Britain and Immigration: Before and After the Referendum

When citizens of the United Kingdom headed to the polls on June 23, they became the first group in history to opt out of the European experiment by popular vote. While many reasons prompted the British exit, growing migration was a prominent justification given by the Leave campaign. Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage, leaders of the Leave campaign, stated that there was no consent for the scale of migration witnessed in the past few years. They promised to bring migration to the normal levels of the 1990s when more people were leaving the UK than entering.

In the past few years, British citizens have continuously voiced their desire to halt or at least reduce the influx of migrants. After failed attempts by Prime Minister David Cameroon to fulfill these requests, Brits decided that leaving the EU was the only viable way to control their borders.

Now that Brexit is a reality, immigration continues to be a complicated issue as many EU citizens in Britain remain uncertain about their future in the country. Anxiety about growing migration is intricately woven into the decision to leave the EU and will remain a defining issue in the post-Brexit world. To understand Brexit, then, one must first understand migration.

United Kingdom Migration Laws

The European Union has adopted an open border policy to facilitate traveling and working throughout the continent. The Schengen Area is a zone of twenty-six European Union countries that have agreed to ease travel requirements with other Schengen Area members. The agreement allows EU citizens within the Schengen Area to travel throughout the area only using an identity card. It also allows non-citizens within the Schengen Area to acquire one visa and move throughout the twenty-six countries.

There are different types of Schengen visas including work and student visas. Work visas, for example, are acquired by individuals who would like to work in one or more of the Schengen area countries. The student visa is used by students who have secured a place to study within an educational establishment in a country in the Schengen Area.

The two European countries that have opted out of the Schengen Agreement are the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom. According to laws in the United Kingdom, migrants are divided into non-visa nationals and visa nationals. Non-visa nationals encompass a variety of groups including EU citizens. These non-visa nationals do not require a visa to enter the UK at ports or other points of entry. However, if migrants want to remain the country for longer than six months they must receive entry clearance. Additionally, European Union nationals traveling to the United Kingdom must show a passport or identity card which is strictly scrutinized against security databases.

Around 3.2 million people living in the United Kingdom in 2015 were citizens of another European Union country. European Union migrants make up half of the migrants in the United Kingdom, most of whom hail from Poland, Ireland and Germany. European Union nationals are more likely than UK citizens to participate in the labor market. Currently, 78% of European Union citizens are working in the United Kingdom compared to 74% of UK citizens.

Although foreign born citizens are employed in a variety of sectors, their presence is most prominent in low skilled sectors. In 2015, 59% of EU born workers were in a low skilled job compared to 45% of UK-born citizens. Conversely, 41% of EU born workers were in a high skilled job compared to 55% of UK-born citizens. The presence of EU workers in low skill sectors shows that EU workers are more likely to take on jobs that may be undesirable to those born in the UK.

So if the United Kingdom is mostly benefitting from European Union migrants why did the country choose to leave the European Union?

The Referendum and Immigration

While the Leave campaign presented several justifications for leaving the EU, a persistent theme was an emphasis on national sovereignty and the reduction of migration.

In 2015 the United Kingdom welcomed 630,000 migrants and in 2016 thus far the UK has welcomed 333,000 more. This influx of migrants, prominent throughout Europe, has prompted 77% of Brits to declare that there needs to be a reduction in migration. In fact, 50% of Brits believe that immigration is the most important issue facing Britain, compared to 27% who say the same about the economy.

This anxiety over booming migration played a major role in the Leave campaign’s justification for a European Union exit. The UK Independence Party, led by Nigel Farage, focused on the threats of migration leading up to the Brexit referendum, and anti-immigrant rhetoric persisted throughout European Parliament debates over the Syrian refugee crisis. Like U.S. presidential candidate, Donald Trump, UKIP painted migrants as potential criminals and terrorists taking over the United Kingdom. Nigel Farage even used a poster to emphasize that if the UK remained part of the European Union, the country would be flooded with migrants. The poster displayed by Farage leading up to the referendum depicts a long line of Syrian refugees on the Slovenian border with a caption which reads “Breaking Point: The EU has failed us all.” The posteralso cautions readers that Britain must break free and take control of its own borders. Now that referendum results are in, the country has “broken free” but what does that mean for its borders?

Immigration after Brexit

The Leave campaign proposed an Australian style point-based immigration system which would apply to all migrants, even those from the European Union. Under this system, the more in demand the skills and qualifications of an immigrant, the more eligible the immigrant is for a visa.

As resentment over Brexit mounts in Europe, it is likely that European countries will use migration as a concession for any future trade deals with the UK. In fact, Germany, Portugal, and the Czech Republic say the UK must accept free movement of people in return for access to the single market. The EU single market is an association of countries which trade with each other without restrictions or tariffs.

