Will Doves or Hawks Fly? An Analysis of Democratic Policies in the Levant

In 2011, the streets of Cairo were teeming with political, financial, and religious fervor—with Egyptian President Mubarak at the root of discontent. Young protesters led by the Muslim Brotherhood and pro-democratic groups such as the “Tamarod” movement, took to Tahrir Square to oust a dictator representing three decades of Egyptian strife under secular autocracy, a militant ruling party, and economic strain. While uncertainty loomed in Tahrir Square, discord loomed in the White House Situation Room. Obama and his administration were bereft of time—with the choice of opting for “the right side of history” with young, pro-democracy protestors, or with a decades-old status quo embedded in the Mubarak regime. Answering the pleas of his advisors, President Obama chose to support the rebels. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton—the current 2016 Democratic Presidential frontrunner -- unsuccessfully advocated siding with Mubarak based on the rationalization that supporting an unstructured, youthful revolutionary movement would not be any less than naïve. The rebels represented change and renewal, but Mubarak represented years of American investment, relative stability, and guarantee of U.S. access and provision.

Such a decision is congruent with Clinton’s so-called “hawkish” foreign policy agenda—yet scholars, critics, and constituents alike are still scratching heads in regards to Clinton’s strict theoretical framework. Many point to former First Lady, Senator, and Secretary of State as an oscillation between neo-conservatism and liberalism in international affairs. Clinton’s opponent, Vermont Senator Bernard Sanders, staunchly falls within liberalism, yet is misunderstood in his policy projections. In the largest and arguably, most historic presidential election this country will witness, the media machine has detracted voters from dissecting Hilary’s ideological direction or Sander’s exact foreign policy agenda. In this piece, I seek to dissect Clinton’s and Sanders’ theoretical identities and visualize their policies in the most precarious geopolitical hotspot of the 21st century: the Levant region.

Neo-con, Realist, or both? Assessing Hillary’s Ideological Conundrum

Advisor Jeffrey Bader once remarked that Clinton is “not an ideological person, she’s a deal-maker.” The ambiguity that surrounds the exact identity of Clinton’s foreign policy has been the subject of widespread speculation in this election. Her extensive record appears to be a conjectural blend of realist, idealist, and neo-conservative policy selections. As a New York Senator, she voted yes for intervention in Iraq. In her “pivot to Asia” as Secretary of State, she sought a role for the United States in territorial disputes in the South China Sea. She has angered Jewish voters when she has remained neutral with Israeli-Iranian tensions, while acknowledging Israel’s pivotal role as an American ally in the Middle East, and even proposing support of Iranian democratic attempts at a 2016 appearance at AIPAC. Public perception has suggested that Clinton reflects all three ideological identities of realism, liberalism, and neo-conservatism. Yet, when we arrange her record comprehensively, we will discover that Clinton is unapologetically neo-con in every crease and corner of the fabric that is her foreign policy agenda. Clintonism will champion hard power over soft, politics of preconditions, shoe-leather diplomacy, and operating from a position of strength. Is Hillary the next Kissinger? No, but expect a hybridized version of Kissinger, Kagan, and Robert Gates. Hillary will exemplify her appreciation of using clout of diplomacy, but realizes militarized strength may be necessary to sit parties at the table in the first place.

To compare the Democratic candidates, one must comprehend Clinton’s appreciation for statecraft abroad, while Sanders focuses on the American state itself; external reformation runs divergent to internal reconstruction. Clinton and Sanders both exercise caution when flexing their foreign policy muscle, yet differ in nature. Clinton sees the military as a valuable mechanism, while Sanders sees it as a potential deterrent. Clinton practices caution in the calculation and execution of hard power initiatives, keeping her cards close to her chest. Yet in retrospect, she keeps a maximalist thirst for an American militarized footprint across the world. Secretary of Defense Gates recalls Clinton favored 40,000 boots on the ground when he advised 30. After all, Clinton’s education in the world of foreign policy began not in her tenure as Secretary of State or even as First Lady, but as a freshman New York Senator on the Committee on Armed Services, where she developed a great appreciation for American military capability. Sanders on the other hand, is more cautious in foreign policy. He voted against intervention in Iraq and champions that decision as representative of his strong anti-interventionism. Many have compared Clinton’s foreign policy as a continuation of the Obama Administration, such as non-intervention in Syria, but in fact it is Sanders that would replicate “skeptical restraint” best. While critics have pointed to Sanders as immature in foreign policy and avoidant of the topic altogether, they must explore Sander’s liberal logic of policies he has already presented on debate floors across the country. To understand Sander’s global strategy is to understand his domestic platform. His policies abroad are anchored to his economic strategy to alleviate collegiate debt, combat Wall Street, and improve social welfare programs; the United States cannot pour money into carpet-bombing the Islamic State that drains taxation at home, nor expend resources fighting for democracy in Iran or Egypt when democratic ideals are endangered at the expense of the corporate machine.

Visualizing the Levant

The Levantine region of the Middle East has become characterized by regenerative, endless conflicts, ruptures in the ethnic and religious foundations, and proxy interests intersecting in Iraq and Syria. Civil wars are incubated within civil wars—spurred initially by democratic fervor and devolving into foreign manipulation of rebel factions to install puppet leadership. These conflicts are consequential; it is fuddled, it is not simplistic enough to characterize with theory alone. A presidential candidate who claims to contextualize a policy strategy in all corners of this conflict is lying, but a candidate that can produce a doctrine America can commit to, is integral in the Democratic race. Senator Sanders has accomplished this, publicly advocating commitment to non-intervention in the Middle East. Clinton’s stance tethers its “globocop” approach to combatting the swath of violent non-state actors, bloodthirsty dictatorships, proxy interests battling from the Gulf, and militarized “aid” from China and Russia. To Clinton, Putin has no business fighting in Syria. To Bernie, neither does the United States.

Clinton mutually supports an Israeli state and Palestinian forces, yet shies away from the high dive board when pursuing the hunt for a two-state solution like presidential predecessors have done, believing the timing is not ripe in 2016. Senator Sanders additionally will pivot towards the acknowledgement of the right for a Palestinian solution, playing what he called an “even-handed role” in the interaction between Israelis and Palestinians. While Sanders is Jewish, he has shied away from proclaiming himself a Zionist. Sanders has proven to be tactical when approaching the Palestinian question; he wholeheartedly supports the Israeli right to exist, but does visualize an emerging landscape of a new Middle East. Does this make Sanders a realist on Israel? Possibly. It is not clear whether Sanders will pursue a two-state solution, but it’s clear he will not isolate the Palestinians, as have previous administrations. With both candidates, the world will see an American presidency that will re-balance its allegiances in the Gaza Strip.

The question of Syria has deeply characterized the foreign policy agenda of the Obama Administration, and will quite possibly plague the remainder of the twenty-first century. The Syrian Civil War is a tumultuous blend of civil war, proxy interests, terrorism, and underlying cultural and religious tensions—remnants of colonialism and the 1917 Sykes-Picot Agreement. Both Sanders and Clinton understand that any future policy decision in Syria should represent the American people’s aversion to intervention, yet nips the humanitarian strife in the bud. Such a policy has posed presidential politics in a state of flux; Senator Ted Cruz advocated carpet-bombing campaigns, Trump called for the elimination of local gas sources, and many other candidates have called for the eradication of ISIS before approaching the Syrian Civil War. To evaluate the stances of the two Democratic frontrunners, one must first question what beast the candidates will encounter first: Assad or ISIS? Clinton has chosen ISIS, opting to place a larger American presence in the region, surpassing Obama’s authorized 50 Special Operation Troops. The former Secretary of State has advocated the preparation and training of Syrian Sunni and Shiite rebels to fight in Syria, believing they would be a “psychological boost to the opposition” that would back American enemies into a dark corner. Mrs. Clinton sees it necessary to unite under a common international enemy, and then seek regime change with the dismantling of Assad in Damascus. Senator Sanders, on the other hand, has chosen to avoid what he calls a “never-ending quagmire” between American boots on the ground and ISIS fighters, and additionally has not supported a no-fly-zone in Syria. Clinton’s threaded short-term strategies starkly contrast with Sander’s isolationist long-term vision of the struggle with ISIS. While Clinton sees it necessary for the American struggle to incorporate international cooperation, Sanders finds it necessary for the fight to be a globalized one. Sanders has called for an international coalition to combat the Islamic State, emulating the Jordanian King Abdullah's plan to build a coalition of Muslim nations on the ground, while remaining international powers carry airstrike campaigns and economic measures to cut off the blood-flow of the Islamic State.

Looking Towards The Future

The presidential strategies in Syria best reflect two very contrasting tones set in the Levant region. Clinton’s neo-conservative approach and foreign policy chops will utilize hard and soft power to promote democratic, American ideals in fluctuating political systems. Under a Clinton administration, Hawks will predominately fly over the Levant—a product of the former Secretary of State’s step-by-step strategizing, teaming diplomatic strength with military muscle to accomplish infrastructural stability and political peace in the Levant. Sanders will, by contrast, engage the global arena in coalition building and aversion to on-the-ground intervention. His foreign policy decisions will reflect that of his domestic platform, illustrating the Senator’s long-term vision of a cooperative and welcoming United States in the international community. As Levantine conflicts have begun to pour into the political, economic, and cultural borders of Turkey, the Balkans, and Europe, the world holds its breath as candidates assemble policy projections for such a delicate region. While running within the confines of the Democratic Party, this race is showcasing candidates that will envision two very different faces of the Levant Region in the next four years to come. Doves may fly, but under the shadow of hawks.

Hope and Change in the Time of Police Violence: From Obama's Inauguration to Trayvon Martin’s Murder

“Euphoric. It was unbelievable to really see that we could do anything we put our minds to. I never had a plan to go to an inauguration before that day.” Dr. Omekongo Dibinga’s eyes lit up as he shared his feelings on President Obama’s 2008 inauguration. He claims it is one of his happiest memories from any public event, one which “sparks something in his heart.” Dibinga is not alone in this sentiment. For so many Americans, Obama’s election seemed to represent the beginning of a new era. As he stood in the freezing cold that January night at the National Mall, he held his little toddler on his shoulders. It was as though, for just one moment, he was holding her up higher than the scourge of a country whose legacy was rooted in slavery, eugenics, and mass incarceration. She would be hurt by these injustices later, but tonight she would witness her father's joy. An eternity of oppression and despair, seemed for just a moment, to fade in the triumph of a new narrative of hope we can believe in.

At the time, Dibinga was a motivational speaker and diversity counselor in schools that served predominantly low income youth of color. The morning after Obama was elected, he believes his students arrived to class with a new light in their eyes, a new sense of pride and belonging. “I saw my students show up to my class wearing Obama t-shirts. I had never seen my students choose to represent a politician on their clothing before. I had seen rappers and musicians, but never a president.” Dibinga recalls that Wednesday in the classroom with a Jay-Z quote: “The day Obama won the election, the gangster became less relevant.” His students were able to see themselves in a new light, one where they finally saw a representation of themselves beyond entertainers and athletes, a president who looked like them. “I saw black people stand and pledge allegiance to the flag for the first time in their lives. To be alive and witness that moment, I wouldn’t trade it for the world. People finally felt like they were part of this country after being on the outskirts for so long.”

