The Truth Behind the “Illegal Alien”: Debunking Anti-Migrant Talking Points

Image credit: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)

In the past few weeks, President Donald Trump declared a national emergency at the southern border, attempted to end birthright citizenship, suspended US refugee admissions, shut down the Biden administration’s immigration programs, and ordered for Guantanamo Bay to be prepared to house up to 30,000 migrants. Amongst this barrage of activity undertaken by President Trump, nothing exemplifies the US shift to reject its “melting pot” roots more than the intense influx of raids by US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), paired with his consistent anti-immigrant rhetoric. The recent ICE raids have evidenced racial profiling, with American citizens being detained on the basis of their race or skin color, including indigenous American citizens of tribal nations. ICE has also been granted the authority by President Trump to apprehend migrants in or near schools, churches, and hospitals, prompting pushback from public schools. Sowed by claims of high crime rates from undocumented immigrants and stolen American jobs, the seeds of xenophobia have been planted quite deeply. But is there any factual basis to these anti-immigrant arguments? 

The extreme rise in anti-immigrant hate, discrimination, and administrative action necessitates an examination of the truth and facts on the topic. In an assessment of the common arguments against migrants in the US, there is little to no evidence supporting the claims of high crime rates, violence, and job-stealing. 

CLAIM: Migrants are criminals, murderers, terrorists, violent, etc. 

“Not only is Comrade Kamala allowing illegal aliens to stampede across our border, but then it was announced about a year ago that they’re actually flying them in. Nobody knew that they were secretly flying in hundreds of thousands of people, some of the worst murderers and terrorists you’ve ever seen,” said Trump at a news conference in Los Angeles, California on September 13, 2024.

FACT: Data indicates that immigration, including undocumented populations, is not linked to higher crime rates; in reality, the inverse is true. 

Studies have shown that immigration is not linked to higher crime rates. In fact, communities with greater immigrant population concentrations have been observed to have lower crime rates and increased levels of social connection and economic opportunity, which are factors indicative of neighborhood safety. 

Additionally, when it comes to claims of terrorism, a 2019 CATO Institute study examined terrorist attacks from 1975 to 2017 and found no association between immigration and terrorism. The study assessed terrorism’s relationship to immigration status, comparing native-born terrorism to foreign-born and undocumented migrants, and found that, in the 43-year period analyzed, there were 192 foreign‐​born terrorists and 788 native-born terrorists who planned, attempted, or carried out attacks on U.S. soil. The vast majority of attacks that were planned, attempted or carried out were made by native-born terrorists. Additionally, the chance of a citizen being killed in a terrorist attack by a refugee on U.S. soil is about 1 in 3.86 billion per year, and the chance of being murdered by an attack committed by an undocumented immigrant was found to be zero. 

Cases such as the tragic murder of Laken Riley have been wielded as examples and proof of this migrant-criminal generalization, despite their statistically unlikely nature. Native-born US citizens have been found to have significantly and consistently higher rates of violent crime in comparison to undocumented migrants, although these instances receive far less media attention. The case of Laken Riley in particular became a major campaign talking point for President Trump, who signed into law the Laken Riley Act in her honor. Ultimately leading many to overestimate the crime risks of migrants, specific cases like this have been utilized to continue the dissemination of the dangerous migrant narrative.  

CLAIM: Migrants steal American jobs and hurt the US economy.

“Virtually 100% of the net job creation in the last year has gone to migrants. You know that? Most of the job creation has gone to migrants. In fact, I’ve heard that substantially more than — beyond, actually beyond that number 100%. It’s a much higher number than that, but the government has not caught up with that yet,” said Trump in August of 2024.

FACT: Immigration helps boost the economy, and is not linked to higher American unemployment. 

The Congressional Budget Office reported in 2024 that immigration contributes significantly to economic growth, rather than stunting it. Economists believe that post-pandemic, the surge in immigration led to growth in the economy without contributing to price inflation. 

Furthermore, concerns about migrants stealing jobs from Americans have also been debunked. The rate of unemployment for US-born workers averaged around 3.6% in 2023: the lowest rate on record. The claim that more immigrants displace US-born workers is simply not factual, otherwise the unemployment rate would be significantly higher. The truth is that US-born workers have very low interest in labor-intensive and commonly agricultural jobs, which are then filled by migrants.

 Government data indicates that immigrant labor actually provides promotional opportunities for US-born workers, and that a mass-deportation event would cause costs of living to skyrocket. This is because immigrants tend to take jobs that are complementary to native-born workers, not acting as substitutes to them, but as supplements. Additionally, immigrants contribute not only to the labor supply, but to labor demand as well due to their consumption of goods and services. This is furthered by the entrepreneurial tendencies of many high-skilled immigrants; immigrants have been found to start businesses at higher rates than native-born workers, generating jobs and long-term economic growth. 

CLAIM: Migrants should just go back to their own country.

“Why don’t they go back and help fix the totally broken and crime infested places from which they came,” tweeted Trump in 2019, targeting progressive Democrat congresswomen who had been outspoken against his immigration stance. 

FACT: According to a study on those migrating to the US from Latin America and the Caribbean, nearly 73% have been victimized by violent crime in their home countries, many of which have been destabilized throughout history by US interventions. 

The largest population of migrants in the US is from Mexico, making up around 23% of the country’s total immigrant population. In 2022, a UN International Organization for Migration survey found that 90% of Mexican migrants fled due to violence, extortion, or organized crime. 

Similarly, undocumented immigration from the Northern Triangle (El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras) has been increasing steadily over the past 30 years. Looking at the US involvement in these countries, all three have been destabilized by past US intervention. 

During El Salvador’s 12 year long civil war from 1979 to 1992, the US government backed the repressive regime that dispatched paramilitary death squads against civilians. Post-war, El Salvador saw an explosion of gang violence across the country. Guatemala has been plagued by national instability for decades, which was largely exacerbated by a 1954 CIA-backed coup that triggered an armed insurgency. Guatemala has since faced decades of human rights abuses committed by its leaders. The 2009 Honduras coup was supported by US DoD officials, and led to an age of violence and instability in the country that's effects are still felt today. Post-coup, Honduras has faced extreme poverty, economic inequality, and gang violence. 

Additionally, studies have examined the distinct correlation between US firearm manufacturing and the rates of gun violence in Latin America and the Caribbean. The US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives indicates that a large sum of guns recovered from crimes in El Salvador, Honduras, and Mexico were manufactured in the US. The US remains one of the main legal firearm exporters to Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador, and the US Government Accountability Office reported that these legal exports are often diverted to criminal networks.

Global migration has increased overall over the past few decades, hitting a record high in 2023. As of May 2024, over  120 million people have been forcibly displaced due to human rights violations, persecution, conflict and violence around the world, including 6.4 million asylum seekers.

CLAIM: They should just come into the country legally. 

“The current administration terminated every single one of those great Trump policies that I put in place to seal the border. I wanted a sealed border. Again, come in but come in legally,” said Trump in his speech at the Republican National Convention in July of 2024.

FACT: It’s not that migrants do not want to enter legally, but rather structural, institutional, and financial obstacles impede them from doing so.

Many migrants do want to come into the US legally. The process however, is extremely time-consuming and difficult to navigate. In the years following the outbreak of COVID-19 there has been a massive backlog in cases, amounting to 2 million pending cases in 2023— more than triple the amount from 2017. Partly due to understaffed immigration courts, the backlog means years of waiting for a case to be heard. Beyond shortages in immigration judges and staff, the DOJ’s Executive Office for Immigration Review has been found to have “longstanding workforce management challenges,” and “did not have a strategic workforce plan to address them,” according to the US Government Accountability Office. 

Additionally, immigrants and asylum seekers are five times more likely to win their case if they have a lawyer. Unfortunately, publicly-funded lawyers are not a right for migrants, and even if they were , there is a massive shortage in immigration lawyers to begin with, and they are often far too costly to obtain. To make matters worse, many migrants don’t speak English, and ICE provides little guidance on how to go about legal processes, and certainly not any translated versions of instructions or resources. 

THE BOTTOM LINE:

As Trump continues his flurry of anti-immigrant actions, it’s essential to remain vigilant to the facts and truth. We must work to see these baseless claims as what they truly are: hateful rhetoric, not factual arguments. Diversity in the US should be celebrated, not abhorred. Dehumanizing language should have no place in the US government, especially not in our highest office. Maintaining a high integrity of indiscrimination and empathy for one another is more necessary now than ever, especially in wake of Trump’s anti-DEI initiatives.

All of these actions are justified by Trump with claims of high levels of violence and crime committed by undocumented immigrants, often paired with extremely degrading language of animalistic and impure nature. The claims by Trump of migrants being “animals”, “not people”, and “poisoning the blood of our country” strikingly resemble the verbal dehumanization that precedes massive cultural violence and genocide. In his book Mein Kampf, Adolf Hitler used the phrase “blood poisoning” as a way to criticize the mixing of races, and during the Rwandan Genocide Tutsis were commonly referred to as “cockroaches”. This sort of dehumanization is designated as the fourth of the ten stages of genocide. 

With the first flights full of deported migrants landing in Guantanamo Bay this past Tuesday, our full attention must be on the treatment of migrants, legality, and ethics of this detainment. Guantanamo Bay has repeatedly been subject to strong criticism by human rights groups for violating basic human rights, holding detainees without charges or trials, and violating the US Constitution; the implications of holding deported migrants at the facility are quite alarming, with high potential for human rights abuses obscured from the public eye.

The Trump Administration’s Oncoming Attack on Birthright Citizenship: What Does It Mean to Be an American?

Via Flickr

American birthright citizenship, and the associated rights and liberties, is core to the American experiment. The idea that someone born in the fifty states, regardless of their race, gender, status, or parents’ country of origin, is entitled to all of the freedoms, protections, and civic responsibilities that the United States has to offer, is an incredibly compelling one. American citizenship is intrinsic and inalienable. It has given us some of the nation’s best and brightest and created a distinct national identity; we can recognize our distinct ethnic, religious, or regional differences while living in the same communities, voting together, catching a football game, and so on. It unifies us – we are all “one America.”  It is what allows American communities to become cohesive and truly great; removal and separation breaks down the communities that make up our nation. It is this integral, compelling core value that is being challenged by recent executive orders by the Trump administration. 

Mere hours after being inaugurated again, President Donald Trump signed an executive order “Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship.” In doing so, the Trump administration seeks to “protect” American citizenship by redefining birthright citizenship to require both parents of a child to, at minimum, be legal residents of the US (green card holders) or full citizens. Prior to this, any child born on US soil was granted birthright citizenship, regardless of their parents’ legal status or nationality. This principle was codified in the 14th Amendment, which was designed to overturn the court precedent established in Dred Scott v Sanford, the landmark 1856 Supreme Court case that denied African-American slaves American citizenship despite being born on American soil. It was further solidified in another SCOTUS case, United States v Wong Kim Ark, in which a Chinese-American born in San Francisco had been denied citizenship on the basis that his parents were Chinese nationals during the time of the Chinese Exclusion Act, even though his parents were considered permanent residents of the United States. Ultimately, in the case Wong Kim Ark was found to be a citizen, therefore establishing the precedent that the parents’ origin is irrelevant to the citizenship status of their child. Birthright citizenship applies in almost all cases, with children of foreign diplomats being the only exception, as they’re not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States. The question is, how does this executive order overturn years of legal convention?

It is that exact phrasing in the 14th Amendment, “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” (meaning the jurisdiction of the United States) that the Trump administration has used to justify the executive order. In essence, the executive order asserts that a child born to parents that are not in the United States legally or are in the United States temporarily (on a visiting or student visa) is therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, but rather the parent’s country of origin. In other words, the administration has exploited the vagueness of the terminology to say that the US has no legal responsibility to someone whose parents do not hold permanent residence in the US. Executive orders, from a legal standpoint, are used to direct how the executive branch should enforce legal policy; often, they are used to enact policy that would otherwise be legislatively difficult, but it is still possible to legally challenge or prevent an executive order through the legislative and judicial branches. For the time being, a federal district court judge has blocked the order temporarily on the grounds that it is built off a bad-faith constitutional interpretation, calling it “blatantly unconstitutional.” But, the directive still holds political weight; it makes good on Trump’s political promises, yes, but it also establishes a more essentialist view on what it takes to be an American, especially in the context of the country’s changing demographics and rising rates of global migration. Moreover, it is an order that, while likely to be overturned, still inflicts fear in both his political opponents and any prospective migrants. 

Where do we go from here? Should the case go to the Supreme Court, there is a good chance that even the Trump-appointed justices break from the administration. Justice Amy Coney Barrett has been shown to break rank in favor of logical and clear constitutional rulings, highly valuing her own conservative principles and not wanting to serve as a mere pawn to the Republican agenda. Chief Justice John Roberts places high value on judicial precedent; this is evident in his concurring opinion in Dobbs v Jackson Women’s Health Organization, in which he emphasizes judicial restraint and stare decisis. Justice Neil Gorsuch has also occasionally taken more diverse ideological stances, authoring the majority opinions in Bostock v Clayton County and McGirt v Oklahoma, opposing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and in support of the sovereignty of Native American lands. Something with this clear of a judicial precedent is unlikely to be overturned easily, but it is still a possibility; in recent years, the court has shown a willingness to overturn long-held precedent, especially given the recent decisions overturning Roe v Wade and Chevron v NRDC. More than that, however, this executive order has opened the political and ideological floodgates. The country is facing an intense, vehement reckoning over immigration, from the looming crackdown on irregular migration to the political battles over H-1B (work visa) recipients. Amid these political battles, we again ask, what is the meaning and value of American citizenship? Who deserves to be a citizen? This executive order may well be a step toward a narrower, more exclusive definition of what an American citizen is.

Meloni's English Ban: An analysis into Italian Prime Minister, Giorgia Meloni's proposed legislation to fine foreign languages

In March of 2023 the party of Italian Prime Minister, Girogia Meloni, proposed introducing a new piece of legislation that would seek to address the growing issue of the dominance of the English language across Italy and the issue of Anglomania (the obsession with English customs), all in hopes of countering growing fears over the loss of Italian language and culture. The legislation proposes fines of up to 100,000 euros on public and private entities using foreign vocabulary in their official communications and requiring all company job titles to be spelled out in the official local language. 

Meloni’s new legislation seeks to address what her party sees as key cultural issues affecting Italian society. On the surface level, the legislation is an attack against EU integrationist policy and an attempt to promote Italian cultural power. Although this legislation may seem both amusing and bizarre from an outside lens, its implications, both politically and socially, could be tremendous. Only through placing this language ban in the context of Meloni’s immigration policies can we understand the greater intent; Meloni’s legislation is a direct threat towards Italy’s growing immigrant population, who often lack Italian language skills and can often only hope to communicate with Italian government officials in a shared second language, English. 

Italy’s changing image 

At its core, Meloni’s legislation reveals a growing fear and frustration brought on by fear over losing Italian cultural identity and frustration with the English language's dominance across all sectors. 

Like their fellow EU neighbors, Italy has struggled in recent decades to come to terms with its new multi-cultural identity, brought on by increases in immigration and participation in international communities and systems. Italy’s recent immigrant population is largely dominated by migrants and refugees from Eastern Europe and Northern Africa. Non-white Italians report a level of discrimination and isolation despite spending decades in the country. Michelle Ngonmo, a Black Italian fashion designer stated that “there is a real struggle between the people-of-color Italians and [white] Italian society. Asian Italians, Black Italians are really struggling to be accepted as Italians.”

The changing demographics of Italy reflect a country grappling with its newfound cultural identity. While many have embraced the tide of immigration as both a benefit and reality of globalization, Meloni’s political party has deliberately ignited anti-immigrant spirit. 

The Brother’s of Italy

Meloni leads the Brother’s of Italy party (Fratelli d'Italia), a nationalist and conservative far-right party that has its roots in neofascism. After co-founding the party in 2012, she led the party through a series of political victories, eventually emerging as the preeminent far-right party in Italy. 

Similar to other far-right parties across the continent, such as the National Rally in France or the UKIP party of the UK, the Brother’s of Italy embodies many populist values and policies, including anti-globalization efforts, xenophobia, and an emphasis on national unity and heritage. However, the Brother’s of Italy has deeper roots in historical notions of facism, tracing back to the first postwar Italian neo fascist party known as the Italian Social Movement (Movimento Sociale Italiano or MSI, which existed from 1946 to 1995) as well as the Salò Republic which was known for its Nazi-origins. The predecessors behind the Brother’s of Italy party reveal a political party that is steeped in decades of fascist theory. Meloni was a member of the MSI youth party in the early 90s that became known for its far-right magazine, Fare Fronte and adoption of French far-right ideals. Political upheaval and turmoil caused by political corruption scandals across Italian politics led to the end of the MSI in 1995, but elements of the party continued.

Meloni’s rise to power

The well known youth party transformed into Azione Giovani (Young Action) which was at this point associated with the Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance party or AN) the successor of the MSI. Meloni held a position on the youth leadership committee which led her into politics. At age 19 she was filmed praising fascist dictator, Benito Mussolini, as an example of strong leadership in Italian politics. 

 She was elected as Councilor for the Province of Rome in 1998 which she held for four years. She continued to develop her political career by becoming the youngest Vice President to the Chamber of Deputies in 2006. Her experience in far-right youth organizations led her to become the Minister of Youth under the fourth Berlusconi government. Then in 2012, she founded the Brother’s of Italy party alongside fellow politicians, Ignazio La Russa and Guido Crosetto. Throughout Italy’s rocky political climate of the 90s and 2000s, Meloni positioned herself as a politician loyal to far-right causes, but also able to adapt to contemporary political climates. 

In a speech from 2021, Meloni identified her far-right values, saying, “Yes to the natural family, no to the LGBT lobby, yes to sexual identity, no to gender ideology... no to Islamist violence, yes to secure borders, no to mass migration... no to big international finance... no to the bureaucrats of Brussels!”

Meloni has routinely denied that her party has any connection with fascism; she has denounced Mussolini and his reign of fascist terror in speeches, citing Mussolini’s racial laws as one of the darkest points in Italian history. However, her latest proposed legislation to restrict the use of English and promote Italian reveals Meloni’s nationalistic approach to uniting the Italian people as well as a denial of Italy’s multiculturalism. 

Contemporary fascism

Meloni’s political career has flirted with fascism from the beginning. We can witness it in her blatant statements of support for Mussolini as a young youth leader, but also in the inherent nature of her political positioning in parties rooted in fascism. Meloni’s critics are quick to call her a fascist or “fascist-adjacent” for her political remarks, her friendship with Hungary’s authoritarian leader, Viktor Orbán, and her ultraconservative values. Although these points are all valid and true, they do not actually threaten Meloni’s political standing or reputation, but instead allow her to counter the remarks and paint her opponents and critics as irrational left-wing radicals. Meloni simply has to deny her associations with fascism, something she has done on numerous occasions, such as during her pro-EU speech following her inauguration in which she also spoke out against Italy’s fascist past. International attention on Meloni’s fascist roots has shifted attention away from the real danger of her ultra-conservative politics, which intend to restore traditional Italian values and relies on tactics of alienation and discrimination.  

Anglomania 

Meloni has stated that her proposed legislation is an attempt to protect Italian national identity, which she sees as weakened by the dominance of English as the international language of business and politics. It is true that English has become the lingua franca of the world, dominating arenas such as international institutions, cultural interests, and educational institutions. However the bill does not only call for the ban of English but words from all foreign languages in businesses. The legislation also called for university classes that are “not specifically aimed at teaching a foreign language” should only be taught in Italian, thus preventing the likelihood of English-speaking classes taking precedence. Yet Meloni’s legislation makes it clear that her desire to protect Italy’s cultural heritage is rooted in populist and far-right xenophobia.

Foreign residents make up around 9% of Italy's population. Italy is also home to the third largest migrant population in Europe, following the migrant crisis of the past decade. The change in population has brought varying forms of anti-immigration sentiment. Meloni has been at the forefront of the movement during her political campaign and time in office. Her first act of anti-immigration legislation in November of 2022 attempted to prevent adult male asylum seekers from entering the country. Italy’s interior minister, Matteo Piantedosi, claimed that the reason behind this policy was that these people are “residual cargo,” unworthy of being rescued and Meloni referred to recent immigrants to Italy as “ethnic substitution,” implying that ethnic Italians are in danger simply from their population’s change in ethnic and racial diversity. 

Meloni’s proposed language ban must be understood in the context of her prior legislation and political  viewpoints; this is more than a critique of the dominance of the English language and the promotion of Italian culture. Meloni’s ban is a threat to all immigrants and foreign-born Italians as a sign of Italy’s growing preference for an homogenous ethnic population and anti-immigration policies.

A broken immigration system: the extension of the Title 42 immigration policy leaves many Cuban asylum seekers in crisis

After five years of saving money, Patri, from Havana, Cuba, was ready to make the trek to the United States. Cuba’s economic crisis has become so dire in the past few years, due to COVID-19. The cost of living has been steadily rising and there has been an increase in food shortages. In 2022, 2% of Cuba’s population left for the U.S. and Patri hoped to be one of them. She saved up the equivalent of 8,000 dollars. However, this was rendered impossible by the Supreme Court’s decision that extended Title 42’s immigration policy. Now if you are seeking asylum, as Patri is, from four countries, Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Haiti, you have to apply for a parole process. The process allows only 30,000 migrants to enter the U.S. per month and the qualifications are steep. You need to have a valid passport, pass a background check, afford the airfare, and have a sponsor with legal status who is already inside the U.S. that can help to support you financially. If you do not have a sponsor, as Patri doesn’t, you will be turned away at the border and forced to remain in Mexico for the time being. For many, this can be a death sentence, left vulnerable to theft, homelessness, and kidnapping for ransom. Despite these risks, many migrants make the trek anyway because they simply have no other alternative. The extension of the harmful Title 42 immigration policy by the Supreme Court and the Biden Administration leaves many Cuban asylum seekers in a crisis due to unreasonable restrictions. In response, the Biden Administration has put forth future policy changes to counteract the extension of Title 42 that will hopefully accomplish its goal of fixing the broken immigration system. 

What is Title 42? 

Title 42 is a U.S. law used in issues such as civil rights, public health, social welfare, and more. The government can use it to take emergency actions to keep contagious diseases out of the country. It was first used in 1929 during a meningitis outbreak to keep Chinese and Filipino ships from entering the U.S. and spreading the disease. The law was only enacted again in 2020 by then-president, Donald Trump, due to the global COVID-19 outbreak. However, Trump also used this law and its implications to turn away migrants from the border more quickly without having to consider their cases for asylum. Since this law has been put into effect in 2020, 2 million people have been barred from entering the U.S. 

The Trump Administration’s impact on immigration policy

Donald Trump’s campaign and presidency are defined largely by his harsh views and policies on immigration and enforcement.  There are 100 million displaced refugees in the world today, a number that only grew worse during Trump’s presidency. He reduced legal immigration into the United States by 49%. From 2016-2019, there was an increase in denials for military naturalizations by 54%. During his presidency, 5,460 children were separated from their families at the U.S.-Mexico Border. In 2017, he announced that he would dismantle DACA, Deferred Actions for Childhood Arrivals, which provides relief from deportation and work authorization for immigrants brought to America as children. He also tried to terminate TPS, Temporary Protected Status, a program that grants legal status – including work authorization and protection from deportation – to people from designated countries facing ongoing armed conflict, environmental disaster, or other extraordinary conditions preventing their safe return. Hate crimes against Latinos and Hispanics rose by 21% in 2018. By increasing his anti-immigrant rhetoric, he made the issue of immigration one of the top priorities in the 2020 election. 

