Indonesian Democracy Under Threat

journalofdemocracy.org

Indonesia represents one of the few functioning democracies in Southeast Asia. While its neighbors have languished under military rule, with little representation in government, Indonesia has built a sturdy democratic system that serves its citizens better than it hurts them. According to Freedom House, elections are free and fair, with alleged irregularities in the recent 2019 election being dismissed by the country’s top court. The elections themselves are competitive, with multiple parties representing a variety of interests running in elections and receiving votes in the national parliament. A free and independent press has flourished under a relaxed set of regulations, allowing proper scrutiny of the government and access to high-quality information. While there have been reports of intimidation of journalists, the country has largely allowed for a free press, much to the benefit of the country’s democracy. Peaceful protests have been allowed, albeit with limited outbreaks of violence leading to the use of force by security forces. This was exemplified in 2019, as protesters rallied against new government policy.  Simultaneously, the country faces several challenges, including rampant corruption from businesses, an underrepresentation of minorities in government, excess military involvement in politics, and a judiciary too prone to making decisions informed by religious beliefs.

However, as this paper will argue, the biggest challenge facing Indonesian democracy is that of its reckless President Joko Widodo. While initially a marker of continuous democratic elections with his election in 2014 and reelection in 2019, he has shown himself to be incredibly power hungry, pushing for electoral reform that would allow him to seek a third term as President. This is specifically barred by the constitution and would represent a massive setback in the country’s democracy.  As such This paper will argue that Joko Widodo represents the biggest threat to Indonesian democracy and should be barred from seeking a third term. Though he has been a monumental force for the country, pushing through massive investment in infrastructure, serving to bolster the country’s economy and making it a regional power, his power-craven ambitions have stained his legacy, and more concerningly, threaten to upend a flawed, yet massive democracy.

Indonesian sovereignty, like much of the developing world, was born out of a long history of colonial rule and exploitation. The British and Dutch arrived in the 16th century, establishing trading ports, and representing colonial expansion into Southeast Asia. The Dutch then obtained full control over the region, suppressing the local population, often brutally. Fraught relations between the colonizers and colonized people of Indonesia sparked frequent rebellion throughout the course of Dutch rule, particularly on the island of Java. The outbreak of World War II served to upend Dutch control of the region. While initially falling under the occupation of the Japanese as they moved to conquer Asia, their loss in the war prompted calls for formal independence from the Dutch. The rich ethnic diversity of Indonesia that had long divided the island along ethnic lines united in their opposition to colonial control and advocated for their freedom. Under mounting international pressure, the Dutch chose to relinquish control of the island, giving the island it’s freedom for the first time in nearly 400 years.  

In the aftermath of World War II, Sukarno emerged as the country’s leader, inciting nationalist rhetoric that inspired the islands people to resist Dutch attempts to reestablish their control. As such, he was proclaimed President in 1945. Democratic aspirations were strengthened when the constitution was drafted that same year, establishing a formal separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. This mirrored other major democracies and inspired hope for a free Indonesia. However, this hope dwindled as the years progressed. Sukrarno, a once democrat that united the various ethnic groups of Indonesia, slowly evolved into an authoritarian, working to consolidate power in the executive branch and aligned himself with Islamist forces as well as the military. Despite term limits being imposed by a Constitution Sukarno helped to draft, he held office for more than 22 years. Sukrarno resisted calls for parliamentary elections until 10 years after the country’s constitution had been written. In 1955, when election finally occurred, split results amongst voters for the parliament gave way for Sukarno to dissolve parliament, further concentrating the power of the Presidency. This furthered popular disapproval of Sukrano’s rule, and delegitimized the democracy he had promised to his people. However, his main challenge came from an alliance he had bounded between a host of opposing forces. The main two factions he had aligned himself with were the Communist Party of Indonesia, or PKI, and the military, both of whom felt threatened by the other. Increasing Sukarno allegiances with the PKI threatened the military’s power, causing an attempted coup in 1965. With Sukarno’s power weakened, he ceded power to General Suharto, who let the armed forces. Under his rule, he undertook an anti-communist purge, which was aimed at rooting out all communist presence in Indonesia. 

During the purge, it’s estimated that between 500,000 and 1,000,000 people were killed, in a horribly brutal display of authoritarian force. Under Suharto’s rule, opposition parties were delegitimized in elections, with the army playing a pivotal role in all forms of government. Backed by the United States, Suharto made Indonesia a hub for foreign direct investment, which led to increased urbanization and modernization of the country’s economy. While political representation was stifled and limited, Indonesians remained supportive of Suharto because of the economic prosperity that occurred over the course of his rule. However, his tenure was indeed marred by the brutality of opposition parties and figures, as well as increased military involvement in the political system, as well as heavy corruption from outside business interests. The 1997 Asian financial crisis brought Indonesia’s spiraling economic growth to a halt, and forced Suharto to leave power after 32 years as President.  In the aftermath of the Suharto presidency, a number of Constitutional reforms were undertaken, aimed at increasing the separations of power between the three branches of government. It cemented regular elections with term limited presidents into the constitution. It also increased regional autonomy throughout the country, which was virtually non-existent under the dictatorships of the 20th century. Following the 1998 reforms, regular elections commenced in 2004, and have occurred every 5 years since then. Though the system has been critiqued for a lack of representation of minorities and persistent corruption from outside forces, the system has guaranteed electoral rights to hundreds of millions and have facilitated regular competitive elections, both of which are informed by a free press. Economic prosperity over the same democratic period has flourished, serving to further legitimize the political system.