Dibinga was very careful with his word choice. This was just a moment in time. A powerful moment, but far from the end of a nation fueled by white supremacy. Maybe it felt like the start of an era where a man of color could lead the free world, but it did not feel like the end of an era where white supremacy remains as prevalent as the air we breathe. It wasn’t until a black man could sit in the Oval Office that we heard proud utterances of a “post-racial United States.” Nevermind the photoshopped images of a lynched Obama with the phrase “hope” replaced with the phrase “rope,” or the fact that congress seemed completely unwilling to get anything passed under his watch. At first these messages were whispered on our social media, and later they became more and more confident, even self-righteous shouts of “Your president is black, so what are you people so upset about?” So many, including Dibinga, feared this narrative. We only needed to look at the worn faces of those in the ultra-segregated communities in our home city of Boston, the crumbling state of Boston’s public schools, the hopelessness of our voter turnout, the clearly inequitable way the “T”  subway system skipped over our black and brown neighborhoods, and the way communities lived in an inescapable state of chaos and poverty. “It was projected that people like me wouldn’t live past the age of 25, that if we weren’t killed by them we would be incarcerated,” said Dibinga. These realities proved to us that regardless of how our president lived, we were very much living in a harsh and unforgivingly racist society.

This has become particularly clear in the recent resurgence of a new civil rights movement which has been sparked in part by the death and subsequent lack of justice for Trayvon Martin. Patrisse Cullors coined the hashtag #BlackLivesMatter after Mike Brown's death, and it has needed to be used countless times since when we face yet another pointless act of police brutality. After Trayvon's death, President Obama stated “If I had a son, he would look like Trayvon.” This emotive sentiment was one of the first times Obama had been so vulnerable about his position as a person of color for the whole nation to hear. While Dibinga and many others felt affirmed by these words, many others felt threatened by having the president make a statement that connected him exclusively with other Americans of color. The president who Dibinga celebrated had just claimed something Dibinga also felt; this representation from a president was a new experience.

“I see myself in everyone of these guys who is killed.” Dibinga is referring to his reactions to the recent deaths of young black and brown men and women. In 2015, 1205 people were killed by the police in the United States. Black men and boys are twenty-one times more likely to be killed by the police than their white male counterparts. He carries the memory of Obama’s election deeply on his conscience, but says that the media coverage of those killed by police is “always on [his] mind.” Dibinga is somber as he shares how he is scared and sad to hear media “come up with all these theories about why a kid deserved to die. You can’t help but wonder, what story will be told if it happens to you?” As state-sanctioned violence against people of color increases, how can we return to that feeling of unlimited possibility on November 4, 2008 without it being tainted? How can we believe in the hope Obama promised without feeling a sense of fatalism or frustration? Dibinga quietly shares “you feel like you are being minimized at every step… I wonder if people even care about who I am here...”

The media didn’t help to dispel this sense of being one dimensional. For the media, these murders are shown as must see TV. “Why is it in America we have to see proof of a black man being killed? Why do people have to see us get slaughtered in order for us to believe it?” Over the summer a twitter hashtag, #iftheygunnedmedown, began to gain traction. The hashtag showed two pictures side-by-side of a man in a suit, and that same man dressed in clothes where he would be perceived as a “thug.” “When we die they show us at our worst, if I get killed by police tonight they won’t show the picture of me getting my diploma… To the media at the end of the day your accomplishments aren’t going to mean anything if you are killed by police.”

Dibinga began to share negative interactions with the Boston police that further fuel how much he saw himself in each man who had been lost. “My Congolese mother [with a Ph. D.] who didn’t learn English until she was 29 was in the train station and a white girl told the cops she was selling drugs. Without question my mother was arrested and when my father came to pick her up in jail, she only had her shirt on.”  These stories are so common that they sometimes feel inevitable. If this is the reality, how can we believe in any hope or change? Even for Black and Latino Americans without stories quite as intense as this one, many more did wonder why there were no train stops, grocery stores, or decent schools in our neighborhoods. Each individual's story is unique, but they also include patterns caused and upheld by a legacy of racism. Today, Dibinga’s daughter is nine years old, and she doesn’t remember being present for Obama's original inauguration. Although she was born in a time characterized by hope and change, she is now being raised in an era of heightened cynicism and mistrust. Will she grow up to  live a life more boldly stamped by a Black president or by the mindless state sanctioned violence her grandmother experienced?

The Pragmatic, the Exciting, and the Uncertain: Hillary Clinton's Infrastructure Proposal

In late November 2015, the Clinton campaign announced plans to pursue an increase in federal infrastructure spending by $275 billion over 5 years, a plan the campaign calls “a major down payment on a stronger America”. Though comments concerning the plan have been largely muffled on the campaign trail by emphasis on the historical achievement of her mere nomination, email scandals, and the bewildering aura of her Fall challenger, Clinton did state in late May her intention to send “a comprehensive infrastructure proposal to Congress in her first 100 days in office”. Presumably, the inclusion of the plan in the agenda of her first 100 days signifies the status of this issue as a top priority for Clinton, and something she seems willing to bet her legacy on should she have the pleasure of serving.

Which is an issue, because while the plan is appealing rhetorically, it features a worrying lack of detail. While the Clinton campaign claims that the plan will be fully paid for, it only mentions “business tax reform” as its method of payment, without any specifics concerning which particular taxes will change, the manner in which they will change, or how reforming the business tax code will capture an extra $275 billion over 5 years. Nevertheless, it should be noted that it is generally accepted in the economic community that “business tax reform” is a worthwhile policy goal, as it is much more efficient to simply tax people’s incomes if you’re looking to tax them. That being said, if a President Clinton finds herself facing a Republican Congress next Spring, the likelihood of her presiding over revenue positive tax reform is dubious.

However, once one gets past the unclear method of payment, the Clinton campaign’s plan starts to get interesting. Of the original $275 billion sticker price, $250 billion will be set aside for direct infrastructure investment via conventional tax and spend methods. General repair is a major part of this spending—as the campaign vows to “fix and expand our roads and bridges”, oversee maintenance projects on various pipelines, dams, and levees, and address the “pothole tax”. But the biggest emphasis seems to be on new projects with an eye on efficiency and new technology. Not only does the plan call for the construction of new airports and air traffic control systems, expansion of public transport options with an emphasis on higher capacity passenger rail systems, and “initiating the upgrades of the at least the 25 most costly freight bottlenecks by the end of her first term”, but the plan also articulates a desire for investment in clean energy via attention to the development of a “smart” electrical grid, creating space for non-gasoline fueling stations, and ensuring that “the federal government is a partner in delivering clean and affordable energy”. The Clinton campaign even commits itself to ensuring that, by 2020, “100 percent of households in America will have access to affordable broadband that delivers world class speeds”. If all this was not enough, the campaign assures voters that this infrastructure plan will involve to creation of thousands of “good paying, middle class jobs – paying well over the national median” in order to make it happen.

And according to economists at large, all of this is pretty good stuff, as infrastructure investment in general has shown to have a positive relationship with economic growth (though the magnitude of this relationship is still up for debate). Specifically, economists will be generally be favorable to the idea of repairing roads to address the “pothole tax”, allowing money that would otherwise be allocated to car maintenance to flow into consumption that is utility positive, raising social welfare. Additionally, while not a public good by definition, clean energy is generally considered a type of good which is chronically underprovided by the market due to the typically large up-front costs and low rates of return, meaning that third party intervention is needed to capture the gains in welfare that are not realized when it is underprovided. Also, Clinton’s plan to connect 100 percent of Americans to high quality broadband is another provision of her plan that is likely to score points with labor economists, as lack of internet access is one of many things that have been cited as holding potentially capable workers from realizing their maximum income potential.

But perhaps the most interesting part of Clinton’s plan is the allocation of $25 billion as a seed fund for an independent, government owned infrastructure investment bank, both because the design and role of the bank lacks detail and precedent, but also because it could potentially offer a more permanent solution to infrastructure neglect in the future. The Clinton campaign states that the bank will exist to “provide loans, loan guarantees, and other forms of credit enhancement” to fund investment in “complex multi-modal projects like freight and port improvements, and in projects to modernize our energy, water, broadband, and transportation systems in urban and rural communities”. The bank will do this by issuing “special ‘super’ Build America Bonds”, building upon the structure of a program that lived and died within Obama’s first term. The campaign also mentions that the bank will be a “one-stop-shop” for state and local governments, municipalities, and project sponsors to secure the capital and expertise needed to see through infrastructure projects that have been vetted and approved by the bank’s “bipartisan review board”.

Unfortunately, but perhaps not surprisingly, the campaign leaves out many of the technical details of the bank’s creation and operation schemes that would be useful in imagining what exactly the bank would look like and how it would operate. Currently, the Build America Transportation Investment Center (BATIC), the keystone of the July 2014 executive action Build America Investment Initiative, considers itself a “one-stop-shop” for expertise in infrastructure projects. The BATIC does not, however, issue credit itself, but rather walks applicants through the process of securing private loans or applying for financing via the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) program, administered by the Department of Transportation, which provides long-term, flexible financing for highway and transit projects at below market rates, allowing communities easier access to funding for certain infrastructure projects.

Considering that the Clinton campaign has explicitly stated that the infrastructure bank will serve as a “one-stop-shop…to utilize federal resources and expertise in developing infrastructure projects”, it is most likely that a President Clinton will look to combine the efforts of both the BATIC and TIFIA programs to create a single source of both expertise and federal credit for infrastructure projects. Creating a new bank on its own would simply duplicate the responsibilities of these existing programs, and dissolving the BATIC and TIFIA offices in order to create her new bank seems to be an unnecessarily roundabout way of bringing the bank into existence.

Regardless of the exact specifics of the creation scheme, it does appear that the capability of Clinton’s infrastructure bank does, to some extent, already exist within multiple programs. That should not, however, necessarily discourage their synthetization into a single entity that both counsels and finances future infrastructure projects, as advocates have noted that the ability for a bank to cut across offices to get expertise and financing options to clients allows for a more efficient process in getting projects off the ground. It should also be noted that the current BATIC and TIFIA programs are concerned with highway and transit projects, and that if the Clinton campaign’s direct spending agenda is any indication, the infrastructure bank will be tasked with financing projects far beyond repairing roads and laying down new railroad tracks.