The Biden Campaign’s immigration policy promises

Since immigration played a powerful role in the 2020 election, the Biden campaign put out extensive information on how he was going to help fix the immigration crisis if he was elected to office. He starts by evoking emotion in his plan by saying, “It is a moral failing and a national shame when a father and his baby daughter drown seeking our shores. When children are locked away in overcrowded detention centers and the government seeks to keep them there indefinitely.” He ultimately, flat-out states, “Trump has waged an unrelenting assault on our values and our history as a nation of immigrants. It’s wrong, and it stops when Joe Biden is elected president.” 

Biden states overall goals for immigration policy, such as modernizing the immigration system and welcoming immigrants into the community. However, since this election was about defeating Trump and reversing his policies, Biden created promises for his first 100 days in office. These include, “Immediately reverse the Trump Administration’s cruel and senseless policies that separate parents from their children at our border” and “End Trump’s detrimental asylum policies.” He wants to end the separation of families at the border by ending the prosecution of parents for minor violations since these are mostly used as scare or intimidation tactics. He said that he wants to restore asylum laws so they can actively protect people fleeing persecution. The Trump Administration put restrictions on access to asylum for anyone traveling through Mexico or Guatemala and those fleeing from gang or domestic violence. 

The economic crisis in Cuba

Why are there record numbers of migrants leaving Cuba for the United States? The number of migrants (200,000 in 2022) reflects percentages that haven’t been seen since the 1990s, and it's because Cuba is facing its worst socio-economic crisis since the collapse of the Soviet Union. There are daily shortages of food and medicine. There are regular power outages and last year during a protest against the government, the internet was switched off. Shortages of resources have culminated since 1962 when the U.S. trade embargo was imposed. To survive, Cuba has become reliant on earnings from international tourism and Cuban nationals working abroad. Due to COVID-19, the island was mostly closed off to foreign tourists and reduced visitor numbers by 75% in 2020. When Trump was elected in 2016, he reinstated longstanding travel and business restrictions between Cuba and the U.S., further closing them off from U.S. resources. He also reinstated Cuba to the list of state sponsors of terrorism, which obstructed the country’s access to international finance. 

In the last few years, resistance to the government has risen, partly due to social media and the internet. There are increased demands for political and economic change and for government officials to be held accountable. In 2021, there were massive Cuban protests that were fuelled by COVID restrictions and food and medicine shortages. Due to limited resources provided by the government, many were forced to turn to the black market. Many preferred to work for and sell on the black market because they usually made more money than a salary at a typical job to cover basic needs. The Cuban's ability to be resourceful and stretch themselves thin is running out and unless there is significant economic change, many more are bound to follow the 2% of the population that have already left in 2022. 

Impact of the continuation of Title 42 on Cuba and asylum seekers

The continuation of Title 42 could create an asylum crisis for many Cubans. An official from the Washington Office on Latin America, a human-rights nonprofit, estimates that people like Patri, without a sponsor, have no chance of crossing the border anytime soon. While she and many others wait in Mexico for their case to be heard, they would be risking dangerous conditions such as homelessness and kidnapping for ransom. Oftentimes, appointments for Title 42 expectations get booked as soon as they become available and people have to wait weeks to have their cases heard. 

Since there are so many restrictions, many Cubans are turning to more creative ways to migrate to the U.S. In 1994 there was a Cuban rafter crisis or balseros crisis where 35,000 Cubans migrated to the U.S. on makeshift rafts. They spent all their money on the materials to make a raft and row across the Gulf of Mexico to Miami, Cuba. After five weeks of riots, Fidel Castro announced that anyone who wanted to leave Cuba was welcome to do it without hindrance. However, President Clinton mandated that any rafters captured be detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. About 31,000 of those 33,000 were detained at the base while many others were lost at sea. Even though this process of immigration is risky and dangerous, many are worried that the balseros crisis will happen again. 

The extension of Title 42

On December 27th, 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court voted to keep Title 42 in place, allowing asylum-seekers to be turned away at the border, even though it would have expired at the end of 2022. It is now in place indefinitely after 19 Republican state attorneys general filed an emergency appeal to the Supreme Court to keep it in place. U.S. District Judge Emmet Sullivan ruled that Title 42 should expire at the end of this year because the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s implementation of this policy was “arbitrary and capricious.” While many, such as Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch, argued that the public-health justification of Title 42’s implementation has lapsed, they still voted for it to stay in place. Some Democrats, such as California Governor Gavin Newsom, think that if Title 42 is ended, the asylum system would break. White House Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre said in a statement that “Title 42 is a public health measure, not an immigration enforcement measure, and it should not be extended indefinitely.” Yet, the Biden Administration is complying with the Supreme Court’s Order and enforcing Title 42, offering no alternative to those trying to seek asylum on the border. 

However, there are steps in the right direction being made. In January of 2023, Biden issued an executive order restricting asylum applications on the U.S.-Mexico border for four countries, Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Haiti. As mentioned in the first paragraph, the qualifications for asylum applications are steep, including needing a sponsor in the U.S. that can sponsor you financially. If one goes to the border without a sponsor, they will be turned away and the “Remain in Mexico” policy under Title 42 will be in effect. This Executive Order talks about expanding legal pathways for safe, orderly, humane, and legal migration. This includes increasing humanitarian assistance to Mexico and Central America, expanding the parole process, launching an online appointment portal to reduce overcrowding and wait times at the border, and tripling refugee resettlement from the Western Hemisphere. Biden has also reopened the U.S. embassy in Havana for visa applications allowing some an official route to emigration to the U.S.

Conclusion 

After the extension of Title 42 by the Supreme Court, the  NGO, The Washington Office on Latin America, WOLA, gave a list of 5 reasons why Title 42 must end immediately. Title 42 was not designed to protect public health, it creates a discriminatory system because it targets four specific countries, it puts people in need of protection in danger, and it undermines the U.S. ability to promote a protection-centered response to regional migration. However, the foremost reason is that Title 42 is illegal. It denies refugees protection from life-or-death situations. The Biden administration expels around 2,500 migrants every day.  Section 1158 of Title 8 of the U.S. Code does not allow for the blocking of fundamental protection and safety of migrants seeking asylum. Instead of perpetuating and prolonging a broken immigration system, it would be beneficial to invest time and resources in other areas. This would start with restoring the right of all refugees to seek asylum at the border. Using a COVID-era policy is not a justification anymore to keep implementing this law. Another is ensuring humanitarian support for the migrants that are arriving while also coordinating the response of federal, state, and local organizations to make sure everyone gets the same resources and treatment. Finally, there needs to be improvements to the adjudication capacity and resources, as the wait time could be anywhere from 2 months to 1 year.  There is a shortage of lawyers at the border who have impossible caseloads. By increasing the number of public defenders at the border, due process can still be ensured in a timely manner. The US immigration system has been broken for decades. Every day we wait to fix or come up with a new policy, thousands of people fall through the cracks and succumb to the danger they are running from. The system needs to be fixed, for the sake of rebuilding our asylum process and the democratic values that the U.S. was founded on. 

Amnesty for the Innocent: Relocating Russian Dissenters Following Putin’s War in Ukraine

The current migrant crisis in Europe completely outpaces any similar crisis on the continent since World War II. A month into the offensive Russian war in Ukraine, nearly 4 million Ukrainians had fled the country seeking asylum abroad, with an additional 7 million being internally displaced. With the war continuing to escalate, more refugees are sure to continue pouring from the country. 

Though those refugees fleeing Ukraine seem to get the majority of the press attention, as well as the majority of the assistance from Western nations (and all for good reason), the crisis has also sparked a similar exodus of Russians and Belarusians from their respective countries. A mid-March survey concluded that roughly 300,000 Russians have left Russia since the start of the invasion of Ukraine, while liberal estimates predict the real number could exceed one million persons having already left, all largely due to crippling Western sanctions, the total collapse of the Russian ruble and the Russian economy, and a wide-scale authoritarian crackdown by the Russian federal government. At the start of the Russian invasion, thousands of Russians took to the streets, in over 70 cities, to protest the war; on the first day of the war the total number of protestors arrested was 1,900 while over 13,000 protestors had been arrested a month into the war, amounting to the largest scale protests and political arrests in the country’s modern history. Soon after, Russia would take draconian measures to ban social media outlets such as Facebook and Twitter, crack down on various independent media outlets (falsely labeling them as “foreign agents”), and implement a new law allowing the government to sentence individuals to up to 15 years of imprisonment for defying the Kremlin’s narrative regarding the war. Meanwhile, the Russian economy was totally ruined as Western sanctions and popular pressure caused foreign capital and investment to flee overnight, unemployment to soar, the ruble to deflate, and the purchasing power of ordinary Russians to dwindle. As the future economic prospects for all Russians suddenly changed for the worse, those Russians with the means to leave have done so. And because conditions within Russia seem to only be getting worse, more are sure to follow those who have already left. 

Most of those Russian nationals leaving Russia consist of the urban college educated youth as well as the middle class. The young and the middle class were most likely to work in the service sector and with foreign companies before sanctions, while this section of the population is also most likely to be critical of Kremlin talking points regarding the war. Additionally, middle class Russians (aside from perhaps Russia’s elite, affluent ruling class) have the most financial means to resettle, while they also have comparatively better career opportunities abroad; young Russians also tend to have better skill sets for work abroad and have fewer commitments and responsibilities tying them to Russia—such as family or an existing committed career—and many seek to avoid being drafted into the Russian armed forces in the midst of war. Generally, the majority of those who are leaving Russia are “academics, IT specialists, journalists, bloggers” or protestors, who all fear that the unpredictable climate within Russia could quickly make their lives impossible. Most of these Russians fleeing are destined for countries which offer visa-free entry for Russian citizens, namely Georgia, and Armenia, with other common destinations including Azerbaijan, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Serbia to name a few. Though the Russians fleeing predominantly consist of individuals who are adversarial towards, or are at least skeptical of, Putin’s regime, their reception has been somewhat mixed. In Georgia, for example, Russian nationals in the country have been experiencing high degrees of discrimination, both on the street in day-to-day life and while looking for apartments and opening Georgian bank accounts. That being said, the majority of Georgians remain receptive to Russian expatriates and for good reason, as Russians leaving Russia offer the country a valuable, new, educated labor market. With more than 1,000 companies being founded by Russian nationals within Georgia in the last month, the benefits of taking on Russian expatriates are undeniable. But, despite their somewhat mixed reception in Georgia and other countries, Russians have been received far worse in Western countries, namely in the European Union and in North America. The Czech Republic, Latvia, and Lithuania have all announced that they will no longer be processing visa applications from Russian applicants due to the war in Ukraine, while Greece has placed additional restrictions on Russian nationals seeking visas; meanwhile, instances of hate crimes and discrimination against individual Russians abroad in Europe and North America have skyrocketed following the invasion. Therefore, much of the world suddenly seems to be a very hostile place to many Russians, and as Russians continue to flee and seek out safe havens from political persecution and economic ruin, those countries which accommodate the masses of young and educated Russians leaving will have much to gain. Countries across Europe, but namely those Baltic states with large Russian-speaking communities, should embrace the current wave of migrants from Russia, both as a means of securing talent and educated labor but also as a contribution to the Western strategy of punishing Russia for its ongoing offensive invasion. 

Putting entry and visa requirements aside, countries in Central and Eastern Europe are among the most suited to take in Russian expatriates. For one, the Baltic countries of Estonia and Latvia are particularly suitable for Russian immigrants, as both countries already house large Russian diaspora communities. Estonia’s population consists roughly of 24% native Russian speakers, with the concentration of these ethnic Russians mainly being in the country’s Northeast, around the urban center of Narva where the percentage of Russian speakers accounts for 90% of the city’s population. Latvia maintains a similarly sized Russian population, consisting of 25% of the country’s total population, over 35% of the population of Latvia’s capital city, Riga, and 56% of the population of the country’s second-largest city, Daugavpils. Therefore, with a large Russian speaking community already being present, urban centers like Tallinn, Riga, Daugavpils, and Narva all make realistic and comfortable options for Russians looking for new homes abroad. 

Additionally, repatriating Russian nationals could serve as a highly effective strategy to encourage economic growth in some of the poorest parts of the Baltic States. For example, Latvia’s poorest region, Latgale, also contains a large Russian speaking majority, making up 60% of the region’s population. Should educated, young and middle class Russians seek residency in Latvia, they will likely resettle either in Riga or in parts of Latgale, such as the large post-industrial city of Daugavpils, as these are the two main areas with dominant or large Russian-speaking communities. Once in the country, these expatriates might contribute greatly to the economic rebirth of the country; cities like Narva and Daugavpils are both post-industrial cities where poverty and poor quality education have proven to be massive problems. Should Russian entrepreneurs resettle in Daugavpils or Narva, and start new businesses, they will surely bring with them great employment opportunities for members of those respective communities already living there, possibly leading to the revitalization of these urban areas.. And should Russian expatriates also settle in Riga or Tallinn, they can further contribute to the relative success that these two cities have been experiencing in recent years, in terms of economic development. 

Furthermore, Estonia specifically is an exceptional possible destination for many Russian expatriates, specifically those who work in fields relating to IT (a large portion of those Russians fleeing, as already discussed). Information and Communications Technology has quickly become Estonia’s dominant economic sector, contributing the most to the country’s GDP growth over the past decade. With over 6,000 IT companies calling the small Baltic country of 1.3 million home, and with Russian language, similarly to the Latvian case, still playing a major role in daily urban and business life, Estonia makes for an unrefusable opportunity for many Russians looking for better job security abroad. 

Aside from contributing to economic success, Russian immigrants might also deradicalize the Russian-speaking communities already in the Baltic. In Estonia, 89% of ethnic-Russians watch Russian state media, while only 49% follow Western media outlets; in Latvia a stark 97% of Russian-speakers watch state media while only 10% follow Western media outlets. Looking at these figures, it becomes quite clear that there is more than just a linguistic divide between Baltic-Russians and dominant Baltic national identities like Latvians or Estonians; there is also a deep political divide partially originating from the forms of media that individuals choose to consume. By contrast, the largely urban educated and young population of Russians leaving Russia are far less likely to buy into Kremlin narratives; therefore, if the Baltic countries were to take in some of these more liberal and democratically minded Russians, this could easily contribute to diluting the influence of the Kremlin within Baltic-Russian communities and alleviate their radicalism over time. 

But before any of the potential positive effects of Russian expatriates resettling in the Baltic can be felt, Estonia and Latvia will need to adjust their visa policies towards Russians. As previously mentioned, Latvia has suspended the processing of all visa applications for applicants from Russia, a move which clearly must be reversed. Estonia and Latvia should offer Russians six months to a year of visa-free stay in their respective countries, and they should offer a clear pathway thereafter towards permanent residency and citizenship. Of course, it is not enough to merely accept these migrants. The respective Baltic states, and any country accepting migrants for that matter, must do all they can to integrate these migrants into their broader, national identities and into national society. Baltic countries could offer short-term business loans to Russian migrants who meet certain qualifications and who agree to remain in the country for a certain period of time to increase their economic integration with the host society, and Latvia and Estonia could offer subsidized formal instruction in their respective national languages to improve rates of social integration. Such actions would also need to be accompanied with a massive reworking of the media narrative surrounding Russians and Russian-speakers in the Baltic. Instead of allowing media outlets to malign Russian nationals as being totally loyal to the Kremlin and complicit in the actions of the Putin regime, government spokespersons should actively counter these narratives; instead, they should paint a more fair picture of ethnic Russians, as a people living subjugated by an authoritarian regime, who live in fear for their lives and their families, and who need the help of the West in order to achieve fair standards of living. Without such a shifting of the mainstream narrative within the regional context of the Baltic, Russophobia is certain to continue to increase, social integration will be made more difficult for those Russian-speakers already living within the Baltic, and the possible slew of benefits from accepting Russian migrants will be discarded, with those benefits instead being directed to countries accepting those Russians fleeing Putin’s regime. 

Even worse, if these migrants are not given good opportunities wherever they may resettle, many of them are sure to return to Russia, where they will continue to live and work under the Kremlin’s iron fist, contributing to economic productivity and the growth of the Russian economy. For a West concerned with punishing Russia after its offensive invasion of Ukraine, accepting Russian migrants plays directly against Putin’s hand. It gives some of Russia’s brightest and most productive the promise of a free, safe, and prosperous future out of the reach of authoritarian strongmen, and it eliminates nearly any incentive to ever return to Russia, permanently depriving Russia of its next generation of skilled labor. 

Putting all else aside, the very moral legitimacy of Western liberal democracy depends on our reaction to authoritarian leaders, like Putin, who threaten peace and antagonize innocent civilians at home and abroad. The West has responded positively by helping Ukrainian victims of the Russian invasion restart their lives, safe from the shelling of Kharkiv or the bombardments of Mariupol. Meanwhile the West has ignored the desperate cries of so many Russians, who too live in fear for their lives, their freedom, and their livelihoods. Only by answering the calls of all those in need can the West truly fulfill its prerogative in safeguarding human rights and human dignity the world over.

How Local Governments Help Afghan Refugees

Anti-immigration sentiment rings loudly throughout the American political scene. However, with a recent influx of refugees from Afghanistan, the United States has to pool together depleted resources in order to help those escaping the Taliban. Citizens of Afghanistan continue to face human rights abuses at the hands of the Taliban, exemplified by a deadly attack on a school in Kabul. Not only are civilians facing this terror, but so are thousands of Afghan citizens who assisted the United States military during the two decades of military occupation.

Immigration is a multilateral issue and pools resources from every level of the government, including local government. Municipal governments play an intricate role in integrating refugees with the communities they arrive in, and their role is often overlooked and under-funded.

What is Happening in Afghanistan?

After 20 years of United States military presence in Afghanistan, the United States pulled almost 60,000 troops out of the country in the summer of 2021. The aftermath left the nation of Afghanistan in shambles and vulnerable to the Taliban. The terrorist organization rapidly gained power, causing thousands to flee the nation. Over 122,000 people have evacuated Afghanistan including Afghan citizens, Afghan interpreters, and United States citizens. Those fleeing Afghanistan qualify for a Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) under U.S. law; however, the process of obtaining a SIV takes 14 steps over the span of months—keeping 65,000 applicants stuck in Afghanistan. The Biden administration is working to expand access to visas through means of work or humanitarian parole to allow more refugees into the United States in as swift a fashion as possible.

Refugee Resettlement in America

Whether an SIV is required, or a refugee is on humanitarian parole, those who come to America are sent to one of seven military bases for health screenings and work authorization. This process can take longer than one week, and as of October 3, 2021, there are 53,000 refugees waiting across the seven military bases. When the initial screenings are completed, refugees are placed with resettlement organizations, which help them obtain housing, utilities, furniture, food, work, and English literacy training. Marisol Girela, the Associate Vice President of social programs at RAICES in San Antonio, Texas, stated that their organization alone has seen a dramatic increase in refugees arriving over the summer. Many resettlement organizations, such as RAICES, work closely with local governments, but federal barriers block effective partnerships.

Federal Barriers to Effective Resettlement

The Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS) sued the Trump administration in November of 2020 over an executive order passed by President Trump. The goal of the executive order was to require municipal governments to obtain approval for refugee resettlement programs on the city, state, and federal level. This order put up more bureaucratic barriers when it comes to refugee resettlement, and HIAS, along with Church World Services and the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Services, sued the administration on the basis of the undue burden that the executive order placed on resettlement agencies who are legally required to obtain formal city and state approval for their work.

The Trump administration’s anti-immigrant ideology strained refugee resettlement organizations, who do crucial work on the local level. Reuters acknowledged that the decrease in immigration caused resettlement groups to downsize, as they operate as nonprofits. With the current increase in refugees from Afghanistan, these groups are too under-funded and under-staffed to provide the best quality assistance to the refugees. They are left scrambling for resources, due to the quick and urgent demand for safety in America. As of September 2021, President Biden’s administration requested funding from Congress to resettle 65,000 Afghan refugees this fall and eventually 95,000 refugees by September 2022. The administration told state governors and refugee resettlement coordinators to prepare themselves for a sharp increase in demand, as refugees are coming to America whether Congress grants the administration funding or not.

Local Government’s Role in Resettling Afghan Refugees

The bulk of refugee resettlement is done at the local level with resettlement organizations. Cities across America such as Rochester, NY,  Buffalo, NY, Cleveland, OH,  Pittsburgh, PA, and Elizabeth, NJ have committed to welcoming refugees and actively push back against anti-immigrant rhetoric. Support for resettlement comes from all levels, from the U.N. to private citizens’ donations, but it is a city or town’s local government that gets into the intricacies of resettlement. Yet, due to aforementioned federal barriers, local authorities are isolated from policymaking on the topic of resettlement, but still placed with the majority of the responsibilities. Additionally, issues that face local governments in the wake of COVID-19 impact refugees particularly hard. Cities are currently struggling with a housing boom which makes finding a larger, family home increasingly difficult. These are the kinds of homes refugee families are in need of. Furthermore, there is a shortage of rental properties in cities across America, and landlords are hesitant to rent to those without credit as they are already losing out due to the economic impacts of COVID-19. Difficulties that municipal governments face are exacerbated when those strained resources are needed to help incoming refugees.

According to the German Marshall Fund of the United States, local governments play an essential role in coordinating medical appointments, English literacy courses, and job training. Community leaders know what resources are needed to effectively resettle in their unique location in terms of cost of living and neighborhood engagement. The federal government’s Afghan Placement and Assistance Program, while effectively expanding refugee assistance, does not take diverse housing costs across America into account which can lead to further fiscal difficulties. By processing a deep understanding of the municipality, local officials and organizations are equipped to know the intricacies of resettlement in their particular community. Additionally, people in a community tend to trust their local leaders, so when their mayor, town supervisor, or city council shows active support for refugees, it puts pressure on federal legislators to do the same by continuing to expand access to America.

Refugee Resettlement in the District of Columbia

Due to the sudden nature of increased violence in Afghanistan, those who flee are coming to America with incomplete documentation, a single bag of possessions, and barely any support system. Dire needs for necessities such as clothing, housing, and food prove the local government’s vital role in directly assisting refugees. The nation’s capital can serve as an example for how local governments aid in refugee resettlement, especially for those coming to America with little to no resources. The D.C. Office of Refugee Resettlement (DCORR) provides “temporary assistance for needy families, medical assistance and screenings, employment services, case management services, English language training, education assistance, and foster care placement.” Children accompanied by parents and unaccompanied children are eligible for the Children’s Health Insurance Program and Refugee Cash Assistance. Aside from gaining access to medical assistance and screenings, refugees settling in the District of Columbia also are eligible to receive health literacy in physical and emotional wellness services through the D.C. Department of Human Services. Refugees that come to the District of Columbia are commonly moved to the city from the military base for refugees in Fort Lee, Virginia and then, through the DCORR, placed with Catholic Charities Refugee Services or Lutheran Immigrant and Refugee Services—who are a part of the aforementioned lawsuit with HIAS. Nonprofits serve as the liaison between both federal and local governments and the refugees themselves, ensuring that the services offered by the city governments make it to the refugees. This can include coordinating housing arrangements, picking up families and individuals from military bases, and assistance with benefit applications for social security and Medicaid. Both Catholic Charities Refugee Services and Lutheran Immigrant and Refugee Services in the District of Columbia provide these services to the refugee community. Their role is important to ensure direct connections are made with the refugees who arrive from Afghanistan.