There are three main models for the UK’s post- Brexit relationship with the EU proposed by the Leave campaign. The first option is the Norwegian modelwhereby the UK exits the European union to join the European Economic Area which is what Norway did in 1994. Under this model, EU policies not covered by the EEA Agreement such as agricultural and fisheries policy would not apply to the UK. The UK would need to retain a range of EU legislation, however, including the free movement of people. So, under this model the promise of curbing migration would not be fulfilled because the UK would be forced to maintain the free movement of people.

The other alternative is the Swiss model. Under this model, the UK would join the European Free Trade Association but not the European Economic Area. The Swiss model is unique because Switzerland enjoys some access to the single market through bilateral agreements. In order to maintain access to the single market, Switzerland was required to allow the free movement of people, which would likely be a prerequisite for any bilateral agreements with the UK as well.

The last alternative is a total exit from the EU and the single market. Under this model the UK could join a Customs Union. The EU does not impose tariffs on goods traded from Customs Union countries in exchange for those countries’ compliance with EU single market regulations. The UK could also rely on the World Trade Organization rules on nondiscrimination whereby trading partners are not treated any less advantageously than others, unless there is a separate free trade agreement between the members. Under WTO rules, the UK would be treated as a third country that does not have a free trade agreement with the EU. The last option is the negotiation of a completely new free trade agreement with the EU. Even with a new agreement, however, there is a chance that free movement of people would be a prerequisite for any access to the EU market.

Implications

As European Union and British politicians continue to negotiate, European migrants in the United Kingdom are living in uncertainty. While those who have lived in the UK for more than five years are afforded permanent residence, no one knows if the EU migrants who have been in the UK for less than five years will be asked to leave. Additionally, there has been no clarification as to when European Union migrants will be forbidden from freely entering the United Kingdom.

The United Kingdom was never fully integrated in the European Union system of free movement but the country has welcomed EU migrants for decades. With growing hysteria about migration, however, Britain was unable to sustain its open border policy any longer. Capitalizing on anxiety, the Leave campaign framed migration as a threat to both security and sovereignty. The consequences of this fear mongering were grave—Britain became the first and only nation to leave the European Union by popular vote. Anxiety about migration led to a catastrophic decision which will have lingering effects for years to come.

So, as the world prepares to assess the state of geopolitics in 2016, it must consider the impact of Brexit. As individual nations and as a collective, we must not let anxiety about migration be a leading factor in any future elections. We must pick leaders who can unite us as a global community which can tackle the problems of the 21st century, not leaders who will divide us into fragmented nations living in fear.

A Tale of Two Memberships: Scotland and Northern Ireland’s Possible Paths to EU Membership as Independent States

The Brexit referendum on 23 June 2016 brought 30 million voters (with a 71.8% voter turnout) to the polls to decide whether the United Kingdom (UK) would stay in the European Union (EU). The “Leave” campaign narrowly won with 52% of the vote; however, when split by countries in the UK, Wales and England voted to leave while Northern Ireland and Scotland voted to remain by much larger margins. Additionally, demographics with a higher income, more education, and younger age generally voted to remain. Although the referendum was not legally binding, the new Conservative UK Prime Minister, Theresa May, stated that she has committed herself to the will of the people and will guide the UK leaving the EU. However, Prime Minister May also said that she will not invoke Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, which gives the country two years to negotiate its exit with EU members, before the end of 2016. Thus, the UK would remain a full member of the EU until Article 50 is invoked and the UK begins negotiations to leave. Once negotiations are fully over, the UK will officially no longer be a part of the EU; however, until that time, the UK is a full-fledged member. When the UK leaves the EU, it will need to negotiate a new trade deal because it will no longer be a part of the EU single market. Thus, there is a possibility that the EU would instate trade tariffs because the UK would not be part of the single market.

Since Scotland and Northern Ireland both voted overwhelmingly to remain, one or both of the countries may leave the UK in order to stay in the EU. However, there are two paths for the different countries. Scotland only has one option if it wants to remain in the EU: secede from the UK and join the EU as a separate country. Northern Ireland has two options: it can unite with the rest of Ireland in the EU and become part of the EU by joining an EU member state, or it could leave the UK and try to become a member of the EU member. The best option for Northern Ireland to remain in the EU is unification. Otherwise, Ireland would go through the same accession process as Scotland, which will have a long, difficult road to EU membership, if it gets in at all.

Accession Process

As the UK now has to negotiate its exit from the EU, there are talks of Scotland and Northern Ireland leaving the UK to join the EU. If Northern Ireland were to join independently, it would join Scotland in the EU accession process.

The EU has strict criteria for membership: a country must have stable institutions that represent and ensure democracy, human rights and minority protection, and rule of law, a functioning market economy capable of dealing with competition in the EU market, and the ability to effectively implement membership obligations and to adhere “to the aims of political, economic and monetary union”. The first step to membership is an application for candidacy. Negotiations can only begin with a unanimous decision in the EU Council.