The bank’s capability could potentially go beyond simply synthesizing the current capabilities of various offices however, as the campaign has suggested that the bank would have the authority to issue “‘super’ Build America Bonds”. The original Build America Bonds (BABs) were a part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 that allowed state and local governments to reduce their borrowing costs when funding infrastructure projects, making it easier to finance projects via loans as opposed to traditional tax and spend methods. The program ended on December 31, 2010, though the Department of Transportation is still on the hook for paying interest on both the 10 and 30 year bonds that were part of the program. The campaign’s use of the adjective “super” to describe their version of the BAB program suggests that the campaign looks to reinstate and expand the issuance of BABs through the infrastructure bank, but is silent as to just what this expansion would look like. Perhaps a Clinton Presidency would look to simply issue more of these bonds, or perhaps focus on issuing longer term bonds with higher sticker prices to raise more capital up front for projects today. Unfortunately, we can do little more than speculate as to how the campaign plans to supersize the BAB program of the past, but we can be reasonably sure that the campaign looks to create an institution that uses an expanded form of BABs to help finance infrastructure projects in periods of inaction in Congress.

And the political advantages of being able to fund infrastructure investments with only the implicit approval of Congress should not be discounted, and they are doubtlessly a major point in favor of the bank’s existence. Assuming that it is adequately funded, the bank holds the potential to continue nationwide infrastructure investment irrespective of infrastructure investment’s political popularity. When the Clinton campaign highlights the need to “improve the way we invest in infrastructure”, this bank is what they are talking about. With the establishment of this bank, the Clinton campaign looks to address not only the neglect of past decades, but the potential neglect to come in future decades as well.

However while the potential to bypass Congressional inaction may certainly be appealing in the case of infrastructure investment, it must be stressed that there is little to no precedent for this kind of institution in the world. The closest example of a nationwide infrastructure bank like the one the Clinton campaign seems to be describing is The Infrastructure Bank Plc in Nigeria. The bank is tasked with “providing financial solutions to support key long term infrastructure projects”, much like the Clinton campaign’s proposal, but is majority privately owned, with federal, state, and local governments, as well as the Nigeria Labour Congress as individual minority shareholders. Additionally, the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) launched on Christmas Day 2015, and while it also is focused on providing expertise in and financing infrastructure projects in Asia, it has 57 countries as members/shareholders, and 20 members who are not in Asia. Again, while the goals of the AIIB are analogous to the Clinton campaign’s proposed bank, it does not appear as though its modus operandi will be comparable.

Additionally, and perhaps more worryingly, the details that the campaign offers pertaining to the practical operation of the bank are largely nonexistent, and big questions loom over the proposal. The campaign has stated that the bank will be headed by “a bipartisan board of highly qualified directors”, who will presumably influence or even make the final decisions as to which projects get funded and which do not, but does not offer suggestions as to how it plans on selecting and properly vetting candidates for the banks board of directors. The campaign also mentioned that applicants must be able to demonstrate that projects are in the “public interest”, but does not define “public interest” or clarify how one might differentiate between projects that are or are not in “public interest”. Even further, the campaign is silent as to how the bank or its directors would be held accountable for selecting projects that are in the “public interest”. Even basic concerns of equity are not addressed by the campaign, as it offers no explanation as to how local municipalities who are cash-strapped or have poorer credit are expected to benefit from this new bank, leaving the bank’s operation scheme open to criticism of only benefiting well-to-do communities that can better afford infrastructure investment, but may not need it as much.

Nevertheless, from an economic perspective, there’s a lot to like from what we do know of the Clinton campaign’s proposal, and this shouldn’t be discounted by the disappointment that may come from the proposal’s more unclear areas. Given Mrs. Clinton’s statements concerning the status of this proposal as a top priority of her presidency, it should certainly be expected of the American electorate to challenge Mrs. Clinton over the next few months to clarify details concerning her plans to pay for the proposal and of the infrastructure bank’s creation and operation schemes, in order ensure that the campaign is putting forth a thorough and realistic plan that can immediately be acted upon in a Clinton Presidency. While the buffoonery of her Fall challenger may cause some to simply accept Mrs. Clinton’s proposal as satisfactory by virtue of not being utterly ridiculous, this should not preclude a proper vetting process in which the viability of Mrs. Clinton’s proposal is put on trial by the American public. As it stands, no matter how enticing the potential of the plan may seem, the mystery surrounding key details should keep enthusiasm grounded, and the jury still out.

“This Sure Sounds Familiar…” Populism and the Cyclical Decline of Political Parties

It is the summer preceding the presidential election, and the United States is a nation of mass discontent. Many citizens feel that they are being deceived and swindled by the elite of society and the businesses meant to hold the economy together. The justice system appears rigged to favor the few rather than protect the many and regions all over the country are being impacted by waves of battered and distressed immigrants—immigrants that often have had limited education, do not come from countries that strictly favor English, and who practice religions that decidedly differ from the Christian principles many Americans consider ‘tradition’. This influx of immigrants also comes at a time when the nation’s economy is not particularly thriving, and many deal with upheaval and unemployment in their workplaces, whether from expanding population versus demand, or from technological change.

That summer, to be specific, is of approximately 1854.

In the decade span of 1845 to 1855, the United States felt the influx of thousands of European immigrants—immigrants that were often poor, uneducated, and very Catholic in a relatively Protestant nation—as well as the global turning tides of the slavery debate on the economic stage. The response to this change, more immediately than the Civil War, was the evolution of political theatre. Amongst all of this societal turmoil, after all, the U.S. saw the final breaths of the Whig Party, and the rapid formation of its populist replacement: The Know Nothing Party.

The Know-Nothings were a short-lived party that had national popularity but tangible power in Massachusetts. It advocated for nativist ideologies, anti-immigration, and anti-Catholicism, and its membership was for Protestant men only. Historian Tyler Anbinder noted in his Nativism and Slavery that the Know Nothing’s success relied not only upon the conditions of society at the time, but the collapse of the Whig Party, which had suffered internalized weakening and factionalism over the last several years, and in particular damage over the Kansas-Nebraska Act.

The 1840s saw a massive and continual influx of Irish immigrants in particular, fleeing their country out of fear, hope for employment, and starvation. When they arrived in America, they found a largely Protestant nation that resented their masses and their devotion to the Pope; Irish stereotypes ranged from laziness and alcoholism at best, to primitive clan-behavior and subhuman existence at worst. The name, Know Nothing, came from the melodramatic practice of the earliest party foundations: the Order of the Star Spangled Banner, which was founded to resist Catholic immigration, encouraged members asked about the order to reply that they “know nothing” of the cause.

The Know Nothing Party did not survive long, and although familiarity with the name is common, the ability to list the beliefs of the party is more difficult. Once the Know Nothing movement disintegrated, the Republican Party formed in its wake, took Abraham Lincoln as its leader, and the nation dove into a brutal and bloody civil war. Did the Know Nothing movement cause the war, or even qualify as a variable cause? No, not necessarily. Things are always more complicated than that, and the Know Nothings were not terribly successful on the national stage—they simply gave a platform for people to voice their discontents, however xenophobic or radical they may have been. The trouble with populist ideologies taking form as political parties rests in the inherent broadness of the issue: populism is a movement based upon mobilizing the power of a perceived oppressed majority against an oppressive few.is, essentially, to represent the populace, and to oppose the strong will of the elite few.

Abstract notions of populism seem promising. The complication is that a politician who declares themselves a ‘populist’ has told their audience very little about their specific policy proposals. Although populist rhetoric and policies are often left leaning of the nation’s middle-ground voting position, strong economic structure is often lacking in favor of economic policies fueled by societal-based resolutions. In the context of macroeconomics, Rudiger Dornbush and Sebastian Edwards summarize this issue neatly:

Populist regimes have historically tried to deal with income inequality problems through the use of overly expansive macroeconomic policies. These policies, which have relied on deficit financing, generalized controls, and a disregard for basic economic equilibria, have almost unavoidably resulted in major macroeconomic crises that have ended up hurting the poorer segments of society.

The Republican Party, somewhat affectionately known as the GOP, is in a minor crisis. The current 2016 election has seen the party nomination of Donald Trump, a businessman, television personality, and now—politician. He is known for his bombastic speeches, broad and sweeping statements, and controversial opinions on women and minorities. He is, generally: anti-Muslim, anti-immigration, and pro-middle and lower classes. His popularity is evidenced by his nomination; but why? Curiously, perceived authenticity tends to reign supreme.

Notions of authenticity are key to populist success, as the masses are receptive to those who are believed to be identifiable and proactive. This is, according to Bram Spruyt, Gil Keppens, and Filip Van Droogenbroeck, “the ‘people centrism’ component in populism—that is, the representation of the people as a pure and homogenous group whose will should be the crucial reference for politicians—is the element that theoretically distinguishes populism from mere political discontent […] populism remains a politics of hope, that is, the hope that where established parties and elites have failed, ordinary folks, common sense, and the politicians who give them a voice can find solutions.” Furthermore, in a fellow World Mind publication, Jeremy Clement also expands on American Populism regarding Trump, in particular comparing him to George Wallace: “The claims of both are generally not supported with evidence, but that is not the point. The speech sounds good and feeds into the idea of the common, struggling, working man fighting against an unfair system that does not respect his values.” The authenticity that Donald Trump possesses, presumably, is his ability to rouse hope in people based on the desired images many have of what America is—American exceptionalism, indeed.

American historian Andrew J. Bacevich emphasizes the broken nature of how the U.S. views itself. In an article for Politico breaking down the crisis with Russia, he tackles the notions of American exceptionalism and how the problematic nature of these self-assumptions has hindered the U.S.’s competence. He writes:

The events we are commanded to remember are those that happened during the period 1933-1945. In geographic terms, we can be even more specific: They occurred in the space bounded by London, where stiff upper lips withstood the Blitz, and Auschwitz, where countless Jews were murdered. But the true epicenter was Munich, site of the great betrayal from which the horrors were said to follow. Events prior to or after that period—1914 or 2003, for example—or events occurring beyond that expanse—you know, like Vietnam—don’t count for much.

The bitter satire of Bacevich’s article is rather forgivable. This comes from a man who regards American exceptionalism as a sort of religion, one that has severely narrowed the perspective of Americans and compromised the strength and capability of the nation—the people are more preoccupied with perceived entitlements to grandeur than to continually earning high regard. American exceptionalism exists within a very peculiar universe: the 1950s were golden, everyone was happy, and things have only gone downhill from there. Likely mental images of stereotypical grandparents reminiscing on the ‘good old days’ have been conjured by this point. For Trump, American exceptionalism is the ambrosia and nectar of his entire campaign.

Donald Trump is a candidate thriving on populist ideologies in America, but the very passion fueling him is also enabling the potential for a collapse of the Republican Party of which he is the candidate. There is a desire to return to the ‘good old days,’ a notion that rejects the realities of history—but it is a reminiscence that Trump encourages: ‘Make America Great Again!’ cries the businessman’s campaign. What once may have been a melodramatic concern is now fair game: Donald Trump is the candidate of the GOP, yes, but he is hardly representative of the party—whether one considers the primary platform or its factional offshoots, such as the Tea Party. The man could easily run as a third-party candidate and likely endure little competition for voters with a separate GOP presidential candidate. The trouble is that Trump is not a Republican: he is a man who has chosen to enter American politics on his own terms.