In 2014, the country elected Joko Widodo, who has been the country’s longest serving President in the democratic period. He ran for and won re-election in 2019, with his fresh five-year term due to be up in 2024. However, Widodo has expressed interest in extended his term past the constitutionally mandated period of two five-year terms, culminating in a 10-year term in office if fulfilled, as Widodo is likely to do. There has been discussion amongst political leaders of either delaying the scheduled 2024 election or removing the two-year term limit in the constitution. Either scenario is equally as dangerous for Indonesian democracy. What is more concerning is that the idea is being propagated by political leaders other than Widodo and has tentative support from the Indonesian population given Widodo’s popularity. The rationale given for such a dramatic move is economic – the country wanned under the COVID-19 pandemic and Widodo is viewed as the best person to lead the recovery effort. Democracy has already stagnated under Widodo – the military has increased their role in politics, reminiscent of past dictatorial trends, and individual freedoms have been limited via legislation he has signed into law, such as giving the military more power in his government and drastically limiting the freedoms of the LGBTQIA+ community. Allowing Widodo to seek a third term in office sets a dangerous precedent in a country with a deep authoritarian past. Increasing their dependency on Widodo only furthers his grip on the political system, and could legitimize him to seek further years of the Presidency. Others in his circle have also raised the idea of having the legislature elect the President in the future, rolling back a key tenant of the 1998 reforms that allowed the populace to directly vote for the executive. Widodo has overseen a country that has backslid massively and has the chance to further erode its democracy should he try to extend his term.

In conclusion, Widodo’s efforts to lengthen his stay in office follow a string of actions that have weakened Indonesian democracy. He must be barred from seeking a third term if the country is to stay free.

Constitutional Amendments and the Future Political Course of the Russian Federation

Constitutional Amendments

On January 15, 2020, Russian President Vladimir Putin of Russia gave his yearly address to lawmakers. In his speech, Putin, without warning, proposed a series of changes to the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Some of the proposed changes include increasing the power of the lawmakers in selecting the Prime Minister and Cabinet-level positions. Currently, lawmakers only confirm the President’s nomination for the post of the Prime Minister and no other high-level post is subject to lawmakers’ confirmation. Under Putin’s proposed changes, lawmakers would have the power to nominate and confirm their choice for Prime Minister and other high-ranking cabinet positions. Furthermore, the President would not be able to reject the lawmakers’ choice.

Furthermore, Putin proposed putting a constitutional limit on the influence of international law in Russia. Essentially, Putin suggested that if international law was found to be in violation of the Russian constitution, then the international law would be nullified. In another law-related amendment, Putin floated the idea of increasing the power of the Constitutional Court. The proposed change would give the President the power to request that the Constitutional Court examine the constitutionality of any legislation before it is signed into law by the President. 

Additionally, Putin suggested two amendments that would change certain eligibility requirements that have to do with holding high office in Russia. First, the residency requirements would be increased for candidates for President from 10 to 25 years. Second, members of the Duma, the Federation Council, Ministers, and judges would be prohibited from having dual citizenship or other long-term residency documents of another country.

Some other notable proposals in Putin’s address included providing a guarantee that the minimum wage and pension will remain above the poverty line, prohibiting any future President from occupying the post of President for more than two terms, and strengthening the status and role of the Government Council.

In Putin’s speech to lawmakers, he stated that “these amendments do not fundamentally change the Constitution and thus, can be adopted by the parliament. However, I consider it right to hold a referendum on all suggested amendments and only after the results of the referendum adopt the amendments.”  However, despite rumors that a national referendum on the constitutional amendments will be held in May, as of now no details have been released. 

The proposed amendments constitute one of the largest domestic political events in the Putin era. However, following Putin’s address to lawmakers, another earthquake shook the Russian political scene. Dmitry Medvedev, Putin’s Prime Minister, announced his resignation. Medvedev’s resignation meant that the entire ministerial cabinet would also resign. Sources within the Russian government told Novaya Gazeta, a prominent Russian newspaper, that resignation of the cabinet was a complete surprise even at the highest levels of government. Medvedev stated that he considered his resignation to be the proper action in the context of Putin’s proposed constitutional changes.

Appointment of Mikhail Mishustin as Prime Minister

Immediately following Medvedev’s resignation, Putin appointed a new Prime Minister, Mikhail Mishustin. Mishustin was confirmed as Prime Minister on January 16 with a vote of 383-41. Previously, Mishustin was the head of Russia’s federal tax service since 2010 but he has not played a role in national-level politics until now. 

