Capital Over Country: Challenges of International Investment Arbitration in Latin America

The return of democracy in the 1980s and 1990s experienced by most Latin American states after decades of military rule coincided with a pivot to market-oriented economic policies, encouraged by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the perceived failure of state-led economies. To attract foreign investment, states implemented an array of budgetary and trade policies: austerity measures meant to reduce hyperinflation were introduced and Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) were negotiated to reduce the risks for foreign investors investing in Latin American countries. Under these treaties, investors were to be granted most-favored nation (MFN) status to compete on a level playing field with local and international competitors and granted protections against expropriation, broadly defined as measures which deprive the investor of the economic value of its investment. Investors gained the right to pursue claims against host countries due to unfair or unequal treatment at international arbitration organizations like the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) rather than in the courts of the host government. 

The negotiation of BITs came in response to a series of 10 market-oriented policy prescriptions recommended by the United States to developing economies to promote economic growth known as the Washington Consensus: including legal security for property rights and liberalization of foreign direct investment (FDI). Development economists posited the free flow of FDI through countries with untapped natural resources and labor pools would result in the development of new markets, poverty reduction, and greater integration with the world economy. While some scholarship has suggested a link between FDI and the achievement of these goals, a growing body of research has linked a larger share of FDI in a developing country’s economy to greater inequality and weaker domestic industries unable to compete with foreign firms.[1] [2] Furthermore, the attainment of the United Nations 2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) which encourage sustainable and inclusive development by taking into account the social, environmental, and political factors which most concern the citizens of the host country has become complicated as states, especially those in Latin America and the Caribbean, have sought to renegotiate their international obligations in pursuit of these goals. 

States seeking to expropriate foreign investments fueled by populist rhetoric and electoral promises to reassert national sovereignty over domestic resources have clashed with aggrieved investors armed with the power of contractual legal commitments demanding compensation for allegedly violating agreements signed by their predecessors. This article will first outline the current Latin American investor-state arbitration landscape, then proceed to outline three primary approaches states have taken to avoid costly arbitration awards, and conclude with a recommendation that BITs should be renegotiated to grant greater stakeholder participation in the process of FDI if investors wish to maintain a healthy business environment and lessening the risk of sudden hostile takeovers by a resurgent political left. 

2 The Current Latin American Investor-State Arbitration Landscape

 Latin America is notable for its considerably higher percentage of arbitration decisions which ruled in favor of investors when compared to other regions. For example, investment arbitration decisions in the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) ruled in favor of the state 29.7% of the time, compared to other middle and low-income regions at 42.9% and the United States, Canada, and Europe at 50%.[3] In 2012, the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) tribunal awarded Occidental Petroleum $1.77 billion in a case against the Republic of Ecuador due to alleged breaches of the US-Ecuador BIT, the largest award ever issued by an ICSID tribunal.[4] The 2001-2002 convertibility crisis in Argentina and subsequent ICSID claims made by investors showed that politicians are more likely to answer popular demands to expropriate from the electorate rather than follow through on their BIT obligations.[5] However, the region’s largest and most populous country, Brazil, has yet to ratify a single BIT and serves as a useful point of reference for evaluating the efficacy of such agreements in achieving their goals. The high rate of successful treaty-based arbitral claims filed against LAC countries can be explained in part due to (1) the commodity-driven and extractive nature of the region’s economy and (2) the political volatility of the region. 

2.1 Criticisms of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 

Bolivia was the first to denounce and withdraw from the ICSID in 2007 under socialist president Evo Morales, citing issues of national sovereignty over the country’s vast natural resources. Having rewritten the country’s constitution in 2009, Morales also started the process of denouncing and renegotiating all of Bolivia’s BITs. However, this has not stopped ICSID claims against Bolivia from being filed regarding investments made both before and after the withdrawal from the convention due to survival clauses in the previous agreements.[6] Furthermore, in 2009 Ecuador withdrew from the ICSID Convention under leftist President Rafael Correa but as of July 2021, newly elected moderate President Guillermo Lasso has since re-ratified the convention in hopes of bringing new foreign investment to the country. In 2012, Venezuela denounced and withdrew from the ICSID Convention, after it was made to pay hefty awards to oil companies which the Chavez government had expropriated.[7] When governments oscillate between their levels of commitment to their international treaty obligations, investors become weary. 

2.1.1 Argentina and the ICSID

While Argentina remains a party to the ICSID Convention, it has displayed little willingness to comply with its international obligations. The nation tops the list of most frequently sued states; it refuses to comply with some of its arbitral decisions, opting instead to shift decision-making to domestic courts where it hopes for a more favorable outcome may be reached. Creditors’ lobbying efforts in the United States were successful when the U.S. withdrew trade benefits extended to Argentina and voted down World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank loans for the indebted nation. President Obama stated, “it is appropriate to suspend Argentina’s designation as a GSP beneficiary developing country because it has not acted in good faith in enforcing arbitral awards in favor of United States citizens or a corporation, partnership, or association that is 50 percent or more beneficially owned by United States citizens.” After making an example of Argentina using coercive monetary policy, Argentina eventually settled some of its disputes with disgruntled investors, leading to the reestablishment of GSP relations in 2018. As of 2022, hyperinflation caused by the devaluation of the peso as foreign investors pulled out during the pandemic, combined with a decline in commodity prices and a high level of indebtedness to international financial institutions and investors has crippled an already fragile economy.[8]

Argentina exemplifies the plight of many lower and middle-income countries in Latin America who in the 1990s adopted structural adjustment reforms to liberalize their markets and attract foreign direct investment through the signing of bilateral investment treaties. Neoliberal policies were successful in creating economic growth for the middle and upper-class elite, yet demanded cuts to social safety nets, public healthcare expenditures, and exacerbated inequality in what is already the world’s most unequal region.[9]

 Considering that (86%) of investor claimants in international arbitration courts are from high-income countries and the majority (66%) of cases are brought against lower and middle-income countries, the status quo created by bilateral investment treaty agreements asserts that a multinational corporations’ right to make profit supersedes a state’s national sovereignty to enact reforms demanded by its democratically elected government.[10] Therefore, such BITs need to be renegotiated to reassert sovereignty of host nations to protect the environment, fund desperately needed social programs, maintain a sovereign monetary policy, and create a mutually beneficial relationship between FDI and the state. 

3 Towards Solutions

Political upheaval brought about by acute social and economic inequality, the region’s relationship with international institutions and creditors, and the crippling impact of the pandemic fundamentally reshaped the political opportunity structure in many states: the region has been more vulnerable to democratic backsliding, more willing to rewrite existing laws and constitutions, more desperate for international investors, and more dependent than ever on high commodity prices to keep their fragile economies intact. In 2019, Latin America was the only region to register zero economic growth, and experienced the largest economic contraction due to the pandemic. Countries face the following non-mutually exclusive policy options in pursuit of a post-pandemic recovery: (1) settle ongoing arbitration cases to boost investor confidence (2) renegotiate or withdraw from BITs and ICSID conventions, or (3) boost foreign capital inflows through greater Chinese foreign direct investment. 

References

[1] Herzer, Dierk, Philipp Hühne, and Peter Nunnenkamp. 2012. “FDI and Income Inequality - Evidence from Latin American Economies.” Review of Development Economics 18 (January). https://doi.org/10.1111/rode.12118.

[2] Tuman, John P., and Craig F. Emmert. 2004. “The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America: A Reappraisal.” Latin American Research Review 39 (3): 9–28.

[3] Remmer, Karen L. 2019. “Investment Treaty Arbitration in Latin America.” Latin American Research Review 54 (4): 795–811. https://doi.org/10.25222/larr.154.

[4] ICSID. n.d. “Occidental v. Ecuador (II) | Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator | UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub.” Accessed March 19, 2022. https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement/cases/238/occidental-v-ecuador-ii-.

[5] Remmer, Karen L. 2019. “Investment Treaty Arbitration in Latin America.” Latin American Research Review 54 (4): 795–811. https://doi.org/10.25222/larr.154.

[6] Kluwer Arbitration Blog. n.d. “Life after ICSID: 10th Anniversary of Bolivia’s Withdrawal from ICSID.” Accessed March 19, 2022. http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2017/08/12/life-icsid-10th-anniversary-bolivias-withdrawal-icsid

[7] “International Arbitration Tribunal Orders Venezuela to Pay ConocoPhillips $8.7 Billion for Unlawful Expropriation of Company’s Oil Investments.” n.d. ConocoPhillips. Accessed March 19, 2022. https://www.conocophillips.com/news-media/story/international-arbitration-tribunal-orders-venezuela-to-pay-conocophillips-8-7-billion-for-unlawful-expropriation-of-company-s-oil-investments/.

[8] González, Enric. 2021. “Argentina’s Perpetual Crisis.” EL PAÍS English Edition. March 5, 2021. https://english.elpais.com/usa/2021-03-05/argentinas-perpetual-crisis.html.

[9] Baer, Werner, Pedro Elosegui, and Andrés Gallo. 2002. “The Achievements and Failures of Argentina’s Neo-Liberal Economic Policies.” Oxford Development Studies 30 (February): 63–85. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.279383.

[10] Samples, Tim. 2018. “Winning and Losing in Investor-State Dispute Settlement.” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3233704. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3233704.

Burkina Faso and the Resurgence of Coups in West Africa

nytimes.com

Towards the end of January, the Patriotic Movement for Safeguard and Restoration (MPSR) announced that the government and national assembly had been dissolved, and they had removed democratically-elected Roch Marc Kaboré from his position as president of Burkina Faso. Kaboré was detained and replaced by Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, an overnight curfew was implemented, land and air borders were closed, and the constitution was suspended for one week. A coup d’état had struck.

While this is the most recent one, a trend has emerged in the past year and a half as Mali, Guinea, and Chad have faced military takeovers. There is a resurgence of coups in West Africa, and the contributing factors are not adequately being mitigated. With the presence of everything from violent extremism to poverty, democratic institutions are struggling to stay alive in the region, and there has been controversy regarding international response. Moreover, discussion of this subject has been full of generalizations and blanket policy suggestions. Examining the coup in Burkina Faso can provide a deeper understanding of the circumstances in West Africa and why it is important to acknowledge each country’s distinct identity, advancing the global conversation surrounding intervention and aid.

Growing Violence in West Africa

The buildup to the coup in Burkina Faso was multifaceted, but a major reason for the overthrow was the rising threat from violent extremists. As with the 2020 coup in Mali—the one often seen as the trigger for the other military takeovers—many civilians thought that their government had failed to protect them. Since 2016, over 230 terrorist attacks have taken place in Burkina Faso. Last November, 53 people were killed after a gendarmerie post was attacked, which was “the worst strike on Burkinabe security forces in years.” Just one month later, a civilian militia trained by the government to contain insurgents was ambushed, and at least 41 members were killed. According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “violent events linked to militant Islamist groups” increased by 70 percent between 2020 and 2021 in the Sahel region, and the United Nations reported that almost 12,000 people were displaced within two weeks in December. There were at least 2,354 fatalities from the violence in 2021. 

Many believed that the government response was not enough, and the people of Burkina Faso made that clear. As gunfire erupted at Kaboré's residence and several of the country’s military barracks on the day of the coup, protests raged in the capital. The headquarters of Kaboré’s party was looted and set on fire, and people were tear gassed by police as hundreds marched through Ouagadougou. The events of this day showed what Damiba explicitly said in his first speech since taking power: the takeover was due to their former leader’s failure to stop attacks across the country. 

Repercussions Regarding Sanctions and Aid

A major player in how the world has responded to the coups is the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). After the coups in Mali and Guinea, ECOWAS responded by closing member states’ borders and imposing economic sanctions. However, these sanctions were highly controversial, in part because the affected economies were already poor. If the goal of these sanctions is to promote stability in the region, the long-term consequences may backfire. As explained by the International Peace Institute, the sanctions may be “necessary” but “counterproductive,” and the people whose lives could be altered the most would be marginalized groups in rural areas, those displaced from the violence, and unemployed youth. A large portion of the protestors on the day of the coup in Burkina Faso were showing up in solidarity with the affected population in Mali. 

While the possibility of sanctions remains and ECOWAS has warned of them, Burkina Faso has only been removed from the bloc thus far, and the African Union (AU) also suspended the country pending the reinstatement of the constitution. Additionally, while sanctions have not been imposed, the United States has paused $450 million in aid to Burkina Faso. The United States has been the largest international donor to the country, but U.S. law requires the suspension of non-humanitarian aid to countries where a democratically-elected government has been taken over unconstitutionally, and there is still much uncertainty regarding Burkina Faso’s path forward. Although the constitution has been restored now and MPSR ensured “the continuity of the state pending the establishment of transitional bodies,” those transitional bodies are yet to be established. 

In a more recent development, Burkina Faso may see a steep decline in aid due to the invasion of Ukraine. For example, the Norwegian Refugee Council spokesperson in West and Central Africa said, “Some donors have already indicated that they would proceed to a 70% cut of our funding to support operations in Ukraine…” Additionally, a regional advocate from Refugees International said that “Russia is one of the leading grain exporters in the world,” and more people in sub-Saharan Africa will be in need of emergency food assistance as the international community cuts ties with Russia. Finally, certain impacts of foreign aid on political stability as a whole are still debated, but time will tell whether the military government is able to successfully carry out their plans. 

However, a timeline has been given for the transition of power in Burkina Faso, and it was announced a week after the invasion of Ukraine. Damiba was officially inaugurated as president back in February and a team of 25 ministers stood by his side, but it took until March for other plans to be released. On March 3, an economist and professor named Albert Ouedraogo was announced to be the interim prime minister, and the plan as communicated by the military government is for Damiba and Ouedraogo to work towards political stability for the next three years before hosting elections. 

International Response to the Coup

Countries in other parts of the world have also reacted to the coup, including France. Although France has been less involved in Burkina Faso than it has in some neighboring countries, Burkina Faso is a former French colony, and France has about 5,000 soldiers in the region. For years, France has been trying to halt militant attacks from extremists by sending in troops and working with the groups in power, but after the events of January, the country is in a tough place. After the takeover of Burkina Faso, President Emmanuel Macron said, "I would remind you that our priority in the region is to fight against Islamist terrorism,” but it should be noted that Macron has an upcoming election to think about. While he has already been reducing the number of troops in the area, if France takes any drastic measures, those actions would reflect on him.

Russia is also worth discussing, for reasons beyond the invasion of Ukraine. In Mali, the junta has relied on security from the Wagner Group, a paramilitary organization backed by the Russian government, and this group has been deployed in Libya and the Central African Republic as well. Reportedly, the leader of the coup in Burkina Faso was regularly in communication with the military leaders of Mali and Guinea, and twice, Damiba tried to convince Kaboré to use Russian paramilitaries. Kaboré refused, but with Damiba in power, the situation has shifted. 

Examining France and Russia’s current role in the region, counterterrorism and tension between the West and Russia were at the forefront of the conversation—but there is more at play. Some have said that “core political problems” are being ignored while foreign powers use West Africa to compete among themselves. In terms of Burkina Faso, the International Crisis Group surfaced the importance of addressing the social crisis in the north and the development deficit, as well as the pre-existing spread of corruption in the administration judicial system. Not every coup in the region can be solely blamed on violent extremism (although it is certainly a large factor in this situation) because the acceptance of democracy underlies the pattern.

The Need for Nuance

The chairman of ECOWAS and president of Ghana, Nana Akufo-Addo, called the coup in Mali “contagious” during the summit following Burkina Faso’s takeover. This implies that the coups are having a domino effect, or that they are modeled after each other. Notably, however, not every coup in West Africa stemmed from the violent extremists, but rather the interruption or prevention of democratic trajectories. Some, including Vice President of the US Institute of Peace’s Africa Center Joseph Sany, believe that conveying the idea of a coup contagion is problematic because it “absolves the world community” from assisting West African countries in creating democratic institutions. Fully attributing these coups to violent extremism could greatly affect the viability of international response.

On the other hand, Akufo-Addo did address the observed controversy over democracy, and he called for a collective response to the trend of coups in the region. Perhaps “contagious” is a fitting way to describe the pattern in West Africa, not because extremism is the overarching factor, but rather concerns about democracy. Panic generated from violence inevitably leads to critique of the present format and exploration of government systems, but while root causes are important to address, there does seem to be a connecting factor beyond violent extremism. 

Moving forward, those discussing coups in the West African region should be conscious of nuance while noting that there are major similarities. Talking as though each country is struggling for the same reason and attributing all of this to religious extremism interrupts how the international community responds to military takeovers in West Africa, and that way of thinking draws attention away from social issues, government/judicial corruption, poverty, and more. Particularly in terms of strategizing foreign aid, countries need to pay attention to both the situations of individual countries and the region as a whole.

Accountability of NGOs: Empowerment vs. Power

Strong civil society organizations have developed worldwide to combat injustices and support humanity, particularly so with the advent of democracy in recent decades. People all around the world have recognized the power of asserting their own agency and are looking to address their concerns and promote human development more than ever before in history. However, this movement has reached varying success across the world due to the diversity of regimes and situations the civil society finds itself in. For example, there is a particular difference between the so-called northern NGOs (NNGOs) usually located in the more economically stable and institutionally integrated parts of the world and the southern NGOs (SNGOs) which are usually located in areas where there is a greater struggle for economic and institutional stability. The latter often faces additional funding, operational, and participation issues precisely because of the environment it finds itself in. In the end, only about 1% of all official aid and an even smaller portion of humanitarian assistance becomes delivered to local organizations of the so-called global south and input of these organizations is similarly downgraded and misunderstood in spite of their direct connection to communities served by humanitarian interventions and NGO assistance. 

Just like with the general interaction between the “North” and “South” in which the so-called developed countries wield, or attempt to wield, greater economic and political influence over the so-called developing world, SNGOs often find themselves, due to the nature of world order today as a consequence of history, colonization, and modern developments, in a subordinate position to NNGOs. This is exemplified in the disproportionate funding that is usually delivered mostly to NNGOs, lack of connection to funding sources, lack of presentation on negotiating tables, and lack of attention from mainstream media and the rest of civil society. What adds irony to this arrangement is that humanitarian and peacebuilding work that is often the focus of NGO work is most often delivered precisely in the areas in which SNGOs operate and that they are most familiar with, and thus best suited to interact with and implement projects in. 

This problem has been mitigated to an extent with the focus of NNGOs being shifted away from simple intervention in faraway lands. This approach often resulted in major confusion and misallocation of resources and trainings because of misunderstandings arising due to NNGOs distance from the area of intervention and the problem at hand. Real life results of these shortcomings can range from focus on unnecessary desk over training and capacity-building delivery to actually endangering lives by allowing unqualified personnel to provide medical treatment. Recognizing the gravity of these issues, NNGOs have since recognized the need to partner with their counterparts in the regions the intervention is occurring to make their program more adjusted to the locality they are working with. In this way, small local NGOs of the so-called developing world get a chance to take their slice of the pie with a portion of funding being allocated to them and they are allowed an extent of autonomy and agency in program implementation. Major hiccups and programming disasters arising from the developed world’s presumed ability to properly address issues everywhere are thus being alleviated to an extent, but certainly not yet eliminated. 

However, it should be noted that the funding and intervention opportunities SNGOs now get are being filtered through NNGOs’ funding allocation choices and programming preferences. There is still an underlying assumption that NNGOs are most capable of deciding where capacities and resources are missing and most appropriately design an intervention, with the local SNGOs serving as an additional player, in worst cases to be merely of service to the funder and an instrument of the NNGOs’ agenda. In the best case there is a somewhat honest attempt to allow for “empowerment” of the SNGO because at least some funds and attention are now getting to the deprived counterpart thus making both the funder and the NNGO feeling more confident about their success albeit actual agency of SNGO was lifted to a very limited degree. In reality, however, SNGOs continue to lack direct involvement with funders and donors, often have limited autonomy in project planning and funding allocation as a consequence of being in a contractual and subordinate relationship to the NNGOs that are inviting them to join the project, and remain in a position where, even when their empowerment is supposedly promoted, they continue to be deprived of actual power and agency. 

Towards Solutions

In order to allow for a more appropriate intervention and begin tackling the underlying inequities of the current world order as it pertains to civil society, it is crucial to address these disparities in the relationship between NGOs from varying backgrounds. This issue should be addressed in a way that not merely empowers SNGOs but also facilitates their grand entrance to the mainstream rhetoric, incorporates their ideas in the funding and project planning processes, and cements their independence through acknowledging their power and agency that they already possess and are able to develop without explicit interference of the “northern” counterparts. In order to allow these processes to occur, it is instrumental to recognize the difference between merely empowering SNGOs and move the rhetoric towards more explicitly acknowledging their existing power as well as the need for existing power structures to make space for manifestation of this power to maximize impact and importance of SNGOs. A clear example of manifestation of such power would be allowing greater agency in funding allocation, greater access to funding, and a more direct contact with donor in accordance with greater economic autonomy. In addition to this, SNGOs should be allowed greater autonomy and agency in creation of locally-applicable projects and they should be the first to present an idea so that NNGOs’ possible intervention is influenced by the local perspective as opposed to the local perspective continuously being influenced by outside forces. In order to maximize effectiveness and understanding of SNGOs, appropriate translators and social and cultural professionals should be allocated to the initiative as needed to avoid misunderstandings amongst any of the parties involved and improve everyone’s ability to collaborate.  

To come back to the very definitions of issues at play, two definitions of empowerment are: 1) “making someone stronger and more confident, especially in controlling their life and claiming their rights” and 2) “giving someone the authority or power to do something.” In either of these definitions, there is an underlying assumption of the passivity of the actor empowerment is intended for and there is a need for someone else to step in and “activate” this actor. In the long run, this can justify continuous involvement of NNGOs in the development of SNGOs’ worldview and lived experience as NNGOs appear even necessary as a means of motivating the SNGO to become motivated and able to engage and cause positive change. Power, on the other hand, is usually seen as “the ability or capacity to do something or act in a particular way.” This positioning emphasizes the existing power within the SNGOs so giving power as opposed to empowerment to SNGOs should be a more desirable framing that would also draw further considerations and actions towards a more positive change and enabling of greater agency and space for SNGOs so that there is an ability for SNGOs to stand on equal footing with NNGOs, funders, and other actors involved in the civil society world. 

Acknowledging that SNGOs already have power and do not need a mere “helping hand” so they can be able to only assist in the intervention down the road as it becomes needed for funders and NNGO counterparts as is presently happening would change the way that SNGOs are treated and enable actual agency and a more effective intervention. CSOs have already seen that interventions are more effective when SNGOs are involved in the process, at least as local consultants and subcontractors. Allowing even greater agency and placing NNGOs in a position of support to SNGOs would only maximize these already important achievements CSOs have made ever since entering the stage of greater cooperation across geographic, political, economic, and cultural lines. NGO intervention, when the local organizations are brought to the center, will be equipped to: 1) tailor an intervention approach that is more cognisant of the local context, 2) understand risks and contingencies at a deeper level, 3) be able to sustain its impact for years and possibly generations to come due to a more direct organizational involvement, 4) waste less time and timing due to bureaucratic constraints being eased as the local organization’s road towards implementation is cleared, and 5) establish better accountability towards both the local community and donors as bigger NGOs and international organizations can still help monitor the process and take charge in auditing and reporting while local organizations focus on actual implementation, interaction with local society, and continuation of the project and its impacts.  

Of course, there is already a movement towards greater inclusion of SNGOs, and smaller local organizations for that matter. The difference in centering power over empowerment is crucial because it allows for a proper positioning of the SNGOs and paves a way towards a more radical step in placing the various CSO actors in the international system on equal footing. The system of humanitarian intervention may have many faults and in need of more considerable changes, but this is a constructive way to reframe the thinking around who holds power and who has the right to think is able to provide empowerment to others, if anyone at all should have that right. Drawing from the need to recognize the power that smaller SNGOs already hold is also the fact that the underlying reasons for lack of acknowledgement of this power are things such as lack of communication, internet connectivity and language barriers, as well as the underlying assumption that work that is benefitting smaller local NGOs is done once the contract is signed and objectives are fulfilled in a way that benefits the funder. 

