How I Learned to Stop Worrying about the Bomb

In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, many scholars last year wrote about the ramifications that the war would have on international security. Among the concerns was the distress about the potential impacts that the war would have on the nuclear nonproliferation regime. In their article for Foreign Policy (published in March of last year), Andreas Umland and Hugo von Essen, analysts at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, argue that the war in Ukraine will cause middle power states to derive three main lessons. First, nuclear weapons remain a powerful source of power in the international system. Second, if you are a state with nuclear weapons, it is foolish to relinquish said weapons. Third, treaties, alliances, and the like cannot be trusted as a means of ensuring security. In this article, I aim to expand the discussion via addressing and disputing these claims. I argue that even though middle power states may recognize that nuclear weapons are a powerful tool, they’ll still refrain from acquiring them and instead make use of other methods (such as international agreements), either willingly or by the coercion of a great power, to quash their security concerns.

Umland and von Essen argue that states with nuclear weapons or aspirations to acquire such weapons will perceive the invasion as proof that nuclear weapons are essential to their security. They argue that states will see Ukraine’s past efforts to denuclearize as foolish, as they eliminated the deterrence effect that was preventing a Russian invasion. Because of this, they conclude that non-nuclear weapons states are likely to rush to obtain nuclear weapons before their regional adversaries, and that nuclear weapons states are unlikely to agree to disarmament measures in the future.

I disagree with the notion that states will take away that Ukraine was invaded because it denuclearized. To start, Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons 30 years before the invasion. Assuming Umland and von Essen are right in their claim that the decisive factor determining whether Russia decided to invade the former Soviet state was its possession of nuclear weapons, then it seems illogical that they would wait so long to launch an invasion. Instead, I would argue that there is another factor that has more explanatory power regarding Russia’s behavior: Ukraine’s position relative to the West. Simply put, it seems as though the more Ukraine has panned towards the West, the more aggressive Russia’s behavior has become.

In February 2014, after Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych rejected a proposal to increase cooperation with the European Union in favor of expanding ties with Russia, large-scale protests erupted across the country, culminating in the ousting of Yanukovych on February 22nd.  As the reality became increasingly clear to Russian elites that their attempts at influencing Ukraine were facing staunch resistance from the populace, they responded by launching an invasion of Crimea, a region in southern Ukraine. Russia’s response then was motivated primarily by the fear of a Ukraine that aligns itself more towards the West and away from Russia. This factor remains prevalent in their decision calculus today, as it likely undergirded the decision to launch a full-scale invasion in February of last year, a decision that coincided with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s goal of Ukrainian integration with the EU and NATO by 2024.

Additionally, an important caveat I’ll add to Umland and von Essen’s argument is that, while the weapons were on Ukrainian soil, Ukraine didn’t have control over the weapons, which limits the ability of the weapons to act as a deterrent. For a nuclear weapon to act as a deterrent that changes the behavior of other actors, there must be a credible threat that the state would use it in the face of a provocation, a condition that cannot be meet if a state is unable to use them, whether initiated in a conflict or otherwise. Regardless, while the weapons nonetheless influenced Russia’s decision to invade, I disagree with Umland and von Essen’s analysis that states will believe their presence (or lack thereof) was the single most decisive factor behind the invasion. 

Instead of focusing on their nuclear weapons, I would argue that states will recognize that Ukraine was not part of a regional alliance, such as NATO or the European Union, with a guarantee to protect its members in the face of encroachment or invasion. This development will compel states to strengthen bilateral relations with a great power, realizing that it is a much more efficient and effective means of ensuring security than pursuing a nuclear weapon, as states can enjoy the same benefit of security without the costs of acquiring nuclear weapons. 

To clarify, I think that Ukraine was in a unique situation, in which a country’s pursuit of a network of alliances prompted an aggressive response from another. Russian President Vladimir Putin has long sought after Ukraine, a former Soviet state that he argues is “ethnically Russian” and should therefore reintegrated into Russia. Ukraine suffered from the illusion of choice: either pursue alliance commitments and aggravate Russia or don’t and risk fighting Russia alone in the event of an invasion. The lack of alliance commitments left Ukraine as a sitting duck in the event of Russian encroachment. Conversely, the shift towards the West to form alliance commitments angered Russia and accelerated any desire to invade. In this case, what Ukraine believed was in their self-interest clashed with what Russia believed was in their self-interest, which caused conflict.

In terms of the international reaction, this is where Umland, von Essen, and I agree: middle power states will look to avoid an instance in which a conflict emerges from their self-interest clashing with another state, and thus will look to bolster their security. Where we disagree, however, is in the methods by which these states will use. Umland and von Essen argue that other middle power states will interpret Russia’s attack as an indication of the necessity of nuclear weapons to ensure international security, whether it is to deter confrontations with regional adversaries or encroachments from great powers. While I won’t deny that middle power states will reconsider the power of nuclear weapons on the international stage in the wake of the war in Ukraine, I don’t think that sentiment will necessarily translate into them seeking a nuclear weapon of their own. Instead, I would argue that it provides a reason why they should enhance cooperation with their allies, especially great power allies, to achieve an enhanced sense of security.

Regarding treaties, Umland and von Essen argue that the war in Ukraine undermines the credibility of treaties to prevent non-proliferation, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and leaves middle power states with little incentive to abide by treaties writ large, given the willingness of great powers (such as Russia) to completely disregard them. However, it seems as though the opposite is happening. Instead of abandoning treaties, assurances, and the like, middle powers have begun to (and will likely continue to) cling to them, recognizing that their livelihood may depend on the security provided by a great power. 

Consider the increase in cooperation between Taiwan and the US in the past year, as evidenced by high-profile meetings, for example. Taiwan, a state that many would argue is a likely candidate for an amphibious invasion in the coming years from its neighbor China, is reaffirming the importance of its relationship with the United States. Former Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan and current Speaker Kevin McCarthy’s meeting with president Tsai Ing-Wen have signaled to China that the US’ commitment to Taiwan remains stronger than ever. These visits are rooted in a Taiwanese desire for security, as enhanced cooperation is an indication that the US recognizes the vital role Taiwan plays in advancing its national interests. This recognition is informally hinting towards a willingness by the US to defend Taiwan in the event of a conflict, thus deterring a Chinese invasion without involving the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Based on Umland and von Essen’s analysis, one would expect Taiwan, as a middle power, to pursue nuclear weapons to resolve their security qualms. Instead, they’ve taken steps to fortify their relationship with the United States, leveraging their relations with a great power to hedge back against China. 

Additionally, even if states decide that it is in their best interest to pursue a nuclear weapon, international actors will intervene to prevent this desire from translating into concrete action. China has played a key role in preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, because (among other reasons) they recognize that any such effort would be seen as aggressive by its adversaries in the region, namely Israel and Saudi Arabia, and set off a regional arms race. China cannot afford such an outcome, as they benefit immensely from stability in the region, as it ensures they can continue to trade extensively with both Saudi Arabia and Iran. As a result, they have a unique incentive to step in to prevent any actions that would jeopardize access to those markets, which, much to their dismay, means no bomb for Iran.

Regardless of whether this is an instance of a middle power reaching out to a great power to ensure its security (without the pursuit of nuclear weapons) or a great power reaching out to a middle power to provide security (to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons), or something in between, the result remains the same: no nuclear proliferation by the middle power.

Umland and von Essen’s fears that the war in Ukraine will collapse the non-proliferation regime are overblown. The war in Ukraine has done little to fundamentally change the costs and benefits of pursuing a nuclear weapon as a means of addressing security concerns, meaning that states will opt to pursue treaties and other agreements. These declarations allow countries to achieve the same security without the international backlash associated with developing a nuclear weapons program. Additionally, while the NPT in its current state may have lost credibility, any residual loss will be supplemented by the intervention of state actors. The interest of great powers to cap the proliferation of nuclear weapons (and their accompanying destabilizing effect on regional and international security) will ultimately continue to prevent any remaining desire by states to pursue nuclear weapons from materializing. 

A Deliberate Strategy

Introduction

On February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine, violating the UN Charter and creating the largest threat to European unity and security since World War Two. While the threat to European security is undeniable, the threat posed to international humanitarian law is equally alarming. In the year since the invasion, more than 8,000 civilians have been killed and 8 million Ukrainians have become refugees. As the war continues and Russia retreats from regions it once occupied, evidence of possible violations of international law is being discovered. 

While media coverage in the West has focused on alleged violations committed by Russia, that does not mean Ukraine is innocent. In the eyes of the law, Russia and Ukraine are equal and they are held to the same standards. Any breach of those standards, even once, cannot and should not be tolerated because any potential violation that is not investigated or prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law risks being repeated, either in Ukraine or elsewhere by states who watch how this war is being conducted and think they can do the same. Understanding the various alleged violations of international law that have been committed by both sides since the war began is critical if we are to not repeat them and if there is to be any measure of justice once this war is over. There are people still alive today who remember the horrors of World War Two, who remember what this world was like without the Geneva Conventions to regulate the conduct of war. 

History of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Tensions between Russia and Ukraine can be traced back to 2004 and the Orange Revolution. The revolution began in November 2004 after the second-round results of the presidential election proclaimed Viktor Yanukovych the winner, despite exit polls showing opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko in the lead. The elections were marked by widespread voter fraud and corruption in favor of Yanukovych, the Kremlin’s candidate. Russian election monitors had “validated” the results of the run-off and proclaimed Yanukovych the winner. However, the Supreme Court of Ukraine annulled the results of the first run-off and ordered a repeat of the vote in December. Yushchenko won comfortably, much to the chagrin of people in eastern and southern Ukraine, as well as Russia. Yushchenko’s victory was a setback for Russia’s plans to keep Ukraine within its sphere of influence. However, Russia got its way in 2010 when Yanukovych became president after Yushchenko’s term was riddled with infighting and he failed to integrate Ukraine with the West.

Yanukovych’s presidency did not last long before he was ousted during the Euromaidan Revolution in 2013 when protests erupted across Ukraine after he rejected a deal that would have led to greater economic integration with the EU. The protests spread across the country and Yanukovych fled to Russia in February 2014. A month later, Russia annexed Crimea, citing a duty to protect the rights and lives of ethnic Russians, who comprise a majority of the Crimean population. Not long after the annexation, separatist groups in Luhansk and Donetsk in eastern Ukraine declared independence from Ukraine. Russia supported the separatist groups in the war against the Ukrainian military, with some reports suggesting that Russian soldiers had crossed the border and were fighting alongside the separatists and that some shelling had come from inside Russia. 

In 2015, Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany began negotiating the Minsk Accords, with “provisions for a ceasefire, withdrawal of heavy weaponry, and full Ukrainian control of the regions.” However, the agreement and ceasefire collapsed, and fighting resumed. In October 2021, Russia began substantially building up its troop presence on the Ukrainian border, with over 100,000 troops stationed there by the end of the year. In early February 2022, Russia deployed troops to its border with Belarus, surrounding Ukraine from the north, east, and south. Finally, on February 24, 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and the war has only deteriorated: more than 71,000 alleged war crimes are being investigated by the Ukrainian authorities. 

International Law

After World War Two, the international community agreed that the conduct of war needed to be regulated or the atrocities committed during that time would be repeated. The Geneva Conventions, which are the foundation of international humanitarian law (IHL), are a set of four treaties and three additional protocols that regulate how states can wage war. One of the innovations of the Geneva Conventions is the concept of grave breaches, which are the most serious breaches of the law of war. Grave breaches are unique in that they are only applicable in international armed conflicts (e.g., the current Russo-Ukrainian war). There are articles common throughout the four conventions (the Common Articles) that describe what a grave breach is. Articles 50 and 51 of the first and second conventions describe grave breaches as “wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body of health, and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.” Article 130 of the third convention includes the previous language, adding that “compelling a prisoner of war of the right of fair and regular trial prescribed in this Convention” is also a grave breach. Finally, Article 147 of the fourth convention, building on the three previous articles, includes “unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a protected person of the right of fair and regular trial” and the “taking of hostages.” Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions are legally and colloquially referred to as war crimes, which must be prosecuted by the High Contracting Parties. 

It is widely accepted that international human rights law (IHRL) is applicable during times of war and that principle has been affirmed by numerous international legal bodies. Even though states are technically allowed to derogate some of their responsibilities under IHRL, they are only allowed to do so “to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. The measures of derogation may not be inconsistent with the state’s other international obligations, such as those under IHL.” There are also certain human rights that are considered non-derogable, such as the right to life, the right to liberty and security, and freedom from torture and inhumane or degrading punishment. Crimes against humanity are the most serious breaches of international human rights law, including violations of non-derogable rights.

This is where international criminal law (ICL) becomes applicable. ICL applies to four broad sets of crimes: war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and the crime of aggression. These are the four crimes the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over, as outlined in the Rome Statute. The Rome Statute defines war crimes as both grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, as well as “other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict” such as intentionally targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure. The Rome Statute also has defined crimes against humanity as acts “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.” Examples of crimes against humanity include, but are not limited to, “murder, extermination, deportation or forcible transfer of population, imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty, torture, and rape, sexual slavery… and any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity.” Even though neither Russia nor Ukraine are state parties to the Rome Statute, war crimes and crimes against humanity committed on the territory of Ukraine are within the International Criminal Courts' jurisdiction because the situation was referred to the ICC by 43 state parties, and Ukraine lodged a declaration formally accepting the ICC's jurisdiction over crimes committed on the territory indefinitely.

Probable Violations of International Law

On October 18, the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine published a report detailing the findings of its investigation into events that occurred between February and March 2022 in the Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Sumy provinces of Ukraine. The Commission “has found reasonable grounds to conclude that an array of war crimes and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law have been committed in Ukraine since 24 February 2022.” Russian armed forces were responsible for the vast majority of war crimes and human rights violations. The Commission found that Russia most likely used explosive weapons indiscriminately in civilian areas, including indiscriminate attacks on residential buildings, schools, hospitals, and other buildings of non-military importance. Attacking civilian infrastructure not out of military necessity is a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions. Additionally, “The Commission found numerous cases in which Russian armed forces shot at civilians trying to flee to safety and obtain food or other necessities, which resulted in the killing or injury of the victims.” The Commission also found that “violations against personal integrity” were committed in the four provinces under Russian occupation. “These violations included summary executions, torture, ill-treatment, sexual and gender-based violence, unlawful confinement and detention in inhumane conditions, and forced deportations.” These are also grave breaches under the Geneva Conventions. Furthermore, the Commission found “a pattern of summary executions in areas temporarily occupied by Russian armed forces" including in Bucha, where over 400 people were executed during the month of Russian occupation. Many Ukrainian civilians were also illegally confined, tortured, and forcibly transferred to Russia. “Russian armed forces inflicted severe physical and mental pain and suffering upon the victims.” Sexual and gender-based violence was rampant with victims as young as 4 and as old as 83. Each of these crimes described by the Commission constitutes grave breaches under the Geneva Conventions and can be considered war crimes. 

Even though Russia is responsible for most of the violations of international law, Ukraine is not absolved of wrongdoing. The Commission also found evidence of war crimes committed by the Ukrainian armed forces. “The Commission has also documented two cases in which Ukrainian armed forces shot, wounded, and tortured captured soldiers of the Russian armed forces.” In the first case, between March 24 and March 26, Ukrainian soldiers deliberately shot three Russian prisoners of war while interrogating them. The second instance occurred on March 29 when a Ukrainian soldier shot an already wounded Russian soldier three times at close range. 

The Commission’s investigation was limited in scope. It only investigated violations of international law committed through March 2022. As more Russian forces began retreating, evidence of possible war crimes and other violations of international law have been reported. In September, the Ukrainian news agency, Ukrainska Pravda, reported that 447 bodies had been exhumed from a mass grave in Izium, Kharkiv Oblast. Most of the bodies are civilians and their exact causes of death will be investigated, although most show signs of violent death, and 30 showed evidence of torture. As stated above, attacking civilians is a war crime, and the evidence, in this case, speaks volumes, but it must be properly investigated for this to be definitively called a war crime. 

A Deliberate Strategy?

International law is clear, but it seems that every day the world discovers another possible war crime or another violation of human rights. This begs the question: why? Why violate the laws of war and international human rights law? The answer is different depending on which country you are asking about, even though the law is equally applied to both. "This equal application of IHL to both belligerents is particularly difficult to accept in the current situation, where Russia is the aggressor and therefore responsible for all human suffering in Ukraine, whether or not it results from violations of IHL and even when it is directly caused by Ukraine because even that would not have occurred if Ukraine had not to defend itself from the Russian invasion.” The answer to why Ukraine committed those two war crimes is very simple: self-defense. The extent to which committing war crimes is the best way to defend your country is questionable, but that is the reason. 

On the other hand, Russia appears to be violating international law as part of a deliberate strategy. In the months and days before the war, Vladimir Putin made a series of addresses to the nation. On July 12, 2021, Putin wrote an article titled “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” in which he wrote there is no historical basis for Ukrainian independence from Russia, that Ukraine is a product of historical Russia and as such owes its existence to Russia. In this article, Putin accused Ukraine of fratricide by forcing Russians to assimilate into Ukrainian culture to create an “ethnically pure Ukrainian state, aggressive towards Russia.” Ironically, Putin ends the article by stating “we respect the Ukrainian language and traditions. We respect Ukrainians’ desire to see their country free, safe, and prosperous,” but the only way to do that is by aligning itself with Russia.” 

Exactly eight months later, three days before the invasion, Putin addressed the nation, repeating the same sentiments on the historical unity of the two nations, and proclaiming that Ukraine “actually never had any stable traditions of real statehood.” On the day of the invasion, Putin's intention for Ukraine became clearer. He stated that Ukraine was perpetrating genocide against ethnic Russians. "The purpose of this operation is to protect people who… have been facing humiliation and genocide perpetrated by the Kyiv regime. To this end, we will seek to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine, as well as bring to trial those who perpetrated numerous bloody crimes against civilians, including against citizens of the Russian Federation.” Vladimir Putin’s thinly veiled eliminationist rhetoric is contrasted by the outright eliminationist rhetoric of Russian media pundits like Timofey Sergeytsev. At the beginning of the war, Sergeytsev called the Ukrainian masses “passive Nazis” and “accomplices of Nazism” and called for a “total lustration” of Nazis (i.e., the Ukrainian people and government). Sergeytsev, echoing Putin, wrote, “Ukraine, as history has shown, is impossible as a nation-state, and attempts to "build" one naturally lead to Nazism.” Any Russian citizen or soldier, reading these articles and listening to these speeches in the Russian state media echo chamber, would undoubtedly internalize this as the truth. Many Russians have: 74% support the military’s actions in Ukraine.

Russia has made it abundantly clear it does not recognize the existence of an independent Ukraine, going as far as saying that Ukraine is run by Nazis that need to be “liquidated.” To achieve this goal of demilitarizing and denazifying Ukraine, the Russian armed forces have been deliberately brutal towards civilians in the towns they occupied. For example, Germany’s foreign intelligence service, the BND, intercepted radio communications among Russian military personnel when they were north of Kyiv. One soldier said that they shot a person on a bicycle and another soldier said, “First you interrogate soldiers, then you shoot them.” Killing a civilian and prisoners of war are both violations of the Geneva Conventions.  Committing atrocities serves as a means to an end. By terrorizing civilians and committing gross violations of international law, Russia is trying to deter resistance and assert its dominance over the Ukrainian people. “Russia’s political goals in Ukraine lend themselves to violence against civilians, even more so after Moscow’s narrative shifted the motive for the war from liberating the Ukrainian population to cleansing it from “Nazi” elements.” Asserting control over the Ukrainian people can only be achieved by dehumanizing them to the point where they no longer have the will to fight back. 

Moving Forward

There is strong evidence both Russia and Ukraine have violated international law during this war. The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine found evidence of such violations, disproportionately committed by Russia. There is also evidence supporting that this is a deliberate strategy by Russia to assert control over the Ukrainian people. Atrocities do not happen in a vacuum, but when they happen, they must be documented and investigated with the utmost urgency and respect for the people harmed. There are currently numerous international and domestic investigations open, but investigations of this nature can take months, even years, to complete. The Commission of Inquiry needed seven months to investigate crimes committed in just one month. This war has lasted for over a year, so the world may not find out the extent of war crimes until long after the war has ended. This poses its own set of challenges. Witnesses could emigrate, evidence could be destroyed, and victims, who are severely traumatized, may need years before they can tell their stories. It is also highly improbable that Russia will cooperate with any investigation, seeing as it does recognize the authority of the International Criminal Court, nor does it recognize Ukraine as a sovereign nation. None of these challenges should deter the international community from investigating, documenting, indicting, and, hopefully, prosecuting these gross violations of international law. Europe has seen the ‘cleansing’ narrative before and it, along with the rest of the world, must set the precedent now that any crimes and violations of a similar nature in a similar context will be thoroughly investigated and prosecuted, lest they will be repeated.

Crumbs in the Breadbasket: A Global Food Crisis on the Horizon

In September 2022, Ukraine’s farmers began sowing winter wheat, rye, barley, and rapeseed with the echoes of Russian artillery and the smell of burning cities fresh in their minds. Many agricultural fields such as those in Ozera, Ukraine were cratered by rockets, flattened by tanks, and littered with the vestiges of war. Tractors started with no guarantee that Russia would respect Ukraine’s right to export grain from its Black Sea ports. Many of those who would be working in these fields were off fighting against the Russian military. Ukraine’s rich black soil and its seaports which give it access to international markets make the country a critical global agricultural exporter and is the reason why it is commonly referred to as “the breadbasket of Europe.” Unfortunately, Ukraine’s Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food anticipated the land dedicated to winter grain crops would decrease by up to 35 percent. The time and resources lost to Putin’s war not only threaten Europe’s food security but could cause a devastating disruption in global food distribution. The international community recognized this threat and has acted. In November 2022, Türkiye and the United Nations negotiated a deal to extend the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI), which assures Ukraine’s grain exports safe passage past Russian naval blockades, by 120 days. Although the BSGI took a critical step in staving off the worst consequences of a global food shortage, there is more to be done.

As the March expiration-date soon approaches, Russia has telegraphed that reupping the crucial deal will come with some foot-dragging. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Vershinin said during a February 13 interview that without the “real removal of sanctions restrictions on Russian agricultural exports,” the extension of the deal is “inappropriate.” However, this statement bends reality, because Western sanctions have not explicitly targeted Russian agricultural exports. Moscow has argued that blocks on its payments, logistics, and insurance industries are a “barrier” to the export of grains and fertilizers. The Kremlin seems to be using the threat of a global food crisis to further its own interests and weaken Ukraine’s economy.

Moscow is not too proud to hide its intentions. As a condition of the BSGI, joint teams from Ukraine, Russia, the United Nations, and Türkiye must inspect each ship to prevent the arrival or departure of unauthorized cargo and passengers. Ukrainian ship inspector Ruslan Sakhautdinov claims that his Russian counterparts systematically delay inspections by double and triple-checking fuel gages and scrutinizing crewmembers’ personal belongings. The practice has become routine and created serious backlogs. In October 2022, Istanbul’s typically beautiful sunrise on the Marmara Sea was littered with 165 cargo ships waiting for inspection. In January 2023, Ukraine exported 3.1 million tonnes of grain which fell far short of its 5 million tonne goal. In fact, the BSGI has not once met its goal since the deal was signed in August. October was the month that came closest to the target— when 194 ships were cleared for passage exporting 4.3 million tonnes of grain (compared to the 85 ships in January). October’s brief success was thanks to Moscow stepping away from the deal which in consequence allowed for the Ukrainian, U.N., and Turkish inspectors to work without the obstruction of their Russian colleagues.

One consequence is that, as the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service observed in January, “Ukraine farm prices remain low due to the increased stockpiles and decrease in export demand as some countries shifted to other suppliers.” Facing market volatility and lower expected returns, many of Ukraine’s wheat producers have made the calculation that it is in their best interest to plant fewer acres so that they aren’t stuck with silos of grain which can’t be sold. Russian farmers on the other hand have increased their grain production and exports since the war started. However, they don’t have the capacity to supplant Ukraine’s agricultural losses. Moscow has critically damaged Ukraine’s production capabilities and continues to undermine global food networks with threats to the BSGI.

Russia’s actions come as World Food Programme (WFP) boss David Beasley stressed at the Munich Security Conference that nonrenewal of the grain deal would be catastrophic for millions in Africa who are on the cusp of starvation. Beasley noted too that the initiative’s current grain flows have still not been sufficient for the needs of poorer countries that are reliant on regional exports.

Together, Ukraine and Russia constitute 12 percent of the global market share in calories. The most vulnerable countries to food shortages share some common characteristics. They typically (although not all applicable) are reliant on Ukrainian and Russian imports, are low-income, have active conflicts, and lack robust internal food distribution systems. Countries in the Middle East & North Africa (MENA), Central Asia, and Eastern Africa are most at-risk due to the Ukraine conflict. In the MENA region, Jordan, Yemen, Israel, and Lebanon are most vulnerable. Armenia (92 percent of its grain imports come from Ukraine and Russia), Azerbaijan, and Georgia are the most vulnerable Central Asian countries. In Eastern Africa, the countries with the highest reliance on Ukraine and Russian grain imports are Eritrea, Rwanda, Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, Kenya, Djibouti, Burundi, and Ethiopia.