Accession involves 35 chapters relating to policy areas such as environment, rule of law, human rights, energy, and transportation. These chapters are non-negotiable, but candidates can determine how and when to adopt and implement them. Meanwhile, the EU receives guarantees on completion and effectiveness from the candidate country and from the Commission, which monitors implementation and benchmark requirements. Outside the 35 chapters, candidate countries also negotiate financial and transitional arrangements. The negotiations occur between representatives and ministers of the EU and the candidate country at what is called an intergovernmental conference. For each chapter, in a process called screening, the candidate country must meet the opening benchmarks before the chapter can be opened. Then, for each chapter, the candidate country must submit a position for negotiation while the EU adopts a common position and sets closing benchmarks for the chapter, which must be met before closing negotiations for that chapter. Some chapters have interim benchmarks that must be met. Thus, the length of negotiations may vary depending how prepared the country is to join the EU.

In closing negotiations, all negotiations for individual chapters must be finished. Details of membership, arrangements and deadlines, financial arrangements, and potential safeguard clauses are all in the Accession Treaty. The treaty has three steps to becoming a binding agreement: it must have the support of the EU Council, EU Commission, and European Parliament; the candidate and all EU member states sign it; the candidate country ratifies it according to their constitution. Once ratified, the candidate becomes an acceding country and will become a full member on the date agreed in the Treaty.

Scotland

In the event that Scotland secedes from the UK, the EU headquarters in Brussels stated that Scotland has to exit the EU with the UK and cannot remain on its own. Additionally, if Scotland were to secede before the UK leaves the EU, it would be leaving an EU country and thus be leaving the EU. Therefore, Scotland will have to go through the accession process as an independent country.

The accession process poses a number of problems for Scotland, mainly the length of the negotiations and its financial burdens and obligations. Due to the lengthy negotiations, Scotland would be on its own, neither in the UK nor the EU, for some time, which would hinder trade and investment. Additionally, Scotland’s projected country deficit is three times that of the UK, and Scotland would have a higher deficit than the UK does now. The EU limits the amount of debt and deficit its member states can have, and since the economic crisis and the Eurozone crisis, it will likely oversee these requirements more closely and ensure that its members adhere to them. Thus, Scotland might have to reduce their deficit in order to become a member of the EU. Additionally, as reported in 2015,, Scotland has 6.2% unemployment, compared to the UK’s 5.1%, and GDP growth of 1.9%, compared to the UK’s 2.3%. In addition to these potential economic problems, EU membership would be vastly more expensive for Scotland than it was under the UK because Scotland would lose the UK membership contribution opt-outs that Margaret Thatcher negotiated during her time as Prime Minister.

Another potential problem for Scotland’s EU membership is the potential problems regarding its referendum to leave the UK. The EU values democracy, rule of law, and human rights; however,many Scots were ineligible to vote in the referendum. Anyone who is a citizen of a Commonwealth country, the EU, or the UK living in Scotland was able to vote; however, Scots residing outside of Scotland were unable to register to vote. This could call into question whether the process was truly democratic, as some Scottish citizens could not vote in the referendum. This issue must be addressed during negotiations, and Scotland would have to comply with EU democratic ideals, as many Scots were unable to vote in a decision. Thus, looking at all of the problems with Scotland’s independent path to EU membership, it would take years, if not over a decade, to negotiate membership.

Northern Ireland

Given the difficulties that Scotland will face if they try to become an EU member on its own, Northern Ireland’s best path to EU membership is through unification with the rest of Ireland. Using the case of German unification after the fall of the Berlin Wall as a precedent for EU accession, if Northern Ireland becomes part of Ireland, it will enter the EU as part of a member state.

When East Germany and West Germany united, East Germany gained from joining the EU because it “could rely on the tried and tested rules and institutions, the West German social market economy and immediate access to large amounts of financial resources”. Unification inspired high expectations, and East Germany gained advanced, sophisticated institutions and administrators. Unification eliminated most of the legal barriers regarding sovereignty, which usually delay establishment of institutions and full EU membership. However, there was a cultural difference between the two Germanys, and institutions were established on top of East Germany’s previous institutions.

There is still a divide between the two sides of Germany in terms of economic prosperity. After ten years of membership, labor productivity was still 60% of that of West Germany. There has been moderate improvement since unification, though. In 1991, East German income per capita compared to West Germany was 40%, and in 2016, East German income per capita compared to West Germany reached two thirds. Due to Soviet occupation for over forty years, East Germany has a higher level of social distrust than its Western counterpart, which plays a role in its development and integration in the EU. Overall, the economic gap between Germany and East Germany has significantly decreased despite remaining differences.

Although the German unification was successful, it highlights potential problems for Northern Ireland to light. Aside from cultural, religious, and historic tensions between Ireland and Northern Ireland, Northern Ireland might not be as developed because it would not go through the negotiation process or receive EU funding for meeting set benchmarks. However, Northern Ireland has been a part of the EU as long as the UK has, so it has the infrastructure required. Additionally, Northern Ireland was not under Soviet rule and has been developing alongside the rest of the UK and Ireland. Given the minor economic differences between the two countries, Irish unification would be the best option for Northern Ireland to remain in the EU.

