI, currently use or have used the “al-Qaeda” brand name. Others, such as al-Shabaab, do not, and were even instructed by bin Laden not to adopt the name, as an attempt to avert Western attention.

Another example of this is when al-Zawahiri sanctioned Jabhat al-Nusra’s official split from al-Qaeda as part of a deliberate global strategy. Operationally, this split did nothing. The relationship still exists and al-Qaeda still functionally acts as a supporter to Jabhat al-Nusra, which has recently rebranded itself and changed its name to Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. This was done purposefully as an attempt to thwartinternational attention since it is no longer “officially” linked to al-Qaeda.

However, because of the rebranding, other small groups that are fighting the Syrian government may now be more willing to create pacts and align themselves with the group. This complements the already existing attitude among these Syrian groups that the al-Qaeda affiliated organization is much more inclusive, cooperative, and easier to work with than the Islamic State. This speaks towards the heart of and truly exemplifies al-Qaeda’s broad global strategy: unify jihadists everywhere in order to effectively dismantle the apostate regimes. The Islamic State’s more forceful and conquering strategy is starkly different.

As ISIS falters and loses credibility as the mantle of global Jihad, al-Qaeda will jump at the opportunity to reap any benefits to be had. Financiers, foreign fighters, and radicalized recruits will begin to turn their attention towards al-Qaeda once more. Al-Zawahiri certainly isn’t as charismatic or adept a leader as bin Laden, but the decentralized nature of the organization limits any direct fallout from this. Al-Qaeda has essentially transformed itself into a series of loosely organized movements fighting under the al-Qaeda name. And because of the broad disposition of al-Qaeda’s ideology, nearly every independent movement is able to align itself with al-Qaeda very easily.

The United States and its allies have mostly focused efforts on the Islamic State, and while they maybe haven’t completely ignored al-Qaeda as a threat, it certainly seems that way. While this is understandable, it’s also a mistake. Al-Qaeda has benefited from the distracted attention generated by the obnoxious activities of the Islamic State. The Islamic State certainly remains a critical threat to stability in the Middle East and U.S interests abroad, but it is al-Qaeda that remains the greater danger against the United States homeland. Their determination to strike at the Far Enemy, their willingness to pool resources and cooperate with other terrorist groups, and their projected growing capability to do so, puts al-Qaeda in a prime position to strike.

The Islamic State is indeed an extremely violent organization and remains a serious threat to global security, and deadly attacks in France, Belgium, Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan, and elsewhere are testament to its determination to wage Jihad despite setbacks on its home front in Iraq and Syria. However, the future of the Islamic State looks bleak. The Islamic State is extremely intolerant of other jihadist groups if their ideology differs in any measure, and seeks to be the sole authority of Jihad, and therefore sees themselves as the only legitimate Jihadist group. Not only is this very polarizing (you are either part of the Islamic State or you are their enemy), but it eliminates the possibility of forging important alliances. This is crucial if they wish to grow and make significant expansions outside of the Middle East (and even so within the Middle East). If the momentum from the U.S-led coalition and the Iraqi Army holds, the Islamic State will continue to lose territory, popular support, resources, and manpower. Without any allies to turn to, the more moderate-leaning Islamic State fighters and leaders will take what resources they have left and eventually find their way back towards al-Qaeda and its affiliates (specifically Jabhat Fatah al-Sham), creating an even stronger and more robust al-Qaeda organization.

Al-Qaeda has been operational for almost 30 years, despite fighting two separate and prolonged wars against two different superpowers and their allies across the globe, as well as major leadership deaths and failures. As an organization, al-Qaeda isn’t going anywhere, and only seeks to benefit from the dismantling of the Islamic State. Its continued determination to strike at the Far Enemy makes this expectation even more concerning.