The Brussels-based thinktank Bruegel in March 2022 following Russia’s invasion anticipated the global food implications of the conflict and forecasted three possible scenarios. In their worst-case scenario, Ukraine would need all of its grain for domestic consumption and exports fell 100 percent year-over-year. Thankfully this has not materialized and unless there is a dramatic turn in the war (possibly from Russian use of strategic nuclear warheads), this will scenario will remain a hypothetical. The second worst-case scenario would see Ukraine export half of its normal production. In the best-case scenario, Ukraine would export roughly 70 percent of its normal production. The current situation hovers in between the second-worst case and best-case scenarios. Although Ukraine exported 23.6 million tonnes of grain in the 2022/23 season (70.4% of its exports from the same stage the year prior), decreases in production will allow Ukraine to harvest only 51 million tonnes which is 59 percent of 2021 pre-war harvests.

High food prices also pose a danger to global food security. In the first stages of Russia’s War in Ukraine, food prices lept and the greatest costs were felt in low-income countries. For instance in August 2022, it cost Ayan Hassan Abdirahman— a mother of 11 children who lives in the capital of Somalia— twice as much as it did just months before to buy the wheat flour that she needs to prepare breakfasts. Increases in crude oil prices and disruption to Russian fertilizer exports have increased food production costs globally. These consequences are most visible in the ports of Brazil. The South American country is the 4th largest agricultural producer in the world and imports 85 percent of the fertilizer it requires— mostly from Russia. Sea ports across the country reached their maximum capacity due to growing stockpiles of imported fertilizer. Farmers were unable to purchase the products, delaying the sowing process, because the price of fertilizer became too expensive. In recent months, prices have decreased but are still roughly 150 percent more expensive than the 5-year average. The higher cost of production will result in higher food prices which would be unreachable from millions globally without international assistance.

WFP estimates that today 349 million people across 79 countries are facing acute food insecurity (which the Global Network Against Food Crises defines as when a person’s inability to consume food puts their life into immediate danger). This number rose nearly 200 million from pre-pandemic levels. 60 percent of the world’s malnourished populations live in areas affected by armed conflict which makes the successful delivery of food assistance more difficult. Food insecurity can be both begotten and beget violence with the notable examples of the 1789 French Revolution and the 2011 Arab Spring which were precipitated by historically-high food prices. Global food instability caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine would not only be a dramatic humanitarian catastrophe but could bring a massive destabilizing event to the world order.

Although the situation seems overwhelming, many policymakers and groups such as the Consortium of International Agricultural Research Centers (CGIAR) propose solutions to systematically reduce the risks and consequences of a global food crisis. CGIAR emphasizes the importance of reliable, real-time data analyses of food and input price volatility which can inform appropriate international and national policy responses. Governments must provide their farmers with targeted subsidies for productivity-enhancing inputs, machinery, fertilizer, and energy costs to increase yields in low and medium productivity environments. International assistance must be provided to low-income countries so that the higher costs of inputs is not passed onto consumers. Governments should invest in sustainable crops which require less water than wheat and barley and can better survive climate shocks such as quinoa and seaweed. However, not all policy responses are made equal and many government interventions could worsen the situation. Experts recommend that countries should avoid sanctions and export restrictions on food and fertilizer products and refrain from hoarding or panic buying input-products. This is not a crisis of anyone but Vladimir Putin’s making, yet it is incumbent upon the international community to make comprehensive policy solutions so that the world’s breadbasket can hold enough for everyone.

The Reports of the UN’s Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated

Disclaimer: The author is currently an intern for the United Nations within the Department of Peace Operations. This article was written by the author entirely in his personal capacity. The opinions expressed in this article are entirely the author's own and do not reflect the view of the Department of Peace Operations or the United Nations as a whole.

When Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24th, 2022 it was one of the most  geopolitically destabilizing events since the end of the Cold War. Every major international  organization and national government has been challenged and forced to re-evaluate its role in an  increasingly dangerous world. NATO has begun to add traditionally neutral Sweden and Finland  to bolster their eastern flank, while the European Union has organized severe sanctions against  Russia and temporarily resettled millions of Ukrainian refugees. No organization has perhaps  faced as much criticism as the UN. The popular perception that the UN has been impotent in  Ukraine and gridlocked elsewhere because of great power conflict couldn’t be further from the  truth. Despite the looming threat of a Russian veto, the UN has been able to help Ukraine as well  as conducting business as usual elsewhere. While there is room for improvement, this success  should be greater recognized. 

In the immediate aftermath of the invasion, the criticism of the UN was harsh. Russia, a  permanent member of the Security Council charged with upholding the UN Charter, had  blatantly violated the Charter with the UN wholly unable to prevent it. One observer described it  as an “extraordinary failure of the UN Security Council to live up to its primary responsibility to  maintain international peace and security.” Another said that there is “no better example of the  United Nations’ failure to live up to its founding ideal.” A third argued that the UN “became a  forum of superpower rivalry.” 

This has been accompanied by predictions that the UN will become increasingly  dysfunctional and unresponsive to international needs and calls for the UN to either be seriously  reformed or replaced entirely. Ukrainian President Zelenskyy has repeatedly called on the UN to  boot Russia from its permanent seat on the Security Council, and the UN general assembly has passed a resolution mandating they meet after a veto. This has been accompanied by more  outlandish proposals to disband the UN entirely and create a successor organization based  exclusively around democratic states. In the short term, there were grim predictions for UN  effectiveness. Seasoned UN observer Richard Gowan argued “the Security Council (is) facing a  period of increasing fragmentation and paralysis.”  

The UN, however, has been able to beat back these excessively pessimist predictions. In  Ukraine, the UN under Secretary-General António Guterres has been able to organize  humanitarian aid for Ukrainian civilians, mediate several key agreements that have helped  reduce the potential international impacts of the conflict, and galvanize international opinion against Russia in the UN General Assembly. Outside of Ukraine, Russia and the other great  powers have shown a remarkable ability to cooperate through the UN on other international  issues such as the Afghan crisis, despite massive disagreements over Ukraine. 

With regards to the Ukraine war, the UN and its various organs and agencies have proven  surprisingly able to reduce the conflict’s human suffering, despite the ever-present threat of a  Russian veto on their activities. While these efforts have so far been unable to end the conflict  entirely, they still show that the UN can provide value during a crisis. 

Guterres, has emerged as a key part of the shuttle diplomacy system that allows for  Russo-Ukrainian negotiations. For instance, he visited both Moscow and Kyiv in April in an  attempt to broker a ceasefire. While this effort failed, it positioned the Secretary-General so he  could negotiate two important agreements between the two states. First, he arranged for a UN-led  civilian evacuation mission from the besieged city of Mariupol. The UN and the Red Cross  would evacuate over 600 civilians on May 12th, only a few weeks after the Secretary-General's  visit. In July, the UN and the Turkish government would broker a deal that let several Russian and Ukrainian ports export wheat and other agricultural products to the rest of the world. While  the implementation of this deal has been at times shaky, the deal is critical. The war runs a  significant risk of sparking famine and high food prices in the Global South, due to a previous  inability to export grain from Russian and Ukrainian Black Sea ports. If this deal continues to  hold, the risk of mass famine and food instability will be minimized throughout the world. 

The UN has also been able to provide on the ground aid to those most affected by the  conflict, Ukrainian civilians. The UN’s various humanitarian aid services, including the World  Food Program (WFP) and World Health Organization (WHO) amongst others, have provided  basic services to over 11.5 million Ukrainians. The UN has provided over 250,000 children with  education, over 1.5 million with food, and over 8.5 million with medical care as of September  14th. This is despite the fact that the Russian government, which has frequently attacked  civilians over the course of the conflict, has significant influence on where and how the UN  operates as a result of the country’s permanent membership on the UNSC.  

Russia doesn’t, however, have veto power over the UN General Assembly. The General  Assembly, which doesn’t have the ability to make legally enforceable resolutions like the  Security Council, is still a key way to gauge international opinion. The general assembly acted  swiftly following Russia’s February invasion. The General Assembly took advantage of United  Nations General Assembly Resolution 377 (the “Uniting for Peace '' resolution), which lets the  general assembly begin an emergency session if the P5 fails to act on a matter of international  security. This was the first time that “Uniting for Peace '' was activated since 1997. The General  Assembly would pass General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1, which deplored Russia’s invasion  and demanded they withdraw their forces from Ukraine. The actual vote was a disaster for  Russia, with 141 states voting in support and only five opposed. This decisive vote left Russia isolated diplomatically, and empowered the US and EU to further support Ukraine and sanction  Russia safe in the knowledge that there would be little international backlash. While the UN has served a useful role within the Ukrainian conflict, its ability to manage  conflict outside of Ukraine is also notable. Despite the frequently espoused new era of great  power competition that has accompanied the Russian invasion, the UN has still been largely able  to maintain its prior ability to manage international security. 

Before the invasion, many international observers thought that Afghanistan would be the  UN’s most pressing issue of 2022. The Taliban victory has caused a massive humanitarian and  financial crisis throughout the country, the response to which has been constrained by an  American unwillingness to recognize and (implicitly) assist the new Taliban regime. After the  Russian Invasion of Ukraine, many observers worried that the UNSC would be unable to work  together on Afghanistan. These fears came to a head in March, only a few weeks after the  invasion, when the mandate for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan  (UNAMA) needed to be authorized. Despite concerns that the Russians might veto the extension,  the Russians abstained and UNAMA was re-authorized with an expanded humanitarian and  political mandate. 

The UN has also been able to continue its peace and security functions even when there is  a direct Russian interest. The Russian mercenary Wagner Group is currently highly active in  Mali, where they are supporting the military junta and frequently massacre civilians, The military regime, with the support of Russia, has begun to move away from its traditional security  partners and limit the ability of the local UN peacekeeping mission, MINUSMA, to protect  civilians and monitor human rights abuses. Given that MINUSMA is frequently in conflict with  the Russian-backed Malian military regime, a Russian veto of the operation would be in its interests. However, MINUSMA was reauthorized in June, with Russia and China abstaining.  While the resolution did little to improve MINUSMA capabilities, the fact that it passed at all  shows that the UN can still pass meaningful resolutions in a post-Ukraine world. 

After the invasion, the permanent member of the Security Council decided to pursue a  strategy of “compartmentalization.” While the P5 would trade sanctions and extraordinarily  harsh language over Ukraine, they agreed to try to avoid letting that “poison the well” with other  issues. UN observer Richard Gowan, who previously said “the Security Council (is) facing a  period of increasing fragmentation and paralysis,” now argues that compartmentalization appears  to have largely worked. This is because doing so remains in both the national interests of Russia,  America, and Europe. For American and Europe, it continues to let the UN continue an agenda  they broadly support. For Russia, it keeps diplomatic channels open, prevents further  international isolation, and lets them influence UN operations by threatening, but not using, the  veto. While the situation in Ukraine demonstrates the continued limited ability of the UN to  intervene in a conflict where a P5 state is a party to the conflict, its action outside of Ukraine  shows that it still has its uses. 

While the Russian invasion of Ukraine is the most destabilizing international event in decades, it isn’t unprecedented in the UN’s history. Nearly two decades prior, another permanent member of the Security Council launched an invasion of another state in brazen violation of the UN Charter. While the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine have several key differences, they sparked similar outcries and criticisms of the UN. In the decades since the war, however, the UN has been able to support peace in war torn countries, provide humanitarian assistance to millions, and foster economic development. It’s important to keep these successes in mind as we visualize the role of the UN in a post-invasion world order.

How France Lost its Mustard: A Story of War, Famine, and Western Negligence

 An unusual phenomenon has struck France in the last six months; where once sat jars of mustard lining the condiment aisle at grocery stores now sits empty. Upon first glance this may seem as just another random food shortage, likely spurred by the seemingly never-ending production and shipping issues resulting from the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. But for the average French citizen who consumes one kilogram of mustard a year, and for a country that describes mustard as its favorite condiment, this is no small issue. Thus, outrage ensued. The national mustard shortage has made the product impossible to find, leaving individuals to turn to social media to beg fellow users for donations or to show off their sacred spread. French shoppers were forced to deal with a grim reality: mustard was nowhere to be found. 

At the root of this shortage lies a much larger international crisis: the war in Ukraine. Indeed, mustard production is a large part of both Russia and Ukraine’s agricultural yield. Ukraine is the fourth largest producer of mustard seed, and the second largest exporter. However, they produce a different mustard then the French, Dijon variant. The Ukrainian mustard seed is typically a milder one, and hugely popular within Eastern European countries. However, due to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, production and export of the mustard seed has stopped, forcing Eastern European buyers to turn to French mustard instead, which has upped demand for French mustard, thus causing the shortage.

Mustard seed production is not the only export that has halted ever since Putin ordered the Russian army to invade earlier this year, other valuable exports such as wheat, barley, and corn have faced similar deficits due to the conflict. The widespread fighting has significantly decreased the areas available for harvest, particularly in the territories of Kherson, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv, Sumy, Chernihiv and Kyiv. 

International Food Shortages

         Ukraine’s countryside is home to some of the most fertile land on the planet. The US International Trade Administration (ITA) estimates that Ukraine possesses close to a third of the world’s black soil reserves, (a fertile and moist soil that produces the highest agricultural yields). It is thanks to this fertile land that Ukraine is commonly labeled “the breadbasket of the world.” The country produces large amounts of grain, wheat, and barley, and exports around 90% of its total production. Alongside grain production, Ukraine also exports large amounts of corn and sunflower oil. Ukraine exports its goods to all four corners of the globe, but its primary areas of export are to Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia. Ukraine sends its food to the places that need it most: developing countries that are heavily reliant on wheat and corn and are sensitive to price increases and shortages. These countries include Somalia, Libya, Lebanon, Egypt and Sudan. During times of peace, Ukraine was easily able to export its wheat and other grain products, but current Russian blockades along the Black Sea coast are preventing the trade of necessary food supplies.

         According to Ukrainian crisis management scholar, Anna Nagurney, over 400 million people across the world rely on food from Ukraine. Additionally, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, estimates that around 181 million people could face a food crisis or famine this year, caused by shortages and increased prices. [*3] At the root of this issue lies the millions of tons of Ukrainian agricultural production that has halted ever since the war began. Now, millions of vulnerable people across the world face the threat of a deadly famine.

         For many across the Western world, this minor mustard shortage in France marked the first realization of the ongoing war’s broader implication. Since the start of the War in early 2022 the West has been largely concerned with Europe’s reliance on energy from Russia. The threat of a gas shortage in Europe has dominated Western media headlines, leaving little room for concern or interest in the ways Ukraine has supported other corners of the world. Although it is an inherent truth that a country’s media primarily focus on issues that affect its own people (European and American news sources and media cannot be blamed entirely), the neglect of this crisis reflects a deep failure within Western media to document crises unrelated to us.

The Failure of the West

Since the start of the war in Ukraine, European and American war and conflict experts have neglected to draw attention to the wider implications of the war. There has been little to no analysis or discourse on Russia’s role in Africa’s food crisis and Russian hunger politics. Instead, much of the discourse around the war in primary news outlets has analyzed the psychology behind Putin’s decision to invade, or how the West should have seen the war coming. Other popular opinions tend to focus on the war’s implications for shifting the balance of power, the return of NATO, and the impact sanctions will have on the energy crisis. What is missing from this conversation is a thorough understanding of Putin’s ambition in other parts of the world, and how war routinely affects vulnerable and dependent populations first.

By choosing to focus on the ways that the West will be affected, politicians, scholars, and other experts have fundamentally failed to understand the global stake of this war and the true global reach of Russia’s intentions. Russia is starving the Global South as a political tactic to help them win the war. Putin is employing Stalin’s tactic in the 1930’s of political famine once again to help end sanctions against Russia, and create a narrative for African and Asian countries in which Ukraine is seen as the witholder of food and fuel. Yale historian and author, Timothy Snyder, believes that Russia’s tactic of global starvation is a modern attempt at Russian colonialism. In June this year Snyder reflected on the increasing signs of starvation and tweeted that “a world famine is a necessary backdrop for a Russian propaganda campaign against Ukraine. Actual mass death is needed as the backdrop for a propaganda contest.”

The Politics of Starvation

2022 was already expected to be a year of famine and starvation, thanks to ongoing droughts and inflation, but Putin’s role has only magnified the famine’s effects. Countries have already started to prepare for increased food prices and lack of goods: “Some countries are reacting by trying to protect domestic supplies. India has restricted sugar and wheat exports, while Malaysia halted exports of live chickens, alarming Singapore, which gets a third of its poultry from its neighbor.” Snyder believes that Russia’s international famine campaign has three components, each designed to weaken a different part of the world. Firstly, Russian blockages of Ukrainian goods hope to end the narrative of Ukraine as the “breadbasket of the world” for the vast majority of countries that receive its wheat and grain, such as Somalia, Libya, and Lebanon. Putin hopes this will decrease support for Ukrainian freedom and destroy the concept of Ukrainian statehood. Secondly, Putin hopes that this famine will increase the rates of refugee migration into an already politically unstable Europe, as people from Sub-saharan Africa flee into Europe in hopes of finding food and a better quality of life. Putin’s final goal within his mass-starvation tactic is one of political propaganda. Putin plans to blame Western sanctions for food supply issues, thus creating a narrative in which the West is to blame for global starvation. A successful change in narrative for Putin will thus ensure that Russian citizens (many of which are already angry at the war and the effects of sanctions) remain ignorant and naive of the true nature of Putin’s strategic thinking. 

Russia’s need for strong and powerful propaganda is only growing, thanks to Russia’s first military mobilization since World War II, which was announced in late September. The latest increase in military efforts has led to more protests by Russian citizens angry at the Kremlin. Over a thousand citizens were arrested in cities across the country as they protested the need for the 300,000 new troops that Russian officials are demanding.

Frustration and resentment across Russia will only grow as the war continues, therefore Putin’s need to create global implications and shift Russian anger outward will only become more pressing as time goes on. By framing the issues and effects of the war as part of a larger Western-led campaign to starve the world, Putin can prevent his citizens from rising up against him. Russians are already subjected to misinformation and propaganda about the war. The Kremlin has successfully convinced millions of Russian citizens that the war is Ukraine’s fault, spreading stories that “Ukrainians had fired on Russian forces during the cease-fire, and neo-Nazis were “hiding behind civilians as a human shield.” This disinformation tactic makes Russians particularly susceptible to Putin’s lies and less likely to understand his starvation politics. 

Putin has also applied the same tactics of disinformation to African nations, in an attempt to spread anti-West and anti-UN sentiment, while gaining political influence. Putin’s expansion of propaganda to Africa reveals the true diabolical nature of his intentions. Already aware of the need to provide an explanation for the lack of resources exported from Ukraine, Russia has established at least sixteen known operations of disinformation across the continent, otherwise known as dezinformatsyia. The goal of these campaigns is to shift anger onto the West, deny Russia’s role in withholding exports, and prop up political regimes that support Russia’s political ambitions. Through the use of sites such as Twitter, Facebook, and Tiktok, Russia has actively succeeded in creating often untraceable campaigns of lies. The extent to which Russia has spread falsehoods through the continent should both alarm and frighten the West. 

         It is time for Western leaders to acknowledge the global implications of the war in Ukraine, and their correlation to famine and food shortages.  In an attempt to spread concern and awareness, U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres stated “Global hunger levels are at a new high. In just two years, the number of severely food insecure people has doubled, from 135 million pre-pandemic to 276 million today … More than half a million people are living in famine conditions — an increase of more than 500 percent since 2016.” These numbers are already alarming without the added implications of war. Given these circumstances, it is vital that Western leaders work directly with countries already affected by these devastating food shortages. Similarly, Western media must turn its gaze to the international crisis of halted Ukrainian exports. Western negligence has not only led to widespread famine, but it has also allowed Putin to create a devastating narrative of political propaganda in which millions will starve as unknown casualties of a senseless war. 

The European Economy under Russia’s Threats

Early morning on February 24th  2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. While Russia first invaded Ukraine in 2014, and annexed the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine, this time, the invasion of Ukraine by Russia was considered by the international community to be an act of aggression.  The invasion triggered the largest refugee crisis in Europe since World War II, more than four million Ukrainians have left the country and a quarter of the population has been displaced. In response to this invasion, the international community imposed a number of economic sanctions on Russia, in an aim to limit its power and influence in Ukraine. Economic sanctions, as defined by the Council on Foreign Relations, are “the withdrawal of customary trade and financial relations for foreign- and security-policy purposes. Sanctions may be comprehensive, prohibiting commercial activity with regard to an entire country … or they may be targeted, blocking transactions by and with particular businesses, groups, or individuals.” These sanctions have been imposed by many, such as the United States, the European Union, and G7.  

Vladimir Putin, president of Russia, has mentioned that Russia invaded Ukraine in the sole purpose of denazifying Ukraine, as well as protect its citizens who have been facing humiliations and genocides by the Kyiv regime. Ukraine has a long history with neo-nazis. Indeed, Azov is a far-right military group that has been accused of harboring neo-Nazi and white supremacist ideology. The group is now part of Ukraine's armed forces. However, Putin’s claim to denazify Ukraine was quite an interesting and bold statement given that the current president of Ukraine is Jewish, and lost relatives in the Holocaust. 

This invasion of Ukraine has mostly - as expected - affected the country and its citizens. Many were forced to flee the country and seek asylum in neighboring countries such as Poland, Romania, and Moldova. However, many Ukrainians were forced to stay, and fight for their country. Ever since the invasion, Ukraine’s economy has contracted. According to the International Monetary Fund, “the loss of life, damage to critical infrastructure, trade disruption and an outflow of refugees would lead to gross domestic product falling by a minimum of 10% in 2021”. However, many countries have stepped up and helped Ukraine in these difficult times. Countries have donated weapons, funds, and have delivered humanitarian and non-lethal aid. While many countries have helped Ukraine, they have also simultaneously worked against Russia. Through economic sanctions, they hope to weaken the country and its president, Vladimir Putin. But many challenges have arisen as economic sanctions against Russia persist.    

Many Ukrainians have fled the country to a safer place. While most women and children are able to successfully escape the war and seek refuge in neighboring countries such as Poland, men are forced to stay in Ukraine to fight and protect their country. However, this conflict has greatly affected Ukraine, who found itself cut off from the world by war. Trade has been disrupted throughout the country, and according to the UN, hundreds of thousands of people inside Ukraine have been cut off from life-saving aid such as humanitarian aid due to the military encirclement of cities. Vulnerable populations in Ukraine such as elderly citizens, or the economically disadvantaged are most likely to become refugees and will have the greatest difficulty coping with rising food and fuel costs. Relief efforts are underway around the world to ensure that people's basic needs for food, shelter and psychological safety are met in the conflict zone and beyond.

Trade-wise, the conflict has disrupted the global supply chain of diverse goods, and affected international trade as a whole. Ukraine is a massive producer and exporter of seed oil, corn, wheat, and iron ore. However, since the beginning of this war, the country’s production has declined as people have fled the country and men were forced to give up their occupations to join the army and help fight against the Russians. Similarly, the concentration of wheat, fertilizer, and related production in Russia will strain food supplies globally. Securing the continuous supply of food to the countries most tied up to exports from these regions is becoming an issue. Stocks - about half of the corn Ukraine was expected to export for the season - are increasingly difficult to get to buyers, providing a glimpse of the disruption caused by the war in Russia, which accounts for roughly $120 billion global grain trade. Already disrupted by supply chain blockages, surging freight rates and weather events, markets are expecting further turmoil as shipments from Ukraine and Russia - which together account for about a quarter of the global grain trade - become more complicated and raise the specter of food shortages.        

Ports, railroads, and roads throughout Ukraine have either been closed, or taken over by the Russian army. No foreigners have really been able to get in the country ever since the start of the war due to fear. Thus, the Ukrainians that remain in the country have found themselves unable to access foreign goods and services that the country once imported. The lack of production, manufacturing, and transportation in Ukraine due to the war has also disrupted the global supply chain, as previously mentioned, which has had and will keep having a negative impact on the world’s economy and other countries that relied on Ukrainians and Russians export of agricultural goods, which consisted of a wide variety of goods. Citizens that remain in Ukraine have done so to fight for their country against the Russian army, as a result, there are fewer people than ever that work to produce and provide goods not only for Ukrainian citizens, but also for foreign citizens who relied on such goods. 

As the effects of war can be felt everywhere, other countries such as the United States and NATO cannot get involved in the conflict due to the concern that it will become a war between Russia and the West. Since Ukraine is not a member of NATO, the alliance is not obligated to defend the country. Similarly, as the United States is an ally of NATO, the country cannot get involved in the conflict, unless Russia invades a NATO country, which is not so likely to happen as this could result in World War III. However, both NATO and the United States are determined to do all that is in their power to support Ukraine. 