Conclusion

Although Brexit will likely have a negative economic effect on the United Kingdom, the country is large and developed enough to thrive regardless of its EU membership status. However, if Scotland opts for independence, it will struggle while if Northern Ireland unites with the rest of Ireland, it will continue on its path in the EU. In particular, Scotland trades more with the rest of the UK than any other country, dwarfing its exports to non-UK countries by comparison. Looking at other economic indicators like deficit and debt, Scotland’s independence would likely increase borrowing and decrease economic stability and security. As Scotland relies heavily on its robust banking sector, the decrease in stability would lead to less investment and fewer banks in the country. As a result, Scotland would regret leaving the UK because the UK would remain stable and prosperous, as it could get products that usually come from Scotland elsewhere. In addition to economic instability, the likely lengthy amount of time it would take to join the EU, if at all, should dissuade Scotland from independence. With neither the UK nor the EU, Scotland would be a small country of just over 5 million with an unstable economy and decreased trade, investment, and movement of human capital. These consequences should, if Northern Ireland were to pursue independence, persuade Northern Irelanders to unite with the rest of Ireland and join the EU upon unification. Northern Ireland has a simpler path out of the UK and into the EU than Scotland, so it would likely not have a major effect on the economy other than changing currency.

Merkel’s Far-Right Conundrum

Recently, Germany held two regional elections that may foretell doom for Angela Merkel’s Christian Democrat (CDU) party in Germany’s 2017 federal election as well as for Merkel’s open-door refugee policy. The CDU’s two setbacks in the Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Berlin elections can be explained by the recent rise of the rightwing populist party, Alternative for Germany (AFD). AFD has been campaigning on a platform opposed to Merkel’s open-door refugee policy, which faces the enormous task of integrating over a million refugees into German society. In early September, the Christian Democrats placed third in Merkel’s own regional constituency, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. CDU placed behind the Social Democrats (SPD) in first and the three-year AFD in second, which gained 30.5% and 20.9% of the vote, respectively. While CDU’s loss in this region won’t impact the current administration’s composition, it has been largely seen as a symbolic victory for AFD and its anti-refugee rhetoric, especially considering Mecklenburg-Vorpommern makes up Angela Merkel’s own constituency. Despite this blow caused by AFD’s symbolic victory, the Christian Democrats experienced an even larger wake up call a few weeks later in Berlin, a notorious stronghold for the Social and Christian Democrats, where AFD, with 12.2% of the vote took third behind the Christian Democrats with 17.8% of the vote and the Social Democrats with 22.8% of the vote. While both the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats claimed victory in Berlin, many are calling it a meager win. For AFD, a fledgling and fringe political party, to do so well in Berlin signals that the far-right now has an opportunity to jump onto Germany’s national stage in its next federal election.

AFD’s victory over the Christian Democrats marks an impressive rise for the right-wing populists. They are now represented in ten state parliaments and show no sign of stopping or slowing down. AFD leaders state that their victories in Berlin and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern amount to a de facto referendum on Germany’s open-door policy to refugees. Prime Minister Merkel has been steadfast in defending her open-door policy. However, as her party bleeds voters to AFD, she has begun to signal that she may begin walking away from asylum seekers. As much of Europe becomes weary of the refugee crisis and dubious of its capacity to accept more, it now appears that Germany has also reached its limit. However, the question remains just how much Germany’s recent regional elections will impact the Grand Coalition between Merkel’s party and the Social Democrats that have defined German politics since 2013. If the far-right continues to surge as it has in Germany and other European countries then surely this Grand Coalition will falter. Currently, the world is looking to Angela Merkel to see whether she will accept the backlash against the open door policy or if she will stand strong and continue championing Germany’s dedication to refugees. Both stances will have profound effects on German and European politics.

AFD was founded in 2013 as a response to the Eurozone debt crisis and Angela Merkel’s policies towards it. At its founding, it was primarily composed of liberal academics and economists who opposed Merkel’s Eurozone bail out policies. In September of 2013, AFD were not able to win the 5% of the national vote needed to secure seats in the German parliament, however those days have largely changed with AFD now polling at more than 10% in national opinion polls. This remarkable surge of support since 2013 is no accident. Party leaders of AFD purposely focused at wooing xenophobic voters through the use the use of fear and paranoia during the peak of the refugee crisis. This is evidenced through the party’s link with the Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West (Pegida) movement, which has recently created a political party of its own, and is further exemplified by their shared commitment to work together to bring their anti-refugee platform to the federal level within Germany. Pegida is famous for its right-wing and hateful rhetoric that often electrifies the many protests against refugees and Islam it carries out in Europe. More recently the group attempted to boycott Kinder chocolate after the company began a marketing campaign that contained pictures of two children of African and Middle Eastern descent. Little did members of the movement know, the boys were actually German footballers. This illustrates just how quickly this movement’s Islamophobia and xenophobia can take hold. In addition to being affiliated with xenophobic groups, the leaders of AFD themselves have been accused of both Islamophobia and anti-semitism. The newly-elected AFD senator from Berlin, Kay Nerstheimer has recently taken fire from critics for both calling civilian victims of the Nazi regime “guerrilla fighters” that were not protected under international law and downplaying the atrocities of the Nazis. Nerstheimer has also referred to Syrian refugees as “disgusting vermin” and as “parasites that feed off the juices of the German people.” Despite AFD originally arising as a response to the Eurozone bailouts, they have now pivoted to scapegoating refugees as a way to power; and it’s working. The only question is exactly how much it will change the political landscape of German politics, and subsequently, that of the European Union.