In the end, in order to truly embrace and tap into power that local NGOs holds, funder and the rest of civil society involved in proposing intervention should: 1) invest more time and effort in contacting local NGOs when desiring any kind of intervention; funder should allow time for NGOs to more fully explore partners they are already in contact with and be able to engage translators and more researchers in the pursuit of new partnerships so that organizations that have previously been ignored or simply difficult to reach are now brought into a more profound engagement, 2) place local NGOs on equal footing in interactions with donors, policymakers, and other actors involved in the humanitarian intervention; this means that SNGOs agency and independence should be acknowledged and ensure they have a place at negotiating tables, are involved in funding allocation processes, and are consistently consulted on any changes or inquiries about the project and related activities or future planning, and 3) retain local SNGOs in the spotlight and work with them in a sustained, consistent fashion; this means that engagement should never end upon completion of the project; funders, contracting parties, and bigger NGOs partnering with SNGOs should recognize their presently dominant role and instead allow themselves to take a step back and also listen and learn from the smaller local organizations that may have better contacts and engagement on the ground and are also in turn looking to understand the dominant frameworks of funding flows and interactions better - if all parties are open to learning from each other and understanding that no one party is more capable than the other, whereas each brings its unique contribution to the table, with the local organizations bringing crucial local knowledge as well as new insights into how policymaking and humanitarian aid provision could work, then a more sustained and fruitful work and collaboration are ensured to ensue.

Food Apartheid and Indigenous Peoples

Settler-colonialism had, and continues to have, devastating consequences for Indigenous Peoples in the Americas. Colonization can be broadly defined as a “process by which a territory is settled by a group of people that has emigrated from another country or region and transformed the land” which “includes the displacement of people indigenous to that territory and treating them as second-class citizens ruled by the members of the foreign colonial group” (Sagaskie 102). Sagaskie expands upon this by adding that two significant facets of colonization are that, one, there is a conquered group who has lost their sovereignty to the invaders and that, two, there is an indigenous group that is considered to be inferior (102). However, while this definition includes the historically prevalent practice of colonization in pre-modern times, it does not truly encapsulate the experience of Indigenous populations as Western Europeans instituted a very specific form of colonization known as settler-colonialism. This type of colonization is distinct in that it “...functions through the replacement of indigenous populations with an invasive settler society that, over time, develops a distinctive identity and sovereignty.” Unlike classical colonization, settler-colonialism was unique in that “settlers' ' intended to stay through the elimination of Indigenous Peoples- additionally, this is not considered to be a singular event, but a perpetual process. Furthermore, settler-colonialism differs from other forms of colonization in that it is an inherently white supemacist act- the elimination of Indigenous Peoples is legitimated through racist logics that they are inferior and therefore brutality is not just justified, it is seen as necessary to protect the interests and identities of the settler state.

One feature of settler-colonialism in the Americas is its destruction of Indigenous Peoples’ food sources and traditional relationships to food. Prior to the arrival of Europeans, different nations, that span from what we now call Alaska to South America, had balanced food networks that involved intimate connections to their environment and cultures. It is virtually impossible to generalize the diets of Indigenous Peoples as they were as diverse as the regions they occupied (Sagaskie 103). Furthermore, their diets were dependent on the local resources that were readily available thus food staples were not necessarily fixed- however, there were foundational elements to Indigenous diets that are often referred to as the Three Sisters which consisted of corn, beans, and squash. The cultivation and consumption of these crops were integral to the diets of nations such as the Anishinaabe, Oneida, and Iroquois, though settler-colonialism increasingly made it difficult for Indigenous Peoples to harvest them; the United States actively attempted to undermine these practices through the forced removal of nations from their ancestral lands, destruction of crops, and severely limiting access to arable land (Sagaskie 103). These processes carried out by the settler government undermined the ability of Indigenous groups to access food; it is one such example of the US facilitating Indigenous genocide. The introduction of a new “meat” industry also contributed to the destruction of Indigenous food sources and, subsequently, their populations. The Spaniards, who were anxious to ensure their own survival, appropriated large amounts of land for grazing livestock; the vast numbers of livestock, many of which were new to the Americas, managed to destroy Indigenous croplands. The effects of this were severe: Indigenous Peoples became malnourished and not only starved to death, but also became more susceptible to European diseases as their immune systems were weakened. Ultimately, the settler-state’s ability to limit the food options of Indigenous Peoples, thus forcing them to consume European foods, and forcibly relocate them to remote reservations where they were expected to adapt to sedentary lifestyles, laid the foundation for high levels of food insecurity in the 21st century. Indigenous Peoples throughout North America are specifically subjected to food apartheid, thus affecting their ability to sufficiently access nutritional, quality, and culturally relevant food which further impacts their health and overall quality of life. 

What is food insecurity versus food apartheid?

The US Department of Agriculture (USDA) defines food insecurity “as a lack of consistent access to enough food for an active, healthy life.” In addition to this definition, the Interagency Working Group on Food Security and Food Security Advisory Committee have established that there are two types of food insecurity: Type I includes “individuals or groups of people who do not have enough food to eat,” while Type II includes “individuals or groups who do not have enough nutritional and culturally appropriate food.”  The issue of food insecurity is compounded by various factors, however location is often perceived to be the largest barrier. The term “food desert” are geographical locations that lack affordable food of a good quality. However, the term is arguably inaccurate- it ignores the intentionality behind certain communities not having enough food that can be traced back to settler-colonialism and white supremacy. Many have argued that the term “food apartheid” is more valid as it examines the whole food system and the way it intersects with race, geography, and economic policy. Furthermore, while the term food desert hints at the geographic aspect of food insecurity, which is certainly important, it is not the only factor to consider. Since 2011, the federal government has spent approximately 500 million dollars to produce a higher amount of well-stocked grocery stores in low-income communities- however, food insecurity did not diminish with the presence of grocery stores alone. The USDA even reported that proximity to supermarkets “has limited impact on food choices” and “household and neighborhood resources, education, and taste preferences may be more important determinants of food choices than store proximity.” In other words, though mainstream discourse surrounding food insecurity has focused on the proximity to grocery stores, it  is not the only factor to consider- one must consider the actual income of the neighborhood’s residents, access to cultural food staples, and transportation. For example, the presence of a Whole Foods in a low-income neighborhood does not necessarily matter when the residents cannot afford Whole Foods prices. To further highlight this issue, a 2014 study conducted in two Philadelphia neighborhoods found that while the presence of new grocery stores may have improved the perception of food accessibility, there was not an increased consumption of fruits and vegetables. It is also important to consider whether or not SNAP recipients can even shop at local grocery stores as they are both limited in options and price. While food apartheid is mainly discussed within the context of communities in urban areas, Indigenous nations in the United States, particularly those who live on reservations, are also subject to food apartheid which has not only severely impacted their access to healthy, affordable foods, but it has also affected their abilities to maintain relationships to traditional food systems. 

Indigenous Food Access in the United States 

Native reservations are subject to some of the highest rates of poverty that can be further characterized through a lack of access to food and healthcare. Indigenous Peoples in the US have one of the highest poverty rates of any marginalized group: 35 percent of children live in poverty. In terms of actual food access, 1 in 4 Indigenous Peoples are food insecure, while Indigenous households are 400 percent  more likely than other US households to report not having enough to eat. This is largely due to a significant portion of Indigenous Peoples living in remote areas where supplies are scarce and incomes are inadequate due to a lack of job opportunities. When broadening the scope of the issue from individual households to reservations and/or counties, the uncompromising nature of food apartheid becomes even more apparent. At least 60 reservations experience food insecurity. Additionally, out of the 28 counties that are considered to have a majority Indigenous population, 18 of them have high rates of food insecurity. A-Dae Romeros-Briones, the Director of Programs of the Native Agriculture and Food Systems at the First Nations Development Institute, has argued that: “With the onslaught of settlements and later reservation and federal policies, Tribal Nations were forced into other areas of unfamiliarity through the reservation system. This forced relocation remains an underlying issue as Tribal Nations today are trying to cultivate their lands, learn their environments and adjust to the abrupt transitions. Imagine a thousand-year-old society moving suddenly and now forced to re-build.” The technologies of settler-colonialism have forced Indigenous Peoples to adopt sedentary lifestyles and access food through a system that is actively harming them. This continues to be apparent as the US government’s policies that are presented as “assistance” arguably generate even more harm. SNAP participation among Indigenous households is around 24 percent, which is nearly double that of the general population. The USDA’s Food Distribution Program on Indian Reservations provides food commodities to Indigenous Peoples with low-income though the available foods have virtually no nutritional value and are high in fats and carbohydrates. As a result, Indigenous Peoples face higher rates of health issues alongside minimal accessibility to affordable and quality healthcare. Native communities have higher rates of Type II diabetes, which, due to inaccessible healthcare infrastructure, often leads to a higher rate of fatal cases.  Although the Indian Health Service (IHS) is the main healthcare provider for reservations, it is still not equipped to sufficiently help local communities; the private sector is not an option for most as there is poverty and high uninsured rates. The COVID-19 pandemic has only served to exacerbate these issues as Indigenous populations experienced a higher rate of cases and COVID deaths than any other group. Prior to the pandemic, more than 35 million people, including a high number of children, were living under food apartheid; this data actually reflects the lowest food insecurity rates in more than 20 years, yet the economic impacts of the pandemic have increased vulnerabilities. The disparities that have been produced and exacerbated by the pandemic are further proof of settler-colonialism’s perpetuity: Indigenous Peoples have higher rates of pre-existing conditions such as respiratory diseases, reservations have limited access to water which limits preventative measures, such as hand-washing, and poor health, and social distancing is difficult to maintain due to crowded living situations that are a result of impoverishment. 

The Navajo Nation is an extreme example of food insecurity as a result of food apartheid. Spanning 17 million acres across Arizona, Utah, and New Mexico, the Navajo Nation is the largest reservation in the US- it also only has 13 grocery stores. As a result, the average time for a resident to drive to a grocery store, assuming they have access to a vehicle, is three hours one-way. In a similar vein to other Indigenous nations pre-colonization, the Navajo people, otherwise known as the Dine, maintained an intimate relationship with the land and its various ecosystems as gardeners, hunters, and stewards- when the settler government of the US forcibly appropriated their land, subsequently displacing them, their livestock were killed and their fields were destroyed. Their way of life was permanently altered. Since the mid-1800s when the US forced the Dine on the Long Walk, where they were forced to travel to an internment camp at Fort Sumter, the Dine have had high rates of food insecurity with intentionally inadequate assistance from the federal government. Many Dine receive federal food benefits, such as SNAP, however, as previously mentioned, these are severely limited in their scope as Dine recipients are forced to buy unhealthy foods as they are the cheapest option. Artie Yazzie, a Dine, has said: “We have these big old thirst-busters that cost 60 cents, and three people can share it…So we’re going to go ahead and buy that instead of the $3 water or milk.” Artie has highlighted the crux of the issue: the nature of the food system accessible to Indigenous Peoples deliberately perpetuates insecurity and impoverishment. It exacerbates the conditions many Indigenous persons are subjected to which is having to purchase unhealthy food as it is both the cheapest, thus benefits last longer, and it sustains more family members than just one person. Another trend in the Navajo Nation that can be applied to other Indigenous communities is the disproportionate presence of convenience stores. A study conducted on 22 American Indian reservations in Washington State found 50 stores; when breaking that number down, these stores consisted of 25 convenience stores, 16 grocery stores, and nine supermarkets (O'Connell et al. 1).  O’Connell et al. assert that “nutrition environments on American Indian Reservations are characterized by few supermarkets and many gas-station type stores, moderate availability of fresh produce, and a reliance on off-reservation stores for regular or bulk shopping” (2). This observation is further compounded by the fact that 17 reservations do not have a supermarket on their reservation and the nearest locations are typically 10 miles away from the tribe’s headquarters (O'Connell et al. 1). In terms of the stores’ content, only about 38 percent of items on the checklist were available, with supermarkets having the most, though they are the least accessible, and convenience stores, which are the most prevalent, having the fewest (O'Connell et al. 4). Furthermore, dairy and sugar products are available in abundance, while fresh fruits and vegetables are the most difficult to find (O'Connell et al. 1). More specifically, eggs, white bread, and whole milk were the “most consistently available items” among all visited stores; eggs are the most consistent product in convenience stores which typically dominate reservations (O'Connell et al. 4). Distance also played a significant role in food availability: the average distance from tribal headquarters to the nearest supermarket on reservations, when one was available, was 5.3 miles, while the nearest off-reservation supermarket was typically 11.1 miles (O'Connell et al. 6). Thus it was incredibly important that one have access to a vehicle, though, of course, the difficulties of procuring vehicles in impoverished areas are more pronounced.

Indigenous Food Access in Canada

The US is not the only country in North America where Indigenous People are subjected to food apartheid and have limited access to food. In Canada, Indigenous populations also face higher levels of poverty and food insecurity. The country’s Constitution recognizes three groups: First Nations, which is a collective term for over 600 communities, Inuit, and Métis; approximately 4.9 percent of the population, which is equivalent to 1.67 million people, identify as being Indigenous. Out of three formally recognized groups, the First Nations make up the majority with a population of 900,000 individuals. Prior to settler-colonialism, the First Nations occupied a large territory where they harvested animals and plants for sustenance, as well as social, political, economic, and cultural reasons. However, in 1876, the settler government of Canada passed the Indian Act which established the existence of reserves, otherwise known as the Canadian equivalent of reservations; the purpose was to allocate small parcels of land for use by First Nations people, though they were in remote areas that were selected without consultation. The law’s passage was, simply put, a way to steal more land and protect settler-colonial interests. In present-day, almost half of First Nations people live on reserves that are mainly located in British Columbia, Ontario, and Manitoba. The Canadian Community Health Survey (CCHS) reported that 28.2 percent of Indigenous Peoples living off of reserves are food insecure, compared to only 11.1 percent of white Canadians facing food insecurity. The First Nations Regional Health Study then reported that of the First Nations households that live on reserves, and in Northern communities especially, approximately half are moderately or severely food insecure; households with children are also disproportionately impacted. In a similar vein to Indigenous Peoples in the US, food insecurity compounds health disparities as well- only 37.8 percent of First Nations adults report that their health is excellent or very good, compared to 59 pecent of Canadians nationally. Furthermore, the disruption of traditional food practices, which historically entails the consumption of foods that prevent diseases, and reliance on unhealthy foods has led to an increase in diabetes. Despite the fact  that healthcare is socialized in Canada, First Nation communities experience lower quality care compared to non-Indigenous populations. 

One example of a First Nation experiencing food apartheid, is the Fort Albany First Nation in Mushkegowuk Territory along the Albany River in northern Ontario- although traditional food were still highly prevalent, the majority of food intake was derived from store-bought food (Skinner et al. 2). Traditional food practices and harvesting activities involve hunting, fishing, and gathering, though these activities are in decline due to an increase in barriers (Skinner et al. 2). The primary limitations for community members were the high cost of hunting and the proliferation of environmental issues thus their ability to hunt in specific areas were limited; the cost of fuel and hunting equipment has impacted the ability to hunt large land-based animals, game birds, and small game. As a result of decreased food access, food sharing amongst family and community members is common (Skinner et al. 7). While the Inuit are considered their own distinct Indigenous group, they experience similar problems, but due to their geographic location food insecurity is even worse. The Inuit occupy the Canadian Arctic and face food insecurity at three times the rate of First Nation and Métis populations. Furthermore, 69.9 percent of  households with at least one preschooler are food insecure. When households have at least one hunter, food insecurity becomes less prevalent though, similar to the Fort Albany First Nation, hunting has become increadingly more difficult due to the cost of gear and gas; as a result, many have to turn to the local markets which have exceptionally high prices for food that is low in nutritional value (Skinner et al. 6). Fruits and vegetables are typically more expensive than highly processed foods in northern markets which partially has to do with transportation costs; additionally, sometimes food is spoiled by the time it reaches several communities. In a survey concerning northern First Nations, 82 percent of people stated their store often or sometimes sold expired food. It is easy to imagine that the Inuit, who are extremely remote, face similar challenges. However, one significant challenge for Indigenous communities in Canada, especially if they still maintain traditional food processes, is climate change. The rise of global temperatures has impacted the migration patterns of animals, such as birds and caribou, on First Nation territories. It is also affecting their ability to successfully harvest food as unpredictable weather patterns and climatic conditions have impacted the growth of certain plants and have made the physical act of harvesting extremely more difficult. Climate change is also increasing the cost of certain store-bought foods as transportation becomes more difficult. While there are many converging forces that contribute to the Indigenous population’s food insecurity, the devaluing of Indigenous life by the settler government has paved the way for food inaccessibility and poor quality to be considered acceptable, despite the harm it causes. 

How can we protect food access for Indigenous Peoples?

Within the context of international law, and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, North American countries are in violation of a few key articles when considering food insecurity. Article II specifies that: “Indigenous peoples and individuals are free and equal to all other peoples and individuals and have the right be free from any kind of discrimination, in the exercise of their rights, in particular that based on their indigenous origin or identity.” The disparities between non-Indigenous and Indigenous populations highlights the unequal treatment when it comes to food access- such disparities are arguably intentional on the part of settler-colonial governments whose entire existence is rooted in the devaluation of Indigenous People. Furthermore, when it comes to exercising their rights, such rights must also include maintaining their traditional and cultural ways of life, which includes sustainable food systems. This is further enshrined in Article 11, which states that: “Indigenous peoples have the right to practice and revitalize their cultural traditions and customs…” Article 11 should also be applied to food- this means that Indigenous Peoples need access to land, tools, and nutritional food. This also means that not only should there be more well-stocked stores within an accessible distance to Indigenous Peoples, it also means that their low-income status must also be addressed. However, while solutions need to undercut systemic issues that are economic and political in nature, one localized solution is to support food sovereignty. This concept was founded by the organization Via Campesina which is composed of Indigenous Peoples in Central and South America fighting for land ownership. The term encompasses the needs of Indigenous Peoples to eat “healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods and their right to define their own food and agriculture systems.” The concept of food sovereignty would allow Indigenous Peoples to control their own lands and food systems, which would not only help them access food, but it would be high in nutritional value thus diminishing reliance on settler food systems that produce and reinforce endemic health problems such as diabetes. While food apartheid is an intentional tool used by settler governments such as the US and Canada, Indigenous Peoples can find ways to subvert such harmful systems and not only survive, as they have been doing for generations, but to also thrive in a healthy, sustainable manner. 

References

O'Connell, Meghan, et al. “Food Access and Cost in American Indian Communities in Washington State.” NIH Public Access, 2011, pp. 1–10.

​​Sagaskie, Hunter Frederick. “The Impact of Colonization.” Michigan Sociological Review, vol. 33, 2019, pp. 101–114. 

Skinner, Kelly, et al. “Giving Voice to Food Insecurity in a Remote Indigenous Community in Subarctic Ontario, Canada: Traditional Ways, Ways to Cope, Ways Forward.” BMC Public Health, 2013, pp. 1–13. 

France and the Presidency of the Council of the European Union

On January 1st, 2022, France took over the Presidency of the Council of the European Union. During difficult times, the country has been preparing for the presidency since 2017, but its agenda has had to be revised as the world continues to face ongoing challenges. France will be presiding for six months, until July 1st  2022. But with the French elections right around the corner, the future of the Council of the European Union remains unknown. Current French President Emmanuel Macron waited until the last day to become a formal candidate for the election, which will be held in April, just weeks from now. 

The last country to preside over the Council of the European Union was Slovenia. The country’s six months’ program was based around one common theme: resilience. Faced with the pandemic and a prolonged economic crisis throughout Europe, Slovenia developed a plan called “Next Generation EU”. This recovery plan was and still is an opportunity for countries that have suffered from the pandemic to emerge stronger, to transform their economies, to create jobs and opportunities. One of the main goals of Slovenia's Presidency was to ensure safety and stability in neighboring countries of the European Union, especially the Balkans. 

The Council of the European Union represents the interests of the 27 member states in respect to the European Commission and Parliament. Emmanuel Macron, French president since 2017, spoke on January 19 in a speech for the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union. The French president presented his objectives for the presidency of the Council of European Union to the European Parliament in Strasbourg, mentioning a reform of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, a new alliance between the European Union and Africa, the future of the Balkans or the relationship with Russia or the United Kingdom. 

The country is taking the presidency in difficult times, with the ongoing pandemic and challenges that nations across the European Union have been facing over the last two years. Additionally, the French elections are right around the corner, and Macron only recently became an official candidate for these elections, seeking a second term. However, the outcome of these elections remains a mystery, which leaves the future of both France and the Council of the European Union unknown. 

France has prepared its six-month program detailing the priorities and guidelines for the presidency of the Council of the European Union. The program for the French Presidency has three ambitions: a more sovereign Europe, a new European model for growth, and a humane Europe. The guidelines of the Presidency are in line with the work carried out by the Slovenian Presidency, as well as the broader framework of the Trio Presidency programme prepared with the future Czech and Swedish Presidencies.

Emmanuel Macron has expressed strong ambitions for this mandate, but his objectives and his detailed agenda could be disrupted by the Covid-19 crisis, the presidential election, and different global issues such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Indeed, the sanitary crisis in France is only now getting better, still hundreds of thousands of new cases appear every day. Vaccines being mandatory, the situation has improved and the country will soon be lifting the mask mandate, but citizens have expressed their discontent with the rules that were set up to mitigate the effects of the virus on individuals. Additionally, the elections, like any other elections, have created a tense situation in the country, as the future of France remains unknown. Many current candidates, such as Marine Le Pen and Eric Zemmour have created a lot of divide in the country, as their ideologies are very different from the ones of other candidates such as Valérie Pécresse, or the current French president, Emmanuel Macron. 

The first ambition of the program of the French Presidency is a more sovereign Europe. In a tweet, Macron shares “A sovereign Europe is first and foremost a Europe capable of controlling its borders.” The programme calls for a reform of the Schengen area, the aim is to strengthen this area and to “create a political steering of border control and an emergency support mechanism in case of crisis” as Emmanuel Macron stated in his tweet on December 9th, 2021. 

Protecting European borders will also allow for a greater control of the migratory crisis, and improve the asylum policy for the many refugees who seek safety in countries of the European Union. France also has the goal to strengthen relations with Africa, as it is one of Macron’s priorities since the beginning of this mandate. Additionally, this first ambition of France has the aim to build a stronger Europe, by its action for the prosperity and stability of its neighbors, in particular by its commitment to the Western Balkans, which follows the goal of Slovenia's presidency. 

The second ambition of the program of the French Presidency is a new European model for growth. Most countries in Europe have been greatly affected by the Covid-19 pandemic, which has created economic issues throughout countries in the European Union. France has set the goal to make Europe a land of production, to create jobs and opportunities for European citizens. This growth model aims to help countries get out of the current economic crisis that they may be facing or have faced over the last two years, helping them in their growth and development, to make Europe a land of prosperity and endless opportunities. 

The third and last ambition of the program of the French Presidency is a more humane Europe. Emmanuel Macron emphasized in its agenda the importance of having a Europe that works with one another, and that listens to the concerns expressed by its citizens through the Conference on the Future of Europe. Over the last few years, a variety of domestic and international affairs such as the economic crisis, the pandemic, or the migrant crisis have divided not only France, but Europe. For this Presidency, French President Emmanuel Macron set the goal of a humane Europe, that is committed to fighting discrimination and securing a future for the next generation.

While the program for the French Presidency has three ambitions, it also has a variety of priorities that the country would like to address throughout its Presidency. Its three priorities are: the introduction of a minimum wage throughout the European Union, the regulation of digital giants and the creation of a carbon tax on products imported into Europe according to their environmental impact.

President Emmanuel Macron said he's in favor of legislation on a minimum wage for all EU nations. Fair wages that ensure a decent standard of living are one of the principles of the European Social Charter. For France, the introduction of minimum wage is aimed at increasing living standards throughout Europe. The introduction of minimum wage will also enhance working conditions in Europe. Having a set minimum wage across European countries would also allow for more fairness, as every worker has the right to a fair wage that guarantees them a decent standard of living. 