There are several months to go before the U.S. engages with what may be one of its most important presidential elections in decades—it could, quite literally, change the course of American household politics. Although Trump is hardly friendly with many Republicans, he has recently won endorsements from several major faces, such as Paul Ryan and Chris Christie. However, there is a deeper meaning implicated in these endorsements: party insecurity. In the 1840s, the Whig Party of the United States endured several fractures that eventually sank the entire Party—the mass voting populace no longer unified in its identification with Whig platform values. Today, the same may be happening for the Republican Party; Republican voters find themselves across a broad spectrum, some finding themselves in polarized positions at the far end of the spectrum and too often at the derogatory butt of many liberal media jokes. These jokes do not harm those in the far end, though; the damage is often felt more often by centrist Republicans who are all-too-conscious of the public eye and misconceptions. The result, however, is the same: increasingly irreversible divisions within the Party, impacting both voter optimism and campaign numbers.

What is important to note here is that the Whig Party did not fall in a month. It is likely that the Republican Party will continue to persist as well; Trump is a wild card, but the future hinges on more than one man. Populism compromises the future of the GOP, as it questions the capacity of the Party to connect with U.S. citizens and encourages further political divisions and ideas on reformation. The Know Nothing Party did not last long in its most tangible form, but its values would reverberate across the country for nearly a century. It is difficult to argue that Donald Trump’s dream of a wall will not hold the same impact, both for immigrants and Muslims, as well as for the stability of the floundering conservative Party that has played host to so much of the groundwork for these attitudes.

Do As I Say, Not As I Do: American Exceptionalism and Post-9/11 Use of Torture

In a press conference on August 1, 2014 President Obama answered a question regarding the handling of a then recent report on Retention, Detention and Interrogation (or RDI) by stating that, “Even before I came into office it was very clear that in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 we did some things that were wrong. We did a whole lot of things that were right, but we tortured some folks. We did some things that were contrary to our values.” Indeed, historically, American values have been opposed to torture. A 2004 article published in New Political Science claims that “Americans tend to think of systematic government torture as a hallmark of fascism; or of backward third world regimes such as that of the thuggish Saddam Hussein in Iraq.” The article later notes that no one would have imagined that the systematic and organized practice of torture would become central to American foreign policy. This is further highlighted in Examining Torture: Empirical Studies of State Repression where the authors Tracy Lightcap and James Pfiffner argue:

In the twentieth century, the US State Department regularly published accounts of torture in some countries, publicly condemning its use and urging improvements in human rights in these countries. In particular, the United States condemned the use of torture practices as partial justification for the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Thus, it is with some irony that the United States itself has been condemned internationally for the use of torture in its interrogations during the War on Terror.

Even President George W. Bush has been quoted as stating that “The United States does not torture, it is against our laws and it is against our values” with similar sentiments being echoed by others in his administration, such as former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.  

However, extensive evidence shows that torture was the practice and de facto policy of the Bush administration and was executed primarily by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as a core component of the “War on Terror.”  In a six-thousand page report issued by the Senate Intelligence Committee (of which a 500 page summary was released to the public in December 2015) numerous acts of torture were documented, many of which violated international human rights law and stood contrary to American values.

If the use of torture is so contrary to “American values,” why then was torture a tool so routinely used by policymakers and valued by the public in the War on Terror? This ethical dichotomy between “American values,” which traditionally oppose torture, and the reality of the use of torture exists due to the way in which attitudes towards American exceptionalism (which were heightened after 9/11) combined with misinformation in the media and pop culture regarding the effectiveness of torture and the identities of those subjected to torture. This dangerous combination formed the conception that torture is an effective tool against agents who threaten “American values,” while disregarding the way in which the American state would degrade its own values by using torture.

Hilde Restad, Associate Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at Bjørknes College has worked extensively on the topic of American Exceptionalism. In her book, American Exceptionalism: An Idea that Made a Nation and Remade the World, she asserts that in the aftermath of 9/11, “the Bush administration communicated a conception of American exceptionalism that set the United States apart from the rest of the world as a leader of a new crusade for democracy, strategically playing on this sense of national identity in order to engender support for specific practices.” This conception of American exceptionalism fell more closely in line with the good-versus-evil rhetoric commonly employed during the Cold War (and particularly the Reagan administration) than the still present, but less overt, ideals of American exceptionalism communicated between the fall of the Soviet Union and the attacks of 9/11. President Bush, Hilde Restad asserts, consistently framed the attacks of September 11, 2001 as an assault on freedom and the United States’ democratic institutions. This rhetoric helped to establish the idea that the United States was the “moral leader in the crusade against terrorism.” The association of fighting terrorism with defending American values treated support for the War on Terror as a test of patriotism, and this tactic was used in 97% of presidential rhetoric immediately following 9/11. It is unsurprising, then, that there was widespread bi-partisan support for the War on Terror.

This rise in the salience of American exceptionalism in U.S. political discourse is exemplified in a 2011 New York Times op-ed addressing a foreign policy debate among that year’s presidential hopefuls. The Times reported, “This is a crowd that’s big on exceptionalism, and not according to its onetime definition: as a reference to the peculiar and advantageous circumstances of our county’s genesis. They’re asserting that we have a unique global standing, our eminence essential and our values worthy of export.” The candidates were not off-base in trying to appeal to American exceptionalism in their campaign rhetoric either, as a 2010 Gallup poll showed that 80 percent of Americans agreed that “because of the United States’ history and Constitution, the United States has a unique character that makes it the greatest country in the world.”

Data also show that, as recently as December 2014, just after the release of the Senate Intelligence Committee’s report on torture (which revealed that the CIA committed acts such as playing “Russian Roulette” with detainees and subjecting them to rectal rehydration), many Americans still believed that the CIA’s treatment of suspected terrorists did not amount to torture and that the torture of suspected terrorists could be justified. Specifically, a Washington Post- ABC news poll revealed that 38 percent of Americans believed that the CIA’s treatment of suspected terrorists did not amount to torture, and 58 percent of Americans believed that torture of suspected terrorists could often or sometimes be justified, additionally 19 percent responded that torture could be justified in rare instances. Of the same group of respondents, 53 percent believed that the use of enhanced interrogation techniques on suspected terrorists produced information that could not have been produced any other way. These types of sentiments are echoed not only by the general public, but also by American soldiers, as a 2007 Washington Post article revealed that at least one-third of American soldiers believed that torture should be allowed if it helps gather important information about insurgents.

These statistics clearly show that, while around three-quarters of Americans believed there to be at least some rare instances that justify torture, the majority of respondents assume that the use of torture or enhanced interrogation techniques can result in information that advances U.S. national security. Unfortunately, and contrary to many Americans’ beliefs, torture does not typically result in reliable information. After the release of the Senate Intelligence Committee’s report on torture, the Washington Post stated that “the report found that more than two dozen detainees were wrongly held, that the program was poorly managed, and that the CIA misled U.S. officials about the effectiveness of the program.” The New York Times also found at least eight specific instances in the report in which CIA claims of torture being effectively used to gain intelligence were shown to be false. The most high profile case in which the CIA lied about the effectiveness of its program was in relation to the killing of Osama bin Laden. In this case, the CIA claimed that information produced under its enhanced interrogation program led to vital information about one of bin Laden’s secret couriers and ultimately aided the now famous 2011 raid that killed the al-Qaeda leader. As it turns out, however, the CIA had information about this courier as early as 2002 and that information had been obtained from a different detainee who had been cooperative from the outset. Furthermore, in 2012, researcher John Scheimann concluded in his paper “Interrogational Torture: Or How Good Guys get Bad Information with Ugly Methods” that, although information from interrogational torture is unreliable, it is likely to be used frequently and harshly.

In addition to, or perhaps because of, this misinformation from the CIA, the idea that torture is a useful and essential tool in obtaining information is prevalent in many contemporary elements of pop culture, which helps explain why so many people find the arguments for torture so convincing. Even recently deceased Supreme Court Justice Anthony Scalia once cited the television show 24 and its main character Jack Bauer as relevant background for constitutional jurisprudence regarding “rough interrogation” methods. He states that “Jack Bauer saved hundreds of lives… Are you going to convict Jack Bauer? Say that criminal law is against him? … I don’t think so.” But as both the Atlantic article where this quote appears, and satirical news anchor John Oliver point out, Jack Bauer is not real, and torture works in shows like 24 because it has to in order to move the plot along.

So although American values, according to academics as well as public officials oppose the use of torture, many actions taken by the United States government, and the Central Intelligence Agency in particular, following 9/11 can be classified as torture. Further, an overwhelming number of Americans think that the use of these techniques was essential in obtaining information relevant to American security and the War on Terror. After 9/11, there was a rise in the frequency of rhetoric on American exceptionalism, framed in the context that the terrorist attacks were the result of hatred for American constitutional freedoms, such as the freedoms of religion, speech, and democratic election. The hatred of these values and freedoms, which 80 percent of Americans believe make the United States the greatest country in the world, now poses a threat to American security and American lives. In post-9/11 America, the pairing of growing support for the idea that the United States is a beacon of democracy, and the greatest country in the world, now threatened by terrorism, with the false information that torture effectively produces intelligence that is crucial to national security can be attributed to the ethical dichotomy in which American ideals are fundamentally opposed to the concept of torture.

The United States’s Uninvited Guest: Legal Pluralism

The United States has found itself on a cultural breaking point. Currently, two major opinions are coexisting—and clashing heavily—in political society. The first is that the U.S. Constitution prohibits the establishment of an official religion, and in larger interpretation the establishment of the U.S. as a “Christian nation”; the second is the prospect of expanding normative and legal pluralism in the U.S., in favor of legislation determined by Christian values. The issue is more complex than it might initially seem; does the installation of Christian laws make a nation Christian, and did the Founding Fathers want such a thing at all? Although the Fathers forbade an established religion, some politicians argue that this does not negate the presence of Christianity in the government overall. This work argues that expansive legal pluralism in general family law has no place in the United States, not only because of the diverse and non-Christian population of the nation, but also because language in the Constitution and philosophical background of the Founders indicates it was not their intention or desire to found a Christian nation, either officially or informally.

It is important to first determine precisely what legal and normative pluralism mean. Norbert Rouland defines legal pluralism as, “the multiplicity of forms of law present within any social field”. In extension, John Griffiths defines the term as:

[O]ne in which law and legal institutions are not all subsumable within one ‘system’ but have their sources in the self-regulatory activities which may support, complement, ignore or frustrate one another, so that the law’ which is actually effective on the ‘ground floor’ of society is the result of enormously complex and usually in practice unpredictable patterns of competition, interaction, negotiation, isolationism and the like.

A functional example of a culture with recognizable legal pluralism is a country with active Sharia Law. An example discussed here will be Jordan. Now, in the most simplistic of terms, Jordan operates with both Sharia and civil courts. Sharia courts have jurisdiction over personal and familial matters such as Diya and matters concerning Islamic Waqfs. The Personal Status Law of 1976, still enforced today, is also based on Sharia law. However, the Sharia courts are meant for the Muslim population of Jordan; a non-Muslim party can only be taken to court in the Sharia system if he or she consents to submitting to the jurisdiction. Non-Muslim Jordanians subscribe strictly to the civil court, unless they choose otherwise.