Comparative Analysis of Bush and Obama Pre- and Post-9/11 Strategies

Background

On September 11, 2001, 19 Islamic terrorists from Saudi Arabia and several other Arab nations associated with the Islamic extremist group al-Qaeda hijacked four American aircrafts and carried out suicide attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. Two planes were flown into the towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, a third plane struck the Pentagon outside of Washington, and the fourth plane crashed in a field in Pennsylvania, its target unknown but suspected to be the White House or the Capitol Building in Washington. The attacks killed over 3,000 people, including more than 400 police officers and firefighters, and seriously injured over 10,000 others. The attacks on 9/11 triggered major U.S. initiatives to combat terrorism and were the basis for the Iraq and Afghan wars. On the night of 9/11, President George W. Bush gave an ominous address from the Oval Office in which he stated, “We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.”

The Build to September 11th

During Bill Clinton’s Presidency in 1998, the United Nations inspection agency withdrew from Baghdad in protest of Saddam Hussein’s unwillingness to cooperate with inspection measures. President Clinton then called on American Armed Forces to strike military and security targets in Iraq due to the belief that Hussein was harboring weapons of mass destruction (WMD); the President stated that Hussein’s reluctance to cooperate with inspections presented “a clear and present danger to the stability of the Persian Gulf and the safety of people everywhere.” The U.S. pledged to enact a long-term strategy of containment toward Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction, but at no point did the Clinton administration consider an operation specifically designed to overthrow Hussein’s regime.

In December of 2000, President Clinton told President-Elect George W. Bush that the biggest threat to be concerned with would be al Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden. In January of 2001, soon-to-be Vice President Dick Cheney met with Pentagon national security officials to discuss Iraq; the Pentagon reported to Cheney that Saddam Hussein was contained and isolated, and that there was no need for any aggressive action against him, and that acting otherwise would “immediately engender strong opposition in the region and throughout the world.” However, the Bush administration did not agree with the Pentagon’s sentiments nor did it share President Clinton’s concern with al Qaeda. The Administration instead prioritized China’s increasing military power and the desire to oust Saddam Hussein from power. Former national coordinator for security, infrastructure protection, and counterterrorism in the Clinton administration Richard Clarke was appointed as a special advisor to the NSC by Bush and was startled at the lack of attention that was being placed on al Qaeda by the new Administration. He told his colleagues that the terrorist organization was “clearly planning a major series of attacks against us” and that they “must act decisively and quickly” against imminent attacks. The President’s advisors did not believe Clark’s warnings and said he was giving bin Laden “too much credit.” Throughout the summer months of 2001, the CIA repeatedly warned of imminent attacks by bin Laden on American facilities. On May 1, June 22, 23, and 25, intelligence briefs issued by the CIA warned of imminent attacks. Bush disregarded the warnings.

Strategy of President Bush

Immediately following the attacks, Bush and his advisors met with the CIA to discuss strategy. It was debated whether the focus moving forward should be on the destruction of al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden or against terrorism more broadly. The CIA director of counterterrorism argued that the Taliban and al Qaeda needed to be jointly eliminated, due to the intricate entwinement between the two groups. The topic was continuously tabled, but finally, after continuous pressure from the President to develop a concrete plan of attack rapidly, a decision was made.

President Bush’s first objective in the wake of 9/11 was to topple the Taliban regime and attack al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Thus, Operation Enduring Freedom was the first initiative launched by the President. On October 7, 2001, the U.S., with assistance from Australia, France, and the United Kingdom, carried out air strikes on Taliban and al Qaeda targets in an attempt to stop the Taliban from harboring al Qaeda, and to stop al Qaeda from using Afghanistan as a base for operations. Due to the U.S.-led effort in Afghanistan, the Taliban was forced to relinquish power and the state was renamed the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. However, by the time the allied forces took over the capital, most high-ranking Taliban and al Qaeda officials had escaped to Pakistan. Within two years, Taliban forces launched a counteroffensive. Within five years, Bush had almost doubled the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan from 26,607 to 48,250.