The regulation of digital giants is another one of the priorities of France’s Presidency. Their priority will be economic regulation and accountability of digital platforms, especially in the face of hate speech, with legislation on digital services and markets. Economy Minister Bruno Le Maire said that “digital giants are not just nice companies with whom we need to cooperate, they are rivals, rivals of the states that do not respect our economic rules, which must therefore be regulated.” Regulating these digital giants will allow for terrorist threats, and hate speech to be limited, and regulated.

The last priority of the French’s Presidency is in regard to the environment. Their priority will be the creation of a carbon price at the borders of the European Union on imported products. The environmental crisis is an issue that every country is facing, it is a team effort to combat climate change. Through the creation of a carbon price, France hopes to help the environment in the long-run. 

Emmanuel Macron's relationship with the Council of the European Union is important now more than ever. The European Union is facing difficult challenges ever since Russia invaded Ukraine on Thursday February 24th. It has been the duty of Macron to take the role of a mediator in this conflict. He has talked with both Putin, Russia’s president, and Zelenskyy, Ukraine’s president. Over the last few weeks, Macron has demonstrated a great sense of diplomacy, as he attempts to initiate a dialogue on NATO’s role in Europe and Ukraine. Many have said that Emmanuel Macron may benefit from the situation in Eastern Ukraine. His diplomacy has benefitted him politically, he appears to have shown great strength as he and other world leaders are attempting to solve this conflict.

Emmanuel Macron’s agenda advocates for subjects that will be at the heart of the French presidential campaign, that is just a few weeks from now. As France is set to preside the Council of the European Union until July 1st 2022, the French elections are at the center of the attention, as they have divided the country now more than ever. With many candidates with differing viewpoints and the future of France remains unknown, and so does the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, that the country is presiding until July 2022, way after the elections have taken place. 

French president Emmanuel Macron is well aware of the challenges that he will encounter and has encountered while presiding the Council of the European Union. Three months is a very short amount of time to make a meaningful change, considering that we are unaware of what will happen with the presidency of the Council of the European Union  after the elections. 

The question of postponing the French elections by six months had arisen, as a means to not disrupt the presidency of the Council of the European Union, but Emmanuel Macron finally decided against it. A way to show his commitment to Europe in the middle of a presidential campaign. According to many, the French agenda is more than ambitious, but many wonder what will happen with the elections, if Macron is not reelected, it could change a lot of things, lead to new discussions, and affect the future presidencies of the Council of the European Union.

Like any other elections, the French elections have been tense, the final list of candidates was only recently finalized with a total of 12 candidates, the future of France and of Europe remains a mystery. Many fear that the next president will want to change things for the future, having opposing views with Macron, meaning that everything that France will have done until the elections will go to waste, especially future plans that Macron will have set up for future presidencies. 

French citizens are currently divided, as elections are just a few weeks away. As of March 4th 2022, 12 candidates have reached the 500 sponsorships needed to become an official candidate at the French presidential elections. President Macron had already reached the 500 sponsorships needed before he even became an official candidate. But many other official candidates had struggled to reach the 500 sponsorships needed. Indeed, Marine Le Pen, Eric Zemmour and Christiane Taubira were worried about not obtaining the 500 sponsorships. 

The 12 candidates for these french elections are: Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, Yannick Jadot, Marine Le Pen, Jean-Luc Melanchon, Philippe Poutou, Eric Zemmour, Valérie Pécresse, Emmanuel Macron, Anne Hidalgo, Nathalie Arthaud, Fabien Roussel and Jean Lassalle. These candidates are from different parties, but their ideologies have not divided France as much as Eric Zemmour or Marine Le Pen’s ideals have.  

Eric Zemmour and Marine Le Pen are two candidates from the far right. Marine Le Pen party called National Rally is a party that since its creation, is above all an anti-immigration party, which advocates a significant reduction in legal immigration and the protection of French identity, as well as stricter control of illegal immigration. Eric Zemmour, candidate from the far right party is called Reconquête. Both Eric Zemmour and Marine Le Pen have divided France by their ideologies that are very different from the ones of current French President, Emmanuel Macron. 

Marine Le Pen ran against President Macron during the elections in 2017. These two candidates have struggled to reach their 500 sponsorships, and many fear that there is a chance that they will be elected. This will not only divide France but also Europe, as their goals are very different from the ones set by the current agenda that has been set up for the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union. For example, one of the main priorities of the French agenda is to protect European borders and create stability in the European Union; however, Zemmour wishes to build EU border wall to fight undocumented migration. Many are opposed to this idea, as it could potentially create instability and further divide in the European Union. 

The elections will occur right in the middle of France’s Presidency of the Council of the European Union, with ministers and a president who will have to campaign at some point, an effective French presidency of less than 3 months is expected. If there is a changeover in May, the new President and its ministers will have to take over the current files on the fly, but this may lead to conflicts with the current agenda, other members of the Council of the European Union, and other nations.

France’s agenda for the presidency of the Council of the European Union is very ambitious and progressive. However, the uncertainty around the French presidential elections may give rise to more challenges, and discussions after the presidency is over. As of right now, the fate of France and the Council is in the hands of the French voters.

A New Far-Right: How Éric Zemmour Stole Votes and Media Attention from Marine Le Pen throughout the French 2022 Presidential Election

The 2016 US presidential election may feel like a bygone era after several tumultuous years, but in France an eerily similar situation appears to be playing out reminiscent of Donald Trump’s rise to power.

 A mere six months ago Marine Le Pen, leader of France’s far-right party, the National Rally, appeared to be in a strong position for the upcoming French presidential election, despite her presidential loss in 2017. President Macron’s image and stronghold appeared to be failing thanks to his inability to control the ongoing pandemic and resentment over his tax policies and stance on immigration, whereas Marine Le Pen had maintained her supportive base, and used Macron’s failures to instigate disdain against him, thus growing her base.  

Yet in a series of events not unlike former President Trump’s campaign to the White House, another far-right candidate, Éric Zemmour, has entered into the French political arena. By many standards Éric Zemmour is a man of contradictions and hypocrisy, who has used his career as a journalist and author to routinely attack modern day French society. 

Who is Zemmour 

The son of Algerian, Jewish immigrants, Zemmour grew up in Paris where he started his career working as a newspaper journalist, before switching to radio and television. Zemmour’s main success comes from skills as a television presenter and author. He has mastered the art of controversy, routinely making xenophobic, racist, or sexist remarks, and yet frequently avoiding the social judgement that comes with his many convictions and fines of racial hatred. 

Zemmour’s Jewish identity has not prevented him from making anti-semitic public statements and promoting false statistics in regards to French complicity with the Vichy Regime of World War II. During a segment on CNews (a French far-right TV channel), Zemmour falsely claimed that Vichy sought to protect French Jews throughout the War, despite there being no such evidence to support this statement. Zemmour appears to show no recognition or connection to the immigrant experience of his parents, notoriously claiming that unaccompanied migrant children were essentially “rapists” and “murderers.”  

Zemmour’s appeal stems from a variety of skills and political tactics that he has manipulated throughout the election process. His provocative statements have struck a chord with voters, similar to the way Trump won over support in 2016 by saying the unsayable. Additionally, Zemmour’s status as a public figure, not a former politician, has helped him present himself as an alternative to the routine figures seen within the French political system. As the son of immigrants, a Jew, and alumnus of the elite SciencesPo university Zemmour is able to navigate a variety of identities that he can use as a form of protection against criticism. His Jewish identity has enabled him to make antisemitic comments without fearing reproach, and his academic prowess has given him a seat at the table amongst the other intellectual elites of his generation. The complexity of Zemmour’s character and identity allows him to attract a variety of voters from diverse backgrounds, but his best trait according to French voters? He is not Marine Le Pen. 

Le Pen’s weaknesses

Despite bringing the National Rally Party into the French presidential arena, Le Pen has struggled to shake off the image that is routinely associated with her and her party. The French have become accustomed to the National Rally party, ever since its creation in the late seventies. Under her father, Jean Marie Le Pen, the party achieved political success, but it was known mostly for its scandals and provocative political tactics. Since taking over the party from her father in the early 2010’s, Le Pen has done her best to modernize the National Rally, even going so far as to change its name from the National Front to the National Rally. She lost badly to Macron in the final round of the 2017 presidential election, but France was still forced to admit she had taken the party to new heights. Yet for all her efforts Le Pen has been unable to shake the older image of the National Rally; her usage of modern far-right political issues, such as promoting anti-immigration discourse and populist sentiments have resonated with voters, but her party is still seen as it was during her father’s reign when the National Rally represented Holocaust denial and pension reform. Ultimately, Zemmour’s biggest advantage stems from the fact that he has no association with Le Pen or the National Rally party. He represents the new French far-right, and thus can use his clean slate as a tool for success. 

Throughout his campaign Zemmour has frequently either ignored or humiliated Le Pen. He has declared himself to be the only true far-right candidate, insisting that Le Pen has betrayed France by embodying the centrist right. He also exploited tensions within Le Pen’s own party by welcoming former National Rally figureheads to his campaign, such as Jérôme Rivière and Gilbert Collard who were former spokespeople for the National Rally. Marine Le Pen’s own father, Jean Marie Le Pen (who has a fractured relationship with her) has shown little family loyalty in an interview where he declared himself to be both sympathetic and supportive of Zemmour. The former leader of the National Rally also emphasized when he sees as an advantage of Zemmour: “The only difference between me and Mr. Zemmour is that he’s a Jew, so it’s difficult to qualify him as a Nazi or a Fascist…That gives him great freedom » Jean Marie Le Pen’s comment also acknowledges the inconfortable the truth that many have been reluctant to admit: Part of Zemmour’s success in being viewed as a legitimate far-right candidate is that his Jewish identity gives him a minority status that protects him from political and cultural reproach. Zemmour can be critized for racism, sexism, and xenophobia, but he does not have to deny associations of Nazism, unlike many other current and former far-right politicians who are known for their fascist associations. Le Pen is thus facing both the expected reality of a tense political election between rival candidates, but also dealing with the unexpected betrayal of her party members. 

Zemmour’s triumph over Le Pen also stems from the political image that he has artfully crafted throughout his campaign. Both Le Pen and Zemmour have frequently drawn upon figures from France’s past throughout their campaigns, as they paint the picture of a return to the time when France ruled the continent. Le Pen has frequently evoked the image of Joan of Arc, presenting herself as a modern savior of France. With a pension for historical myths and legends, Le Pen often emphasizes France and Joan of Arc as a historical symbol of Christianity and purity in a modern and corrupted world. However Zemmour has taken a more modern historical approach, modeling himself off another « hero » of French history: resistance leader and former president, Charles de Gaulle. 

Zemmour as De Gaulle 

Despite his far-right politics, Zemmour’s video announcement of his 2022 presidential campaign showed an intense correlation with Charles De Gaulle’s famous speech calling for the liberation of France during World War II. Zemmour declares his presidential bid in the video while reading into an old fashioned microphone while barely making eye contact with the camera. The imagery is intense and reflects the exact movements of Charles De Gaulle in his famous speech on resistance, recognizable all across France. Zemmour’s decision to portray himself as Charles de Gaulle may appear to be an unlikely choice, given the two men’s differing political viewpoints (gaullism, a mixture of populisc liberalism and conservatism versus Zemmour’s obvious populism), but by aligning himself with one of France’s most well known and well respected war time leaders, Zemmour is convincing viewers of his legitimacy. Zemmour has succeeded in aligning himself with historical figures in a way that Marine Le Pen has not. While Le Pen has sought to reshape France into its mythical past of glory and tradition, Zemmour has focused on celebrating contemporary concrete history - a tactic that has clearly resonated with voters.

Zemmour also models himself off of more recent leaders, such as Donald Trump. Although he possesses the sophistication and vocabulary that former President Donal Trump notoriously lacked, Zemmour’s speeches reveal similar themes to Trump’s. During a speech in December, Zemmour stated that “We are a great nation, a great people. Our glorious past presages our future. Our soldiers conquered Europe and the world!” He added later that, “we will be worthy of our ancestors. We will not allow ourselves to be dominated, turned into vassals, conquered, colonized. We will not allow ourselves to be replaced.” Through his speeches Zemmour reveals the same populist tactics that won over millions of Americans in 2016.

Uniting the far and center right 

Zemmour has also succeeded in ways that Le Pen has failed to do through his ability to unite the center and far-right. Thanks to his pedigree, educational background, and magnetism, Zemmour is able to establish himself as a legitimate intellectual and man of culture. He has the academic credentials that allow him to remain within the status quo, which is a useful tool when appealing to the more traditionally conservative and rigid center-right. Le Pen has never succeeded in this field, due to issues such as her gender, family history, and the national image of her party. However, thanks to the many aspects of his identity and political tactics, Zemmour can present himself as an antidote to the decades long tension between the far and center right. He offers voters on both sides the chance to unite for a populist candidate, because he can also guarantee center-right voters the promise of stability and status-quo that they are accustomed to. Zemmour has taken Le Pen’s weakest points and used them against her; in areas where she has failed, he has won. It is no wonder that the two candidates would have such strong feelings against each other. Earlier this month in an interview for Figaro, Le Pen accused Zemmour of attempting to “kill” the National Rally, depicting him as a man who seeks destruction along with victory. Yet her intense feelings on Zemmour also reveal a harsh truth for the National Rally: Zemmour has beaten Le Pen at her own game.

Understanding the Core Values Of Pre-modern Shari’a Law as Appropriated by the Canonical Nation-State in the Late 20th Century: Egypt, Pakistan, Iran, and Indonesia

Islamic law, namely shari’a, has been misconstrued by outside groups for centuries. Features that initially informed the law such as the Qur’an, hadith, fatwa, madhabs, the madrasa, waqf, and primary legal personnel, like the mufti and qadi, are not as common across Muslim legal institutions as they once were as a result. Figures in the original Islamic court had initially been responsible for the emergence of shari’a law in the Muslim world as an academic, legal and social institution. However, the pervasiveness of the law as a multidisciplinary institution, upon the establishment of the nation-state, cannot be described as a conventional shari’a legal system with mufti and qadi legal figures, among others. Under nation-state development, “re-Islamization trends” occur, as Wael B. Hallaq suggests in An Introduction to Islamic Law. After 1970, post-Muslim nation-states were subject to re-Islamization (Hallaq 140, 2011)-- an incursion created on the basis of a misunderstanding of shari’a law by the state. The emergence of the state’s presence in the shari’a legal structure impeded the legal, social, and academic superstructure of shari’a law. This article will explore cases of the re-Islamization trends from the 1970s onwards in the nation-state contexts of Egypt, Pakistan, Iran, and Indonesia. It will argue that shari’a law as conventionally understood in pre-modern Islamic societies informed by the key actors mentioned– is undermined by the nation-state in these post-1970 contexts.  

Upon analyzing the operations of shari’a law, it is crucial to understand the social and political environments in which shari’a is rooted. Hallaq emphasizes the lack of an established sovereign state amidst the emergence of Islamic law, and specifically how this had implications for Muslim legal personnel. Pre-modern Islamic societies were comprised of minimal all-encompassing governance over societies. Hallaq highlights that bureaucracy and state administration were few and far between. When found, bureaucratic and administrative centers were primarily confined to urban areas. Thus, there was no tangible way to associate people and groups with regions in pre-modern Islamic society. Moreover, paperwork signifying citizenship did not exist, rendering nationality or “geographical fixity” of state borders murky (Hallaq 7-8, 2011). As a result, pre-modern Islamic societies resorted to “self-rule,” so governing factors that informed pre-modern Islamic law were not subject to the authority of the state, and self-rule was implemented (Hallaq 7-8, 2011). In understanding the structure of pre-modern Islamic societies and the law, shari’a cannot be understood as a product of the state; however, upon the establishment of the state, an abundance of intervention occurred, making the essence of shari’a law different from what it once was before modernization.   

In terms of the key legal personnel that informed pre-modern Islamic law and were not subject to state authority, the mufti was a legal specialist tasked with making a non-binding, but heavily-relied-upon settlement for a dispute, or fatwa, in his community (Hallaq 9, 2011). To conclude a fatwa, the most sacred source and text of the law was utilized to inform this: the Qur’an (Hallaq 15, 2011). An additional major source behind the Qur’an is the hadith, which is everything the Prophet Muhammad has ever said or done (Hallaq 16, 2011). It is important to note that hadith has adopted narratives over time since the Prophet’s death in the seventh century. Moreover, one can only imagine how much hadith has changed regarding rhetoric since its inception. A primary element of Islamic law is the emphasis on rationality and its influence on life in shari’a society. Hallaq indicates that rationality is determined by God, which is advised by both the Qur’an and the Prophet. Ultimately, notions of reason and revelation derived from the Qur’an and the Prophet work to reinforce Islamic law and feed to its rationality (Hallaq 15, 2011).  

Further, the qadi, or Muslim judge, mediated disputes– often involving disputes outside of the courtroom. For instance, the qadi may have been seen settling a dispute between a husband and wife in their home (Hallaq 11, 2011). An essential part of the qadi’s role is to be a community member and overseer. In terms of how the legal personnel became versed in the law or became a part of the ulama, was due to a heavy emphasis on academia and scholarship, specifically among legal personnel. Morality and the embrace of knowledge through scholarship were important values and aspects of early Islamic law. Under madhabs, or legal schools where ideas and opinions could be collectively adopted, those studying to be a part of the Islamic legal personnel studied in study circles, or madrasas when the law became more established in academia during the tenth century to earn their titles (Hallaq 31-32, 2011). These madrasas were educational, financial, and political institutions that allowed for hierarchy among professors and students, but also allowed for waqf endowments, which dedicated spaces for Islamic law to be studied, specifically within mosques (Hallaq 38, 2011). This conveys the importance of academia that has reinforced early Islamic law as education institutions manifested into financial institutions to become an academic and financial superstructure–fused into both.

Consequently, shari’a law, in several cases, when applied in the contemporary, does not resemble shari’a in a pre-modern context. In part, this is due to how shari’a has been misconstrued, misrepresented, and therefore undermined by governance structures upon being placed in the hands of the western, hegemonic nation-state. This is enshrined in Egypt, Pakistan, Iran, and Indonesia. Consistent misrepresentation has created discourse on shari’a law persisting into the 21st century. One example of a case in which shari’a law is prevalent is in the present day (21st century) nation-state of Zamfara, northern Nigeria, as conveyed in the documentary, Inside a Shari’ah Court. The synopsis of the film is comprised of the following: a narrator that is a Muslim woman from Britain, where shari’a law is not practiced. In the film, she travels to Zamfara to investigate, in an ethnographic vein, the operations of shari’a law and better understand the questions many bring into the overarching discourse: the inclusion of shari’a law in British juristic practice. The documentary conveys similarities between the juristic practices embraced in Gusau and those during pre-modern Islamic society, specifically the community fashioned orientation of legal personnel and community members, the role of the judge, and the importance of knowledge to inform the law. Upon her arrival to the village of Gusau, Zamfara, the narrator approaches Judge Isah, the Muslim judge of the community, with her questions about the operations of shari’a law in this community, many of which are combative. 

The narrator of the documentary provides a thick description through what I have denoted as an anthropological and ethnographic process. Here, she qualitatively observes and inquires about the juristic practices of shari’a law in Gusau. However, a key question that emerges from the work done in this film is the symbiotic relationship between power and knowledge; is it fair for the knowledge and experiences shared in this documentary by the residents of Gusau to be thickly described and expertly accounted for by BBC? Ultimately, the film reveals shari’a as backward, oppressive, and uncivilized. This conveys shari’a as a very misrepresented practice, not only by non-Muslims but outside groups that do not practice shari’a law (BBC, 2007).  Ultimately, a contemporary film like this enshrines how systems of coloniality has further unfolded through more nation-state agendas like western research and documentary as these structures reinforce a claim of expertise, knowledge, and control by westerners.

Furthermore, though shari’a law is present in modern-day Nigeria, there are many Muslim states in which the circumstances are not the same. The modernization of the law in conjunction with state intervention has made it so that the legal system appears vastly different than it did before the end of the first World War. The hands of the Nationalist elites took over Muslim societies through implementing modern technology, cultural institutions, among western nuances that align with the emergence of global capitalism (Hallaq 135, 2011). Even before this, Hallaq suggests that the earliest forms of pre-modern governance perpetrated by the Ottoman Empire during the sixteenth and seventeenth-century set the stage for the modern transformations that occur from the 19th century onwards. In part, this is due to the sovereign’s implications for shari’a law. The Circle of Justice established by the sovereign saw the military as inextricably linked with sovereignty and became laced into shari’a law. Additionally, the transformation of the qadi under the Ottomans was made to be appointed and dismissed by the sovereign (Hallaq 72-73, 2011). The Ottomans were also responsible for constructing the largest Muslim empire by the end of the sixteenth century, responsible for both Egypt and Iran. 

Persisting into a further period of modernization, the colonization of the law has also enabled the modernization of shari’a law that occurs during the latter half of the 20th century. The Ottomans could not keep up with the rapid modernization of their European counterparts, so they were less successful by the 17th century. One example of European colonization of Islamic law is Dutch Colonial rule in Indonesia and the establishment of adat to apply “normative” law practices in the legal system with the intent to “unify the law,” which is eventually embraced by the state of Indonesia in the late 20th century (Hallaq 90, 2011). I will soon convey the Indonesian state’s application of colonized Islamic law in the late 20th century and how it does not result in a unified legal system.

But, the codification of the law under nationalist regimes during the early 20th century established an ultimate shift towards modernization that differs from the governance happening in pre-modern Islamic societies: the shift from a more collective approach to the law, to one that strives towards individualism and treats families as individual “units” existing “on their own,” under the law, aligning with the capitalist system that was rapidly emerging (Hallaq 135, 2011).  This modernization of legal structures is further enshrined in the post-1970s “re-Islamization trends” that Hallaq describes, which are primarily state doings that worked to mold Islamic societies in Egypt, Pakistan, Iran, and Indonesia. In essence, the laws applied in these contexts cannot be described as shari’a law as it once was recognized in a pre-modern, stateless society.  

Hallaq identifies Egypt as one of the longest experiments in legal modernization and ideological secularization. Specifically, two groups from the mid-nineteenth century onwards were established in Egypt, one being the Azharis. The Azharis strongly identified with the ulama and conventional visions of shari’a law. Another religious group that was even more prevalent in Egypt during this time was the “Muslim Brothers,” or better denoted, Islamists, which spread beyond the confines of Egypt to other countries in the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia (Hallaq 143-144, 2011).  

These similarities between pre-modern shari’a legal societies and those of the Islamist majority with an Azhari minority in Egypt, pressured the government to consider using shari’a as their legal system. Largely, this required compliance to nationalism from the Azharis, which was implemented. It also included suppression of Islamist political formations under the Nasser regime at the time. In turn, the subordination of both groups on behalf of Nasser’s regime made it so that the implementation of shari’a in the first place could be disregarded by the state. In 1971, the SCC (Supreme Constitutional Court) was established to “curb infringements” by the legislative and executive branches. However, the impacts of the SCC were ambiguous, lacking a definition of what shari’a law was until 1993. Even so, the SCC took a rather ignorant and audacious stance in its definition of shari’a law, ignoring hadith and suggesting that any judge versed in national courts could interpret shari’a. Though the state of Egypt during the late 20th century had agreed to implement shari’a law, this is merely their misinterpretation of what had been established in pre-modern Islamic society: the sacred and fundamental superstructure of shari’a. So, key ideas that initially informed shari’a law have been ignored. For instance, the SCC did not regard hadith or the value of the ulama because they suggested that any judge educated about the national court was qualified to adjudicate in a shari’a context. This suggests fewer exclusive qualifications for legal personnel, namely Muslim judges, that are defined in pre-modern shari’a societies (Hallaq 145-147, 2011).  