The Community’s Role

Local governments and nonprofits play a critical role in refugee resettlement, but so do members of the community. In the District of Columbia, local businesses and charities are accepting donations. Items that are in demand include household items, utensils and cookware, furniture, clothes, food, and toiletries. Along with accepting donations, the same organizations are putting out Amazon wish lists for those resettling in America from Afghanistan. Organizations are also coordinating volunteers to help set up refugees with apartments, and rides from the airport. Support for Afghan refugees starts from the top and trickles down to individual volunteers and donors. HIAS has set up resources and instructions to contact federal representatives to advocate for greater support for refugees. 

The increase in refugees coming to America is sudden, but urgent. Those coming from Afghanistan are vulnerable to the Taliban and are relying on American organizations to provide safety and stability. Local governments are not often thought of in this process, but they are immensely important to it. However, years of depleting resources from refugee resettlement at the federal level has trickled down to hit local governments, as they carry the bulk of resettlement responsibilities for vulnerable populations with the least number of resources.

The Immigration Battle: How the U.S. and Germany’s Respective Immigration Models Affect Immigrant Economic Participation

The 2015 migrant crisis was one of the worst in global history. As a result of the ongoing conflicts in Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq, as well as the unbearable living conditions in Eritrea, Kosovo, Yemen, and other nearby states, over 19.5 million refugees fled their native countries, mostly in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, and arrived at Europe’s and Asia’s borders in unprecedented numbers. This sudden influx of people by both land and sea into the European Union (EU), Germany in particular, created deep divisions within society over how to best cope with the vast amount of incoming refugees, many of whom could not speak the local language and had no documented proof of their existence. In addition to Europe, the United States was another preferred destination for refugees, although reaching America’s borders was a greater logistical challenge. 

Nonetheless, with the highest immigration rate out of all 28 EU countries and another whose existence is essentially built on the backs of immigrants, Germany and the United States are two of the most salient states to examine when analyzing the impacts of the recent immigration crisis. Both of these respective nations pride themselves on their ability to serve as a beacon of hope, change, and freedom for all, and while they share a lot of the same immigration laws and issues, they also differ immensely in their long-term treatment and adjustment plans for immigrants. This disparity, despite their similar roles as two of the most popular migration destinations in the world, downplays the important role and potential impact that immigrants can have on the country that they move to, especially in the economic sector. Despite the popular claim that immigrants steal native jobs, the economic and employment sector is often analyzed to determine how prosperous a state is. As a result, understanding how immigrants are accepted into the employment division in Germany and the United States is crucial to understanding the complexities of the Western immigration debate.

Overview of American and German Immigration History

The United States

Often said to be a “nation of immigrants,” the United States has been a desirable destination for refugees and immigrants alike for hundreds of years due to its promises of change and the opportunity to achieve the coveted ‘American Dream.’ However, immigration to the United States really began to take flight when an 1850 census included questions regarding nativity for the first time. Data from that census revealed that there were 2.2 million immigrants residing in the United States at that time, making up about 10 percent of the overall population. In the next 60 years, those numbers increased as people began to leave Europe because of lack of employment, crop failure, rising taxes, and famine, with the majority coming from England, Ireland, and Germany. In that period of time, the percentage of foreign-born individuals in the United States stayed between 13 and 15 percent, eventually reaching a peak of 14.8 percent in 1890. 

However, the culmination of the Great Depression, World War II, and new restrictive immigration laws that only let in strictly northern and western Europeans significantly decreased the rate at which people were coming into the U.S., leading to a low of 9.6 million immigrants, or 4.7 percent of the total U.S. population in 1970. After 1970, the number of immigrants residing in the United States quickly increased as more and more people immigrated from Latin America and Asia primarily. New laws including the Immigration Act of 1965 that abolished admission quotas, paired with the nation’s growing economy, led to an all-time high of more than 44.4 million immigrants in the United States as of 2017.

Yet the United States is no stranger to restrictive immigration laws; in 1882, Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act suspending the immigration of Chinese workers for ten years, and in 1892, it passed the Act to Prohibit the Coming of Chinese Persons into the United States. Yet, despite those restrictions, which were later repealed, and the continuation of those social attitudes by many Americans today, the United States also made significant strides in welcoming immigrants and refugees alike in later years. The most notable ones were the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 which “authorized the admission of up to 205,000 non-quota immigrants fleeing Europe,” and the Refugee Act of 1980, which established a new system for “processing and admitting refugees from overseas” and formally defined a “refugee” as “any person… who is unable or unwilling to return to [a] country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution.”

Nonetheless, since the September 2001 attacks by al-Qaeda, there has been an increased focus on immigration, specifically on immigrants from the MENA region, as well as calls for a return to more restrictive immigration laws. During his 2016 presidential campaign and throughout his presidency, President Donald Trump continuously pushed for a crackdown on illegal immigration by enacting the ‘Muslim ban,’ which has been shot down in many states for being unconstitutional, and building a wall at the southern border. President Trump's anti-immigrant rhetoric is primarily targeted towards Mexicans and Muslims, although he recently called for increased visa restrictions on Chinese citizens as well. This rhetoric, although in opposition to the country’s global role as a beacon of hope and freedom, is strikingly similar to the country’s anti-immigrant behavior from over a hundred years ago.

Germany

Whereas the United States faced an unprecedented influx of immigrants in the 19th and 20th centuries, Germany battled the opposite; between 1820 and 1920, as a result of war, famine, and political upheaval, around 6 million Germans left their home country in search of opportunity. However, around 1890 the emigration rate slowed down considerably as the German Empire entered a period of industrialization, attracting both those who had left as well as foreign workers who saw the potential to make a big profit in the newfound coal and steel industries. 

Yet while Germany was a country made up of immigrants, it was not a country whose society was very welcoming towards those who were foreign-born. In fact, xenophobic attitudes manifested themselves drastically in the 1920s under Adolf Hitler and the Nazi party who advocated for the creation of a “pure” and “superior” German race, who he referred to as the “Aryan race.” This translated into nationalistic and anti-Semitic world views and a strong hatred for those who were neither German nor white. This anti-immigrant behavior later manifested itself into a 1973 government act known as the “Recruitment Ban”; this ban essentially ended the “era of foreign labor recruitment” of “guest workers” to West Germany and prevented them from entering the country from states who were not part of the European Economic Community at the time. Post-1973, immigration rates in Germany actually increased when the Soviet Union fell and the situation in Yugoslavia turned bloody and violent. Yet with the new influx of immigrants, xenophobic behavior also grew and mob violence broke out across many Germany cities and towns. Another significant anti-immigrant act was also passed in 2005 and became known as The Immigration Act or the Residence Act; this act essentially established Germany as a “country of immigration” with a legal duty towards integration. Having experienced the extremist views under Hitler, this fundamentally changed the way in which Germany presented itself in the international community as an immigrant ally.

Since joining as a member of the EU in 1957, Germany has become the second most popular migration destination in the EU after the United Kingdom, with approximately 15.96 million immigrants living in the country by 2011, amounting to about 19 percent of the population. Yet with the 2015 migrant crisis and the influx of migrants from the Middle East in particular, the population in Germany rose to 82.2 million people, an increase of 978,000 or 1.2 percent. In that same year, immigration to Germany totaled 2.14 million people, a 46 percent increase from 2014. As a response to the immense wave of immigrants fleeing the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, German Chancellor Angela Merkel called for an open border migration policy that would allow Germany to welcome those from primarily Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq. While Merkel was alone in this decision and her popularity levels dropped significantly, immigration to Germany in recent years has slowed considerably, with most individuals originating from Turkey and Poland.

The United States: Geared Towards Permanent Residency

At present, the current discourse among scholars in the field of immigration is that the American immigration system is more exclusionary and geared toward permanent residency. For those immigrating to the United States, the process to become a U.S. citizen can be done one of four different ways: acquiring citizenship by birth, acquisition, derivation, or naturalization. Immigrants also have the option of obtaining a Green Card or a Permanent Resident Card, which would allow them to permanently live and work in the United States. While the process to become a U.S. citizen is a long and difficult one, it is a process and a system that is designed to grant someone permanent residency and not simply a temporary stay. While the United States does offer temporary work, school, and travel visas, those have a time limit, and after a certain amount of time, the individual must return to their home country unless they choose to overstay their visa and risk deportation. Obtaining permanent residency is the only way to live in the United States in the long-run without facing potential repercussions with immigration authorities.

Furthermore, the United States’s immigration system has an exclusionary design which is made more difficult due to the length of time that it takes to become a U.S. citizen, as well as the necessary documented proof and other government obstacles that must be overcome. The citizenship process tends to be a long and arduous one if citizenship by birth is not an option, and much like the vetting process for refugees, it can take up to 18-24 months including an array of comprehensive interviews and security checks that are completed by the Department of Homeland Security and the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. The entirety of this process first includes getting sponsored by a U.S. citizen, be it a relative or an employer. To even be considered for an immigrant visa, the immigrant must be sponsored, which then leads to the submission of a petition for citizenship. After the petition is filed, the immigrant must pay processing fees, submit financial and supporting documents, and go through an interview; if the immigrant passes the interview, he or she will then be granted their immigrant visa and legally be allowed to enter the United States. This process is exclusionary in nature because many immigrants either do not have the necessary documentation and proof of their existence, do not have the financial means to pay the processing fees, and/or do not have someone residing in the U.S. that will sponsor their visa. As a result, only a fraction of immigrants applying for visas are accepted.

Additionally, despite immigration being one of the most salient issues a country can face, misperceptions still persist, especially regarding how immigration affects a country’s economy and workforce. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the U.S. labor force, defined by the BLS as “all people age 16 and older who are classified as either employed and unemployed,” was approximately 160 million people in January 2018. There is also the Labor Force Participation Rate (LFPR), which is the percentage of people in the labor force who are either working or actively looking for work. Out of that 160 million in the labor force, immigrant laborers, mostly from Latin America, make up a record high of 17 percent as of 2019, amounting to roughly 27,200,000 people. With 2019, the economy is said to be on track to have the same success as it did in 2018, where output increased by $560 billion and grew by 3.1 percent.

Yet irregardless of the aforementioned data, many immigration critics argue that immigrants, regardless of their legal status or the percentage that they hold in the labor force, “steal American jobs” and “hurt the American economy.” President Trump is one such proponent of this belief; in November 2018, he stated that “Illegal immigration hurts American workers, burdens American taxpayers, and undermines public safety” in addition to them “taking precious resources away from the poorest Americans who need them most.'' However, while many stand behind that belief, the data reveals that the U.S. economy relies heavily on immigrant laborers and foreign-born workers in the labor force to contribute to national economic growth. A 2017 report by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine found that “immigration has an overall positive impact on long-run economic growth in the U.S.” Furthermore, the report revealed that second generation immigrants are “among the strongest fiscal and economic contributors” in the country, as they contribute around $1,700 annually per person. That data, paired with the fact that there has been a recent increase in more educated immigrants, demonstrates how immigrants are and will continue to be economically beneficial.

The immigrant assimilation process into the economic and employment sector is also aided by the infusion of their native cultures and the establishment of self-made enterprises or businesses, which assists with urban revitalization. While the popular claim is that immigrants steal jobs that are meant for American workers, many immigrants do not have the proper documentation, experience, or language skills to work in high-paying positions. In those cases, they often resort to working the jobs that American citizens do not want, particularly in the fast food and agricultural sectors, as well as many manual labor positions. The impact of immigrant work is seen by their ability to transform “desolate areas into thriving neighborhoods” by increasing the local population, expanding the tax base by setting up their own businesses, and bringing in more customers for both their own companies and domestic companies. The establishment of a business that hosts elements of the owners native culture not only normalizes that culture in an American context, but it draws in people and customers. For example, the beloved Chinatown sector that is found in many urban cities across the country, such as San Francisco and Chicago, is a product of Chinese immigration in the 19th century when Chinese-Americans wished to preserve their culture and surround themselves with similar people. In fact, despite gentrification efforts in many cities, Chinatown continues to survive on its promise of a strong restaurant culture with unique ethnic food.

All in all, while a large percentage of Americans may vehemently disagree, admitting immigrants and foreign-born workers into the country is an economically beneficial decision, regardless of their legal status. Now while there is also a link between immigration and crime rates, which is an aspect of the immigration debate that fuels anti-immigrant supporters, the overarching takeaway, as seen previously by the data presented, is that immigrants are helpful contributors to the U.S. economy. Without foreign-born workers, the United States’ labor force would decrease by 17 percent, amounting to a loss of over 27,000,000 workers. This would significantly damage the U.S. economy, potentially destroy certain industries that are immigrant-based and fun, and decrease the overall Gross Domestic Product (GDP), or the amount of economic activity within the country per year. While immigrants are not essential to the economic sector, the United States is much better off with the continued employment of foreign-born workers. 

Germany: Geared Towards Temporary Workers

In contrast to the United States, Germany’s immigration model is focused more on the temporary entry of foreign workers rather than the acquisition of permanent residents. However, much like the process to become a U.S. citizen, receiving admission to live or work in Germany is also a lengthy affair and has strict requirements that must be met. Admission into the country is further complicated by the fact that Germany is part of the EU, so there are different requirements depending on the status of the immigrant. If the applicant is a non-EU citizen, immigration is dependant on their skill level, as only those who are skilled or highly educated, as well as their family members, are accepted into the country. If the non-EU applicant plans to stay more than 90 days, then they must obtain a Residence Permit, otherwise their short-term visa will expire. 

There is also the option of getting an EU Blue Card, which is a temporary residence permit lasting up to four years, as well as a work permit for those who are highly-qualified as employees. The requirements for that particular permit include holding a college degree and making a salary of EUR 47,600 or more a year. Yet as of recent, those restrictions for non-EU citizens have lessened under a new German immigration act that permits non-EU citizens to work in the country if they have the “qualified vocational training” as well as an “employment contract.” However, if the immigrant in question is an EU citizen, then the process is significantly simplified. The applicant, if from one of the other 27 EU states or Switzerland, must only have a valid passport to enter Germany, but is required to change their address to match their new one in Germany within three months of their arrival. Otherwise, no extra steps are required for EU citizens.

Nonetheless, participating in the German economic and employment sector is not too difficult, no matter if the immigrant is an EU citizen or not, but it does hold more stringent requirements than the United States. Foreign-born workers in Germany must first have a job offer and then get a temporary residence permit which authorizes them to be in the country for work purposes. Next, immigrants tend to need to meet eligibility standards, such as being able to speak German and getting the approval to work that particular job by the Federal Employment Agency. Upon completion of all of that, the immigrant is then able to apply for a Residence Permit, with the length of stay determined by the immigrant’s employer.

This overall focus on the skill level and educational background of the immigrant relates back to the fact that the German immigration system is designed in a way that encourages the temporary entry of foreign workers rather than the acquisition of permanent residents. Because German birth rates significantly declined in the 19th century as well as most recently in 2015, leading to vacancies in jobs across the economic sector, Germany has actively tried to recruit foreign-born workers to fill those empty positions. Most of the individuals immigrating to Germany now are highly skilled and well-educated, and are taking jobs in high-paying positions where they can utilize their academic backgrounds.

The focus on temporary workers rather than permanent residents does not seem to have damaged Germany’s economy too much. In fact, with the recent surge of immigrants and asylum seekers from the Middle East and Africa in particular, Germany has experienced an economic boom. Data collected by the EU’s annual labor-force survey, which analyzes participation, employment, and unemployment rates for several demographics, reveals that between 2007 and 2017, the foreign-born employment rate in Germany for individuals aged 20 to 64 rose by 8 percent, increasing from 62 to 70 percent. Immigrants are not only coming to Germany in large numbers, but they are actively contributing to the economy by seeking jobs and earning an income. However, despite their economic success, immigration integration is not seamless and without complications. Created in 2005, the German government has utilized a nine-month integration course that attempts to “expedite the assimilation of approved asylees” and aid them in obtaining “needed linguistic skills, as well as softer cultural skills and understanding.” Because one of the requirements for a legal Residence Permit include the ability to speak the local language, that being German, this integration course assists with the acceleration of employment efforts.

Yet it is not just immigrants from other countries that have boosted the German economy. According to the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), intra-migrants from other EU states have boosted Germany’s GDP growth by approximately 0.2 percent every year from 2011 to 2016. Since 2011, about 10 million immigrants have entered Germany, half of them coming from other places in the EU. With the influx of migrants, the labor participation rate has increased, with data showing that EU migrants participate more in the economy than German natives. In 2017, employment rates for native Germans was 70.6 percent while their immigrant counterparts was 74.6 percent. Because their focus is on temporary workers, migrants head to Germany with the primary objective of finding a job and making money. Per Marius Clemens, an economic researcher at DIW Berlin, “Germany’s GDP would have grown by 1.2 percent instead of 1.5 percent in 2015” had it not been for EU immigration rates, therefore showing that “EU immigration has made-and continues to make-a considerable contribution to the economy.”

Irregardless, while both the United States and Germany are both desirable destinations by immigrants and are two countries that not only share a history of immigration, but are also facing a large influx of immigrants in the present day, neither of their immigration models is without fault. Whichever model is deemed the “better one” is based entirely off of the immigrants’ objective purpose. If the applicant wishes to become a permanent resident in the United States, then it is advisable that they not only be prepared to endure a long and arduous application and screening process, but that they steel themselves against the awaiting xenophobic attitudes and anti-immigrant rhetoric that is perpetuated by many American citizens. However, if the applicant wishes to find work in an environment that has a less strict process (to a degree), then Germany’s immigration model would be the better option.

Regarding immigrant participation in a nation’s economic sector, both the United States and Germany rely on foreign-born workers to boost their economy and contribute to economic growth. In these two respective countries, immigrant laborers and immigrant-owned businesses are invaluable in their contributions to the national economy. The overall participation process for an immigrant in either of these states is a long process, as to be expected, but once admitted into the country on a permanent or temporary basis, there are numerous opportunities for an individual to participate in the economic and employment sector and contribute to the national economy.

What's the Hold Up? USCIS and Immigration Delays

The Unites States of America is often described as a “melting pot”, with people from all over the world immigrate here in search of a better life for themselves and/or their families. Some come seeking educational or economic opportunity, while others come for asylum and safety. The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) is the federal agency that oversees the lawful immigration of people who are temporarily or permanently settling in the United States and is responsible for granting or denying immigration benefits to those individuals. Over a million immigrants and asylum-seekers enter the U.S. each year, with over 35 million applying and entering legally, and USCIS has been having a hard time keeping up. Between the large number of people coming to the U.S., along with new policies targeting the immigration system, USCIS has seen a significant backlog of cases that has been impacting the lives of many immigrants and their families.

USCIS was established on March 1, 2003 and is under purview of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). After the devastating events of September 11, 2001, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which fragmented the previous federal immigration agency into three new separate agencies under the DHS in order to enhance national security and improve efficiency in the handling and processing of cases they receive. These three agencies are the following: USCIS, which is responsible for immigration service functions; Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which is principally responsible for immigration enforcement; and Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which handles immigration enforcement and border security.

While security measures were definitely heightened after the three agencies were established, the efficiency aspect of the plan fell short. Long USCIS processing delays are now the norm for immigration cases across the board as the delays have reached crisis levels. Processing times increased by 46 percent over the past two fiscal years and an overall 91 percent since 2014. In fact, even though application submissions declined by 17 percent in 2018, processing times continued to rise. In some cases, H-1B petitions (temporary employment visas) can take up to a year for a decision. I-140 immigrant visa petitions that used to take about three months to process now take about eight months. Naturalization cases (N-400 and N-600 petitions) used to process in five months - now it is 10 months.The most recent backlogs and longer wait times can ultimately be attributed to the Trump Administration and its various immigration policies. While President Trump and his administration claim that they want to end “illegal” immigration, in actuality, they have made things far more difficult for immigrants seeking to enter the country by legal means. A recent analysis of USCIS data by the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) refers to these “crisis-level delays” as “bricks in the Trump administration’s ‘invisible wall’ curbing legal immigration in the United States.”

This state of affairs is exactly the opposite of what USCIS was intended to do. When USCIS was first created, its explicit priorities were to eliminate application backlogs and prevent future backlogs from forming. USCIS was meant to provide immigration benefits to customers; it was not intended to function like a law enforcement agency. Under President Trump however, things have not gone according to plan as the implementation of new security protocols has needlessly extended the processing of virtually every immigrant application. Recent changes in immigration policies are also contributing to these processing delays. In April 2017, President Trump signed his “Buy American and Hire American” executive order which impedes U.S. employers’ ability to recruit foreign labor. In particular, it restricts temporary H-1B visa holders in the name of “protecting American workers.” Under this order, USCIS will increase H-1B inspections and commence site visits of businesses that employ foreign workers holding “specialized knowledge” under the visa. USCIS says their goal under the broadened Administrative Site Visit and Verification Program is to prosecute employers who purposely misuse a subset of the 800,000-plus visa workers in today’s economy. Some say USCIS is now relying on anti-fraud investigations rather than rights. 

USCIS has implemented changes that also contribute to longer processing times. For example, they no longer give consideration to prior determinations made on applications. As a result, even extensions of stay require complete re-adjudications. This policy, adopted by memorandum in October 2017, rescinds prior guidance dating back to 2004 and 2015, which instructed officers that when adjudicating an application for renewal or extension of certain temporary visas for employment, they should near-automatically approve the application if the circumstances were substantially the same. USCIS claimed this way of doing so was “problematic” because of fear that the original application was fraudulent and it “shifted the burden of proof from the applicant to the officer.”

Another issue lies in the interview process. The 2017 institution of interviews for all employment-based green card cases has created substantial backlogs. Prior to the summer of 2017, the only benefits applicants who were interviewed as a matter of policy (as opposed to one-off situations with unique concerns) were marriage-based family green card cases. These cases represented about one-third of all green card admissions that USCIS handled in 2017. This means that the other two-thirds of USCIS cases had no recent contact with a USCIS officer before receiving their green card. Following the January 2017 presidential directive to improve the screening of applications, USCIS began interviewing all applicants seeking to adjust status to an employment green card (about 165,000 cases) and applicants who claim to be family members of asylees and refugees (both historically high-fraud categories). This has led to a significant increase in processing times for one-third of the USCIS caseload.

New USCIS policies have also led to a dramatic rise in requests for evidence, meaning that USCIS officers must adjudicate cases twice. However, the Administration’s focus on enforcement has diverted resources from adjudication. Suspensions of premium processing have made it impossible to speed up adjudications even in the most desperate cases.