His second goal was to oust Saddam Hussein, the 5th President of Iraq, in order to “prevent him from developing weapons of mass destruction” and to help Iraq create a stable democratic regime. The President and his advisors were set on the idea that Hussein was attempting to recreate the state’s nuclear program that had been eliminated after the Gulf Wars. The Bush Administration was desperate to make a connection between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, even though top CIA officials and International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) officials insisted that there was absolutely no evidence that Hussein was rebuilding a nuclear program, and that connections between Hussein and al Qaeda were weak. Bush, however, did not accept these claims and continued to press on in order to create a rhetoric that Hussein and al Qaeda were inexplicably linked, and that Hussein was an imminent threat to freedom and U.S. security. Perhaps a more truthful rationale for the Administration’s invasion of Iraq was the desire to democratize the region in order to enhance Israel’s security. Another interest that was severely under-articulated was the United States’ long-standing dependence on Persian Gulf oil. The Bush Administration believed that if Iraq were to have a nuclear weapon, Hussein would be in a position to gain control over a large segment of the world’s oil reserves. Eighteen months after the 9/11 attacks, Bush authorized the invasion of Iraq. The war against Iraq was extremely unsuccessful; it lasted much longer than estimated—formally ending in December 2011—and cost the U.S., Iraq, and the entire Middle East more lives and money than projected. Conflict in both Afghanistan and Iraq continued at the end of Bush’s second term in office, leaving Barack Obama with the remainder of two complicated, costly, and contentious wars.

Strategy of President Obama

President Obama inherited the failed attempts to reform both the Afghan and Iraqi governments and to rid the Taliban of its power. By 2009, the Taliban had fled Afghanistan into neighboring Pakistan. Drug trade in Afghanistan had become a $4 billion business, and the Taliban used the money to fund its insurgency against the Afghan government and the occupying forces. Al Qaeda had also secured safe havens in Pakistani tribal regions. Obama’s first move was to send Vice President Joe Biden to Pakistan to meet with President Asif Ali Zardari to secure diplomatic ties with the government and to emphasize the important role Pakistan had in the Afghanistan conflict, which, unlike Bush’s Administration, was to be the Obama Administration’s focus. Zardari expressed concerns at the anti-American sentiment in the country, and said that helping the U.S. would create hatred toward the Pakistani government unless there was something in it for the people. He requested economic resources so that he could justify supporting the U.S. and Biden did not object.

The next stop was a meeting in Afghanistan with President Hamid Karzai. Karzai expressed that the Afghani people did not want Americans to leave the country because they were there fighting terrorism, but that civilian casualties were a concern. He stated that an additional 30,000 American troops would make the efforts more successful. Biden was hesitant. Obama’s first decision as president was to commission a sixty-day review of the Iraq war, since additional troops were likely to be needed in Afghanistan, and a drawdown in Iraq would be necessary to supply the additional forces. Obama called on advisors to come up with strategies for Afghanistan, because if more troops were needed in the country, he would need a set plan in order to validate further involvement. The debate went back and forth between sending an additional 17,000 troops or 30,000 troops, and Obama took the time necessary to hear from multiple sources about what the best plan of action would be. After several days to think on the final strategies, Obama approved the request for an additional 17,000 troops, knowing that without more Americans on the ground, the Afghan elections would probably not be possible.

In late March of 2009, Obama announced that the U.S. would help Pakistan battle al Qaeda, but Pakistan had to “demonstrate its commitment to rooting out al Qaeda and the violent extremists within its borders.” He also announced that the U.S. would send 4,000 troops to Afghanistan to train and enhance the Afghan army and police force, and that economic and social aid would be sent to the country.

Bush vs. Obama and Present Day

Several key differences between the Bush and Obama administrations can be noted at this point in the War on Terror timeline: President Bush was bent on ousting Saddam Hussein and focusing on Iraq rather than on Afghanistan. At the start of his Presidency, Obama made it clear that stabilizing Afghanistan and attacking the Taliban in neighboring regions would be the chief objective. Bush was also less receptive to information that went against his own personal beliefs about how the war should be fought, as well as what was truly happening in the region. No matter which senior official told the President that there was absolutely no evidence that a nuclear program was being reestablished in Iraq under Hussein, Bush and his advisors continued to push the discourse until it became accepted and acted upon. Obama, although reluctant to send additional troops into Afghanistan, listened to all opinions and encouraged dissenting voices at the table. In deciding how to continue in Afghanistan, Obama said, “I’m a big believer in continually updating our analysis and relying on a constant feedback loop. Don’t bite your tongue. Everybody needs to say what’s on their mind.” There was not as much pressure to act quickly under Obama; Bush was fixated on the idea of responding with concrete action within days of the attacks, but Obama was more determined to act with strategy and purpose, even if that meant a delay in action.