Their inability to get physically involved in this conflict is due to the fact that Ukraine is not a member of both the European Union and NATO. Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelenskiy, whose country is facing a massive unprovoked invasion from neighboring Russia, has called on the European Union to grant Ukraine EU membership under a special procedure as soon as possible. However, it is not as easy as it sounds, the process to gain EU membership is very long and many EU countries are against an expansion of the European Union. Similarly, Ukraine is unable to join NATO just yet, but the organization is committed to helping the country and its citizens in these difficult times.

As a response to the war, many countries have set up a number of economic sanctions in the aim to weaken Russia. But as these sanctions take place, a big question arises: who do these sanctions actually hurt? Economic sanctions on Russia have a goal to affect the economy of the country. SWIFT - the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, is a Belgian cooperative society providing services related to the execution of financial transactions and payments between banks worldwide - has banned Russia. As a consequence, Russian banks are no longer able to use the financial interface to transfer money. But financial sanctions, not banishment from SWIFT, are the key economic punishments being imposed on Russia. Economic sanctions on Russia such as a ban on exports, blocking of Russian assets, sanctions against individuals, ban of oil and gas imports from Russia. Additionally, all Russian banks have had their assets frozen. But who are these sanctions truly affecting? The government? Or the people? 

As horrible as it is, economic sanctions against Russia are actually impacting Russian citizens who have seen their assets abroad frozen, and who also cannot access goods and services that they once did. The lower class in Russia is the one suffering the cost of these sanctions, but as time passes, Russia as a whole will feel the effects of these sanctions, as many foreign companies have pulled out of the country in response to its invasion of Ukraine. Sanctions would prohibit Russian energy exports, which would traumatize the European economy, which is heavily dependent on Russia, and would worsen the surge in energy prices. As companies have pulled out of the country, Russia’s GDP is expected to heavily shrink as an outcome. Russia's central bank has been struggling to stabilize the value of the ruble and prevent a sharp rise in interest rates without access to about half of its foreign exchange reserves. The Russian stock market was also closed for weeks, suspending shares of domestic companies that could plunge as soon as trading resumed. 

The sanctions also have an impact on the European and global economy, which is heavily dependent on Russia for oil, gas, and different goods. The country is also a big importer of luxury goods, so countries such as France and Italy will see their export of luxury goods decline in the next year (and more). This will greatly impact the economy of these countries as such exports contribute to a big portion of their gross domestic product. Businesses have also been hurt, they have lost a lot of their revenues as they pulled out of Russia. However, if they had stayed in the country, with the increasing number of economic sanctions, they would have suffered the long lasting effects of these sanctions on their businesses, which would have also impacted other countries that are also home to such companies.

Oil prices have gone up throughout the world. The United States, France, or the United Kingdom are all three big importers of Russian gas and oil. The “Russian oil ban” as it is called has created a lot of discontent in many European countries, whose citizens have to suffer the cost of an increase in oil and gas prices. Europe exports 45% of gas from Russia, and has pledged to reduce its purchases of Russian gas by two-thirds before the end of the year. However, an alternative must be found in the aim to reduce the price of oil and gas in European countries. Europe has become too dependent on Russia for gas, but until an alternative is found, citizens will have to deal with the increase of gas and oil prices in their respective countries. 

Overall, the economy of Europe has been slowing down as a result of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Not only was the supply chain disrupted by this invasion, but citizens in both countries are completely left alone. No one can really get into Ukraine, as a result, the country struggles to import goods that its citizens once consumed on a daily basis. They are left with local producers and manufacturers. Similarly, countries who used to trade with Ukraine can no longer do so. Wheat and grains are agricultural goods that the country used to export, however, as a port has been destroyed, the country has been cut off from the world, unable to export its goods to countries who relied on them. But similarly, many companies have backed out of Russia, leaving citizens unable to access certain goods and services.

As Russia keeps invading Ukraine and does not seem to be willing to put an end to this conflict that has already cost the lives of many, I wonder whose economy will be the most impacted: Russia’s economy, or Europe’s economy? Both are really powerful, but the sanctions that countries in the European Union and NATO have set up against Russia have also affected more than just Russia. Although Russia’s GDP is expected to shrink this year as a result of this invasion, I wonder how much longer can the country go without the help and support of other countries, or even companies that were once in the country. Left completely alone, Russia is left with its own resources, and is fully aware that its citizens are suffering from this conflict. It makes me wonder how much longer will they be able to fund this war, and allow for its citizens, especially the lower class, to be impacted by it.

Although much has been done by the international community in response to this conflict, Ukraine is still being invaded by Russia, and many face the consequences of this conflict every day. It is extremely hard for other countries and NATO to physically be involved in this conflict as it could lead to world war III. Many fear Russia, a powerful nation that has access to numerous nuclear weapons. While it is understandable that the international community is unable to get too involved in this conflict, and with the long process that is for Ukraine to be able to join NATO and the EU, the international community is left with the options to use sanctions against Ukraine, or to donate to Ukraine, military aid, humanitarian aid, weapons, and funds. As the situation does not seem to be getting any better, the international community should do everything that is in their power to limit the influence of Russia on Ukraine, in the hope that one day, Russia will back out. 

To conclude, this conflict has taken a turn that no one really expected. While many were aware of Russia’s threats, it was still a big shock when Russia actually invaded Ukraine. As the international community is doing everything that they can to help Ukraine in these difficult times. Many countries have welcomed refugees, sent humanitarian and military aid, as well as many other resources, Ukraine and its citizens that have remained in the country still greatly suffer from this war. Russia’s citizens have also been greatly affected as the economic sanctions are directly affecting them. The economy of Russia, Ukraine, and Europe is shrinking. Unless Russia backs out of Ukraine, the consequences of this conflict will be long lasting and an entire economy will have to be rebuilt, which will take time. In the meantime, we can hope that Ukraine will be able to join the EU and NATO, in the aim to get more support and help from other countries, as Ukraine puts up a big fight against the superpower, Russia.

State of Present-Day Federalism

The modern age is seeing once again a rise in authoritarianism and decline in freedom. As much as today’s globalized age and an accompanying increased tendency of people and ideas to come together and mix or clash calls upon greater mutual understanding, patience, and pluralism, we instead witness a rise in isolationist, nationalist policies. Pluralism, or a system in which two or more groups, principles, sources of authority coexist, is by definition supposed to lead to an increase of public tolerance, inclusion, and peace even in societies featuring a complex mix of ideological and ethnic belongings.

A mechanism that seemingly goes perfectly in hand with pluralist tendencies is precisely federalism. This is because the very idea of federalism allows for a distribution and compartmentalization of power in a way that ideally echoes societal needs and provides for an appropriate division of powers and greater societal and regional cohesion. However, with much left to still be explored and better understood, different styles of federalism have developed, with some favoring division along political lines while others along social lines, each with various degrees of success in ensuring citizen liberties and preventing abuse of power that are some of the core goals of a federal order.

Given the increased complexity of national, regional, and international bonds in the globalized world, ideas of pluralism or coexistence of various often competitive entities becomes imperative. In order to further develop potential for federal political order to support this kind of pluralism leading to greater peace and co-existence in the modern world, this article will reflect on different ways in which federalism is presently working to do this in countries across the world.

The Case of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

Ethiopia is one of the oldest organized sovereign states. Throughout its long history, it has witnessed a number of power changes, migrations, internal, regional, and global turbulence, for the most part managing to preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity in spite of all these threats including European colonialism and major financial crises of the past century. The Derg regime replaced its monarchy with nationalization and attempt at socialism by assassinating the last Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie and changing political and economic circumstances to match the regime’s ideology. This period of Ethiopian history featured authoritarian behavior on behalf of the regime and is remembered with censorship and brutal behavior towards civilians. Everything changed again in 1991 when the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) won against the Derg regime and established democratic rule in the country. This is now being yet again challenged as, following dissolution of the EPRDF due to internal strife and shifting power dynamics, Prime Minister and Noble prize winner Abiy Ahmed broke off with his own Prosperity Party and attempted to yet again change political scenario in Ethiopia. Opposed Abiy Ahmed’s promise on bringing prosperity and economic and democratic progress to the country stand armies labeled as rebels such as the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) that in turn labels Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s actions as power-grabbing and undemocratic. The conflict is currently revolving primarily along ethnopolitical lines and has so far caused thousands of deaths and forced millions to flee. All of this comes following a period of perceived tolerance that marked the era of the EPRDF. As such, the regime of EPRDF that was marked by political focus on ethnic federalism and need for pluralism along the often described as divisive ethnic lines, serves as a perfect example and a test to durability and functionality of federalism when uniquely framed along ethnic divisions.

The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) stayed in power in Ethiopia between 1991 and 2019. On top of its national emphasis on ethnic federalism and pluralism, it in itself featured very pluralist and compartmentalized politics. The party was actually a coalition of four political parties: Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Amhara Democratic Party (ADP), Oromo Democratic Party (ODP), and Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (SEPDM). The very existence of EPRDF required constant collaboration amongst the leaders of each party within the coalition, with special value placed on party, local, regional, and federal elections. Ethiopia first witnessed a democratic and federal ruling arrangement following the EPRDF ascend to power. The democratically elected House of Representatives chooses the president who has largely a ceremonial role as well as the prime minister who actually holds the executive power. In order to ensure nonpartisanship and separation of powers, the 6-year presidential and ministerial terms are usually meant not to overlap with the 5-year terms of the members of the House of Representatives.

The ideas of the federal government and the ruling coalition were passed onto the entire nation as the country was federally compartmentalized along ethnic lines, with Tigray, Amhara, and Oromo, being some of the largest ethnicities within Ethiopia having their separate local politics that would often center around their ethnic grouping, space, and culture. Southern Ethiopian tribes that largely practice traditional religions and are generally fewer in number were also able to receive special protections and recognition in this way. The ideal is that each ethnicity would be able to thrive on its own terms while also functioning as one on a unified national front with a form of supra-ethnic identity that would characterize them simultaneously as Ethiopian along their other ethnic, cultural, and local markers. This practice, while practiced in its own unique way everywhere due to unique ethnic and sociopolitical make-ups of each location, is not unique to Ethiopia. Other countries that featured or continue to feature this arrangement to varying degrees of success include Nepal, Pakistan, South Sudan, and historically Apartheid-era South Africa through its locally-led Bantustans, as well as former Yugoslavia and to an extent present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Ethnic federalism is presently blamed for Ethiopian political fallout and ongoing war as now that Abiy Ahmed - a member of the Oromo, the largest ethnolinguistic group of the country that has traditionally been scarcely represented in politics - came to hold substantial power, the scales quickly tipped and fragile balance was disturbed as the traditional rulers usually of Tigrayan ethnicity sided against the present status quo. Ethnic federalism is, in short, blamed for maintaining and facilitating easier inflammation of ethnic fault lines because it by nature maintains these ethnic divisions through the way it facilitates politics and attempts to maintain inclusion. However, an alternative view to ethnic federalism also persists. It is easy to quickly label ethnic federalism as the cause of all troubles when, in fact, it might be simply a manifestation of causes that are buried deeper in the past. Oftentimes, ethnic federalism was in fact an imperfect albeit rare solution to more deeply engraved ethnic divisions and internal struggles. Countries that feature ethnic federalism, as evidenced from the list above, also tend to stand witness to centuries of foreign rule and colonial oppression and have been exposed to a number of migrations and complex ethnic and religious diversity as a result of this dynamic history. Thus, ethnic federalism can appear as the only possible solution, albeit imperfect. In this way, ethnic federalism can be awarded blame for maintaining ethnic fault lines, but should also be judged with an understanding of local complexities and unique situations the country found itself in historically and presently.

The Case of the Republic of India

The Republic of India features a highly diverse and complex social and political landscape. Having gained independence from the British Empire in 1947, India cherished its freedom and democracy ever since. However, India underwent a partition with Pakistan in that same year due to disagreements often labeled as ethno-religious which echo to this day and that affected the potential for a more unified South Asia. This perhaps showed flaws in ability to accurately and in a pluralist and inclusive fashion represent all of its constituents. All of this, similar to other cases where a need for ethnic federalism seems the apparent albeit imperfect solution, is against the backdrop of complex and divisive colonial heritage. In this case too, we see a need for greater attention towards ethnic foundations of political opinion that, for better or worse given flaws of ethnic federalism, are not as emphasized in India as in the previous case of Ethiopia. Regardless, present-day Indian politics show a focus on the increasingly Hindu nationalist ruling party and the emphasis on constitutional integrity and a rather unique form of centralized federalism. India, the world’s most populous democracy, now features a complex interaction between demands of local and somewhat central federal government, with demands balanced to carefully meet local needs for self-agency and linguistic integrity with the federal government’s need for national control. The system seems somewhat contradictory yet has shown to work resiliently for more than half a century.

In the case of India, we find a scenario more reminiscent of countries that adopted ethnic federalism succumbing to the need to balance ethnic divisions and unique cultural, religious, and linguistic spaces alike to those in India, here met with a persistent focus towards an emphasized federal level politics and nationalized parliament. The nationalized, centralized federal government has seen an interruption in Indian politics, especially in the 1990s following failure of the Indian nationalist Congress party that dates back to the independence movement, to maintain its traditional overwhelming majority in the parliament and consistent regional resistance towards centralized governance as witnessed in provinces such as Assam, Kashmir, Mizoram, and Punjab in the 1970s and 80s. This resulted in a rise of regionalization and coalitionary politics in the coming decades only to be yet again interrupted with the rise of Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata party (BJP).

India serves as an example of a nation carefully balancing demands for national unity and regional cultural, ethnic, and linguistic identities without relying on often divisive ethnic federalism and clear political compartmentalization along fault lines. However, the rise of nationalist politics that now threaten to establish a scenario alike to tyranny of the majority in a country that prides itself on its pluralism and democracy that withstands millenia-old demographic and class diversity shows that this promise may be too fragile and questions ability for a more centralized federation to ensure pluralism and civilian protections. On the other hand, Indian politics has previously managed to survive threats to its division of powers and imposition of presidential over federal and constitutional rule in landmark cases such as S. R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) that ensured protection of regional administration and supremacy of federal, constitutional rule against the backdrop of presidential attempts at misusing constitutional authority of Article 356 to curb local autonomy. This means that there is still hope for resiliency of Indian uniquely centralized federal political institutions to withstand the pressure of internal nationalisms that threaten destabilization of the Indian federal system.

The Case of the Russian Federation

The largest country in the world, Russia, features its own version of federalism as well. The Russian Federation emerged following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It became an attempt to balance the traditionally highly centralized power of Russian political leaders with the vast space and diversity of people and regions it governs, against the backdrop of a modern globalized and interdependent world. The Russian Federation as such consists of a number of areas with established regional governance that are all considered equal federal subjects albeit with diverse degrees of autonomy. There are 85 such federal subjects, albeit the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol are two areas that are not yet internationally recognized as belonging to Russia. The federal subjects, based on their degree of autonomy and specific national considerations are divided into oblasts, republics, krais, autonomous okrugs, federal cities, and autonomous oblasts. Of these, republics and autonomous okrugs and oblasts or areas tend to be home to specific ethnic minorities where we see a degree of federal compartmentalization along ethnic lines. Given Russia’s vast territory featuring over 193 different ethnic groups, an aspect of ethnic federalism is not surprising , albeit fears of destabilization of this vast country often results in an emphasis on the core Russian, or Slavic, ethnicity as a state foundation.

While each federal subject has its own head, parliament, and constitutional court, federal politics, especially since the turn of the century, have come to dominate the Russian political landscape. The wording of the Russian Constitution allocates the president with primary relationship to maintenance of constitutional integrity and the federal presidential head also can choose degrees to which regional autonomy is reflected in practice. Regional governance of Russian federal subjects also is set up in a way that reflects the overarching federal government’s hierarchical structure and can thus serve to additionally reflect the degree of centralization favored by the federal government on regional governance institutions, as may presently be the case given the state of Russian politics centered on its president. This leaves integrity of minority rights as well as safeguarding of the separation of powers, civilian freedoms, and decisions regarding international relations, such as the decision to sign treaties or go to war, largely in the hands of the executive branch or the president. Implications of this scenario are evident in the ongoing attack on Ukraine that does not seem to feature an approval on a federal but rather on a centralized presidential level, as well as attempts to undermine and silence all internal opposition, again showing the overwhelming real-life implications of (mis)application of federalism. A greater recognition of the importance of separation of powers and checks and balances as key characteristics of federalism, as well as greater appreciation of civil liberties and powers vested in regional governments and autonomous regions would result in a more favorable case for pluralism and inclusion of the highly diverse political, ethnic, and cultural landscape of the world’s largest country.

The Case of the United States of America

The United States of America, or arguably the first modern world democracy, features a centuries-old constitution that establishes a very clear separation of powers and voting provisions. On a federal level, it features legislative, executive, and judicial separation of powers that many modern democracies take inspiration from, while on a territorial governance level, the country features what some describe as a true example of different states with their own degree of autonomy coming together to form “a more perfect union.” Decisions on the powers granted to states vs. the federal government are constitutionally divided and inalienable. However, states: a) often compete with one another to attract businesses by lowering taxes which hurts state-funded programs, b) can experience economic inequalities across state lines, and c) there is also a degree to which federal funding can manipulate states into accepting or enforcing certain kinds of legislation to which they otherwise would not agree upon, as seen in the enforcement of prostitution, drinking, substance control, and historically even slavery laws. Similarly, there is a weakness in the US ability to respond to pressures that need a more unified central government, as, for example, in cases of grave financial distress seen in the Great Depression.

However, the US was able to withstand many tests to its political system. The challenge of the Great Depression was resolved through unprecedented overarching federal policies showing the willingness of regional governing bodies to accept a more centralized federal functioning in times of grave need. On the other hand, the US failed to uphold integrity of its democratic institutions and territorial unity in the 1860s when it underwent a civil war revolving precisely around the issue of state rights and relation of the federal government towards the country’s particularly tragic disagreement on the institution of slavery.

Interestingly, the US was initially envisioned by its first president George Washington in his farewell address as a nonpartisan entity that would as such facilitate seemingly endless political plurality and inclusion. However, since the turn of the 19th century to the present day, the US features a rigid two-party system that leaves little space for a more nuanced ideological debate in its legislative body, the Congress, that also plays a major role in the decision to go to war or engage in international economic cooperation. The US curiously also finds itself amidst international criticism for imperial tendencies and overreliance on its military industrial complex. The state of constantly being in war campaigns around the world which received a highly mixed public opinion in the last couple of decades and (mis)treatment of its territories and indigenous/minority populations only serve to enforce the aforementioned criticism and further question US ability to ensure political, ideological, and cultural integrity of all of its subjects. In the end, a greater appreciation for the role of centralized government approaches in historically maintaining the country’s stability and minority protection coupled with a less rigid division of the congressional representation of public opinion may assist the US on the path of greater pluralism, stability, and inclusion.

The Case of the Argentine Republic

The Argentine Republic stands as an example of federalism from the South American continent. Argentina features a presidential representative democracy akin to that of the US where the president is in charge of the executive power, the National Congress possess legislative power while the judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court. Argentina similarly exhibits a highly decentralized political system, with each of its 23 provinces exercising considerable regional power and maintaining considerable ability to influence debates on the national levels through representation in the legislative branch. However, regional politics tend to suffer from exclusionary practices which then translate to misrepresentation of a region or a part of the region’s population and damage the cohesiveness of politics on the greater federal level, and Argentine congressional structure also can have unbalanced representation, having often been ranked highest globally on overrepresentation of some regions in the upper chamber. This may be a consequence of the post-colonial effects that see a translation of the exclusionary elite-based politics of the Spanish Empire translated in the modern world. Argentina is additionally grappling with dictatorial experiences such as that of the military junta rule of the 1970s that curbed pluralism and civil liberties but now also serve as a reminder of the fragility and importance of federal and pluralist ideals.

 Of particular attention are also the rights of the indigenous people in Argentine areas, that have faced centuries of abuse due to European colonialism and remain at threat in the post-colonial world. While indigenous peoples and integrity of their land, language, and culture are now federally recognized and under constitutional protections that many can learn from, in practice they often still face discrimination and theft from their lands and also stand victim to exclusion from political presence, including on local, province, and federal levels. In short, the federal structure of Argentina may benefit from greater enforcement of these protections as well as from greater focus on transparent and fair elections and representation on regional levels to ensure a more balanced discussion and development in the National Congress. Additionally, Argentine development policy initiatives could benefit from a sustained focus on perceiving Argentine provinces not as homogenous isolated units, as was traditionally the case, but as interconnected entities that should be on a shared development track coupled with cooperation from both all levels of government with civil society and flourishing local initiatives.  

Conclusion

Federalism, while at its core a system of governance favoring division of powers and participation of multiple entities in a shared political process, can differ significantly in the way that it is practiced. As evidenced in the cases above, the way federalism is to be manifested is highly dependent on a country’s history, past institutions, as well as features of its political, ethnic, and cultural makeup. The unifying lessons from examples above show the need for a strong constitutional backing in establishment of a federal political order, as well as the importance of the precise and detailed wording of this endeavor and ability to enforce constitutional integrity through a clear separation of powers and rule of law. The importance of separation of powers and check of balances, as well as constitutional and federal government’s ability to maintain protection of minority rights also proved of instrumental importance and challenge no matter what region and historical background a country finds itself in. An additional consideration when establishing a federal style of governance is the need to understand implications that ethnic divisions will play on the system and how ethnic divisions can be mitigated through democratic, inclusive policies on local, regional, and federal levels to avoid divisions while ensuring freedoms of ethnic, cultural, and religious expression. Lastly, there is also a need to recognize the dynamics between central and regional governance levels, appreciating and considering the need for centralized actions as well as federal, regional divisions and autonomy, and ensuring that the two levels of government are able to coexist, maintain clear communication in the interest of citizenry, and also maintain checks and balances on each other through constitutional, judiciary, and democratic means.

Amnesty for the Innocent: Relocating Russian Dissenters Following Putin’s War in Ukraine

The current migrant crisis in Europe completely outpaces any similar crisis on the continent since World War II. A month into the offensive Russian war in Ukraine, nearly 4 million Ukrainians had fled the country seeking asylum abroad, with an additional 7 million being internally displaced. With the war continuing to escalate, more refugees are sure to continue pouring from the country. 

Though those refugees fleeing Ukraine seem to get the majority of the press attention, as well as the majority of the assistance from Western nations (and all for good reason), the crisis has also sparked a similar exodus of Russians and Belarusians from their respective countries. A mid-March survey concluded that roughly 300,000 Russians have left Russia since the start of the invasion of Ukraine, while liberal estimates predict the real number could exceed one million persons having already left, all largely due to crippling Western sanctions, the total collapse of the Russian ruble and the Russian economy, and a wide-scale authoritarian crackdown by the Russian federal government. At the start of the Russian invasion, thousands of Russians took to the streets, in over 70 cities, to protest the war; on the first day of the war the total number of protestors arrested was 1,900 while over 13,000 protestors had been arrested a month into the war, amounting to the largest scale protests and political arrests in the country’s modern history. Soon after, Russia would take draconian measures to ban social media outlets such as Facebook and Twitter, crack down on various independent media outlets (falsely labeling them as “foreign agents”), and implement a new law allowing the government to sentence individuals to up to 15 years of imprisonment for defying the Kremlin’s narrative regarding the war. Meanwhile, the Russian economy was totally ruined as Western sanctions and popular pressure caused foreign capital and investment to flee overnight, unemployment to soar, the ruble to deflate, and the purchasing power of ordinary Russians to dwindle. As the future economic prospects for all Russians suddenly changed for the worse, those Russians with the means to leave have done so. And because conditions within Russia seem to only be getting worse, more are sure to follow those who have already left. 

