The Proliferation of Organized Crime Groups in Europe’s First “Narco-State”: A Look at Albania in the post-Cold War Era

“While organized crime is not a new phenomenon today, some governments find their authority besieged at home and their foreign policy interests imperiled abroad. Drug trafficking, links between drug traffickers and terrorists, smuggling of illegal aliens, massive financial and bank fraud, arms smuggling, potential involvement in the theft and sale of nuclear material, political intimidation, and corruption all constitute a poisonous brew.”

James Woolsey, Former Director of the CIA

In the early twenty-first century, the international community adopted a policy of indifference towards the Balkan peninsula after the United States (U.S.) successfully commandeered NATO-led military interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo to prevent the escalation of a conflict that threatened to “taint the post-Cold War world.” However, as democratic backsliding and rising nationalist-populist parties threaten to reverse European integration efforts, stability in the Balkans is no longer guaranteed. While a large number of European countries are currently experiencing calls for secession, the Balkans face a greater, more established threat: transnational organized crime. These organized crime groups (OCGs) have been operating in the Balkans since the Yugoslav Wars, and they continue to threaten states’ efforts to democratize and stabilize. As the “hub” for organized crime in the region, the impact of these groups is especially visible in Albania, whose accession to the European Union (EU) has been halted due to the proliferation of organized crime and group ties to the country’s economic and political systems. However, the question remains as to what conditions have enabled Albania in particular, and not another Balkan state, to become the regional hub for organized crime groups and the illicit drug trade in the post-Cold War era?

It is critical to understand why the situation in Albania differs from the other Balkan countries that also host a number of OCGs. The factors of analysis that will be used to examine the reasons for this difference include Albania’s poor social and economic conditions, the magnitude of political corruption, and the country’s porous border as a result of their geographic location. In addition to analyzing these factors, this piece will also examine the implications of the proliferation of organized crime in Albania, particularly as they pertain to the country’s potential for acquiring EU membership, and as well as the overall impact on both the Balkans and contemporary Europe.

Historical Context

The Balkans and Organized Crime

Comprised of twelve countries, including the states that made up the former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and Greece, the Balkans lie at the crossroads between Europe and the Mediterranean Sea, essentially serving as a bridge between Europe and Asia. While economically beneficial, this geopolitical location also makes the Balkans extremely susceptible to transnational criminal activity. Following the demise of the Soviet Union, the Balkan states were left politically weak, with no real governmental structure left in place. These conditions, paired with a fractured economic system, made the Balkan peninsula vulnerable to transnational organized crime groups.

Historically, organized crime in the Balkans was facilitated by means of “Balkan routes” which ran primarily through Turkey, Greece, Italy, and Bulgaria. Through the use of these routes, transnational criminals were able to smuggle illegal drugs like heroin and marijuana, and now also cocaine and human beings, to other European countries such as Austria, Hungary, Poland, and Germany, among others. The outbreak of war in the Balkans in the 1990s increased smugglers’ use of these routes, as smuggling became a “survival strategy” for citizens who required basic supplies, as well as for groups like the Kosovo Liberation Army, who needed weapons and ammunition in order to fight. As a result of war-time smuggling, criminal profits made during the conflicts translated to political power in the post-war period. This led to corruption and the establishment of criminal structures in the Balkan countries’ political systems, such as the judiciary, the bureaucracy, and various state law enforcement agencies.

Albania as the “Hub” for OCGs

However, while transnational OCGs threaten the entirety of the Balkan countries, Albania is especially vulnerable to this type of clandestine criminal activity. Regarding the centralization of organized crime, Albania serves as the main hub, acting as both a “producer country” and as a “distribution node” for groups such as Hellbanianz. According to the U.S. Department of State’s 2018 Strategy for International Control of Narcotics, “Albania produces and exports a significant amount of marijuana [and] is a transit country for Afghan heroin and cocaine,” making it one of the fastest-growing threats in contemporary Europe. As the primary exporter of cannabis in the region, Albanian OCGs take advantage of the historical “Balkan routes” that were used by smugglers and ensure the safe transportation of their products by placing “Soldiers” and “Capos” along the route to ward off public inquiries. The U.S. State Department also describes Albania as home to “rampant corruption, weak legal and government institutions and weak border controls” where drug trafficking and smuggling are among the top sources of revenue.