Not only are these processing delays bad for the government, but they have serious consequences for the employment sector. U.S. businesses are hurt when they cannot obtain work visas for necessary or key employees in a timely way. Foreign-national employees become disenchanted due to their inability to obtain a legal status and may leave the U.S. for better opportunities. Families suffer financially when dependents cannot obtain work authorization. Vulnerable populations also suffer greatly when they cannot obtain protection under U.S. immigration laws. 

On May 13, 2019, 38 members of Congress from both sides of the aisle sent a letter to Kenneth Cuccinelli, the Director of USCIS, questioning the delays. They pointed out that USCIS was created “to be a service-oriented, immigration service agency with the mission to adjudicate immigration matters to enable individuals to obtain work authorization, citizenship, humanitarian protection and other important services.” But the new mission statement issued by USCIS in early 2018 no longer emphasizes customer satisfaction. Rather, it focuses solely on enforcement.

To fix this problem, changes have to be made at the policy level. However, given the fact that there is currently a divided government and immigration is a hotly contested topic between the Trump Administration and both chambers of Congress, the reality is that the U.S. will not be seeing real policy change anytime soon. What Congress can do in the meantime is continue to hold agencies like USCIS and DHS accountable through hearings or meetings with members of each respective agency. Members of Congress are also in a unique position because their individual offices in their districts have the power to handle immigration cases. 

The probability that any of these policies will be reversed in the near future is slim and, even if they are reversed, it would take time to implement the new policies and even more time for agencies to adjust to them. Yet, it is not impossible and there is a way to work around the current policies to try to make things run more efficiently. Congress could also look into providing more funding to USCIS. If they are given more funding, they can hire more staff, more caseworkers, and get access to more resources. Congress could appropriate funds that are earmarked for infrastructure and technology improvements that will speed up processing rates.

The Politics of Belonging: Fearful Nationalism and its Ramifications for Global Stateless Populations

Nationalism is the fruit that blooms from the tree of fear. When populations fear that their resources and government institutions are insufficient to provide for their imagined ‘native’ populations, they subsequently become fearful of the incursion of populations believed to be different from the national ‘in’ group. This fearful, paranoid nationalism leads to discussions of who does or does not belong within a nation, often delineated along ethnic or religious lines. Stateless populations, who exist at the fringes of state control or who are the subject of targeted campaigns of expulsion, face the direct consequences of exclusionary conceptions of the nation state. In the summer of 2018, statelessness catapulted into the international eye through the harrowing escape of the Moo Pa, or ‘Wild Boars,’ soccer team from a flooded cave in the Chiang Rai province of Thailand. This area of Thailand borders Myanmar, and its relative isolation from the metropole of state power in Bangkok results in the local population facing significant difficulties in receiving state support. The territorially-envisioned nation state struggles to adequately accommodate populations such as those in Chiang Rai, whose ethnic and linguistic boundaries do not cleanly align with national boundaries. Some local populations in Chiang Rai are nomadic, and separated from much of the world by treacherous mountainous terrain. Following the rescue of the Moo Pa team, three of the players and their coach were granted citizenship by the Thai government, highlighting many local populations’ struggles with statelessness. While the state may not play a large role in daily life in Chiang Rai, without recognition as citizens, people cannot vote, buy land, travel, or even be legally employed. Stateless populations the world over share these hardships, and the UNHCR identifies Southeast Asia as home to the world’s largest stateless population. Yet, despite this, it is impossible to pinpoint a single cause for statelessness. Statelessness occurs for many disparate reasons, and the analysis of the enclaves along the Indian-Bangladeshi Border, the persecution of the Lhotsampa population in Bhutan, and the nomadic Bajau Laut in the Sulu Sea near Malaysia will exemplify the different causes of statelessness. Through this comparison, an overarching narrative of fearful nationalism counterproductively diverting state efforts away from extending the benefits of citizenship to their populations and instead increasing border security emerges. In order to end statelessness, national governments must reconceptualize their role, prioritizing guaranteeing the right to citizenship over preventing undocumented migration.

Statistics on statelessness fail to paint a full picture of the problem, given that they primarily rely on estimates. Still, Myanmar and Thailand are two of the three nations with the largest stateless populations on the globe. The issue is rife across Southeast Asia, with the majority of Southeast Asian nations hosting stateless populations. UNHCR is unable to calculate the stateless populations in China and India, yet given that these are the two most populous nations, it is safe to assume that both host sizeable stateless populations as well. In Myanmar, the Rohingya population in Rakhine state faces an explicit campaign of expulsion perpetrated by Buddhist state leaders due to the formers Muslim faith, resulting in the majority of all stateless people in Southeast Asia hailing from Myanmar. The Khmer Krom population living in Vietnam similarly faces statelessness, due to the perceived alterity associated with their residence close to the Cambodian-Vietnamese border. Malaysia hosts a sizeable population of descendants of Sri Lankan, Filipino, and Indonesian migrant workers, from both pre- and post-colonial times, who remain stateless. Many Bangladeshi Biharis are stateless, due to beliefs of their ‘otherness’ stemming from the Bangladesh Liberation War nearly half a century ago. Ethnically Han Chinese populations in India and Indonesia are similarly often stateless. A loosely defined area termed ‘Zomia’ that stretches through the remote hill-regions of Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and Myanmar is home to many stateless indigenous peoples known as ‘Hill Tribes.’ Refugee populations across the entire region are also at acute risk of statelessness. All of these populations experience undue difficulties accessing state resources, yet states’ fears of undocumented migration obfuscate efforts to extend citizenship to stateless populations.

Data from UNHCR via Marie McAuliffe

Statelessness primarily stems from targeted discrimination, exclusionary legal structures, complex histories, and inadequate state capacity, and each of these causes fall under the larger umbrella of fearful nationalism, for nations focus on keeping perceived outsiders out of their nations. Nations fears’ of undocumented members of groups outside of their imagined national ‘in’ group result in policies that overemphasize bureaucratic procedures and documentation that stateless populations are often unable to produce, and fail to achieve nations’ core goal of providing for their populations’ basic needs. Willem Van Schendel explains in his writing in The Journal of Asian Studies that “the contiguous, uninterrupted homeland is a fiction, as is obvious from the fact that many nations and states have learned to live with discontinuous territories,” yet still, states focus on preventing undocumented migration from these discontinuous territories rather than developing solutions to extend citizenship to the residents of such areas.

The politics of belonging plays a key role in this securitization, because groups native to a nation may be deemed ‘outsiders’ and thus forcefully expelled from states in the purported interest of security. The well-documented plight of the Rohingya population in Myanmar exhibits the most pronounced example of this, with the discriminatory 1982 Burmese citizenship law delineating citizenship as exclusively open to 135 recognized ethnic groups. The Rohingya population is not one of these recognized groups, and thus the 1.1 million Burmese Rohingya have no documentation to verify their legal residence, and can thereby be forcefully expelled through targeted military action. The government’s refusal to grant them citizenship results in the Rohingya’s inability to legally marry or own property. The government claims that they are all illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, referencing the similarities between the Rohingya’s language and the Bangladeshi language Chittagong, despite the long history that the Rohingya have in Myanmar. Based on these claims, the Burmese government inhibits the Rohingya’s movement, healthcare, and education. Following the Burmese military’s systematic campaigns of expulsion, nearly one million Rohingya fled to Bangladesh, yet the Bangladeshi government prohibited these refugees from marrying its own citizens, hoping to prevent them from gaining Bangladeshi citizenship. These actions are the direct result of fearful conceptions of the nation state that attempt to exclude populations deemed to not belong from utilizing state institutions.

Fearful nationalism further incurs statelessness in areas on the fringes of state control.  This fear motivates states to dedicate efforts to combatting undocumented migration that would be more effectively spent building state institutional capacity in such areas. In Chiang Rai, Thailand, where the Moo Pa soccer team hails from, more than half a million members of Thai minority hill tribes are stateless, despite generations of residence in Thailand. The bureaucratic process to obtain citizenship in Thailand is especially arduous, in an attempt to ensure that economic migrants deemed to ‘illegitimate’ cannot gain citizenship. No matter the number of ancestral generations who lived in Thailand, Thai citizenship is inseparably tied to possession of a blue citizenship ID card. Procuring such an ID card no small task, with the required paperwork stretching roughly 50 pages, and a stateless hill tribe population that has little access to the formal schooling necessary to successfully complete such paperwork. While the application process for citizenship is intended to last three months, some applications have floundered in administrative limbo for up to 15 years. Lucy McCray of the International Justice Mission (IJM) elucidates that this protracted application process results from the fact that “district officers’ confusion about the law frequently leads to the refusal in acceptance of citizenship applications. While the punishment for approving ineligible citizenship application can result in the officers’ dismissal, there is no punishment for inaction.” While Thailand’s government has a stated goal of eradicating statelessness by 2024, the obstacles faced by rural populations near Thailand’s borders illustrate how fearful nationalism drives nations to prioritize securitization of the expansion of state capacity.

Graphic from the Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion

The ramifications of stateless status inimically propel populations into cyclical poverty without the documentation necessary to access state resources during times of hardship. These ramifications are far reaching, with Robyn N. Lui identifying that stateless populations have no legal protection, face impaired physical, economic, and psycho-social well-being, and often strain both their own and their host communities. Furthermore, the populations who incur these negative consequences often became stateless when fleeing even more hostile circumstances. Emphasizing the prevention of undocumented migration rather than the protection of human rights directly harms stateless refugee populations such as the Rohingya currently living in refugee camps in Bangladesh near the border to Myanmar. Stateless populations’ economic potential is incredibly diminished by their lack of documentation. In Thailand, national immigration law that originally restricted stateless people’s movement to the district they lived in was amended in 2016 to allow travel through their entire province, yet this limited mobility still impairs their ability to seek adequate work and receive government-sponsored education and training. Moreover, without legal status, stateless populations have no access to credit or land ownership, both of which are important prerequisites for upward economic mobility in rural economies. Without sufficient documentation and resources, many stateless people are forced to participate in the informal economy. They may seek work through a third party, and without legal protections such third parties can exploit the stateless. Stateless women, in particular, are at risk of exploitation, leading to high rates of sex trafficking. This begins a ruinous cycle, for women may see the paltry pay received through sex work as preferable to destitution, yet this survival sex forces its participants to avoid government interaction for fear of arrest and lost income, thereby preventing trafficked stateless women from ever receiving the benefits of citizenship through official channels. A Thai hill tribe member succinctly explains the harm caused by statelessness, saying that “my life would’ve been very different if I had citizenship from when I was born, because then, I would’ve been able to plan and dream about what I wanted to do in the future. Instead I have spent my life chasing after citizenship, using a lot of money, and losing out on so many opportunities.”

Graphic from UNHCR

A global obsession with who belongs rather than what rights are guaranteed equally harms stateless populations resulting from complex history, exclusionary legal structures, and insufficient state capacity, as demonstrated through analysis of the enclaves of India and Bangladesh, the Lhotsampa of Bhutan, and the Bajau Laut of Malaysia.

The Enclaves of India and Bangladesh

The idiosyncrasies of India’s decolonization, the partition of India and Pakistan, and the Bangladesh Liberation War left borders that do not neatly conform to Westphalian visions of territorial continuity, yet parochial machinations of border protection fail to adequately adapt to such incongruous state borders. In India, the estimated size of the stateless population ranges from four to ten million people. Significant efforts have been made to combat undocumented migration, with more than 100 special courts established near the borders to Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh to decide who legally belongs in the nation, declaring upwards of 85,000 people foreigners since 1985. Yet, there have not been similar efforts dedicated to resolving the tribulations of the populations living in the 123 Indian enclaves in Bangladesh and the 74 Bangladeshi enclaves in India. These populations are isolated from their own state resources by their territorial separation, and common Indian and Bangladeshi emphasis on border security inhibits the free movement of the sequestered enclave populations. Entirely surrounded by foreign nations hostile to their passage, the enclaves’ populations’ access to resources is exclusively limited to those in their own town. The enclaves do not have their own independent passport offices, nor do they have consular offices for the nation surrounding them. As a result, in order to receive the documentation necessary to access their own state’s resources, enclave populations must break the law of the nation that surrounds them and cross through it illegally to reach their own nation’s main territory. There, they can either break their own nation’s law by entering illegally, or travel long distances to reach an official entry point and hope that the border guards will be sympathetic to their situation. After entering their own nation, enclave people must first apply for and receive a national passport, and then travel a long distance to a consular office of the nation that surrounds their enclave and apply for a visa. This visa will allow them the freedom of movement necessary to access their own nation’s institutions, yet when the visa expires, the entire cycle starts over. The strong emphasis both India and Bangladesh place on combating undocumented migration places enclave populations at risk of being shot and killed if they are discovered crossing through the nation that surrounds them without the proper documentation, documentation that is not available to them within their enclave. An opportunity to resolve this problem presented itself at the 1953 passport conference, where ‘multiple entry visas’ were proposed to allow the free movement of enclave peoples, yet this was never implemented, and the situation persists more than half a century later. Willem Van Schendel explains the ramifications of this failure, for “…by omitting the enclave people from the passport agreement, both India and Pakistan abandoned them as citizens. Marooned in their enclaves, they could not leave without infringing the laws of both countries.” Without freedom of movement, the enclaves persist without access to their own governments’ institutions, rendering their populations stateless. The enclaves’ residents cannot register new births, attend state universities, or even vote in their own nation’s elections, highlighting how fearful nationalism that emphasizes border protection damages populations living in territorial gray areas due to complex histories.

Map via Hosna J. Shewly

The Lhotsampa of Bhutan

The global emphasis on the politics of belonging also allows nations to construct narratives of alterity to justify the expulsion of unwanted populations, and such is the case with the Lhotsampa of Bhutan. Although similar to the recent expulsion of the Rohingya population in Myanmar, the persecution of the Lhotsampa began in the 1980s and receives far less attention. Currently, there are more than 120,000 exiled Lhotsampa living in Nepal and between 15,000 and 30,000 living in India. The Lhotsampa practice Hindu traditions and speak Nepali, neither of which were problems until a new king assumed the throne and began to implement nationalist policies based on support for the Drukpa sect of Buddhism. Previously, King Jigme Dorji Wangchuck held a pluralistic view of Bhutanese society, and worked with the Bhutan National Assembly to pass the Royal Edict on Lhotsampa Citizenship Act, which granted citizenship to migrants from Nepal who were living and working in the country. King Jigme Dorji Wangchuck also enacted several reforms that began to secularize the nation. In 1972, he died and power transferred to his son, King Jigme Singye Wangchuck. Initially, King Jigme Singye Wangchuck continued his father’s legacy, but the Drukpa political elite gained the new king’s support in the late 1980s, resulting in resurgence in fearful nationalism that felt intimidated by the presence of the Hindu Lhotsampa. The Drukpa and the Lhotsampa are not the only populations in Bhutan, with other ethnic groups such as the Ngalung, the Sharchop, and multiple groups of indigenous peoples, yet under guidance by the Drukpa elite, the king adopted a ‘One Nation, One People’ policy that heavy-handedly glossed over such ethnic differences. Under this policy, Buddhism became the national religion and Drukpa symbols and traditions became national, ignoring the multifaceted heritage of the Bhutanese population. Part and parcel with this shift came a new fear of the Lhotsampa minority, who were the second largest group to the Drukpa, and thus perceived as the most threatening.

The government of Bhutan weaponized citizenship laws to achieve their goal of Buddhist supremacy, constructing a narrative that the Hindu Lhotsampa did not belong in the country. In 1985, a new Citizenship Act was passed that restricted routes to citizenship to those that the Lhotsampa cannot fulfill: birth, registration, and naturalization. Birth citizenship in Bhutan is based on jus sanguinis, or blood, requiring that both parents of a child be Bhutanese citizens for a child to receive citizenship, rather than jus soli, or soil, where all children born in a nation receive citizenship, as guaranteed by the American 14th amendment. Registering for citizenship requires land-tax receipts from before 1958 to prove historical residence in Bhutan, which is excessively difficult for Lhotsampa to produce in 1985 not only because of the nearly 30 years passed, but also because some Lhotsampa only began to pay taxes after they were granted citizenship by royal edict in 1958. Even in cases where Lhotsampa could produce such documentation, government officials have evicted them nonetheless. Finally, the prerequisites for naturalization are designed to exclude the Lhotsampa, including a requirement to speak Dzongkha, given that the majority of Lhotsampa speak only Nepali. These laws rendered the majority of the Bhutanese Lhotsampa population stateless, forcing the majority of the Lhotsampa to flee to refugee camps in Nepal. Fearful nationalist leaders also attempted to deter Bhutanese citizens from marrying Lhotsampa, with the constitution declaring that you cannot receive land or loans from the state or hold an elected office if you marry a non-citizen. The systematic discrimination against the Lhotsampa is evidenced by the almost total lack of representation of Lhotsampa in public offices, as illustrated by the image below. In 1990, the Lhotsampa population demonstrated for the restoration of their rights, yet the government instead reacted with punitive measures that require Lhotsampa to carry No Objection Certificates in order to receive a passport, receive scholarships, apply for government jobs, or even for their children to attend school. These policies demonstrate how narratives of belonging and state security allow for the use of citizenship laws to exclude populations, ignoring the denial of human rights that such laws incur.

Data from UNDP via Dhurba Rizal

The Bajau Laut in Eastern Sabah, Malaysia

Legal statehood is often tied to a fixed, terrestrial home, and the seafaring, nomadic Bajau Laut who live in floating villages in the Sulu Sea near Eastern Sabah, Malaysia, suffer from statelessness due to the Malaysian state’s inability to accommodate their non-terrestrial residence. The Sulu Sea sits between the Malaysian portion of the island of Borneo and the Philippines, although the Bajau Laut are not strictly confined to this region, and can sometimes be found as far north as the South China Sea and as far south as the Arafura sea between Papua New Guinea and Australia. The Bajau Laut did not always live an exclusively aquatic lifestyle, initially splitting their time between cultivating rice on land during the wet season and living at sea to fish during the dry season, yet the addition of ‘laut’ to Bajau specifically denotes ‘sea Bajau.’ Today, some Bajau Laut still blur the line between Bajau and Bajau Laut, living on houseboats in port towns such as Semporna, Malaysia, or living along the eastern coast of Sabah and only occasionally venturing out to sea. Still, the majority of the Bajau Laut live at sea in transborder regions, beyond the reach of many Malaysian state institutions.

The Bajau Laut’s aquatic home outside of traditional territorial delineations results in the Malaysian government’s reticence to extend them the rights of citizenship, electing to prioritize strict immigration policy over provision for the Bajau Laut’s needs. Malaysian immigration policy makes no distinction between undocumented immigrants, stateless people, refugees, and asylum seekers, because Malaysia is neither a signatory to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention nor to the 1954 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. Combined with the Malaysian government’s characterization of the Bajau Laut as illegal immigrants and recent transplants, the Bajau Laut have little protection from arbitrary arrest and no guarantee of legal due process. Indeed, their stateless status impairs the wellbeing of the Bajau Laut in many ways, for, as Greg Acciaioli, Helen Brunt, and Julian Clifton explain in the Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies, “where only ‘genuine’ or ‘authentic’ citizens have access to civil registration, education, legal employment, and affordable health care, groups such as the Bajau Laut face insurmountable barriers when even attempting to register their births.” Beyond this, new discussions surrounding environmental protection areas intersect with the Bajau Laut’s subsistence, for it is entirely possible that fishing in traditional areas may be banned under new protections dictated by a political process that the Bajau Laut are deprived any say in. The alterity of the Bajau Laut was heightened by the ‘Tanduo Incident’ in 2013, wherein rogue Filipino militants invaded eastern Sabah, and the Malaysia military was forced to intervene. Following this, fears of foreign incursion and migration control efforts intensified, damaging the Bajau Laut, who are perceived as outsiders by the Malaysian government. A security zone established in the sea between the Philippines and Borneo following the Tanduo Incident restricts all nighttime sea travel, limiting the Bajau Laut’s ability to both work and live in waters in which some have spent their entire lives. This security zone increased the number of undocumented migrants in neighboring areas of Indonesian Borneo, plausibly the result of Bajau Laut attempting to comply with the curfew. Yet, Indonesia deports these undocumented immigrants to Malaysian Borneo, where Malaysian authorities may subsequently deport them again to the Philippines, with all governments involved persistently avoiding the root cause of the problem: a lack of adequate state capacity to accommodate populations who do not fit into traditional territorial ideas of statehood. As further explained by Acciaioli, Brunt, and Clifton, “against a backdrop of ultranationalism, ethnocentrism, and the politics of alterity, groups such as the Bajau Laut, living in…the ‘ungoverned periphery’ of contemporary nation-states, are rejected as ‘outsiders’ and subjected to either forced sedentarization or expulsion.” Categorizing the Bajau Laut as ‘outsiders’ allows governments to justify choosing the solution nearest at hand and increase border security rather than undertaking the more difficult process of expanding state capacity to extend the rights of citizenship to the Bajau Laut.

Prioritizing Belonging over Borders

Beginning the work to end statelessness entails a three-pronged approach, wherein national birth registration programs must be established to ensure that all people born within nations receive citizenship, regional funding mechanism must be established to prevent implementation costs from inhibiting birth registration programs, and, most importantly, nations must prioritize belonging over borders.

Expanding birth registration addresses statelessness at the root, laying the foundation for a future without statelessness. Any initiative seeking to expand access to birth registration must not only expedite the registration process, but also build state capacity to reach populations on the fringes of tradition state power, such as the Bajau Laut and the Thai hill tribes. Birth registration initiatives should focus on areas and times where their efforts will yield the most benefit, such as at marketplaces on holidays when remote populations are likely to congregate. Technology should concurrently be used to increase awareness of registration campaigns, utilizing the types of technology that remote populations are most likely to have access to, such as radios. Registration programs must also be open to adults in order to retroactively address those who were not registered at their time of birth. Cambodia exhibits the efficacy of a robust state effort to prioritize birth registration. A team of 13,000 people was trained to begin a massive registration campaign, transforming the nation from having less than 5 percent of births registered before 2000 to having 91 percent of all people registered by 2005, with an astounding 7 million people registered in the first 10 months of the initiative. Crucially, the program coordinated cross-cutting participation from the entire population, including monks and school teachers. Registration was also made free for newborns and financially accessible for late registrations, ensuring that poverty would not preclude citizenship. Funding from the Asian Development Bank also rewarded those volunteers who registered more than 100 people, ensuring high participation. The important role of the Asian Development Bank in the success of Cambodia’s registration drive highlights the importance of funding mechanisms.

Nations must be enabled to enact birth registration programs without fear of sacrificing other national initiatives through regionally coordinated funding mechanisms. ASEAN’s regional immigration agreements focus almost exclusively on skilled migration, neglecting to address the prevention of statelessness. Adopting a regional policy on statelessness is difficult because ASEAN operates based on consensus, yet establishing a regional funding mechanism to allow nations to independently undertake their own birth registration programs would conform to the ‘ASEAN way’ of emphasizing national sovereignty. ASEAN is not the only multilateral organization that should fund such initiatives, given that the problem extends far beyond the organization’s bounds, as evidenced by Bhutan, which is not an ASEAN member. Given the incongruity of Southeast Asian states’ ratification of international conventions, a funding mechanism could also enable a regional review of legal shortcomings.