Most of those Russian nationals leaving Russia consist of the urban college educated youth as well as the middle class. The young and the middle class were most likely to work in the service sector and with foreign companies before sanctions, while this section of the population is also most likely to be critical of Kremlin talking points regarding the war. Additionally, middle class Russians (aside from perhaps Russia’s elite, affluent ruling class) have the most financial means to resettle, while they also have comparatively better career opportunities abroad; young Russians also tend to have better skill sets for work abroad and have fewer commitments and responsibilities tying them to Russia—such as family or an existing committed career—and many seek to avoid being drafted into the Russian armed forces in the midst of war. Generally, the majority of those who are leaving Russia are “academics, IT specialists, journalists, bloggers” or protestors, who all fear that the unpredictable climate within Russia could quickly make their lives impossible. Most of these Russians fleeing are destined for countries which offer visa-free entry for Russian citizens, namely Georgia, and Armenia, with other common destinations including Azerbaijan, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Serbia to name a few. Though the Russians fleeing predominantly consist of individuals who are adversarial towards, or are at least skeptical of, Putin’s regime, their reception has been somewhat mixed. In Georgia, for example, Russian nationals in the country have been experiencing high degrees of discrimination, both on the street in day-to-day life and while looking for apartments and opening Georgian bank accounts. That being said, the majority of Georgians remain receptive to Russian expatriates and for good reason, as Russians leaving Russia offer the country a valuable, new, educated labor market. With more than 1,000 companies being founded by Russian nationals within Georgia in the last month, the benefits of taking on Russian expatriates are undeniable. But, despite their somewhat mixed reception in Georgia and other countries, Russians have been received far worse in Western countries, namely in the European Union and in North America. The Czech Republic, Latvia, and Lithuania have all announced that they will no longer be processing visa applications from Russian applicants due to the war in Ukraine, while Greece has placed additional restrictions on Russian nationals seeking visas; meanwhile, instances of hate crimes and discrimination against individual Russians abroad in Europe and North America have skyrocketed following the invasion. Therefore, much of the world suddenly seems to be a very hostile place to many Russians, and as Russians continue to flee and seek out safe havens from political persecution and economic ruin, those countries which accommodate the masses of young and educated Russians leaving will have much to gain. Countries across Europe, but namely those Baltic states with large Russian-speaking communities, should embrace the current wave of migrants from Russia, both as a means of securing talent and educated labor but also as a contribution to the Western strategy of punishing Russia for its ongoing offensive invasion. 

Putting entry and visa requirements aside, countries in Central and Eastern Europe are among the most suited to take in Russian expatriates. For one, the Baltic countries of Estonia and Latvia are particularly suitable for Russian immigrants, as both countries already house large Russian diaspora communities. Estonia’s population consists roughly of 24% native Russian speakers, with the concentration of these ethnic Russians mainly being in the country’s Northeast, around the urban center of Narva where the percentage of Russian speakers accounts for 90% of the city’s population. Latvia maintains a similarly sized Russian population, consisting of 25% of the country’s total population, over 35% of the population of Latvia’s capital city, Riga, and 56% of the population of the country’s second-largest city, Daugavpils. Therefore, with a large Russian speaking community already being present, urban centers like Tallinn, Riga, Daugavpils, and Narva all make realistic and comfortable options for Russians looking for new homes abroad. 

Additionally, repatriating Russian nationals could serve as a highly effective strategy to encourage economic growth in some of the poorest parts of the Baltic States. For example, Latvia’s poorest region, Latgale, also contains a large Russian speaking majority, making up 60% of the region’s population. Should educated, young and middle class Russians seek residency in Latvia, they will likely resettle either in Riga or in parts of Latgale, such as the large post-industrial city of Daugavpils, as these are the two main areas with dominant or large Russian-speaking communities. Once in the country, these expatriates might contribute greatly to the economic rebirth of the country; cities like Narva and Daugavpils are both post-industrial cities where poverty and poor quality education have proven to be massive problems. Should Russian entrepreneurs resettle in Daugavpils or Narva, and start new businesses, they will surely bring with them great employment opportunities for members of those respective communities already living there, possibly leading to the revitalization of these urban areas.. And should Russian expatriates also settle in Riga or Tallinn, they can further contribute to the relative success that these two cities have been experiencing in recent years, in terms of economic development. 

Furthermore, Estonia specifically is an exceptional possible destination for many Russian expatriates, specifically those who work in fields relating to IT (a large portion of those Russians fleeing, as already discussed). Information and Communications Technology has quickly become Estonia’s dominant economic sector, contributing the most to the country’s GDP growth over the past decade. With over 6,000 IT companies calling the small Baltic country of 1.3 million home, and with Russian language, similarly to the Latvian case, still playing a major role in daily urban and business life, Estonia makes for an unrefusable opportunity for many Russians looking for better job security abroad. 

Aside from contributing to economic success, Russian immigrants might also deradicalize the Russian-speaking communities already in the Baltic. In Estonia, 89% of ethnic-Russians watch Russian state media, while only 49% follow Western media outlets; in Latvia a stark 97% of Russian-speakers watch state media while only 10% follow Western media outlets. Looking at these figures, it becomes quite clear that there is more than just a linguistic divide between Baltic-Russians and dominant Baltic national identities like Latvians or Estonians; there is also a deep political divide partially originating from the forms of media that individuals choose to consume. By contrast, the largely urban educated and young population of Russians leaving Russia are far less likely to buy into Kremlin narratives; therefore, if the Baltic countries were to take in some of these more liberal and democratically minded Russians, this could easily contribute to diluting the influence of the Kremlin within Baltic-Russian communities and alleviate their radicalism over time. 

But before any of the potential positive effects of Russian expatriates resettling in the Baltic can be felt, Estonia and Latvia will need to adjust their visa policies towards Russians. As previously mentioned, Latvia has suspended the processing of all visa applications for applicants from Russia, a move which clearly must be reversed. Estonia and Latvia should offer Russians six months to a year of visa-free stay in their respective countries, and they should offer a clear pathway thereafter towards permanent residency and citizenship. Of course, it is not enough to merely accept these migrants. The respective Baltic states, and any country accepting migrants for that matter, must do all they can to integrate these migrants into their broader, national identities and into national society. Baltic countries could offer short-term business loans to Russian migrants who meet certain qualifications and who agree to remain in the country for a certain period of time to increase their economic integration with the host society, and Latvia and Estonia could offer subsidized formal instruction in their respective national languages to improve rates of social integration. Such actions would also need to be accompanied with a massive reworking of the media narrative surrounding Russians and Russian-speakers in the Baltic. Instead of allowing media outlets to malign Russian nationals as being totally loyal to the Kremlin and complicit in the actions of the Putin regime, government spokespersons should actively counter these narratives; instead, they should paint a more fair picture of ethnic Russians, as a people living subjugated by an authoritarian regime, who live in fear for their lives and their families, and who need the help of the West in order to achieve fair standards of living. Without such a shifting of the mainstream narrative within the regional context of the Baltic, Russophobia is certain to continue to increase, social integration will be made more difficult for those Russian-speakers already living within the Baltic, and the possible slew of benefits from accepting Russian migrants will be discarded, with those benefits instead being directed to countries accepting those Russians fleeing Putin’s regime. 

Even worse, if these migrants are not given good opportunities wherever they may resettle, many of them are sure to return to Russia, where they will continue to live and work under the Kremlin’s iron fist, contributing to economic productivity and the growth of the Russian economy. For a West concerned with punishing Russia after its offensive invasion of Ukraine, accepting Russian migrants plays directly against Putin’s hand. It gives some of Russia’s brightest and most productive the promise of a free, safe, and prosperous future out of the reach of authoritarian strongmen, and it eliminates nearly any incentive to ever return to Russia, permanently depriving Russia of its next generation of skilled labor. 

Putting all else aside, the very moral legitimacy of Western liberal democracy depends on our reaction to authoritarian leaders, like Putin, who threaten peace and antagonize innocent civilians at home and abroad. The West has responded positively by helping Ukrainian victims of the Russian invasion restart their lives, safe from the shelling of Kharkiv or the bombardments of Mariupol. Meanwhile the West has ignored the desperate cries of so many Russians, who too live in fear for their lives, their freedom, and their livelihoods. Only by answering the calls of all those in need can the West truly fulfill its prerogative in safeguarding human rights and human dignity the world over.

It’s Okay to See the ICBM Program Go

Introduction

The Biden-Harris Administration comes into office facing a myriad of unprecedented domestic and international challenges. None of these challenges, however, can be resolved or mitigated by more nuclear weapons. Though the national security establishment continues to argue that a modernization of a previously critical component of the nuclear triad is essential, that position remains highly questionable.

The United States is set to construct a new weapon of mass destruction able to travel several thousand miles and carry a warhead more than 20 times more powerful than the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. In September of last year, the Air Force gave Northrop Grumman an initial contract of over $13 billion to begin engineering and manufacturing 600 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as part of a nuclear triad modernization program supported by both the Obama and Trump Administrations. In total, the construction project could add up to $100 billion for the weapon, which will become ready for use by 2029. Operation and support costs could include another $164 billion. The plan is to replace the 450 Minutemen III ICBMs in active service or reserve with 600 Ground-Base Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) missiles, a more modern ICBM.

ICBMs are strategic weapons systems dispersed in hardened silos throughout the American Great Plains and Southwest to protect against attack. They are connected to an underground launch control center and typically have a minimum range of 5,000 kilometers (hence intercontinental). U.S. nuclear-armed ICBMS are on high alert, meaning they can be launched within mere minutes of a president’s command. The Air Force currently has 400 ICBMs deployed in the American West. Along with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and nuclear bomber planes, ICBMs are one of the components of the nuclear triad. According to the Trump Administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, “The triad’ s synergy and overlapping attributes help ensure the enduring survivability of our deterrence capabilities against attack and our capacity to hold at risk a range of adversary targets throughout a crisis or conflict. Eliminating any leg of the triad would greatly ease adversary attack planning and allow an adversary to concentrate resources and attention on defeating the remaining two legs.” President Obama’s Secretary of Defense Ash Carter called the triad “a bedrock of our security” and “foundational” to U.S. policy. Is it really though?

Has the Triad Outlived its Necessity?

Traditionally, the ICBM has been understood as the most responsive element of the triad. It is a byproduct of the Cold War and the assumption that the U.S. would need to deter a surprise attack through the promise of rapid, overwhelming force and destruction. During the Cold War, ICBMs provided accuracy that was not achievable at the time from the other components of the triad. Furthermore, ICBMs served as an insurance policy in the event that the U.S.’s nuclear submarines were disabled. The basis underlying all of this was the strategic doctrine of deterrence as elucidated by Bernard Brodie in “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” who noted the paradox of deterrence: “We are...expecting the system to be constantly perfected while going permanently unused.”

This logic no longer holds. First, America’s ICBMs provide no unique nuclear strike capability not already provided by the other legs and the absence of any immediate threat to U.S. nuclear submarines means no adversary can “preempt massive retaliation” by the U.S. According to President Bill Clinton’s Secretary of Defense William Perry, “Today, the United States’ submarine and bomber forces are highly accurate, and we have enough confidence in their security that we do not need an additional insurance policy — especially one that is so expensive and open to error.” 

Furthermore, being on high alert, ICBMs pose a unique risk of accidentally starting a nuclear war. If American sensors determine that an adversary’s missiles are en route to the U.S., the president would be forced to make a decision on whether to launch ICBMs before the enemy missile would destroy them, a period as short as a few dozen minutes. Once launched, the decision is final and they cannot be recalled.

The risk of an accidental launch may seem trivial, but mistakes can always occur as long as the program exists. In 1979, computer errors at North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), Strategic Air Command’s command post, the Pentagon, and the Alternative National Military Command Center led U.S. defense officials to believe the Soviet Union had launched more than 2,000 missiles at the U.S. Nuclear bombers were prepared to take off when, a few minutes later, it was declared to be a false alarm. It turned out that according to an investigation by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), a training video had accidentally been loaded into an operational computer at the Cheyenne Mountain Complex in Colorado Springs, home to NORAD.

In September 1983, a Soviet early warning system warned that an American ICBM was incoming before the report was altered to five missiles. Soviet Air Defence Forces Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov refused to report the incoming ICBMs to his superiors, dismissing it as a false alarm (he thought that if the U.S. was going to launch a strike, it would have included more missiles). Ultimately, Petrov’s intuition was confirmed by ground radar, as the alarm was caused by a rare sunlight alignment on high-altitude clouds. 

The world historical and world-ending stakes of a launch combined with the preciously little time afforded to make that monumental decision makes an accidental nuclear ICBM launch a serious possibility no matter the odds. This is where deterrence theory falls apart, in its assumption of rational actors in control of their situation.

Will Ending the Modernization Put the U.S. at a Strategic Disadvantage?

Supporters of ICBM modernization would argue that abandoning the ICBM program will leave the U.S. exposed to nuclear adversaries. Air Force Major Shane Praiswater, a visiting military analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, argues that Russia and China’s ambitious nuclear modernization programs seek to “equal, if not surpass” U.S. nuclear capabilities, and a U.S. failure to modernize its ICBMs would leave the U.S. at a comparative strategic disadvantage. Again, however, with U.S. ICBMs on high alert, the U.S. instead runs the risk of accidentally igniting a nuclear war, which is statistically speaking much more likely to happen than a state deciding consciously to strike the U.S. Secondly, despite hawkish fearmongering about China’s nuclear arsenal, there are currently more nuclear weapons stored in Albuquerque, New Mexico than in China- by a factor of seven and a half.

Instead of an ill-defined, open-ended nuclear competition with Russia and China bound to increase the odds of an accidental nuclear holocaust, the U.S. could help prevent a global arms race simply by renouncing the ICBM, the least accurate and easiest component of the nuclear triad for adversaries to target. Moscow pursues its modernization out of the pursuit for nuclear parity with the U.S. and views the U.S. modernization as threatening, fomenting a security dilemma. 

And this is for good reason. As Brent J. Talbot, a professor of military and security studies at the Air Force Academy, notes, the Minuteman force and the proposed GBSD force ICBMs would have to fly over Russia to strike any other emerging nuclear power (like North Korea) because they are based in the northern part of the U.S. When launched from that region, “The ballistic trajectories of the missiles require polar flight paths to reach most destinations around the globe. Thus, if the United States were to retaliate against a North Korean or Iranian attack, use of ICBMs would require overflight of Russian airspace en route to their targets, perhaps causing the Russians to think that the United States had initiated an attack against them.” In Talbot’s words, “Preserving 400 of 700 launchers to strike only one adversary is, once again, evidence of Cold War logic.” Because the ICBM can only plausibly be used against Russia, it does preciously little to deter potentially rogue actors, as North Korea is often characterized by some of these same hawks. In short, it does not even do the one thing its most ardent proponents believe it does.

America’s alliances, international institutions, and arms control agreements like New START and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, Iran Deal) work perfectly fine to deter its competitors from obtaining nuclear weapons, much less using them. The idea that only more spending on nuclear weapons will provide deterrence assumes fatalism in diplomacy when in reality diplomacy is what has prevented the world from descending into President John F. Kennedy’s prediction of a world awash in nuclear weapons (he feared famously in 1963 that by 1975 there would be 20 nations with nuclear weapons; today there are nine). Rather than the outdated Cold War mindset that America must match Moscow missile for missile, American nuclear policy ought to be decided on the basis of how many nuclear weapons America actually needs.

Cost Savings

Finally, ending the ICBM modernization will save the U.S. billions, if not hundreds of billions of dollars that are urgently needed at home and in the diplomatic sphere. The coronavirus pandemic and the climate crisis have laid bare that the most severe and serious national security threats to the U.S. are transnational and non-military. National security, in other words, has to start with human security. Ending the ICBM program, along with concurrent defense spending cuts, could save the country enough money to put a down payment on a Green New Deal, foreign aid to vulnerable populations like the Palestinians or people in Central America and the Caribbean beset by natural disasters and human rights abusing governments, or a universal coronavirus vaccine, as the bills introduced by Senator Ed Markey (D-MA) and Representative Ro Khanna (D-CA) call for. The stakes of such a decision are clear: we can either destroy the world three and a half to four times over in a fit of hubristic superpower rage or we can save it once and for all. 

Conclusion

The world survived one arms race, but barely and not without numerous close calls. Modernizing the ICBM program and swearing undying, unconditional fealty to the nuclear triad long after it has served its purpose risks igniting another one. What we have today is a policy-procurement gap, whereby contractors like Northrop Grumman’s interests are served instead of the national interest. As Joe Cirincione, the former head of the Ploughshares Fund writes, “Contracts race ahead of policy…[Continuing the triad] will lock us into building weapons we do not need at a price we cannot afford.” Nuclear weapons could not possibly be more irrelevant or ill-suited for the primary security threats the U.S. faces today in the form of the pandemic and climate change. The Biden Administration has to blow up this modernization plan before it blows everyone up.

Opposition Protests in Russia: An Analysis of the Economic Effects of COVID-19 in Russia and Their Role in the Current Protests

In Russia, as snow mounds up by the feet and temperatures drop below zero, the fiery energy of the Russian people rages on stronger than ever. Hundreds of thousands of Russians across the country have been protesting in support of the Russian Opposition leader Alexei Navalny since early January. 

Anti-Putin and pro-democracy protests are nothing new, as Russians have routinely become disenchanted and frustrated with Russian President Vladimir Putin and growing issues surrounding liberal democracy and free and fair elections. However, unlike the opposition movements of the past, these protests stand a chance in bringing  about widespread social reform, and it’s not just due to Alexei Navalny’s fame and charisma. 

Russia has been hit particularly hard t by the economic crisis brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic, and with no immediate end to the pandemic in sight, it’s uncertain when the country’s economic circumstances  will improve. Millions of Russians are facing unemployment and dwindling savings are causing widespread resentment, fear, and anger towards the Russian government. Economic struggles alone are enough to bring people to protest, but the combination of economic strife, growing anger over Putin’s government, and unwavering support for Alexei Navalny is enough to create an unstoppable movement. 

Alexei Navalny

Russian Opposition Leader Alexei Navalny is a lawyer and anti-corruption activist, as well as a fierce critic of Putin. He first gained notoriety back in 2008, when he started blogging about Russian politics and corruption within the state. Following his success in blogging and reporting, Navalny expanded his influence and methods into more serious corruption investigations, demonstrating his commitment and bravery. 

Navalny’s most impressive anti-corruption work can be found on Youtube, where he reveals the investigative process of proving powerful Russian officials, such as former President Dmitri Medvedev and former Prosecutor General Chaika Yury, to be incredibly corrupt, such as using state funds to create personal, luxury villas. Navanly’s immense success in investigative journalism helped him establish the Anti-Corruption Foundation, where he and a team of other journalists carry out investigative work. 

Throughout his career Navalny has frequently faced near death incidents and poisonings, frequently traced back to the Kremlin (although they deny such claims). Most recently, Navalny was nearly killed by a lethal nerve agent planted in his clothing before being rushed to an emergency treatment center in Germany. Alexei Navalny was immediately arrested upon his recovery and returned to Russia. 

Protests

Navalny’s arrest and subsequent calls to rally on his social media drew the Russian people into the streets from St. Petersburg to Moscow to the smallest rural towns. Throughout January and February the Russian people took to the streets, and were frequently arrested and detained in mass numbers. Reports of police brutality are widespread amongst the protests, with photos and videos posted on social media showcasing police officers beating and torturing protesters. Researchers from Human Rights Watch suggest that the number of detainees at protests in Russia is higher than ever reported, finding that over  5,000 people were likely detained and arrested over the course of a single weekend. Once arrested, the detainees are placed in harsh conditions where they are frequently denied the right to food, water, and restrooms.

The Russian government has frequently faced pressure to address the demands of protestors calling for Navalny’s release. With no sign of the protests stopping, the Russian government has amped up arrests despite the peaceful actions of protestors, such as holdingin candlelit gatherings or walking arm in arm through the streets. However, the Kremlin should consider the other economic and political issues currently facing Russia. Unlike in previous times of outrage and anti-Putin sentiment, this time the Russian government will have to contend with the economic burdens caused by the COVID-19 pandemic which is drawing Russians out onto the streets. 

A History of Anti-Putin Protests 

Anger over Putin, corruption, and a lack of free and deomocratic elections in Russia is nothing new. From the time that Putin rose to power in 2000, Russians have routinely expressed outrage and anger over their leader.

In the past decade alone, Russians demonstrated their political rights and views against Putin multiple times. Starting in late 2011, following the state Duma elections, over 50,000 people across the country marched in protest of apparent fraud following the election results. For the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union, anti-government sentiment and anger over Putin was openly expressed. These protests drew Russians together despite the wide range of political opinions and identities  among them. The Kremlin responded as expected, denying the supposed election fraud and encouraging the arrests of protestors. The protestors demanded a cancellation of the recent election votes and  pleaded for another election. Other demands included investigations into the corruption of the Chief of Electoral Commissions and a release of arrested prisoners. 

Less than six months later, in May of 2012, protests commenced again, with Russians gathering in Bolotnaya Square to demand free and fair elections. These anti-Putin and anti-government marches became known as the “March of Millions.” Many were arrested and Human Rights Watch reported numerous instances of police brutality and unfair arrests. 

While these protests eventually dwindled due to lack of follow-through at the hands of organizers, and severe repression of information by the Russian government, the Kremlin was still forced to acknowledge that for the first time since his inauguration, Putin could no longer rely on the neverending support of the Russian people. 

At the heart of the 2011-2013 Russian protests was anger over a mismanaged democracy amongst urban, educated Russians. While the government refused to meet the demands of its people, it did create public works projects in hopes of both distracting the Russian people from the protests and restoring faith and pride in the Russian government. Numerous public works projects were created, including implementing urban renewal ventures consisting of improving city sidewalks, roads, and public parks. 

The Kremlin continued to spend money in hopes of reigniting the Russian people’s national pride and sense of unity. Hosting national sports events such as the World Cup allowed Russians to cheer on their team while promoting pride for their country. The success of the Russian government’s ability to promote Russian nationalism and  unify its people became known as the Rally Around the Flag Effect, and it heavily shaped Putin’s foreign policy approach. 

The Rally Around the Flag Effect 

The global response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 was intense, critical, and threatening, but the sentiment within Russia could not have been more different. Following the annexation, Putin’s approval rate soared to a supposed 84%, garnering admiration from Russians across a variety of  social classes, age ranges, careers and locations. Surveys from the time reveal that overall attitudes towards national pride, hope for the future, and support for the Kremlin all rose dramatically. The success of the Crimean annexation and Putin’s response to it led to the coining of the term “Rally Around the Flag”, in which Russians supposedly put aside their issues with the state to support Russia and Putin; yet in reality this is government propaganda, in the which the Kremlin distracts the Russian people by instilling them with nationalistic values. 

However, at present the political and economic climate is vastly different. Putin and his government can no longer afford to throw money into public works projects in order to distract from the protests, and they lack the foreign policy capabilities to carry out a military event as dramatic and violent as the annexation of Crimea. Not only is the government much weaker, but it is becoming increasingly clear that Russia’s economic state, caused by the COVID-19 pandemic,  is increasingly the issue pushing Russians out onto the street in protest. 

The Economic Effects of COVID-19 in Russia 

Unsurprisingly, Russia has experienced devastating economic ramifications at both the national and local level in conjunction with the spread of COVID-19. The economic struggles caused by rising unemployment rates has affected Russians in both urban and rural regions. Russia has reported relatively low COVID-19 numbers, particularly in comparison with other European countries and the US; however, many experts speculate that these numbers have been heavily falsified and that Russian data on COVID-19 cases is likely three times higher than reported. 

Despite their seemingly low number of COVID-19 cases, Russia cannot hide its economic struggles. The country’s GDP is likely to shrink by six percent from 2020 to 2021, and the country has already seen sharp increases in unemployment, lowered wages, banking struggles, and the shrinking of major industries. A decrease in trade and drop in oil prices is at the forefront of this economic recession. While some industries such as agriculture have managed to stay afloat, it is clear after almost a year since the first initial global shutdown that  all aspects of Russia’s economy have been damaged, and in every region. This is particularly threatening to Putin’s government, who have always relied on their strongholds in smaller, conservative, rural areas. 

Protests in support of Alexei Navanly have now been reported in over a hundred cities and towns, with the largest number  in these smaller, rural areas. With all regions of the country erupting in protest, the likelihood of the government to repress these protests is lower than in earlier years. Statistically, rural areas are demonstrating a much higher turnout than in more urban areas. The effects of globalization have taken effect worldwide, including in the farming regions of Russia who are now showing increased anger over Putin than their urban peers in Moscow and St. Petersburg. This anger can also be attributed to the lack of economic relief reforms dedicated to agricultural regions both before and during the pandemic. Following the 2011-2013 protests, the Kremlin’s economic implementations mostly targeted cities, largely ignoring rural communities. It now appears as though this resentment at being ignored has finally reached its boiling point, as anti-Putin sentiment erupts across the countryside. 

Critics have been quick to claim that Russian protestors stand no chance at achieving their goals, using earlier opposition protests as evidence. Nevertheless, those who doubt the might of the Russian people should keep in mind the underlying factors at the root of this issue. Unemployment and feelings of abandonment are powerful forces that will drive anyone to the streets, regardless of political devotion. 

As the Kremlin continues to crack down on the protestors, the Russian government and the rest of the world should acknowledge the significance that the economic strife caused by COVID-19 has played throughout these protests. For the first time since Putin’s ascent to power, the Russian people actually stand a chance at achieving lasting reforms. 

What the West Gets Wrong About Putin

After his 2001 Slovenia Summit with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, American President George W. Bush reiterated his belief that a constructive and productive dialogue between the U.S and Russia was possible. Per Bush, “We had a very good dialogue. I was able to get a sense of his soul. He's a man deeply committed to his country and the best interests of his country and I appreciate very much the frank dialogue and that's the beginning of a very constructive relationship.” As four consecutive American presidents have faltered in their stated efforts to improve relations with Moscow while simultaneously leading the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), it is evident that American policymakers underestimated the ambitions and capabilities of Putin. 