Comparatively, in post-1970 Pakistan, state intervention to implement shari’a juristic practices was nationalized and misunderstood. Pre-modern shari’a practices were not implemented to their fullest extent. An example of this is under the Objectives Resolution of 1949, which initially was included as a Preamble to the Constitution in Pakistan. This resolution intended to expunge all laws contradicting the traditional laws of shari’a. In turn, it was intended that each High Court would have a “Shariat Bench,” but this was codified into a single FSC (Federal Shariat Court) in 1980. Hallaq accentuates the impediments faced by the FSC in court: The Supreme Court could deny the FSC’s decisions and the FSC could not adjudicate the Constitution, fiscal, procedural, or personal status laws. Additionally, the five judges in the FSC were from national courts rather than the ulama class, so they were not versed in the same juristic practices that synthesize knowledge and scholarship with the law. This is similar to the nationalization of judges in the Islamic courts perpetuated by the SCC in Egypt around the same period. The case of Egypt also worked to devalue the importance of knowledge about shari’a across the ulama. In this way, it is made clear that traditional shari’a law was subordinated by the state of Pakistan (Hallaq 150-151, 2011).  

During this time frame, Iran was experiencing the prodigious Iranian revolution of 1979. As a result, this had vast implications for the structure of Islamic law. Ayatullah Khomeni, leader and theorist of the Iranian revolution and Pahlavi state of Iran, emphasized that the “Marja-Taqlid, or Jurist-in-Charge,” must fulfill the role of the Imam, or leader of the prayer if the Imam is not present. Formally, this was embedded in the 1979 Constitution of the new Republic, where Article 5 indicates such specifically. Khomeni also emphasizes the notion of itijihad, or Islamic legal mastery, and how it must be embraced by an Islamic state complying with shari’a law. To ensure this, the Marja-Taqlid will supervise the activities of the Islamic state and render things ‘Islamic’ or ‘un-Islamic.’ Khomeni theorized how he felt Islam should operate in Iran and suggested a rather paradoxical theory: “Islamic governance grounded in the shari’a’s rule of law was gradually fading away in favor of a modernist perception of governance.” (Hallaq 153, 2011)  

However, the reality of his regime cultivated a modern state and modern perceptions of governance, hence its paradoxical nature. This is perpetuated by the state in practice under the Pahlavi legal system. For example, according to Article 167 of the 1979 Constitution of the new Republic, court judges are required to adjudicate cases utilizing codified law. Upon the absence of codified law, their decisions rely on a fatwa given by a qualified jurist -- to the state’s standards and construction. The codification of the law by the state here conveys a modernized form of shari’a law that does not resemble the initial facets of pre-modern shari’a. As a result, the state was granted the ability to pronounce what is and is not Islamic. Further, any vague law requires the court to make a fatwa based on the principles of Islamic law, or even the judge himself can exemplify itijihad. As seen in Iran, Egypt, and Pakistan, the ulama is undermined here when the qualifications to legal mastery are made less exclusive upon modernization on behalf of the state (Hallaq 154-156, 2011).  

In Indonesia after 1970, shari’a law was held to a similar standard. Hallaq identifies Law No. 14 of 1970 as a law that reinforced the judicial powers of shari’a courts, thus allowing them to be mediators of disputes before the level of adjudication, which assumes a courtroom setting with a case decision being determined. This is important to consider because it undermines shari’a law in that it was not emphasized as a law appropriate to make an adjudication. Rather, shari’a jurists mediate outside of the court in this context and are not given access to the courtroom. Likewise, the new Compilation of Islamic Law in Indonesia, which had the objective to foster unification of Islamic law across the country, drew on a more modernized version of the law. This resulted in many counterintuitive impacts that were exacerbated by the state (Hallaq 161, 2011).  

For instance, after the collapse of the Suharto regime in 1998 via the operation of “decentralization” (aka Otonomi Daerah), laws No. 10 and 32 established in 2004 under the new Compilation, acknowledged the “relative autonomy” of the districts in Indonesia. This gives the federal government powers over both domestic and global policies while leaving domestic affairs up to the individual districts themselves. As a result, the residual impacts of this have caused a lack in a unified ideology of shari’a practiced across sixteen districts in Indonesia, unification being an imperative aspect of the pre-modern structure that informed shari’a. With that said, upon Indonesia’s decision to give powers to the state, it diminishes early objectives to achieve a unified ideology (Hallaq 162, 2011).  

Fundamentally, the misconceptions concerning Islamic law have merely been upheld by the actions of the nation-states in the cases of Egypt, Pakistan, Iran, and Indonesia. The contents of this paper have analyzed the modernization of Islamic juristic practices in the latter part of the 20th century and only one isolated 21st-century context examined through a thickly described lens. With that said, extrapolation beyond the 20th century would further strengthen the assessment of whether shari’a law is prevalent and resembles its pre-modern structure. Seeing as the political context of four of these nation-states has fluctuated in time, perhaps Islamic law has been even further modified and resembles pre-modern shari’a structure even less than it did in a post-1970s context before the twenty-first century.  

References

Hallaq, Wael B. An Introduction to Islamic Law. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 

2011.

Hamid, Ruhi. Inside a Shari'ah Court. BBC, 2007.

Where to go from Seoul? Reviewing the 2021 UN Peacekeeping Ministerial

The UN recently held its annual Peacekeeping Ministerial this last December, the first after the 2020 event was canceled due to the pandemic. This year, dozens of foreign and defense ministers met in a crucial forum for organizing international support for UN peacekeeping operations. This article will try to serve as a post-mortem “round-up” of the conference's activities, as well as to analyze the impact the ministerial might have on peacekeeping operations going forward.

UN peacekeeping is increasingly finding itself in a tough position. As Paul Williams of GWU explained in early March 2020, “the Council's three strategic goals for peacekeeping operations: implementing broad mandates, minimizing peacekeeper casualties and maximizing cost-effectiveness—cannot be achieved simultaneously.” Since his writing, the COVID-19 pandemic has only deepened the crisis. National governments are now even less willing to fund peacekeeping operations (PKOs) due to the need for domestic investment. Meanwhile, the pandemic and its economic impacts have intensified levels of conflict worldwide, while simultaneously having increased the number of challenges for peacekeepers on the ground. The UN Department of Peace Operations clearly needs additional support to respond to international conflict, and the Peacekeeping Ministerial offers just the opportunity to do so.

The UN Peacekeeping Ministerial has been held annually since 2014, with the exceptions of 2018 and 2020. While it was initially a meeting at the head of state level, in recent years it has shifted down to the level of foreign and/or defense ministers. The ministerial has emerged as a method for states to coordinate their support to UN peacekeeping operations, as well as to serve as a forum for discussion between member states on key thematic areas relating to peacekeeping. Crucially, the UN Peacekeeping Ministerial is the primary window for states to pledge new units and capabilities to PKOs. It is almost the equivalent of a draft-day or the first day of free agency in American sports: a hectic few days where an organization (in this case the Department of Peace Operations) attempts to significantly boost its capabilities by adding new assets and personnel.

South Korea was the host this year, and as such, they were partially responsible for setting the agenda. They identified two major themes: medical capacity building and technology. It is becoming increasingly clear that there is a medical gap in peacekeeping missions. Even in Mali’s mission, MINUSMA, there are issues with ensuring high levels of care and medical evacuation capabilities. This is despite the fact that Mali is considered one of the most dangerous missions for peacekeepers and thus the need for medical care is highest. Thus, one objective for the ministerial was to receive more pledges for medical units and medical capacity building. The other major theme was technology. Like with medical resources, the UN has identified the implementation of new technology as a key way to improve mission success. Because of this one of the hopes of the ministerial was to secure pledges in high-tech equipment like night vision goggles, C-IED technology, and tactical drones.

In addition to these major themes, there were four online preparatory conferences held by member states before the ministerial proper. The first on peacebuilding and sustaining peace focused on how integrating peacekeeping missions with other UN organizations such as country teams and special political missions. The second on partnerships for performance and accountability focused on how to properly monitor and evaluate peacekeeping missions. The third on capacity-building and training initiatives focused on how the UN could coordinate member states (particularly those with a highly developed military capacity) providing training and other technical supports to Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) with less developed militaries. The final conference, on the protection of civilians and safety and security, focused on ways to reduce the risk of injury and death to both peacekeepers and civilians within mission areas, such as by increasing mission mobility via additional helicopters. 

With those common goals and themes set, representatives from nearly every UN member state arrived in Seoul to determine who would contribute what to help support the public good that UN peacekeeping provides. Now that the preliminary work has been explained and the dust has mostly settled, we can now examine the results of the ministerial by thematic area, 

The ministerial was able to make significant headways in the field of medical capacity. Several countries pledged hospitals and other medical units, most notably seven field hospitals from Egypt, Ghana, Italy, Kazakstan, Mongolia, Morocco, and Uganda. In addition, developed militaries, such as Canada, China, and the United States have offered other forms of medical support such as training, equipment, and off-site treatment. Key amongst these is a large number of first aid kits going to African TCCs in MINUSMA, who are currently suffering a disproportionately high casualty rate within a PKO with an already high casualty rate. These pledges represent a significant improvement in the UN's potential medical capacity, especially when combined with pledges of aeromedical evacuation capable helicopters.

This leads us to the second theme of the Ministerial, technology. The Koreans were the host and they made a splash ahead of the conference when they announced a pledge of 16 helicopters in a rare joint pledge with Kenya. South Korea will provide the actual helicopters and some technical personnel, while the bulk of the deployed personnel will hail from Kenya. When combined with pledges from Germany, Italy, Kazakhstan, and Sri Lanka, the at least 25 newly pledged helicopters should increase UN helicopter levels in large-scale missions by 57%. In addition, Italy, Rwanda,  and Kazakhstan all pledged unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) units of various sizes. These aircraft pledges are vital: in the DPOs pre-ministerial pledging guide they specifically requested large quantities of UAV and helicopter units, and it appears that those requests have been fulfilled. In terms of other technology-related pledges, France and several other European countries pledged engineering equipment to other TCCs. The large number of aircraft pledged is probably the most important set of pledges coming out of the Ministerial, as their presence will provide much-needed boosts in the critical areas of medical evacuation, logistics, and rapid reaction to some of the UN's most challenging missions.

The ministerial was also notable for the large number of training pledges put in by the developed, Global North militaries. France pledged to train 10,000 African peacekeepers, the UK pledged a training center for trainers from Nepal as part of a “Training the Trainers” initiative, and Germany pledged six Mobile Training Teams. While these pledges are clearly beneficial, they highlight a continuation in current labor relations set up within UN peacekeeping. Developed countries such as the United States and Europe will provide large amounts of training, equipment, and on occasion highly specialized units such as helicopter squadrons. In contrast developing countries largely from Africa and South Asia contribute the bulk of the boots on the ground and suffer the bulk of the casualties. While there have been some shifts towards greater western participation, particularly with MINUSMA, it's clear that the ministerial represents a continuity not a change in that regard.

A final key result from the ministerial was a large number of highly mobile pledges that should boost the mobility of UN PKOs. In the pledging guide, the DPO requested two quick reaction force (QRF) companies. These formations are motorized, airmobile, and capable of responding to attacks on civilians at a much quicker speed than conventional infantry battalions. Instead of receiving two QRF companies, the UN received QRFs from Bhutan, Indonesia, Mongolia, Nepal, Peru, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Tunisia (x2), Uganda, and Uruguay, but, in some cases, these pledges are smaller than a company. However, UN requests for reconnaissance units and SWAT teams went unanswered. Despite this, when these QRF units are combined with the newly pledged UAV and helicopter formations, UN peacekeeping formations have become significantly more mobile than they were before the Ministerial.

Now that the ministers have left and the conference is over, the work continues. Getting all of these newly pledged units ready for the rigors of a UN peacekeeping deployment and transporting the needed thousands of personnel and thousands of tons of equipment across the globe to get them there, is a colossal logistical and technical undertaking. Political issues may also complicate the new pledges. Kazakhstan was one of the larger contributors in the Ministerial, pledging helicopters, hospitals, and UAV units. However, they have been under fire from the UN after Kazakh military units illegally wore UN blue helmets while policing recent protests against the government. It’s unclear if this dispute will endanger the deployment of Kazakhstan’s pledges, but this incident highlights the types of problems that may occur between pledge and deployment.

In conclusion, the 2021 UN Peacekeeping Ministerial was a solid success. Against a backdrop of falling budgets and questions about peacekeeping's future, the UN was able to significantly improve its capabilities in the key areas of mobility, technology, and medical capabilities. Almost every critical need identified by the DPO ahead of time was filled, with some (such as QRF capability) excessively so. It is extremely probable that these new pledges help ensure that UN PKOs are even more capable of protecting civilians in conflict and building peace in their areas of operation.

A Case to Update How America Measures Poverty

Millions of Americans experience poverty each day. The idea to measure poverty for the purpose of allocating government resources came about in the 1960’s during Lyndon B. Johnson’s “War on Poverty.” The Office of Economic Opportunity needed a statistical measurement and relied on Mollie Orshansky at the Social Security Administration to provide that equation. In 1967, the United States government officially adopted Orshansky’s measurement as the Official Poverty Measure. With this measure, the government created a threshold of who – based on income – qualifies as experiencing poverty and who does not. The Poverty Threshold is the minimum amount of income needed to avoid poverty, and that threshold can vary for families of different sizes, ages, and members. However, for each size of a family, the threshold throughout the U.S. is constant. For example, in 2018 the Poverty Threshold for a single person was $13,064, but that number will alter when evaluating a family of four. The measurements and subsequent thresholds are used to determine eligibility for government services and track trends in poverty. However, there has been little change to how poverty is measured in the United States since the 1960’s, despite how greatly the nation’s economic context has changed. Therefore, poverty in the United States has been mismeasured for years. There are changes that can be made to the poverty measurement in order to account for needs in the 21st century, and to include those who were previously excluded from the equation.

The Current Poverty Measurement

The measurement that President Johnson’s administration created compared pre-tax income of a family unit to three times the minimum food basket of 1963. To gauge the economic makeup of the country, the Official Poverty Measurement draws upon data from the Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement, where 100,000 households are surveyed annually during the months of February, March, and April. However, the income that is calculated within the poverty measurement is not just income earned from work. According to the United States Census Bureau, income can include: “Earnings, Unemployment compensation, Worker’s Compensation, Social Security, Supplemental Security Income, Public Assistance, Veteran’s Payments, Survivor Benefits, Pensions, Interest, Dividends, Rents, Royalties, Income on estates, Trusts, Educational assistance, Alimony, Child support, and other qualifying sources. Qualifying income in comparison to the average annual cost of food is adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPRI Urban), meaning that “it measures the changes in the price basket of goods and services purchased by all urban customers.” Therefore, changes in an urban family’s regular spending habits are accounted for, but expensive expenditures and geographic diversity are not.

This measurement accounts for 88% of the United States population but does not adequately account for sudden and costly expenditures: such as healthcare.  However, some analysts suggest adjusting poverty measurements to the Chain Consumer Price Index. The Peter G. Peterson Foundation “argues that the chained CPI provides a more accurate estimate of the changes in the cost of living by reducing the substitution bias, which occurs when consumers substitute one good for another as prices rise.”  The Chained CPI reflects what people buy before and after a price change, and therefore can provide a more accurate estimate of poverty in the United States based on how people are able to withstand economic changes: to not fall under the poverty threshold.

Gaps in the Official Poverty Measurement

The current threshold is created based upon if a family falls above or below the Official Poverty Measure. One’s total income is taken and divided by the threshold. While this measure heavily relies on food, it is not an adequate representative of how a family in 2022 allocates their funds. The Annie E. Casey Foundation notes that while families previously spent one-third of their budget on food in 1963, it is certainly not the case anymore as housing; utility; and technological cost put a heavier burden on American families. Due to holes in the poverty measurement itself, poverty within the United States is under-estimated and therefore excludes many individuals from obtaining fiscal assistance.

One reason that poverty is under-estimated in the United States is that many people experiencing poverty are ignored in official government measurements. When calculating pre-tax income, non-family housemates are calculated separately than the rest of the family, skewing the scale of need. Furthermore, those in institutions such as prisons, nursing homes, college dormitories, military barracks, foster homes, and experiencing homelessness are not surveyed at all in the poverty measurement: leaving out many who are in need. Additionally, the measurement fails to gage the depth of income. The Official Poverty Measurement has not kept pace with the changes in healthcare policies, tax regulations, and other laws. Furthermore, it fails to account for other social programs families receive such as the Child Tax Credit and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). However, one of the core issues opponents note with the Official Poverty Measurement is how there is no variation amongst geographic regions. The cost of living in a rural area is not the same as in a city. For this reason, the lack of geographic variation within the poverty measurement is one of its main faults.

Supplemental Poverty Measure

The federal government has known about gaps in the Official Poverty Measure since only a few years after it was created. However, research is conducted continuously in order to keep up with a rapidly changing economy. In 1970, members of the Census Bureau, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the Department of Health and Human Services formed the Interagency Poverty Task Force to re-evaluate how the United States measures poverty. In 1990, the National Academies of Sciences met again to evaluate the true scope of poverty in the United States. After finding a higher rate of poverty than the Official Poverty Measurement, the Supplemental Poverty Measurement was created. The Supplemental Poverty Measurement accounts for modern needs in a way that the Official Poverty Measurement does not. It includes expenses for food, clothing, shelter, and utilities. Additionally, the equation makes geographic adjustments and benefits, which is one of the core issues with the original measure. The equation adds cash income and non-cash benefits and subtracts work expenses; medical expenses, and child support from the previous total.

However, this new equation is not a full-proof solution. First, the Supplemental Poverty Measure does not account for the value of benefits. For example, one’s housing unit may not be stable, and access to healthcare does not mean that an individual has a comprehensive plan. Another concern is that the new measurement is prone to human error due to its base in a family’s spending habits and its data collection method. It is based on survey results, which may not be accurate. The American Enterprise Institute suggests that a new poverty measure “will use administrative data to improve the accuracy of survey responses, include a fuller set of resources, reflect actual spending, and recognize some of the issues regarding poverty thresholds.” Finally, there are advantages to living in a high-cost urban area, such as access to more job opportunities and diverse culture. Overall, the concerns with the Supplemental Poverty Measure come from the quality of living being quantified.

Despite its errors, the Supplemental Poverty Measure takes steps closer to truly understanding poverty in the United States. It accounts for a family’s average expenditures over five years, rather than annually. With knowing how many people  and expenditures are excluded from the Official Poverty Measure, the higher poverty rate the new methodology uncovers is widely accepted as a more realistic measure. Furthermore, it gives critical insight to social and economic patterns to further understand how poverty touches American lives.

Moving Forward

Four out of every ten Americans cannot financially manage a $400 emergency such as an ambulance ride, flood, or car accident. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, 50 million Americans faced food insecurity, with that number rising since the start of the pandemic. With 43.3% of Americans identifying as poor or low-income, a measurement that under-estimates poverty makes it seem like an odd socio-economic phenomenon, further stigmatizing the experience: which is harmful.

In a modern economy, Americans pick up more than one job to keep their family above the poverty threshold. With food taking up less than a quarter of a household’s budget, a modern measure is needed to adapt to a changed economy. Shawn Fremstad, a senior policy fellow at the Center for Economic Policy and Research, states that “A better, more modern measure of poverty would set the threshold at half of median disposable income — that is, median income after taxes and transfers, adjusted for household size, a standard commonly used in other wealthy nation.” This is because median income changes faster than the rate of inflation, so a new measure based upon those estimates can keep up with the changing economy more than the current measurement can. Flexibility and inclusivity are key going forward.

Conclusion

An understanding of poverty in the United States is critical to create policy that helps those experiencing it. Policymakers need to recognize that poverty touches every aspect of an individual’s life, from housing to school and healthcare. A new and improved poverty measurement must consider the aforementioned different aspects of poverty, as well as the different groups of people experiencing it — such as those excluded from the Official Poverty Measurement and diverse geographic factors. Without a change in how poverty is measured, the standards of living for an individual can decline without acknowledgement, and they can be barred from crucial social programs. The poverty measure has a long and stagnant history in the American economy, and it is worth the effort to question where there is room for improvement, so more people can thrive.

Educational Policy is not enough to Address Rural Educational Inequity in China and the U.S.

It has been argued that cities are the future. In recent years, there has been an uptick in highly educated individuals moving from non-urban areas to America’s major cities. Scholarly, political, and social interest in theories about “brain drain” has infiltrated many interdisciplinary fields, analyzing why there seems to be an unspoken agreement among aspiring professionals that rural areas have no opportunity. As the U.S. and China begin competing for first place in what is appearing to become a bipolar international order and as the major cities in both these countries grow wealthier and more urbanized at breakneck speed, the question about what happens to rural areas is inevitably raised. In the contemporary context of increasingly urbanized international superpowers and a pandemic-shaken world, urban/rural educational inequity is becoming a concerning issue despite not receiving nearly enough attention from policymakers around the globe. In this piece, I aim to analyze the urban/rural educational inequities in China and the U.S. and explore whether or not Chinese and American educational policy with its current characteristics and limitations is the most effective solution for tightening the educational equity gap between urban and rural communities.

Since the Chinese market reforms began in the early eighties, China’s GPD has risen dramatically, making income inequality a major policy issue in addition to widening the equity gap between urban and rural students. Although China spends over ¥5.3 trillion ($837 billion) on education, the allocation of this money is inequitable. Cities with large populations like Beijing and Shanghai require more funding, but what does this mean for places like southwestern China’s Yunnan province, among other rural regions with widespread financial instability and suppressed financial mobility? Many would argue that the state of China’s education system is not poor, at least when compared to pre-market reform China. This line of reasoning can be supported by the data showing China’s adult literacy rate rising from 65% in the 1980s to 96% today. In fact, some policy progress has been made in recent years with China’s development of an economic modernization plan, signifying the country’s commitment to basic public education for all by 2035.

However, the problem with urban and rural educational inequity cannot entirely be solved by money. Income inequity between urban and rural provinces is inexplicably related to the problems faced by China’s rural schools. With financial mobility being near impossible in rural provinces, many parents migrate to China’s major cities for work, leaving behind a generation of children widely referred to by Asian studies and development scholars as the left-behind children. Many of these children, saddled with newfound household responsibilities instead of parental academic supervision, drop out of school after the compulsory nine years of public education. Thus, the “increasing intergenerational poverty trap” is strengthened. If China’s market reforms have only aided in widening the educational inequity gap, what kind of supplemental policy has the potential to achieve more equity for rural schools?

Tackling some of the core issues in which rural poverty is rooted is a good start. Beginning in 2011, China launched a nutrition improvement plan designed for compulsory education students living in crowded, poverty-stricken areas in rural China. With ¥52 billion being spent by the central government on nutritious meal subsidies for rural students and ¥100 billion being put toward the construction of rural school canteens, many would agree that educational equity progress is heading in the right direction. Data problematizes this assumption, showing that only an approximate quarter of the rural compulsory students enjoy this policy. This likely has to do with the government’s focus on compiling nutrition quizzes for rural students and advocating more strongly for the funding of nutrition training for teachers than the funding of rural jobs that keep students’ families from having to move to large cities in order to support their children. These strategies do not address integral educational inequity issues in China like the urban/rural college gap. Over 70 percent of students from China’s major cities attend higher educational institutions as opposed to under 5 percent of students from rural, lower-income areas. China’s GPD rise has caused these inequities to increase since China’s western rural regions are struggling to keep up with the increasingly rich and increasingly urbanized cities.

This same “wealth-inequity paradox” can be seen in the U.S. In fact, many of the challenges affecting rural education in China are shared by rural schools in the U.S. As major urban areas in the U.S. like New York and D.C. have become increasingly richer, while the poor are largely excluded from any kind of financial or social mobility, which can be brought about by access to quality education. Many of the inequities facing rural education in America can be linked back to institutional racism and segregated schools. Although rural Americans as a whole have gradually attained better education over the years, students of color have considerably lower rates of college enrollment and completion. Solutions are being proposed for tightening the equity gap between rural students of color and rural white students, such as Dr. Gerri Maxwell’s proposal of more after-school programs for rural students of color and putting more of an emphasis on social justice leadership in rural K-12 schools.