Factors of Analysis

Poor Social and Economic Conditions

Albania’s economy has experienced significant growth since the end of the Cold War. However, underlying social issues still prevent the country from achieving further economic success, the greatest being a lack of job opportunities. This can be attributed to the period between 1996-97 when the Albanian economy was besieged by a series of financial pyramid schemes. Despite enjoying success after transitioning to a market economy in the post-war period, Albania’s new economy was rudimentary and unstructured. This weak financial system enabled pyramid schemes to be carried out. A form of fraud, pyramid schemes are a way to make money based on the recruitment of investors, who are drawn in with the promise of high returns. The more investors involved, the more levels reached in the “pyramid” until eventually there are no more investors, profits are lost, and the system is rendered unsustainable. 

In Albania, the proliferation of these schemes was detrimental to social and economic growth. Once schemes began to collapse, riots ensued as an estimated 800,000 individuals lost their money, leading to the acquisition of approximately $13.3 million in illegal proceeds. While knowledge about the true nature of pyramid schemes later reached the masses and people became more careful about where they invested their money, the impact of these schemes in the late 1990s set the stage for financial failure in an economic system that had a weak foundation. 

The legacy of these pyramid schemes enables the success of OCGs in modern-day Albania because they are often cited as the reason for the lack of employment opportunities, which OCGs then use as an argument to draw people in to commit criminal acts as an alternative means to make money. Compared to the greater Euro Area, where unemployment rests at 7.5 percent as of October 2019, Albania has an extremely high national unemployment rate, recorded at 12 percent in December 2019, and an even higher youth unemployment rate, which averaged out at 20.9 percent in the second quarter of 2019. The country’s unemployment rates, paired with an aging population and high levels of emigration to Greece and Italy, help contribute to the phenomenon known as “brain drain,” which occurs when highly-trained or intelligent people leave their home country in search of better opportunities and a life outside of widespread poverty. This is where the impact produced by OCGs is the greatest, as these groups flourish in fragile states where post-conflict conditions ensure weak governance, poverty, and inequality. Albanian nationals who are living in poverty and are unable to find jobs are drawn to the idea of making fast cash through the illicit drug trade, which only serves to further the success of OCGs and perpetuate their existence in society.

Political Corruption

Coined “Europe’s first narco-state,” which the International Monetary Fund defines as a state “where all legitimate institutions become penetrated by the power and wealth of the illegal drug trade,” political corruption is key to the success of organized crime groups and the growth of the illicit drug trade in Albania. Corruption was rampant in the highest levels of government in the capital of Tirana under former Prime Minister Enver Hoxha until his death in 1985, and that trend persists today under Prime Minister Edi Rama, who, along with other government officials, is said to be in collusion with drug traffickers. According to the Independent Balkan News Agency, cocaine gangs such as the “Avdyli group” successfully rigged Albanian elections in 2016 by engaging in vote-buying for the mayor of Durres, a major port city in the country. Additionally, allegations that ties between OCGs and government officials influenced 2017 parliamentary elections in Albania were verified in a three-year-long study, which found that 20.7 percent of Albanians were offered favors in exchange for their vote. In Albania, which is said to be the most corrupt Balkan state by the Corruption Perceptions Index, the best way to secure people’s votes is by paying them in the cash that is generated by the drug trade. This enhances the level of top-down corruption that occurs in the public sector, of which drugs and OCGs play a participatory role, and allows Albanian government officials to perpetuate unorthodox practices. Rudina Hajdari, a member of the Assembly of the Republic of Albania, summarizes the issue in Albania:

“Young Albanians feel angry and cheated by the government. We have seismic, mind-blowing problems with corruption. When drugs came into the picture, so much cash was flowing that it actually shook the national currency. Money dictates our country’s decisions, and as that money is provided by drug cartels-to individual politicians, and to all political parties-anyone fighting corruption hits big hurdles.”