Immediately after the Berlin elections, it appeared that Angela Merkel began backpedaling on her open-door refugee policy due to the rise of AFD in what was traditionally a bastion for the Christian and Social Democrats’ Grand Coalition. In a press conference, Chancellor Merkel expressed regret for Germany’s open-door policy stating, “If I could, I would go back in time to be better prepared for the refugee crisis in 2015, for which we were rather unprepared.” She’s also signaled that she is willing to be flexible regarding the policy’s future by stating, “If I knew what change in refugee policy the people in Germany want, I would be prepared to consider it.” This shows just how Merkel, who has previously been a staunch defender of the open-door policy, has been taken aback by the unexpected potency of the AFD. It also subtly shows just how much of a threat the AFD is for the Grand Coalition of the Christian and Social democrats in Germany’s federal elections. However, after these statements Merkel has continued on to say that she does “not see a change of course, but coherent work over many, many months” in regards to Germany’s refugee policy. These opposing statements make it unclear exactly how Merkel will move forward concerning refugees and AFD’s challenge to the Grand Coalition, however, Merkel’s stance will certainly have implications for Germany’s 2017 federal election.

The rise of the AFD has many questioning whether Chancellor Merkel will lead the Christian Democrats as their nominee for chancellor next year. Merkel has not yet publicly stated whether she will “stand again in next year’s general election,” and the growing disquiet around her chancellorship could create many challengers for her in the election, not just from the AFD, but even within her own party. If Merkel stands by her refugee policy and the AFD continues to surge it would not be surprising to see a candidate within the Christian Democrats challenge her for the chancellorship. This would be incredibly damaging for the Christian Democrats and would all but guarantee the fracture of the Grand Coalition and victory of the AFD. However, Merkel may still back down as the AFD gains political power in a move to win back voters and lick the CDU’s political wounds. The Grand Coalition may still survive, but it would concede a symbolic AFD victory as the country shifts right on refugee policy. Lastly, Merkel may concede her leadership and let her party choose a new standard bearer. This would allow her to continue standing strong on her refugee policy while at the same time let her party distance itself from the policy to save the Grand Coalition.

Regardless of Merkel’s next steps and the outcome of Germany’s 2017 elections, the surprising power of AFD’s challenge to the Christian and Social democrats spell a dark future for German politics, but also for European politics as other European countries also deal with their own far-right political party challenges. Racist politics have once again made their way into Europe’s most progressive policies and the unfortunate victims will be war-weary men, women, and children looking for an escape from violence.

Combatting the Dutch Disease: Learning from Botswana’s Success

Modern-day International Political Economy literature employs various theories to explain the rate of economic development in some countries versus others. A common quandary within these studies is the underdevelopment of nation-states with a large endowment of lucrative natural resources. The continent of Africa has received a lot of attention in this field. Why are living standards so low in many African countries when diamonds, oil, and other natural resources are abundant throughout the continent?

In 1977 The Economist named this dichotomous effect of natural resources on a nation’s economy the “Dutch Disease.”  Their case was named for the Netherlands, after its oil abundance was the causal mechanism to the decline in its manufacturing sector. The Dutch Disease (also called “the resource curse”) contends that if a nation-state is abundant in natural resources, its economy will center around that industry and not diversify in other sectors. As a result, the revenue from natural resources will be concentrated in a small portion of the population and stagnate other economic ventures, creating underdevelopment.

Social scholars have verified this theory using many case studies, but Botswana consistently acts as the exception to the Dutch Disease. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson have even labeled Botswana an “African Success Story.”  Since its independence in 1966, Botswana has boasted peaceful, democratic institutions,high growth rates, decreasing child mortality and development of non-extractive sectors. Why has Botswana achieved this success while other resource-abundant nations have faced internal conflict and low growth rates? Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson report, “There is almost complete agreement that Botswana achieved this spectacular growth performance because it adopted good policies.”

Defining a ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ policy is a sub-debate within this literature that offers more insight for similarly-endowed African states. Jerven asserts that ‘good policy’ refers to the absence of bad policies, namely nationalizing the resource industry. After diamonds were discovered in 1987, DeBeers was created by Cecil Rhodes to manage diamond trading. Private investment developed the infrastructure in this sector, so public funds were not diverted in the process of diamond exploitation. While a small political elite often manages the revenues from resource extraction, DeBeer’s management prevented political leaders from having control of the diamond industry in Botswana. As a result, rent seeking and corruption were disincentivized and government revenues focused on national development.