Above all else, a new conception of the nation state must be promoted that emphasizes citizenship as an inalienable right, transcending legal structures that currently reinforce ethnic nepotism and the patrilineal passage of citizenship. While it is impossible to entirely transcend the divided sovereignty of the global nation state system, it is possible to reconceptualize ‘belonging’ as a right for all people rather than a guarded quantity.  Thailand is a clear example of a successful reconception of the right to statehood as universal. The 2008 Civil Registration Act confirms a jus soli idea of citizenship, with all children born in Thailand receiving Thai citizenship, regardless of the status of their parents. While questions still linger regarding the total implementation of this law, with populations in remote areas often still not receiving birth registration, this legal change is a crucial step to eliminating statelessness in Thailand. Indonesia also took a productive step in the year 2000 when it naturalized 110,000 stateless ethnic Chinese living within its borders. Fearful nationalism can be stifled by a destigmatization of migrants and a change in tone in the rhetoric surrounding migration. Rather than discussing the ‘threat’ of migrants, political leaders and media outlets should make a conscious effort to emphasize the ‘deservingness’ of all people of a set of basic rights, including citizenship. Too often, nations conflate people's’ identity with their right to belong, as was the case in India after partition, where Hindus were assumed to be Indian and Muslims were assumed to be Pakistani, regardless of their actual place of residence. Acciaioli, Brunt, and Clifton expound that “such policies, based on the necessity of extruding an alien ‘Other’ to bolster the sense of security of an increasingly demoralized citizenry, have contributed to the increasing pressures to deny political belonging to groups such as the Bajau Laut.” Nations must adopt the not-so-radical stance that all humans deserve to belong somewhere, and develop policies that reflect such an attitude. Citizenship cannot be restricted to pass through only one parent, as this perpetuates pernicious gender disparities. Legal structures must ensure to remove all exclusionary requirements from citizenship, such as requirements of any specific ethnicity, religion, or language. The development of the state capacity required to permanently end statelessness can only occur through a shift away from a fearful nationalism that emphasizes border security to a progressive nationalism that extends the right to belong to all people.

The Balancing Act: Preserving National Sovereignty in ASEAN while Promoting Regional Growth and Protecting Migrant Rights

As a regional organization, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) prides itself on forging its own course, yet ASEAN should not allow this fierce independence to inhibit the achievement of its economic and humanitarian goals. Roughly 40% of all migrants who originate from within ASEAN remain within the nations of the regional organization. This arises from patterns of cyclical migration stemming from the temporary nature of the low-paid, low-skilled work that drives the majority of migration in the region. Such transient labor forces result in a population of nearly 7 million intra-ASEAN migrants, constituting almost 10% of the region’s total population. Analysis of ASEAN’s labor force by the International Labour Organization reveals that an amalgamated sum of three-fifths of the total working population in ASEAN work in vulnerable employment. Vulnerably employed workers lack formal work arrangements, and thus lack guaranteed minimum wages or safe working conditions. Of the total 179 million workers in vulnerable employment in ASEAN, 92 million do not earn enough to escape poverty. The migrant population faces additional challenges, for, while formal migration channels are open to high-skilled professionals, the low-skilled migrant population that composes the majority of all migrants lacks the same migration opportunities. This gap in regional migration policy creates large numbers of undocumented migrants. Furthermore, the lack of adequate migration policy endangers undocumented low-skilled migrant by forcing them to work for exploitative employers who hire migrant to work in hazardous working conditions for substandard wages. Current structural limitations and disparate national priorities impede ASEAN’s ability to protect migrant rights, and thus impedes communal growth. Understanding the inimical contrast between ASEAN nations’ distinct national goals and ASEAN’s collective goals allows the reader to understand that binding supranational migrant rights protections are a prerequisite for regional growth.

Due to ASEAN’s organizational structure, which requires full consensus to pass any agreement, and ASEAN nations’ strong emphasis on independent sovereignty, ASEAN lags behind the rest of the international community in terms of humanitarian law. While the United Nations General Assembly passed the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families in 1990, ASEAN took its first steps towards cohesive regional migration policy in 2007 with the release of the “Cebu Declaration,” or the Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers. It took another 10 years after this declaration for ASEAN to adopt the Manila Consensus on the Protection and Promotion of Rights of Migrant Workers, signing the declaration in 2017. Scholars often laud ASEAN’s subalternity, noting that the regional organization fights to preserve its postcolonial autonomy through its lack of supranational authority that could infringe on member states’ sovereignty by enforcing external norms. In order to maintain regional priority cohesion without supranational authority, ASEAN periodically releases a statement of its community vision. The most recent community vision outlines in its fourth goal a desire to “…realise a rules-based, people-oriented, people-centred ASEAN Community, where our peoples enjoy human rights and fundamental freedoms…” and, in its tenth goal, a desire to build “a highly integrated and cohesive regional economy that supports sustained high economic growth by increasing trade, investment, and job creation…” with the eventual goal of creating an ASEAN common market. An ASEAN common market would entail the free movement of labor, goods, services, and capital, and in 2015 ASEAN founded the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) with this goal in mind. Efforts such as the Manila Consensus and the AEC provide clear examples of the potential benefits of heightened communal action, yet they also underscore the difficulty in reaching decisive action in an organization that relies on consensus. Disparate national priorities often become roadblocks to effective action, leaving important issues to be addressed solely at the state level. Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines prefer the idea of more robust and centralized ASEAN institutions, while Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and Myanmar prioritize protecting their autonomy. These incongruent goals hamper ASEAN’s efficacy on issues that require collective action. ASEAN adopted the Vientiane Action Programme (VAP) at its tenth summit in 2004, aimed at streamlining ASEAN integration; however, while the VAP commits to addressing ASEAN’s lack of a human rights framework, it is limited in function to research and monitoring. Many ASEAN member states have fragmented national identities, which, when combined with a strong memory of external influence during ASEAN nations’ colonial histories, results in a strong emphasis on national sovereignty. The ramifications of this sentiment are elucidated by Pranoto Iskandar of the Institute for Migrant Rights, who postulates that “the predominant activism has willfully disengaged itself from the international concept of human rights and embraced a ‘nationalist’ conception that has eschewed non-citizens’ entitlement to human rights in the domestic legal systems.” As a result, national self-interest often mars ASEAN humanitarian efforts, with the ASEAN Community Vision 2025 specifically identifying the free movement of “skilled labour, [and] business persons” when discussing an ASEAN common market, promoting the rights of upper-class migrants that nations desire while ignoring the rights of low-skilled migrants. National self-interest further complicates consensus on regional migration compacted by stratifying the interests of nations that primarily send migrants, and nations that primarily receive migrants, each of which prioritize their own distinct objectives. The current Manila Consensus privileges the rights of wealthy migrants, such as educated professionals and tourists, while failing to adequately protect the rights of the low-skilled workers who constitute the majority of the migrant population. Although chapter 7 of the Manila Consensus pledges to create an “action plan” on protecting migrant workers’ rights, ASEAN does not command the adequate enforcement mechanisms to implement such an action plan. To maintain its strength, the organization must chart a course that both circumvents interventionist human rights regimes that privilege norms exported by the West and avoids relying on postcolonial elites who mobilize on national autonomy for personal gain for human rights enforcement. ASEAN can preserve its postcolonial autonomy while simultaneously enhancing its subalternity by developing a new structure for regional cooperation that effectively protects migrant rights without imposing external norms on nations. This new structure can take the form of regulatory regionalism, which allows for nations to adhere to mutually agreed upon rules under the auspices of their own sovereign governments. A migrant rights framework with binding language will fulfill the ASEAN Community Vision 2025’s fifth and tenth goals by not only protect ASEAN citizens’ human rights, but also by enabling greater communal growth through regional economic integration.

The ‘ASEAN Way’ of operating purely on consensus is indeed a triumph of subalternity, yet, when combined with sending nations’ and receiving nations’ disparate migration policy goals, it inhibits the creation of an effective migrant rights framework. Current policies problematically distinguish between professional migrants and low-skilled migrants, restricting the rights of low-skilled migrants. The low-skilled migrants denied sufficient legal protection by current laws already work in precarious environs, due to the lack of labor rights that innately comes with their undocumented migration status. Low-skilled migrants in ASEAN endure high migration costs, lengthy travel times, and complex migration paths, even within the legitimate migration frameworks, and inadequate regional guidance exacerbates these tolls for irregular migrants. Article 56 of the Manila Consensus outlines that governments will, “for humanitarian reasons, closely cooperate to resolve the case of migrant workers who, through no fault of their own, have subsequently become undocumented,” however ambiguity in the definition of ‘humanitarian reasons’ imperils migrants by leaving interpretation open to national governments. The focus of the Manila Consensus, as a whole, illustrates its limitations, for the rights outlined in the document only apply to documented migrant workers, bypassing the majority of the migrant population that is undocumented. While drafting the document, the Philippines proposed that the consensus should be ‘morally binding,’ while Indonesia suggested that the document should instead be ‘legally binding,’ and this schism resulted in a final consensus that is neither morally nor legally binding. This is but one example of the difficulties rooted in operating on consensus, yet, interestingly, both the Philippines and Indonesia are primarily labor-sending nations, and the majority of conflicts on migration policy emerge between labor-sending and labor-receiving nations. Migration within ASEAN falls into two normative patterns, with Laura Allison-Reumann of the Nanyang Technological University in Singapore explaining that “the first involves the Greater Mekong Subregion with workers from Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam primarily moving to Thailand for work; and the second involves Brunei, Malaysia, and Singapore as destination countries for workers from Indonesia and the Philippines.” The priorities of sending and receiving states diverge because sending states focus on the human rights of their citizens abroad, while receiving states focus on the economic implications of hosting migrant workers. State policies diverge due to the disparate national discourses surrounding migration, with some nations portraying their migrant worker populations abroad as victims and others portraying them as heroes, resulting in different policy approaches towards worker rights. Furthermore, the Cebu Declaration and the Manila Consensus both counterproductively stratify the obligations of sending and receiving nations, rather than emphasizing the shared responsibility of all nations to protect the human rights of migrants, both those migrating from them and those migrating into them. Even if the Manila Consensus defined specific national obligations, the lack of binding language makes the agreement virtually superficial. Although Myanmar is a signatory to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which guarantees children the right to nationality and registration at birth, as well as a signatory to the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, the Rohingya minority in Myanmar is routinely denied citizenship and are the target of rampant human rights abuses, demonstrating the weakness of nonbinding agreements. Undocumented migrants must be afforded the same human rights as migrants who travel through formal channels, and these rights can only be protected by legally binding language.

Policies that differentiate between high-skilled and low-skilled workers impede human rights promotion because they provide institutional justification for neglecting the needs of populations already prone to dangerous working conditions and exploitative employers. ASEAN member states enacted eight Mutual Recognition Arrangements (MRAs) that expedite the migration process for professions deemed to be especially desirable, such as doctors and engineers. While the AEC should aspire to achieving free migration for all of its citizens, the majority of all ASEAN migration is from the six poorer nations to the Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia, and Thailand, and is predominantly by low-skilled workers. Without legally binding protections, these low-skilled migrants are at risk of abuse, and the economic benefit they confer will diminish. Article 57 of the Manila Consensus provides hope for a more robust migration framework, recommending that nations “take measures to prevent and curb the flow of undocumented migrant workers and explore cooperation and coordination among ASEAN Member States in providing assistance to those who are in need of protection.” For such an agreement to manifest itself, motivated leadership or widespread interest is needed. The Philippines chaired ASEAN in 2007 when the Cebu Declaration was signed and in 2017 when the Manila Consensus was signed, and this makes sense given that the Philippines sends the largest number of labor migrants worldwide, providing the motivated leadership necessary. Currently, however, Singapore occupies the ASEAN Chairmanship, and migration is not one of the issues Singapore identified as is focus. Thus, the nations of ASEAN must recognize the benefits attached to more liberal migration policies and migrant rights protections in order to achieve the widespread interest necessary to adopt a new framework with binding language.

One such benefit is the economic growth that a transient regional labor force facilitates, providing sound justification for ASEAN nations to pursue a binding migrant rights framework that will enable greater worker migration. The Manila Consensus acknowledges that migrants are the “driving force of economic growth in ASEAN,” as expounded by Khampheng Saysompheng, Minister of Labour and Social Welfare Ministry of Lao PDR and Chair of ASEAN Labour Ministers Meeting. The economic growth already experienced within the region is unevenly distributed, tied to the uneven distribution of migrants throughout the region. Unemployment in Thailand is at 1.5%, while it is at 10.9% in the Philippines, and three quarters of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the region flows into Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia, leaving the other seven nations in ASEAN to split the remaining quarter. Even within nations, the benefits of growth are not equally shared, with women, minorities, and rural communities given short shrift. Despite these disparities, both sending and receiving nations enjoy some level of economic benefit from migration, indicating that a comprehensive and binding migration framework would benefit the region as a whole by increasing migrant flows. Although not ASEAN members, Japan and Taiwan both illustrate the correlation between migration and investment, following what Japanese scholars call the ‘flying geese’ model of development, wherein one nation experiences growth that is a catalyst for foreign investment, and thus becomes the target of migrant flows from neighboring nations, and these regional migrant flows build economic linkages that enhance the prosperity of both nations. The arguments against liberal migration policies such as free labor movement within a common market hinge on the influx of migrants reducing the number of jobs available to locals and lowering wages in already low pay low-skilled work. In reality, data from the World Bank verifies that migration doesn’t depress wages in receiving countries. Indeed, liberal migration policies in a binding consensus would also enable firms to attract populations with specific desired skill sets to migrate to them, allowing nations in the region to build their competitive advantages, and thus all the nations in ASEAN would benefit from gains through regional trade due to nations’ disparate specializations. In addition, a freer flow of labor, goods, services, and capital through an AEC common market would provide more benefit through the jobs created by the economic growth it enables than the detriments perceived to be brought by heightened migration. The World Bank postulates that any ‘brain drain’ incurred within ASEAN due to more liberal migration would be offset by ‘brain circulation’ wherein educated workers move regionally to where their skills are in demand. The regional trade enabled by free labor migration of all types of workers is key to communal growth, with World Bank data demonstrating that “…a 1 percent increase in the bilateral stock of migrants increases bilateral trade by 0.11 percent, though there does not seem to be a difference in the pro-trade effects of low- and high-skilled migrants.” The relationship between regional growth and liberal regional migration is clearly illustrated above, and ASEAN can benefit from such regional growth and quicken its progress towards a common market with a binding regional migration policy.

Achieving both stronger migrant rights protection and greater regional growth does not require the supranational institutions that ASEAN is so reticent to establish, but it does require accountability for member states, which can be provided by regulatory regionalism. A regulatory regionalism structure is multinational and flexible, allowing it to adapt to the demands of the region. Laura Allison-Reumann summarizes the applicability of regulatory regionalism to ASEAN, describing that “regulatory regionalism also lends itself to a more favorable operationalization of ASEAN's foundational norms, given that it does not aspire to be a supranational entity that may threaten national sovereignty.” Thus, nations can align their national agendas through the use of binding language without any greater authority figure. The ASEAN structure allows for sweeping government powers to be exercised in order to promote development, yet the consensus format often results in nations kicking contentious issues down the line rather than addressing them. ASEAN’s attitude towards supranational authority originates from the first three regional behavioral principles asserted in the foundational Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and reasserted in the Bangkok Declaration, respect for state sovereignty, freedom from external interference, and non-interference in internal affairs over all others, yet the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation also highlights that states will adhere to certain norms. This commitment to regional norms enables the efficacy of a binding regulatory regional agreement, transcending the limitations that come with a lack of supranational governing bodies. ASEAN’s inability to enforce its norms while it lacks both supranational authority and binding agreements stems from its emphasis on noninterference, for in 2010 the Thai government rejected efforts for an ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) fact finding mission to investigate its political crisis, and in Myanmar the rampant human rights abuses enacted against the Rohingya are decried but not addressed. The organization defends its noninterference by lauding the broad economic power wielded by its governments, for, as described by Aguirre and Pietropaoli, “While this may weaken ASEAN’s human rights legitimacy, it must be seen within the context that places priority on regional economic development and the maintenance of domestic sovereignty.” Yet, human rights enforcement and economic development are far from mutually exclusive. Indeed, the AEC can enhance its growth by extending protections to all levels of migrant workers, for while low-skilled work such as agriculture, fishing, domestic work, manufacturing, and construction account for 87% of ASEAN’s regional migration, the AEC’s MRAs cover only 1% of member states’ employment. The resulting irregular migration flows result in a massive stateless migrant population within ASEAN, all of whom lack adequate legal protection due to their precarious migration status. Thailand and Myanmar combine to host 10% of the world’s stateless population, and a lack of citizenship documentation precludes effective workforce utilization, with Thai scholars Palapan Kampana and Adam Richard Tanielian positing that “statelessness is an economic death sentence in a world on the move.” Thailand and Malaysia attempted to address the problem of stateless migrants by enacting 10 amnesty programs since 1992, yet this ad hoc approach to migration policy impairs ASEAN’s ability to communally negotiate with external bodies due to the lack of regional migration policy. When Singapore assumed the ASEAN Chairmanship, it highlighted its goal of improving business opportunities, and one way to achieve this goal is implementing a binding regulatory regional agreement on migration. Regulatory regionalism allows ASEAN to maintain its subalternity and avoid supranational intervention while codifying migrant rights, thereby enhancing regional growth.

A binding consensus agreement in the form of regulatory regionalism will protect migrant rights in a way that the current ‘ASEAN Way’ cannot parallel. Protecting migrant rights in ASEAN confers benefits to the migrants whose rights are protect and to the nations whose growth potential is enhanced. A unified regional migration policy allows nations to attract desired workers, thereby allowing national economies to specialize. When combined with the reduction of regional trade barriers, specialized regional economies benefit the entire region. Furthermore, Foreign Direct Investment will be enhanced by such unified migration policy, and the region will also be able to more effectively negotiate with external nations. ASEAN does not need to cave to building supranational institutions to protect its migrants and achieve greater regional growth, but it requires enforceable human rights policy. Regulatory regionalism with binding language will protect migrants and enable growth without infringing on national sovereignty, thus preserving ASEAN’s subalternity while simultaneously achieving ASEAN’s Community Vision goals and making strides towards a regional common market.

The Human Rights of Migrant Asian Caregivers

Ms. Sondos Alqattan was a a social media influencer known for her makeup Instagram, which had up to 2.3 million followers. However, makeup companies have been pulling their support for Alqattan after she released a video of herself complaining about her Filipino domestic worker, and the day off every week that Filipino domestic workers are entitled to: "How can you have a servant at home who keeps their own passport with them? And what's worse is they have one day off every week. I don't want a Filipina maid anymore." Since the release and delete of this video, many responses from Twitter have included a #StopSlavery hashtag, the plight of domestic workers equated to a modern form of slavery. This circumstance of domestic caregivers from foreign countries is not isolated to Kuwait alone. Asia’s history of abuse towards foreign care workers is an antiquated and largely unaddressed violation of human rights, which in some cases results in the ultimate price. While systems may differ across countries, abuse is a consistent factor for the caregiver populations in many of the countries where migrants work.

Migrant domestic care workers, who are citizens of different countries traveling to another to provide labor, are essential components of the healthcare in Asian countries who suffer from population ageing and lack sustainable numbers in the caregiving industry. Some governments, such as those of Japan and Taiwan, implement programs that facilitate the migration of these care workers and provide a special status without giving citizenship. These foreign care workers hold professions such as nurses at hospitals or nursing homes, or work “under the table” as nannies and house cleaners. The situation for some of these workers, however, reveals the ethical dilemma of each host country independently establishing an appropriate process either through government regulation or private enterprise that ensures the preservation of caregivers’ and receivers’ rights, both of which are owed to them as citizens of a global community and protected under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Proper healthcare is a human right, as it encourages a life in which one is free to live as one pleases. Taking steps to nurture a healthy and prosperous population requires a tentative balance between government intervention and individual attention from caregivers’ employers and patients alike.

The abuse of those within the healthcare system significantly impedes a solution intended to relieve the relatives of the elderly, especially in countries with declining populations. Governments pass policy to mitigate this difficulty, but the regulation of migrant workers puts them in a vulnerable legal position, without the rights of citizenship to protect them. The rights of migrant workers are not just important, but imperative to the health care systems of countries who depend on them.

The systems and policies in place for foreign caregivers differ across countries. For example, Taiwan has the foreign live-in caregiver programme. This program restricts populations with temporary permits, and caregivers cannot bring their family members with them to Taiwan. Meanwhile, Japan restricts populations by only allowing in highly skilled workers, under several conditions, such as requiring a degree from a 4-year university for nursing. These regulations prevent problems with migrant populations, and provide an organized and regulated system which brings migrants a means of income for themselves and their families back home.

Graphic from the PEW Research Center.

In some countries, remittances account for a large section of a country’s GDP and experts believe that receiving income from family members working in other countries mitigates the effects of severe poverty. For some households, the work of a foreign caregiver is life or death. And yet, the regulation of live-in caregivers is poorly monitored, resulting in  government regulation that is not effective outside of the migration process. This leaves live-in caregivers in a precarious position when facing abuse by their employers, especially when caregivers live in the homes they work in. In fact, exploitation of care workers is more likely in a domestic setting than in a non-domestic setting.

The impacts of the difficult nature of regulating domestic care worker conditions are notably demonstrated in the difficulties of Singapore. Singapore does not strongly enforce any policies about the condition of domestic caregivers, due to difficulties imposing such policies and Singaporean fears of overdependence on these migrant workers. Some in Singapore fear that a focus on rectifying inefficiencies such as migrant caregiver abused could bolster that overdependence.

As a result, the extent of abuse and maltreatment of caregivers and receivers is unknown in Singapore. The degree to which a government enforces its policies and caters them to the needs of migrant workers, both through institutions and through household employment, is more important than whether those policies are established in the first place. Policies can be effective in theory and be poor in implementation. In the case of migrant workers in Asian countries, the policies regarding their residence in their country of work are more strictly enforced in comparison to policies regarding their rights. A means of remedying this ethical dilemma lies within proper documentation and deeper statistical analysis of domestic caregiver abuses. While this requires participation and diligence from both analysts and victims of abuse alike, a lack of data yields no progress. Therefore, NGOs should work in tandem with governments to share data and encourage domestic caregivers to share their experiences, so that both parties understand the depth and requirements of both the caregivers and the entities they work for.

The Fate of the Temporary Protection Status in El Salvador

Salvadorans are the largest group of foreigners to benefit from Temporary Protection Status (TPS), a humanitarian program created by Congress in 1990 to allow populations suffering from war or catastrophe to live and work in United States. The Secretary of Homeland Security has the power to extend TPS protection as a result of ongoing violent conflict, environmental disasters, or other “extraordinary or temporary conditions”. In 2018, the Trump administration ended TPS for Salvadorans, leaving the community forced to choose between returning home or risking deportation.