Normative pluralism simply dictates “a plurality of bearers of value”. The idea is that there is ultimately one primary value; in the case of the U.S., the likely goal of normative pluralism for some lawmakers and citizens is that that value is Christian morality.  Although everyone can be Christian in different ways, and to varying degrees, ultimately that single religion, or single value, prevails amongst a plurality. While normative plurality works clearly within demographics, it is not so easily applied to the entire United States.

In October of 2010, Delaware U.S. Senate candidate Christine O’Donnell questioned the presence of a separation of Church and State being mandatory in the U.S. Constitution. Of course, she was not entirely misled in her questioning: the specific language of “separation of Church and State” does not actually appear in the founding document. In fact, the concept wouldn’t be realized for several years later by Jefferson in a letter. What the First Amendment does say is that the government shall make no law “respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof”. So, if one only considers this particular line from the First Amendment as representative of the Founders’ full opinion, then it is reasonable to assume that while the United States cannot declare an official religion, the inclusion of religious principles, Christian in particular, are not by any means forbidden.

However, this singular reading would be a mistake. The First Amendment is essentially a written guarantee that the government may not compel nor prohibit the exercise of religion in its state. It is as important to note this distinction, as it is to note that the Founders likely did not intend an atheistic nation. Rather, that men and women would practice their religion of choice in their private lives, without the interference, guidance, support, or opposition of the government. After all, the original Puritans of North America had fled religious persecution of a similar nature in England only a century or two prior.

If the value of private practice is maintained, then, normative and legal pluralism in family law cannot reasonably exist in the United States. For while individual households are free to worship at their leisure, protected by the United States, they cannot also be free to dictate the practices of others by legal declaration. The difficulty is two-fold, of course. First, that the U.S. has become vastly more diversified in culture and religion since the Founding Fathers first wrote down their ideas on the conceptualization of their new nation. The second, that it seems rather unlikely that the Founders, spurred on by hopes of religious and economic freedom, and inspired by the ideology of the Enlightenment, would have condoned Christian superiority and dominance at the expense of others.

Attempting to interpret the will of the Founding Fathers is a risky and elusive effort. To guess the wills and opinions of men who cannot be directly asked is a perilous endeavor, but perhaps it is a venture worth pursuing. After all, there is no doubt that the Enlightenment influenced the Fathers—Jefferson alone, in his devotion to the philosophies of John Locke, is evidence enough of it. In one correspondence, John Adams wrote, “Every Species of these Christians would persecute Deists, as soon as either Sect would persecute another, if it had unchecked and unbalanced power. Nay, the Deists would persecute Christians, and Atheists would persecute Deists, with as unrelenting Cruelty, as any Christians would persecute them or one another. Know thyself, Human Nature!”

Adams’s letter, then, returns us to the religious and political speculations of Senator O’Donnell. In her turn with Democratic opponent Chris Coons, she likely thought she was being clever—for Coons could not reasonably argue that the Constitution claimed a separation of Church and State. But that was 2010. Today, although the sentiment of the Christian nation remains, the discourse surrounding that ideal has morphed. In Rafael Cruz’s A Time for Action: Empowering the Faithful to Reclaim America, Rafael’s son, Ted Cruz, wrote the following in his epilogue to the work: What we are really seeing is an increasing hostility to religious liberty, and to Christians in particular”. Given the lack of significant anti-Christian terror in the U.S., it can be largely assumed that this ‘hostility to religious liberty’ may well be the backlash to the assumption that U.S. law should be dictated by Christian religious platforms.

It is worth noting that many of the issues in the U.S. can be summarized by a lack of precision of language. If violation of religious liberty is defined by an inability to dominate U.S. law with that same religion, then the concept of liberty itself has been deeply misconstrued. Religious liberty in the U.S., after all, is the right of individual and private practice. There is, in fact, an argument to be made that the religious liberty of non-Christians is violated when Christianity dictates the decisions of lawmakers concerning the masses.

A separation of Church and State is not demanded by the Constitution, but it is an implied necessity. As evidenced by lawmakers concerning the legislation surrounding abortion, many find it difficult to disassociate their faith from their authoritative powers. In January of 2016, Ted Cruz attended a pro-life rally, accompanied by many other pro-life leaders, including Iowa conservative leader Bob Vander Plaats. At the event, Vander Plaats said, “I don’t know about you, but I know about me, and 2016, this country hungers and thirsts for a spiritual revival. To turn our hearts back to God, his principle and his precepts”. Cruz himself stated, “Every human life is a precious gift from God and should be protected from the moment of conception until the moment of nature death,” which wouldn’t be such a complicated thing—he is, of course, entitled to hold any given opinion—except that he is also running for one of the most authoritatively powerful positions in the entire world. Cruz and Vander Plaats hold similar opinions to many in the pro-life crowd; their collective voice seek to eliminate Planned Parenthood as an accessible health center for women, and more importantly, to eliminate abortion as a legal medical procedure for those in the U.S. seeking the service.

Politics aside, the issue here is not one of opinion, religion, or even autonomy. It is an issue of language. Private practice is no longer private when one seeks to eliminate the right to choice of other individuals because of their personal prerogatives. An argument exists that the very legality of abortion violates the religious liberty of some Christians—however, this position is not without its fallacies. The primary one of interest here is that this sentiment does not fundamentally align with the nation that the opinion exists in. If the possession of certain rights violates one’s sense of personal liberty, and only nationally enforced laws of religious foundation can right one’s sensibilities, then the United States cannot be a nation of contended residential choice.

Legal plurality in the U.S. simply does not align with the language of its foundations, whatever the current interests of contemporary Christians may be. Even if the Fathers did not declare a separation in those precise words, the first Amendment is not vague on its demands concerning a limitation of religious imposition on others. If legal decisions such as abortion and the institution of marriage are determined based predominately on the religious values of a demographic, then those legislators are in violation of the intentions of the Constitution. The religious prerogatives of politicians cannot determine the lives and decisions of the masses, particularly if there is not a normative pluralism amongst the entire population in favor of such a trend.

The New Face of American Populism

The rhetoric surrounding Presidential elections and politics in the U.S. has evolved in some ways, devolved in some ways, and stayed the same in other ways as time has gone on. Populist rhetoric, used notably George Wallace in the 1960’s in opposition to the civil rights movement, has taken a new form today. While most candidates in this present election appeal to populist attitudes and use populist arguments in some form, one candidate in particular has a brand of populism that fits traditionally with that of the 19th Century U.S. People’s Party and that of George Wallace in the 1960’s. Donald Trump has used familiar techniques to push his way to the top of the Republican field. These techniques are eerily similar to those used in the past, but that have also evolved into something new that is unique to Trump and American politics in this era.

It is important to note exactly what “populism” is in this context and why it is relevant to discussion of political discourse today. When the word populism is used it is usually used pejoratively. The phrase has dozens of meanings depending on its context. In this context however, populism refers to a specific type of political tactic. The essence of populism has several different layers. In general it relates to the pitting of an evil elite group of society against the good common man. Populism also has underlying principles among them being; a rejection of the rule of law but the belief in the moral preferences of the majority as absolute, a belief in the honest labor of the producers of society and a negative view of those who do not fit this work ethic, and a belief in the revitalization of national ideals (i.e. Making America Great Again).

There are certain dangers associated with this type of speech. Above all is the tendency of populist speech to degrade proper civil discourse. It tends to focus more on becoming in tune with common citizen ideals instead of focusing on what is beneficial for the country as a whole or what is the best policy. Populist rhetoric tends to fuel emotions rather than reason. The populism today of Mr. Trump has these undertones in common with the populism of George Wallace in the 60’s, showing a continuing trend of effective populist tactics.

Trump’s and Wallace’s Populism

When discussing policy and political ideas, the constitution is only mentioned by Trump and Wallace when it suits them. To them, the most important staple of democracy is majority rule, the beliefs of the common man. Thought like this tends to favor the views of the majority over the rights of minorities. Take for example Trump’s calls for the surveillance of the Muslim population, or Wallace’s calls for “segregation forever” despite previous Supreme Court rulings and the rights of those effected by segregation.

The sanctity of the working man, or the producers of society, is held by both leaders. Wallace used the tax system as a means to pit the working class against the poor/lower classes. He explained how the tax system stripped the working class of their hard earned money and was used to feed to poor. Similarly, Trump takes a stand against undocumented immigration on the grounds that American citizens are forced to pay tax dollars to undocumented immigrants and the grounds that immigrants entering the U.S. could burden the welfare system. The claims of both are generally not supported with evidence, but that is not the point. The speech sounds good and feeds into the idea of the common, struggling, working man fighting against an unfair system that does not respect his values.

These two leaders have another more ominous commonality between their rhetoric. As discussed before, populist rhetoric does not usually examine the affects and usefulness of policies, but how well they fit into the structural model of the populist’s version of how society is doing. This type of thought requires scapegoats to use as a means of transferring blame. When a policy needs to be put in place but has no real function, a scapegoat is needed. For example Trump needed to offer a policy of Muslim surveillance, so the stories of the Muslim community in New Jersey celebrating the fall of the world trade center were invented. Just as when Wallace needed to implement segregationist polices for political purposes myths about the negative effects of integration were circulated. Furthermore both leaders used the threat of violence and the plight of protesters to further their agenda. Wallace rallies contained violence against counter protesters and used the mocking of protesters as a means of communicating with supporters. Today we see the same atmosphere of violence surrounding Trump rallies and the same contempt for protesters, which takes away from the process of true discourse surrounding policies and ideas.

Where Trump Diverges From Traditional Populism

Trump undoubtedly has his own brand of politics. Very few politicians communicate the way he does and his type of campaigning has completely changed the way American political discourse is carried out. Regarding his brand of populism, he differs in some ways from past populists.

Most notably is Trumps image as a billionaire. Trump not only is a billionaire, but he flaunts this trait while still claiming to be a man of the common people. This is interesting because it breaks with previous tradition. Normally a populist would want to be viewed as one of the people they are representing. However, in Trumps brand of populism he is able to connect with the common man yet still flaunt his elitism. This is likely due to his pull yourself up by your own bootstraps ethic. Meaning that he is viewed as a common man who just happened to work hard enough to become wealthy.

Secondly Trump has changed the intellectual nature of political discourse. Populists in the past although they did not necessary use logic and reason to choose policies, they did lace their rhetoric with pseudo-intellectual talk that glossed over the nature of their speech. With Trump he does not use this tactic. His speeches are filled with one-liners, contradictions, and no clear political philosophy. This could be an anomaly with Trump, or it could be indicating a change in the nature of the American voter. Social media, twitter, and headline news has made us hungry for quick information without regard for analysis of the issues at hand. Perhaps, Trumps rhetoric is just a manifestation of the decline in the public’s desire for proper civil discourse.