This exchange of dirty money for votes helps to ensure job stability of politicians who wish to remain in office and perpetuate the cycle of corruption from which they are benefitting. Saimir Tahiri, former interior minister under Prime Minister Rama, resigned in May 2018 amid investigations into his culpability regarding drug trafficking charges and accusations of corruption, of which he was later found guilty of abuse of office. As interior minister, Tahiri was responsible for the conduct of elections. A corrupt official in this position is detrimental to Albanian politics, as elections are more susceptible to the demands and desires of the politician in charge rather than to the votes of the people. The implications for Albania’s democratic government are therefore greater if this corruption and criminal association between politicians and OCGs have infected the rest of the political system.

The effects of this systemic interaction between corruption and OCGs are seen by Albania’s slow progress towards attaining EU membership. Serbia, another Balkan state that yearns to join the EU, is also facing halted progress due to corruption and poor human rights practices. If Serbia, who is ranked as being less corrupt than Albania, cannot be accepted into the EU without intense negotiations, then Albania’s chances of becoming a member in the near future are slim. While Tirana has made impressive progress towards eradicating organized crime and was granted candidate status in June 2014, the influence of OCGs and the illicit drug trade are still prevalent in many areas of the country. 

The overall rampant corruption and lack of government stability highlight the degree to which the illicit drug trade, through which OCGs operate, is intertwined with Albania’s democratic system. The high level of government corruption not only hinders Albania’s ability to adequately address the ingrained nature of OCGs, but it also impedes the country’s efforts to join the EU, membership that could improve their international standing as well as boost their economy. With an upcoming presidential election in 2022, continued reports of criminal groups infiltrating the government to gain political power do not bode well for Albania, the country’s EU ambitions, nor the rest of the Balkans.

Ideal Geographic Location

Externally, Albania’s unique geographical position at the crossroads between eastern and western Europe enables OCGs to take advantage of both the country’s land and maritime borders to facilitate the transportation of drugs to the rest of the Balkans and greater Europe. Located in the Western Balkans, Albania shares a land border with Montenegro, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Greece, and Italy, and a maritime border with the Adriatic Sea. While other Balkan states such as Croatia and Bosnia also have access to the Adriatic Sea, the sea is heavy utilized by criminal groups in Italy who allegedly have ties to OCGs in Albania in particular and are either bringing drugs to them or picking drugs up. As a narcotics hub, Albanian OCGs have also formed connections with other organizations in Latin America, Central Asia, and Western Europe as a result of easy access routes. These connections allow Albanian OCGs to operate successfully and continue to challenge both Italian and Turkish traffickers even when maritime operations run by local law enforcement attempt to stop them. 

Internally, Albanian OCGs have a strong presence in the port cities of Durres and Vlore where a majority of business occurs and there is established financial infrastructure. The locations of these cities, along the western coastline of the Adriatic Sea, help contribute greatly to smuggling efforts. In February 2018, Albanian law enforcement seized 613 kilograms of cocaine that was concealed in a shipment of bananas headed to Durres from Colombia, a market value of $219.96 million. The use of these port cities as stops in a longer distribution line that connects countries and continents highlights the global reach of these OCGs and the interconnectedness of their relationships with one another. Albania’s particular location makes it an ideal location distribution-wise and source-wise for many OCGs given the wide range of options that can be taken to disseminate the product, whether that be drugs or human beings, to other areas of the world.

Conclusion: Lessons for the Balkans and the EU

Albania’s role as the epicenter of organized crime, and subsequently the illicit drug trade in the region, is a problem pertinent to both the Balkans and the entirety of Europe. Currently, the EU is in the midst of another wave of enlargement, of which it hopes to integrate the remaining Balkan countries in a controversial move according to current member states. Infamously known as the “Colombia of Europe” due to the prevalence of drugs and organized crime in society, Albania’s weak economic system and high level of political corruption, which are aided by their strategic geopolitical location, make it extremely susceptible to the influence of OCGs and makes it even more difficult for them to acquire EU membership. While Albania has made significant progress towards internal reformation, including partnering with the EU to strengthen judicial cooperation and destroying cannabis farms, Albanian OCGs have simply evolved and adapted their methods in response to government actions. This is visible in a report disseminated by the U.S. Department of State, of which the agency concluded that “The Government of Albania made no significant progress toward thwarting money laundering and financial crimes in 2018” despite substantial efforts, and the country still remains extremely vulnerable to money laundering due to corruption and OCGs.