Now, nearly 200,000 Salvadorans, many of whom have lived in the United States for over a decade, must leave the country by 2019 unless they can find another protection program. Most Salvadorans came to the U.S. in 2001, the year El Salvador was hit by a 7.6 magnitude earthquake that left thousands dead or homeless. Due to a lack of government funds, the rebuilding process stalled, and it took several years to rebuild damaged roads, buildings, water systems, and hospitals. Thanks to international assistance, most infrastructure has since been restored, allowing Washington to claim that TPS is no longer justified.

Yet major problems remain. El Salvador’s path to stability is thwarted by gang violence, corruption, and low economic growth. The violence stems from conflict between MS-13 and Barrio 18, two rival gangs who trace their origins to the United States. In the 1990s, civil war led thousands of Salvadorans to flee to the United States. Salvadoran gangs formed in California as self-defense groups. Following a deportation program by the U.S. government, these fully formed gangs returned to El Salvador, where low police presence and a lack of reintegration programs led to further violence. Gang presence has since grown, and El Salvador has become one of the most dangerous countries in the world as a result. This trend has only been exacerbated by the mass-migration of unaccompanied minors throughout Central America. If forced to return to El Salvador, mothers, fathers, and children could face extortion, rising gang violence, kidnappings, coerced service to gangs and sexual violence. 

The mass return of Salvadorans would also lead to economic harms. Salvadorans in the US currently act as a source of economic growth for their home country through the remittances they send home every year. The Salvadoran economy is too weak to provide employment or resources needed to sustain returnees. While the unemployment rate is at 7%, more than 40% of workers are underemployed and 66% work in the informal sector. Despite having an annual workforce entry rate of 60,000, the economy only creates 11,000 jobs a year. The entry of so many returnees would displace less skilled Salvadorans, increasing poverty and risking greater violence and immigration.

Ending TPS for Salvadorans will also damage the American economy. There are few Americans willing to take jobs currently held by Salvadorans in the service, construction, and child care industries. A study by the Immigrant and Legal Resource Center found that stripping Haitians, Salvadorans, and Hondurans of their TPS status would, over 10 years, deprive Social Security and Medicare of $6.9 billion and shrink GDP by $45.2 billion. Ending this humanitarian protection program would cost employers billions in turnover costs and reduce government revenue for social programs. 

Finally, this policy will damage thousands of Salvadoran families who would be torn apart. Economic opportunities for Salvadorans and their children would be limited after stripping away their work permits, leaving most children to live in poverty without the economic support from their parents. Children born with in the US would be separated from their parents. Those who stay illegally risk abuse at the hands of their employers. 

Ending TPS for Salvadorans risks tearing apart families, exposing them to violence, and generating economic harms. Salvadorans with TPS status consider the United States to be  their home.  Knowing very little about the current state of their home country, they would seem like foreigners in their own country. The Trump administration should extend the TPS program while working with the Salvadoran government to stabilize the country.

Overestimating Refugees’ Economic Impact: An Analysis of the Prevailing Economic Literature on Forced Migration

The UNHCR reported in June 2016 that the number of number of refugees, asylum seekers, and internally displaced persons reached a record high of 65 million individuals worldwide. How will all these individuals impact the economies of the countries in which they find asylum? Do refugees, as some politicians claim, force domestic workers out of the labor market? Do refugees exert a substantially negatively net fiscal impact? This paper attempts to address these questions by analyzing the prevailing economic literature from 1990 until the present on refugees’ and immigration’s economic impact. I argue that, although the estimated economic effects of immigration and refugees vary, their overall impact is negligible. Refugees exert a slightly negative impact on domestic wages if domestic labor is immobile. At the same time, refugees’ net fiscal impact depends more on their tax contribution—which is a function of their labor market integration—than their consumption of publicly funded goods and services.

Overview

Refugee and forced migration issues have dominated recent political debates in Europe and other parts of the world. Those on the political Right claim that refugees threaten European national security, economic prosperity, and cultural traditions; those on the political Left claim that the influx of refugees represents a humanitarian crisis that demands accepting additional refugees. Perhaps the Economist’s attempt to reconcile these two opposing opinions puts it best: “Humanity dictates that the rich world admit refugees, irrespective of the economic impact. But the economics of the influx still matters.” Setting aside that international law does require states to provide refugees with asylum, this paper attempts to address the two most salient economic questions regarding refugees’ arrival in Europe.

First, do refugees displace domestic workers, leading to higher rates of unemployment and lower wages? Second, do refugees exert significant strains on public finances? While perfect data do not exist to answer either of these questions beyond the shadow of a doubt, evidence suggests that, in the short run, granting refugees asylum leads to a negligible overall effect on the labor market and public finance. In the long run, however, refugees positively contribute to the labor market and public finances, the extent of which depends mostly on the success of their integration into the economy.

Refugees and the Labor Market

Economists disagree about the precise nature and extent of immigration’s impact on the wages and unemployment rates in immigrant-receiving countries. On the one hand, some studies suggest that immigration has “essentially no effect on the wages or employment outcomes” of domestic workers. David Card’s famous analysis of the Mariel Boatlift found that refugee immigration had a positive, yet minimal impact on the Miami economy due to the city’s ability to absorb refugees into previously unexploited sectors. On the other hand, George Borjas argues that, because of labor mobility, the impact of immigration on unemployment and wages may be tenuous in regional labor markets, while simultaneously depressing labor market conditions at a national level. Borjas measured skilled and unskilled immigrant labor in terms of educational qualifications and found that a 10 percent increase in the labor force due to immigration resulted in a three to four point decrease in domestic workers’ wages.

However, other studies attempt to find some sort of middle ground, disputing both the argument that immigration has no effect on the labor market and the argument that immigration drastically depresses wages and employment. Gianmarco Ottaviano and Giovanni Peri, for instance, adopt the qualification bands from Borjas’ framework, but they assume that, even within those bands, immigrant and domestic workers are not perfect substitutes. In other words, immigrants with the exact same educational qualifications as domestic workers can function as “imperfect substitutes” because of labor market discrimination. Even if immigrants could do the same job as domestic workers, they don’t practically function as perfect substitutes because, in reality, they may not be hired by employers who consider them less capable because of their race, ethnicity, nationality, language, etc. As a result, Ottaviano and Peri find that immigration has “a small effect on the wages of native workers with no high school degree (between 0.6% and +1.7%) […and] a small positive effect on average native wages (+0.6%).” Moreover, Ottaviano and Peri also note that, given the standard error, this effect is not “significantly different from 0.” The largest impact on the labor market observed was on the wages of previous immigrants, which were found to have “a substantially negative effect (−6.7%).” Thus, even at the theoretical level, the effect of immigration on the labor market has been highly contested.

Later, even more tweaks were made to the traditional methodology used to study the economic effects of migration. Stephen Nickell of the University of Oxford and Jumana Saleheen of the Bank of England recently studiedmigration’s impact on average British wages in any given region of the country between 1992 and 2014. Crucially, Nickell and Saleheen measure skill distribution by occupation, a clever methodological tweak considering “that it is often very tricky to accurately compare education qualifications across countries.” In addition, treating skill distribution as a function of occupationhelps to translate the economics of migration directly into the jargon of public discourse, which treats immigrants principally by occupation rather than by educational attainment, such as with the “stereotype of the Polish plumber—used widely as a symbol of cheap labor.” Ultimately, Nickell and Saleheen findthat migration exerts “a statistically significant, small, negative impact on the average occupational wage rates of the regions” studied. The largest effect on wages observed related to semi-skilled and unskilled labor, where a 10% increase in migrant labor resulted in a 2% decline in the average wage. Nickell and Saleheen’s occupational measure of qualification might be said to be more accurate than educational measures such as Borjas’ considering that, oftentimes, educational credentials do not transfer between countries. Therefore, Nickell and Saleheen’s findings suggest that refugees immigrating to Europe may adversely affect the labor market, but not nearly to the extent that some politicians claim.

Moreover—and with specific regard to refugees—the Economist notes that the wage-dampening may “even have positive side-effects” for the domestic labor market. A recent paper by Mette Foged and Giovanni Peri finds that, in Denmark between 1991 and 2008, domestic workers pushed out of low-skilled industries by refugees changed jobs to other, “less manual and more cognitive” labor-intensive sectors. Such jobs included “legislators and senior [government] officials,” “corporate managers,” and even “skilled agricultural and fishery” sectors. By contrast, the proportion of refugees composing manual skilled sectors such as “machine operators,” “drivers,” and “mining laborers” rose substantially, resulting in “positive or null wage effects and positive or null employment effects” for domestic populations over the long run. So, to the extent that refugees substitute for domestic labor—however imperfect that substitution may be—their overall economic impact also depends on the abilities of displaced domestic workers to find employment in other sectors. Additionally, evidence exists from Congolese refugee camps in Rwanda to suggest that one additional refugee receiving cash aid contributes an estimated $205 to $253 to the local economy. Taking the difference between contributions and per-refugee cash aid, refugees yielded a positive individual contribution of between $70 $126 annually. Most of the refugees’ individual contributions resulted from spillovers with the local economy, such as the “purchase [of] goods and services from host-country businesses outside the camps.” If refugees displace workers who move into other sectors of the economy and experience higher wages, then they also positively contribute to the sales of local businesses.

Refugees and Public Finances

Refugees exert a similarly ambiguous impact on public finance as they do on the labor market. In fact, a 2013 OECD report notes that including or excluding non-personal sources of tax revenue, such as corporate income taxes, as well as non-excludable goods like roads, in an analysis of immigrants’ net public fiscal impact “often changes the sign of the impact” itself. Estimates of immigrants’ net fiscal impact thus vary depending on the methodology employed, although the report’s main findings suggest that—however measured—the impact “rarely exceeds [plus or minus] 0.5% of GDP in a given year.” In fact, the OECD observed the highest impact on public finance in Luxembourg and Switzerland, where immigrants positively contributed an estimated 2% of GDP to the public purse. Compared to domestic populations, however, the OECD report found that, on average, immigrants have a lower net fiscal contribution overall.

This is an especially salient concern in the short run, because refugees can potentially exacerbate strains on the public purse, contributing to increases in demand for public services while the supply of those resources remains temporarily fixed. In fact, precisely because of the protections afforded to asylum seekers under international law, “additional public spending for […] housing, food, health, and education, will increase aggregate demand,” therefore making such services more costly to provide, all else equal. However, in many cases, the short-term costs of accommodating asylum seekers are borne by international donors rather than governments. In fact, University of Oxford Professor Emeritus Roger Zetter notes that global programs to accommodate refugees in the short term total 8.4 billion USD globally, but that economists “rarely analyze the economic outcomes of their program[s].” Instead, they “tend to assess the impacts and costs for the host community” as a percentage of GDP regardless of whether or not the government actually pays for the accommodations provided to refugees. Such analyses are frankly misleading because, while aggregate demand for publicly funded goods may increase in the short run, the cost of meeting such a higher demand puts strain on NGOs, the UNHCR, and other international donors, not on governments.

Among the three countries with the highest numbers of Syrian refugees—Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan—GDP is expected to rise, while estimates of the costs of accommodating refugees are paltry. The OECD predicts that Turkey’s GDP growth will “remain close to 4% per annum in 2016 and 2017.” Meanwhile, the 5.37 billion euros that Turkey spent between 2012 and 2015 on “the perfect refugee camp[s]” amount to less than 0.2% of GDP per year. Turkey, importantly, is one of the only countries paying the entire costs of short term asylum accommodations out of pocket, “except for some relatively minor international donations” Similar trends have been observed in Lebanon and Jordan, where GDP growth far outpaces the short term costs of accommodating refugees largely due to the fact that—in contrast to Turkey—refugee camps and resettlement programs are funded principally by NGOs and the UNHCR.

Yet even following the short term costs of accommodating refugees, their net fiscal impact over time depends more on the success of their integration into the labor market than their raw consumption of publicly provided goods and services. Joakim Ruist from the University of Gothenburg, for instance, suggeststhat the net fiscal contribution of refugees in Sweden steadily increases from approximately 10,000 kronor (approximately 1,100 USD) during the first year of residence to over 30,000 kronor (approximately 3,300 USD) during their seventh year. In a similar vein, the IMF observed that, depending on the speed of labor market integration, “the level of GDP could be about 0.25 percent higher for the EU as a whole and between 0.5 and 1.1 percent higher in the three main destination countries (Austria, Germany, Sweden)” by 2020.

Importantly, Ruist found that four-fifths of refugees’ net fiscal impact has been estimated to result from their smaller contributions to tax revenue, while only one-fifth was due to “higher per-capita public costs.” In other words, the net fiscal impact of refugees has more to do with their limited contribution to government revenue than their increased demand for public services, suggesting that refugees are more than capable of paying for the public services they consume if successfully and fully integrated into the labor market. This further justifies the need to focus on integrating refugees into the labor market of their destination country, as opposed to simply denying asylum claims based on perceptions that refugees will “steal” domestic jobs.

Furthermore, attempting to estimate refugees’ net fiscal impact based on previous models of migration like Borjas’ wrongly assumes that refugees have a reasonably similar economic profile as other immigrants. In reality, the net fiscal impact of any immigrant varies depending on both the economic profile of the immigrant and the economic conditions of the receiving countries. For example, immigration to Europe between 2007 and 2009 heavily strained public finances because “lots of [immigrants] were pensioners, who tend to drain the public finances,” according to the Economist. By contrast, most refugees fleeing Syria, who “constitute[d] the biggest national group migrating to Europe in 2015,” are both younger and more skilled than those fleeing the last “refugee crisis” in Europe—that of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The median age of Syrian refugees in 2014 was 23 years-old, and compared to the former Yugoslavia, the ratio of “youth cohorts” to “near-retirement-cohorts” has declined from 1.3 to 0.7 since 1990. Moreover, the International Labor Organization reported in 2014 that an average of 56% of Syrian refugees residing in Lebanese camps worked either in skilled or semi-skilled sectors. Therefore, the impact of refugees on the economy overall, and specifically on a country’s public finances, depends on the economic profile of the refugees with particular regard for working-age and job skills.

Conclusion

According to the Pew Research Center, a record 1.3 million people applied for asylum in Europe in 2015, nearly double the previous record of 700,000 set in 1992, and the number of forced migrants across the globe continues to rise. Therefore, understanding refugees’ impact on European economies will become hugely important as more and more are granted asylum and resettled in their new homes. While previous studies of immigration’s impact on the labor market and public finances is somewhat ambiguous, the prevailing economic literature suggests that, in the short run, refugees will have a slightly negative impact on average wages and employment rates in substitutable sectors, and a slightly negative impact on public finances. However, in the long run, if prevailing economic scholarship holds true, wages will stabilize while those forced out of employment by refugees will find work in other sectors, and refugees will yield a net positive fiscal contribution. Finally, considering the fact that refugees hardly function as perfect substitutes for domestic labor, their integration into the labor market would bolster the overall net fiscal expenditure of immigrant-receiving countries.

Trumpism and Immigration

This election has seen the deterioration of civil discourse and the proper exchange of ideas come to a boiling point. Statements issued by President Trump, Republicans, and Democrats have been shortened and maimed into brash statements that seem to only serve as a means for garnering attention. Trump is particularly guilty of this. A study by PolitiFact revealed that 75 percent of Trump’s statements turned out to be mostly or entirely false while the other 25 percent turned out to be half true or mostly true. This leaves us with a grand total of exactly zero fully true statements of all that were analyzed. The following analysis seeks to empirically illustrate the likely effects of various policies offered by Mr. Trump and his base.

The Wall

The construction of a wall along the Mexican border has been one of the most publicized and discussed policy proposals Trump has issued. The logistics of building this mammoth wall are far beyond anything Mr. Trump has ever attempted. Fortunately, structural engineer Ali F. Rhuzkan has done some work for us by doing research into the logistics of this proposal.

Some of the more striking observations that Mr. Rhuzkan makes are as follows:

• “This wall would contain over three times the amount of concrete used to build the Hoover Dam.”

• “Such a wall would be greater in volume than all six pyramids of the Giza Necropolis.”

• “That quantity of concrete could pave a one-lane road from New York to Los Angeles, going the long way around the Earth.”

• “We could melt down 4 of our Nimitz-class aircraft carriers and would probably be a few cruisers short of having enough steel.”

Rhuzkan’s wall model

I implore anyone reading this article to imagine all of the good that could be done with the money and materials that would go into making this wall. The funds could be used for programs to prevent the crime that Mr. Trump accuses undocumented immigrants of committing, shoring up our national debt, providing attorneys to refugees escaping violence, perhaps even for investing in foreign development to avoid the need for immigration in the first place.

Aside from the logistical and monetary realities of building this wall, it would tarnish our international reputation and harm our relationship with Mexico, a close regional ally. A wall between our two nations would send a message of indifference and hatred. It is hard for two cultures to learn from and respect one another through a barrier of cold steel and cement.

Another issue the wall creates is that it does not solve the underlying humanitarian issues surrounding immigration. The reality of the situation is much different than that which the political sphere has been discussing recently. Nowadays, immigration from Mexico has largely declined, with more Mexicans going back to Mexico than coming to the United States. However, a large portion of those coming to the United States are fleeing violence from Latin America and Mexico. These types of immigrants are not looking to sneak into the United States or steal jobs, but they are surrendering at the border. Many (roughly 38%) of these types of immigrants are women and children. No wall is going to stop these refugees from coming, and pretending they do not exist is not going to help their plight.

Deportation

Donald Trump has put his weight behind a deportation plan and, although he has backpedaled after his inauguration, the risk of him changing his mind further remains. Under Trump, 11 million undocumented immigrants could be deported. Among the reasons offered as justification are the costs to taxpayers, crime, and welfare abuse. More cynically, Trump has been quoted speaking to fellow Republicans saying that they should not pass comprehensive immigration reform simply because immigrants do not typically vote Republican.

Before moving into the issues with this plan, I would like to point out a contradiction regarding Trump’s reasoning for deporting immigrants. He has made broad statements claiming that immigrants come to America to take American jobs, but on the other hand claims that immigrants need to be stopped because they are abusing our welfare system. These two claims imply that immigrants are so hard working that they steal our jobs, but they are so lazy that they are feeding off our welfare system.

Aside from these issues with the deportation plan, like organizing a deportation force in the 21st Century to round up and forcibly remove 11 million human beings from this nation, there are significant economic consequences connected to this policy.

The sudden deportation of this many immigrants would leave a gaping labor shortage in our economy. The industries that immigrants work in are specific to immigrants (as shown in figure 2) and the loss of labor skills would leave certain industries bankrupt of labor with no one to fill the gap. Not every unemployed person in this nation is looking for any job, they will not settle for these low skill jobs.

Immigrant distribution across industries

The Washington Post illustrates a specific example of this labor shortage that would occur in California, Nevada, Texas, and New Jersey. The article states, “[E]ven if every unemployed American in those states took an undocumented worker’s job — wildly unlikely, given that most Americans are unwilling to do the dirty jobs filled by many immigrants — it would still leave hundreds of thousands jobs unfilled.” In California, undocumented workers range anywhere from a third to half of the agricultural workforce. Deporting these immigrants would affect about half of the fruits and vegetables consumed in America and cripple California’s farming industry.

Deporting 11 million immigrants would provoke massive international displacement. Dictators and extremists cause humanitarian exoduses, not those with democratic principles.

Regardless, all of this fear mongering over immigrants is in vain. On top of the evidence already presented, plenty of other studies have shown the benefits of immigration for host countries. I sifted through examples from Miami to Great Britain, but I settled on a  scenario from South Africa published in Foreign Policy magazine to illustrate my point.

Before the end of apartheid in the early 1990s, black South Africans had their citizenship revoked and were exiled to quasi-nation states called Bantustans, cut off from white South African society. Before apartheid fell, white South Africans were afraid, as many in America are today, of what would happen when the barriers fell and the black South African population (9 times that of the white population) flooded the labor market. To put this into perspective, this would be the same proportion as the entire population of Brazil, China, and India simultaneously immigrating to the United States. The result was unlike anything anyone expected. Household incomes for both black and white South Africans doubled between 1993 and 1994. This type of economic situation has repeated itself as well. When the EU lowered labor migration restrictions between European countries Portuguese immigrants rushed to Denmark for work. This left both Denmark and Portugal with a more than 2% GDP increase rather than economic collapse.

The above examples illustrate that immigrants are complementary workers to native populations. They get more work done faster, and they do not simply come and take jobs. They create more. More jobs and more wealth. This is a statistic that Donald Trump should look into. Instead of building a wall to block out immigrants and silence their cries for help, we should be building bridges to help those in need and allow them to contribute to our economy. Instead of deporting 11 million immigrants, we should be granting them a path to citizenship so they can continue to contribute to our economy and be allowed to pay taxes.

Conclusion

The Mexican border wall and broad deportation plan are the extreme end of President Trump’s policy statements on immigration. His administration has backpedaled from some of these claims, but the possibility of a partial implementation, or reversal of policy remains. My hope is that the aforementioned policy proposals have been placed in sufficiently clear light regarding their actual effects on the U.S. population and economy.

Migration, Assimilation and Identity: The Effects of the Salvadoran Civil War and State Violence on Migration to the U.S.

INTRODUCTION

This research aims to investigate how the Salvadoran Civil War of the 1980s affected migration patterns from El Salvador to the United States of America and how these migrants have assimilated or are assimilating in the U.S. The research defines assimilation as the “[a]daptation of one ethnic or social group – usually a minority – to another. Assimilation involves the subsuming of language, traditions, values, morals and behavior or even fundamental vital interests.” Examining the change in the ethnic identities of migrants, specifically first and second generation migrants, will bring light to any future migratory patterns returning to El Salvador or potentially permanent plans to settle in the U.S. Interest in this topic stems from a lack of general awareness about the 1980s Civil War and its effects. In the Nations of Emigrants, the Salvadoran population in the United States has been conceptualized as the fifteenth department of El Salvador, because of its sheer size. Yet, there seems to be a lack of generalized knowledge on this population. Also, and significantly, the research aims to give a voice to the stories of many Salvadoran-Americans who have not been able to share their experiences, aiming therefore to create empathy and greater understands for their circumstances. The research does not differentiate between illegal and legal migration, but rather considers anyone who has emigrated from El Salvador to the U.S. as within the population of study.

This research’s data consists of existing personal accounts of migrants, relevant published statistics, and original interviews conducted with the local migrant population. The research will first present a comprehensive case study of the 1980s conflict and its subsequent effects on El Salvador with the goal of then identifying demographics and patterns with a better understanding of their origins.