Legal and Human Rights Abuses of the Obama Administration’s Drones

The Obama administration has largely abandoned one of the most vital elements of governmental responsibility in lieu of national security. The protection of human rights has become an afterthought in the wake of the administration’s foreign policy on drones since President Obama took office in 2008. Although the government will not confirm or deny any specific casualty numbers, independent research groups have found that as of 2014, the United States had carried out at least 400 drone strikes since Obama took office, killing upwards of 2,600 people. From 2009-2012 the Obama administration carried out at least 239 covert drone strikes, a significant increase from the 44 strikes approved under George W. Bush. These strikes violate not only international human rights law, but international humanitarian law--the laws of war--and are the cause of increasing international legal scrutiny against the United States, as well as civil outrage across the world.

In 2008, when Obama took the oath of office, few would have associated the young President with the term “targeted killings,” but these often clandestine counterterrorism operations have become one of the most prominent and controversial characteristics of the Obama administration’s reign. To date, the United States is known to have carried out targeted killings using drones in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen. Many of these operations have breached international human rights and humanitarian laws, have violated certain articles of the United Nations Charter, and are arguably infringing on the national sovereignty of the states in which these strikes are conducted. While drones have supposedly been effective in targeting specific militants that the Administration claims could not have been killed without their use, the large civilian death toll violates human rights so gravely that it renders the policy morally unfeasible, no matter its reported efficacy.

International humanitarian law, also known as the law of war, applies to all states in armed conflicts, or any state in conflict with an armed non-state actor. For an attack to be lawful, it must discriminate between combatants and civilians and “the expected loss of civilian life or property cannot be disproportionate to the anticipated military gain of the attack.” While all attacks that cause civilian deaths violate the laws of war, attacks that target civilians, are indiscriminate, or cause disproportionate civilian casualties do violate these laws.

The Obama administration’s drone strikes have frequently violated one or more of these stipulations. Obama has asserted that the United States strikes only when it has “near-certainty” that no civilians will be harmed. However, a Human Rights Watch investigation of seven U.S. drone operations in Yemen found clear violations of international humanitarian law in two attacks, one of which killed 14 militants and 42 sleeping citizens. The Obama administration evidently contradicts its position that it resorts to targeted killings by drones only when civilian lives are almost certainly safe from harm. “The U.S. says it is taking all possible precautions during targeted killings, but it has unlawfully killed civilians and struck questionable military targets in Yemen,” said Letta Tayler, senior terrorism and counterterrorism researcher at Human Rights Watch. The second unlawful strike identified by Human Rights Watch killed 12 civilians coming home from the market. The other five drone strikes targeted cars in a wedding procession, killing 12 men and wounding 15 others. Although the Obama administration may claim otherwise, the undoubted awareness of civilian loss of life suggests the indiscriminate nature of these attacks.  Each attack was indiscriminate and caused disproportionate civilian loss of life—each of these attacks represented violations of international humanitarian law.

These unconscionable acts of unmitigated violence are not going unnoticed in the states in which they are perpetrated. Terrorist organizations are growing each day, likely in response to the violence caused by American drone strikes. Malala Yousafzai, 18-year-old Nobel Peace Prize winner and survivor of a Taliban assassination attempt, spoke to the Obama administration about the drone strikes in her home country of Pakistan. She claims that drone strikes only cause more violence: “I expressed my concerns that drone attacks are fueling terrorism. Innocent victims are killed in these acts, and they lead to resentment among the Pakistani people.”

While the law prohibits states from targeting civilians, individuals “directly participating in the hostilities” are not legally immune from state aggression. This condition has multiple interpretations, and the United States seems to be exploiting this fact. Human Rights Watch claims, “It is generally accepted to include not only persons currently engaged in fighting, but also individuals actively planning or directing future military operations.” But the United States may be using an “overly elastic” definition of an individual who may be lawfully attacked during an armed conflict, according to Human Rights Watch. A November 2012 drone strike in a military town in Yemen killed an alleged al-Qaeda recruiter in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), even though recruiting activities alone are not sufficient legal grounds under the laws of war to target someone for attack, because recruiters themselves are not the ones carrying out attacks that can be considered “imminent threats.” While Obama’s policy guidelines state that the U.S. conducts strikes only against individuals who pose an “imminent threat to the American people,” and when capture is not feasible, the administration has evidently not been accountable on either of these standards.

The Peshawar High Court (PHC), the highest judicial institution of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, one of the four Pakistani provinces, ruled in 2013 that the United States drone strikes in Pakistan breached national sovereignty, were in violation of provisions of the Geneva Conventions and the UN Charter, and were in “blatant violation of Basic Human Rights.” Article 2(4) of the UN Charter strictly prohibits “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state…” The PHC determined the United State violated Pakistani sovereignty based on this Article, taking into account opposition to the strikes by the president of Pakistan, the prime minister, his cabinet, and parliament.

The court cited 1,449 civilian deaths and 335 civilian injuries since 2008 in the North and South Waziristan, concluding that the majority of individuals killed have been civilians. The PHC referenced provisions of the Genocide Convention as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to legitimize their rulings that these killings violated the laws of war. A further legal opinion given by international legal authority Francis Boyle determined that the "murderous drone campaign is both widespread and systematic and thus qualifies as a crime against humanity that verges on genocide.”

The United States has, moreover, failed to meet its international legal obligations in its lack of transparency and accountability in regard to drone strikes. According to the European Court of Human Rights, “There must be a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its results to secure accountability in practice as well as in theory, maintain public confidence in the authorities’ adherence to the rule of law and prevent any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts.” The lack of transparency does not just give the U.S. a negative international standing, it is against UN policy. Article 51 of the UN Charter states that “measures taken by Members in the exercise of [their] right to self-defense…be immediately reported to the Security Council.” The United States has not made any such report. Unmasking the secrecy surrounding the program and enforcing accountability, especially where civilian casualties occur, is crucial both morally and legally. That the Obama administration has prioritized a stringent, often excessive foreign policy on counterterrorism over basic human rights is abhorrent.

Beyond its violations of the laws of war, the United States' use of drones does not conform to international human rights law, which is defined in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a state’s duty to respect, protect, and fulfil human rights. Particularly sidestepped by the Obama administration is the legal obligation under this Declaration to “protect individuals and groups against human rights abuses.” In recent years, and in response to human rights groups and other pressures, the U.S. has succeeded in reducing the proportion of civilian casualties to militant casualties. However, because of increased operations the total number of human rights violations by civilian deaths has showed no significant decline.

The use of drones for targeted killings does have certain advantages. Drones can help minimize civilian casualties in comparison to manned aircraft operations, and can have enhanced surveillance capabilities that, in theory, allow for a more thorough and accurate strike. But the use of drones, as has been demonstrated in the U.S., can be “hampered by poor intelligence or local actors’ manipulation.” There are also no safeguards in place to ensure that these attacks are completely lawful and appropriate. According to a Justice Department white paper from 2011, any person, including any citizen of the United States, can be targeted and killed if an “informed, high-level official” believes that person poses an “imminent threat of violent attack” and capture is not “feasible.” Citizens of the U.S. have fallen victim to this unbridled display of power, including Anwar al-Awlaki, former al-Qaeda propagandist and United States citizen, who was killed in Yemen in 2011. The 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force Act (AUMF) played a major role in the decision to target and kill al-Awlaki, and this law is as broad as it is controversial. The AUMF is not bound by geographic or temporal limitations, raising many questions about the safety of Americans within the United States. If the Obama administration believes an individual is acting against the United States, regardless of citizenship, location, or time of involvement with an anti-American force, that person is subject to being targeted and killed. Al-Awlaki was the first known U.S. citizen deliberately targeted and killed by an American drone strike, but he may not be the last. The administration’s official policy is that the AUMF should “ultimately be repealed” but does not support its immediate repeal.

The Justice Department white paper that outlined the ability to attack does not disclose who qualifies as a high-level official, what information is necessary to be considered informed, or what qualifies as evidence for a targeted attack to take place. The paper also does not outline the exact definition of an imminent threat. These holes in policy represent only some of the many transparency and accountability violations that are needed in order for the United States’ drone strikes to be considered legal on the basis of international humanitarian law.

The Obama administration has targeted and killed more militants that it believes to be threats to national security via drone strikes than any other administration. Yet this administration has also killed more innocent civilians through drone strikes than any other. These attacks have turned families in Pakistan, Yemen, and several other states into “terrorist sympathizers” and have fueled more anti-American sentiment than ever before. The United States has violated both international humanitarian law and international human rights law in these attacks, setting a dangerous precedent that promotes an abusive foreign policy, while simultaneously undercutting its ability to criticize others’ ability to exercise similar attacks.

The administration’s use of drone strikes has been exceptionally opaque, with covert missions as the norm rather than the exception. No pre-strike or post-strike assessments of civilian harm have been confirmed or presented to the Security Council as mandated by the UN Charter, fostering a dangerous custom without investigation or accountability. No meaningful safeguards against abuse or error currently exist, propagating human rights violations with each strike. Human rights have become an afterthought in the wake of the Obama administration’s foreign policy on drone strikes. It is time to ask the crucial question, “Are we creating new terrorists faster than we can kill them?”

Violence in the Schoolhouse: The State of Corporal Punishment

Corporal punishment was the preferred method to keep America’s students in line for much of American history. Paddling, spanking, and other forms of violent punishment have slowly been replaced by other techniques such as positive reinforcement. However, today corporal punishment still exists in many American schools, with disastrous consequences for youths, families, and the United States as a whole. These consequences range from mental and physical harm to children, a tarnished international image, harm to families, and a discriminatory punishment system.

Where Does Corporal Punishment in American Schools Stand Today?

Corporal punishment has existed for many centuries. It was used in the Middle Ages to punish school children and until 1948 was used in Britain to punish minor criminal offenders. Some infamous examples of corporal punishment include the flogging of Christ and the use of flogging by the British navy during the 18th century.

The good news is that corporal punishment is on the decline. During the 2006-2007 school year 223,190 students received corporal punishment in comparison to approximately 1.5 million students in 1976. However, nineteen states (shaded red in Figure 1 below) still allow corporal punishment.

Why Should The U.S. Ban Corporal Punishment?

Aside from the more obvious arguments against corporal punishment, such as the negative effects on children’s ability to learn and so on, the administration of corporal punishment has discriminatory factors associated with it. Table 1 below outlines some striking statistics. Overall, African Americans disproportionately receive twice the amount of corporal punishments that their percentage of school population would suggest. It is hard to convince young African American students to behave in school when they are unfairly administered corporal punishment by their discipliners.

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Table 1: Corporal punishment minority statistics

Differently abled students also bear an unfair burden. One study showed that in Tennessee disabled students are twice as likely to be paddled as their peers. This is especially true for students on the autism spectrum, since their disability interferes with their ability to follow what would otherwise be considered appropriate social behavioral norms.