Researchers have also looked into the proposal of attracting and retaining faculty members of color as a way to provide rural students of color with mentorship, but this raises the question of whether after-school programs and mentorship are enough to achieve educational equity in a country scarcely instating any policies to address this issue. While China’s rural education policies have been arguably ineffective at producing any noticeable equity in its most poverty-stricken, rural regions and with the U.S. not fully addressing the unique needs of rural schools, education policy scholars are left with few answers as to how to achieve urban/rural educational equity without the funding and support of government policy. Scholars from both China and the U.S. have supported the idea of technology as a means to bring about meaningful and sustainable change to rural schools. However, only half of the rural children in China have the necessary undisrupted access to online classes, causing a serious increase in the Chinese education gap during the pandemic. This has much to do with the mere 56.2% of rural families who have internet access at home and the staggering 7.3% of students in Chinese villages who own a computer. This problem is shared by those in America, although not to the same extent, with 35% of rural students reporting that they often or sometimes have to do their homework on smartphones and 12% reporting that they often or sometimes have to rely on places with public Wi-Fi like fast-food restaurants to do their homework. This data problematizes the increasingly popular counter to educational policy effectiveness, which argues that technology’s effectiveness in addressing and combating educational inequity seriously outweighs policy’s effectiveness. If poor students in rural America and China are being excluded from the digital age, technology without efforts to make Wi-Fi more accessible is futile.

Reports from the Asian Institute of Research offer a holistic solution to the inherently multidimensional issue of education inequity in China. The report’s first countermeasure involves “vigorously develop[ing] the rural economy” as one of the preliminary steps in combating the rural education gap. Targeting alleviation of rural poverty is another goal of the Asian Institute of Research rather than specifically targeting schools with nutrition quizzes. An interesting point brought up in the report is the emphasis on improving the social support system of rural teachers and fostering a sense of belonging rather than nutrition training among other training efforts from the government. Many of these ideas are directly applicable to the rural education challenges going on in the U.S. Dr. Gerri Mitchell’s proposal of hiring more faculty members of color is immeasurably more achievable once these faculty members are given the social and professional support needed to enjoy a sustainable career in education as well as a sense of belonging, which is essential for teacher retention. The cyclical nature of rural poverty in the U.S. and China is driven by a myriad of causes, including institutional racism in the U.S., rural taxes in China, and the decline of industries that formerly sustained these regions in both countries. These driving forces prove that development policies would be much more effective in addressing the urban/rural educational inequity gap in the U.S. and China than educational policies alone.

These holistic, economy-focused policies will only work in accompaniment with government acknowledgment of the social determinants of learning. Similar to the social determinants of health, a prominent public health theory analyzing the ways in which one’s surroundings, identity, and lived experience contribute more significantly to their health than their individual choices, the theory of social determinants of education works to place more emphasis on the context of one’s surroundings, identity and lived experience over a school’s individual choices, a teacher’s individual choices, or a student’s individual choices. Specifically for a rural student, one’s social environment and community, economic stability, and physical environment and community are significant contributing factors toward their academic success. For a school, its physical environment and community are overlooked aspects of its success. Rundown schools in communities with failing job markets and economic instability are widespread in rural America and China. They cannot be fixed by educational policies alone but rather policies that address the reasons why these schools and communities are struggling in the first place. Overall, the work to end rural educational inequity in China and America begins with poverty-reduction policies.

Women in Terrorist Organizations- Victims or Accomplices?

The role of women in terrorist organizations, particulary jihadist groups in the Middle East (the most notorious of which are the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, and the current governing force of Afghanistan, the Taliban) has been studied from a variet of perspecties, mostly focusing on their victimization. Terrorism is both a consequence and perpetrator of instability and violence, which, as is the case with most marginalized populations, affects women in particular. Women living under terrorist-controlled strongholds in the Middle East are brutally subjugated, forced into sexual and domestic slavery, forced to serve the organizations dominating them, and tasked with indoctrinating the next generation. When we consider the women who willingly join terrorist groups and engage in acts of terrorism such as suicide bombing, we more often that not only consider women in the West - to take one infamous example, Shamima Begum, who traveled from the United Kingdom to an Islamic State-controlled region of Syria and was charged with terrorism upon her return to the United Kingdom. However, plenty of women in the Middle East have willingly joined terrorist organizations, defying the “jihadi bride” trope which will be examined in more detail later in this article. In refusing to acknowledge the agency of Middle Eastern women - in the negative context, the agency to commit crimes and harm others, not just the agency to obtain an education or to start a business - we risk not only underestimating the security threat that women pose, but we deny ourselves the possibility of a more well-rounded and well-informed counterterrorism strategy and fail to fully comprehend the socio-political factors that both breed terror and inspire women to join the movement. 

Chief amongst those factors seems to be a well-documented feeling of a lack of agency on the part of many women who join terrorist organizations. As a Washington Institute study found, “one of the principle reasons these women can choose to take part in terrorism is to gain a sense of agency and power that they were never given in their communities through leaning into extremist ideology and accepting the new leadership roles opening up for women within those structures–even as these organizations treat them as second citizens and will even use women to generate revenue through sex trafficking.” In other words, women frustrated with a lack of agency viewed jihadism and joining terrorist organizations as a way to reclaim a sense of independence previously lacking. The emphasis on preserving a patriarchal system was part of a broader rejection of diversity that included the repression of racial and ethnic minorities. Put simply, those who tried to choose a life outside of the communal norm were seen as threats, an attitude that has suffocated the creative and productive abilities of women and, indeed the this region as a whole. What is relatively new is that some of the women who have lived through these traumas, especially those already exposed to a radical upbringing, increasingly see joining terrorist groups as a way of recapturing the agency denied to them by society. In a twisted way, some women respond to socially accepted oppressive traditions to women’s rights, as well as social pressures that encourage radical thoughts and definitions of self-sacrifice in the name of the sacred, by seeking agency through the most extreme performance of these 'values.' The fertile soil in which some women naturally harvest radical ideas stems from the lack of alternative ways to express their inner anger-turned-hatred. An interesting perspective to explore 

The BBC has warned of the dangers of falling into the habit of assuming women only join or are affiliated with terrorist organizations as ‘jihadi brides’.  ISIS’ capture of the Syrian city of Raqqa in 2013 led to a a shift in their online propaganda; not only were women actively recruited for traditional roles like wife and mother (which still remains their primary function), but as doctors, nurses, teachers, and administrators. “Notably, women were eventually given the responsibility to monitor compliance among other women, evident in the establishment of the all-female al-Khansaa police brigade. This adaptation by the Islamic State to changing circumstances was later reflected in the seventh edition of the group’s online propaganda magazine, Dabiq, which included a new section directly addressing women.”

One of the most vital roles that women play in terrorist organizations is that of a recruiter. As USAToday found, “Western women have also been highly effective online recruiters for young girls from their countries of origin. Teenage girls — justifiably skittish about conversing with strange men online — are likely to be less circumspect about communicating with someone of the same gender who holds allure by being slightly older, sharing their interests and confidences and conveying a sense of inclusion. Thus Hoda Muthana from Alabama recruited American girls, while Aqsa Mahmood from Scotland successfully recruited girls from Great Britain.”  Failing to recognize this can have deadly consequences, with the Washington Post stating “Extremist groups rely upon women to gain strategic advantage, recruiting them as facilitators and martyrs while also benefiting from their subjugation. Yet U.S. policymakers overlook the roles that women play in violent extremism—including as perpetrators, mitigators, and victims—and rarely enlist their participation in efforts to combat radicalization. This omission puts the United States at a disadvantage in its efforts to prevent terrorism globally and within its borders.”

The Washington Post summarized it best, saying that “Pull factors for joining a terrorist organization were a desire for a new environment, pride, support of a political cause, free education and training, image, and access to social and political roles. Push factors were deprivation, redemption and honor, revenge, romantic ties, family influence, commitment to an ideological cause, traumatic experiences, and protection of self and family.”

It has already been established in the literature on terrorism that a wide range of social, political, cultural, and economic trend contribute to the rise of terrorist organizations. Almost ironically, the global war on terror has both caused and strengthened many of these trends. By recognizing the veritable threat that female terrorist fighters pose, as well as the vital role that they play in terrorist networks and their strengthening, we can more holistically broaden our understanding of terrorism dynamics, and in doing so, our understanding of effective counterterrorism strategies.

Bodhissatva of Compassion: The Dalai Lama and the Convergence of Politics and Religion

Introduction

History is no stranger to the connection between religious and political authority. Whether one chooses to study the vast tomes of European literature or the oracle bones of ancient China, they will inevitably discover a clear link between rulers and the religions their subjects practiced. Multiple European monarchs were declared “Defenders of the Faith” for upholding the virtues of Christian exceptionalism, and although the Venice of today betrays the history of Catholic political coordination, the Papal States often directly influenced the political affairs of most European states whether Catholic or otherwise. Most Chinese rulers derived their power from the “Mandate of Heaven”—a justification both material and divine for the rule of the emperor—which spread in various capacities to additional Asian nation-states like Korea, Japan, and Vietnam. These examples are far from isolated, and they serve as only the most popularly known iterations of this “divine right of kings”. But while the monarchs of the Renaissance or antiquity might have recognized a clearer bridge between religious and political life, most modern states have adopted secular models of governance. Disregarding vocal evangelical or traditionalist voting blocs, most living in the developed world would be shocked to witness presidents, prime ministers, or governors  proclaiming themselves to be representatives of some spiritual presence.

Of course, there are always exceptions to the rule. Iran, officially the Islamic Republic of Iran, is a functional theocracy, having been established by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as a Shi’ite state. Iran’s constitution begins by lauding the god of Islam, dedicating all that follows from the start to “Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful.” The state of Iran exists, both intentionally and in practice, as an Islamic state, with a criminal justice system influenced heavily by sharia (Islamic) law and an inextricable link between political and religious life. Likewise, the aforementioned Holy See operates in a similarly theocratic manner, with the Pope possessing near-unilateral control of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches ex officio. Although the Vatican City technically operates as an independent, secular entity, its bylaws are almost directly decided by the Pope and the College of Cardinals. In both instances, Iran and the Vatican officially acknowledge the Ayatollah and Pope respectively as holy men who either directly or indirectly commune with the divine. Although these states are rare, they are far from nonexistant. Furthermore, these states often grant extreme power to the highest executive  official, allowing them not only to influence the faithful, but over the administrative system as well.

One of the leading deviations from this trend is the 14th Dalai Lama: Tenzin Gyatso. Born in 1940 shortly before the conclusion of the Chinese civil war, Tenzin has largely lived the life of a refugee, having fled from China in 1959 following the suppression of the Tibetan national uprising in Lhasa and remaining in India ever since. The path of Gyatso’s life has been a winding one, with his aims, goals, and intentions shifting as the political situation in Tibet and China itself has changed. Many know the Dalai Lama as a figure of personal spirituality and religious charity, similar to Mother Theresa in his achievements and contributions. To critics, his writings are commonly associated with the “lukewarm Buddhists” and  “dharma-hoppers” of Western Buddhism, encouraging a lifestyle free of obligation to one’s self or others and prevailing the “self-help book epidemic” of other faux-enlightenment figures like Joel Osteen. Despite this apathetic or outright scathing view of Gyatso, for Tibetan Buddhists and Chinese government officials, the nature of his position as Dalai Lama runs far deeper. In fact, it is quite possible that his life—and more importantly his death—could rock the very foundation of Tibet more than any individual alive today. Questions thus remain: what exactly is the Dalai Lama? Why did he need to flee in 1959, and why has he refused to return to his homeland? What are the political implications of his inevitable demise, for Tibet and elsewhere?

In attempting to answer these questions, and others, I wish to explicitly state that I am neither Buddhist nor Tibetan, and my knowledge of the Dalai Lama and Tibet stem only from self-study. While I source my statements, I acknowledge that there is doubtlessly information which I have missed and cultural dynamics which may go over my head. However, in presenting this topic, I not only aim to educate readers about a niche concept within foreign policy, but also to provide an outsider, third-party account of the Dalai Lama affair.

Life After Death: Reincarnation and the Nature of the Dalai Lama

It is first important to understand the lineage of the Dalai Lama and how his divine nature manifests. Buddhism is, to most, a religion of “undesirable reincarnation”: meaning that individuals are trapped within the cycle of death and rebirth (known as samsara) until they achieve nirvana or spiritual enlightenment. Much of Buddhist scripture revolves around this process of samsara, with the centuries-old Bardo Thodol—known in the West as the Tibetan Book of the Dead—describing how an individual should and must react during death to achieve total enlightenment. Across the Middle East, East Asia, and Oceaniac islands, Buddhism has taken many shapes and forms, with various sects borrowing aspects of Christianity and Islam. Likewise, Buddhism has had a deep influence on the history and development of modern Hinduism, Jainism, and many other Central and South Asian religions, and has itself been influenced by these faiths. For example, the idea of dharma—or a virtuous life—is cited to have originally appeared in Hindu texts but was later adopted by Buddhists to mean following the doctrine of the Buddhist teachers.

Bearing this in mind, the various interpretations of Buddhism mean that certain denominations believe that individuals may consciously choose to continue the cycle of rebirth after achieving enlightenment for the purpose of guiding fellow Buddhists to achieve moksha (freedom from samsara). These tulka (or tulku singular) as they are known are not trapped within the cycle, but instead opt to reincarnate into another person in order to forever distribute their wisdom and understanding of nirvana. When applied to the Dalai Lama, this specifically refers to his status as tulku, a reincarnated host body of the bodhissatva (Buddhist teacher) Avalokiteshvara. Technically, no historically-accepted source confirms that Avalokiteshvara ever truly existed as all writings concerning his (or her in some accounts) life derive from spiritual sources. However, this wealth of textual accounts confirms at least that his status within the Tibetan school of Buddhism—known traditionally as a branch of Vajrayana Buddhism—has been long-revered, with a majority of Tibetan Buddhists accepting the Dalai Lama as the reincarnation of this divine figure. To some then, the nature of this high status might at first appear puzzling. Is Avalokiteshvara a human or god? As such, is the Dalai Lama then a human or god?

When asked whether being perceived as a divine figure was a burden or a blessing, the Dalai Lama responded that “It is very helpful.” This answer reveals a few layers of the Dalai Lama’s importance as both a religious figure and a political leader. On the one hand, given that Avalokiteshvara was an enlightened human who chose to continue samsara, their reincarnation means that the Tibetan authority derives from the material world. Furthermore, with Avalokiteshvara being described as originating from Tibet, this meant the ultimate authority of Tibet could only derive from a Tibetan. On the other hand, because Avalokiteshvara is simultaneously human and a mythical figure with divine background and seemingly-inaccessible levels of enlightenment, this means that the Dalai Lama is unique among modern theocratic figures in that he is essentially the reincarnation of a god. Thus, Tibetan political organization is somewhat similar to the aforementioned Chinese “Mandate of Heaven”. Decrees, policies, or wisdom revealed by the Dalai Lama cannot be questioned because they are officially the ordained words of a divine bodhissatva.

It should be noted that the process for revealing the next Dalai Lama has differed throughout the hundreds of years since the third Dalai Lama’s appointment in 1543. This Dalai Lama, Sonam Gyatso, posthumously appointed two predecessors to be his past lives and officially began the lineage of the Dalai Lama. From Sonam, an esoteric procedure was established, where the Dalai Lama, on his deathbed, would foresee the birthplace of his successor tulku. Traditionally, the dreams, visions, and predictions of other high lamas—that is to say the Dalai Lama’s spiritual and political advisors—additionally influenced this operation. Scholars have long commented on the unique dynastic relationship in the Tibetan case, since unlike elsewhere, the Dalai Lama was not based on genetic lineage. As the Dalai Lama has reflected, the process of choosing a Dalai Lama has an egalitarian and indirectly democratic manner of selection. Although some tulkus have originated from those coincidentally close to the high lamas who would have the final say in choosing the next Dalai Lama, most have come from humble beginnings. All have exhibited varying degrees of administrative competence and interpretation of their role as a governmental figure, and this is owed to all coming from different backgrounds and families.

The Dalai Lama and the CCP

All of this being said, a reader might now competently predict the widespread concern over the inevitable selection of the 15th Dalai Lama following the death of the reigning one. While Tibetans had worried for decades over the future of the Dalai Lama’s succession, the Chinese government made official in 2011 that the monastic process of selection would no longer be officially considered. Only Beijing would have the power to select another Dalai Lama, and any other successor candidates would not be considered. But why has the CCP directed intense attention toward the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation? How has the government justified this action, and how has the 14th Dalai Lama responded? More than anything, is there any substantial evidence to suggest that the Chinese government will follow through with its promises? Or are these simply empty threats that the CCP will allow to turn-over upon the passing of the current Dalai Lama?

First, an understanding of Chinese authority over Tibet is necessary to understand the two entitites’ relationship. China holds a long and arduous history with Tibet, but the modern administration over Tibet began in January, 1950, when the Maoist government—freshly in control of mainland China—declared that it would “liberate” Tibet from the yoke of the Dalai Lama. In fairness, there is worthwhile evidence to suggest that life under the Dalai Lama at this time was not beneficial for many Tibetans. As Sorrell Neuss from The Guardian argues: “feudalism and abuse in Tibetan culture has been conveniently forgotten.” From 1913 up to firm Chinese control over Tibetan affairs in 1951, many sources claim that the Drepung Monestary (the controlling monestary of Tibet) enforced a primitive system of serfdom which placed the Tibetan commoners into servitude for the state. A plethora of documented evidence exists which points to medieval-styled torture practices for those who disobeyed the high lamas, with criminals occassionally having their eyes gouged out or their arms forcibly amputated depending on the severity of the wrongdoing. As such, the arrival of the PLA in Lhasa in 1950 was not received entirely negatively, for although Drepung had raised levies against Chinese forces, many wished to see the government go.

Unfortunately, as current critiques toward Chinese rule reveal, the process of “Hanification”—that is, the ostensible ethnic migration and social change of non-Han Chinese territories—has been far from a net positive. Some credit should be given to the Chinese, as with any authoritarian state, in partially uplifting the conditions of the Tibetan people. At the time of occupation, life-expectancy was only 36 years and over 95% of the population was illiterate. Not only did this create a legitimately-sourced moral obligation to the Chinese, it allowed officials to express the factual shortcomings of the Dalai Lama’s rule. Shortly after its incorporation into the PRC, these failures and others were fixed by educating the population and introducing modern medicine to the region. Industrial development and the construction of novel infrastructure—from hospitals to paved roads—brought unparalleled levels of prosperity to the region. To its credit, China has continued to introduce the amenities and and pleasures of modernity to Tibet. As of 2021, the CCP had even pledged $30 billion USD to the development of a 435 kilometer (roughly 270 mile) long high-speed railway linked to Lhasa across the Tibet region.

But even under the USSR did literacy increase. As with the introduction of most authoritarian rulers—regardless of their race, ideology, or intentions—not all Tibetans gained from the occupation. The first to face drastic change were the Phala nomadic peoples of Western Tibet, who were furthest from Beijing’s grasp and had long enjoyed the freedom of their livelihood. Following an uprising in Lhasa in 1959—which formally drove the Dalai Lama and his supporters into exile—the CCP began a full-scale revision of the Tibetan way of life, including for the pastoral Tibetans of the west. Under the rogre (“mutual aid”) system, poor households—which included nomadic peoples unaccustomed to agriculture—were forced (often under threat of violence) into sedentary units to increase crop yields. This is only a glimpse into the way the CCP has drastically altered the lifestyle of many Tibetans, and not always for a net positive. As late as August, 2021, during a celebration of the CCP’s 70th anniversary of rule over Tibet, Beijing insisted on the Tibetan way of life being discarded to adopt a lifestyle more “Chinese in orientation.”

In practice, the consequences for refusing this “Chinese-oriented” lifestyle have been imprisonment, torture, and even death. One of the more notable victims of this refusal include Choekyi Gyaltsen, the 10th Panchen Lama—another theocratic figure who will be brought up later—who directly opposed Chinese rule. In response, Chinese authorities stripped him of all power, declared him an “enemy of the people of Tibet”, humiliated him (both verbally and physically), and forced him to disavow his faith in a public letter. Similar stories happened to hundreds to thousands of Tibetan Buddhists who refused to renounce their religion and heritage. This treatment has continued up until today, as human rights organizations continue to report a failure on behalf of Chinese officials to uphold freedom of religion, press, movement, and assembly. Materially, Tibetan protestors have repeatedly complained about the frequency of local Beijing-appointed officials simply disregarding Tibetan rights and property. Land-grabs are increasingly common, and numerous reports have surfaced of land being sold away for mining rights without small-scale owners’ permission. These mines have resulted in the desecration of Tibetan land and ecosystems, as improper lithium and gold mining have stripped the land of its former beauty. Clearly, the situation is a complicated one, with a variety of arguments for and against Chinese rule over Tibet.

Based on Prescedent: The Story of the Panchen Lama

What does this all mean for the Dalai Lama? Ultimately, aside from the abuses under the high lamas’ rule in the early-mid 20th century—during which Tenzin Gyatso was only a child and had no official power—it is clear that Chinese rule over Tibet is far from an objective good for all parties. But unfortunately, these reports are far from anything new for those interested in the history of human rights under the CCP. As this article from Helen Davidson at The Guardian makes evident, contemporary concerns over rights abuses in China are not only limited to Tibet, but also to Outer Mongolia, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and elsewhere. What is it about the Dalai Lama situation that makes it unique?

As stated previously, the biggest fear concerning the Dalai Lama as a political figure for Tibetan Buddhists, and specifically his cycle of reincarnation, is that the CCP is likely to tamper with the results of the process. As Krithika Varagur from Foreign Policy put it in her article “The Coming Fight for the Dalai Lama’s Soul”: “There is no question about this: There will be two candidates for the next Dalai Lama.” Considerations surrounding who exactly will succeed Tenzin Gyatso as Dalai Lama have farther reaching implications than the perception from most Westerners that the position’s opening will not matter in the grand scheme of things. After all, why would Buddhists or Hindus care about the death or abdication of a pope? But it is not only that his death will bring about a time of mourning for many Buddhists, but there is evidence to suggest that the Chinese Communist Party will interfere with the process by proclaiming their “own” Dalai Lama and raising him to support the state and its actions in Tibet.

One of thes best ways to illustrate the likelihood of this is to explain the series of events which surrounded the aforementioned 10th Panchen Lama’s succession following his death in 1989. To digress, the very circumstances surrounding his passing are looked at from some Tibetans with suspicion, as Choekyi Gyaltsen died of a heart attack aged 50 just five days after delivering a speech in which he stated that the “price paid for [Tibet’s] development has been greater than the gains.” Choekyi’s status as Panchen Lama—being the tulku reincarnation of the buddha Amitabha and effectively the second-highest position in the Tibetan Buddhist administration—left a vacuum similar to that which the Dalai Lama might  leave following his passing. As both Choekyi and Tenzin had long feared, two separate Panchen Lamas were discovered in 1995: Gyaincain Norbu and Gedhun Choekyi Nyima.

Gedhun was appointed first by the Dalai Lama as the official successor to Choekyi on May 14th, 1995. In one of the most flagrant examples of CCP corruption, Chinese authorities apprehended Gedhun Nyima and his parents just four days later, citing “concern” that the family might be kidnapped by “Tibetan separatists”. To this day, neither Gedhun Nyima nor his parents have contacted anyone outside of China, nor have they appeared alive in television appearances or documented journals. According to CCP officials, as of 2020, Gedhun is claimed to be living as a “college graduate with a stable job” and has refused to accept his ordained position, arguing that he was never the chosen candidate. Gyaincain—known by his religious name Qoigyijabu—was selected on December 8th, 1995, much to the chagrin of most Tibetans, especially those living abroad. As expected, Gyaincain has repeatedly upheld Beijing’s ideology and statements, condemning an anti-CCP protest in Lhasa in 2010, claiming that it was detrimental to national unity. More recently, Gyaincain expressed pro-socialist sentiment, urging Tibet to “sinicize” in order to modernize by embracing the PRC.

Thus, the story of the Panchen Lama’s succession stands as a bleak indicator of what could be to come for the Dalai Lama. Theories range wildly around the identity and current place of Gedhun Nyima. It is entirely possible that he is alive as the CCP insists, and it is equally possible that he and his family were unfortunately murdered by the government, as is the fate of many political prisoners in China. Some have theorized that, assuming Gedhun is alive, that he is being kept healthy only to deter the Dalai Lama or any other influential Tibetan authorities from proclaiming another Panchen Lama aside from Gyaincain. In the event that a new Panchen Lama was announced, Gedhun could be released to the world, exposing the “falsification” of divine Tibetan authority, and thereby undermining the Buddhist powerbase that exists in Tibet today.