A comparison can be drawn between Mishustin’s sudden elevation to the national political sphere and Anton Vaino’s similar unexpected rise to prominence. In August 2016, Anton Vaino replaced long-time Putin ally, Sergey Ivanov, as the Presidential Chief of Staff. Before Vaino was appointed to this position, he was the head of Protocol, and before that he held a series of technocratic positions within the Russian government.  At the time of Vaino’s appointment, analysts noted that Vaino was known for his competence as a bureaucrat and that, unlike the man he replaced, Vaino had no independent power of his own. Vaino's appointment suggested that Putin was clearing ‘the old-guard’ out and replacing them with efficient technocrats who would be able to competently pursue his agenda without developing any sort of independent influence. 

Mishustin also has a technocratic background and is known for his competence. Before becoming the head of Russia’s federal tax service, he had a long career in a series of low-profile bureaucratic positions mostly relating to taxes. During Mishustin’s tenure as head of the federal tax service, he led an extremely ambitious modernization of Russia’s tax collection methods. He focused on digitizing the process of collecting taxes with the goal of increasing efficiency in order to increase overall revenue. The Federal Tax Service is now widely considered to be the most technologically advanced department of the Russian government. Mishustin’s efforts succeeded. Due to increased efficiencies, the total amount of taxes collected has risen 33 times faster than the rate of GDP growth. 

The parallels between Mishustin and Viano suggest that Putin appointed Mishustin to execute his agenda between now and 2024, as well as guarantee that whoever holds the post as Prime Minister could not challenge Putin before or replace him after 2024. 

Mishustin’s background as an efficient money-manager is also worth noting, particularly in light of some of Putin’s domestic political challenges. Sources close to Putin’s government told the Russian newspaper, Komersant, that the shakeup of the government could be related to budgetary issues facing Russia in recent years. Putin has proposed and instituted a series of ambitious social-economic initiatives which will require serious government expenditures. There has traditionally been resistance to these expenditures within some blocks of the government. When Andrey Isaev, a Duma Deputy, asked Mishustin where he planned to get the resources to fund the initiatives of the President, Mishustin simply replied: “The resources exist.” Overall, it seems that Mishustin, with his reputation as a technocratic problem solver, was brought in to execute Putin’s national projects without dissent.

Putin is Feeling Domestic Pressure

 Mishustin’s appointment as Prime Minister along with some of the language in Putin’s address to lawmakers could suggest that he is feeling the public’s call for the government to do more to raise living standards. At the beginning of his address, Putin stated that “today in our society, there has been a clear demand for change.”  Although Putin’s popularity according to the Levada Center (one of Russia’s only public opinion polling organizations) has been stable at around 69 percent since July of 2019, in recent years there has been a series of protest movements that have called attention to poor living and economic conditions in the country. 

In June 2018, the Russian government announced a proposal to increase the retirement age from 60 to 65 for men and from 55 to 63 for women. This proposal was met with widespread popular disapproval and protests erupted in over 80 different cities in Russia. In August of 2018, protests also erupted in cities across Northwest Russia after it was discovered that the government was building a massive landfill in an abandoned town northeast of Moscow. Waste from Moscow would be dumped in this landfill and there were fears among locals that this would lead to an ecological disaster. Additionally, in February of 2017 in response to a proposed increase in the taxes paid by truck drivers who drive on federal roads, Russian truckers went on strike for 10 days. These policy changes were proposed to raise revenues or decrease costs to the federal government. Since 2014, Russia has suffered under western sanctions and combined with the pressure of an aging population and significant expenditures on the modernization of the military, Russia finds itself cash-strapped. Putin’s appointment of Mishustin can be interpreted as an effort to improve Russia’s financial situation so that it can provide the services and benefits that the Russian populace desires. 

What Does This Reveal About Putin’s Political Future?

Putin’s current term as president will end in 2024 and it seems unlikely at this point that he will run for a fifth term. However, it is widely accepted that Putin has no intention of stepping away from politics or power come 2024. Thus, it has been expected for quite some time that Putin would find some way to ensure that he would maintain a position of power post-2024. 

The predictions regarding Putin’s possible methods to preserve his influence have varied dramatically. Some have predicted that Putin intends to become the President of a new country that would be formed by combining Russia and Belarus. Some have forecasted that Putin will follow Nursultan Nazarbayev’s, the former President of Kazakhstan, example of stepping down from the presidency but maintaining power by becoming chairman for life of the Security Councils of Kazakhstan. 

Regardless of the path that Putin takes, if the proposed amendments pass, the next Russian President will have significantly less power than the office has today. And many of the proposed amendments, like the following, could be used to centralize Putin’s power and ensure that no political opponents could challenge him. 

• Limiting the influence of international law: Russia has often emphasized that “western, democratic capitalism” is not the proper style of governance for every country. This constitutional change could codify this ideology and empower Putin even further to use authoritarian measures to maintain power. 