Aside from the discriminatory nature of corporal punishment, the negative effects on children are severe and sometimes irreversible. A study by the Brookings Institution revealed that students who are subject to corporal punishment at a young age are more likely to abuse drugs or alcohol. These students are also more likely to imitate such abuse later in life through domestic violence or emotionally abusive relationships with their children. The study claims that these students “may learn to associate violence with power or getting one’s own way.” Children who are punished physically—regularly or severely—are more likely to develop mental health issues later in life.

Corporal punishment can be physically devastating for children as well. According to Time magazine, “[t]he Society for Adolescent Medicine has documented [...] severe muscle injury, extensive blood-clotting (hematomas), whiplash damage and hemorrhaging” in cases of corporal punishment. These gruesome injuries have sometimes caused parents to give up jobs to homeschool their children, thereby negatively affecting students’ family lives. Not to mention that these injuries unnecessarily contribute to skyrocketing healthcare costs when they require medical attention.

The effects that corporal punishment has on students boil down to one simple fact: in the United States of America—one of the most developed and democratic states in the world—one of the only groups of citizens who can be beaten legally are school children. This, of course, exhibits a terrible confusion of our priorities.

The last reason for banning corporal punishment is the simple fact of embarrassment. Over 70 nations worldwide have laws that explicitly prohibit corporal punishment in schools. The United Nations has criticized countries that still allow corporal punishment saying that “there is no doubt that corporal punishment is a violation of children’s rights under the Convention on the Rights of the Child because it is constitutive of violence that causes . . . suffering.” That the U.S. has not ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child is further proof of its negligent policy towards children. Therefore, the U.S. should A) ratify the Convention, and B) respect its basic obligations towards its citizens under the age of 18.

If Corporal Punishment Were to Be Banned, How Would We Do It?

A simple answer would be for schools to just stop doing it. No law requires schools to paddle or hit children. However, with that route being perhaps too far away, legal action seems necessary.

States without specific regulations prohibiting corporal punishment could amend their laws to define it and outlaw it. These states should take a similar route as Iowa and New Jersey, for instance, both of which ban the practice in both public and private schools. As Figure 1 showed, the states in which corporal punishment still lingers are typically more conservative states. This is not a coincidence, Republicans in general tend to view the practice more favorably. So all else being equal, passing laws in these states will be theoretically more difficult than passing laws in more left-leaning states that do not already ban it.

The federal government could use its spending power to incentivize schools or state governments to ban the practice. A program similar to Race to the Top or to a statute such as Title IX where schools will lose funding if they do not abide by prohibitions on corporal punishment could be effective. Alternatively, and to the benefit of those in the disabled community, Congress could introduce an amendment to the Americans with Disabilities Act that specifically protects disabled students from corporal punishment in schools. If a lawsuit arose that claimed that corporal punishment constituted child abuse, and was thus unconstitutional, the Supreme Court could overturn its 1977 ruling that allowed corporal punishment via the “Trop” standard which allows for evolving standards of decency in America society or another similar mechanism.

Regardless of which legal or social path is taken to end corporal punishment in American schools, it needs to be done quickly. Hundreds of thousands of students are affected every year and this practice is clearly detrimental to society.

Comparative Analysis of Bush and Obama Pre- and Post-9/11 Strategies

Background

On September 11, 2001, 19 Islamic terrorists from Saudi Arabia and several other Arab nations associated with the Islamic extremist group al-Qaeda hijacked four American aircrafts and carried out suicide attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. Two planes were flown into the towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, a third plane struck the Pentagon outside of Washington, and the fourth plane crashed in a field in Pennsylvania, its target unknown but suspected to be the White House or the Capitol Building in Washington. The attacks killed over 3,000 people, including more than 400 police officers and firefighters, and seriously injured over 10,000 others. The attacks on 9/11 triggered major U.S. initiatives to combat terrorism and were the basis for the Iraq and Afghan wars. On the night of 9/11, President George W. Bush gave an ominous address from the Oval Office in which he stated, “We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.”

The Build to September 11th

During Bill Clinton’s Presidency in 1998, the United Nations inspection agency withdrew from Baghdad in protest of Saddam Hussein’s unwillingness to cooperate with inspection measures. President Clinton then called on American Armed Forces to strike military and security targets in Iraq due to the belief that Hussein was harboring weapons of mass destruction (WMD); the President stated that Hussein’s reluctance to cooperate with inspections presented “a clear and present danger to the stability of the Persian Gulf and the safety of people everywhere.” The U.S. pledged to enact a long-term strategy of containment toward Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction, but at no point did the Clinton administration consider an operation specifically designed to overthrow Hussein’s regime.

In December of 2000, President Clinton told President-Elect George W. Bush that the biggest threat to be concerned with would be al Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden. In January of 2001, soon-to-be Vice President Dick Cheney met with Pentagon national security officials to discuss Iraq; the Pentagon reported to Cheney that Saddam Hussein was contained and isolated, and that there was no need for any aggressive action against him, and that acting otherwise would “immediately engender strong opposition in the region and throughout the world.” However, the Bush administration did not agree with the Pentagon’s sentiments nor did it share President Clinton’s concern with al Qaeda. The Administration instead prioritized China’s increasing military power and the desire to oust Saddam Hussein from power. Former national coordinator for security, infrastructure protection, and counterterrorism in the Clinton administration Richard Clarke was appointed as a special advisor to the NSC by Bush and was startled at the lack of attention that was being placed on al Qaeda by the new Administration. He told his colleagues that the terrorist organization was “clearly planning a major series of attacks against us” and that they “must act decisively and quickly” against imminent attacks. The President’s advisors did not believe Clark’s warnings and said he was giving bin Laden “too much credit.” Throughout the summer months of 2001, the CIA repeatedly warned of imminent attacks by bin Laden on American facilities. On May 1, June 22, 23, and 25, intelligence briefs issued by the CIA warned of imminent attacks. Bush disregarded the warnings.

Strategy of President Bush

Immediately following the attacks, Bush and his advisors met with the CIA to discuss strategy. It was debated whether the focus moving forward should be on the destruction of al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden or against terrorism more broadly. The CIA director of counterterrorism argued that the Taliban and al Qaeda needed to be jointly eliminated, due to the intricate entwinement between the two groups. The topic was continuously tabled, but finally, after continuous pressure from the President to develop a concrete plan of attack rapidly, a decision was made.

President Bush’s first objective in the wake of 9/11 was to topple the Taliban regime and attack al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Thus, Operation Enduring Freedom was the first initiative launched by the President. On October 7, 2001, the U.S., with assistance from Australia, France, and the United Kingdom, carried out air strikes on Taliban and al Qaeda targets in an attempt to stop the Taliban from harboring al Qaeda, and to stop al Qaeda from using Afghanistan as a base for operations. Due to the U.S.-led effort in Afghanistan, the Taliban was forced to relinquish power and the state was renamed the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. However, by the time the allied forces took over the capital, most high-ranking Taliban and al Qaeda officials had escaped to Pakistan. Within two years, Taliban forces launched a counteroffensive. Within five years, Bush had almost doubled the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan from 26,607 to 48,250.

His second goal was to oust Saddam Hussein, the 5th President of Iraq, in order to “prevent him from developing weapons of mass destruction” and to help Iraq create a stable democratic regime. The President and his advisors were set on the idea that Hussein was attempting to recreate the state’s nuclear program that had been eliminated after the Gulf Wars. The Bush Administration was desperate to make a connection between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, even though top CIA officials and International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) officials insisted that there was absolutely no evidence that Hussein was rebuilding a nuclear program, and that connections between Hussein and al Qaeda were weak. Bush, however, did not accept these claims and continued to press on in order to create a rhetoric that Hussein and al Qaeda were inexplicably linked, and that Hussein was an imminent threat to freedom and U.S. security. Perhaps a more truthful rationale for the Administration’s invasion of Iraq was the desire to democratize the region in order to enhance Israel’s security. Another interest that was severely under-articulated was the United States’ long-standing dependence on Persian Gulf oil. The Bush Administration believed that if Iraq were to have a nuclear weapon, Hussein would be in a position to gain control over a large segment of the world’s oil reserves. Eighteen months after the 9/11 attacks, Bush authorized the invasion of Iraq. The war against Iraq was extremely unsuccessful; it lasted much longer than estimated—formally ending in December 2011—and cost the U.S., Iraq, and the entire Middle East more lives and money than projected. Conflict in both Afghanistan and Iraq continued at the end of Bush’s second term in office, leaving Barack Obama with the remainder of two complicated, costly, and contentious wars.

Strategy of President Obama

President Obama inherited the failed attempts to reform both the Afghan and Iraqi governments and to rid the Taliban of its power. By 2009, the Taliban had fled Afghanistan into neighboring Pakistan. Drug trade in Afghanistan had become a $4 billion business, and the Taliban used the money to fund its insurgency against the Afghan government and the occupying forces. Al Qaeda had also secured safe havens in Pakistani tribal regions. Obama’s first move was to send Vice President Joe Biden to Pakistan to meet with President Asif Ali Zardari to secure diplomatic ties with the government and to emphasize the important role Pakistan had in the Afghanistan conflict, which, unlike Bush’s Administration, was to be the Obama Administration’s focus. Zardari expressed concerns at the anti-American sentiment in the country, and said that helping the U.S. would create hatred toward the Pakistani government unless there was something in it for the people. He requested economic resources so that he could justify supporting the U.S. and Biden did not object.

The next stop was a meeting in Afghanistan with President Hamid Karzai. Karzai expressed that the Afghani people did not want Americans to leave the country because they were there fighting terrorism, but that civilian casualties were a concern. He stated that an additional 30,000 American troops would make the efforts more successful. Biden was hesitant. Obama’s first decision as president was to commission a sixty-day review of the Iraq war, since additional troops were likely to be needed in Afghanistan, and a drawdown in Iraq would be necessary to supply the additional forces. Obama called on advisors to come up with strategies for Afghanistan, because if more troops were needed in the country, he would need a set plan in order to validate further involvement. The debate went back and forth between sending an additional 17,000 troops or 30,000 troops, and Obama took the time necessary to hear from multiple sources about what the best plan of action would be. After several days to think on the final strategies, Obama approved the request for an additional 17,000 troops, knowing that without more Americans on the ground, the Afghan elections would probably not be possible.

In late March of 2009, Obama announced that the U.S. would help Pakistan battle al Qaeda, but Pakistan had to “demonstrate its commitment to rooting out al Qaeda and the violent extremists within its borders.” He also announced that the U.S. would send 4,000 troops to Afghanistan to train and enhance the Afghan army and police force, and that economic and social aid would be sent to the country.