Although the experience of these wars has, obviously, been negative, and billions of dollars and thousands of lives have been lost since 2001 when the war began, retrenchment is not an option for several reasons and on several fronts. In regard to Afghanistan, stability will continue to decrease as U.S. forces decrease in the region. Total retrenchment would be the most extreme, and worst, scenario. In 2015 Afghan security forces, including local police, suffered a 70 percent increase in casualties compared to 2014. The average count of casualties per week currently stands at around 330. This increase in violence is directly related to the decrease of foreign aid and military services. The toxic combination of a new unstable government with leaders who have not yet been proven trustworthy, and the simultaneous withdrawal of U.S. troops is increasing the likelihood of a resurgent Taliban and potentially wasting years of war and the American lives lost during the conflict. The withdrawal at this critical yet sensitive time in Afghanistan’s move toward stabilization also provides the perfect breeding ground for ISIL to gain power and control. While difficult and messy war efforts that last longer and cost more than expected are not the ideal reality for any nation’s foreign policy, isolationist strategies would not bode well for the international community either. The globalized world is as interconnected as it is interdependent, and the United States’ deep involvement in all regions of the world is important and necessary. The capacity of that involvement, however, may change over time.

You Don’t Know What ISIS Wants

In August of 2014, James Foley, an American journalist, became the first American casualty in the current conflict with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Executed by beheading in a propaganda video distributed to a global audience via YouTube, Foley would quickly become a common name in foreign policy circles. His brutal execution would catalyze a strong American response which has surpassed, according to a report from CNN in early December of 2015, 20,000 missiles and bombs fired from American ships, warplanes, and drones, according to a report from CNN in early December, 2015. Within the American political scheme, there is a near unanimous fervor suggesting that a fight must be taken to ISIS in Iraq and Syria. In his final State of the Union Address, President Obama asked Congress to pass a new Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) to provide legal grounds to wage war against ISIS, and some Republican leaders, like Speaker Paul Ryan, have agreed. Naturally, there is disagreement on how that fight should take shape; Republican Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell opposes an AUMF, but still believes that there should be a robust military response to the ISIS threat. But there has been an unusual development occurring in the rhetoric surrounding America’s response to ISIS. It has appeared that, overnight, politicians across the globe became experts in counterterrorism, psychoanalysis, and Islam. Since joining the fight against ISIS, Americans across the nation have become worried that our actions might be exactly what ISIS wants us to do.  ISIS, a vast network of fighters that has assembled supporters from West Africa to the Caucuses, is a complex organization with many goals and desires. We do not know their intentions, and shaping U.S. policy on ideological prejudices prevents realistic policy discussions from taking place.

We must wonder, how do so many people have such a firm grasp on what terrorists located over 6,000 miles away from the United States desire? Countless media pundits have written opinion pieces in dozens of respectable newspapers and journals claiming to know what ISIS wants and exactly how they want to achieve their goals. Politicians have begun to claim that their political opponents are potential allies to the terrorist group. An article ran in liberal news blog ThinkProgress entitled “Trump’s Muslim Ban Is Exactly What ISIS Wants.” Several days later, Democratic presidential frontrunner and former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated in the December, 2015 Democratic debate that Republican frontrunner Donald Trump was “becoming ISIS’s best recruiter” and that “They are going to people showing videos of Donald Trump insulting Islam and Muslims in order to recruit more radical jihadists.” Aside from Politfact’s conclusion that Secretary Clinton’s statement was purely false, they raise important points regarding the ongoing rhetoric used to discuss ISIS.  President Obama urged the nation during his State of the Union to not buy into the belief that ISIS “[does] not threaten our national existence. That is the story ISIL wants to tell.” Senator Ted Cruz, a leading Republican candidate for President, issued a statement in November 2015 after the deadly attacks in Paris, France that left over 100 dead and over 300 seriously injured, that ISIS “will not be appeased by outreach or declarations of tolerance,” advocating a much more forceful avenue against the terrorist group. There are many conflicting opinions as to what ISIS truly wants, and while this debate rages on, the capacity for American leadership in the efforts against ISIS fades.