However, the biggest takeaway regarding the proliferation of OCGs in Albania regards what their behavior means for the rest of Europe. While organized crime is not exclusive to Albania and the Balkans, Albania’s existence as the regional “hub” for organized crime and their role as a facilitator for the transnational drug trade should be of great concern to the Albanian government, the Balkans, greater Europe, and even the West. The willingness and ability of Albanian OCGs to successfully cooperate with rival criminal groups in Latin America, Central Asia, and Western Europe demonstrate the scope of the problem, as the desire for profit-making now exceeds the groups’ feelings of rivalry and competition. The global reach of these groups is shared by other OCGs in Europe, which can impede institutional efforts to better the community, a problem that the EU is facing amidst the Brexit debacle and upcoming Parliamentary elections.

Going forward, Albania should keep working on internal structural reform despite the amount of time it will take to fully eradicate the problem. In this case, organized crime groups will continue to pervade every element of society within Albania unless the government amps up its efforts to fight corruption, prevent the perpetuation of unorthodox practice, and boost the economy by investing more in other countries and exporting more products to create more employment opportunities. By engaging more with other regional economies, Albania’s own economy could experience growth and prosper, which would help improve the lives of the country’s impoverished citizens and deter them from joining these OCGs in the first place.

Opium, Stability, and Conflict in Afghanistan

Now it is well known that when there are many of these flowers together their odor is so powerful that anyone who breathes it falls asleep, and if the sleeper is not carried away from the scent of the flowers, he sleeps on and on forever. But Dorothy did not know this, nor could she get away from the bright red flowers that were everywhere about; so presently her eyes grew heavy and she felt she must sit down to rest and to sleep. . . . "If we leave her here she will die," said the Lion. “The smell of the flowers is killing us all.
— The Wonderful Wizard of Oz

Opium, in addition to being the milky white liquid found inside the capsule of the opium poppy flowering plant papaver somniferum, is also the lubricant for the Afghan war economy, which fuels a four decade long conflict that has killed over two million people. Over the last three decades, poppy has become a pillar of the national economy, an adhesive binding the insurgent Taliban to their rural support base, a cancer hobbling the Afghan government’s legitimacy, and a representation of a failed NATO counterinsurgency campaign. As long as top-down policies seeking to curb poppy cultivation fail to interact with the highly localized political economy of the opium market, Afghanistan will continue to face significant threats to national and human security.

Despite its highly local origin as a subsistence crop, opium underpins a vast transnational market steeped in geopolitics and economic globalization. Opium is harvested across rural Afghanistan, namely in the provinces of Helmand and Kandahar, where farmers use small curved blades to ‘mine’ the liquid, which then solidifies to be sold in bulk to local trafficking networks. During the second stage of production, traffickers transport raw opium to laboratories in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia for refinement. These supply networks grew out of the Soviet-Afghan war (1979-1989) when the American and Pakistani intelligence agencies identified the cross-border opium trade as a channel to deliver funds and arms to the anti-Soviet mujahideen. At the peak of the conflict, Pakistan accounted for 70% of the world’s heroin supply. However, the resulting corruption, instability, and public health crisis prompted a government crackdown in the 1990s. Widespread law enforcement action generated the ‘balloon effect,’ a widely observed phenomenon whereby efforts to disrupt supply while keeping demand constant simply ends up exporting illicit markets to neighboring regions with lower production costs. Refinement shifted to Afghanistan and the Former Soviet Union (FSU), where the Russian mafia proved to be an eager partner. Today, chemical firms based in India, China, and the European Union (EU) export the necessary precursors to these labs, such as acetic anhydride, to convert raw opium into opium base, white heroin, and varying degrees of brown heroin. From there, the refined product moves overland towards the Pakistani coast and Turkey, or by air to Abu Dhabi and Sharjah, before reaching cities like London and New York.