• Increasing the power of the Courts: The Russian court system is notoriously vulnerable to political influence. Freedom House gave the Russian court system a score of 1 out of a possible 4, stating that “The judiciary lacks independence from the executive branch, and career advancement is effectively tied to compliance with Kremlin preferences. The Presidential Personnel Commission and court chairmen control the appointment and reappointment of the country’s judges, who tend to be promoted from inside the judicial system rather than gaining independent experience as lawyers.” A more powerful court system that is easily influenced could be an ideal means for Putin to exert power after he moves on from the office of the Presidency. 

• The increasing residency requirements and prohibition of dual citizens: This measure helps guarantee that prominent Russian exiles cannot return and run for political office. Furthermore, this gives the Kremlin an excuse to disqualify individuals that have been educated, or spent extended periods of time in the West, and thus are more likely to hold liberal values, from seeking government jobs or elected positions. 

• Codifying a two-term limit for the office of the Presidency: This guarantees that no individual can acquire the same degree of long-term power to challenge Putin. 

What to Watch For

There are few times in recent memory that the political future of the Russian Federation has been as uncertain as it is now. However, there are a couple of overarching themes to watch out for in the coming weeks and months. 

• Putin will act to preserve his position of power: Any reforms proposed by Putin should be analyzed through the paradigm of Putin’s self-interest. To ascertain why the Government of Russia undertakes a course of action, examine how Putin could benefit.

• Prepare for unexpected changes in the Russian Government. Even the most attentive of Russia watchers were taken completely by surprise by the timing of this dramatic shakeup. Reports in the Russian press state that even the highest levels of the Russian government were unaware of these proposed changes. 

• Examine the backgrounds of the new ministerial cabinet members when they are announced. If the appointees have similar technocratic, low-profile backgrounds like Mishustin, this could indicate that Putin is attempting to further centralize power while also building a team that can deliver on Putin’s ambitious social-economic plans.

• Expect the Russian government to institute reforms with the aim of cutting costs and increasing the services provided to the Russian populace.

What's Next? A Recap of Israel's Elections and What Lies Ahead

 It is unlikely, but not impossible, that Israel will return for the third round of elections this year, with the most likely outcome being a unity government with power-sharing between Blue and White and Likud, with Yisrael Beytenu leader Avigdor Liberman maintaining a senior cabinet position. It remains to be seen whether Blue and White leader Benny Gantz will give up his opposition to splitting the premiership while Likud Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is under indictment, or whether Likud will buck Netanyahu as the head of their party in order to form a government.  

On October 24, 2019, it was announced that Netanyahu and Gantz will meet in the near future to discuss the possibility of forming a unity government. After Netanyahu’s failure to form a coalition, President Reuven Rivlin has tasked Gantz with doing so. Blue and White has said that Gantz has spoken with each of the leaders of the various factions elected to the Knesset. Likud confirmed there would be a meeting between Gantz and Netanyahu, but Netanyahu would be negotiating on behalf of the bloc of right-wing and religious parties loyal to him and stressed he would not enter a coalition without those 55 members behind him. Blue and White previously rejected this negotiation. 

The Knesset is Israel’s unicameral parliament which is made up of 120 lawmakers. The prime minister is the coalition leader of the Knesset, generally the head of the party with the greatest number of seats. In an election, voters vote for a party rather than individual candidates, with seats in the Knesset apportioned according to the percentage of votes each party receives in the election. After the election, a coalition government must be formed by the elected representatives in the Knesset. A ruling coalition generally must have at least 61 members to ensure a majority of the 120 seats, though it is possible to form a “minority government” with less than 61 seats, provided opposition parties approve the coalition from the outside. 

The president of Israel formally asks whichever party leader he or she feels is most likely to be successful in forming a government to attempt to form a governing coalition. Since no party has ever achieved a 61-vote majority on its own, they have always relied on other parties to join the coalition. Following the September 17th election, President Rivlin gave Netanyahu the first mandate to form a government, which lasted 28 days and ended on October 21st when Netanyahu returned the mandate, having failed to form a coalition. 

The 22nd Knesset was elected on September 17th, 2019 and features nine political parties, represented by 120 members of Parliament. There are three main political groupings: Blue and White, Likud, and Orthodox parties. Blue and White, with 33 seats, is a newly formed party led by formed Israel Defense Force (IDF) Chief of Staff Benny Gantz, a political neophyte who ran on a centrist platform primarily against perceived corruption by Netanyahu and his government. Gantz pledged on the campaign trail that he would not form a government with Netanyahu, who will soon face indictment on several alleged corruption cases. Next is Likud with 31 seats. Likud is Prime Minister Netanyahu’s party and is the largest right-wing party in Israel. The party remains committed to keeping Netanyahu in office despite the pending indictments. Finally, there are 17 seats held by two primary Orthodox parties: Shas and United Torah Judaism (UTJ). Shas has previously joined coalitions led by Likud, supporting Netanyahu in the elections. The party has no stance on a two-state solution, and they lean right on other social issues. On the other hand, UTJ is a non-Zionist faction which does not endorse the creation of a secular Jewish state, but which supported Netanyahu in the elections.