Other exogenous factors led to Botswana’s growth success. Its regional trading partnerships, especially with South Africa, allowed the agricultural and manufacturing sectors to continue growing rather than being replaced by the diamond export industry. Inflation was avoided since the South African Rand backed Botswana’s currency.  Regardless of these other factors, Botswana’s government responded to their challenge of resource management with foundational policies for long-term growth.

Government Policies

While the Botswana government’s lack of involvement in diamond trading is beneficial from a free-trade perspective, policies have also been established by the government to maintain a high expectation of corporate social responsibility (CSR) with De Beers’ “Central Selling Association.” The Mines and Minerals Act of 1999 was established to ensure that the Botswana government ultimately manages the resources it was endowed with, and works in the interest of the people to act as oversight to diamond trading. As Robb points out in “A Diamond’s Wealth is Forever,” the Department of Mines, not the president, has jurisdiction over licensing. Additionally, the government revenues from diamond trading are fixed percentages of sales, rather than changing at the discretion of individual leaders. Robb also reports that the tax rate is moderately low to encourage investment, and royalties are tax-deductible. However, there is space for negotiation within these tax rates.

In terms of revenues, Hillborn writes that the government has a 50/50 deal with DeBeers, and has used this income to provide social programming and develop other industries. As mentioned previously, the private sector’s management of Botswana’s mines allows pubic capacity to be utilized in other endeavors.

Modern-Day Implications

The phrase “natural resources” often creates mental imagery of gold, copper, oil, and other lucrative luxury goods. However in our modern-day globalized supply chains, lesser-discussed natural resources have gained new attention.

In 2015, Newsweek revealed that the tantalum needed to produce iPhones often comes from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in areas that may be managed by warlords. Tantalum could potentially provide large government revenues that, when managed effectively, would result in overall development per capita. However, the lack of governance in areas of DRC where Tantalum is abundant marks another missed opportunity for resource revenues. New technologies such as iPhones offer renewed opportunities for resource management. Minerals and gasses used in modern technologies have higher values and greater market revenues.

While these resources are finite, in many places deposits are still being discovered. These new discoveries give governments, especially in lesser-developed parts of Africa, incentives to change their policies. Botswana’s government approach of allowing private investment while offering oversight for its revenues is exemplary for modern-day cases.

In June, scientists in Tanzania discovered a large amount of helium below its surface.  While helium does not appear to be a luxury good, it is highly lucrative in today’s world. According to BBC’s report of this new discovery, helium is needed to operate MRI machines, rocket engines, and even laser scanners at grocery stores. Tanzania—a resource-rich country that still faces low living standards—has the opportunity to follow Botswana’s example and employ policies that will invite private investment, oversee the equity of these companies, and invest the revenue in sustainable development practices.

In combating the resource curse, Botswana does not have to be the “miracle” that social scientists idealize in development literature. Discoveries of natural resource deposits and the increasing value of minerals used in modern-day technologies offer two unique channels to combat the resource curse through responsible governance—for states and multinational corporations alike.

Understanding The Bellicosity of Israel’s Defense Policy

Israel is a state that inspires passionate debate, particularly surrounding its use of force, or, more specifically, its willingness to use violent force as a first option, as they perhaps most controversially did at the start of the Six-Day War. In early June of 1967, Israel responded to Arab troop build-ups with an effective pre-emptive strike against Egyptian airfields, launching what is now known as the “Six-Day War.” International law, however, is murky on whether or not pre-emptive strikes are legal.

What could explain this bellicose military policy? Israel is far from a universally-accepted state, and thus has little political capital to spare on controversial military endeavors. This article proposes that the most fruitful way to comprehend the military policies of Israel is to utilize the theory of Constructivism. When using the lens of Constructivism, outsiders can peer into the Israeli, and Jewish, zeitgeist. The roots of Israeli military policy are found in the ways in which Jews, and thus the Israeli military establishment, understand certain threats. Due to the threat perception of the Israeli military establishment, the international system is viewed as a Realist one, suggesting that existential threats can only be circumvented through the accumulation of power, and the willingness to use it. While it is beyond the scope of this article to either defend or criticize Israeli bellicosity, reaching a peaceful solution to the cleavages plaguing the Israel versus Palestine paradigm is dependent upon understanding the zeitgeists of all involved factions.

Constructivism: Understanding Israel’s View Of Threats Through Stories, Violence, and Oppression

Constructivism is a theory of international relations positing that international actors “construct” their own identities and realities. The experiences, stories, and history of a people create a shared identity and a perceived context around different situations. In the political sphere, these constructed identities and perceptions synthesize to generate policies. To a nation, such as Israel, that possesses a history and identity imbued with persecution, less severe threats, such as a one-off stabbing, are viewed existentially, demanding decisive and oftentimes, destructive, action.