Through the invasion of sovereign states and interference in foreign politics, Putin’s Russia has undermined European confidence in NATO and democracy. In at least some regard, the blame lies at the feet of American foreign policy analysts, whose interpretations of Russia in the early post-soviet period were largely colored by predisposed attitudes about the country and who were too eager to project the idealism of the unipolar moment onto the past two decades. For a former KGB agent like Putin who conceptualizes and compartmentalizes threats, the world is a zero-sum game where the restoration of Russia’s prestige comes at the expense of the rest of the world. This push-pull dynamic of U.S. provocations and outright Russian bellicosity has shaped U.S.-Russian relations today and demands a new strategy.

The Pre-Putin Days

Understanding Putin’s geopolitical calculus requires studying U.S.-Russia relations in the era before he came to power. For Putin, the end of the Cold War was a formative experience. He has called the breakup of the Soviet Union and erosion of Russian power “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.”

When the U.S. came to power in this unipolar moment, as Charles Krauthammer among others would coin it, the U.S. was essentially the closest thing imaginable to a global hegemon and thus played a prominent role in the settlements of post- Cold War Europe. In particular, at the February 1990 meeting between American Secretary of State James Baker and then-Soviet Union leader Mikhail Gorbachev, Baker told Gorbachev that “there would be no extension of NATO’s jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the east” and agreed to terms that “Any extension of the zone of NATO is unacceptable.” As a former imperial power and superpower, the new Soviet leadership was petrified of a post-USSR world order in which the U.S. played a sizable role in Europe and challenged Russia diplomatically and militarily in Eurasia.. The U.S., meanwhile, wished to stabilize and securitize Europe without being overly adversarial toward Russia. These goals, not necessarily in contradiction of each other, have largely remained the same but the way each party approached achieving that means led to the thaw.

Presidents Bush and Clinton, two presidents who saw their duty as Commander-in-Chief as defending the international liberal order, sought a policy of “enlargement.” By bringing more countries into the democratic, U.S.-led order, the logic went that the U.S. could keep Europe from takeover by a resurgent revisionist Russia. Poland and a reunified Germany joined and they were followed by more than a dozen other states including Albania and Montenegro most recently. To this day, the door remains open to Ukraine as it is embroiled in a hot war with Russia over the Donbass. 

Presidents Bush and Clinton were presented with three real options for a post-Cold War NATO, as Benn Steil wrote: ignore Baker’s promise and expand NATO on the basis that Russia would always behave like the imperial Great Power it conceived itself, wait until Russia took concrete actions that infringed on the sovereignty of its neighbors (George Kennan’s position), or “expand NATO on the cheap,” figuring that the alliance faced no true enemy anymore. Bush chose the third position and Clinton continued the policy, despite the advice of Sam Nunn, the former senator of his own party, who argued, “Are we really going to be able to convince the Eastern Europeans that we are protecting them while we convince the Russians that NATO enlargement has nothing to do with Russia?” Nunn’s criticism gets to the root of the issue with Eastern European NATO expansion: while NATO has admittedly succeeded greatly in building an alliance of democracies and intervening to put an end to crimes against humanity in the Balkans, it would have had to be seen as legitimate by both the allies and Russia to avert violent resolution of disputes and it has failed to do so. The choice fundamentally was between isolating and building up against Russia in a fit of post-Cold War triumphalism and using America’s status as the sole superpower to urge Russia to behave like a responsible actor in exchange for being treated like one. Instead of isolating or cautiously integrating Russia, the United States made the well-intentioned but fatally flawed decision to ignore it.

The Reality of NATO Enlargement

The claims of NATO expansion promoters are contradicted by the historical record. While they claimed that Eastern European countries that had been threatened before by the Soviets remained vulnerable in the post-Cold War era and needed to be welcomed into the alliance, Russia was incredibly weak in the 1990s. Secondly, while the world will assuredly never know whether Vladimir Putin was fully intent on pursuing an interventionist foreign policy in his own backyard before NATO enlargement, it can be noted that tensions grew after enlargement.

In reality, the expansion of NATO’s influence into the Balkans and the proposed bids to Russian neighbors represents an unnecessary and somewhat predictable strategic mistake. In its well-intentioned bid to establish a single Europe free from an Eastern threat and united in values and security, NATO isolated Russia. In extending membership and security guarantees to the weakest European states that would simultaneously be the most difficult to defend once Russia recovered, NATO left itself with two undesirable options. The first was to let Russia have what it wants and undermine the solidarity of the alliance in the name of not having a dog in the fight. The second option was to contest every Russian challenge and put NATO troops at risk over the status of countries that are either minuscule in size or internally rife with rising authoritarianism and corruption. Washington and Brussels could live with these contradictions because they never envisioned these security guarantees would need to be fulfilled. 

Eventually, however, Putin sought a more expansionist agenda. Two major strategic decisions by the U.S. and most of its European allies served as catalysts for deteriorating U.S.-Russian relations: the recognition of Kosovo’s independence in 2008 (Russia is the closest ally of Serbia, which continues to dispute Kosovo’s claim) and NATO’s Bucharest Summit, held that same year, which guaranteed future NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine. Both decisions crossed a red line for Moscow, as statements by Russian leadership made clear. Former Russian president Dmitri Medvedev, before the Russian war in Georgia, elucidated a clear position laying out Russia’s perception of greater European integration in Eastern Europe, calling Ukrainian and Georgian accession a threat to Russian security. At the same time, then-Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov argued that Georgian accession would “lead to another stage of confrontation.” In this way, what followed, in the form of Russian instigation of wars in Georgia and Ukraine, should have been foreseen by American officials. Putin was not as much a brilliant strategist creating chaos and disorder out of post-Cold War kumbaya but rather he was taking advantage of and responding to American foreign policy on the fly. Yet in its hubris, Washington added to its security burdens and provoked Russia while getting next to no benefit out of the enlargement. 

It is also worth noting that the democratizing benefit of NATO was widely oversold beyond Central and Western Europe. There has been a great worry among NATO watchers about democratic backsliding in several NATO powerhouses and some of the newer or proposed members from recent periods of expansion. Turkey, which has the second-largest military in NATO, is rated as Not Free by Freedom House for the first time in the history of the report as Recep Erdogan has concentrated his own power and persecuted political opponents. The country once billed by the U.S. as a model secular democracy in the Middle East and Southeastern Europe is now essentially a theocracy with more journalists imprisoned than any other country in the world. In Hungary, Viktor Orban has shuttered universities, promoted white nationalist theories about immigrants, criticized liberal democracy, and now made himself a dictator for the foreseeable future through a new law granting him authority to rule by decree. Montenegro, Ukraine, and Poland each struggle with corruption and have experienced recent democratic backsliding. With this, the very democratic solidarity at the root of NATO is endangered and NATO expansion did not stop any of it from occurring.

Russia has noticed, leveraging its relationships with Turkey and Hungary to exacerbate discord within NATO. Putin sees Orban and Erdogan as ideological allies in the campaign against the European Union and European integration writ-large, and the NATO alliance did not stop Putin from politically and financially supporting anti-democratic forces aligned with them. Nor did it stop Turkey from seeking closer military ties with Russia, through the purchase of S-400 missile systems despite bipartisan congressional urging. The acquisition of the S-400 system will presumably hurt NATO’s security cooperation. Turkey’s critical role in NATO has not stopped it from turning toward Russia.

Putin and Make Russia Great Again

Another point of contention between common narratives about Putin and the historical record is whether his aspiration to “Make Russia Great Again” is (a) the main motivating factor of his foreign policy and (b) actually achievable. “[Putin] came to believe that he had been chosen for a special mission—to save Russia,” Russian journalist Mikhail Zygar wrote in Time. To some, especially those of all political stripes who have spent the past half-century projecting their worst fears onto Russia whether justified or not, it may seem that Russia will always have an interest in maintaining authoritarianism at home and behaving like an empire abroad.

The problem is that that is not the only factor at hand, and Russian interests, imperial or otherwise, are no more immutable than those of any other country. As Rutgers-Newark professor and scholar of empire Alexander Motyl writes, “As anyone with an appreciation of Russian, or any, history knows, no state can pursue identical interests for the duration of its historical existence, because states and their surroundings are always changing… As a result, foreign policy becomes a function of geopolitics, national interests, and ideologies, but also of regime type, personality of the leader, historical timing, context, and many other factors.” Take the example of the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine. It may be that Putin authorized the action in part because he wanted to restore Russian prestige, but it is impossible to ignore that the Maidan revolution that ousted Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych made Ukraine politically unstable, and thus more vulnerable than ever before. At the same time, a revolution in his own backyard led by the populace would make any dictator sweat. Thus, Putin also saw the Ukrainian state as an easy target for expansion, wanted to send a message to the West that it was overextending its sphere of influence through NATO expansion, and wanted to assert his power in the face of regime vulnerability. In the end, it was not just ideology that motivated Putin, but also geography, the stability of rival states, and vulnerability at home, a more reactive, less ideological conclusion than the prevailing wisdom.

Furthermore, Putin’s Russia does not pose the existential threat that it once did to the United States. In a very real way, Putin has not and cannot “Make Russia Great Again.” Economic growth in Russia has slowed to a crawl, in part due to falling oil prices and inequality but also due to U.S. sanctions placed on Russia for its repeated abuses of human rights and international law. Its GDP is roughly the same as it was in 2008. While Russia has improved relations with several major players in international politics like China and Turkey, it still has very few real allies. Even among the few powerful countries with which it has good relations, such as Saudi Arabia and India, the United States has a serious claim to being a closer ally. In the same sense, since being kicked out of the G-8 for the intervention in Crimea and condemned widely for foreign assassinations, Russia has lost institutional power in recent years. Finally, militarily, Russia is relatively weak compared to its rivals. The European members of NATO alone spend four times as much as Russia on defense even as some of them fail to meet the suggested guideline of 2 percent of GDP and regional powers like Saudi Arabia and India, as well as the declining great power of France, all spend more on defense than Russia.

That is not to say that Russia is not going to continue to be an important consideration for policymakers. It is not to say that Russia will not continue to be a major player beyond its own region. Indeed, through its backing of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and facilitation of peace talks in Libya and Northern Syria, Russia plays a much larger role in the Middle East than China does. Furthermore, Putin has reoriented Russian foreign policy towards the region since the Arab Spring, regaining some of the lost diplomatic clout from the Crimea invasion. Instead of a pariah state that had been absent from the region since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Russia is now being treated by even its most ardent rivals as a major player in Middle Eastern affairs. This is because the Iraq War and the U.S. intervention in Libya projected a form of regime change politics and created instability that reduced Russian trust in the U.S. while the Arab Spring showed that popular democratic movements could change international politics, a notion the ever-cautious Putin feared would manifest in regime vulnerability. It is important to note this caveat to understand why dialogue with Russia and consideration of its interests will continue to be essential even if it is not as capable of projecting power as it once was.

A New Strategy

Though often made out by those on both sides of the aisle as a master grand strategist, Putin’s foreign policy successes can be better understood as ample improvised reactions to American policy at best and outright boom or bust gambles at worst. The Blob, as former Obama Administration National Security Council staffer Ben Rhodes derogatorily refers to the network of the governmental, think tank, and media foreign policy establishment has long projected its fears onto Russia, from the Cold War to Putin’s alleged quest for world domination. To them, Putin is a brilliant strategist with a coherent worldview synonymous with decimating the institutions of the post-Cold War international order. In their eyes, there is no democracy Putin and his cronies cannot hack, no U.S. ally he would not squeeze, and no border dispute he would not settle violently in his favor. This lens, while common for the reasons outlined above, is not entirely valid.

A new Russian strategy must be devised to account for this new perception of Putin’s worldview and capabilities. With 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons on either side of the negotiating table, war must be averted at any cost. To date, the American strategy has been too militarized and focused on competition rather than a more nuanced position that acknowledges that cooperation is necessary to reduce the nuclear threat and define the rules of the road, even as the U.S. must stand ready to call out Putin’s Russia when it violates international law and foments instability. The primary challenge in this strategy of getting to peace and disarmament for U.S. policymakers will be to determine where valid Russian interests cease and where realistic red lines must lie. 

A more coherent and nuanced Russia strategy would continue to reiterate that the former Soviet republics bordering Russia are entitled to their sovereignty under international law and Russian violations of that sovereignty will be condemned accordingly. Yet at the same time, the U.S. should make clear that it does not intend to expand its sphere of influence through NATO or other means up to Russia’s border. Georgia and Ukraine’s NATO bids should be withdrawn, as they only give greater credence to the conspiracy theory that NATO exists to encircle and isolate Russia, a theory that has drawn Russia to foment war in both of those countries. Concurrently, the U.S. and its allies must cooperate to ensure that Ukraine’s territorial integrity is preserved and Russia abides by the terms of the Minsk Protocol in Donbass. Finally, in Eastern Europe, Russia must not be rewarded for its reckless and illegal annexation of Crimea, which should not be recognized. Reckless land grabs have no place in 21st century Europe and international politics, and as long as this principle remains intact, the U.S. should not recognize the annexation. 

In Syria, Moscow’s support for Assad’s regime has brought great harm to the Syrian people. Unfortunately, U.S. military misadventures in the Middle East have validated the Russian view that Washington seeks to destabilize the region through destructive regime change wars. This view may be motivated by Russia’s own interests, but that alone does not discredit it. As such, the U.S. has to be willing to negotiate an enduring peace settlement that includes all of the various factions and ultimately dramatically scales back both the U.S. and Russian presences in the region, even if it means Assad controls a sizable part of the country.

The U.S. missed a major opportunity when it chose to prioritize NATO expansion over the Partnership for Peace, which included Russia and aimed to create trust between NATO and Russia. Furthermore, the Partnership for Peace was not just a military alliance, as it facilitated cooperation on science and environmental issues, disaster response, policy planning, and civil-military relations. The Partnership was uniquely able to thread the needle posed by Nunn between assuaging Russian concerns about NATO enlargement, supporting democratic values, and preparing aspiring members for consideration. In short, it reached beyond the alliance to forge trust between NATO states and non-NATO states. While non-recognition of the Crimea annexation would preclude readmission to the G7 for good reason, the U.S. should seek to build similar low-risk institutions like the Partnership for Peace that engage with, rather than isolate Russia to facilitate cooperation on non-security issues and reduce distrust on security issues.

As stated earlier, 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons are in the hands of the U.S. and Russia. Those who huddled under desks during the Cuban missile crisis and those in the Obama Administration who worked tirelessly to approve the 2011 New START treaty that dramatically limited the deployment of strategic nuclear weapons by either side need no reminder of the danger of these weapons. Nevertheless, the George W. Bush and Trump administrations took dead aim at the various arms control and disarmament treaties governing these weapons. In 2002, the Bush Administration withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which limited the number of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems each party could possess. Russia responded by building up its nuclear capabilities. Last September, the White House officially withdrew from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which led to the elimination of almost 3,000 nuclear missiles. Even if the U.S. claim that Russia had been cheating on the deal was true, remaining a party to it would have been preferable because now Putin gets to tell the world that the U.S. cannot keep its word and that its interest in nonproliferation is not serious. Furthermore, with New START itself in danger of not being reauthorized (despite U.S. conclusions that Russia abides by the deal’s terms) by 2021, it is quite possible that there will be no legally binding limits on the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals for the first time in 50 years. Forty-five years of nuclear chicken was enough. The transparency and restrictions on proliferation and deployment instilled in these treaties reduce the likelihood of a third world war, and it is imperative that U.S. strategy prioritize getting back to the negotiating table.

Finally, Vladimir Putin’s kleptocratic authoritarian petrostate regime is as repressive as they come. The current president’s foreign policy is largely defined by his willingness to cozy up to dictators, including Putin himself. On the other end of the table, Putin has exported his particular brand of xenophobia, homophobia, all across Europe in the form of backing far-right parties and leaders like Orban. The U.S. has an obligation to support democracy and human rights through peaceful means in Russia and across Europe, as transparent, stable governments that can be held accountable by their voters make for good allies because they are sympathetic to the liberal worldview that benefits the U.S. and behave in predictable and rational ways. As Putin’s government bars his opponents from running against him, murders scores of journalists, and tortures LGBTQ people in Chechnya, the U.S., as the leader of the free world, must call him out and hold him and his cronies accountable every step of the way. 

While the last two decades of U.S. Russia policy has largely been characterized by a misreading of Vladimir Putin’s motives and capabilities that emboldened him, this new proposed Russia strategy builds upon the successes of the time period in arms control and the Global Magnitsky Act and reorients U.S. policy towards shared interests and challenges while condemning Russia’s many misdeeds. Russia may not be the imperial power some believe it to be, but its importance cannot be overstated in 21st century Eurasia and in international forums. To confront it when its actions demand it to be confronted and to cooperate and reduce tensions when changes in interests occur, nuance is essential. The status quo must go.

Constitutional Amendments and the Future Political Course of the Russian Federation

Constitutional Amendments

On January 15, 2020, Russian President Vladimir Putin of Russia gave his yearly address to lawmakers. In his speech, Putin, without warning, proposed a series of changes to the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Some of the proposed changes include increasing the power of the lawmakers in selecting the Prime Minister and Cabinet-level positions. Currently, lawmakers only confirm the President’s nomination for the post of the Prime Minister and no other high-level post is subject to lawmakers’ confirmation. Under Putin’s proposed changes, lawmakers would have the power to nominate and confirm their choice for Prime Minister and other high-ranking cabinet positions. Furthermore, the President would not be able to reject the lawmakers’ choice.

Furthermore, Putin proposed putting a constitutional limit on the influence of international law in Russia. Essentially, Putin suggested that if international law was found to be in violation of the Russian constitution, then the international law would be nullified. In another law-related amendment, Putin floated the idea of increasing the power of the Constitutional Court. The proposed change would give the President the power to request that the Constitutional Court examine the constitutionality of any legislation before it is signed into law by the President. 

Additionally, Putin suggested two amendments that would change certain eligibility requirements that have to do with holding high office in Russia. First, the residency requirements would be increased for candidates for President from 10 to 25 years. Second, members of the Duma, the Federation Council, Ministers, and judges would be prohibited from having dual citizenship or other long-term residency documents of another country.

Some other notable proposals in Putin’s address included providing a guarantee that the minimum wage and pension will remain above the poverty line, prohibiting any future President from occupying the post of President for more than two terms, and strengthening the status and role of the Government Council.

In Putin’s speech to lawmakers, he stated that “these amendments do not fundamentally change the Constitution and thus, can be adopted by the parliament. However, I consider it right to hold a referendum on all suggested amendments and only after the results of the referendum adopt the amendments.”  However, despite rumors that a national referendum on the constitutional amendments will be held in May, as of now no details have been released. 

The proposed amendments constitute one of the largest domestic political events in the Putin era. However, following Putin’s address to lawmakers, another earthquake shook the Russian political scene. Dmitry Medvedev, Putin’s Prime Minister, announced his resignation. Medvedev’s resignation meant that the entire ministerial cabinet would also resign. Sources within the Russian government told Novaya Gazeta, a prominent Russian newspaper, that resignation of the cabinet was a complete surprise even at the highest levels of government. Medvedev stated that he considered his resignation to be the proper action in the context of Putin’s proposed constitutional changes.

Appointment of Mikhail Mishustin as Prime Minister

Immediately following Medvedev’s resignation, Putin appointed a new Prime Minister, Mikhail Mishustin. Mishustin was confirmed as Prime Minister on January 16 with a vote of 383-41. Previously, Mishustin was the head of Russia’s federal tax service since 2010 but he has not played a role in national-level politics until now. 

A comparison can be drawn between Mishustin’s sudden elevation to the national political sphere and Anton Vaino’s similar unexpected rise to prominence. In August 2016, Anton Vaino replaced long-time Putin ally, Sergey Ivanov, as the Presidential Chief of Staff. Before Vaino was appointed to this position, he was the head of Protocol, and before that he held a series of technocratic positions within the Russian government.  At the time of Vaino’s appointment, analysts noted that Vaino was known for his competence as a bureaucrat and that, unlike the man he replaced, Vaino had no independent power of his own. Vaino's appointment suggested that Putin was clearing ‘the old-guard’ out and replacing them with efficient technocrats who would be able to competently pursue his agenda without developing any sort of independent influence. 

Mishustin also has a technocratic background and is known for his competence. Before becoming the head of Russia’s federal tax service, he had a long career in a series of low-profile bureaucratic positions mostly relating to taxes. During Mishustin’s tenure as head of the federal tax service, he led an extremely ambitious modernization of Russia’s tax collection methods. He focused on digitizing the process of collecting taxes with the goal of increasing efficiency in order to increase overall revenue. The Federal Tax Service is now widely considered to be the most technologically advanced department of the Russian government. Mishustin’s efforts succeeded. Due to increased efficiencies, the total amount of taxes collected has risen 33 times faster than the rate of GDP growth. 

The parallels between Mishustin and Viano suggest that Putin appointed Mishustin to execute his agenda between now and 2024, as well as guarantee that whoever holds the post as Prime Minister could not challenge Putin before or replace him after 2024. 

Mishustin’s background as an efficient money-manager is also worth noting, particularly in light of some of Putin’s domestic political challenges. Sources close to Putin’s government told the Russian newspaper, Komersant, that the shakeup of the government could be related to budgetary issues facing Russia in recent years. Putin has proposed and instituted a series of ambitious social-economic initiatives which will require serious government expenditures. There has traditionally been resistance to these expenditures within some blocks of the government. When Andrey Isaev, a Duma Deputy, asked Mishustin where he planned to get the resources to fund the initiatives of the President, Mishustin simply replied: “The resources exist.” Overall, it seems that Mishustin, with his reputation as a technocratic problem solver, was brought in to execute Putin’s national projects without dissent.

Putin is Feeling Domestic Pressure

 Mishustin’s appointment as Prime Minister along with some of the language in Putin’s address to lawmakers could suggest that he is feeling the public’s call for the government to do more to raise living standards. At the beginning of his address, Putin stated that “today in our society, there has been a clear demand for change.”  Although Putin’s popularity according to the Levada Center (one of Russia’s only public opinion polling organizations) has been stable at around 69 percent since July of 2019, in recent years there has been a series of protest movements that have called attention to poor living and economic conditions in the country. 

In June 2018, the Russian government announced a proposal to increase the retirement age from 60 to 65 for men and from 55 to 63 for women. This proposal was met with widespread popular disapproval and protests erupted in over 80 different cities in Russia. In August of 2018, protests also erupted in cities across Northwest Russia after it was discovered that the government was building a massive landfill in an abandoned town northeast of Moscow. Waste from Moscow would be dumped in this landfill and there were fears among locals that this would lead to an ecological disaster. Additionally, in February of 2017 in response to a proposed increase in the taxes paid by truck drivers who drive on federal roads, Russian truckers went on strike for 10 days. These policy changes were proposed to raise revenues or decrease costs to the federal government. Since 2014, Russia has suffered under western sanctions and combined with the pressure of an aging population and significant expenditures on the modernization of the military, Russia finds itself cash-strapped. Putin’s appointment of Mishustin can be interpreted as an effort to improve Russia’s financial situation so that it can provide the services and benefits that the Russian populace desires. 

What Does This Reveal About Putin’s Political Future?

Putin’s current term as president will end in 2024 and it seems unlikely at this point that he will run for a fifth term. However, it is widely accepted that Putin has no intention of stepping away from politics or power come 2024. Thus, it has been expected for quite some time that Putin would find some way to ensure that he would maintain a position of power post-2024. 

The predictions regarding Putin’s possible methods to preserve his influence have varied dramatically. Some have predicted that Putin intends to become the President of a new country that would be formed by combining Russia and Belarus. Some have forecasted that Putin will follow Nursultan Nazarbayev’s, the former President of Kazakhstan, example of stepping down from the presidency but maintaining power by becoming chairman for life of the Security Councils of Kazakhstan. 

Regardless of the path that Putin takes, if the proposed amendments pass, the next Russian President will have significantly less power than the office has today. And many of the proposed amendments, like the following, could be used to centralize Putin’s power and ensure that no political opponents could challenge him. 

• Limiting the influence of international law: Russia has often emphasized that “western, democratic capitalism” is not the proper style of governance for every country. This constitutional change could codify this ideology and empower Putin even further to use authoritarian measures to maintain power. 

• Increasing the power of the Courts: The Russian court system is notoriously vulnerable to political influence. Freedom House gave the Russian court system a score of 1 out of a possible 4, stating that “The judiciary lacks independence from the executive branch, and career advancement is effectively tied to compliance with Kremlin preferences. The Presidential Personnel Commission and court chairmen control the appointment and reappointment of the country’s judges, who tend to be promoted from inside the judicial system rather than gaining independent experience as lawyers.” A more powerful court system that is easily influenced could be an ideal means for Putin to exert power after he moves on from the office of the Presidency. 