CASE STUDY

Thus far, over two million people have emigrated from El Salvador as a result of the civil war. The civil war is said to have been a result of agricultural concerns that led to military action. Leading up to the civil war, El Salvador’s governmental power relied on the success of coffee exports and the relationships of coffee plantation owners with the military. Because of how the power was concentrated in the hands of the coffee exporting sector, the government began to pass reforms “aimed at creating splits in the middle and lower social groupings.” However, the concentration of power in the hands of the elite also created problems as the world became more globalized and modern technology began to play a larger role in coffee growing, thus disproportionately hurting poor, indigenous small-share landholders. This role meant larger rates of unemployment for those previously employed in the coffee industry, which led to increased strength and presence of labor unions in the late 70s. These labor unions combined with student groups and peasant organizations to rebel and seize several government buildings and embassies; however, they did not take into account the consequences of angering existing opposing armed forces. The Salvadoran military, known as the Fuerza Armada de El Salvador (FAES), countered with an armed attack against the perceived insurgency as tensions came to a climax on February 28th, 1977. Protests emerged, advocating for a fair election and military forces in response began to massacre opposing demonstrators, such as the main leftist group the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). Thus began a slew of massacres from both “terror squads of the ultra-right” and left-wing guerillas. People even in El Salvador’s middle classes were not spared and, under the guise of a “state of emergency,” the government justified sustained military action against those whom they perceived as leftist insurgents. One civilian wrote that “men were blindfolded and killed in the town’s center” and “young women were taken to the hill nearby, where they were raped, then killed and burned.” She further wrote that she listened to children being choked to death, three of whom were her own. Soon after, in 1979, when Carlos Humberto Romero’s government was overthrown, right-wing death squads increased their activity to about 1,000 killings per month. This directly resulted in the forced displacement of over one million Salvadorans, most of whom were expelled from the country and sought refugee status abroad; about 61,000 died in total. To put these numbers into perspective, close to one-third of the total population was either killed or forced into exile, and this does not include those killed by “government cleansings.” The government and military specifically targeted the peasant populations. Due to these mass movements of communities within El Salvador, communities began to go without water, sanitary services, and electricity, thus exacerbating the existing infrastructural problems. By 1985, over 70% of displaced households lacked permanent employment, and of those, 20% were depending on the employment of children under the age of 16.

*Note, this table is estimated to be 30x beneath actual values due to those who arrived illegally.

The U.S.A. was seen as the primary destination for exiles turned refugees, with Mexico following close behind. This choice is most likely attributed to the perceived economic opportunities in these nations. The Salvadoran government has attempted to recognize exiled citizens and migrants as “allies” rather than enemies because of the economic contributions they make to the home population. About half of all refugees have stated that they would like to return to El Salvador. However, for those that have already returned, conditions were so poor and United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) return camps had such awful conditions that most did not actually stay. Additionally, because those who have returned even just for a small amount of time tended to face discrimination and shame for lack of “patriotism,” most did not end up staying permanently. Most are also punished or targeted by the military upon return. Also, many who did at one point intend to return, have found that their villages have been completely destroyed. Leaving and returning is seen as a massive betrayal by the government and thus those who have been identified as returnees are usually targeted and killed. American deportations are seen as a source of increased conflict violence in El Salvador. Therefore, the cyclical migration process is much more feasible.

MIGRATION PATTERNS

Most Salvadoran emigrants who fled to Mexico or the U.S.A. were recognized by the UNHCR as having refugee status. However, between Mexico’s refusal to acknowledge the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Refugee Protocol, over 1 million Salvadorans were left at risk of deportation. Also, the U.S.A. did not help the situation as their immigration policy in the late 70s and early 80s only allowed in 20,000 immigrants from any one country in the Western Hemisphere.

Refugees of the Salvadoran Civil War and Salvadoran state violence have been categorized into three groups. Emigres are those who leave and do not return, while return migrants return to resettle and repatriate in El Salvador, and circulators, who migrate from El Salvador to various different countries with no specified end destination. Adrian Bailey and Joshua Hane cite most migrants from this crisis as being circulators who made “short-term myopic” decisions to escape the ongoing war. They also argue that the initial choices and forces behind this displacement affect future behavior due to higher rates of education and younger ages, providing them with the characteristics to continue to move from place to place. The majority of these circulators migrate with economic goals in an effort to “maximize family welfare and practice risk aversion.” These Salvadoran migrants relocate in one of the largest economic migrant circulation systems between the U.S.A., Mexico, and Puerto Rico. In the Washington D.C. metro area alone, a 1995 study cited a population upwards of 150,000 migrants from El Salvador.

However, despite sustaining themselves in a cyclical migration pattern, issues with English proficiency stunt migrants’ mobility. In a 1982 study by Guy Poitras, 259 Salvadoran refugees were interviewed and only 22% of the respondents could speak English “well” or “very well.” This, in combination with having less education than many non-Salvadoran-Americans, gives migrants limited social mobility in U.S. society. Also, their obligation to family members in El Salvador deters upward mobility. In terms of sheer numbers though, it is predicted that the Salvadoran population will continue to increase steadily as migrants gain legality and can begin to petition for family members.

THE JOURNEY: TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS

The journey of the migrants is not an easy one, with many forced to travel by foot for the majority of the way. Many people are lost along the way to coyotes, drowning, abuse, or murder when they return home. Some are literally dismembered by trains or have their fingers sliced while jumping fences. Mexican officials have also reported finding bloated bodies of those who have perished along the way, with their identification documents on their chest so that relatives at home can be notified. Their journey is classified as clandestinesince migrants travel below the radar for safety. Many are also subject to the will of smugglers, who can detain or extort them. Most migrants travel illegally, thus forcing them to keep quiet about any injustices committed against them along the way. These migrants are multidimensional. Some gain legality to travel through Mexico, but not to arrive in the U.S. Some also leave unbeknownst to the people of their hometowns, shrouding their journey in mystery and creating more dangerous and vulnerable circumstances for the travels themselves. Also, many take out loans to finance their travels, which can become a major burden even if the journey is successful. One man named Miguel Lopez Herrera worked for six months at an hourly wage of $4.25 to repay a $750 loan he took out to finance his journey. The majority of people are willing to undertake these risks. In an interview conducted in August 2000, every one of three Salvadorans was looking for a way to leave the country. The people who facilitate the smuggling are called coyotes, defined as smugglers or a smuggling group. The coyotes generally use illegal vehicles to transport migrants and sometimes force migrants to carry drugs across the border. Some have even begun to refuse to take women or children, because they believe they are too likely to die during the journey. In an interview with NPR, Rey Kowalski says the price of smuggling across the Mexico-U.S. border is about $2,500. However, after crossing, the coyotes sometimes hold migrants for ransom if they understand their family members are already in the U.S. waiting for them to arrive. Also, many who arrive do not even know they have illegally immigrated to begin with. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is trying to improve school infrastructure and educational resources about the dangers of coyotes to try to decrease this practice of human trafficking. They, along with other organizations and the host governments, are trying to limit migration and work on remedying the causes of migration in El Salvador itself.

As stated earlier, there is a level of multidimensionality in the journey from El Salvador to the U.S. Many migrants arrive to Mexico legally, and the problem arises in their crossing of the U.S.-Mexico border. It is not illegal to leave Mexico without papers, therefore, many migrants do not realize that crossing into the U.S. is illegal. I had a chance to interview Salvadoran case worker Marina Ortiz recounted the story of her three siblings who made the trek to the U.S. in 2013. Her three siblings were being threatened by the government and chose to walk from El Salvador to the United States. When they arrived in the U.S., none of them applied for asylum. Ortiz says they did not know applying for asylum was even an option, and therefore they still remain undocumented today. The three live in a community of people with stories similar to theirs in New York city. None of their bachelor’s degrees translated to the U.S. educational system, so between that and a lack of English proficiency, finding work is a difficult task.

On top of being unaware of their rights, if they make the journey, many migrants have access only to limited resources. According to an interview I conducted with United We Dream Policy and Advocacy Analyst Zenen Perez, oftentimes migrants will give the little money they have left to a business that will claim to help them with their asylum process. Later, the business will have disappeared entirely, along with their money. Perez said that, in 2014, an analysis by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse observed that less than 30% of Central American women and children had access to legal representation. Consequently, less than 1.5% of those were allowed to stay in the United States, compared to the 25% who were allowed to stay that did have attorneys.

AN ONGOING DEBATE: ECONOMIC MIGRANTS OR REFUGEES?

To this day, Salvadorans are mostly labeled as economic migrants and thus still face a great risk of deportation in the United States. Many come to the U.S. seeking protection from threats or possible death back home, but U.S. policymakers cite their illegal entrance via Mexico as evidence of their economic goals, rather than their legal eligibility for asylum under the 1951 Refugee Convention. However, asylum seekers Maria Yolanda Mejillo and Pedro Antonio Leibo strongly contest this point. I had the opportunity to talk to Maria and Pedro, and in late 2013, their second son was targeted by the military for having graduated and earned his bachelor’s degree. As such, he made the decision to walk from El Salvador to the United States, where he believed he could be granted asylum. At the Texas border, due to increased border controls, he was turned away. In 2012, the Consequence Delivery System (CDS) was implemented by border enforcement, in which people caught crossing the border were less apt to be allowed their request for political asylum and underwent “expedited removal” instead. As an educated individual who knew about the asylum process, one can assume he fell victim to this system at the Texas border. Border patrol officers have also more than doubled in number since 2004, and even drones are being implemented to survey the area. Most of the people who arrive at the border are also abused, with up to 25% of arriving migrants reporting such instances. In the same year that border patrol doubled, a panel presentation was held in El Salvador where many people posed the question “If they say it’s a crime for us to travel to the United States without papers, then why don’t they give us papers?” As of right now, one can only apply for asylum once inside the United States. It is not economically feasible for people to arrive by plane or other safe means though, and sometimes travelling by foot is the only option.

The Salvadoran military kidnapped and killed the interviewee’s son upon his return on February 18th, 2014. To this day, his family does not know the kind of death he suffered or where his body was buried, only that he is dead. Following this, the oldest and youngest sons, who also have bachelor’s degrees, fled the country. The two walked from El Salvador to New York, successfully crossing the border. The two have not had their bachelor’s degree translated and currently work at a local bakery, waiting for their parents to immigrate and hopefully be granted asylum. In March 2016, Mejillo and her husband arrived in New York and applied for asylum with the help of a case worker, hoping to be a part of the over 60% of cases that are granted asylum in New York.

Stories like these are at the heart of heated policy debates, as the children of Mejillo and Leibo came to the United States to utilize the education they had acquired. They knew if they remained in El Salvador, they would face government persecution, but at the same time, would risk economic stagnation without the opportunity to use their bachelor’s degrees. As William Stanley states, “The motivations of individuals are complex: some individuals who leave El Salvador out of fear may also hope for economic success in the United States.” Additionally, migration from El Salvador is not exclusively rooted in the conflict of the civil war. Before 1980, people were already migrating for economic reasons on a seasonal basis. Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) statistics show a sharp increase in migration following the start of the war, however, indicating motives that are greater than just economic goals. Reports from many global organizations point to fear as the primary motive for migration although it is difficult to find precise data on this. Also, more than one thousand Salvadorans were killed by military forces in 1979 alone, and since then, those numbers have only grown. The current atmosphere of fear makes it easy to label people as economic migrants and deny them asylum, but the extreme human rights violations occurring in El Salvador force huge numbers of people into exile and illustrate the deeper fear that exists.

MIGRANT DEMOGRAPHICS

A 2009 study found a strong correlation between major depressive episodes and downward social mobility of migrants. Since most migrants are not able to bring their papers validating their education over to the U.S., cannot fund returning to college, or cannot afford to take a recertification exam, many are forced to work jobs for which they are highly overqualified. Unfortunately, this comes in the form of menial jobs such as manual labor or janitorial work. This creates extreme downward social mobility. In this study, most migrants felt they faced downward mobility as opposed to stable lateral or upward mobility. This means that these migrants were far more likely to experience at least one major depressive episode, controlling for exogenous effects. This was also found to be especially true for migrants to which finding a job was of major importance to them.

Most of these migrants are in the lower classes of the U.S. economy because of institutional discrimination. Since many employers are aware that these migrants are unauthorized, there have been reports of them sending empty checks to migrants or forcing them to work overtime. The knowledge of their lack of authorization can also lead to worksite raids and sometimes deportation. This is incredibly problematic because, for those with American-born children, their children legally have U.S. citizenship. This fractures families and has severe traumatic consequences. Furthermore, a Migration Policy Institute (MPI) study shows that second-generation Salvadorans actually see a lower level of employment than their parents. The second-generation population cites 70% of those under eighteen working, and this number drops exorbitantly to a mere 30% after the eighteenth birthday. This is especially interesting as the second generation tends to see higher education levels than their parents. However, overall, their median household income was about $10,000 less than the average American household, indicating that they were entering the workforce with lower paying jobs than the average American.

Returning to the Ortiz family, their story is not unique and most migrants are in situations similar to theirs. MPI says these communities are called ethnic enclaves, and although they make the migrants feel safe, they result in social and linguistic isolation and can thus propagate institutional discrimination. Understanding the scope of ethnic communities allows businesses to limit these communities’ access to better jobs, quality schools and viable social networks. Also, they can be left out of zones of insurance coverage and not covered by personal physicians, creating a system of health effects as well, according to an MPI report.

Many of these migrants are classified as unaccompanied minors because coyotes incorrectly advertise the migration process. As was mentioned, many migrants are not aware of the legitimate process by which to cross the U.S.-Mexican border. As a result, coyotes capitalize on this and “increasingly influence the rate of migration through more aggressive and misleading marketing.” For instance, coyotes will tell families that if children are sent over unaccompanied, they will be able to request for their families to come over for reunification and as a result be allowed to stay in the United States. This however, is not true. This information was collected by looking at USAID focus groups, surveys, and deportee discussions. Along with information published by other organizations, this shows that, although there are many factors that push migrants to come to the U.S., they do not see a main one.

One major issue related to this kind of migration is the fact that many of these children can be so young that they do not know exactly where they came from, or only know the name of a larger nearby city instead of their city of origin. Additionally, there is a huge language barrier that limits progress in reunification with families or finding basic information about these children.

The language barrier is of course not only prevalent in deterring family reunification, but basic mobility once in the United States. This greatly affects migrant demographics as many states utilize the high school tracking system and students who are not fluent in English, get categorized as English Language Learners, and put on lower tracks. NPR follows the story of a student by the name of Alejandra Galindo who is a gifted student that was put in lower level classes because of her lack of English fluency. English Language Learners, or ELLs, get put in separate classes from native, white students. From a young age, kids are exposed to institutionalized racism which has severe psychological effects. Also, they are told that because of the color of their skin, they do not have as much potential these other students. ELLs are often not tested to be gifted, and as undocumented parents are not always informed about different tracks and programs in the school system, these children’s talents can be overlooked. Educators in Arizona, a state where 80,000 gifted students have been identified, say there is a moral obligation to better serve ELLs and create funding for those who are gifted within the state.

IMPLICATIONS

Existing statistics and research seem to show that the patterns of migration from El Salvador we have seen in the past thirty years shows no indication of letting up. Publications have shown increased gang violence pushing people to leave, and the increased number of deportations contributes to violence at home. Interviewed individuals say that when someone is found out to have tried to leave and then forced to return, they become a target for the government and local gangs. This cycle is vicious, and there currently does not seem to exist a solution to break it. Given current deportation numbers and anti-immigrant rhetoric in the U.S., the cycle of deportation and a hometown push to leave will most likely continue. These numbers will only continue to rise in coming years as more people seek to gain better economic opportunities and a viable life in the United States, something that is not feasible in their countries of origin.

CONCLUSION

This research began with the aim of uncovering questions of assimilation and integration into the U.S. from El Salvador, but more questions arose as it began. Statistics showed surprising downward mobility from second-generation children of migrants, who, in theory, should have been more integrated. This raises questions about what is failing in our current methods of assimilation, and how can this be improved. Furthermore, there is much to be said about the debate between economic migrants and asylum seekers, and how this plays into admittance into the U.S. Based on the firsthand accounts of Salvadoran migrants, it is evident that these people are first and foremost asylum seekers. Although many do try to create better economic opportunities, this is only a latent factor to the overarching issue of violence and instability in El Salvador.

In January of 2016, the Restoring Family Links branch of the Red Cross published an article about the increase in gang violence and environmental concerns as a push factor for Salvadoran migration to the U.S. The U.S. has attempted to stem migration by publishing ads to warn migrants against doing so. In tandem with this, the U.S. has increased deportation raids. However, most of these raids have been targeted on newly arrived families awaiting asylum as opposed to those with criminal records. Hopefully, seeing these new statistics, the argument for Salvadorans as asylum seekers will gain more traction seeing the violence and issues they face currently from their nation of origin.

In the future, research should aim to fill gaps in terms of how these people are integrating, as there was not much real life data on this. Additionally, as the second-generation gets older, their progress and mobility should be tracked as well as for their kids to see patterns among the generations that are living in the United States, and how they perceive their own mobility.

The migrants from El Salvador all have their own incredibly complex stories, some unfortunately with similarly saddening outcomes. Hopefully, as more of their stories come to light to humanize their journey and explain their experiences, people can use the compassion they use for those around them for them as well to help them integrate and achieve the quality of life they are working so hard for.

Immigration Policy Under President Trump: Toughening Up or More of the Same?

Since the day he announced his candidacy for President of the United States, Trump has called for comprehensive immigration reform, usually spouting, “We’re gonna build a wall, and Mexico’s gonna pay for it!” Through telling his supporters that immigrants have taken jobs away from hard-working Americans and given only higher crime rates in return, Trump’s anti-immigrant rhetoric has energized xenophobic movements in the United States. Consequently, a palpable national tension between white nationalists and minority groups surges, leaving undocumented individuals fearing for their future and safety. As Trump’s political style lends itself to vague (yet “tremendous”) promises, it is difficult to forecast how exactly the President-elect will choose to reform immigration policy come January. Throughout the duration of his campaign, Trump has presented various – and at times contradictory – promises regarding how he will approach immigration issues while in office. Oscillating between hardline, mass-deportation strategies and the idea that skilled undocumented immigrants should be able to pursue legal status in the United States, Trump’s concrete plans for immigration reform remain somewhat of a mystery.

During a campaign rally in Phoenix, Arizona, Trump claimed, “Anyone who has entered the United States illegally is subject to deportation – that is what it means to have laws and to have a country.” Yet, at the same time, he has expressed that the United States economy stands to benefit from immigrants seeking further education. In an interview with Chuck Todd on NBC’s Meet the Press last fall, Trump explained, “We’re going to try and bring them back rapidly, the good ones…We have to bring [immigrants] that are university, you know, go to universities, that are doctors. We need a lot of people in this country.” Nonetheless, Trump’s immigration platform contends that the United States’ primary security interest lies in ensuring every inhabitant resides in the country legally, suggesting the ultimate goal of deporting the 11 million unauthorized immigrants currently in the U.S.

In order to ensure all undocumented immigrants are removed from the country, Trump has vowed to strike down every executive order Obama enacted during his time in the Oval Office, and as the next President of the United States, Trump has the power to do so. Such an act would terminate the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), a policy that has granted protection and work permits to young immigrants brought into the country as children. Should Trump choose to enforce removal proceedings against those that DACA has benefited, more than 700,000 people face the risk of deportation. When pressed to detail his plans to pay for his more robust deportation efforts, Trump has hinted at reallocating funding from federal bureaus such as the Department of Education and the Environmental Protection agency.

Serving as an influential voice throughout the campaign, Trump’s long-time supporter and recent pick for U.S. Attorney General, Alabama Senator Jeff Sessions, has built his political career on anti-immigration rhetoric and calls for mass deportations. As head of the Department of Justice, Sessions would have the ability to direct national resources toward the currently backloggedimmigration courts. By encouraging federal prosecutors to increase the number of criminal cases brought against undocumented immigrants and by hiring more right-leaning judges for federal immigration courts, Sessions would have the power to speed up the removal proceedings for hundreds of thousands of undocumented immigrants. Additionally, with Sessions as Attorney General, Trump could withhold federal funding from more than 200 self-proclaimed sanctuary cities, including New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles, which offer refuge to undocumented immigrants in order to force local governments to share information and more fully cooperate with the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

On a contrasting note, House Speaker Paul Ryan assured many fearful Americans that the President-elect’s administration would not direct efforts toward Trump’s “deportation task force,” stating on CNN’s State of the Union, “We believe an enforcement bill, a border security enforcement bill is really the first priority and that’s what we’re focused on.” Indeed, Trump’s border wall became a major talking point throughout his campaign. Though he often spoke of his wall as a modern feat of architecture during election season, he has since admitted that stretches of the border wall may be guarded by a fence, or left to natural barriers. To help secure the border, Trump states he will hire several thousand new Border Patrol agents and end Obama’s “catch-and-release” policy, instead forcing unauthorized aliens out of the country upon point of entry.

Following his win in the election, however, Trump has seemingly taken a step back on some of his more polarizing campaign promises on immigration. To contrast the hate-inciting rhetoric he employed earlier in his campaign, Trump has offered that, upon completion of the fortified border wall/fence, he may soften his policies on deportation. During his 60 Minutes interview with Leslie Stahl, he stated, “After the border is secure and after everything gets normalized, we’re going to make a determination on the people that they’re talking about who are terrific people, they’re terrific people, but we are going make a determination,” though the implications of this position remain unclear. Moreover, while Trump has in the past portrayed undocumented immigrants in a broadly negative light (“They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists,” though, “some of them,” he assumes, “are nice people”) his tone appeared more nuanced in his 60 Minutes interview. He stated:

“What we are going to do is get the people that are criminal and have criminal records, gang members, drug dealers, we have a lot of these people, probably 2 million, it could be even 3 million, we are getting them out of our country or we’re going to incarcerate. But we’re getting them out of our country, they’re here illegally.”

Though the figures he presented in the interview have been disputed by immigration experts for being exaggerated (Pew Research Center estimates the total number of undocumented immigrants at 11 million – of that number, about 800,000 are criminals), Trump’s decision to focus deportation efforts on undocumented immigrants with criminal records may alleviate the concerns felt in his initial anti-immigration rhetoric. What’s more, his plan to focus deportation efforts on so-called “bad hombres” is not so unfamiliar to Washington – Obama has similarly directed efforts toward removing criminal immigrants from the U.S.

Speaking on immigration in his final presidential debate with Hillary Clinton, Trump praised Obama’s deportation numbers. “President Obama has moved millions of people out,” he stated, “Nobody knows about it. Nobody talks about it, but under Obama, millions of people have been moved out of this country. They’ve been deported.” Over the past decade, federal enforcement rates on deportation have steadily increased. With the removal of nearly 2.7 million undocumented immigrants during his two presidential terms, Obama stands to become the U.S. President with the greatest number of deportations enforced in history. In regards to Trump’s comments on 60 Minutes, Migration Policy Institute director Muzafar Chishti expressed, “What he’s saying is sort of consistent with present policy,” given that he achieves his goal of 2 to 3 million deportations over the duration of his presidency.

Looking toward 2017, the forecast for the future of U.S. immigration policy remains uncertain. Unlike any of his predecessors, Trump embodies an unpredictable storm of pandering and promises, ever-shifting with the winds of public opinion. Though policy experts may construct an idea of what Trump’s presidency will look like through his public statements, interviews, and contributions from his advisors and allies, millions of undocumented immigrants must play the waiting game to see what their future truly holds.

Britain and Immigration: Before and After the Referendum

When citizens of the United Kingdom headed to the polls on June 23, they became the first group in history to opt out of the European experiment by popular vote. While many reasons prompted the British exit, growing migration was a prominent justification given by the Leave campaign. Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage, leaders of the Leave campaign, stated that there was no consent for the scale of migration witnessed in the past few years. They promised to bring migration to the normal levels of the 1990s when more people were leaving the UK than entering.