Additionally, there are also other factions playing a role in the elections. Joint List, with 13 seats, is a unified ticket of four major Israeli Arab parties that have become the third-largest faction of the Knesset. There is the communist party Hadash, the secular Arab interest party Ta’al, the conservative Islamist United Arab List, and the nationalist Balad party. Then there are Left-wing Zionist parties with 11 total seats. The Israeli political left is represented by the Labor-Gesher and the Democratic Camp, two smaller parties who adhere to leftist domestic and foreign policies but also embrace Zionism as opposed to the Joint List which is generally anti-Zionist and made up of majority Arab-Israeli parties. There is also Yamina with seven seats, which is a united list of right-wing parties who are in support of Netanyahu, and Yisrael Beiteinu with 8 seats. Yisrael Beiteinu is the right-wing political party led by Liberman that was founded to represent the concern of Israel’s million-plus Russian-speaking immigrant community. The party is a proponent of Lieberman’s plan to achieve a two-state solution, which calls for Israel to annex large parts of the West Bank in Israel that are predominantly Arab.

To summarize all of the competing parties, the Israel Policy Forum groups them into three blocs. The first is the pro-Netanyahu bloc, which is a united front of right-wing and ultra-Orthodox parties that has 55 total seats. The second bloc is comprised of a group of centrist, left-wing Zionist and Arab political parties that oppose Netanyahu with a total of 57 seats. The last bloc is Yisrael Beiteinu who controls eight seats and whose secularist leader Liberman has pledged not to sit in a coalition that includes either the religious parties or the Arab ones. In all, there are four potential outcomes to the elections: a unity government (Gantz, Netanyahu, Liberman); a unity government minus Netanyahu (with Gantz, Gideon Saar, Liberman); a Minority government with Gantz, Liberman, and Arab parties in minority, or a bloc of the left and religious parties. 

A unity government between Kachol Lavan (33 seats), Likud (32 seats), and Yisrael Beiteinu (eight seats) would total 73 seats. This would require compromises from both Likud and Kachol Lavan. Netanyahu and Likud would be required to cede control over the right-wing “bloc,” the smaller parties the prime minister is currently negotiating on behalf of. There is also President Rivlin’s proposal, which calls for a rotating premiership, something Kachol Lavan adamantly opposed on the campaign trail. Mr. Netanyahu would serve as prime minister first, but if charged, he would declare himself incapacitated while he sorted out his legal troubles. Mr. Gantz would then serve as acting prime minister with full powers. Finally, there is Liberman’s plan, which is somewhat like Rivlin's proposal. Like Rivlin, Liberman calls for a rotating premiership between Netanyahu and Gantz. However, Liberman’s plan would also require Netanyahu to back out of an agreement with the religious right-wing bloc. These parties (Shas, United Torah Judaism, and the Ayelet Shaked-led Yamina alliance) could only join the government later based on agreements that the three parties will have to reach amongst themselves. As a part of his plan, Liberman also hopes for this unity government to focus on two key issues. First, he wishes to reach an agreement with Likud and Kahol Lavan to pass a law that would force ultra-Orthodox yeshiva students to draft into the military and nix a law that would keep supermarkets close on Shabbat. Second, Lieberman wants the parties to discuss minimizing budgets, raising taxes and finding a permanent solution for the situation in the Gaza Strip. 

For a unity government without Netanyahu, there would be Gantz, Gideon Saar, and Liberman. Theoretically, Likud could have joined a unity government without Netanyahu and with Kachol Lavan.  However, the party supported the prime minister’s push for new elections instead. Likud MKs like Gideon Saar and Michal Shir, perceived as critical of Netanyahu, ultimately voted in favor of dissolving the Knesset and moving to new elections. 

Gantz could form a minority government with Liberman and Arab parties in the minority. Likud said in its campaign that both Liberman and Joint List chairman Ayman Odeh had spoken about recommending Gantz as prime minister. However, a government that includes both those parties, which despise each other, seems impossible. Liberman has said he won’t join a coalition with the Arab parties, and most factions within the Joint List reacted with outrage to Odeh’s comment about possible political cooperation with Gantz. Gantz has the option of forming a minority government with outside support from the Arab parties — a course advocated by Democratic Camp’s Ehud Barak — but neither side would be thrilled with that arrangement and the resulting government would be on extremely shaky ground. 

A coalition government between the Left and Religious blocs is unlikely, but at this point could very well be possible. The question remains what would it take to get the left-wing bloc without the Arab parties, but concessions to get the orthodox parties onboard? One option could be for the ultra-Orthodox parties to join Gantz, Labor-Gesher and the Democratic Camp. Similar center-left governments with the Haredi parties existed in Israel decades ago, but Shas and United Torah Judaism (UTJ) have in recent decades become automatic supporters of Likud. UTJ already declared it stood by Likud “all the way.” Another problem is that as it stands, those parties seem to add up to a very narrow majority — not a recipe for a stable coalition.  