 Concluding Remarks: What is to Come

There is no doubt that the Chinese Communist Party will directly influence and decide the next Dalai Lama. Since Beijing’s promise to retain heavy oversight over the process in 2011, the process of selecting another Dalai Lama is almost guaranteed to be heavily biased in favor of the CCP and the Chinese paradigm. The death of any theocratic figure poses deep, complicated questions for the future of their religious adherents. It is vital to understand that the entire future of an independent—or at least autonomous—Tibet may hang in the very balance should the CCP choose to rig the selection process, as they clearly have previously. The United States must support the self-determination of the Tibetan people, as well as demand freedom or at least the truth behind what happened to Gedhun Nyima. In fighting for the liberation of the Tibetan people from Chinese oversight, and in demanding the inevitable selection of the next Dalai Lama be fair and transparent, there is hope for Tibetan Buddhism to maintain its stability and for Tibetans to regain control over their culture and destiny.

The Islamic State- Beaten but Not Broken

In the early morning hours of February 3rd, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, the second leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, was killed in an American operation in northwest Syria. His death followed that of the organization's founder and self proclaimed caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2019. Al-Qurashi’s death is an important milestone in continuing the struggle against the forces of ISIS - yet it appears to have overshadowed the more significant events of the previous month. 

On January 20th, a truck in the northeastern Syrian city of Al-Hasakah suddenly veered towards the walls of the Al-Sina’a prison. It detonated, marking the beginning of a prison break at the largest detention camp of ISIS fighters in the world, and the largest and most complex operation of the organization since their territorial defeat three years earlier. 

The military defeat of ISIS and the loss of its territory did not mean the end of the organization's existence, despite the rhetoric and lack of attention paid by many Western governments. For the tens of thousands of the organization's fighters, there were few options. Many fought to the death, others attempted to slink away into unpopulated or barren areas to try and avoid detection - but thousands of fighters, along with their wives and children, were either captured or surrendered. These fighters have been held in a kind of purgatory - crammed into massive detention centers for years with no end in sight. 

The Al-Sina’a prison in Al-Hasakah was one of these detention centers and held an estimated  3,500 and 4,000 prisoners, all either ISIS militants or their children - some of whom were child soldiers. Al-Hasakah is under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces, a multi-ethnic - but primarily Kurdish - armed group seeking to carve out an autonomous zone in northwest Syria.

Al-Sina’a has long been infamous for holding both the former militants and their children (the so called ‘cubs of the caliphate’) in atrocious and inhumane conditions. The prison is overcrowded, with food, water, and medicine being in short supply. 700 of the prison's occupants are children, and their continued incarceration without charge or chance of rehabilitation is particularly problematic. 

Yet it's important to note that these conditions are not on account of the SDF’s cruelty but instead of a lack of resources. Of the 3,500-4,000 prisoners, only a quarter are from Syria. The diverse makeup of the prison population is representative of the global nature of ISIS' membership. Indeed, the continued presence of these multinational prisoners is due to the refusal of the rest of the world to repatriate their citizens who left to join ISIS. It is an underreported absurdity that the international community has abandoned the people of Syria and Iraq to deal foreign citizens. So these fighters are stuck, with their countries unwilling to bring them home and prosecute them. They have no chance at rehabilitation by rotting away in sweltering inhumane conditions surrounded by hardened terrorists. Without any program of rehabilitation, the militants remain ready and committed to their ideology. This situation is particularly unjust for the children of these prisons, imprisoned for the crimes of their parents, still surrounded by a hateful and twisted ideology.

Beyond its horrid conditions, Al-Sina'a has been commonly referred to as a "ticking time bomb" for an ISIS resurgence. Several months earlier the Aisyah, the police of Rojava, had intercepted an earlier attempt by ISIS to attack this very same prison. On January 20th, they were not so lucky. 

The ISIS attack was sudden and intense. The first car bomb cleared the way for an ISIS cell to rush into the prison, bringing arms to the prisoners, who had been ready and rioting for their comrades - an indication of the complexity of the operation - before they raided the prison armory. What followed was the beginning of a brutal week of urban warfare. Fighting raged for days as the SDF, with air support from the American led-international coalition, mobilized troops to confront the sudden and massive insurgency. The residents of the Ghweiran neighborhood of Al-Hasakah, where the Al-Sina’a prison is located, found themselves in the midst of a ferocious battle. Approximately 45,000 people were displaced on the first day of fighting alone. It also appeared that the SDF had prematurely declared victory at times - after the battle had been declared over, a new ISIS pocket would either be found in door to door sweeps or would suddenly open fire on SDF forces. When the dust truly did settle, close to 500 militants and escapees were killed, with close to one hundred SDF fighters and prisoner workers dying as well. Worryingly, it is still unclear how many members of ISIS were able to escape. 

Though the battle ended with the defeat and capture of the prisoners and their would be liberators, it is frankly too early to conclusively call this operation a victory against the ISIS. It is still unknown who the escapees are and if high level leaders may have been able to disappear and rejoin their organization's insurgency. Notably, experts worry about the attack’s implications. It is a clear propaganda victory for ISIS, demonstrating that they still have the capability to stage large, complex, and deadly operations. This attack was also not an isolated event. On the contrary, the last few months have seen a resurgence in ISIS' activity in both Iraq and Syria. When this prison break is viewed with the proper context - that of an emboldened ISIS willing and able to operate a cross border insurgency - the implications are worrying.

Which leads to the question - what is to be done? Multiple conditions must be addressed in order to remedy the underlying problems that led to this attack. More significant aid must immediately be distributed to the people of Iraq and Syria that are responsible for ensuring hardened ISIS veterans remain behind bars. Assistance should provide for both more humane conditions for prisoners as well as address the ability for inmates to properly repatriate back into normal society. In the case of the SDF in Rojava, the issue of Turkey must be addressed as well. Turkey has been hostile to the Kurdish-dominated SDF since its inception. This hostility can be seen in both the Turkish invasions of Rojava as well as in the allegations that Turkey had bombed SDF reinforcements on their way to the Al-Sina’a prison. Continued Turkish aggression towards the SDF in Rojava only serves to pull resources away from the detention of ISIS fighters and produces the instability that allows for the ISIS to continue to fester.

In the long term, the international community must come to terms with the fact that they cannot merely wash their hands of their own civilians and must repatriate the foreigners that joined ISIS. The presence of thousands of foreign fighters held in detention camps in Iraq and Syria is not a viable solution. Only with the action of the international community can this issue be truly resolved. In the future, these attacks will continue to occur unless these changes are made. The rest of the world needs to begin to repatriate their citizens and must stop delegating the task to the people of Syria and Iraq. If nothing is done, the prospects of an ISIS resurgence remain high and the future of northern Syria looks bleak.

The AUKUS Deal, China, and Nuclear Non-proliferation

The AUKUS deal is a security partnership involving Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It was announced in September, and its first project will be to provide Australia with a nuclear-powered submarine fleet. Although diesel-fueled submarines are useful, nuclear submarines can “remain submerged almost indefinitely” without a snorkel, and many suspect that one of the main purposes of this partnership is to offset the power of the Indo-Pacific region. However, while trying to get the upper hand, Australia would “have to become the first non-nuclear-weapon state to exercise a loophole that allows it to remove nuclear material from the inspection system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).” China’s perspective is that this will negatively interfere with the arms race, and other influential people involved in non-proliferation efforts worldwide have denounced the agreement. However, 60 percent of US residents do support the AUKUS deal due to national security, and the deed is done. The pact has been made, and Australia’s previous partnership with France for diesel-fueled submarines has ended. The only remaining steps are to prepare for the implications of actually delivering the fleet and be mindful about how other agreements may be compromised by this action.

Interests in the Indo-Pacific Region and Conflict with China

The European Union has strategized over the Indo-Pacific region for a long time. After the United Kingdom left the European Union, however, the U.K. reportedly did not consult with the EU about the AUKUS deal, and foreign policy has become alarmingly less unified. At the same time, it is obvious that the EU would oppose it with the U.K. having left because the agreement caused Australia to cancel a $40 billion submarine deal with France—the country that actually initiated European engagement in the Indo-Pacific. Regardless of opinion on the efficacy of the deal, however, this development also shows the increasing lack of coordination among the European Union, the United States, and allies. Gone are the days of a united front, despite there being an overall goal of non-proliferation.

Meanwhile, it has been four years since Australia’s then-prime minister Malcolm Turnbull declared they would “stand up” to China, the country that actually remains to this day their biggest trading partner. The relationship between China and Australia has also worsened since then, particularly due to the fact that the latter called for a global inquiry surrounding the initial outbreak of COVID-19 and China’s handling of the situation. While their trade relationship is still well, China has responded to Australia’s declarations with bans and restrictions on its goods. In the context of these tense relations, it only makes sense for Australia to be bracing itself in regard to China. 

In reviewing this analysis, it makes sense that the components of the AUKUS deal would be a priority for all parties. Yet, China has argued that those involved in the AUKUS agreement have a “Cold War mentality.” While the White House has disputed the idea that the AUKUS deal has anything to do with the Indo-Pacific region, China’s claims are not entirely unfounded, and there is no denying the substantial difficulties between countries—particularly in the aftermath of the Trump administration. Additionally, many have noted that specifically in regard to China, deterrence has worked relatively well with nuclear activity, and hanging onto mediocre agreements could be the best move as of current.

A Double Standard in United States Nuclear Foreign Policy

To zoom in on the United States, the country has a clear double standard in terms of nuclear technology and foreign policy. For a quick reality check, the U.S. has more nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines than China, and in terms of submarines as a whole, the United States has 68 while China has 12. In fact, the total number of submarines belonging to the United States is more than that of China, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and India combined. To top it off, in terms of use, “the United States and Russia each have deployed five times more nuclear warheads than Beijing possesses”—and it is known that the threat of China is one of the main reasons for this deal. Although power cannot be boiled down to submarines or even military resources in general, the importance of focusing on gaining an upper hand with nuclear technology versus focusing on non-proliferation is debatable, particularly in the following context. While boasting a strong fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, the United States has emphasized non-proliferation efforts yet also come into conflict with countries not considered to be allies over their refusal to cooperate with the United States’ wishes. 

Critics have been pointing out Washington’s hypocrisy over nuclear weapons for years. In 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry visited Seoul and said that “North Korea will not be accepted as a nuclear power.” President Barack Obama said the same year that Iran possessing a nuclear weapon at all is “a red line for us.” At the same time, the Obama administration was planning “to spend billions on upgrading nuclear bombs stored in Europe to make the weapons more reliable and accurate.” The United States has also tried to impose a number of sanctions on other countries for nuclear weapons over the years while it expands its own powers. Additionally, the Iran nuclear deal, or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was made official in 2015, but in 2018, President Donald Trump left the deal, furthering United States hypocrisy surrounding nuclear weapons. 

However, it is important to note that while looking at current statistics about the U.S. military versus the militaries of other world powers, projections for the future are concerning. Reportedly, the nuclear arsenal of China could triple by the year 2030, meaning 1,000 nuclear warheads would be in its possession. Beyond that, the Pentagon is troubled by the prospect of new technology, specifically how nuclear strategists in China are approaching “nontraditional arms,” and the launch of a hypersonic missile in July showed a design that was meant to “evade the United States’ primary missile interceptors, which can operate only in outer space.” While there is a clear double standard in terms of United States nuclear foreign policy, that does not mean that the U.S. should ignore or underestimate the chance of greater threats to come.

Overall Implications of the AUKUS Deal

The AUKUS deal is arguably counterintuitive to rhetoric flowing from the United States about non-proliferation. While the U.S. has sanctioned other countries, particularly ones in the Middle East, for working with nuclear materials, this new agreement will actively help close allies gain nuclear technology. Other countries may perceive the U.S. as hypocritical when observing through that lens. Additionally, although maintaining a strong military is critical in the context of current concerns, including China, a glimpse at U.S. resources indicates that pursuing more may be excessive. Moreover, focusing on the military when it comes to China may actually threaten the security of the United States. Defense analyst William Hartung who focuses on the economics of Pentagon spending argued, “Focusing on China is a good way to pump up the Pentagon’s already bloated budget—which is currently higher than the peaks of the Korean or Vietnam wars or the Reagan buildup of the 1980s—but it will not make us safer.” Consistently bolstering the resources of the United States military is not the way to deal with the flawed U.S.-China relationship. Putting such an emphasis on war can fuel the flames of a conflict.

Furthermore, the whole idea of the AUKUS agreement is debatable, but the most imminent worrisome situation is how the new Australian fleet will set a precedent. If Australia does end up with the nuclear fleet, it will end up becoming the first country without nuclear weapons to utilize a loophole allowing for them to take nuclear material from the International Atomic Energy Agency’s inspection system. As stated by James Acton from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “In the future, would-be proliferators could use naval reactor programs as cover for the development of nuclear weapons—with the reasonable expectation that, because of the Australia precedent, they would not face intolerable costs for doing so.” Since a major part of nuclear non-proliferation efforts is about enforcement decisions, as in, many policies currently in place are subjective to an extent, this sets a dangerous example for the future. 

Moving Forward With Strategic Stability Talks

While the AUKUS agreement is a questionable move, it is important to acknowledge that President Joe Biden has recently indicated after the virtual summit that the White House would like to hold “strategic stability talks,” and China’s President Xi Jinping expressed a willingness to participate in these talks. Concededly, the relationship between countries may not be strong enough to profit from formal negotiations, but alternative options have been explored; for example, the meeting of nongovernmental experts from each country has been put on the table. Although the particular method of discussion has not yet been clarified, the recent summit has opened the door to security measures that do not fully revolve around the military. The AUKUS deal may have thrown a wrench in non-proliferation progress by setting a dangerous precedent for nuclear possession, but the heightened tensions exacerbated by the agreement have been met with a response of cooperation.

An Analytics Revolution in UN Peacekeeping: Laying the Groundwork

UN Peacekeeping is often faced with difficult trade-offs. As Paul Williams of George Washington explains, “the [Security] Council's three strategic goals for peacekeeping operations—implementing broad mandates, minimizing peacekeeper casualties and maximizing cost-effectiveness—cannot be achieved simultaneously.” Given the current trend of falling Peacekeeping budgets, it’s clear that Peacekeepers will have to offset their more conservative allocation of resources. A possible way to accomplish all three goals could be using statistical analysis to identify and exploit undervalued assets, as well as maximizing the potential of existing assets. I argue that, by adopting such a perspective, peacekeepers can accomplish more with less.

Assets, in this case, can mean several different things. For example, it can refer to troop contingents in the military component, the types of peacebuilding projects undertaken by the civilian component, and the tactics used by both. Each of these assets has a different cost to acquire and use in mission, both in terms of financial and political capital. It will be cheaper and easier to acquire an infantry battalion from a large troop contributing country (TCC) like India than an infantry battalion from the United States. Each of these assets will also provide different levels of value to the mission. The new Peacekeeping strategy would be to identify the assets that contribute the most value compared to their cost.

This identification will come from statistical analysis. The advantage of statistical analysis over conventional value analysis is that, with statistical analysis, we can identify assets that are undervalued because conventional value analysis also sets the cost of an asset. In order to identify which assets are undervalued, we first must determine what factors create value to a PKO in certain classes of assets, with a special emphasis on the use of new technology. If we are to adopt the statistical approach to PKOs, this research must start immediately.

There are, however, two potential issues with this approach. First, the data we use to determine value may be unreliable or unavailable. Second, we must define what constitutes success for a PKO. Given the many objectives of the average PKO, this is significantly complicated for peacekeepers.  

Even with those two caveats in mind, embracing greater statistical analysis and other technologies in Peacekeeping would let Peacekeepers achieve their broad mandates in a safe manner, even with limited financial resources.  The UN has already started to embrace this thinking with a new “Digital Transformation” where new technology, such as drones, and statistical analysis combine to maximize the cost-effectiveness of peacekeepers in the field.

The next three sections will provide case studies that highlight this new type of thinking: force generation reform, increased airpower, and conflict prediction. Hopefully, by embracing some of these ideas, a technological revolution can lead UN Peacekeeping to cost-effectiveness and success.\

Case Study A: Force Generation Reform

While it’s easy to outline this new statistics-based methodology in broad strokes, it’s a bit harder to visualize the strategy in practice. This section aims to apply the methodology to a specific hypothetical case, in order to better illustrate the entire methodology.

In this hypothetical scenario, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations Force Generation Service is trying to acquire an additional infantry battalion. They have five choices, as shown in the table below. C represents the total cost in USD to use the infantry battalion for a year, as measured in both direct payments and the indirect effort needed to convince the TCC to loan the infantry battalion. V represents the expected decrease in civilian casualties in the battalion deployment area.

Country: C. V. C/V

A. $50 million. 60% reduction. 833,333.333

B. $40 million. 55% reduction. 727,272.727

C. $40 million. 45% reduction. 888,888.889

D. $30 million. 30% reduction. 1,000,000

E. $25 million. 20% reduction. 1,250,000

In his hypothetical scenario, the Force Generation Service should prioritize recruiting from country B, because the C/V (or the cost in USD for each percent expected decrease in civilian casualties) is the lowest. Importantly, this strategy ignores all other factors, such as whether B is a large or influential TCC, whether B has a long history in PKOs, or whether the Force Generation Service thinks that battalions from B are harder to acquire than from the other countries. We can also compare assets: as shown below. This is a change from the current system of unit evaluation. The current standard operating procedure for the “Assessment and Evaluation of Formed Police Unit Performance,” for example, relies on subjective responses by evaluators to preset questions on a scale of 1-4

Asset: C. V. C/V.

Infantry Battalion from B. $40 million. 55% reduction. 727,272.727

UAV Squadron from B. $20 million. 30% reduction. 66,666.667

In this scenario, it would be more efficient to bring in the UAV unit instead of the infantry battalion. Even if the UAV unit is smaller, it is more cost-efficient than the infantry battalion. 

Again, this brief thought exercise is intended to illustrate the statistical strategy in practice. Decisions in this model are made based on statistical value, instead of more subjective evaluations. It’s easy to accomplish this with hypothetical values, in the real world calculating C and V is much more difficult. But attempting to determine the specific values of  C and V of military units throughout the DPO’s PCRS system.

Case Study B: Increased Airpower

A consistent effect of underfunded PKOs is that there are never enough peacekeepers to adequately guard the number of people they are charged with protecting. As Williams again notes, even with a modest ratio of 1 peacekeeper for every 100 civilians, the big four UN PKOs would require 397,000 peacekeepers. In reality, they have 69,302 peacekeepers across the four missions. It’s unlikely the UN will be able to afford a larger number of peacekeepers, so the objective would be to allocate their existing peacekeepers in the most efficient way possible. A continued and increased reliance on airpower could maximize this efficiency, for two main reasons. They are increased rapid reaction capability and increased intelligence gathering capability.

Given that peacekeeping missions are understrength, they can’t be in every populated area of their areas of responsibility. This means that when attacks on civilians or other crises occur, particularly in rural areas, peacekeepers have to deploy to the affected areas quickly. Given the poor infrastructure in some of these areas, this is no easy task. One way to dramatically increase the effective deployment range of peacekeeping units is the use of utility transport helicopters. These let peacekeepers bypass physical and political barriers to rapid deployment (such as roadblocks) and reach crisis areas faster.

Right now there is a helicopter shortage in UN PKOs. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), for example, has only 25 helicopters for 18,106 peacekeepers. Increasing the ratio of helicopters to peacekeepers would be a cost-effective way to maximize the rapid reaction ability of peacekeepers in the field.

However, this advantage is primarily reactive instead of proactive. In order to anticipate attacks on civilians before they happen, and deploy forces to counter beforehand, real-time intelligence and data is needed. Drones offer a possible low-cost way to increase the intelligence gathering capability of UN PKOs.

Drones have several key advantages. First, like other aircraft, they are unconstrained by terrestrial impediments on patrolling, such as harsh terrain or the presence of hostile forces. Second, they are able to remain airborne for a longer period than other forms of airborne surveillance. Third, they are less expensive per flight hour than other forms of airborne surveillance.

The data from drones has proven capable of helping protect civilians. As Karlsrud and Rosen note, the photographic and infrared equipment on UAVs let peacekeepers “track movements of armed militias, assist patrols heading into hostile territory, and document atrocities.” This situational intelligence will help peacekeepers proactively deploy to the same areas hostile groups are moving into. Despite that benefit, UAVs have only widely available in one mission, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). 

By increasing their pool of aircraft, UN PKOs can compensate for their lack of personnel at a lower cost than increasing the number of peacekeepers deployed. The DPO has recognized the need for aircraft within their missions. Additional helicopters were deemed a substantial part of their critical mission gaps in a recent report.  Another way to increase that efficiency would be to increase the emphasis on conflict prediction, which will be discussed below.

Case Study C: Conflict Prediction

UN PKOs gather large amounts of data from their patrols, and if they embraced some of the recommendations of this article they would gather even more. But that data needs to be used effectively to optimize peacekeeping deployments. One of the best ways to do that would be to further invest in conflict prediction software.

Some existing models have proved successful. A machine learning model developed by Chris Perry, for example, was able to mostly accurately predicate which African countries would experience conflict using publically available data. There are some studies on how these types of conflict predicting algorithms can be applied to PKOs. Duursma and Karlsrud argue that machine learning can provide quantitative analysis in a field dominated by qualitative analysis. If these algorithms can accurately predict where conflict will spike in the mission area, extra peacekeepers and other conflict prevention measures can be deployed to that area. These algorithms, like the accurate calculations of C and V mentioned earlier, are not fully developed. Thus, an analytics revolution is not fully possible immediately.

Conclusion

By setting a broad and bold statistical research agenda, UN leadership can optimize peacekeeping missions. When combined with continuing to embrace new technologies like UAVs and helicopters, this should let PKOs accomplish their broad mandates and protect civilians even in the face of reduced fiscal ability.

How African Women Navigate Urban Geographies Through Radical Incrementalism

worldbank.org

According to the World Bank, the urban informal sector anchors economic activities across the African continent, accounting for nearly 80% of jobs for African urban dwellers. These are especially pervasive for youth in cities between the ages of 15 and 24, with over 90% of them being women (Guven & Karlen, 2020). The sector itself is difficult to miss among a conventional African urban geography that embodies modernity and thus, urban dynamism. Street merchants and vendors are crucial to ensure food security across the city; craftsmen, manufacturers, and repairers of goods and services, and those who work in the transportation of goods and services keep the world-class city and the economy rapidly moving, among several other tasks that are integral to maintaining urban landscape. In terms of what specifically is meant by the ‘urban informal sector,’ though difficult to define succinctly by several scholars and economists, statistics clearly suggests that it is defined as merely the residual difference between a nation’s total economic activity and the well-recorded economic activity of the formal sector. The informal sector is neither taxed nor monitored by any form of government and absorbs the city’s unemployed population. Persons employed by the urban informal sector typically work a variety of ad hoc jobs that vary across cities, resulting in low wages and substandard living conditions (Fukuchi, 1998, pp. 225-56). The urban informal sector cannot be considered without women as they heavily contribute to the trading and transportation of food and clothes across the city (Kanyinjui, 2014, pp. 1-3). Low productivity and earnings are fostered by the urban geographies of rapidly urbanizing or world-class cities in Africa, which champion spaces that operate on higher-value markets, such as markets that are worth more to customers than commodity products like technology, information, tourism, analytics etc. In turn, the informal sector is pushed to the periphery of the city and is financially excluded from the market. This results in the physicality of urban informal settlements or “slums.” Slums typically consist of human-constructed, sub-standard settlements that lack access to basic services like water and electricity (Ranganathan, 2019). 