Bush vs. Obama and Present Day

Several key differences between the Bush and Obama administrations can be noted at this point in the War on Terror timeline: President Bush was bent on ousting Saddam Hussein and focusing on Iraq rather than on Afghanistan. At the start of his Presidency, Obama made it clear that stabilizing Afghanistan and attacking the Taliban in neighboring regions would be the chief objective. Bush was also less receptive to information that went against his own personal beliefs about how the war should be fought, as well as what was truly happening in the region. No matter which senior official told the President that there was absolutely no evidence that a nuclear program was being reestablished in Iraq under Hussein, Bush and his advisors continued to push the discourse until it became accepted and acted upon. Obama, although reluctant to send additional troops into Afghanistan, listened to all opinions and encouraged dissenting voices at the table. In deciding how to continue in Afghanistan, Obama said, “I’m a big believer in continually updating our analysis and relying on a constant feedback loop. Don’t bite your tongue. Everybody needs to say what’s on their mind.” There was not as much pressure to act quickly under Obama; Bush was fixated on the idea of responding with concrete action within days of the attacks, but Obama was more determined to act with strategy and purpose, even if that meant a delay in action.

Although the experience of these wars has, obviously, been negative, and billions of dollars and thousands of lives have been lost since 2001 when the war began, retrenchment is not an option for several reasons and on several fronts. In regard to Afghanistan, stability will continue to decrease as U.S. forces decrease in the region. Total retrenchment would be the most extreme, and worst, scenario. In 2015 Afghan security forces, including local police, suffered a 70 percent increase in casualties compared to 2014. The average count of casualties per week currently stands at around 330. This increase in violence is directly related to the decrease of foreign aid and military services. The toxic combination of a new unstable government with leaders who have not yet been proven trustworthy, and the simultaneous withdrawal of U.S. troops is increasing the likelihood of a resurgent Taliban and potentially wasting years of war and the American lives lost during the conflict. The withdrawal at this critical yet sensitive time in Afghanistan’s move toward stabilization also provides the perfect breeding ground for ISIL to gain power and control. While difficult and messy war efforts that last longer and cost more than expected are not the ideal reality for any nation’s foreign policy, isolationist strategies would not bode well for the international community either. The globalized world is as interconnected as it is interdependent, and the United States’ deep involvement in all regions of the world is important and necessary. The capacity of that involvement, however, may change over time.

The Discourse Surrounding Internment of United States Citizens: Action Derived From Fear as a Departure from Liberal Democracy

As the world enters its second decade of the new century, crises across the globe are driving people to take refuge from their home countries. Old fears concerning terrorism, as well as current realities about violence and prejudice pose a significant problem for United States politicians: should refugee programs for Muslims be banned on the basis of national security, just as World War II fears produced Japanese internment camps? This paper will not explore the moral justification—or lack thereof—for the implementation of Japanese internment camps during WWII, or for the banning of Muslim refugees. Instead, it will discuss how the decisions of World War II, and the revival of new discussions of ethnically biased policies, contradict liberal democratic political theory in the United States. Liberal democratic theory is at the core of the United States’ political doctrine; it drives the Constitution, the structure, and the ideology of both the government and the people. The contradiction of these values and ideologies is not only a troubling departure from foundational liberal democratic principles, but potentially signal a decline in the political stability of the nation itself as the American people sink more deeply into polarized positions and increasingly neglect objective evaluation of political candidates from either major party.

In the U.S., there exists a divide between the intentions of politicians for the societies they wish to create and lead, and the reality of the political and social atmospheres garnered by the more diverse American peoples. These differences reflect the further, profound difference between the United States’ liberal democratic foundations, and the reality of its lack of democratic representation. Liberal democracy is defined here as a political theory founded on representative democracy, where the government is formed of elected representatives whose power is restrained by both the law and the constitution, both of which serve to protect the rights and freedoms of individuals and are supported by the majority of the state. Of course, the United States is not a perfect liberal democracy. The theoretical justifications for the values and legal attitudes of the nation that can be—and are—threatened by the proposed decisions of the few who hold power.

The Syrian refugee crisis has given way to rhetoric by some United States politicians that is both anti-refugee and, more generally, anti-Islamic. In recent years, conflict has arisen in Syria, The civil war began in spring 2011 when pro-democracy protests erupted across the nation in opposition to the authoritarian regime of President Bashar al-Assad; the President used violent, militaristic methods to suppress opposition efforts, including murder. Since then, conflict has raged between the government and opposition militias, as well as the rise of a third antagonist, ISIS, a radical non-state terrorist actor in the region. All of these threats have culminated in the displacement of Syrian civilians, who have now gained refugee status as they flee their civil war-torn country. The potential for the reinstitution of internment camps for those peacefully seeking refuge in America based on race and religion both represents the state’s increasing political polarization and its departure from the values of liberal democracy that upon which the United States was founded. The complexity of the situation is most apparent when the security argument is considered: does the nation prioritize perceptions of security, or philosophical foundations rooted in the Constitution, during times of crisis? This question might seem rhetorical and self-evident to people on either side of the argument; the ideological conflict at hand here is best exemplified by the U.S. policy decisions made during World War II concerning Japanese-American citizens.

The U.S. first interred civilians during WWII following the Japanese attach on Pearl Harbor, a measure intended to improve security, but which did little else beyond dividing otherwise equal citizens and violating the fundamental theories of liberty and freedom otherwise promoted by the concepts of democracy. In a 1942 film produced by the US Office of War Information, Japanese Relocation, Milton Eisenhower’s narration sets the tone for the official opinion on U.S. action. Eisenhower’s explanation of the motivations for the internment, could easily translate into today’s anti-Muslim immigration discourses by substituting a few key words. The original states:

When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, our West Coast became a potential combat zone. Living in that zone were more than 100,000 persons of Japanese ancestry; two thirds of them American citizens; one third aliens. We knew that some among them were potentially dangerous. But no one knew what would happen among this concentrated population if Japanese forces should try to invade our shores. Military authorities therefore determined that all of them, citizens and aliens alike, would have to move.

The legal basis for the internment of Japanese U.S. citizens and non-citizens alike derives from Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066, which came two months after the attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent declaration of war against.  Executive Order 9066 was declared after the United States had formally declared war and was motivated by determined necessity founded on fear of future attacks and national insecurity. The trouble was, legal basis had been developed around racial motivations in order to support it; legal foundations in the Constitution did not support the xenophobic ideas on security being purported at the time, and so those in power created the necessary legal foundation through Supreme Court decisions such as Hirabayashi v. United States, executive orders, and influential media coverage of the conflict.

Ansel Adams, a photographer of the period who was critical of the executive order, noted that by June 1943, the Office of War Information reported that Nazi agents, not Japanese Americans, who aided the Japanese in carrying out their attack on Pearl Harbor—the rhetoric of security perpetuated at this time was proven wrong. In this case, fear determined the guilt of Japanese Americans before the facts had been appropriately investigated and considered; and, thus, a narrative of the danger that Japanese Americans posed took hold of public perception and ended up oppressing innocent civilians. This fear-based/security-obsessed narrative ultimately led to the forced internment of more than 120,000 Japanese Americans in the Pacific Coastal region, most of whom lost their jobs, possessions, and land, all with little guarantee of their full or partial return following the conclusion of internment.

Today, U.S. political discourse encounters the same methods of abusing the public’s insecurities in order to advance and justify extreme and xenophobic notions of how the country should be governed.  Following recent terrorist attacks in San Bernardino, California and Paris, France—both connected with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)—2016 Presidential candidate Donald Trump advocated a ban on allowing identified Muslims into the United States. Understanding the motivation behind the urge to stop the refugee program is vital to understanding its significance to the theoretical underpinnings of U.S. politics. David Bowers, the mayor of Roanoke Virginia, issued an early statement advocating the refusal of Syrian refugees to his region of the state:

I’m reminded that President Franklin D. Roosevelt felt compelled to sequester Japanese foreign nationals after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, and it appears that the threat of harm to America from ISIS now is just as real and serious as that from our enemies then.

The real and serious threat that Bowers is referring to, however, is unfounded in the wake of the Parisian attacks considering that the perpetrators were European radicals, not moderate Syrians or Muslims. As Adams noted during his work covering the Japanese internment camps, fear of Japanese American spies would fail to become tangible. In a similar way, security concerns regarding Syrian and Muslim immigrants to the U.S. fail because of the tenuous link between extremist ideology and everyday civilians; not all Muslims or Syrian refugees are dangerous, and so to criminalize all members of one demographic is disproportionately xenophobic. Consider the writings of a theorist behind liberal democratic theory, John Locke. In Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration, he argued that churches should have no coercive power over their members, and that there could be no true religion for a state; he wrote of the separation of legislative and executive powers, and furthermore that a government could not exist without the consent of its people to protect and govern it. Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau shared similar notions concerning the relationship between government and people, in fact.

The executive order authorizing the internment camps came at a time of inter-state war that inspired high levels of fear and national insecurity for the state of democracy; Trump’s remarks and the attempted policies of both governors and mayors represent a resurgence of fear-based political discourse based on a fear of refugees and the threats more directly faced by those abroad. There is a sense of irony in that the United States has nearly always proclaimed itself a land without religious oppression. Puritans came from England with motive to practice their religion in peace, and the first amendment of the Constitution forbids the impediment of the freedom of religion.

Although school systems teach the values of the U.S. Constitution—freedom of speech, freedom of religion, civil rights such as voting and desegregation amongst races—the impression that many may have of the active applicability of these rights may be misaligned with the desired reality of those vying for power.  The possibility arises that these protections once deemed inalienable may only be selectively extended. Of the Republican presidential candidates, Jeb Bush and Ted Cruz have recommended that the Syrian refugee program be continued, but that the program should only accept Christian refugees. While no politicians have formally recommended the internment of Muslim-American citizens or of Syrian refugees, their discrimination in terms of their immigration policies sends a concerning message to the U.S. While the United States government may not directly endanger them yet, political discourses based on fear sets a dangerous precedent for policies that may come further down the road.

Embracing a rhetoric that threatens to divide the American people from the values their country was founded on compromises the political stability of the United States as a whole, as ethnically-motivated policies may lead to political polarization, However, the danger comes from public opinion itself, which has become so divided that only 39% of Americans share a somewhat equal number of liberal and conservative positions. As it currently stands, the two-party system in the U.S. grows increasingly polarized, supported by politicians and citizens alike—the fundamental lack of civil discussion on the political spectrum itself can produce the level of instability suggested thus far. And indeed, if fears of xenophobia are once again able to fuel adaptations of the law to the demands of a few in power, democratic instability would not be a possibility, but perhaps an inevitability. The banning of refugees based on religion and ethnicity threatens the security of American citizens who practice Islam and enables U.S. citizens to incorrectly identify non-Christians as un-American. It is impossible for a nation to correctly proclaim itself a sanctuary of liberal democracy if it fails to offer equal status and liberal democratic rights to all its citizens, regardless of their identities. Banning Muslim and Syrian refugees may intend to proffer security by blocking terrorists, but its main accomplishment will be the endangerment of entire segments of the U.S. population, as radicalized fears seem legitimate in contemporary political discourse. If the United States is no longer loyal to its foundational principles as a liberal democracy, the nation may plunge itself into internal political turmoil as people clash over the future of the United States, and whom it truly serves.