Israel is returning for the third round of elections, signaling a second failure by Netanyahu to form a government, as well as a failure by Gantz in his first test as a political leader. The responsibility to form a unity government shifted to Gantz and he had 28 days to do so. The 28 days passed and no coalition was formed, so a third election is the last resort. If Gantz couldn’t form a government within his allotted time, the president also had the option to hand the task to Parliament, giving lawmakers an additional 21 days to come up with a candidate who can command a majority. Many thought this was the more likely option, as no one desired another election. Netanyahu was also reliant on the fact that the public and political pressure to avoid a third election would have persuaded the half-dozen additional lawmakers, whose support he needed, to come to his side. 

Israel could have avoided the third round of elections if any of the major parties dropped their necessary conditions for an agreement: Likud’s retention of Netanyahu as head of the party, Gantz’s refusal to share the premiership with Netanyahu under indictment, and Liberman’s refusal to serve with the Arab parties. As a dual kingmaker and spoiler, Lieberman will likely prevail with his demands.  

The early polls for the third Israeli election in the span of a year, scheduled for March 2, 2020, predict another inconclusive result: that is, neither the Center-Left-Arab bloc (to the extent that such a thing actually exists) nor the Right-Religious bloc, minus Avigdor Liberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu party, are expected to win a majority in the Knesset. Likud and Kachol Lavan are still in a horse race with the latter having a slight edge. There will be nearly three months of campaigning, which can always make a difference, but if the election were held today the needle would barely move.

Israeli politics should not be where it is today. The second election was an unnecessary embarrassment, brought on by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s refusal to play by the same rules applied to his immediate predecessor, Ehud Olmert, and the prospect of a third vote is out-and-out shameful for the very same reason: think what you will of Kachol Lavan’s inconsistent and muddled negotiating strategy, it is Netanyahu’s insistence on serving as prime minister through at least the early stages of an indictment while requesting the Knesset grant him immunity, that has prevented a new coalition from being formed. Gantz has a slight advantage in the blame game, but the anger that may erupt with the dissolution of the twenty-second Knesset (perhaps exacerbated by President Reuven Rivlin’s intervention, in which he blamed both sides equally) can turn on anyone in a volatile news cycle.

Hope, Fear and the Unknown in Thailand’s Upcoming Elections

This March, Thailand is scheduled to have their first elections since the military coup of 2014. As the election date approaches, there is hesitation on the legitimacy of the voting process that will occur in the coming weeks. Thailand has experienced multiple coups, this one being the twelfth successful instance  since 1932. The most notable ones occured in 1991, 2006, and with the most recent coup occuring in 2014. Since the 2014 military coup, norms and expected behaviors have not followed the previous pattern of the other military takeovers. The typical script being: coup takes over power, control over broadcasting and media entities, a parade of military power, and then the drafting of a new constitution with promises of elections within a year. However, the transitional government established after the 2014 coup was unprepared, taking five years before scheduled elections - which are officially scheduled for Sunday, March 24, 2019.

The history of Thailand’s government and civil society is one still trying to figure itself out – constantly tilting from dictatorial conservatism and democratic rule. Thailand has brought forth the vibrant democratic values seen in the 1997 Constitution. However much civil progress has receded in the past 20 years with Thailand now shifting more towards authoritarianism.

A key player in Thai politics is Thaksin Shinawatra, the influential leader of the Pheu Thai Party and former prime minister. Thaksin was elected as prime minister in 2001 and represented an unprecedented victory in elections. Thaksin came into power by optimizing elector support, a seeming obvious in politics, however a tool that went unused and propelled him to the highest office. After the victory in 2001, the Pheu Thai party has won the past five elections only to be forcibly removed by courts or Thai military in 2006 and 2014. The Pheu Thai Party is known for authoritarian practices, dismissal of checks and balances, and human rights violations. The 2006 coup, also known as the ‘good coup’ was an attempt to re-democratize Thailand, however, the 2011 election of Thaksin’s sister, Yingluck Shinawatra brought back the authoritarian practices that lead to the 2014 coup. Both Thaksin and Yingluck are in self-imposed exile, however, Thaksin’s influence in Thai politics is still seen today. The newest Constitution, a product of the 2014 coup, has attempted to remove the influence of elected officials and place more power into the hands of the military.

It is important mentioning that other motivations for this upcoming election might have, in part, to do with Thailand hosting the 2019 Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit this June. Placing Thailand on an international stage will invite international attention and scrutiny if these upcoming elections go poorly.

The Political Parties and Presidential Candidates:

The belief that this election will be any different from the past is hopeful yet hesitant. The political map of Thailand is currently being contested by three key parties as the elections will be held on March 24th. The suffrage age is 18 in Thailand and it is a compulsory system.