One example of Constructivism’s usefulness as an explanatory tool concerns the different attitudes toward intra-European war during the 1900s. Prior to World War II, war in Europe was the product of intense nationalism, realpolitik and imperial ambitions. After the horror of World War II shocked European society, new initiatives to integrate European states ensued because Europeans realized that they could not continue on such a destructive and divisive path. The constructed realities of nationalism and the subsequent warmongering gave way to the new realities of a fully-integrated community of European nations with the establishment of the European Union, forming a new body politic. The change from frequent wars to a genuine attempt at perpetual peace in Europe is best understood through Constructivism. An appreciation of different viewpoints and zeitgeists provides us with an explanatory model of an actor’s actions.

Understanding Israel’s actions in 1967 is predicated on acknowledging the recent and painful history of Jews and how it informs the state’s military policies. The modern Israeli state is an ideological project, one created to provide a safe space for the Jewish people to prosper away from the existential threats that have historically tended to plague them. One of the fathers of Zionism, Theodore Herzl, promulgates in his famous pamphlet, Der Judenstaat (translated literally: The State of The Jews), notions of anti-Semitism as hatred of the Jews as a nation, not a religion or culture. In other words, to the wave of 1800s anti-Semites, Judaism was a biological race, not simply a religion. This new wave of hatred peaked with the Holocaust, in which the Nazis systematically murdered approximately six million Jews (as well as millions of others).

Yet, the Holocaust was not the only instance or type of recent anti-Semitism Jews experienced. Consider the Kishinev Pogrom of 1903, in which drunken rioters murdered 49 Jews and destroyed the Jewish quarter. In 1905, rioters killed or wounded 66 Jews and looted 125 Jewish owned homes and businesses in the Dnepropetrovsk Pogrom. The Dreyfus Affair in 1894 highlighted a less violent form of anti-Semitism, in which implicit biases against Jews forced the perception that they were inherently treasonous criminals. Jewish-French army captain Alfred Dreyfus was falsely accused and punished for revealing sensitive information to Germany. In 1893, Karl Leuger founded the anti-Semitic “Christian Social Party,” and became the mayor of Vienna. Leuger and the Christian Social Party’s political success brought anti-Semitism into the mainstream of political thought, normalizing extreme individuals such as Georg Ritter von Schonerer, who held a young Adolf Hitler as an ardent follower. The synthesis of anti-Semitic politics with the encouraged violence of the pogroms created a seriously inhospitable atmosphere for Jews. Yet, Jews were not altogether unaccustomed to such antagonism and, in many ways, the stories created in the time preceding this new race based anti-Semitism helped to inform the ways in which Jews, and eventually Israelis, perceived threats.

Several Jewish holidays either commemorate or mourn Jews who overcame or succumbed to genocide, diaspora, and enslavement. Purim, Passover, Sukkot, Hannukah, and Yom HaShoah are all concerned with different, and violent, events in Jewish history. The synthesis of the stories with the all-too-recent memories of oppression and genocide in the 1800s and 1900s facilitates the view that any threat is an existential threat to either the Jewish identity or Jewish lives.

Purim is a holiday that celebrates the defeat of Persian Prime Minister Haman. Haman had ordered all of the component nations living in the Persian Empire to bow to him, and when the leader of the Jews, Mordechai, refused, Haman sentenced all Jews to death. The emperor of Persia, however, was married to a Jew (unbeknownst to him), and when this information came to light, Haman was executed. According to this story, ancient Jews had successfully circumvented their genocide through strategic planning and clever manipulation of court politics.

Passover concerns the escape of Jewish slaves from Egypt. As the story goes, Egypt had enslaved Jews for many years, forcing them to build pyramids and lavish palaces for the Pharaohs while living in squalor. Moses, who eventually became one of the Jewish leaders, brought a message to the Pharaoh from God. When the Pharaoh refused to emancipate his Jewish slaves, God sent ten plagues, culminating in the deaths of Egyptian first-born sons. After the Pharaoh’s son died, he freed the Jewish slaves (only to chase them through the desert immediately after). Jewish slaves were able obtain freedom through the use of overwhelming force in the form of plagues. In the aftermath of Jewish emancipation from Egypt, the former slaves wandered the Sinai desert for 40 years, living as nomads. This diaspora is remembered through the holiday Sukkot, in which Jews are encouraged to sleep and eat in huts covered in branches in remembrance of their stateless history, placing further emphasis on the need for a home in which Jews may permanently and safely live.

Hanukkah commemorates the success of a violent guerrilla movement, called The Maccabees, over the Syrian-Greek Seleucid Dynasty, who ruled the land that became Israel. The Seleucids attempted to Hellenize the Jews, converting them to their religion and destroying Jewish holy places, especially the Grand Temple in Jerusalem. Antiochus, the leader of The Seleucids, was wary of an indigenous guerrilla movement and sent a general named Apolonius, along with (roughly) 40,000 soldiers, to eliminate the threat. Judah, the leader of the Maccabees, responded defiantly, stating “Let us fight to the death in defense of our souls and our Temple!” Eventually, and against all odds, the Maccabees won, restoring the Temple to its original glory. In this case, the desire to preserve the Jewish identity against either overwhelming odds or the threat of forced assimilation called for a fierce and incredibly brutal defense.