• The increasing residency requirements and prohibition of dual citizens: This measure helps guarantee that prominent Russian exiles cannot return and run for political office. Furthermore, this gives the Kremlin an excuse to disqualify individuals that have been educated, or spent extended periods of time in the West, and thus are more likely to hold liberal values, from seeking government jobs or elected positions. 

• Codifying a two-term limit for the office of the Presidency: This guarantees that no individual can acquire the same degree of long-term power to challenge Putin. 

What to Watch For

There are few times in recent memory that the political future of the Russian Federation has been as uncertain as it is now. However, there are a couple of overarching themes to watch out for in the coming weeks and months. 

• Putin will act to preserve his position of power: Any reforms proposed by Putin should be analyzed through the paradigm of Putin’s self-interest. To ascertain why the Government of Russia undertakes a course of action, examine how Putin could benefit.

• Prepare for unexpected changes in the Russian Government. Even the most attentive of Russia watchers were taken completely by surprise by the timing of this dramatic shakeup. Reports in the Russian press state that even the highest levels of the Russian government were unaware of these proposed changes. 

• Examine the backgrounds of the new ministerial cabinet members when they are announced. If the appointees have similar technocratic, low-profile backgrounds like Mishustin, this could indicate that Putin is attempting to further centralize power while also building a team that can deliver on Putin’s ambitious social-economic plans.

• Expect the Russian government to institute reforms with the aim of cutting costs and increasing the services provided to the Russian populace.

The Battle Over Language Policy in Russia and Former Soviet Republics

The role and rights of minority languages around the world is part of a growing area of human rights law. Article 4, Section 3 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities argues that “States should take appropriate measures so that, whenever possible, persons belonging to minorities may have adequate opportunities to learn their mother tongue or to have instruction in their mother tongue”. Russia is one battleground for minority linguistic rights. In the various semi-autonomous republics inside of Russia, the changing environment for minority language education has brought up issues of autonomy from the federal government of Russia and the central government's growing influence within the semi-autonomous region. In the independent former Soviet republics, the pushback against the Russian language reflects fears of “Russification” while establishing their language as a bellwether for national identity. Latvia provides a notable example of this, where, while taking different stances, their concerns over identity, linguistic rights, and Russia’s more aggressive approach to cultural influence beyond its borders create parallels. Going forward, language and other cultural elements are set to become more important to minorities as Russia’s semi-autonomous republics see autonomy as more than political, and countries on Russia’s border become more concerned about their own sovereignty through Russia’s soft power tactics. 

There are over 35 languages other than Russian recognized as official languages in Russia. These are the languages of the various republics inside Russia. The republics are able to declare their own official language, institute their own form of government and formulate independent policy that secure these republics' autonomy and preserve their unique ethnic identities.  However, this policy of relative autonomy has come under assault in recent years. In 2018, Russia passed a law that limited the amount of time per week that classroom time could be dedicated to minority languages. Furthermore, the 2018 language law made all language instructions optional except for Russian. Public reception has been mixed, with those inside the autonomous ethnic republics seeing the state’s push to further Russian identity as a threat to their own. Ethnic Udmurt sociologist Albert Razin committed self-immolation in protest over the new language law, quoting Soviet poet Rasul Gamzatov with a sign saying ““If tomorrow my language will be forgotten, I am ready to die today.” This brought the issue to national prominence, with many Udmurts and other ethnic minorities supporting Razin’s cause, and Kremlin advisor Valery Tishkov continuing to argue for Russian language superiority. The law has also brought up broader issues of ethnic identity, the importance of autonomous republics, and how language interacts with the local and national politics affected by this law. For example, a lawsuit filed in Tatarstan regarding the claimants unwillingness to learn Tatar, instead preferring Russian on identity-based terms, was rejected. However, in an interview with TRT World, a seventeen-year old from Dagestan argued that “This law is a threat to this linguistic diversity” and that the law “put limits on our education and deprive[s] us of studying our own language.” This shows a divide inside the ethnic autonomous republics, between those who prefer to learn and study the language of their ethnic group, and those who are willing to assimilate into the broader Russian identity. The Council of Europe noted that “The greater emphasis on the Russian language and the uniform approach to educational reform have weakened the position of minority languages ​​in the education system” and advocated for education that is bilingual/multilingual, and greater involvement of minorities in affairs related to their cultures and cultural autonomies. 

In Latvia, recent legislation doubled the amount of Latvian-taught classes in minority Russian schools to 80 percent of classes. Latvia has a sizeable Russian minority population, and Russia has made efforts to re-engage them with the Russian state and further emphasize Russian identity within the population. Russia’s OSCE envoy, Alexander Lukashevich called plans to increase Latvian language usage in classrooms a“discriminatory policy with the goal of forced assimilation of the Russian-speaking population.” Furthermore,previous legislation reducing Russian language education has set the stage for a potential domestic divide in Latvia’s “two-community society.”

Russian minority political parties, in Latvia,  have framed this as a human rights issue, similar to the arguments of the ethnic minorities facing linguistic repression inside Russia.For example, European Parliament MP Tatjana Zdanoka called on the European Commission to further protect linguistic minorities, using the Lisbon Treaty to argue that countries “who act[s] against the rights of persons belonging to minorities (including linguistic rights) act[s] against the core values of the European Union.” In 2018, three different UN Special Rapporteurs expressed concern on the pushes to “Latvianize” the Latvian education system. They referred to Articles 19 and 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, along with other international human rights documents, to express their concern over possible legal and human rights violations targeting the Russian minority population. The Latvian government has justified their actions by focusing on broader issues of national identity and societal harmony. The most recent Education Law was brought up to the Latvian Constitutional Court, where the Court stated that “every person living in Latvia should be able to understand the Latvian language to participate fully in the life of a democratic society” and that “the state must support the preservation and development of the individuality of ethnic minorities within the framework of a unified education system, promoting the development of the identity of a common democratic society.”

Additionally, school autonomy is a right that schools inside the Russian republics have enjoyed for years, but has been threatened in recent years. Latvian schools for Russian minority students have also seen this threatened through educational policies over the last 15 years. Beginning in 1992, the Latvian government has ordered Latvian to be the primary language in all levels of education. This has varied over time, with new laws ranging from Latvian-only education in public education, to loosened guidelines after protests in 2004 which led to minority high schools teaching up to 40 percent of their curriculum in a minority language. One primary argument that proponents of minority language education use is that the education system’s Latvianization would “cause irreparable damage to national minority schools” due to rising inequality as a result of less allocated resources. Russkiy Mir, a Kremlin-backed organization promoting the Russian language, paralleled their situation in Latvia to the ongoing situation in Ukraine, arguing that it is a violation of human rights and “very disturbing that in the Baltic republic, Russophobia is becoming more and more intense, and the authorities act according to the same scenario as Kiev, where the ruling regime purposefully destroys everything Russian.”

The Latvian government, however, has justified their actions by focusing on the need for a stronger national identity in order to prevent internal strife between the two main ethnic communities as fears of Russian influence become more prevalent. International observers have continued to voice concern, and have generally gone against the stance of the Latvian government and its justification for the increasingly restrictive policies. In Freedom House’s 2019 Freedom of the World Report, Latvia’s score on academic freedom went down one point, with the organization noting the reason for the demotion being the most recent education policy changes, saying that “the measures [are] generally viewed as targeting Russian-language instruction”. Allowing these linguistic divisions and restrictions to continue inside Russia, while simultaneously criticizing similar practices by neighboring countries and former Soviet states, is hypocritical on the part of the Russian government. While calling on European human rights bodies to show concern on Latvian policies is valid, ignoring their own policies of linguistic repression makes their argument much more questionable.

The various laws outlined above show a clear desire by Russia to use the Russian language as a first step towards establishing influence inside the country’s various semi-autonomous republics that have, since the beginning of the Soviet Union, preserved their ethnic identity and culture through their separation from the larger Russian state. Latvia, on the other hand, seeks to affirm official national identity based upon the language of the ethnic majority in the state, at the expense of their Russian minority. The criticism of policies and practices that limit the freedom for linguistic minorities to use their mother tongue should not be selective. The protection of their language in day-to-day usage, education and official recognition is a right enshrined by the United Nations, and cannot be twisted for nationalist pursuits. Russia has echoed concerns of human rights observers to restrictive language policies against Russian minorities in Latvia and Ukraine, but has echoed the same rhetoric of maintaining a single, unified national identity across a linguistically diverse population. Doing so has put minority languages under threat, and must be seen as a threat to personal rights of minority populations. As both Russia and Latvia continue their push towards identity formation through nationwide language policies in education and the public sphere, we must continue to frame and shame any policies that threaten one's ability to communicate and learn their native language, and promote ways to balance cultural and linguistic diversity in all areas of society. 

Russia’s New Role as Mediator in the MENA Region

President Donald Trump made the abrupt and heavily criticized decision to pull American military personnel out of the Turkey-Rojava border in early October 2019, allowing Turkey to invade the Kurdish-controlled land and for Russian troops to quickly occupy the space that had previously been occupied by United States (U.S.) troops. Since then, the international community has been speculating about Russia’s new role as a mediator in the Middle East, as their rocky past of national-interest-driven policy in the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region has led some to call for an examination of Russia’s priorities in the MENA region. If  Russia’s future endeavors prove successful, Russia has the potential to replace the United States as the most influential non-regional power in the Middle East.

As the successor state to the Soviet Union, Russia inherited all of the experience and influence that the Soviets had earned when politicking in the Middle East. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States were constantly participating in proxy wars. Many of these proxy wars took the shape of civil wars and political coups in the Middle East and Africa, including the Congo Crisis and the Angolan Civil War. However, Middle Eastern and African allies of the Soviet Union were often “disappointed” with the quality of their support: weaponry and training provided by the USSR was less advanced than those provided by the U.S., and the Soviet Union failed to prevent the defeat of their allies. As a result, the general opinion of the Soviet Union--and later, the Russian Federation--gradually declined among Arabs and many states instead turned to the U.S. for monetary and military assistance. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s influence and involvement in the region has diminished as the state’s leaders focused on domestic growth and reform. The United States assumed the helm of the most influential non-regional power in the MENA region and has managed to protect this title without serious competitors until President Trump withdrew American troops from the contested area in northern Syria in October 2019.

Now, the tables have turned. Russian involvement in Middle Eastern politics was renewed in the early 2000’s, shortly after Russian President Vladimir Putin took office. Attempts to regain influence in the MENA region were generally unsuccessful, as before 2011 the only significant mode of influence that Russia pursued were arms sales. Middle Eastern politics were not a priority of Russia until the Arab Spring of 2011, when the protests and revolutions that occurred during this tumultuous time had the potential to destroy any remaining allies that Russia had been able to retain in the Middle East. As their allies in the region began toppling one by one, Russia began to support Syria in earnest through their diplomatic powers in the United Nations. When faced with the possibility of being deposed, the Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, began using violence against Syrian protesters and revolutionaries. Kurdish forces in northeastern Syria fought forcefully for their lands, resulting in Assad withdrawing troops from the region (now called Rojava), leaving nearly ¼ of Syria’s territory to the People’s Protection Units (YPG), a mostly-Kurdish militia. Thus, Russia’s eventual military intervention on behalf of Assad in September 2015, ordered under the guise of fighting terrorism in Syria, was welcomed by the Syrian president, and the deployed Russian forces were ordered to put down the rebels that were threatening Assad’s grasp on the rest of the country. It was this military intervention that cemented Russia’s role as a major player in Middle Eastern politics.

Russia’s decision to support Assad was not simply an attempt to retain allies in the Middle East; it was also a political power play of Putin to indicate Russia’s dedication to sovereignty and centralized government, which simultaneously affirmed Russia’s disapproval of Western leadership structures and military interventions. During the Arab Spring, protests in defiance of Putin and the illiberal policies of the Russian government were occurring throughout the Russian capital of Moscow. Instead of supporting the newly created liberal democracies like Western states (particularly the U.S.), Russia made a point to support the centralized, autocratic governance of Bashar al-Assad and, in doing so, was defending Russia’s own domestic interests. Allowing liberal democratic reform to completely destroy any relationships that Russia had in the Middle East would not only lessen the power and influence that the Kremlin had in the region, but would also diminish Putin’s own legitimacy as a strongman president.

Since the intervention in 2015, Russia has helped Assad regain control of nearly every major Syrian city outside of Rojava, launched peace talks, negotiated a demilitarized zone with Turkey, and maintained a significant military presence within Syria. Russia’s intervention is widely accepted by foreign policy experts as the only thing that ensured the continuation of Assad’s presidency, and the creation of de-escalation zones has helped Assad recapture large areas of land within Syria. Both Assad and Putin have also been heavily criticized by the international community for their use of drones and chemical weapons throughout the duration of the conflict. Russian drone strikes are estimated to have killed around 7,000 Syrian civilians alone, and more than 150 cases of chemical warfare have been reported within Syria since 2015. Although the international community has attempted many times to hold Bashar al-Assad responsible for these war crimes, Russia has proven itself to be both a difficult obstacle for the West and a steadfast ally of Syria. Turkey has been particularly vocal in their condemnation of Erdogan’s and Putin’s actions, as more than 3.6 million refugees of the Syrian Civil War have already fled to Turkey.

Turkey protested heavily when Assad allowed the lands in northern Syria to be occupied by the YPG, as the Turkish government believes the YPG to be associated with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a recognized terrorist organization that has been leading an insurgency in Turkey for many years. When the U.S. troops withdrew, Turkey’s military was able to stage an incursion into the Kurdish-controlled lands of northern Syria, displacing thousands of Kurdish people. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has stated that he plans to resettle Syrian refugees in the northern Syrian lands occupied by Turkish soldiers. Outraged and at risk, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Syria’s Kurdish militia alliance with whom the U.S. had partnered with in an effort to fight the Daesh in Rojava, were forced to make a deal with Assad that allowed his army to advance to the border of Turkish-claimed territory. Thus, the U.S. withdrawal has incited anger and conflict in a region where they had once hoped to prevent further violence.

Acting as a mediator, Russian forces directed the SDF and the Syrian army to the land which had been besieged by Turkey for the past month. On October 22nd, Russian President Putin and Turkish President Erdogan met in Sochi to negotiate a ceasefire. They reached an agreement which created a 75-square mile “safe-zone” along the Turkish-Syrian border, away from which the YPG militia was forced to fall back. Since then, a joint force of Russian and Turkish military has been patrolling the new safe-zone and nearby borderlands to ensure the YPG doesn’t return, and the U.S. has promised to assist in keeping the Kurdish out of the area. As of the time at which this article was written, clashes within the safe zone continue.

Although the Turkish incursion into Kurdish territory has upset many in the West and caused many deaths, Turkey, Russia and Syria have all benefited from the strife. Turkey received a new swath of land in which they can resettle refugees, Syria has further cemented their alliance with Russia, and Russia has gained a new role in this important region. The incursion also occurred during a time in which Russia was already seeing an increase in approval in the Middle East, which can be largely attributed to their “Astana process” dialogue between nations in the region and their well-trained diplomats. Now, having filled the space that the U.S. has abandoned as a mediator, Russia may be able to exert more influence than ever before.

In contrast, the U.S. is showing a decline in popularity within the region due to various foreign policy errors and military failures. President Donald Trump’s ban on migrants from several Muslim countries outraged the Arab community, and the U.S.’s failures in Afghanistan and Iraq have led some to doubt the American military’s ability to succeed in Middle Eastern conflicts. American approval in the region plummeted from 63 percent in 2016 to 41 percent in September 2019, before the U.S. troops were even removed from Northern Syria. This recent misstep, preceded by several years worth of unsuccessful operations and uncertain foreign policy have granted Russia many opportunities to improve their standing in the MENA region--all of which they have used to their advantage.

Since the Cold War, Russia’s foreign policy in the Middle East has been defined by competition with the West. Now that the U.S.’s influence has diminished and their reputation in the Middle East damaged, Russia is taking on the role of mediator between Syria, Turkey, and the Kurds. So far, Russia has taken to this role rather well by using the mistakes that the U.S. has made to their favor and putting the national interests of Russia ahead of the interests of the region.

Most of the actions that Russia has already taken thus far in the MENA region have been entirely self-serving in nature, and either directly or indirectly serve to improve Putin’s grasp of leadership on the world stage. The jihadist threat that created conflict in Chechnya and Dagestan has contributed to Russian foreign policy in the Middle East, as part of their national defense strategy is to prevent terrorism within Russia by fighting jihadist and Islamic terrorist groups while they remain outside of Russia. Additionally, having allies within the Middle East will give Russia access to negotiations regarding oil; as a major oil exporter, Russia would gain from the ability to negotiate international oil prices with other oil rich countries throughout the Middle East.  

By courting Turkey and Syria simultaneously, Russia accomplishes two goals--maintaining influence and power within the MENA region, and pulling Turkey away from its NATO allies. And they’re succeeding--Turkey’s western allies have been withdrawing arms deals, expressing outrage, and threatened sanctions for their recent treatment of the Kurds, engagement in Russian arms deals, and Erdogan’s newfound friendship with Vladimir Putin. Despite the complicated relationship that Turkey and Russia have had in the past, both Erdogan and Putin are more than likely to agree to a new, more friendly relationship if it proves beneficial for both leaders in the long run. Currently, Russia provides Turkey with more than half of its natural gas and almost a quarter of its oil. Additionally, a flourishing trading agreement and the status of Turkey as a popular tourist destination for Russians give Russia and Turkey a very positive economic relationship. This relationship couldn’t come at a better time for the two countries, who are both languishing under Western sanctions. All of these factors are only certain to push Turkey further into the grasp of the Kremlin, as they will be more than happy to continue providing Turkey with arms while simultaneously pulling them away from NATO.

Russian influence and presence in the MENA region is self-serving and interest-driven; however, the presence of the Russian military in Syria and the negotiations and peace talks occurring under the Russian flag have caused some to wonder whether or not a new influence is needed in the Middle East. Others argue that if the non-Western solution means selling out the Kurds, the solutions aren’t worth ponderance. Many opportunities to mediate the conflict have arisen from failures on behalf of the West, and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s skillful navigation of the relationship between Syria and Turkey has astounded policy makers throughout the international community. As Russia continues to engage in peace talks and negotiations, the world watches with bated breath. If Vladimir Putin truly wishes to restore Russia’s status as a major player within the Middle East, he’ll have to continue successfully mediating a conflict that seems to have no easy solution. 

The Dangers of Mirrored Thinking: CAATSA Sanctions

Since the 1990s, the United States (U.S.) has employed various sanction regimes at an increasing rate in order to accomplish its foreign policy objectives. After Turkey’s October incursion into Northern Syria, U.S. policymakers immediately started pushing for the introduction of new sanctions against Turkey. Included in the Turkey sanction bill that passed the House of Representatives on October 29, 2019 was a provision to impose a previously defined set of sanctions called Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). However, the specific CAATSA sanctions provisions that Turkey would be subject to are extremely ineffective in accomplishing U.S. foreign policy goals and could actually increase the influence of Russia. The root of the ineffectiveness of CAATSA sanctions is “mirrored thinking,” as U.S. policymakers automatically assume that other states “think” like the U.S. The case of CAATSA sanctions serves as a warning to policymakers to avoid the analytical trap of mirrored thinking in future policy decisions. 

CAATSA Overview

In 2017, Congress passed CAATSA with sanctions targeting North Korea, Iran, and Russia. For each country, CAATSA lays out a separate justification for sanctions and the specifics of the sanctions differ for each country. Thus, CAATSA is effectively three sanction regimes folded into one. However, despite the fact that the targets of CAATSA sanctions differ for Iran, North Korea, and Russia, CAATSA universally implements secondary sanctions on targeted entities.

Per country, CAATSA created a list of persons and entities that are directly targeted by sanctions. Secondary sanctions direct the U.S. Treasury Department to also sanction any persons or entities that partake in “significant” transactions with listed persons or entities. Secondary sanctions on Iran and North Korea are not revolutionary, however, whereas Iran and North Korea are relatively isolated from the international business community, Russia is not. European businesses have significantly more ties to Russia than they do to North Korea or Iran and thus, are more likely, whether intentionally or unintentionally, to do business with a CAATSA targeted entity. Sanctioning a European entity could lead to complications between Washington and Brussels. Thus, the imposition of secondary sanctions on Russia has the potential to weaken U.S. partnerships. 

The Russia-specific sections of the CAATSA legislation state that Congress implemented the sanctions to respond to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, cyber intrusions, and human rights violations, and codifies many existing Russia sanctions programs. In addition, CAATSA Section 231E added provisions that target the Russian Defense and Intelligence sectors. Russian arms exports account for a predominant portion of the country’s technology-intensive exports and are one of the main avenues by which Russia integrates with the global economy. Therefore,  CAATSA sanctions targeting the Russian military-industrial complex are supposed to have a chilling effect on the sales of Russian arms and defense technology. This would theoretically degrade the economic health of the Russian military-industrial base and decrease Russia’s ability to expand its sphere of influence through arms deals. However, the effectiveness of the policy is predicated on the assumption that Russia leverages arms sales to create close ties with states and that Russia is attempting to generate a profit from arms sales. This assumption stems from the U.S. usage of arms sales but does not acknowledge the fact that Russia employs arms sales differently. 

U.S. Use of Arms Deals in Foreign Policy

It is no secret that the United States is the largest arms exporter in the world. In 2018 alone the U.S. made 136 billion dollars in arms deals. According to the U.S. Department of State, “Arms sales and defense trade are key tools of [U.S.] foreign policy.” The vast majority of analysts agree that the purchase of an advanced U.S. defense system creates an extraordinarily strong incentive for the recipient country to preserve a close relationship with the U.S.  For instance, a single U.S. cooperative defense program, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), involves 46 percent of the global economy and ensures that the states purchasing the JSF will be largely dependent on maintaining stable relationships with the U.S. to competently sustain the jet over its projected 50 year lifespan. The U.S. sells arms to make other states dependent on the U.S. in order to preserve their national security. 

In addition, promoting interoperability between the U.S. military and militaries of ally states has been a long-standing goal of U.S. arms sales from administration to administration. In 2014, the Obama administration released a directive stating that one of the primary goals of U.S. arms sales was increasing interoperability capabilities. The Trump administration’s public rhetoric focuses on the benefits of arms sales to the U.S. economy. However, in the Trump administration’s April 2018 National Security Presidential Memorandum Regarding U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, the importance of promoting interoperability is still highlighted. Administrations understand that increasing interoperability results in an increase in ease by which the U.S. can project its military power. 

U.S. planners understand that the outcome of any great power confrontation will hinge on the ability to gather, analyze, and disseminate information quickly. Allies that use U.S. compatible technology enable the U.S. military to easily incorporate the allies’ military assets into the broader U.S. information network. Jonathan Caverley of the U.S. naval war college highlights that “Interoperability among networked drones from multiple countries will likely play an enormous role in future “informationalized conflicts.” Interoperability results in increased lethality, therefore cultivating interoperability through arms sales remains a priority of U.S. foreign policy. 

CAATSA-style sanctions decrease the effectiveness of arms sales to build strong bilateral relationships and to cultivate interoperability. One can imagine that significant disincentives to buy U.S. arms would arise if China were to impose CAATSA- style secondary sanctions on U.S. arms sales. If that were to occur, the primary partners of the U.S., such as the UK, France, Australia, and Germany, would surely continue to purchase U.S. arms. However, states which the U.S. is trying to court might be dissuaded from purchasing arms in the quantity required to produce a dependent relationship and create interoperability capabilities with the U.S.. Thus, CAATSA sanctions would be effective against the U.S.—but Russia’s use of arms sales in its foreign policy is fundamentally different. 

Russia’s Use of Arms Deals in Foreign Policy

Russia’s primary objective of arms sales is to support its image as a first-rate, global power, promote the creation of a multi-polar world, and keep the Russian military-industrial base employed. 

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russia is the second most prolific seller of arms in the world (the most prolific is the U.S.). This is a point of pride for Russia. In a public meeting of the Commission for Military Technology Cooperation with Foreign States, the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin stated: “The arms market is complicated. Competition in this sector is very fierce. That Russia is the world’s second biggest arms and military hardware exporter is thus all the greater an achievement. I think it is an important indicator of our country’s industrial, technological, scientific, and political capabilities…. Russia has a time-tested reputation as a top-class producer of the most sophisticated military hardware.” Furthermore, Russian equipment is less expensive than U.S. arms and that is also a point of pride for Russia. For instance, in February of 2019, the Defense Minister of Russia, Sergey Shogiu, bragged that “Our foreign colleagues realize that our weapons are hundreds of times cheaper than the systems deployed to be used against us. And that does not apply only to the US missile defense system.” Russia’s arms sales enhance Russia’s prestige abroad and, arguably, more importantly, helps cements the perception of Russian power in the collective consciousness of the Russian citizenry.