In the past few years, British citizens have continuously voiced their desire to halt or at least reduce the influx of migrants. After failed attempts by Prime Minister David Cameroon to fulfill these requests, Brits decided that leaving the EU was the only viable way to control their borders.

Now that Brexit is a reality, immigration continues to be a complicated issue as many EU citizens in Britain remain uncertain about their future in the country. Anxiety about growing migration is intricately woven into the decision to leave the EU and will remain a defining issue in the post-Brexit world. To understand Brexit, then, one must first understand migration.

United Kingdom Migration Laws

The European Union has adopted an open border policy to facilitate traveling and working throughout the continent. The Schengen Area is a zone of twenty-six European Union countries that have agreed to ease travel requirements with other Schengen Area members. The agreement allows EU citizens within the Schengen Area to travel throughout the area only using an identity card. It also allows non-citizens within the Schengen Area to acquire one visa and move throughout the twenty-six countries.

There are different types of Schengen visas including work and student visas. Work visas, for example, are acquired by individuals who would like to work in one or more of the Schengen area countries. The student visa is used by students who have secured a place to study within an educational establishment in a country in the Schengen Area.

The two European countries that have opted out of the Schengen Agreement are the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom. According to laws in the United Kingdom, migrants are divided into non-visa nationals and visa nationals. Non-visa nationals encompass a variety of groups including EU citizens. These non-visa nationals do not require a visa to enter the UK at ports or other points of entry. However, if migrants want to remain the country for longer than six months they must receive entry clearance. Additionally, European Union nationals traveling to the United Kingdom must show a passport or identity card which is strictly scrutinized against security databases.

Around 3.2 million people living in the United Kingdom in 2015 were citizens of another European Union country. European Union migrants make up half of the migrants in the United Kingdom, most of whom hail from Poland, Ireland and Germany. European Union nationals are more likely than UK citizens to participate in the labor market. Currently, 78% of European Union citizens are working in the United Kingdom compared to 74% of UK citizens.

Although foreign born citizens are employed in a variety of sectors, their presence is most prominent in low skilled sectors. In 2015, 59% of EU born workers were in a low skilled job compared to 45% of UK-born citizens. Conversely, 41% of EU born workers were in a high skilled job compared to 55% of UK-born citizens. The presence of EU workers in low skill sectors shows that EU workers are more likely to take on jobs that may be undesirable to those born in the UK.

So if the United Kingdom is mostly benefitting from European Union migrants why did the country choose to leave the European Union?

The Referendum and Immigration

While the Leave campaign presented several justifications for leaving the EU, a persistent theme was an emphasis on national sovereignty and the reduction of migration.

In 2015 the United Kingdom welcomed 630,000 migrants and in 2016 thus far the UK has welcomed 333,000 more. This influx of migrants, prominent throughout Europe, has prompted 77% of Brits to declare that there needs to be a reduction in migration. In fact, 50% of Brits believe that immigration is the most important issue facing Britain, compared to 27% who say the same about the economy.

This anxiety over booming migration played a major role in the Leave campaign’s justification for a European Union exit. The UK Independence Party, led by Nigel Farage, focused on the threats of migration leading up to the Brexit referendum, and anti-immigrant rhetoric persisted throughout European Parliament debates over the Syrian refugee crisis. Like U.S. presidential candidate, Donald Trump, UKIP painted migrants as potential criminals and terrorists taking over the United Kingdom. Nigel Farage even used a poster to emphasize that if the UK remained part of the European Union, the country would be flooded with migrants. The poster displayed by Farage leading up to the referendum depicts a long line of Syrian refugees on the Slovenian border with a caption which reads “Breaking Point: The EU has failed us all.” The posteralso cautions readers that Britain must break free and take control of its own borders. Now that referendum results are in, the country has “broken free” but what does that mean for its borders?

Immigration after Brexit

The Leave campaign proposed an Australian style point-based immigration system which would apply to all migrants, even those from the European Union. Under this system, the more in demand the skills and qualifications of an immigrant, the more eligible the immigrant is for a visa.

As resentment over Brexit mounts in Europe, it is likely that European countries will use migration as a concession for any future trade deals with the UK. In fact, Germany, Portugal, and the Czech Republic say the UK must accept free movement of people in return for access to the single market. The EU single market is an association of countries which trade with each other without restrictions or tariffs.

There are three main models for the UK’s post- Brexit relationship with the EU proposed by the Leave campaign. The first option is the Norwegian modelwhereby the UK exits the European union to join the European Economic Area which is what Norway did in 1994. Under this model, EU policies not covered by the EEA Agreement such as agricultural and fisheries policy would not apply to the UK. The UK would need to retain a range of EU legislation, however, including the free movement of people. So, under this model the promise of curbing migration would not be fulfilled because the UK would be forced to maintain the free movement of people.

The other alternative is the Swiss model. Under this model, the UK would join the European Free Trade Association but not the European Economic Area. The Swiss model is unique because Switzerland enjoys some access to the single market through bilateral agreements. In order to maintain access to the single market, Switzerland was required to allow the free movement of people, which would likely be a prerequisite for any bilateral agreements with the UK as well.

The last alternative is a total exit from the EU and the single market. Under this model the UK could join a Customs Union. The EU does not impose tariffs on goods traded from Customs Union countries in exchange for those countries’ compliance with EU single market regulations. The UK could also rely on the World Trade Organization rules on nondiscrimination whereby trading partners are not treated any less advantageously than others, unless there is a separate free trade agreement between the members. Under WTO rules, the UK would be treated as a third country that does not have a free trade agreement with the EU. The last option is the negotiation of a completely new free trade agreement with the EU. Even with a new agreement, however, there is a chance that free movement of people would be a prerequisite for any access to the EU market.

Implications

As European Union and British politicians continue to negotiate, European migrants in the United Kingdom are living in uncertainty. While those who have lived in the UK for more than five years are afforded permanent residence, no one knows if the EU migrants who have been in the UK for less than five years will be asked to leave. Additionally, there has been no clarification as to when European Union migrants will be forbidden from freely entering the United Kingdom.

The United Kingdom was never fully integrated in the European Union system of free movement but the country has welcomed EU migrants for decades. With growing hysteria about migration, however, Britain was unable to sustain its open border policy any longer. Capitalizing on anxiety, the Leave campaign framed migration as a threat to both security and sovereignty. The consequences of this fear mongering were grave—Britain became the first and only nation to leave the European Union by popular vote. Anxiety about migration led to a catastrophic decision which will have lingering effects for years to come.

So, as the world prepares to assess the state of geopolitics in 2016, it must consider the impact of Brexit. As individual nations and as a collective, we must not let anxiety about migration be a leading factor in any future elections. We must pick leaders who can unite us as a global community which can tackle the problems of the 21st century, not leaders who will divide us into fragmented nations living in fear.

Refugees Suffer and Europe Falters

The sprawling makeshift Idomeni refugee camp now risks becoming a permanent shantytown after the recent closure of the Balkan migrant route through Europe. The Idomeni refugee camp, lying on the Macedonian-Greek border, is home to fourteen thousand refugees from war torn Syria and Libya who face squalor conditions, food shortages, disease, and little options of what to do next. Idomeni, a small town on the Macedonian-Greek border, contains roughly half of all migrants attempting to use Greece as a transition state to more affluent nations in the North of Europe. The 2,000 capacity limit refugee camp originally served as a waiting station for refugees with the hope of passing through the border into Macedonia. With the recent closure of the Balkan route, the Idomeni refugee camp is now becoming a bottleneck of refugees as it becomes severely overpopulated with little funding for proper shelter. However, rather than improving the conditions of refugees within Europe, the EU has opted to discourage those escaping war from fleeing to the West. The recent implementation of the EU-Turkey refugee deal attempts to do this by converting refugee camps, such as Idomeni, into bona fide detention facilities as newly arrived refugees face deportation back to Turkey. The EU-Turkey deal is has made it clear that Europe would rather send asylum seekers back into the fire rather than extend a helping hand. Idomeni is an unfortunate embodiment of the EU’s priorities.

The creation of Idomeni and closure of the Balkan route by Macedonia, Slovenia, Serbia, and croatia illustrates the divide within Europe over the solution to the refugee crisis. Chancellor Merkel of Germany slammed the recent closure stating “Sure, it brings us less refugees [...] but it brings Greece more, and that’s not sustainable.” The chancellor then went to underscore the importance of finding a European solution. In other words, a solution in which all countries of the European Union participate, rather attempting to slow the flow of refugees through unilateral action. Balkan countries are still standing by their decision to close their borders. They claim that the closure have slowed the flow of refugees from Greece into the rest of Europe and that a consistent stop will discourage more refugees from entering Europe through Greece. Regardless of the truth to this Greece is still left with over 36,000 refugees hoping for asylum and little resources to properly care for and process them.

Despite this it appears that many asylum seekers will be taking up residence in Greece. Why is it that Greece has been so hard hit by the refugee crisis? The answer is a combination of Greece’s geographic location, the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Regulation. First, Greece is located across the Aegean Sea from Turkey and is one of the first European Union countries in close proximity to Turkey that provides direct land access to other EU countries such as Germany. This makes Greece an ideal entry point into the EU for refugees fleeing the Syrian civil war through Turkey. Second, the Schengen Agreement abolished internal borders within the EU, allowing for ease of travel for all once granted entrance. The Schengen agreement then created an external border of countries that lie on the edge of the EU, such as Greece. As a country that lies along this external border, Greece faces greater strain than other members in processing refugees as they are checked in Greece before entering the EU. Third, the European Union’s common law concerning asylum seekers, the Dublin Regulation, devotes the duty of asylum application processing and relocation to the refugee’s country of entry. Under the Dublin Regulation if a refugee moved on to another EU country, the government of the country can file a transfer request to the country of entry. This places the majority burden on all EU border countries in regards to the refugee crisis, but Greece most of all.

The EU attempted a so called “European solution” for the refugee crisis as mentioned by Chancellor Merkel with a recent deal between the European Union and Turkey. This agreement attempts to ease the disproportionate strain on Greece. Largely endorsed by European leaders as well as the prime minister of Turkey, the deal attempts to “smash the business model of people-smugglers.” However, it has been condemned by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for arresting refugees and turning refugee processing “hotspots” into detention centers. In short, the proposed deal states that all future refugees entering Greece through the Aegean Sea after departing Turkey will be deported back to Turkey. For every refugee sent back to Turkey, another will be relocated in Europe from Turkey. Furthermore, the European Union will double the 3.3 million euros already pledged to increase the quality of Turkey’s refugee camps, renew talks concerning Turkey joining the EU, and release visa requirements of Turkish citizens. This deal has divided Europe with some hailing it as the solution to Europe’s refugee crisis and others slamming it for turning a blind eye from Turkey’s border closure to thousands of refugees escaping war torn Syria. On top of this the legality of this potential “solution” in Europe’s refugee crisis has been called into question. Critics who question the legality of the EU-Turkey refugee deal point out that Turkey not only has a large number of refugees without adequate facilities to house them, but also has not fully accepted the Geneva Convention. As such, this deal may break European and international law concerning that all asylum applications must be properly considered and cannot be sent back to any country without necessary protections for them. Due to the question of legality regarding the deal and the subsequent detention of refugees the office of the UNHCR has withdrawn much of its support for facilities in Greece that registered and assisted entering refugees, refusing to participate in the unlawful arrest of people escaping war. Despite all its flaws, this potential deal is seriously seen by the EU as a solution to the refugee problem in Greece and Europe as a whole. However, with the recent Balkan route closure and the stranded 36,000 refugees within Greece this couldn’t be farther from the truth. European leaders should be focused on improving the current humanitarian conditions of refugees within Greece, rather than condemning them to a figurative and literal limbo before deporting them back to where they risked so much to escape.

The Idomeni refugee camp is unfortunately an excellent example of the consequences of Europe placing a higher priority on denying safe haven to refugees rather than properly housing and protecting them. Jim Yardley of the New York Times visited Idomeni the day of the Macedonia border closure and describes an outrageous scene. Women and children sleep in mud, sewage flows from portable toilets, and illness spreads from person to person. Pictures from Quartz also depicts the Idomeni refugee camp as hopeless situation for an unfathomable number of men, women, and children. Seemingly endless rows of tents cover a ground littered with trash as people sit with hope that they will be allowed to move on from Idomeni into the rest of Europe. In an attempt to make Idomeni at all visible to Europe, two refugees lit themselves ablaze in a recent protest to illustrate their desperation. Europe cannot call the refugee crisis solved by the EU-Turkey deal with such cries for help emanating from Idomeni and other camps.

The International Rescue Committee (IRC) recently concluded that refugees who were recently prevented from crossing into Macedonia from Northern Greece are at an increased risk of humanitarian problems. The IRC found that refugees at the Idomeni camp faces water, sanitation, and hygiene facilities pushed past their limits, a despairingly large amount of trash with no sanity location for it, a short supply of feminine and general hygiene products, as well as limited heating. Limited heating is of a particular concern as refugees resort to lighting their own fires, often in close proximity of tents which presents a very large fire hazard. The increasingly permanent refugee camp also lacks the proper number of actors to protect women, children and the elderly from those who seek to take advantage of the most vulnerable in humanitarian crises. Women lacks safe spaces to seek solace from abuse and the camp has limited sufficient lighting which makes it even more dangerous for the vulnerable. Idomeni is nothing less than a humanitarian crisis and becoming worse. Europe must act and provide funding to care for the refugees within Greece, rather than cutting them off and shouldering them onto another country that is equally ill prepared to house them.

The EU’s focus on preventing more refugees from entering Europe combined with the recent Balkan route closure has created a situation in which Greece is becoming a hellish nightmare for asylum seekers. The EU-Turkey refugee deal is an attempt at a “European solution,” to the refugee crisis, but it prioritizes ending the flow of refugees into Europe through inhumane and illegal methods, rather than improving the conditions of asylum seekers suffering in Greece. It’s clear the EU has the resources to properly care for refugees already within Europe, as evidenced by the money given to Turkey. However, the European Union lacks the will to extend a helping hand in the name of humanity, preferring instead to give that job to somebody else. Whether the recent refugee deal does end the flow of refugees from North Africa and the Middle East into Europe will remain to be seen. Regardless, it overlooks the thousands who already risked it all to escape war and violence present in Idomeni and other camps within Greece. If the refugee crisis is to be truly solved we cannot ignore those who have found themselves at the mercy of our care.

The Discourse Surrounding Internment of United States Citizens: Action Derived From Fear as a Departure from Liberal Democracy

As the world enters its second decade of the new century, crises across the globe are driving people to take refuge from their home countries. Old fears concerning terrorism, as well as current realities about violence and prejudice pose a significant problem for United States politicians: should refugee programs for Muslims be banned on the basis of national security, just as World War II fears produced Japanese internment camps? This paper will not explore the moral justification—or lack thereof—for the implementation of Japanese internment camps during WWII, or for the banning of Muslim refugees. Instead, it will discuss how the decisions of World War II, and the revival of new discussions of ethnically biased policies, contradict liberal democratic political theory in the United States. Liberal democratic theory is at the core of the United States’ political doctrine; it drives the Constitution, the structure, and the ideology of both the government and the people. The contradiction of these values and ideologies is not only a troubling departure from foundational liberal democratic principles, but potentially signal a decline in the political stability of the nation itself as the American people sink more deeply into polarized positions and increasingly neglect objective evaluation of political candidates from either major party.

In the U.S., there exists a divide between the intentions of politicians for the societies they wish to create and lead, and the reality of the political and social atmospheres garnered by the more diverse American peoples. These differences reflect the further, profound difference between the United States’ liberal democratic foundations, and the reality of its lack of democratic representation. Liberal democracy is defined here as a political theory founded on representative democracy, where the government is formed of elected representatives whose power is restrained by both the law and the constitution, both of which serve to protect the rights and freedoms of individuals and are supported by the majority of the state. Of course, the United States is not a perfect liberal democracy. The theoretical justifications for the values and legal attitudes of the nation that can be—and are—threatened by the proposed decisions of the few who hold power.

The Syrian refugee crisis has given way to rhetoric by some United States politicians that is both anti-refugee and, more generally, anti-Islamic. In recent years, conflict has arisen in Syria, The civil war began in spring 2011 when pro-democracy protests erupted across the nation in opposition to the authoritarian regime of President Bashar al-Assad; the President used violent, militaristic methods to suppress opposition efforts, including murder. Since then, conflict has raged between the government and opposition militias, as well as the rise of a third antagonist, ISIS, a radical non-state terrorist actor in the region. All of these threats have culminated in the displacement of Syrian civilians, who have now gained refugee status as they flee their civil war-torn country. The potential for the reinstitution of internment camps for those peacefully seeking refuge in America based on race and religion both represents the state’s increasing political polarization and its departure from the values of liberal democracy that upon which the United States was founded. The complexity of the situation is most apparent when the security argument is considered: does the nation prioritize perceptions of security, or philosophical foundations rooted in the Constitution, during times of crisis? This question might seem rhetorical and self-evident to people on either side of the argument; the ideological conflict at hand here is best exemplified by the U.S. policy decisions made during World War II concerning Japanese-American citizens.

The U.S. first interred civilians during WWII following the Japanese attach on Pearl Harbor, a measure intended to improve security, but which did little else beyond dividing otherwise equal citizens and violating the fundamental theories of liberty and freedom otherwise promoted by the concepts of democracy. In a 1942 film produced by the US Office of War Information, Japanese Relocation, Milton Eisenhower’s narration sets the tone for the official opinion on U.S. action. Eisenhower’s explanation of the motivations for the internment, could easily translate into today’s anti-Muslim immigration discourses by substituting a few key words. The original states:

When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, our West Coast became a potential combat zone. Living in that zone were more than 100,000 persons of Japanese ancestry; two thirds of them American citizens; one third aliens. We knew that some among them were potentially dangerous. But no one knew what would happen among this concentrated population if Japanese forces should try to invade our shores. Military authorities therefore determined that all of them, citizens and aliens alike, would have to move.

The legal basis for the internment of Japanese U.S. citizens and non-citizens alike derives from Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066, which came two months after the attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent declaration of war against.  Executive Order 9066 was declared after the United States had formally declared war and was motivated by determined necessity founded on fear of future attacks and national insecurity. The trouble was, legal basis had been developed around racial motivations in order to support it; legal foundations in the Constitution did not support the xenophobic ideas on security being purported at the time, and so those in power created the necessary legal foundation through Supreme Court decisions such as Hirabayashi v. United States, executive orders, and influential media coverage of the conflict.

Ansel Adams, a photographer of the period who was critical of the executive order, noted that by June 1943, the Office of War Information reported that Nazi agents, not Japanese Americans, who aided the Japanese in carrying out their attack on Pearl Harbor—the rhetoric of security perpetuated at this time was proven wrong. In this case, fear determined the guilt of Japanese Americans before the facts had been appropriately investigated and considered; and, thus, a narrative of the danger that Japanese Americans posed took hold of public perception and ended up oppressing innocent civilians. This fear-based/security-obsessed narrative ultimately led to the forced internment of more than 120,000 Japanese Americans in the Pacific Coastal region, most of whom lost their jobs, possessions, and land, all with little guarantee of their full or partial return following the conclusion of internment.

Today, U.S. political discourse encounters the same methods of abusing the public’s insecurities in order to advance and justify extreme and xenophobic notions of how the country should be governed.  Following recent terrorist attacks in San Bernardino, California and Paris, France—both connected with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)—2016 Presidential candidate Donald Trump advocated a ban on allowing identified Muslims into the United States. Understanding the motivation behind the urge to stop the refugee program is vital to understanding its significance to the theoretical underpinnings of U.S. politics. David Bowers, the mayor of Roanoke Virginia, issued an early statement advocating the refusal of Syrian refugees to his region of the state:

I’m reminded that President Franklin D. Roosevelt felt compelled to sequester Japanese foreign nationals after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, and it appears that the threat of harm to America from ISIS now is just as real and serious as that from our enemies then.

The real and serious threat that Bowers is referring to, however, is unfounded in the wake of the Parisian attacks considering that the perpetrators were European radicals, not moderate Syrians or Muslims. As Adams noted during his work covering the Japanese internment camps, fear of Japanese American spies would fail to become tangible. In a similar way, security concerns regarding Syrian and Muslim immigrants to the U.S. fail because of the tenuous link between extremist ideology and everyday civilians; not all Muslims or Syrian refugees are dangerous, and so to criminalize all members of one demographic is disproportionately xenophobic. Consider the writings of a theorist behind liberal democratic theory, John Locke. In Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration, he argued that churches should have no coercive power over their members, and that there could be no true religion for a state; he wrote of the separation of legislative and executive powers, and furthermore that a government could not exist without the consent of its people to protect and govern it. Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau shared similar notions concerning the relationship between government and people, in fact.

The executive order authorizing the internment camps came at a time of inter-state war that inspired high levels of fear and national insecurity for the state of democracy; Trump’s remarks and the attempted policies of both governors and mayors represent a resurgence of fear-based political discourse based on a fear of refugees and the threats more directly faced by those abroad. There is a sense of irony in that the United States has nearly always proclaimed itself a land without religious oppression. Puritans came from England with motive to practice their religion in peace, and the first amendment of the Constitution forbids the impediment of the freedom of religion.

Although school systems teach the values of the U.S. Constitution—freedom of speech, freedom of religion, civil rights such as voting and desegregation amongst races—the impression that many may have of the active applicability of these rights may be misaligned with the desired reality of those vying for power.  The possibility arises that these protections once deemed inalienable may only be selectively extended. Of the Republican presidential candidates, Jeb Bush and Ted Cruz have recommended that the Syrian refugee program be continued, but that the program should only accept Christian refugees. While no politicians have formally recommended the internment of Muslim-American citizens or of Syrian refugees, their discrimination in terms of their immigration policies sends a concerning message to the U.S. While the United States government may not directly endanger them yet, political discourses based on fear sets a dangerous precedent for policies that may come further down the road.

Embracing a rhetoric that threatens to divide the American people from the values their country was founded on compromises the political stability of the United States as a whole, as ethnically-motivated policies may lead to political polarization, However, the danger comes from public opinion itself, which has become so divided that only 39% of Americans share a somewhat equal number of liberal and conservative positions. As it currently stands, the two-party system in the U.S. grows increasingly polarized, supported by politicians and citizens alike—the fundamental lack of civil discussion on the political spectrum itself can produce the level of instability suggested thus far. And indeed, if fears of xenophobia are once again able to fuel adaptations of the law to the demands of a few in power, democratic instability would not be a possibility, but perhaps an inevitability. The banning of refugees based on religion and ethnicity threatens the security of American citizens who practice Islam and enables U.S. citizens to incorrectly identify non-Christians as un-American. It is impossible for a nation to correctly proclaim itself a sanctuary of liberal democracy if it fails to offer equal status and liberal democratic rights to all its citizens, regardless of their identities. Banning Muslim and Syrian refugees may intend to proffer security by blocking terrorists, but its main accomplishment will be the endangerment of entire segments of the U.S. population, as radicalized fears seem legitimate in contemporary political discourse. If the United States is no longer loyal to its foundational principles as a liberal democracy, the nation may plunge itself into internal political turmoil as people clash over the future of the United States, and whom it truly serves.