In response to cries of racism and Islamophobia, Queen Rania of Jordan said in March of 2015 that there was “nothing Islamic about [ISIS].” This is rhetoric repeated in the U.S. by throngs of people, tending to be on the American political left. Following Queen Rania’s logic, attempting to find the long-term goals of the new “State in Iraq and Syria” should be relatively simple. All states, at some level, have the inherent goal to perpetuate their own existence and provide for (at least some of) their people. This non-Islamic state has done a relatively poor job at that theologically bereft goal through its rejection of participation in the international order.   A modern state would interact with other states by establishing embassies and attempting to achieve diplomatic recognition. Although ISIS has actually begun minting new coins to replace America’s “capitalist financial system of enslavement” according to a piece in Vice News, coupled with a vast bureaucracy governing issues from leisure to education as detailed in a December, 2015 profile in the Guardian, it has not attempted on any level to engage with the world resembling any level of modernity.  If the motivations of ISIS were absolutely devoid of Islamic theology, however unreflective it is of mainstream Islamic theology, the established Islamic State should then resemble any modern state.

De-Islamizing ISIS has several pointed political goals, chief among them, to disaffiliate the 1.6 billion global Muslim population from the several tens (or hundreds) of thousands of extremely radicalized fighters in ISIS-held territory. This goal is unabashedly noble in intent; however, its adherents practice a veiled form of Islamic apologism. Shadi Hamid with the Center for Middle East Policy headquartered in Washington, D.C., wrote in a November, 2015 Op-ed, “There is a role for Islamic apologetics – if defending Islam rather than analyzing it is your objective…. But if the goal is to understand ISIS, then I, and other analysts who happen to be Muslim, would be better served by cordoning off our personal assumptions and preferences.” Hamid makes a sound point; it seems that those who caution against potential actions against ISIS seem to have their own political preferences line up with “what ISIS wants.” For example, a non-interventionist who opposed both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars likely believes that anti-Muslim rhetoric is what ISIS wants, whereas an American right-winger possibly believes that accepting 10,000 refugees fleeing Syria is a form of capitulation and will allow for ISIS elements to slip into the United States undetected. Both perspectives tend to fail to listen to actual ISIS rhetoric which often focuses on Islamic scripture and tradition from the 7th and 8th centuries. While it is true that Dabiq, ISIS’s English-language magazine, does often share snippets of American politician’s speeches in its regular section “In the Words of the Enemy,” it barely amounts to a footnote in the larger context of ISIS propaganda.

Radical movements in the past few decades have shared an unintended unholy alliance with the philosophical left. Bits and pieces of videos created by al-Qaeda’s Osama bin Laden share much of the same rhetoric as used in post-colonial scholarship, focusing fire on the imperialist powers of the global West, for example by noted scholar Noam Chomsky. Academics and bloggers have hounded on the messaging that people should be wary of viewing Muslims as the enemy as it potentially only feeds into ISIS’s supposed rhetoric.  Proponents of this ideology are often those who believe that calling ISIS by its Arabic equivalent Daesh. The final issue of Dabiq in 2015 was titled “Just Terror,” showcasing that brutal terrorists likely do not pay attention to what names they are called in American media, since they seem to be quite content with being viewed as terrorists.