Furthermore, Russia does not necessarily make money from its arms exports. It has been widely documented that Russia will provide loans to states who are cash strapped but looking to buy Russian weapons. A high-profile example of this policy is Turkey’s purchase of Russia’s advanced anti-air missile system—the S-400. This acquisition has an estimated value of 2.5 billion dollars, and 55 percent of this purchase is being financed via a Russian loan.  Additionally, in 2018, Russia issued a 200 million dollar loan to Armenia to finance the purchase of anti-aircraft and radar systems and, in 2013, Bangladesh was issued an 800 million dollar Russian loan in order to purchase Russian training jets. The chance of Russia actually seeing profits from these sales are relatively low. However, this is the trend for the entire military-industrial complex in Russia—Russian production of weapons is not profitable and thus requires state-funded subsidies. The export of arms that are financed by Russian loans is just another way to subsidize Russia’s military-industrial complex. These foreign arms sales keep the Russian military-industrial complex, which employs over two million Russians, operating. Keeping production lines running guarantees that Russia will have a domestic source of arms. Moreover, the two million Russians that are employed in the military-industrial complex and the oligarch owners of these firms provide stable political support to Putin’s government. 

Moreover, Russia’s sales of arms are opportunistic and do not represent any concerted effort to form tight alliances with the states who purchase Russian arms. In 2018,  there was significant media coverage of China’s participation in Russia’s Vostok-18 military exercises. Combined with China’s purchase of S-400’s, many analysts suggested that there was a deepening strategic partnership between China and Russia. Despite appearances, in Vostok-18 Chinese forces only represented one percent of the troops involved. Despite the fact that Chinese and Russian officials might state that arms sales and joint exercises symbolize a growing strategic relationship, actions speak larger than words and so far, Russian-Chinese cooperation has been quite superficial. But, the appearance of Russia creating interoperable capability with any state gives the appearance that Russia is forming an alternative to the western-dominated international system. This promotion of a multi-polar world is referenced many times in Russian foreign policy. Arms sales contribute to the appearance that Russia is creating this alternative system regardless of the actual imperial effects.

How Russia Can Leverage CAATSA Sanctions

As demonstrated, Russia’s geopolitical use of arms sales differs significantly from how the U.S. employs arms sales. Due to these differences, Russia is actually able to leverage CAATSA sanctions to advance its foreign policy objectives—chiefly, the promotion of a more multipolar world. 

Although, as discussed, Russia does not always seek to build close partnerships with other states, it is always looking to undermine other countries’ partnerships. A world where the overall cooperation between states is lower than it is today is inherently more multipolar—an objective of Russian foreign policy. When the U.S. sanctions, or even threatens to sanction another state, the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and the state being targeted is strained—and thus, a step is taken closer towards the realization of Russia’s objectives.

The case of Turkey’s acquisition of Russian arms highlights this “partnership degrading” characteristic of sanctions. Turkey's purchase of Russian made S-400s has resulted in a significant straining of the U.S.- Turkish relationship since Turkey announced the acquisition in December of 2017. Turkey is a NATO ally and the prospect of the United States unilaterally sanctioning Turkey was met with profound dismay by many foreign policy experts. As a result of Turkey’s acquisition of Russian arms, the U.S.  kicked Turkey out of the F-35 consortium (a major U.S. effort in developing closer strategic partnerships with other states) and there has been the talk of even reevaluating Turkey’s membership in NATO.  It is important to note that this tension arose before Turkey’s incursion into Northern Syria- which has even further degraded the U.S.- Turkey relationship. 

Russia was counting on its sale of weapons to undermine the Turkish-U.S. relationship. Russia was therefore willing to make concessions during this arms deal to help achieve this goal. Included in Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400’s were significant technology transfer provisions. These provisions will enable Turkey to maintain the S-400’s independently from Russia. Moreover, this technology transfer, in the future, will enable Turkey to domestically produce an analogous missile system. Thus, the technology transfer provisions negate the “dependency” building characteristics of arms sales which is critical to the way that the U.S. uses arms sales. Furthermore, as noted previously, Russia provided a loan to Turkey to finance 55 percent of the S-400 purchase (decreasing the likelihood that Russia will see a profit from the deal), and Russia also promised to expedite the delivery date of the missile system. The sale of S-400’s does not create a basis for a long-lasting partnership between Russia and Turkey and is not profitable for Russia. However, the sale of S-400’s raised the profile of the Russian arms industry which contributes to the image of Russia as a great power (this effect of arms sales happens regardless of CAATSA sanctions), and in large part because of the threat of CAATSA sanction, there was a significant chilling in the U.S.- Turkish relationship. 

The Perils of Mirrored Thinking

The case of CAATSA sanctions demonstrates how foreign policy can stumble when policymakers transpose their own policy-making paradigms onto the leaderships of other states. Sanctions can be a valuable tool for policymakers; however, not all sanctions regimes are created equal. To craft an effective sanctions policy or any policy in general, policymakers must have a clear understanding of the policy’s goals and how the state that is being sanctioned will react. U.S. policymakers wanted to push back on what they perceived to be Russia’s expanding influence. Because the U.S. gains such a great deal of influence in its own export of military equipment, U.S. policymakers projected that limiting Russia’s ability to sell arms would be an effective way to counter Russia. However, as demonstrated, Russia applies arms sales in its foreign policy very differently than the U.S.. Thus, CAATSA sanctions on Russia’s military-industrial base do not degrade Russia’s ability to project power, but if anything, enhances it. 

Hackers for Hire: Russian Hacktivism on the World Stage

After the 2016 U.S. presidential elections, every American became more aware of the importance of cybersecurity. More notably, they became aware that foreign actors were interfering in American politics. The country became more divided with every mention of Russia, and the effects of the Russian hack can still be felt in the polarized political environment to this day. What most Americans didn’t know was that a few months later, British cybersecurity authorities voiced their concerns that Russian bots and fake social media accounts had influenced the outcome of the Brexit referendum. After some examination, the link between the two situations became clear: both were information warfare operations conducted by Russian hacktivists.

“Hacktivist,” a term first used in 1989 by the hacker “Omega," defines an individual who conducts cyberattacks against private computer networks to further a political goal. They are generally unaffiliated with government entities and often use their skills to defy the actions of the state. Hackers first emerged in the late 1980s  to seek profit from their operations. Modern hackers are decidedly different, having arisen not from the desire for money, but the desire for change. They are activists that can have immense impacts upon a state or community. Hacktivists are credited with assisting the 2010 Arab Spring movement by attacking Tunisian government websites, and were an essential component to revealing the billions of dollars tied up in the “Panama Papers.” International coverage of these successful hacktivist operations has resulted in a noticeable rise in hacktivist activity all over the world. 

In addition to these cyber vigilantes, some hacktivist groups tend to operate in support of their state’s foreign policies. Some countries, such as Iran, North Korea, and China, have outsourced their cyber operations with limited success. Russia has also hired private actors to conduct cyber warfare against their cyber adversaries; unlike the groups in the other states mentioned, Russian hacktivists have been incredibly successful in their cyber operations, and are considered to be among the best hackers in the world. Where most hacktivist groups operate independently or receive some corollary funding from a discreet government agent, many Russian hacktivist groups are highly suspected to be associated with the security and information arm of the Russian government, the Federal Security Service (FSB).

According to Connell and Vogler in their paper “Russia’s Approach to Cyber Warfare”, Russia has specifically adjusted their cyber strategy so that independent hacktivist groups may play an incredibly large role in Russian information warfare. They are cost-effective (sometimes hackers will conduct operations free of charge, as long as the motivation or political goal aligns well with their interests), require little to no oversight (they operate independently and only require a target and desired effect), and have an incredibly high success rate. They can spread propaganda or disinformation, conduct a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack on a target website, create Trojans and malware, steal financial information, and store illegal or stolen information discreetly (learn more about these attacks here).

On numerous occasions, the Russian government has claimed that they played no part in cyber-attacks against other countries. The attribution problem, which has arisen from the tendency for cyber operations to be quick, discreet, and difficult to track, has prevented the international intelligence community from accurately finding the culprit of cyber attacks for many years. Hiring hacktivist groups to conduct operations for the FSB allows the Kremlin to order these attacks without repercussions on the international stage. When accused of actions of cyber warfare, they often assert that “patriotic hackers” were responsible. Although the international security community highly suspects the FSB has been contracting these hacktivists to conduct operations on their behalf, definitive proof of a connection is incredibly difficult to find. Communication with hacktivist groups is conducted through various platforms on the dark web, and payment can be completed through e-payment platforms such as Bitcoin. Thus, this tactic has proven to be incredibly effective. Hacktivists played a major role in the Russian attacks against Georgia, Ukraine, and the United States. The very first operation in which cyber attacks were a complementary component to a larger kinetic conflict would not have been so successful if Russia had not hired hacktivists.

The Georgian Conflict

The Russo-Ossetian war is well-known in the security community as the first conflict in which cyber operations were used to complement a larger kinetic conflict. The conflict began after years of negotiations regarding the sovereignty of the territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, both claimed by Georgia, broke down. This resulted in the armament of separatist groups, who received funding and weapons from Russia, and Russian military movement into both regions. Throughout the conflict, armed combat was accompanied by DDoS attacks against websites vital to the communications network of the Georgian government and military. Since the international security community was unable to discern the exact origin of the DDoS attacks, the Russian government denied responsibility for the actions and instead blamed the attacks on Russian hacktivists. Additionally, the hacktivists were employed to conduct an intensive disinformation campaign within the region; fake websites and social media accounts spread propaganda and misinformation regarding the nature of Georgia’s role in the conflict. As a result, the international community--and, more importantly, the citizens of the region--had no reliable account of what was happening until the conflict had already ended. A lack of definitive proof that the Russian government was involved in these cyber attacks and a general misunderstanding of the nature of the conflict allowed Russia to avoid punishment. Having witnessed the strain that Russian cyber attacks can have upon a government in a time of crisis, many Eastern European states began improving their cybersecurity strategies. Unfortunately, Ukraine realized in 2014 just how difficult it is to withstand attacks from Russian hacktivists when the government is in political turmoil.

The Crimean Crisis

After the Russo-Ossetian war, Ukraine began building up their cybersecurity in anticipation of a Russian attack. This attack eventually came during the 2014 Crimean crisis. Seizing the opportunity created by the Euromaidan protests, Russia employed an advanced disinformation and propaganda campaign. This campaign was accompanied by low-level espionage and disruption missions that targeted Ukrainian government officials through spear-phishing and malware. The propaganda was spread via bots and hackers on social media, much like the disinformation spread during the Russo-Ossetian war. A DDoS attack was also conducted against Ukrainian government websites, which resulted in the websites crashing for several hours before Ukrainian security officials were able to reject the bots from the servers. These operations ultimately undermined the 2014 Ukrainian elections as illegitimate and the Ukrainian military was blamed for numerous false-flag operations against various pro-Russia separatist groups. An investigation into the source of the hacks revealed that the attacks originated with Russian IP addresses; however, the Russian government once more claimed that Russian hacktivists unaffiliated with the government had been responsible for the information operations. Nevertheless, the international community refused to believe these claims, declared the Russian-sponsored referendum to be illegitimate, and denounced the Russian occupation of Crimea in a United Nations General Assembly resolution. Some actors, such as the United States and the European Union, recognized the threat that the Russian information warfare posed to their security, and placed sanctions on Russia. This further dissolved the already fragile tensions between Russia and the United States, and these tensions reached their lowest point since the end of the Cold War when Russian hacktivists hacked the 2016 U.S. Presidential Elections.

The Hacking of the United States Presidential Election

During the 2016 U.S. presidential election, several U.S. political entities, most notably the Democratic National Coalition (DNC), reported that they had been hacked. Soon after private information about Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign was published on websites such as WikiLeaks and DCLeaks.com. Targeted ads and articles also began appearing on various social media platforms during the election, with many of them focusing on divisive political and social issues. The hacks and the ads were both easily traced back to Russian hacking groups with known affiliations to the Kremlin. The U.S. intelligence community determined, with high confidence, that Vladimir Putin had ordered the hacks and the divisive disinformation campaign. The discovery and attribution of the hacks resulted in immediate outrage from the U.S. population and ultimately caused further polarization along party lines.

The software and tactics used to conduct espionage on U.S. political entities were both rather simple, though thorough. The hacktivists employed by the Kremlin belonged to the group that the U.S. intelligence community refers to as “the Dukes.” The Dukes are well-known by the U.S. intelligence community; they have spent countless hours trying to remove the hacker group from public and private email servers all over the country. The hacktivists sent targeted emails containing malware to members of the DNC and other organizations. This practice is known as spear-phishing and often results in the target unknowingly installing viruses or malware to their computers. Once the malware has been installed to the computer, it can search for files, see the computer’s history, and access the internet. The hackers secured files through malware that was downloaded to the computers at the DNC, then revised and released the files in a way that would intentionally discredit the members of the Democratic National Coalition. This practice was perfected by Russia through employing it against their population; any entity that opposed the Kremlin or its policies were infiltrated, prostrated, and publicly shamed by “hacktivists.” The US political atmosphere remains tense years after the hacks were discovered, causing people to worry about how truly devastating hacktivist involvement in international politics can be.

Moving Forward: International Response and Action

The investigation and confirmation by the U.S. intelligence community of interference by the Kremlin and their hired hacktivists severely polarized the U.S. population. The government’s reaction, a ban on several Russian companies and individuals from conducting business in the United States, has been considered by many to be a “slap on the wrist.” Lack of a vehement response or clear policy direction highlights just how extensive the problem is on an international scale. Without the ability to punish hacktivist groups or the entities that employ them, the frequency and severity of cyber attacks will continue to grow globally.

The number of hacktivist groups worldwide has already increased since 2014, according to Dan Lohrmann. As a form of response to the “civilian” hacker groups used by the Kremlin to further their political goals, hacktivist groups in countries such as Ukraine and the U.S. have been created. Some, such as the Ukranian group led by a hacker known as “RUH8” (or “Roo-hate,” expressing the group’s disposition towards the Russian government), were formed with the sole purpose of counteracting Russian influence in their country’s politics after the Crimean Crisis. Others, like the Western hacktivist group “Anonymous” claim that their activities are protesting injustice and corruption where they see it occurring. 

Though the cause supported by a hacktivist group may be noble, the strength and skill with which Russian hacktivist complete cyber operations has caused governments all over the world to take action against Russia and hackers in general. The international community has striven to address the growing concern that cybercrime and hacktivism pose through diplomacy and economic sanctions; however, creating resolute legislation or treaties has proven to be extremely difficult. NATO has reported that the sanctions placed upon Russia in response to the Crimean Crisis have been largely successful and have “inflicted damage on the Russian economy,” but Russian hacktivist activity and cybercrime continue to grow. As a new form of technological warfare, cyber warfare has no international norms that may govern the actions of actors. A lack of clear definitions, acceptable actions, and understood repercussions allow actors to continue using cyber warfare without punishment.

Experts have begun to fear that Russian hacktivism will extend beyond the borders of Russian foreign policy and cybercrime to become its own black market business. The U.S. security firm Taia Global has assessed that the 2014 hack of Sony Pictures by North Korea may have been conducted by paid Russian hacktivists. Documents leaked from the studio were traced to a Russian hacktivist with suspected ties to the FSB. This presents a harrowing possibility: states may, given the opportunity, hire Russian hacktivists to conduct cyber espionage missions on their behalf. Any situation in which states hire foreign nationals to conduct illegal activity in cyberspace would further complicate the attribution problem and make it much more difficult to stifle cybercrime across the globe.

If the international community truly wishes to combat cyber criminals and hacktivists on a global scale, then international laws, norms, and treaties must be set in place to govern the actions of cyber states. Although many experts such as Brian Mazanec assess that norms would be incredibly beneficial for all states suffering from hacktivist and cyber attacks, they also realize that the creation of these norms is highly unlikely under normal circumstances. Many of the worlds largest powers have no interest in creating constraining norms for cyber warfare, as the absence of these norms allows them to attack one another freely; however, the rise of state-sponsored hacktivism has brought the lawless free-for-all within cyberspace to a new turning point. Before hacktivists were deeply involved in international relations, the political and social climates of states were largely unaffected by its cybersecurity policies. After the 2016 election and the polarization of the United States population, a state’s cybersecurity policies became a priority for ordinary citizens in different countries all over the globe. The control over cyberspace that states once had is now threatened by hacktivism, and it is time to consider creating laws and norms that would constrain cyber activity for all actors. Although they may prevent the world’s largest cyber powers from using cyberspace to attack one another, it could also disrupt the startling trend of political polarity in democratic states by punishing the actors using bots and hacktivists to further their political goals. 

Hacktivism has arisen from the continued proliferation of cyber weapons internationally. Although the 2008 Russo-Ossetian War, the 2014 Crimean Crisis, and the interference in the 2016 U.S. elections were all examples of successful Russian hacktivist operations, they certainly are not the only ones. Great Britain continues to grapple with the effects that Russian hacktivists had upon their political climate, and leaders all over the globe worry that their next elections will be undermined by Russian influence. With no laws, norms, or treaties governing cyberspace, the world waits impatiently for another Russian hacktivist to strike. Only two questions remain: Who will be the next target, and when will Russia strike next?

No Warm Welcome: Siberian Animosity towards Chinese Economic Activity

As a nation of 1.4 billion people, it is not hard to decipher why China’s ambitions and potential influence in neighboring Siberia, an area home to a shrinking population of about 25 million, has long been a cause of concern for Russians. This imbalance is expected to increase with time, as China’s quickly expanding economic and political clout continues to eclipse a Russia suffering from economic and demographic stagnation. Despite this, there is no end in sight to increasing ties between Beijing and Moscow, leaving many local Siberian anxieties unconsoled. For policy makers in both capitals, it should be obvious that failure to address these concerns is politically dangerous and economically unsustainable.

The most vocal resistance to Chinese ventures in Siberia manifests in the area surrounding Lake Baikal, the largest freshwater lake in the world by volume, which garnered Chinese interest due to an appetite for water across the border. This demand prompted Russia’s agriculture minister, Aleksandr Tkachev, to propose diverting some of the region’s river water to China in 2016, which has more recently taken the form of either bottling the water or developing a pipeline to pump it into the province of Xinjiang. As the lake occupies a special place in the minds of many Russian people, and serves as an important part of their national patrimony, it was no surprise that the proposals motivated around a million people to sign a petition against the plans and sparked protest against them this past month. These actions were eventually successful in deterring the project from being carried out, although there is reason to believe that backtracking on the part of the Kremlin may have damaged prospects for Chinese foreign direct investment to Russia overall. It is important to note that a great deal of recent Sino-Russian economic cooperation is due to Western sanctions placed on Russia since 2014, after which the nation turned eastwards to mitigate its losses. Failure to elicit confidence in the face of its smaller pool of international investors, and the Chinese in particular, will certainly pose issues for the nation’s economy.

With this in mind, it comes as no surprise that this is just one of a multitude of Chinese-involved economic projects in the region. It is also not the only one that has drawn local tension, as anxiety over Chinese forestry projects and real estate consumption have also become quite pronounced. Due to the close proximity and vastness of Siberia’s forests, Russia is China’s premium supplier of timber, and the Chinese forestry business’ presence in the area has only grown over time. In an effort to mitigate Russian tariffs put in place in 2007, much of the industry decided to migrate to Russia itself and establish sawmills there. In 2008 there were 152 Chinese forestry companies located across Russia, but by 2018 this number jumped to 564. While this has lead to the conception that China is destroying the Siberian environment in a manner similar to what they have done domestically, the fact that significant numbers of Chinese migrant workers have also accompanied the industry’s trek, and only Chinese equipment is used in the work, has not helped with local perceptions.

There has also been serious resentment towards wealthier Chinese purchasing property on the banks of Lake Baikal, and some constructing hotels and resorts there. This has similarly lead to petitions for government action against what locals have called an “invasion” or a Chinese “yoke” (a reference to medieval Mongolian invasions), specifically with the intent to ban the sale of real estate to Chinese citizens in certain parts of the region. This frustration comes, in part, due to the fact that the constructions are often illegal, and that the Chinese often act with seeming impunity.

Frustration towards these kinds of practices are something that can lead to backlash, negating potential benefits for both Beijing, Moscow, and Siberian residents. That being said, it would be wise of China to actually deal with these concerns. This means employing more local workers rather than relying on Chinese labor, as well as bolstering the local economy in general by using Russian equipment and facilities. Strict adherence to local laws, especially environmental regulations, is vital, especially in culturally important landmarks such as Lake Baikal. This also includes replanting trees in accordance with logging agreements, and ceasing to log in protected forests. Although perhaps good for domestic advertisement, local Siberian anxieties would be largely calmed if Chinese tourist agencies refrained from exhibiting Lake Baikal as a former Chinese territory, and if they made a greater commitment to reducing pollution and utilizing Russian-owned resorts and services.

The Russian government must also take serious steps to alleviate these grievances, as many across Siberia blame the Kremlin and business-oriented oligarchs for being permissive of China’s actions. While Russia’s current geopolitical difficulties have limited its bargaining power, it should remain keenly aware of its own interests and sovereignty. Moscow should never hesitate to enforce its own laws when it comes to illegal logging and construction, as public backlash has also shown that a failure to do so can damage long-term economic potential. This comes as failure to address fears over immigration recently prompted the entire Siberian Sakha Republic to ban migrants from 33 fields of work. Considering the ethnic animosity that has already begun to simmer towards the Chinese due to temporary migrant workers, it is not unreasonable to consider that similar decisions could be made elsewhere in the region if this continues.

Russia’s east has always been in need of economic development, and in many ways the rise of China could prove a blessing for the people who inhabit Siberia. However, one-sided resource extraction and disregard for cultural concerns is certainly not a viable way to undertake this task. If this continues, trust in the Russian government will continue to plummet, regionalism will likely experience an ascension, and long-term prospects to use China as an economic substitute for the West in the face of sanctions will suffer. A positive path forward can be determined by choices made in Moscow and Beijing, but it would be wise to remember that the people of Siberia do have a say in the region’s future.

Rubles and Reindeer

The opinions expressed herein are the writer’s and do not reflect those of their employer.

I. Introduction

Last year marked the 100th anniversary of the Russian Revolution, which makes it an appropriate moment to discuss the plight of one of Russia’s largest indigenous populations who were victims of a modernizing and oil hungry Soviet Russia: the Khanty. According to a profile by the Guild of Inter-Ethnic Journalists, the Khanty currently have a population consisting of about 30,000 people, most of whom live in the region named for them, the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug (KhMAO). The Khanty are traditional, nomadic, reindeer-herding peoples that have long lived in western Siberia. As stated in a Russian state news profile, from 1930-1940 the autonomous okrug (or region) was “legitimized” by the Russian government, which intended to bring the Khanty into an official and governed status within the Soviet Union.

Today, the Khanty are one of the few remaining indigenous groups with their own autonomous region. Unfortunately for the Khanty, their historic region and home for centuries just so happens to sit on top of one of Russia’s three largest oil basins. In fact, 75 percent of Russia’s oil production comes from the region and the Western Siberia Oil Basin that lies under the KhMAO accounts for 67 percent of Russia’s oil reserves according to the International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy. The location of this particular oil basin puts the reindeer-herding Khanty in a precarious position and they are losing the fight for their traditional rights. They will continue to lose these rights as they confront a much stronger Russian government and Russian oil industry and there is not sign to this slowing down. The resulting environmental degradation that occurs all the while is a source of argument as well with the abuse of land and resources that could set the stage for worsening conflict. A Russian government that would support the ecology of the Khanty lands, assist representation and/or protect the local language would be the solution to this grievance; will the government actually do it is the true question.

II. The natives, oil and environmental degradation

The Khanty historically lived largely untouched alongside the Russian Empire in a fur-trading region with timber to trade, according to the region’s official website. Once oil was discovered in the 1930s and aggressively tapped in the 1960s, the once undamaged, scenic landscape yielded 70 billion barrels of oil over the following 40 years, as Paul Starobin wrote in National Geographic magazine in 2008.

A March 2017 Guardian article on the Khanty by Alec Luhn documented a specific grievance in the Khanty community that encompasses many of the problems they face (such detailed cases do not usually exist). A sub-region of the KhMAO, known as Surgut, is home to the oil and gas giant Surgutneftegaz, which was created as a combination of a few different state oil companies from the Soviet era. While this massive oil company continually drills into the Siberian land, a Khanty population of 4,000 in Surgut continues to hunt, fish, and herd reindeer as they have for centuries. With Russia’s economy in a slump, drilling increased in an effort to energize the economy with oil exports. As a result, the Kremlin knocked down Surgut’s protected status in 2013.

To compensate the Khanty for their land, Surgutneftegaz planned to pay individuals approximately 170,000 rubles (~$2,500) for the rights to their land. However, the contract that the companies have the natives sign is in Russian – a language in which many Khanty are illiterate. Lukoil, one of the largest oil companies in the world, offered 5 million rubles (~$84,700) to one family for a large parcel of land in another part of the KhMAO as reported by Georgy Borodyansky’s Open Democracy article from 2014.