Opium is a high value-added industry. According to the UNDP, farmers harvesting poppy receive less than 1% of the profits, with the remaining divided between 2.5% to local dealers, 5% spread across transshipment routes, and more than 90% to established criminal networks in the global north. While the selling price for heroin in a city like Washington, D.C. is fifty times greater than the value received by Afghan farmers, the revenue still represents a crucial lifeline for Afghanistan’s rural poor. In 2000, around one million Afghans generated US$100 million by cultivating poppies. In fact, poppy generates between one third to one half of total GDP, with benefits accruing to both the rural poor who harvest the crop and urban traders who are involved in transshipment. Poppy is much more than a simple economic industry. It stems from a weak formal market, poor post-conflict infrastructure and irrigation (the Soviets devastated agricultural infrastructure during their counterinsurgency operations to deny the mujahideen a sustainable rural support network), weak value-added chains, and an absence of micro-credit strategies. To this day, informal money lenders in rural areas, who provide much needed credit to the agricultural sector, demand guarantees in the form of opium stocks, and many rural households keep their savings in raw opium. Therefore, the Afghan poppy economy represents a complex socioeconomic phenomenon with far-ranging political impacts.

As an important symbol of socio economic issues in Afghanistan, the opium economy was bound to become involved in the country’s many conflicts. In his seminal work, On Guerilla Warfare (论游击战), Mao Tse-Tung defines revolutionary warfare as the combination of guerilla tactics and political ideology, with broad popular support underpinning both. While the Taliban have not always operated as a purely guerilla force, they have used classic insurgent tactics for most of their existence and therefore maintain a complex but deep relationship with their rural Pashtun support base. Despite their conservative zeal and hardline form of governance, the Taliban are major proponents of the opium economy. While the production and use of hashish is strictly forbidden and punished harshly, opium production is justified since heroin is allegedly only “consumed by kafirs [unbelievers] in the West and not by Muslims or Afghans,” according to Abdul Rashid, former head of the Taliban’s anti-drug force in Kandahar province. A cursory glance at heroin addiction rates in Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan dispels this claim, and the true reason for the Taliban’s embrace of the poppy industry is likely a strategic necessity rather than an ideological choice.

When the Taliban first emerged in Kandahar and Helmand provinces in 1994, they opposed poppy cultivation on ideological grounds and banned the activity, resulting in a significant drop in local production. However, the resulting backlash threatened the nascent insurgent group as alienated Pashtun farmers increasingly turned to the powerful Akhundzada power-brokers for protection. The Taliban, fearing the loss of their support base, reversed course and began offering security to farmers in return for zakat, or religious taxes, of up to 20%. During the following years, they became deeply involved in the opium economy, raising revenues of between US$50-200 million annually. Their participation extended across the supply chain. Many fighters provided labor, working part-time as farmers before returning to fight after the spring harvest. Local commanders levied taxes in return for assurances of protection and transnational criminal groups paid a flat rate toll to ensure safe shipment.

The Taliban’s early embrace of the opium economy led to rapid market growth. Licit and illicit markets are fairly similar, and both require stability to operate, which the Taliban provided through harsh yet predictable rule. As they expanded across the country, the risk of predation by capricious warlords fell, encouraging farmers to invest in long term poppy cultivation and traffickers to develop new transshipment routes. This significantly affected the global opium market. From 1992 to 1997, poppy cultivation per hectare in Afghanistan grew by 25% annually. By 1997, Afghanistan surpassed Myanmar as the world’s largest opium producer, accounting for more than 50% of the global supply of heroin at a market value of US$3 billion. However, the Taliban abruptly reversed course in 2000. In a unsuccessful bid to receive international recognition from Western states, Mullah Omar declared a nationwide ban on poppy cultivation, resulting in a dramatic 75% drop in the global supply of heroin. While deeply unpopular, the long-term effects of this policy on Taliban control were interrupted by the 2001 U.S. invasion and removal of the Taliban government.