America’s military responses to external threats should be informed by experienced military and counterterrorism experts. People often overestimate themselves when it comes to complex geopolitical issues.  The sketch comedy show, Saturday Night Live, has mocked ISIS several times, but recently poked fun at the uninformed American understanding of ISIS. In its 2015 Thanksgiving episode, cast member Aidy Bryant played Aunt Kathy, the blissfully unaware family member who claims to have “seen an ISIS” in the grocery store and is very grateful that her governor rejected Syrian refugees, who are all supposedly “ISIS in disguise.”  We all have an Aunt Kathy in our families. We likely listen to an Aunt Kathy-like figure from the left on television being interviewed on MSNBC or as the stock-liberal on Fox News. My own mother stated her belief that ISIS did not want Americans to go to Times Square for New Year’s celebrations so that we might live in fear. The newly elected Mayor of Philadelphia Jim Kenney claimed that the January 9th attack by a self-professed ISIS supporter on Philadelphia Police Officer Jesse Hartnett had nothing to do with Islam and “does not represent the religion in any shape or form or any of the teachings.”

For the past several years, Americans have been hearing an uninformed or semi-informed debate take place around “what ISIS wants” as it becomes muddied, it seems more like what “America wants.” Sun Tzu teaches us that it is crucial to “know your enemy,” but he believed that it was equally important to know oneself in order to win battles. The politicized rhetoric over ISIS’ desires prevents a thoughtful policy discussion from taking place.  Our political leaders should take measured actions without regard for “what ISIS wants,” as it is likely untrue and otherwise irrelevant to American interests in the region. ISIS propaganda videos have professed a basic ISIS belief that America and other Western powers want to initiate another round of crusades in the Holy Land: a claim that most Westerners would dispute.  But as scary as it may be, we should come to terms that we do not “know what ISIS wants” short of what they tell us. And so far, they have told us that their goal is singular: to establish an Islamic caliphate.  In 2016, ISIS-watchers should make a collective resolution to stop wasting time discussing the (non)theological aspects of the terrorist organization and return to proposing sound policies to defeat another one of America’s enemies.

France’s State of Emergency

After threats, or attacks upon a country’s security such as the recent terrorist attacks in Paris, a state will most likely strive to undertake measures to reestablish security and prevent future attacks from occurring. However, the steps a state undertake to do this must be in line with the rights and freedoms their citizens are entitled to under the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which every UN member is expected to promote and protect. After 9/11 the United States attempted to prevent future terrorist attacks by a number of measures. However, not all of them, such as the CIA torture program and NSA mass surveillance program, respected human rights. Fortunately, due to a collected public outcry, the CIA’s use of torture is no more, and many aspects of NSA’s mass surveillance that infringe on a person’s right to privacy are currently under heavy scrutiny. However, the same environment of fear that lead to those programs still lives today.

Following the recent Paris attacks in November by a group of individuals linked to ISIL, France’s President Hollande enacted a state of emergency. This state of emergency gives regional authorities a number of powers such as setting curfews, forbidding public gatherings, etc. However, what makes this state of emergency significant is that it gives authorities the ability to conduct raids and enforce house arrests without a warrant. Without judicial oversight, French authorities have been allowed to conduct anti-terrorism operations with no consequence. This has led to an extensive police presence, overuse of raids, and abuse of house arrests by the French government. However, rather than actually being effective against terrorism, France’s state of emergency has only created an environment in which its Muslim citizens experience trampled civil liberties and are targeted as potential terrorists with little to no evidence. As a member of the UN, France is expected to uphold the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and extend the rights defined within it to all of its citizens. However, France’s extensive use of raids and detention under grounds of state of emergency violates the declaration.

Grey Anderson writes an extensive background of the state of emergency law within the Jacobin magazine, which is best summarized to explain the important role its history plays in the violations of civil liberties in France today. The state of emergency law was first composed in 1955 during the Algerian war of independence. France had a peculiar relationship with Algeria in that rather than viewing Algeria simply as a foreign colony, many French citizens regarded Algeria as part of France. France’s identity became entwined with Algeria’s. In 1955, when Algerian nationalists took up arms against the French government in a bid for independence, France sought to put down the nationalist movement in a way that didn’t recognize the conflict as a foreign war. Doing so would legitimize the Algerian nationalists and go against the French discourse of France and Algeria as one and the same. Instead of using military action, France thus crafted a law that imposed a state of emergency in which emergency powers were given to French authorities within Algeria as a tool of repression during a time of war. These roots give France’s state of emergency today its repressive nature. Rather than effective anti-terrorism measures that respect civil liberties, the French government has recalled this 1955 piece of legislation that was intended to prevent a free Algeria.