Palang Pracharat Party is the current political party in power, led by current Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha and backed by the military. This party was established in 2018. Along with Mr. Prayuth, deputy prime minister Somkid Jatusripitak and party leader Uttama Savanayana will have their names on the ballot in the general election.  Leaders of this party lead the 2014 coup and have been pushing the election date farther back in order to ensure fair elections as well as for their own benefit as they gain political support.

Pheu Thai Party’s The political ties to the controversial former of prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra is both damaging and attracting depending on the point of view. The party, however, picked Viroj Pao-in as the representative for the general election.

Thai Raksa Chart party has connections to the Pheu Thai party as well as to former exiled prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra. The Raksa party is preparing to nominate Princess Ubolratana, the older sister of King Vajiralongkorn. She was stripped of her royal title when she married an American, so notions against speaking ill of Thai royalty/sacred monarchy no longer apply to the princess. King Vajiralongkorn decreed that her bid was ‘inappropriate.’ The combination of her royal past and her connection to Thaksin made her an unpredictable candidate both in intention and popularity in turning the election in her favor. Ubolratana was disqualified from the elections by the election commission and the Thai Raksa Chart party is now in process of termination via the election commission requesting the constitutional court to officially dissolve the party. The Court is expected to rule against Thai Raksa Chart.

Democrat Party is currently being lead by former prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva who served from 2008 to 2011. Unique to Vejjajiva was that he was born in the United Kingdom and Western educated. He is known for being outspoken on corruption and authoritarian rule. It is believed that the Democrat party is the least popular among the key players and compromised/concessions would have to be made in order for the party to rise to power.

Assuming, free and fair elections, it is hard to say who will win the majority in the elections. With the current actions of the Thai government, even the legitimacy of elections is in question. The incumbent power and revised constitution give the military or Palang Pracharat Party more of an advantage, especially if the Thai Raksa party is officially dissolved and ineligible to enter new candidates in the election. The nomination of Princess Ubolratana of the Thai Raksa party and her connection with Thaksin and Pheu Thai party made her an unpredictable candidate and inherent threat to the Palang Pracharat Party. With Ubolratana now not a contending candidate, the influence of the military in current government and media outlets, the likelihood of current prime minister, Prayuth Chan-ocha of the Palang Pracharat Party to remain in power is shaping up to be the result. Which begs the question - is this democracy?

Conclusion

The Thai people have experienced constant frustration in the lack of true representation as well as corruption within Thai politics. Elections are not going smoothly. Since the beginning of 2019, protests have sprung up in an attempt to raise awareness on constant delaying of elections; Thai military has suspended a TV station critical of the military and the expected dissolution of a major contending political party. Free and fair elections are critical in developing a true democracy. At the core of this is the dismissal and denial of civil rights given to the Thai people under a ‘democratic rule’. In a Democracy, the citizens are the most important political actors in the state. In Thailand, citizens are becoming increasingly irrelevant and disregarded as political actors. As these power politics play out, hope, fear and the unknown remain as Thailand heads to the polls.

Kyrgyzstan’s Electoral Dilemma

Between Kyrgyzstan declaring its independence in 1991 and 2016, the Central Asian republic has had three presidents. However, only one was elected into office. The following two were installed as part of a transition government following the First and Second Tulip Revolution in 2005 and 2010, respectively. The First Tulip Revolution was over fixed, disputed election results. It resulted in a transition government led by the opposition party’s leader Kurmanbek Bakiyev. Yet just five years later, the Kyrgyz people became fed up with Bakiyev’s complacency with government corruption, nepotism, and stagnation with opposition parties. He was continuing many of the same practices as that of his predecessor, causing discontent among the Kyrgyz public. Protesters stormed government buildings throughout southern Kyrgyzstan and a few days later, the Presidential Palace in the country’s capital Bishkek. The First Tulip Revolution was bloodless, while the Second left between 40 and 100 dead. It set a precedent for the former Soviet republic that only revolution could create change. Democracy was a dream that had yet to be realized.

The democratic dream gained some breath this past October in Kyrgyzstan’s first competitive elections since its independence. Almazbek Atambayev was succeeded by Sooronbay Jeenbekov in the country’s first peaceful transition of power. Jeenbekov is the former prime minister of Kyrgyzstan, having served from April 2016 to August 2017, when he was nominated by the ruling Social Democrat Party to run as their presidential candidate. His main rival was Omurek Babanov, a millionaire businessman-turned-politician who leads the Respublika opposition party who also served as prime minister from December 2011 to September 2012. They were joined on the campaign trail by nine other candidates – including one woman. Jeenbekov relied on his close relations with Atambayev, who personally endorsed him. The president-elect vowed on the trail to continue the policies pursued by Atambayev. Babanov, meanwhile, promised “a crackdown on corruption, constitutional reform to reintroduce presidential rule, and more effective foreign policy.” In a turnout of 56%, Jeenbekov received 54% of the casted votes, thereby making a runoff election with Babanov unnecessary. However, not all are completely satisfied with the election results. The October elections were a success in that they created a peaceful transition of power from one president to another, although Kyrgyzstan has much to work on to become a full-fledged, liberal democracy.