Workers of the urban informal sector build human capital or useful attributes in the informal sector production process. Human capital is present under social protections as informal sector workers can prevent the sale of productive assets in the event of shocks as well as the promotion of savings to build resilience. But not all urban dwellers are granted social protections; informal sector businesses are excluded from the formal sector and hindered from making reliable business transactions, accessing credit for productive investments, and accumulating savings for unanticipated risks. With no social protections and little to no savings, the unadulterated economic downsides emerging from the COVID-19 pandemic have annihilated many of the livelihoods of African workers in the informal sector. Nonetheless, the role of Africa’s informal sector is only estimated to grow at exponential rates as not only Africa’s population itself increases, but as urbanization persists (Guven & Karlen, 2020). Therefore, African cityscapes are likely to thrive, but most of their residents will not. Perhaps the city will boom as private sector actors like urban planners, who have autonomy over governing the city, rely on the informal sector agents or those who work for the informal sector. Yet private sector actors have no interest in investing in social protections of the millions of informal sector agents living in the cities they construct.

According to Mary Njeri Kinyanjui, a key contributor to the political and social dynamics of the informal economy in Africa, notably on the East African coast, are social networks emerging from friendship and kinship. These close social networks are important in reinforcing the strength of their businesses through emotional support, advice, skill-sharing and training, business start-ups, information, social protection, and rotational credit services. Social networks within the informal economic sector have been documented as especially important among poor women. The informal sector is where intersecting networks of trust, kinship, ethnicity, marital status, among several other facets present themselves and promote the development of social networks.

Evolving from social networks are collective organizations, which are an important aspect of the operations of the African informal economy. Kinyanjui emphasizes that they enable the scaling up necessary to promote the potential for political intervention. This modality would be particularly strategic for the informal sector because it differs from less comprehensive approaches to the sector that are primarily focused on structural and welfare-based interventions (Kanyinjui, 2014, pp. 99-101). Despite the stigmatization and subordination of female urban informal workers, they are crucial to the urban economy and the ecology of the city. Thus, to facilitate their integral roles, female informal workers have collectively self-organized in a multitude of ways across African urban landscapes to permeate their Indigenous market work in the city. 

Chapter 8 of Kinyanjui’s book details the types of social networking among women specific to Nairobi’s informal sector. She indicates that informal workers, namely women, collectively organize themselves in what is referred to as vyama. This is a level of solidarity used for organizing among women in the informal sector. Typically, vyama involves bolstering both economic and social action. Its fundamental principle rests on the notion that urban marketplaces are vicious and patriarchal environments. Thus, social and economic networks and interactions like vyama among women promote their survival in the marketplace (Kanyinjui, 2014, p. 105). In a case study conducted on Taveta Road traders in Nairobi, women are seen joining collective organizations in search of solidarity, to find a sense of identity, and a sense of belonging to a community. The female subjects of the study iterate that the chama, an investment in social capital, is what reinforces their belonging in vyama. The conclusion is that on an individual level without notions of vyama or the chama, there is less incentive for these women to engage in their work in the city due to a lack of economic and social support (Kanyinjui, 2014, p. 102). 

Moreover, the chama cha soko, the street market association, is the first level of social and economic collective organization among female informal sector workers in Nairobi. In essence, it is a bridge between the city council and the informal sector and requires daily contributions from its female members. Contributions include security maintenance, cleanliness of business premises, coordination of trade affairs, dispute resolution, and handling of the opening and closing of business premises. The chama cha soko is reinforced by a tangible constitution in which rules and regulations for traders are enforced. It differs from informal economy associations in Latin America or South Africa, for instance, in that the chama cha soko is less likely to counteract government agendas. 

Rather, the intent of the chama cha soko is to ensure that the interests of informal sector workers are not pushed aside for private sector interests on behalf of actors governing the city. When necessary, the chama cha soko mobilizes its constituents to the means necessary to achieve justice for the informal economy. Further, among its constituents, the chama cha soko promotes a nature of toughness. Those within this level of the collective organization who do not abide by the trading rules are subject to k̃uhandwa, or “being brought to the ground level.” In other words, an individual who breaks or bends trading rules can be subject to expulsion from the market (Kanyinjui, 2014, p. 105). 

In Durban, South Africa, an emerging world-class city known for its influences from colonization and India, navigation of urban informality takes an activism approach. The film, A Place in The City/Trying to Find A Voice, investigates slum residents’ efforts to speak out against agendas that trump private property rights over the livelihoods of urban informal. In recent years, residents of the Foreman Road and Motala Heights slums have been confronted with the war of attrition, which is the prolonging of a war or conflict period in which each actor attempts to defeat the other through small-scale behaviors. City planners have also executed a world-class city in Durban. The implementation of the astronomical Moses Mabhida soccer stadium in 2009 for the 2010 World Cup intended to displace slum dwellers from Foreman Road and Motala Heights. To forward this aim, Durban’s governance agenda has been depriving its periphery and ultimately, slum dwellers, of electricity. Informal settlements also lack other basic sanitation services or accounts in the market despite their presence on state property. According to the film, in Durban, about 40% of working-age adults are unemployed or unaccounted for in the market (Morgan, 2008). 

Amidst this unadulterated inequality, urban informal residents of Foreman Road and Motala Heights have mobilized themselves into an activist group known as the Abahlali, to confront the state’s agenda with hopes for a more just urban informal environment. The residents identify the call-to-action in which they desire from the governance actors of city planning. They identify the following as key needs: housing that actually supports the families in settlements (e.g. houses with more than two bedrooms to accommodate a family) and stagnancy of informal settlements, specifically in Motala Heights, as opposed to relocation to Nazareth. According to female residents, staying in Motala heights would provide them with opportunities to learn trading and entrepreneurship skills necessary for work in the marketplace (Morgan, 2008). 

Abahlali activists are comprised of slum residents in Durban that have evolved from a local development committee. In the film, activists emphasize that though they are fighting for justice and a place in the city, the bedrock of their theory of change is to assert that they are poor. They contend that even when given a house by the government, it should be sold and that they will ultimately return to their shack in the periphery of the city (Morgan, 2008). They do so to push against the stigma of informality, proving that it is not impossible to live in a slum. Within the Abahlali activist group, though including both men and women and spearheaded by a male, S’bu Zikode, women have made courageous strides at exercising the heart of the movement.

Due to their critical role in the informal economy and the interminable burdens they face compared to their male counterparts, they have had to sacrifice things in both physical and economic ways. For instance, Mariet Kikine, an Abahlali activist, describes how despite her nonviolent protesting, she was shot six times by the police (Morgan, 2008). This reveals the intersectionality of police violence against African women in the urban landscape of post-apartheid South Africa. In an interview with several female Abahlali activists in Motala Heights inquiring why they would not prefer to relocate from their current settlements to Nazareth, they explain the opportunities to learn trading and entrepreneurship and the social stability they have in Motala Heights (Morgan, 2008). Several women have raised their children in Motala Heights and thus, have a sense of stability, social networking, and are aware of the procedures of marketplace activities in place.

Moreover, radical incrementalism as a theory of change in an urban context is best understood by South African sociologist, Edgar Pieterse, in his book, City Futures: Confronting the Crisis of Urban Development, as the notion that the drive of urbanity is to promulgate radical change amidst all the idealistic aspects of ‘the city.’ Simultaneously, the necessary austerity and burdens of incremental change stand in contempt of radical change. Thus, it is the only way to intervene in a vicious microcosm of hyper-capitalism and modernity (Pieterse, 2013, p. 134). Through both the social networking and collective organizing of women in Nairobi and the mobilization on the ground in Durban, both radical and incremental theories of changes are invoked to promote justice in urban informal settlements. 

The chama cha soko’s communication with the government to promote social protection for the urban informal sector conveys that this group has organized communication with governance actors, especially their private sector counterparts. It conveys adaptability and acceptance of the urban dynamics in place. However, their by-the-means-necessary approach to resistance against the government especially parallels Pieterse’s notion of radical incrementalism. This is because they have not adopted a more violent approach to seeking justice and protection. If they had, they would have deemed contention a larger part of their agenda. 

The Abahlali activists invoke a radical incrementalism theory of change through community mobilization of nonviolent protesting of both women and men. A notable example of demonstrations by the Abahlali activists, especially the women from Motala Heights, is their rejection of displacement or even a home. In part, they claim that this is from the lasting social networks and familial roots they have established there. Considering their rejection of displacement or houses from the government, they embrace the structure of informal settlements, ultimately pushing back on perceptions that slums are insurmountable. In doing so, they have accepted the capitalist system in place that enables urban informality. Female Abahlali activists also exemplify resilience in their nonviolent activism yet are still targeted by hyper-capitalist forces like the police system. For example, Mariet Kikine, who was shot six times by an officer at a demonstration that became violent due to police action, was overpowered by a capitalist entity at that moment. 

Though calling-to-action different ways to bring about justice in the urban informal sector, women from both the Abahlali and the chama cha soko exhibit a level of solidarity with one another to promulgate their agendas. Both agendas emphasize the importance of social protection over their environments in different ways yet work within a broader system to foster small change. They also push back on conventional perceptions and rhetoric regarding slum resistance as neither of the women in these groups exercised violence on their capitalist counterparts unless it was declared necessary to do so. Unsurprisingly, this is when a capitalist force has intervened in a group’s organizing or demonstration.

Fundamentally, through examining the chama cha soko of Nairobi and the Abahlali activists of Durban, the female urban informal sector workers adopt a radical incrementalist theory of change. The chama cha soko exercises collective organizing to ultimately show hybridized reforms between capitalist entities and the informal economic sector. Moreover, the Abahlali activists in Durban foster community mobilization to form demonstrations in order to communicate with governance actors and capitalist entities, with female activists exhibiting particular resilience against such overpowering actors and entities. 

A conclusion that can be deduced from these radical incrementalism theories of change is the notion that urban informality is not a product of inherent disorder. Instead, it is a product of governance actors’ and capitalist entities’ inability to construct models to fit the schema of disorder. In turn, women subordinated and marginalized by these urban outcomes on the African continent have been challenged with the interminable impacts of informality. Instead of overt radical resistance, they are working within a system that has consistently worked against their favor. Avenues for further research may extrapolate beyond these two cases of the Abahlali activists and the chama cha soko to discover a greater understanding of radical incrementalism among women in the informal sector. Perhaps another theory of change may be invoked when analyzing additional approaches from African women in their promulgation of social protections over their urban informal environments.

References

Fukuchi, T. (1998, September). A Simulation Analysis of the Urban Informal Sector: 

Introduction. In The Developing Economies. (pp. 225-256)

Guven, M., & Karlen, R. (2020, December 3). Supporting Africa's Urban Informal sector: 

Coordinated policies with social protection at the core. Retrieved from 

https://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/supporting-africas-urban-informal-sector-coordinat

Ed-policies-social-protection-core

Kinyanjui, M. N. (2014). Women’s collective organizations and economic informality. In Women 

and the informal economy in urban Africa: From the margins to the centre (pp. 99-117). 

London, UK: Zed Books. 

Morgan, J. (Director & Producer), & Grey Street Films. (2008). A Place in The City/Trying To 

Find A Voice [Video file]. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-NG2v9On4h4

Pieterse, E. A. (2013). City futures: Confronting the crisis of urban development. London, UK: 

Zed Books.

Ranganathan, M. (2019, March). "Liberal" Urban Planning. Lecture presented at Guest Lecture 

in World Politics Course in American University School of International Service, 

Washington, DC.

Forgotten: The Druze of the Levant and the Legacy of the Syrian Civil War

Few can deny the historical importance of the Levant region in rearing the foundations of human civilization. Thousands of years and hundreds of generations transformed the desolate, arid sands of the Fertile Crescent into functioning cities and irrigated farmland. Out of the ziggurats of Ur and the Hanging Gardens of Babylon, long histories and mythologies emerged, nurturing some of the earliest societies known to man. It was along the banks of the River Jordan and the Nile that not only human life arose, but human spirituality as well, with the stories and scriptures of the Semitic tribes coalescing over hundreds of years into Judaism. Millennia later, Christianity would emerge, and centuries after that, Islam. This brief description does little justice to the sheer volumes that could be written on the complexities of these developments; the conflict and strife that forged pious steel from godless iron and the peace and harmony that tended the barren twigs of Gethsemane into olive branches. But it is telling of the arduous history which surrounds the Middle East and the people that live there that the present is not so different from the past. Persecution runs rampant in the modern states of the Arab World, leaving countless communities without basic necessities or the agency to change the course of their lives.

One group for whom this has proven especially true is the Druze: a community for which a single definition, much like the Middle East as a whole, gives little justice. The Druze are an oft-forgotten subsect of the Abrahamic faith, numbering between 800,000 and 2 million. Druze are dotted across the region and the United States, with a great majority of the known Druze population residing in Syria. Traditionally classified as ethno-religious in nature, the beliefs of the Druze are often explained as more monastic philosophy than deistic religion. In this sense, the Druze faith shares much in common with Taoism, meaning that while they still believe in spirituality and an almighty being, more emphasis is put on daily living rather than worship or the afterlife. This is not to say that the Druze snub ritual practices and belief in a god, in fact it is quite the opposite. Polls from Pew Research have shown that an astounding 99% of Druze believe in the Abrahamic God. Like the Five Pillars of Islam, Druze follow the Seven Duties, which include a strict adherence to monotheism and mutual solidarity with fellow Druze. However, the Druze faith is also considered by most to be confusingly esoteric. Druzite clergy maintain a strong chokehold over the “full” scripture, creating a laity which is unaware of the true nature of their religion.

Nevertheless, Druze remain steadfast in their beliefs and customs. Moreover, Druze are unique to Abrahamic faiths having solidarity with denominations, namely Jews. While Christians might consider Jews heathens and vice versa, Druze value their long history of solidarity with the Jewish people, having both been oppressed repeatedly by the caliphates and Muslim states of the area. It is with the Jews that Druze possess the greatest solidarity, having interculturally developed alongside one another and having been treated with greater tolerance and acceptance in Israel. The Druze, much like the Sikhs of India, are also renowned for their militant culture, serving in the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) up until 2015 under the separated Herev Battalion. While the group has since integrated with the IDF at-large, Druze continue to be overwhelmingly loyal to Israel as their home and protector.

Yet while the state of Israel has repeatedly expressed and demonstrated support for this ethnoreligious minority, surrounding Arab Muslim states have not been so kind. Political representation is rare if not entirely non-existent. For example, while Lebanon theoretically guarantees the same rights and privileges to Druze that it does to its other citizens, the reality is usually starkly different. While treated better than in other Arab countries, differences between the Sunni Muslim majority and Druze minority makes integration into daily life difficult. Although the Druze gained political representation in Syria in the Ba’athist takeover in 1963, they were quickly sidelined to prioritize the agenda of other Muslims and Arabs, and have remained a political minority ever since. As is to be expected, leaving the Druze politically ostracized has had considerable ramifications for the treatment of the Druze in all other facets of life.

Druze and Islam: A Complicated History

Mistreatment of Druze and ill-will from the Muslim majority of the region stems from a long history of religious suppression, social isolation, and the killing of Druze by fundamentalist Muslims. Two facts are important to acknowledge at this point: the first being that the term “Druze” is, technically, a misnomer. The term Druze, while disputed by some as possibly deriving from the Arabic word darasah (“those who learn”), is largely accepted to derive from the name of 11th-century adherent Muhammad bin Ismail Nashtakin ad-Darazi. An early follower of the faith, Ad-Darazi himself was soon categorized as a heretic and expunged from the sect entirely. Before this could spread, Benjamin of Tudela—a 12th-century Jewish European chronicler—published a history of the Levant which labeled the people as “Dogziyin”, which over time became bastardized to “Druze”. Druze will often go by many names, but the accepted label used by clergy and when referring to themselves is Al-Muwahhidun (“The People of Monotheism” or “The Unitarians”). For the purpose of this article, and given that the debated etymology has resulted in a lack of care or offense from the community, I will continue to use the term “Druze”.

The second fact which requires some elaboration is that the Druze technically arose from a sect of Islam known as Isma’ilism which is itself a branch of Shi’a Islam. Without delving too deeply into the complex—and disputed—history of the faith, Druze slowly developed into its own religion, eventually becoming persecuted under the Fatimid Caliphate, leading to a closing of the faith in 1043. This means that every Druze individual born past this era has been born directly into the Druze faith, culture, and lifestyle. Additionally, while the Druze emerged from a sect of heretical Islam, it has since abandoned a majority of the guiding principles of Islam. Indeed, the Druze are known as a cosmopolitan people, entertaining philosophy from the Old Testament, New Testament, and Qur’an alike. However, contemporary Druze communities reject the rite of Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca), requirement of zakat (alms to the poor), and other important aspects of Islam. Druze theology is instead directed by the Epistles of Wisdom and other such texts.

It is from this division that deep, long-standing animosity arose between the Islamic and Druze communities in the Middle East. Sunni Islamic scholar Ibn Taymiyyah codified this distrust and hatred, labeling their prophet al-Hakim a dajjal (“deceiver” or “devil”) and declaring the Druze “the most evil of people in apostasy.” Islamic theologians like Ibn Taymiyyah came to issue fatwas—legal-religious orders—calling for massacres of the Druze, and that they be fought against until they accepted Shari’a (Islamic rule) as the highest and most important of all laws.

Druze history has been marked by intermittent moments of conflict and cooperation between Muslim communities and Druze minorities. On the one hand, as stated previously, Druze living in Syria and Lebanon have faced discrimination and prejudice throughout their history on behalf of Muslim governments and religious leaders. Lebanon, for instance, has not pursued an actual census of the Druze since 1932 out of fear of inciting pogroms and infighting. On the other hand, as also stated before, the militant nature of the Druze tradition has made them desirable in combat units. Notable examples of this include Druze involvement during the Arab Revolts under the Ottoman Empire in World War I into the 1920s and uprisings against French Syrian rule into the 1940s. Paradoxical as this willingness to fight alongside followers of an enemy faith might initially appear, it makes sense strategically. Small numbers means the Druze are eager to win the trust of their Muslim neighbors, and fighting alongside them is one way of doing that. A similar phenomenon can be seen with the aforementioned Herev Battalion within the IDF. 

Culling: The Syrian Civil War and the Druze

While it has been shown that the history of the Druze has been one fraught with conflict and bloodshed between themselves and their Muslim counterparts, instances of organized violence were relatively few and far between throughout the twentieth century. This trend continued up until the early-2010s with the rise of ISIS and the beginning of the Syrian Civil War. Incidents were at first scattered, blending into the wholesale slaughter of Christians, Jews, Syrian Armed Forces (SAF), counter-revolutionary fighters, and foreigners. It was with the creation of the al-Nusra Front (also known as al-Qaeda in the Levant) in late 2011 that the frequency of attacks against the Druze skyrocketed.

It was around this time that an avalanche of reports began to emerge of flagrant prejudice against the Druze in Syria, specifically in territories occupied by ISIS and al-Nusra. Episodes of persecution began with the desecration of graves and houses of worship in Idlib, Syria, with al-Nusra fighters destroying well over 500 burial sites and around 100 Druze temples within the span of six months in 2012. Eventually, al-Nusra and ISIS began to escalate its methods to forced conversion, with several hundred Idlib Druze issuing statements renouncing their faith in November, 2013 and February, 2014. Finally, militant insurgents in Syria began to actively pursue violence against the Druze minority. While these instances of violence became widespread into the mid-2010s, this horror culminated in the Qalb Lawzeh Massacre. In the early hours of June 10, 2015, al-Nusra fighters—who had previously dug-up graves in the village—began to argue with townsfolk and ransack homes for food and blankets. Over the course of the day, this built up from verbal confrontation to physical violence, ending with the death of 20 Druze villagers.

There is no doubt that the fundamentalism of ISIS and al-Nusra fighters played into the reasoning behind these attacks; but just as there are material incentives for misguided youth and listless vagabonds to join jihadist groups, there were and continue to be material causes behind these injustices. According to Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, an Iraqi expert on ISIL and the Syrian Civil War, the events which transpired at Qalb Lawzeh and the rampant destruction of property and displacement of Druze is not solely rooted in religious differences. Instead, evidence suggests that these principally arose out of land disputes, with al-Nusra forces having promised supporters land in the Jabal al-Summaq area. Underlying facts like this are essential to explaining not only the growth of ISIS and al-Nusra in the 2010s but also the ensuing conflicts between Salafists and easy prey minority groups like the Druze.

Conflict between the Druze and militant insurgencies did not stop with the Syrian recapture of Aleppo in 2016. Rather, attacks became rarer but more deadly. Bombings like the Swedia attacks in July, 2018 that killed more than 200 people (with another 24 taken hostage) highlighted the continued risk to Druze communities in Syria. 

Druze in the Middle East—Tomorrow and Beyond

The greatest tragedy facing the Druze is not only that these crimes continue into our present time, but continue without much notoriety or coverage. Calls for attention to the plight of the Druze date back to as early as the 1980s when Lebanese politician Walid Jumblatt—an important figure in the international Druze community—called for American Druze to lobby against American interference in the Lebanese Civil War. There have been occurrences of Druze involvement in international politics, most recently with the hosting of Sheikh Moafaq Tarif at the UNHCR in 2019, but these have remained scattered and infrequent. Coverage of the horrors at Qalb Lawzeh and Sweida settled down soon after the attacks, and critics have noted the lack of response from the US and international organizations.

The Druze are an ancient and proud people who will not go quietly while injustice faces their communities. They have shown their dedication not only to their fellow Druze but to their countrymen, a unique trait which should garner far more attention than it has received. In assessing proper channels for encouraging democracy and free agency in the Middle East, the US, UN, and all groups concerned with stabilizing the region should look to the Druze as a community to empower and protect. 

The Dangerous Myth of Overpopulation

At the height of an international lockdown during the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic, images of wildlife peacefully walking through deserted city streets proliferated on social media. Monkeys were seen brawling in the streets of Thailand, while boars descended into the streets of Barcelona. These images elicited a plethora of responses, though many agreed on one thing: the staggering number of humans occupying the planet were the root cause of why scenes such as these were incredibly rare. They specifically argued that if not for overpopulation, the relationship between nature and humanity would be much more harmonious. Subsequently, memes with the slogan “Humans are the virus, Covid is the cure” began circulating. While such arguments may seem innocuous, the idea of overpopulation being a root cause of environmental and economic issues is a dangerous one. Its permeability highlights this: it has successfully seeped into our language, discourse, and approach to solutions despite it being rooted in white supremacy, misogyny, xenophobia, and fascism. Its proponents have crafted an incredible marketing scheme to sell overpopulation as the cause of our woes and to many it makes sense: more people means less resources for environmental and economic prosperity- right? However, overpopulation is not the danger its proponents make it out to be nor does it get to the real root cause of our issues. It is simply a tool to inflict further violence on Black and Brown people on a national and international scale and fuel dangerous ideologies such as ecofascism.

What Is Overpopulation?

In 1789, Thomas Malthus, a cleric and economist, wrote a treatise titled Essay on the Principle of Population which argued: “The power of population is so superior to the power of the earth to produce subsistence for man, that premature death must in some shape or other visit the human race…” Malthus’s vision of collapse was premised on the central argument that population growth would inevitably outstrip the human race’s ability to produce food thus generating the conditions for mass famine and societal breakdown. According to Malthus’s worldview, humans were the equivalent of animals who mindlessly reproduce; based on this assumption, he ascertained that human population growth is geometric (2, 4, 8, 12, etc) while food reserved grow at an arithmetic rate (2, 3, 4, 5, etc). Of course, when operating off of this supposition it is easy to portend misery and chaos. However, Betsy Hartmann, the author of Reproductive Rights and Wrongs: the Global Politics of Population Control, points out that Malthus got two crucial points wrong: population growth is not an eternal process, but has been shown to slow and stabilize as a result of higher standards of living. Furthermore, Malthus’s contention that food growth would be outstripped by population did not consider advances in human production (14). The Industrial Revolution, which was in its beginning stages at the time of this treatise’s publication, would produce the technology to sustain the needs of the growing population and more.  Additionally, it has been successfully demonstrated that not only is population growth not a hindrance to society, but it has actually helped produce more innovation- the more people there are, the more minds there are to discover solutions. 