While the law that defines France’s state of emergency is over 60 years old, it was recently updated and enhanced in November when the French parliament extended it for three months. A recent LawFare article written by Daniel Severson, a graduate student at Harvard University, explains the recent updates to France’s state of emergency legislation. The new, 2015 law has significantly broader language than the previous, which has played a significant part in France’s civil rights abuses. The old 1955 law stated that a person could be placed under house arrest if they were involved in activities that “prove to be dangerous to security and the public order.” However, the updated law now states anyone may be subjected to house arrest if there is “serious reason to think that the person’s conduct threatens security or the public order.” The new 2015 law also allows for raids without a warrant upon a place a person frequents if there are “serious reasons to think the place is frequented by a person whose conduct threatens security or the public order.” This broad language makes it far easier for the French government to define terrorist threats and react, but it also makes it far easier for the French government to abuse the civil rights of those who are not affiliated with terrorist groups.

According to the Guardian, there have been 3,099 house raids with more than 260 people detained for questioning, and more than 380 people have been placed under house arrest, including 24 climate activists preceding the November Paris climate summit since the establishment of France’s state of emergency. However, the majority of those who have been affected are French Muslims. In addition, The Guardian also claims that of the 3,099 raids, only 4 have resulted in “judicial proceedings linked to terrorism.” It is obvious that most of the raids and detentions are conducted on little to no evidentiary grounds if out of more than 3,000 raids only 4 have resulted in actual court cases. Lack of judicial oversight has led to the French government acting in a dangerous and lawless manner with many innocent citizens being put in harm’s way. For example, in a video a Muslim man describes and shows the results of a French police raid upon his home. His daughter was hit in the neck by shotgun pellets when they shot the door open and his home was upturned. In an interview with Democracy Now, Yasser Louati, a spokesperson for the Collective Against Islamophobia in France, elaborates on this video and states that the French police had the wrong house, apologized, and then left. Louati goes on to say that carelessness and targeting such as that seen in the described video has created a sense of “outrage and deep humiliation and complete abandonment by the government” within the French Muslim community. With little to no accountability for their actions, the French government is alienating the Muslim community within France.

The UN Declaration of Human Rights establishes a groundwork of civil liberties for every human being regardless of race, religious affiliation, etc. When a state becomes a UN member they must pledge to uphold this declaration and apply it to each of its own citizens. France, however, has violated Article 3, Article 7, Article 9, as well as Article 13 which deal with security of person, representation before the law, arbitrary detention, and freedom of movement, respectively, with its current state of emergency. If France’s raids and detentions actually resulted in prosecutions after extensive evidence of terrorist connection was found before a raid, then yes, the raids would be warranted. However, when 3,000 raids are conducted and only 4 result in prosecutions on grounds of terrorist connections, something is horribly wrong with the anti-terrorism process. Substantial evidence to justify a raid should be found before one occurs, not sought for during. Lack of judicial oversight has allowed for raids to be ordered with little to no justification, which explains the large disparity in France’s number of raids and number of prosecutions. However, this disparity illuminates the heavy handedness of the French government on the Muslim French community as French police detain people and raid home with no terrorist connections.

Currently, the French government is seeking to extend the state of emergency another three months. The Prime Minister of France, Manuel Valls, recently stated that emergency powers may have to be kept until ISIL is defeated. Frankly, an indefinite extension of these laws is frightening and signal that civil liberties have lost out to supposed security in France. If the French government truly values liberté, égalité, fraternité and its role as a UN Security Council member, it should immediately revise its state of emergency law and add judicial oversight while specifying the law’s language to prevent civil rights abuses. It is well within the French government’s right to do what it feels is best for the safety of its people, however as a member of the United Nations and the Security Council, France’s current actions are unacceptable.