In the run-up to the election, the campaign trails encountered several snags that worried voters and international observers over the legitimacy and peacefulness of the elections. Yet international observers including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) noted instances of abuse of public resources, pressure on voters, and vote buying in the weeks and months leading up to the election. The OSCE also wrote in the same report how registration laws to run for president “provide overly broad grounds for candidate deregistration, despite previous OSCE/ODIHR recommendations.” The OSCE additionally concurred with “concerns, noting that while technical aspects were ‘well-administered,’ and that candidates could campaign freely, public resources were misused in the run-up to the election.” In other words, while all candidates were able to freely advertise their campaign without censorship, teachers and government officials were forced to support Jeenbekov. Lastly, Kyrgyz citizens living abroad were denied the right to vote – omitting thousands of voters. Thus, while Kyrgyzstan has set itself apart from its more authoritarian neighbors, the country’s electoral system has many flaws that need to be improved.

The situation became even tenser after Babanov, who once resided in Kazakhstan, met in September with Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev. During the meeting, Babanov mentioned that the Kyrgyz people “appreciate and support the peacemaking efforts” of President Nazarbayev. By painting Nazarbayev as the hero, Babanov simultaneously showed himself as the representative of Kyrgyzstan and outmaneuvered the sitting president Almazbek Atambayev. In other words, Babanov began acting as president before being elected. President Atambayev railed against him and “publicly deplored the alleged Kazakh meddling in Kyrgyz internal affairs, pointing to the Kazakh government’s control.” The blunder dealt a political deathblow to Babanov’s campaign and sparked a standoff between the two Central Asian states. After Atambayev’s remarks, Kazakhstan on October 10 reintroduced border controls and customs checks to Kyrgyzstan and partially suspended the import of dairy products, which was then followed by the Kyrgyz parliament voting “to rescind an agreement to receive $100 million from Kazakhstan…. It is an ‘own goal’ of epic proportions.” The move is likely only going to hurt Kyrgyzstan more than Kazakhstan. The former desperately needs to grow its domestic industry and economy, which would have been aided by Kazakhstan’s aid. Currently Kyrgyzstan is one of the most remittance-dependent countries in the world (30% of the GDP in 2016, estimated at 37.1% for 2017). Bishkek joined the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in 2015 as a way to integrate its economy with those of its more developed neighbors. However, this standoff with Kazakhstan has raised questions over Kyrgyzstan’s future with the EEU. That being said, since its citizens are so dependent on foreign income, the chances of Bishkek leaving is minimal. Nonetheless, Radio Free Europe writes how this dispute highlights “the weakness of the Russian- and Kazakh-led [EEU].”

        On October 15, Election Day finally arrived. Polls opened and closed with few problems reported across the country. The Diplomat reports, “The election itself proceeded peacefully in most localities except Osh, the second-largest city in the country, and Jeenbekov’s home region. Here, it was marred by allegations of ballot destruction, intimidation, and violence towards reporters.” Jeenbekov began his political career in Osh, which raises question if there is any significance in this correlation. However, there is no information as to why only Osh experienced these issues. Nonetheless, they were not enough to warrant the elections invalid. Babanov accepted the results at a press conference where he said, “The people have made their choice,” but also adding, “State television channels were used to pour dirt on us. There was a black PR [campaign] against us. Our campaign activists were abused; they did not know whom to turn to as law enforcement was also one-sided.” While Babanov’s backhanded concession speech was just a small part of a brutal election campaign, the Kyrgyz election has its merits. Of the five Central Asian states that were once part of the Soviet Union, this marks the first peaceful transition of power from one president to another through the form of an election. Artur Gerasymov, Head of the OSCE delegation observing the elections, called the election “an important benchmark for the Kyrgyz Republic…. I hope that the positive developments we have seen will serve as the basis for a consolidation of democracy in this country and in the region.” That being said, Jeenbakov has his work cut out for him. His country’s GDP has shrunk by 12% in the past three years and is now in a diplomatic spat with neighboring Kazakhstan. Furthermore, with a turnout of 56%, only about three in ten Kyrgyz voted for Jeenbekov. Considering that Babanov was backed by a third of the electorate, Jeenbekov is walking a tightrope.

The October elections were a success in that they created a peaceful transition of power from one president to another. However, Kyrgyzstan has much to work on to become a full-fledged, liberal democracy. The elections were fraught with misuse of public resources, reports of voter intimidation, vote buying, and alleged media bias towards Jeenbekov. However, this election marks the first peaceful transition of power in Central Asia among the five former Soviet republics. The run-up to the election caused tensions to spark between Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan over presidential candidate Babanov’s meeting with Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, triggering a string of events that have entrenched the two republics in a diplomatic spat. President Jeenbekov has a wide range of issues to fix with high expectations set on him by the electorate. Only time will tell if the democratic dream in Central Asia will remain an idea or manifest itself into a free, fair, sustainable form of governance.