Some land is worth more than others, but the variation in payouts illustrates that these companies have the ability and the will to pay off the population at any amount. Neither sum of money is enough to sustain the large family units the Khanty live in, especially when in some cases the population in question does not live close to another village, so they are unable to easily access food supplies and other goods. In fact, as Andrew Wiget and Olga Balalaeva wrote for Cultural Survival, a group that is known for research into indigenous populations, the food that the Khanty can gather from their limited river and forest land, they are legally unable to sell due to Russian government restrictions. These paltry payouts will not support them, nor are they able to support themselves. Though to the Khanty, money is not their utmost concern – the interruption of a lifestyle that they have maintained for centuries is.

A key issue regarding this situation is the local’s lack of voice in their local government. Lukoil was formed from Soviet state-owned western Siberian oil companies and Sugutneftegaz is another former state-owned oil conglomerate, which provides them strong government ties and influence. With the many sanctions hitting the Russian oil and gas industry, limiting technology to Russian domestic technologies, an oil company succeeding helps the economy keeps the country afloat. The head of Surgutneftegaz, Vladimir Bogdanov, is one of Russia’s wealthiest men. He is a member of the Khanty-Mansi okrug local government, and uses only Russian technologies and contractors. In fact, he employs a third of the city of Surgut’s 300,000 citizens as documented by Voice of America’s Russian service.

The aforementioned rollbacks on environmental protections are a result of Bogdanov’s clout. His domestic enterprise actually benefits from foreign sanctions and also from the powerless ethnic minority that is unable to push back due to oil’s economic importance. In fact, it is not only Bogdanov that represents the interest of oil in the local KhMAO government. A publication from Cultural Survival, noted in 1996 that not a single Khanty member was in the local representative council. The article goes on to describe how those who move into the KhMAO do so looking for oil work without any attachment or care for the community as a whole or the environmental situation at hand. Without a local voice, the risk of the land slipping further into ruin is more likely.

The degradation of environmental resources and general disregard for the Khanty’s lifestyle is the largest source of grievance between the Khanty and their Russian counterparts. The KhMAO suffered a great amount of damage due to the high oil yield the land has experienced. The landscape in 90 percent of the oil-producing areas has been damaged or destroyed, according to a Georgy Borodyansky’s 2014 Open Democracy article. In addition, there are constant forest fires that threaten the locals’ way of life and the lives of the reindeer they rely upon. Oil drilling fires and overall degradation have led to around 54 million acres of reindeer pasture being decimated according to an Ed Ayres piece in the World Watch journal.

The continuing uncertainty in environmental conditions led some of the Khanty victims to speak at the United Nations Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 21) summit in 2015 to air their grievances to a larger audience. The locals’ calls to the Russian government for an alleviation of drilling activities only results in the government willing to make monuments or national parks out of little corners of affected lands and, of course, allow the oil companies to pay off the locals. Unfortunately, as Wiget and Balalaeva’s article notes, this solution is hardly helpful because oil drilling already blocks access to traditional religious sites that may not have appeared on maps when drilling sites were set up. The oil companies and the indigenous population have no common interests and the former are absolutely powerless vs the latter who have local and national government’s ear.

III: Potential for violence and mitigating the conflict

The conflict’s potential for violence appears quite low. Research on this issue has only revealed a small number of violent incidents, including a 1930s revolution against collectivization and a story recounting a Khanty man shooting an oil company employee’s dog for biting his reindeer in Luhn’s Guardian article. Since, Khanty are a religious, hunting and gathering group that are in an extremely disadvantageous position against the Russian oil companies and they have no reason for violence. If they even consider fighting back or staging another rebellion, the Russian military, which has been known to use violence in suppressing violent conflict (i.e. the wars in Chechnya and Dagestan), would swiftly crush any opposition and likely elect another regional leader into power that would gracefully change laws and allow for more drilling. The more likely battle is a cultural one in which Khanty could lose their language and perhaps become extinct as an ethnic group.

The Khanty language is not widely spoken and Russia’s dependence and promotion of Russian, Khanty as well as other indigenous languages are in danger. Many Uralic languages have already gone extinct (including some Khanty dialects) and very few people today speak Khanty, according to an article on the website Languages in Danger. With fewer children speaking the language, its potential for survival is extremely low. With language, a key identifier of an ethnic group’s existence, its extinction would be a blow to the Khanty’s survival. The Russian government’s efforts to save the Khanty language are just as paltry as the oil companies’ payouts. The possibility of Khanty people eventually taking their payouts, giving up their land and moving to cities to start a new life or joining an oil company to stay close to home are the greatest threat to the culture’s survival. And this is the grimmest part of the conflict between the Khanty, the Russian state and the oil industry. The way to transform the conflict is a proactive resolution and assistance in preserving the Khanty culture, as well as to open up more opportunities for the Khanty population itself. Currently there is no violence in the region but that is simply a sign of Russian government intimidation.

Wiget and Balalaeva previously noted that not a single member of the Khanty community was on the local government in 1996. With statistics hard to come by, it is likely that this situation has not improved. For the conflict to mitigate, the Khanty will need to have more representation in their local government.  The federally-appointed current governor of the KhMAO is a woman by the name of Natalia V. Komarova from Western Russia with a background in construction and economics. This illustrates how people not from the KhMAO region are deciding on what happens to it. Ms. Komarova made a statement through UNESCO’s Russia branch that focused on promoting sustainable development and water protections in the region, but made no mention of drilling or its ramifications. Russia’s UNESCO branch also hosted conferences with the local universities, which provides a good start to promoting sustainability, but did not produce results. Having Khanty members on local councils and in State Duma seats is important, as it would check Ms. Komarova’s power in regard to processes that endanger the local ecology. She has also served on the Duma’s committee on natural resources, which influences her decision making on what is best for the Russian economy; especially given her economic educational background. While the Russian government has allowed UNESCO to establish climate change groups at the local university, but Moscow is too top heavy for this to have any effect in the short term where short term change is necessary.

IV: Specific recommendations

The problem with offering recommendations for a solution between the Khanty and the Russian government-backed oil industry is that the damage is mostly done. The derricks have been raised, the land destroyed, water resources contaminated and reindeer population reduced. Furthermore, recommendations only offer an opportunity to control or mitigate the damage rather than solve the grievance. It is important to understand what will not work before designing recommendations that could help. When dealing with the Russian Federation, for instance, sweeping recommendations that limit or hurt the oil industry will likely receive swift vetoes, as the country depends upon the extraction of natural resources. Also, intergovernmental organization decrees (like the United Nations Human Rights Council) would be taken as an insult and/or violation by the Kremlin. Any effective response must come at the local and state level.

The responses and recommendations for resolving the Khanty’s grievance with the Russian state and the country’s oil industry in the country are as follows: 1) restore environmental protections on the land with local engagement; 2) mandate the Khanty have representation in the local government; 3) provide the Khanty language with protected status while creating more local schools that teach Russian as well.

1) Restoring environmental protections is the most crucial recommendation, as the land can become uninhabitable if drilling and oil exploration are to continue at the current pace. The Russian government should meet with the local population, understand their concerns and decide with them how to properly protect their land and reindeer. The reindeer are extremely important for the Khanty, but due to drilling, it is estimated the region’s reindeer population fell by 28 percent during the 1990s as John Ross noted in Smithsonian Magazine. Data on the current status of the reindeer population decline is not easy to find. However, if oil production has yielded 70 billion barrels in the past 40 years, it is unlikely the population decline has ceased.  Allowing the land to sink further into an oil-soaked ruin, in which the rivers and forests routinely catch fire will cause problems for the native population and Kremlin alike. Adding more bureaucratic hoops to the government’s process for approving drilling operations will at least slow down the degradation and possibly lead to the reconsideration of some oil drilling operations entirely.

2) As noted above, another key issue is the Khanty’s lack of representation in local government. Mandating two Khanty representatives in the office of the governor and encouraging others to run for local council positions is crucial. The reason for having two is that there would be a better dynamic for discussion and more diversity from even within the Khanty community. A federally-appointed governor like Natalia Komarova needs to be balanced by local, indigenous representatives. The same is true for oligarch Vladimir Bogdanov and local government member Vladimir Bogdanov. This sort of influence without Khanty opinions present is dangerous. Having political checks on this influence can mitigate the disparity the Khanty population experiences as a result of its minority status in the Russian Federation.

3) The Russian government needs to work on protecting the language while bringing the Khanty population in from the fringes of Russian society. The population of Khanty in the KhMAO is only 19,068 people (1.3 percent of the population) according to the 2010 Russian census. Declaring the language endangered would attract some needed attention to this issue within the country. The language issue is lower priority compared to the other two recommendations, as it relates to the culture’s survival, and not specifically the people. It is part of a greater challenge as Khanty typically live in more remote sections of the KhMAO, and have less access to public schools. Improving educational opportunities is essential in not leaving a population in the fringes of society.

V: Final words

When studying any Russian indigenous group it is important to understand that many of them are endangered to a severe degree. The fact that the Khanty population still contributes to a percentage of the overall Russian population is a positive sign and should lead to the Kremlin’s further preservation of it. Unfortunately, as Cultural Survival discussed in 2014, within Russia, the native population councils/forums are either relatively powerless or nonexistent. This will need to change if any of the recommendations made above are going to take place. The Khanty should be able to choose whether to integrate fully into Russian society or not. Living on top of an oil gold mine should not be the reason for their demise, but in this case it is. Currently, there is no violence and there likely will never be. The population could die out quietly, before it ever fights back against the government or oil industry. If the culture dies off, the Russian government would be to blame for being complicit in the booming oil industry’s abuses, given the oil companies’ Soviet history and close ties to the Russian state. The fate of the Khanty lies in the hands of the Russian government.

Fork in the Steppe: Ukraine’s Difficult History with Western Integration

The success of American strategy in the European continent relies on key instruments, particularly NATO with respect to military affairs, and the European Union with respect to economic and social spheres. These institutions compete with Russian initiatives to the east, which demonstrate a lack of commitment to the liberal norms and values championed by the West, and replace them with opposing governing models and a willingness to assert military force to achieve national objectives. This is particularly concerning for policymakers in Kyiv, who, prior to 2014, attempted to maintain a balance between a Central European and Eurasian identity, and are now trapped in a heated “frozen conflict”. As Ukrainian political debate began to find itself increasingly calling to engage in economic integration with one side or the other, Kyiv realized the mounting difficulty in maintaining its claim of neutrality. The series of events surrounding this struggle within Ukraine demonstrates the disparity between Western and Russian worldviews. Ultimately, they suggest that the United States and its European allies may be unprepared to prevent a long-term Russian success in the region, rendering the prospect of Ukrainian accession into the European Union and NATO low.

Ukraine and Russia have a long and intertwined history, spanning interactions both remembered positively and negatively. Russia notably recognizes the founding of the Russian state in the Christianization of Kievan Rus’, and emphasises the mutual historical and cultural links between Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus whenever it can. Other events, however, such as the Treaty of Pereyaslav in 1654, or the more well-known Holodomor, are understood in the Ukrainian historical narrative as events characterizing a relationship of mistrust with Russia. The former is noted as having legally commenced the characterization of Ukrainians as an inseparable part of the Russian people, after the Zaporizhian Cossacks controversially pledged an oath of loyalty to the Russian Tsar in exchange for protection against Poland-Lithuania. The image of Ukraine as being a branch of the greater Russian nation has survived throughout the Imperial and Soviet eras, and is an important factor in understanding their current relationship.

On the other hand, Ukraine also has a strong Central European influence, most notably in its west. This is best expressed by Foreign Minister of the Ukrainian SSR Anatoliy Zlenko’s assertion in 1990 that “a common history existing a thousand years and a deep cultural, linguistic, and ideological closeness have linked [Ukraine] with neighboring Poland. The western regions of Ukraine and the eastern provinces of Poland … are similar in makeup of population and economy”. While it cannot be denied that historic links exist, he refrains from mentioning that they have been experienced as mostly negative, perhaps even worse than with Russia. Despite this friction, policymakers in Kyiv saw their interests as increasingly aligned with those of Central European states following the collapse of the USSR, lending truth to Zlenko’s claim of the region’s close ideological proximity to Ukraine.

This is largely due to the fact that Central European nations were successful in both severing Moscow’s influence, as well as crafting a new identity for themselves as “Central European.” In search of a similar future, the Ukrainian authorities made it their priority to become a part of several Central European institutions, most notably in what was then the Visegrád Triangle in 1992. Today the Visegrád Four, this institution was a grouping of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, and was instrumental in developing a post-Communist Central European bloc independent of Moscow’s control. Despite close Polish-Ukrainian relations at this time, the initiative to “join” Central Europe ended in failure, hampered by other nations’ fears that accepting Ukraine would diminish their claims of a Central European identity and anger Moscow.

This aversion to antagonizing the Kremlin was not out of bad faith, as it is now understood that Russia certainly views social influence, such as perceptions of national identity, in zero-sum terms. In a world marked by greater international cooperation, a failure to participate in blocs or alliances can result in a significant loss of influence. In this way, a truly neutral Ukraine, as neither a part of the European Union or the Eurasian Economic Union, could have been in danger of marginalization. This led to pressure on Yanukovych to engage in an economic agreement with either the Eurasian or European Union, as maintaining equal partnership with both is technically and legally infeasible. Recognizing this, Russia did everything in its power to prevent a preference for greater Western ties, envisioning the risk of the eventual full admission of Ukraine into the European Union and possibly NATO. The Russian strategic mindset places a great importance on land as a defensive resource, most vehemently in the Northern European Plain, where no natural barriers exist between Russia and Europe. A Ukraine in NATO would put Western troops deep into this region, constituting unacceptable threat from the perception of Moscow.

This tug of war manifested itself in the back and forth saga over whether or not President Yanukovych would allow the passing of a Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement, which is designed to significantly increase the nation’s interactions with European institutions. Although having been largely committed to the agreement since March 2014, he experienced a last minute change of heart due to fears of Russian economic retaliation, a move which did not go over well with the Ukrainian public and sparked the Euromaidan Revolution. This climaxed in Yanukovych’s descent from power, putting celebrations in Moscow on hold.

A change in the balance of power almost never passes calmly, and this proved no exception, as, in early 2014, President Putin decided to use military force in Ukraine. This decision was partially inspired by NATO’s expression of military force against Serbia in 1999 as support for the self-determination of Kosovo. This use of hard power mixed with an emphasis on territorial self-determination was expressed in Russia’s use of unmarked soldiers to secure and eventually annex Crimea through referendum, as well as their support for armed separatists in eastern Ukraine. The annexation of Crimea was especially informative, as it not only violates international agreements, but levied accusations of disregarding the precedents set after the Second World War regarding the respect of territorial integrity between states in Europe. The Russian Federation thus revealed itself as a revisionist power in Europe, with a lack of commitment to the current world order that is seen as hypocritical and having been solely crafted by and for the West.

How the frozen conflict in Ukraine will mature is still to be seen. No nation engaged in territorial conflict can be admitted to the NATO alliance, and Ukrainian accession to the European Union has since become more unpopular with some member states, particularly Hungary. The reasons for this shift in Budapest’s positioning towards Ukraine are complex, but generally revolve around the Orban government’s newfound faith in illiberalism, a school of thought associated with Russia. Hungary has also espoused concern for the rights of the Hungarian diaspora in Transcarpathia, after a law was passed that greatly restricted the position of minority languages in education. This law was part of a broader movement of growing Ukrainian nationalism, which has crystalized in ways that would not have been possible without the spectre of an aggressive Russia. This national feeling is also marked by significant growth in Ukrainians’ positive perception of the European Union and Western institutions. This is a result of previous sentiments in Ukraine’s east, which were favorable to Russia, suffering due to the increased perception of a Russia that will act maliciously towards Ukraine, coupled with the loss of the most pro-Russian territories in the country: Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk. This has given way to a victory of western Ukraine’s vision of the nation. While there is still a great deal of caution when dealing with Ukraine, Central Europeans have recognized this more profound Western national consciousness, allowing Kyiv to make its way into institutions like the 2016 Visegrád Battlegroup. This stands in contrast to Ukrainian attempts to join Central European institutions in the early 1990s, when Central Europe itself was still fragile, Ukraine divided, and Russia less predictable.

Unfortunately for the current Ukrainian administration, the Russian strategy relies solely on time. As soon as it becomes clear that pro-Western Ukrainian officials are unable to fulfill their promises of economic and political integration, the public will become disenfranchised. This could lead to a rise in the support for more extreme platforms, such as Ukraine’s far-right, which is the most vehemently anti-Russian of Ukraine’s political movements, and has already gained a deal of respect due to its effectiveness in the War in Donbas. However, with enough time, economic stagnation, and Russian resiliency, disenfranchisement could also lead to a more pragmatic approach, one in which there is consensus that admission into the EU and NATO is quite unlikely, and only rapprochement with Russia is a viable path to developing into a prosperous nation. With Ukraine back on cordial terms with Russia, or even latter as a member of the Russian led Eurasian Economic Union, the public would experience increased economic growth and stability, the tangible benefits of which would likely cement support for this policy. Although with the potential to foster greater resentment, this strategy has already proven relatively effective. Moldova, the first country to experience a frozen conflict with pro-Russian separatists, since moved to become an observer state of the Eurasian Economic Union in 2017, 25 years after the Transnistria War.

The series of events surrounding Ukraine are a testament to the zero-sum reality that have materialized out of conflicting perceptions and onto the Ukrainian Steppe. For the post-Soviet nation, a difficult moment of choice between the values and identity of the West or Russia has begun, but only time will tell where that decision ultimately falls. In order for Ukraine to remain committed to Western values, it is in the interest of the United States and its European allies to ensure that Ukraine does not feel it is left out of Western institutions, even if NATO or EU membership is out of the question for the time being. Western assistance to Ukraine can be delivered not only politically, but also economically and militarily, and it would be unwise for Western policymakers to take these off the table. Corruption should be understood as an important piece of the Kremlin’s arsenal, and a tool with the potential to bypass unfavorable public sentiment. With popular support on the side of the West, decreasing the prevalence of corruption and helping to maintain Ukraine as a transparent democracy is a worthy strategy for Brussels and Washington. Despite their ultimate policy choices, however, it is critical for them to understand that time is not on their side.

The Sochi Dialogue; A Pathway for Russian Neo-Revisionism in the Levant

“Victors do not investigate their own crimes, so that little is known about them…”― Noam Chomsky

On the eve before the Syrian Congress of National Dialogue on January 30th, 2018, representatives of the Assad regime’s main opposition group, the Syrian Negotiation Commission (SNC), arrived to their terminal at the Sochi International Airport. As the group’s representatives met with their Russian hosts and prepared to be escorted to the conference, they sighted promotional billboards mounted atop the baggage claim caravels displaying the Syrian Arab Republic’s flag—the primary symbol of the Assad regime. The offended SNC representatives refused to step outside the airport and denied their invitation on spot, citing the conference’s disingenuity to any resistant forces in the way of Assad. Within an hour, the most important opposition delegation invited to Sochi was booked on the next flight to Ankara.

Two days prior, a Turkish mission—ironically coined “Operation Olive Branch”—invaded the Kurdish northern province in Afrin, Syria. The Turkish government issued a statement citing the Sochi Conference’s deference; the inclusion of Syrian Kurds in diplomatic dialogue without consent from the Erdogan government, was a red line for Turkey. Turkish intervention in Afrin was strategically designed to blockade Syrian Kurdish Peoples’ Protection Units (YPG) representatives from attending the dialogue, crippling the Kurds with reconnaissance airstrikes and ground force invasion.  Turkey’s sortie triumphed. The YPG’s spokesman, Fawza al-Yussef announced that Turkey—one of the conference’s hosts—violated the talks’ principle of political dialogue and that no YPG official, under any circumstances, would attend the talks. 

While the conference was quick to invite several local leaders of the ethnic Kurdish community and hosted the regime’s ‘Loyal Opposition’ delegation, Sochi was barren of any contrariety or deliberation. The television screens in the conference lobby—purposed to broadcast the delegates’ speeches and statements—were turned off at the start of the opening ceremonies. Journalists present at the dialogue grew concerned of the lack of interaction with the conference’s host, the Russian government, and lack of access to what little dialogue took place. Many within the international community regarded Sochi as an emblematic failure—a diplomatic disaster that began before the conference commenced, rooted in a conflict far more complex than its proponents realize. Yet, within the contextual framework of Russian neo-revisionism in the Levant, the conference brought unparalleled success. 

The Neo-Revisionsist Vision

While Sochi proved to be a diplomatic failure from its start, it still achieved a number of Russian objectives that, in the long-term, seek to revise the regional order and political expectations in the Levant. While Russian forces initially sought to ‘fill’ the political vacuum in the dawn of the Syrian civil war, they recognized immense capital if Russia were to become a major proponent in the region, eclipsing the United States. Russia’s objective aligns with what Richard Sakwa deems “neo-revisionsim.” Vladimir Putin’s government does not seek to unilaterally challenge or undermine current embedded frameworks of the regional order; rather, Moscow has made its mission to alter decades of Western dominance in the Middle East and ensure Russian strategic interests are equally recognized. 

Shrouded Objectives

The Syrian Congress of National Dialogue at Sochi was designed by the Russian, Turkish, and Iranian governments to serve as a complimentary step—possibly a diplomatic alternative—to ongoing reconstructive talks in Geneva, serving as the eighth round of the Astana negotiations. The talks were originally hailed among members in the international community for its diverse guest list; Sochi called on not only the twenty-member SNC delegation, but also upon participation from the Syrian Kurds, a force that had been absent in diplomatic talks despite their integral role in the civil war. The inclusion of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) in the dialogue was a watershed in reconstruction efforts, sowing seeds of optimism among many negotiators and lending confidence to Russia’s emerging role as a diplomatic heavyweight in the Levant. 

In advance of Sochi, experts and policymakers overlooked the dialogue’s ulterior intent to manipulate the lack of “strategic incoherence” embedded in the policies, agendas, and objectives of Syria’s actors. Dr. Aaron Stein of the Atlantic Council introduced the concept of strategic incoherence in the wake of Operation Olive Branch, pointing to the tunnel-visioned policies of the Syrian crisis’ most valuable players, unengaged in adequate multilateral coordination. Syria’s disaster has yielded local actors the latitude to pursue diverging aims: while the United States’ regional strategy has primarily focused on driving out the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) through cooperation with YPG and Peshmerga militias, Turkey has made its mission to stave Kurdish territorial influence, no matter the cost. While Iran and Russia have dually empowered the Assad regime to keep its reins on power in Damascus, with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps’ (IRGC) and Russian ground forces assisting pro-government Shabiha factions and Shi’a paramilitaries, they contradict an international community that insists upon Assad’s removal. Disorder has reigned supreme in Syria since 2012, and the Russian government has capitalized upon elements of discontinuity and strategic incoherence to pave its own path to a new Levantine order. 

Sochi, while a diplomatic breakdown, was an invaluable diplomatic measure of distraction for the Russian government. While Moscow’s chief diplomats arranged Sochi’s diverse guest list—to great fanfare—pro-Assad’s militant factions prepared dropped mortar shells and rockets on the besieged enclave of East Ghouta, displacing an estimated 30,000 civilians and isolating individuals from international aid convoy trucks and supplies. While Russians forces present in Syria have offered the city’s residents a safe passage out from the bombardment in what it calls a “humanitarian corridor,” Moscow has not ceased its assistance to retake eastern Ghouta, deploying warplanes in a series of bombing and ground assaults. 

An Impossible Order

While many experts have lamented the retracted international role in Syria, enabling Russia to capitalize upon its goal empowering its geopolitical stature in the region. Alina Polyakova of the Brookings Institution defined Moscow’s chief objective as one that transcends ISIS’s defeat and securing Assad’s grip on power; “preserving Assad’s rule was always less about Assad, and more about safeguarding what Putin saw as another domino in a series of U.S.-orchestrated revolutions in Russia’s backyard.” Russian President Vladimir Putin was reportedly agitated by U.S. interventionist strategies in Libya and Iraq during the Bush and Obama administrations, and recognized the strategic value in hybridized, low-cost, asymmetric proxy war. The lack of political coherence is attractive to Putin’s foreign policy agenda; Syria’s geostrategic position between East and West, as well as their warm-water ports, satisfy Russia’s overarching political and economic interests. Securing Assad in Moscow’s corner will retain Russia as a major influencer in the regional order.

While the Russian government has flexed its ability to redefine the Levant under its own terms, there is no certainty that this political order can survive. Moscow has pursued shuttle diplomacy with Israel and Iran, constructed alternative diplomatic dialogues outside of the Geneva Conference, and has established multiple frameworks for a new Syrian constitution and federal elections. It has proven its ability to serve as a power broker in a time of crisis. Yet these reforms cannot remain permanently in place; while the Assad government has maximized its territorial control, opposition still remains in tact and the regime’s repeated use of chemical weapons—facilitated by Moscow—will remain sealed in the memories of the conflict’s survivors.