Despite the fact that Malthus’s treatise has long been debunked, overpopulation never really disappeared and truly re-entered the public consciousness in the 1960s with the works of Garrett Hardin and Paul Ehrlich. Garrett Hardin’s essay “Tragedy of the Commons” is often cited as a foundational argument for protecting natural resources. The essay posits the following: when having access to common land (or resources), we worry that our neighbor’s cattle will graze the best grass, so we must send our cows out first to consume it. The logic is that since everyone is supposedly competitive, what inevitably happens is environmental degradation. However, there are a few foundational problems with Hardin’s premise. The first is Hardin’s view that humans are naturally selfish and competitive- Hardin’s projections as an individual should not provide the basis for over-arching assumptions about all of humanity. Furthermore, this notion has been contested: commons, a historical phenomenon that ceased to exist with the development of modern-day capitalism and its aggressive privatization of land, were early pastures that were well-regulated by local institutions. They were not the competitive, anarchical grazing sites that Hardin suggests. While it is this scenario that is the most well-known part of this notorious essay, it is crucial to examine its other aspects to truly understand the danger Hardin presents. “The Tragedy of the Commons,” has a subheading titled “The Freedom to Breed is Intolerable;” a few paragraphs later he argues: “if we love the truth we must openly deny the validity of the UDHR.” These examples further flesh out the nature of Hardin’s ideas: he is openly advocating for human rights violations to prevent reproduction thus mitigating the ‘issue’ of overpopulation. However, it was not white people that should have been prevented from reproducing. Hardin was a known white nationalist who believed that only racially homogeneous societies could survive; in fact, Hardin even lobbied Congress against sending food to poor nations as he believed their populations were threatening Earth’s “carrying capacity.” 

Paul Ehrlich’s book Population Bomb also echoed Malthusian hysteria. Ehrlich based the novel off of his experiences in a crowded city in India and argued that humans were reproducing far beyond their means. The book advocated for incentives, or blatant coercion if that failed, to control the population. Of course, in a similar vein to Hardin, such tactics would only be employed in countries in the Global South- thus the main targets for their fascistic methods were Black and brown people. White supremacy, classism, and misogyny have all been instrinically linked to overpopulation since its conception. It provided a foundation for Social Darwinism which advocates for the restriction of  particular family’s sizes through any possible method. For example, in 1601 the English Poor Law was implemented by Queen Elizabeth I  in order to provide food for the poor; following the publication of Malthus’s treatise, this was severely diminished by the Poor Law Amendment Act in 1834. The passing of such an amendment was justified using the Malthusian logic that helping the poor only encourages them to reproduce thus exacerbating their poverty. The Irish Potato Famine of the 1840s was also seen as a viable way to reduce the “surplus population” in Ireland, who was an English colony at the time. In the United States, eugenic fears of overpopulation of certain groups resulted in the Supreme Court legalizing sterilization for “undesirable” citizens in 1927. As a result, approximately 70,000 Americans were forcibly sterilized. 

Overpopulation has been used to justify fascism, thus the use of forced sterilizations,  and its various strains, including eco-fascism. Eco-fascism essentially places the blame of environmental breakdown on overpopulation and immigration and advocates for the extermination of poor people of color and migrants. According to eco-fascists, issues pertaining to the environment are the result of poor people of color reproducing and over-consuming beyond their means; they often focus on the individual consumption of cheap, disposable products. The environmental harm produced by industries such as fossil fuels are never blamed. While eco-fascism may take the appearance of a fringe movement, people of color and migrants have already been subjected to obscene acts of violence. The man who killed 22 people in El Paso, Texas in 2019 included eco-fascist sentiments in his manifesto which explains why he specifically targeted an area populated by Mexican immigrants. The mass shooter responsible for the massacre at a mosque in Christchurch, New Zealand was also apparently inclined towards eco-fascism. 

Is Overpopulation an Issue?

The short answer is: no. While large populations may place some strain on local resources, it is not a harbinger of apocalypse that Malthusians present it as. It should also be clarified that while the world’s population has increased greatly, that does not mean the Earth is “overpopulated.” In fact, as I hope to demonstrate, population growth is not a hindrance to the environment or economic development. Issues of environmental collapse and/or poverty are a result of colonialism and the international capitalist market rather than individuals in the Global South. 

Firstly, we must establish why it is that the Global South has had such a population boom over the last century. Malthusians would have us believe that Black and Brown people in the Global South are similar to weeds and have a higher natural proclivity towards reproducing- not only is that racist, it is untrue. What is true, however, is that they live under a different set of circumstances than those in Global North. As Hartmann points out, having larger families is for the purpose of survival and security. Children are able to bring in more income or take care of younger family members while their parents work (Hartmann 6). Additionally, children are often the ones to take care of their parents in their old age as many countries in the Global South do not have the same security in retirement age as those in the Global North who may have access to government funded programs (Hartmann 7). Parents may also have a lot of children to ensure that they will have a son who will survive into adulthood as high infant mortality rates continue to persist in certain countries (Hartmann 8). While this highlights the continuing existence of patriarchal values, it also demonstrates structural issues pertaining to infant and maternal care. 

Historically, famines have been attributed to overpopulation. However, as Hartmann states: “Tremendous advances in agricultural productivity mean that today the world produces enough grain alone to provide every man, woman, and child on earth with 3,200 calories a day…” (16). Considering this statistic, it should be obvious that population growth does not necessarily stress natural resources- there is enough for all. Famine is not typically a natural occurrence, but a breakdown in institutions that oversee food production and distribution (Hartmann 17). Africa has long been the famine poster-child for overpopulation zealots. Though there has most certainly been food crises on the continent, it has more to do with the implementation of neoliberal policies than it does with population growth. Hartmann explains that the pivot to becoming economically dependent on exporting cash crops has displaced subsistence farmers, who are often women, to areas that yield less food (18). Population control would not only be draconian, it would completely ignore the root causes of famine which are institutional rather than individual. 

Malthusians also blame environmental issues on population growth in the Global South. Sir David Attenborough, known for the series Planet Earth which is meant to raise awareness for endangered species, is the head of a coporation known as Population Matters. Their website states: “It took humanity 200,000 years to reach one billion and only 200 years to reach seven billion. We are still adding an extra 80 million each year and are headed towards 10 billion by mid-century.” Ultimately, the argument being made here is that the rate of population must be slowed down in order to save the planet. However, this fear mongering statement provides numbers with no context. With a rate of 80 million people per year, that means the population is slowing down- the population growth in 1970 was 2.1 percent per annum and now it is 1.2 percent. Despite this decrease in population growth, the climate crisis continues to become more severe. Why? It has less to do with reproduction and more to do with a capitalist economic structure that requires the extraction of natural resources, including fossil fuels, and mass consumption.  Since 1988, 70 percent of greenhouse gas emissions have been produced by just 100 mulatinational corporations. If 750 million people in China, India, and Africa’s poorer population stopped producing carbon, while companies like ExxonMobile, BP, and Toyota continued to operate normally, reduction of carbon emissions would be miniscule. To provide more perspective, the total emissions of the poorest half of the population of China, which is around 600 million people, only account for one-third of the emissions for the richest 10 percent in the United States, which is around 30 million people. In India, who alongside China was a target of Malthusian rhetoric regarding population control, someone in the richest 10 percent uses, on average, just one quarter of the carbon of someone in the poorest half of the population in the United States. Despite the fact that the Global South has experienced most of the population growth in the 20th century, they are not the ones responsible for the present ecological crisis. 

Another major reason as to why population growth is seen as a problem is that it exacerbates poverty. This is another baseless argument. For example, in 1960, South Korea and Taiwan were poor countries with fastly growing populations- both experienced population surges over 50 percent, yet their income and standard of living increased exponentially. As Hartmann points out, “...the impressive economic performance of middle-income countries in the 1960s and 1970s occurred alongside rapid population growth” (30). Poverty is not a product of large populations, but is a symptom of larger economic and political forces. The myth of overpopulation is easy to debunk, yet it is still incredibly dangerous as it still influences the language we use to talk about people in the Global South and the harmful policies that are pushed by international institutions and implemented by political elites. Malthusian agendas seek to subject marginalized people, both at home and abroad, to violence. Moving forward, it is important to remain cognizant of the ways Malthusianism influences environmental policy and ultimately inhibit our chances of creating a better society. 

References

Hartmann, Betsy. Reproductive Rights and Wrongs: The Global Politics of Population Control. Haymarket Books, 2016. 

UNESCO and the destruction of Afghan cultural heritage: How the Taliban’s return to power threatens the legitimacy of western-led international organizations

Earlier this year when the Taliban regained power for the first time in Afghanistan since the US-led military invasion of 2001, all attention was immediately centered on the fall of Kabul and Afghan government, as well as the devastating effects and tragedy that the Taliban’s reprise of power would have on the Afghan people. The outside world watched in horror the scenes at Kabul airport and the heartbreaking interviews with citizens fearing for their lives and the future of Afghanistan. Adding to this discourse at the time was the anger and frustration expressed towards the American government and other western governments at their inaction and inability to prevent the return of the Taliban. The twenty year long US military presence disappeared as did their supposed ‘success’ at quelling the Taliban’s dangerous presence. 

Now, as the world is starting to sadly adjust to the reality of the Taliban regime, greater analysis can be done to recognize the true levels of destruction that Afghanistan is experiencing, particularly the loss of their rich cultural heritage. Adding to the failure of the US military presence in Afghanistan is the failure of international institutions, such as UNESCO, to protect the country’s cultural heritage. 

The history of Afghanistan’s cultural heritage 

Afghanistan is home to a diverse and rich cultural heritage, thanks in large part to its history which includes a strong religious legacy of a variety of religions including Buddhism, Islam, and Christian and Jewish sects. Unlike other parts of the world, humans have inhabited Afghanistan for at least 50,000 years, living primarily in farming communities. Early records of human interaction in Afghanistan in the ancient world reveal the presence of the Persian Empire, Alexander the Great, and a wide variety of kingdoms that would be defined by both Buddhism and Islam. Modern day Afghanistan represents a land that is home to thousands of years of human interaction, leaving it with an impressive cultural heritage. Historical monuments in Afghanistan include the Bamiyan Valley that once held the great Buddha statues and the Minaret of Jam, the famous tower built by the Ghurid sultan. Yet now, Afghanistan risks losing its precious cultural heritage due to the Taliban, and their desire to rewrite the narrative of Afghanistan's history. 

Afghanistan has already lost much of its most important and oldest forms of cultural heritage. When the Taliban first took power in 1996 they horrified the outside world by destroying the Buddhist Bamiyan statues of the 6th century. The statues were regarded as examples of the oldest forms of religious monuments worldwide and were part of UNESCO’s many world heritage sites. The Taliban's decision to destroy these sacred, 600 foot tall monuments revealed their intense desire to rid Afghanistan of its Buddhist influence and anything that went against the terrorist organization’s strict rules and image. The Taliban did not only destroy ancient sites, they also attacked more recent forms of cultural heritage as well as Afghanistan’s contemporary art and culture. Museums, libraries, and music were all forms of culture that fell victim to the Taliban. Author and academic, Ahmad Rashid Salim describes the danger of cultural heritage destruction: “When you kill history, when you kill language, when you kill leaders, when you kill intellectuals, when you kill the religious and spiritual leaders of a society, you can do whatever you want with the people who no longer have a past.”

Now, the Taliban’s return to power threatens the few remaining ancient cultural heritage sites as well as the renaissance of culture that the Afghan people have worked so hard to protect and promote in recent decades. Indeed, it appears as though our worst fears are being realized. Following the Taliban’s initial return to power back in August of this year little was known of their intentions regarding the country’s cultural heritage. A Taliban spokesperson was quoted in February of 2021 on the subject of Afghanistan’s cultural heritage: “As Afghanistan is a country replete with ancient artifacts and antiquity, and that such relics form a part of our country’s history, identity and rich culture, therefore all have an obligation to robustly protect, monitor and preserve these artifacts...All Mujahideen must prevent excavation of antiquities and preserve all historic sites like old fortresses, minarets, towers and other similar sites...to safeguard them from damage, destruction and decay.” Officials within the Taliban promised to protect the country’s cultural heritage, including Kabul’s National Museum of Afghanistan; yet suspicions and distrust lingered given the events of previous decades. Tragically, it appears as though our worst fears are being realized: a recent video from early November shows the Taliban conducting a target practice at the limited remains of the Bamiyan Buddhas, despite their supposed promise to protect the cultural heritage site. This blatant disrespect for the cultural heritage site and disregard of their promise reveals the level of destruction that the Taliban is capable of. Afghanistan risks losing all of its influential cultural heritage, a tragedy that will be deeply devastating not just for the country, but for the world. 

UNESCO and the protection of world heritage sites 

Afghanistan is not the first country worldwide that risks losing its history and heritage due to a change in government and desire to redefine a national identity. The destruction of cultural heritage is a tragic part of every culture's history. However, the 20th century saw the first large-scale attempt to recognize the importance of cultural heritage worldwide and implement efforts to protect cultural heritage in all of its forms. 

UNESCO, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, was established with the goal of protecting and promoting peace and cooperation, specifically through cultural work. The UNESCO World Heritage Sites are one of the defining roles of the international organization. Founded thanks to the 1972 Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, the World Heritage List seeks to protect cultural heritage all across the world in the forms of monuments, buildings, geographical landscapes, and other forms of cultural sites. The UNESCO World Heritage List also labels sites that are in danger and must be protected. Heritage sites in danger can be labeled for a variety of reasons including environmental threats, political threats, or economic threats. Afghanistan is home to several cultural heritage sites on the World Heritage List, of which some, such as the Bamiyan Buddhas, have tragically been destroyed. The remaining cultural heritage sites in Afghanistan are high on the list of those in danger. 

Despite the global impact of UNESCO and worldwide recognition of the importance of protecting cultural heritage sites, UNESCO has been helpless in the face of Taliban destruction. While the international organization could evidently not prevent the return of the Taliban in power, their blatant failure to succeed in any form of protection towards Afghanistan’s cultural heritage sites threatens the legitimacy and future of the organization. In the face of the Taliban’s takeover, UNESCO was only able to call for the preservation of the historical sites, despite their implementation of a safeguard protection program with the Afghan Interior Ministry in 2004. Yet, even this protection program appears worthless now.  How can the world guarantee the protection of its cultural heritage when the one organization tasked with promoting and protecting cultural heritage cannot live up to its own goals?  The Taliban’s return to power and their decision to blatantly target Afghanistan’s cultural heritage sites reveals a far larger issue than the blatant destruction seen on the surface: The inability of international organizations to live up to their roles.

The recent failure of international organizations 

UNESCO is not the first international institution that has been unable to live up to its original promise and mission statement, many other prominent international organizations have been unable to meet their promises to the world for a variety of factors. Examples of failure within other international organizations include the European Union’s recent failure to implement western-European influence in Bosnia following the UN’s security council’s vote to end the EU’s peacekeeping mission there. Other more infamous failures include the UN’s tragic inaction throughout the Rwandan genocide, in which UN blue helemt troops evacuated foreigners, but failed the protect the horrifying mass murder of the Tutsi people. Despite UN recognition of their own blatant failure, the organization’s peacekeeping missions in recent decades reveal a clear and obvious struggle of the organization to live up to its goals, following its creation after World War II. 

The liberal international order in conflict

The destruction in Afghanistan and UNESCO inability to protect the country’s cultural heritage sites reveal another larger issue: the failure of the liberal international order. Following the devastating destruction caused by the Second World War, dozens of international institutions and organizations were established with the hope of promoting global cooperation and thus preventing war and mass conflict. Aimed with the goal of spreading liberal, western democracy throughout the world, the victors of World War II believed that through western-led international organization and western influence world wide, nation states would become democracies over time. Therefore making the world a safer place through nation states’ attempts to evolve into the traits encouraged by the western powers. 

The liberal international order is defined by its norms of multilateralism and its promotion of international institutions. The liberal international order has been a central theory that has defined world politics following the second of World War II. The theory was seen as the future of democracy and peace; it promised a more connected world of western-led power and economic, political, and cultural cooperation. However, recent decades have seen the failing of the liberal international order, as the theory could not account for the recent developments of bipolarity between China and the United States, or its failure in its countries of origin, caused by populist movements seen in the United Kingdom and United States. The rise of non-state actors and the rejection of Western values and traditional concepts of nation state sovereignty have also been central to the liberal international order’s decline. The threat of the Taliban stems not just from their capacity to cause mass violence, but also their rejection of the pillars of liberalism. 

International institutions were once established to be the defining pillars of the liberal international order. The establishment of the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, or the World Health Organization all reveal how following their creation, western powers intended for the organizations to engage in multilateral cooperation worldwide, while being largely dominated and funded by the western powers themselves. However, the recent failures of many international institutions reflect the larger failure of liberalism as the defining theory of world order. 

UNESCO’s inability to act in Afghanistan does not just threaten their own stability and legitimacy as an organization designed in part to protect world heritage, but reveals the broader trend of failure within international institutions and the change in world order. The stability and protection once promised by these western led international institutions can no longer be guaranteed; the Taliban’s destruction of Afghanistan’s cultural heritage simply proves it.

Neglect of Public Housing Has Harmful Consequence

Public housing became a critical part of American social infrastructure after President Franklin Delano Roosevelt created the first public housing units for Americans outside of the military. Prior to this expansion, public housing was only offered to members of the U.S. military. Economist and legal scholar Richard Rothstein wrote in his book “The Color of Law” about the pattern of systemic segregation in public housing since President Roosevelt started the program. The first Department of Housing and Urban Development authorities on public housing directly asserted segregationist policies when it came to who can rent public units. The Secretary of the Interior under President Roosevelt—Harold Ickes of the Chicago NAACP—pushed to create public housing units for people of color. However, these policies pushed African Americans together, which gave politicians the ability to directly impact majority-minority communities. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 banned discrimination in the housing market and the Fair Housing Act of 1968 attempted to increase access to housing. Despite these laws, minority populations are continuously hurt when public housing is neglected. Even if one does not support public housing, it is undeniable that millions of Americans rely on the program, and vulnerable populations would be hurt the most if the program was gutted. The American government has significantly diminished the funding for public housing since it’s implementation in the early 20th century, and the pattern of neglect comes back to hurt disadvantaged populations.

History of Public Housing

Public Housing originated in 1937 and has faced opposition since. The Housing Act of 1937 authorized construction of the first public housing units and then the act was reauthorized in 1949. However, with conservative opposition to government assistance, President Nixon halted all public housing programs in 1974. In 1992, the HOPE VI program destroyed thousands of units and displaced or evicted all of those residents. The pattern of demolishing public housing units continues into the present day; according to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 200,000 homes have been demolished since the 1990s. The Fair Cloth Amendment of 1998 set a limit on how many new public housing units could be created, a policy that the Biden Administration is looking to repeal. Currently, 950,000 Americans rely on public housing, and that number is increasing due to the strains of the COVID-19 pandemic as 915,000 families were served in 2019. One qualifies for public housing if they make less than 80% of their local median income. Of the residents who live in public housing, 47% are located in areas that are in high poverty areas; 56% are elderly or disabled; more females than males live in public housing by 30%; the largest age group in public housing is under 18; two-thirds of residents in public housing identify as either Black or Latino. Those living in public housing pay a base rent of $50, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has two funds to subsidize the difference between the rent payments and market price. The first is the Public Housing and Operating Fund, which covers the differences between rent and operating cost of the unit, and the second is the Public Housing Capitals Fund, which exists for covering renovations and development. However, the funding for both accounts has been decreasing throughout the past decade, and it means that renovations on the aforementioned tenants and placement of new ones are backlogged.

Diminished Funds

President Biden made the improvement of public housing a legislative goal for his administration but has already encountered difficulties. Through years of turning a blind eye to public housing, more resources are required to catch up to the damages previously ignored. President Biden proposed $40 billion in a new bill for public housing and an extra $300 billion for public housing in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Bill. However, Republicans have cut that $300 billion to $100 billion already, and there are major drawbacks for municipal governments. For example, New York City only received $26 billion to improve their housing units, after requesting $32 billion. Therefore, the city was not able to complete all of the construction that the municipal government intended to.

For the 2021 fiscal year, HUD under President Trump and Dr. Ben Carson received a $2.8 billion budget for the department. The majority of the funds went to safety initiatives: $35 million to remove lead paint, $45 million for grants to improve unit safety, $5 million for radon tests, and $35 million for inputting new CO2 detectors. Additionally, the budget cut funds for both the Public Housing Operating Fund and the Public Housing Capitals fund by thousands of dollars but increased funding for self-sufficiency funds to $190 million. Money from the aforementioned housing funds was reallocated to “Move to Work Programs,” which test innovative housing policies but tend to leave behind the residents. Lawmakers prefer to subsidize housing, to extend choice but also decrease government involvement in public housing.  

Primary Experiences in Public Housing Units

Narratives about creating self-sufficiency undermine the experiences of public housing tenants and put forward the implication that they do not work hard enough to warrant government aid. To combat this narrative, The Washington Post shared a moving story of a man who once worked as a flight attendant and musician, who suffered heart attacks and strokes and now lives in New York City public housing. His home has several large holes in the ceiling, and with the stormy weather of a coastal city, there is severe damage to the inside of his home. This man worked hard, and faces uncontrollable health battles, yet is neglected rather than assisted. Residents in public housing have spotted urine and feces spread throughout the hallways, they have difficulty securing new appliances, and children encounter violence daily. One resident discussed the difficulties to procure basic home maintenance in Narratively Studio’s article on life in New York City public housing. She had to call city hall to get the contact information for the unit’s maintenance service, and then call the maintenance office and schedule an appointment. Additionally, due to disorganization, the repairmen did not show up to the resident’s scheduled appointment, causing the tenant to argue with the municipal government. This is not an infrequent occurrence. Most who do not live in public housing simply fill out a form online, and could not imagine the bureaucratic barriers to simple maintenance requests. However, life in public housing is not all bad, and it perpetuates a harmful stereotype to believe that one cannot have a fulfilling and happy life in public housing. That stereotype is far from the truth. For example, some tenants discussed the sense of community that they felt within housing projects. Since those living in public housing faced similar economic setbacks, residents cited a great amount of empathy within their neighborhood. One resident stated, “The projects were more human. I saw humanity because everybody knew each other. They walked amongst each other and their kids played together. You didn’t know who had money and who did not have money.” On the other hand, a strong community can be fostered and nourished without people having to encounter so many malfunctions in the infrastructure of the home.

Housing Vouchers

Rather than choosing to fund public housing, legislators are moving towards supporting voucher programs such as Section 8 Housing. Section 8 Housing comes from a contract between HUD and a private property owner under the Section 8 Moderate Rehabilitation Program. Tenants pay up to 30% of their income in rent and a flat utility rate of $50. The gap between what the tenant pays and the cost of operation is covered by HUD. Section 8 housing vouchers can be a positive program for many since sometimes the public housing rent of $50 is more than 30% of the tenant’s income. However, landlords can find loopholes in their contacts and bump the tenant’s rent up to market price, leading to debt or eviction. Additionally, according to Richard Rothstein, Section 8 landlords are allowed to refuse certain government housing vouchers—leaving room for bias, indirect discrimination, and the abandonment of people experiencing the worst poverty. A total move to vouchers could leave behind those in public housing, who do not have the resources to find new locations or apply for vouchers. Additionally, vouchers can lead to more bureaucratic obstacles and backlog than already exist.

The Future of Public Housing

California Representative Maxine Waters is a strong champion for public housing and wants to see a shift from funding rental aid back to public housing. She requested $80 billion to repair one million homes, but only received $65 billion. Frustrated, Representative Waters stated “We cannot build back better without investing in our nation's crumbling housing infrastructure. Housing is not a miscellaneous afterthought, a nice-to-have, a ‘something that can wait until later.” Representative Waters stands with President Biden in an attempt to expand public housing with a whole new housing bill where “The newest version includes $15 billion for the national Housing Trust Fund, a program that supports the construction of deeply affordable housing, as well as $10 billion for the HOME Investment Partnerships program, the federal government’s largest block grant program for building and rehabbing affordable housing. Another $10 billion will go to down payment assistance for first-time homebuyers.” The administration’s main goal is to get Americans into secure and sustainable housing.

Concluding Remarks

The purpose of this piece is not to state that public housing is the best option to provide homes to those experiencing poverty. The goal is to present the data on who utilizes public housing and how the tenants who rely on the federal program are impacted by gutting funds. It is crucial that the millions of Americans who live in public housing projects can live in dignity even if public housing is not a political priority or policy preference.