In post-American invasion Afghanistan, the Taliban, having returned to classic insurgent tactics, use the opium economy to financially and politically sustain their campaign of violence. Opium is their largest revenue stream, accounting for 40-60% of total funds. Beyond direct revenue, the political economy of opium provides them with crucial political capital. Using the same narratives adopted to delegitimize the abusive mujahideen warlords during the 1990s, the Taliban now contrasts itself against the highly corrupt and extractive ruling Afghan government and the overly harsh counternarcotics policies adopted by NATO forces. The Taliban’s shift between banning poppy, supporting it, re-banning it, and supporting it once more appears to be a response to varying degrees of their control over the country. When the Taliban wages insurgent warfare against dominant forces and lacks a comparative advantage in physical resources, it taps into local grievances to win popular support, which in the case of rural Afghanistan, is rooted in the poppy fields. However, once it maintains a monopoly on force and lacks immediate foes, it can afford to take controversial stances like poppy cultivation to achieve external benefits. Therefore, the Taliban’s stance on opium should be seen neither as a function of ideology nor profit seeking behavior, but rather a rational response to structural constraints. Simply put, if the Taliban needs resources and cracking down on the poppy economy is costly, the Taliban will embrace opium.

While the Taliban were quick to realize the importance of cooperating with the opium economy, NATO faced a far steeper learning curve. Early on, they correctly identified economic security as one of the two pillars needed to legitimize Hamid Karzai’s Western-backed transitional government. The opium economy threatened this due to its deleterious effects on good governance and its tradeoff with formal market activity. However, the resulting counternarcotics policies failed to address the importance of poppy cultivation to rural Afghans who as a result, would once again become a crucial support base for the Taliban.

During the initial years following the 2001 invasion, the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) initiated a massive poppy eradication campaign undertaken by DynCorp-trained Afghan security forces. Despite an initial 21% decrease in cultivation by hectare, total opium output only fell by 2%. Success was largely limited to Nangarhar province, while the rest of the country saw widespread unrest in response. In Kandahar province, local backlash put a halt to eradication efforts after only 217 hectares of poppy were destroyed. This pattern continued throughout the duration of the Bush presidency, generating alienation among rural Afghans. Under President Obama, counternarcotics policies were tailored to avoid this backlash by selectively focusing efforts on high-level, Taliban-linked trafficking instead of more widespread, subsistence poppy cultivation. Extremely high levels of corruption in local government doomed the policy from the start. Local power brokers who were assigned by ISAF to implement these strategies were often deeply involved in the opium market themselves and used their newfound power to target their competitors. As a result, the Afghan drug market vertically integrated as local elites consolidated their control over the market and increased their profits. Meanwhile, poor farmers, unable to pay bribes, watched their yearly production and household savings wiped out by eradication efforts.

NATO planners have yet to find a sustainable counternarcotics policy. While poppy cultivation grew significantly under the Taliban government, it boomed following the U.S. invasion. Rare successes occurred when popular local leaders credibly partnered with outside support to suppress poppy cultivation. In Nangarhar province, Governor Haji Din Muhammad and Police Chief Hazrat Ali credibly threatened farmers with jail time to ensure large-scale eradication of poppy fields, resulting in a 96% drop in cultivation. However, coercion is only one side of successful eradication, as provinces with the highest reductions in cultivation, including Nangarhar and Badakhshan, also received the highest amounts of alternative development funds. Even within the development side of counternarcotics, major problems remain. Alternative livelihoods programs, designed to replace poppy cultivation with legal crops, are extremely limited and give little relief to farmers who can see their incomes drop by up to 80%. These programs are designed to start out as quick-impact, cash-for-work projects before evolving into long-term development, but rarely pass the first stage due to insecurity and local corruption. Since many Taliban fighters are part-time laborers, the (overwhelmingly male) workers recruited are no less likely to lay down their arms permanently. High levels of local corruption worsen this trend, since spending on alternative development programs increased in response to upcoming elections, with few incentives to see the projects to completion.  Under NATO administration, a lack of engagement with local political economy and power structures resulted in failed counternarcotics policies across rural Afghanistan with opium production growing steadily as Kabul’s legitimacy plummeted.

At the heart of these problems is government corruption, as Afghan officials are deeply involved in the opium economy. Corruption goes all the way to the top. Until his assassination in 2011, Ahmed Wali Karzai, brother of former President Hamid Karzai, was widely seen by the U.S. government as the key facilitator of the Afghan heroin trade. Government bodies designed to fight drug trafficking, like the Ministry of the Interior, are fully compromised, with one police commander in eastern Afghanistan receiving US$400,000 monthly from heroin smuggling. This widespread graft explains how locally tailored eradication campaigns become tools for criminal expansion. While criminality and corruption can be sources of stability in some parts of the world, as power brokers use their profits to fund public goods, Afghan warlords and government officials are extremely abusive, even by international standards. Afghan elites use the resulting instability for personal benefit. Foreign actors operating in insecure provinces are more dependent on local power brokers while local instability provides a convenient cover for violent criminal expansion. Before his death, Ahmed Wali Karzai and then Governor of Nangarhar province, Gul Agha Sherzai, blamed the Taliban for the wave of assassinations targeting local officials and businessmen, creating a front for the bloody power struggle between them for control over provincial-level illicit networks. Massive government corruption, bolstered by drug trafficking, seriously undermines conflict stabilization efforts by weakening government legitimacy, hobbling the emergent legal system, and leeching off development funds. Worryingly, Afghan populations that report the highest levels of local and national government corruption also exhibit significantly higher support for the Taliban. In fact, the Taliban have recalibrated their messaging in post-invasion rural Afghanistan with a focus on government corruption, promising justice and proper governance in return for support.

Without successful alternative development programs, the security implications of eradication are extremely worrying. Alienated farmers halt intelligence sharing with NATO forces and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). With their economic base eroded, rural communities witness increased competition and conflict over land, water, and humanitarian assistance. When security forces destroy opium stores, representing household savings, deeply indebted farmers resort to selling their daughters as child brides for income or fleeing to Pakistan. Economic refugees fleeing deep rural poverty often end up in camps near the Pakistani border where young men are easily recruited to local madrassas, which serve as crucial recruitment hubs for the Taliban. Therefore, poorly planned eradication campaigns undermine both state and human security.

The international communities’ misfires on counternarcotics policy sacrificed an important opportunity to promote economic development, engage with rural Afghans, and bolster Kabul’s credibility. If the Taliban and the Afghan government reach an agreement under current peace talks, and NATO forces withdraw, the international community has a vested interested in promoting human security in Afghanistan. Even if elites agree to a political compromise, the recent history of the opium economy shows that successful transitions away from poppy require stability at the local level and a broader understanding of local corruption. Colombia’s peace process provides some lessons for how peace agreements can positively transform illicit economies. The international community must walk a fine line between substantial support for rural development and avoid exacerbating corruption at the local level. Here, working on a community-level to engage in visible development could help test models of alternative livelihoods that are gender-inclusive and sustainable before being reproduced at the provincial or national level. Crop substitution must be voluntary and provide ample time for farmers to fully transition. Given the role of local corruption in preventing such policy solutions, the international community must prioritize anti-corruption as part of any development initiatives. All of these require careful considerations of local dynamics, as past initiatives highlighted the perils of well-intentioned national campaigns that backfired spectacularly at the local level. The most important steps to take may begin at home, with Western governments working on reducing heroin demand to drive down profits for trafficking networks and increasing the attractiveness of legal crops. The international community has a strong interest in addressing the severe security and public health threats posed by the global heroin trade. In doing so, security and development experts must keep in mind the overused but relevant adage by Rep. Tip O’Neill, that “all politics is local,” and ensure that efforts to eradicate Afghan poppy cultivation be rooted in broader development and anti-corruption initiatives.