Yom HaShoah is both the day of remembrance for Jewish victims of the Holocaust, as well as a celebration of Jewish resistance to the genocide. On Yom HaShoah, all activities in Israel are centered on spreading knowledge about the Holocaust. Entertainment programs are canceled in favor of interviews with survivors, businesses are closed, and two sirens, one at 11 am and one at sundown, calls for complete silence throughout Israel. The Israeli educational system, perhaps wishing to assign a more hopeful message to the holiday, discusses two forms of Jewish resistance against the Nazis: Passive resistance insofar as many Jews retained their Jewish identity throughout the Nazi’s rule; and active resistance such as the Warsaw Uprising (which shares the same date as Yom HaShoah). The dual focus on the preservation of Jewish identity as well as active resistance highlights the ultimate goal and primary method through which Israel intends to survive as a state: preservation of its Jewish character and a fiercely resilient and resolute defense.

The recent cases of anti-Semitism, such as the pogroms, Holocaust, and legal discrimination, mixed with the stories told every year during holiday gatherings promotes the perception that unless Jews take matters into their own hands, they will be at the mercy of those that wish to do them harm. The product of these experiences promotes three beliefs, first: threats are everywhere; second: most, if not all, threats are existential; and third: the only way to survive in the face of these threats is through the strength and military power of the Israeli state. Famous Israeli general Ehud Barak stated, “Until the wolf shall lay with the lamb, we’d better be wolves”, providing a key insight into how Israeli’s view and understand threats.

Israel, as a state founded by Jews, views the international system in a way that is largely informed by the experiences and realities Jews faced throughout history. As Barak stated, Israel views itself as a lamb, neither inherently violent nor bellicose, but surrounded by threatening wolves nonetheless, suggesting that Israel should become more wolf like, willing to strike decisively to continue as a state.

This understanding explains the events of the Six-Day War, in which Israel attacked Egypt first. Although this might ostensibly make Israel the aggressor, consider Israel’s viewpoint of the situation. Egypt announced hostility to Israel; set its military to its highest alertness level; expelled UN emergency forces from the shared Sinai Border; strengthened its forces on the same border; closed the important Straits of Tiran to Israeli ships; and fomented a more favorable balance of power by signing alliances with Iraq, Jordan, and Syria. To a state created by people with the shared history of subjugation and near destruction, this seemed to be a serious threat for the continued existence of Israel. The response to these threats was a swift and decisive attack, in which 90% of Egypt’s air force was suddenly destroyed without warning. A similar attack was also conducted in Syria. The aftermath of the surprise attacks provided Israel with a prodigious air advantage, and allowed them to capture the Gaza Strip and West Bank in three days. What was perhaps the most powerful and overwhelming alliance in the history of the Arab world was completely defeated in six days as a direct result of Israel’s threat perception and military policies.

The Israeli perception of threats promotes a view that the international system is a Realist one. Realists believe first that the international system is anarchic, in that there is no real central authority to regulate the actions of the state. Second, Realists believe states cannot be entirely sure of the actions of other states, which creates uncertainty and requires significant strategic planning. Finally, the way to ensure continued existence against such uncertainty is through power. States strive to be more powerful than other states because that is deemed the only way to deter unpredictable threats. Israel’s Realist understanding of the international system mandates an assertive defense policy.

Conclusion

Israel is a state mainly populated by Jews, who through stories and myths as well as all too recent memories of anti-Semitism and genocide, perceive the world as an inherently threatening and dangerous place. This zeitgeist is translated to the Israeli defense policy, which continually focuses on a twofold strategy centered on accruing and developing the newest technology and assertive and decisive responses to threats. While bellicosity certainly has its drawbacks, international condemnation, civilian casualties and accusations of warmongering chief among them, Israel feels the need to assert itself in such a way as to ensure its survival. The policies of the Israeli military are directly informed by the Jewish reality. The synthesis of these experiences and stories creates a hypersensitive threat perception, explaining the decisive actions and refusal to be bullied we saw enumerated in Israel’s pre-emptive strikes in 1967.

Maskirovka and Predicting Kremlin Actions in the 21st Century

The word Maskirovka might not be familiar to many of us post-9/11 international affairs wonks but the word is all too familiar to our predecessors, namely the Sovietologists of yore. Maskirovka was a tactic born in the Russian Civil War that followed the October Revolution of 1917 and became official Soviet strategy not only in war but also in all manners of foreign statecraft in the Cold War. The concept emphasized the need for stealth, concealment and misdirection in all things in order to confuse one’s enemy, and though many Soviet ideas have fallen out of favor in modern Russia, Maskirovka remains very fashionable. Russian president Vladimir Putin was born and raised under the doctrine and has become one of its best contemporary practitioners, as he holds nearly all of Russia’s foreign policy decisions in his hands. Putin has demonstrated his mastery of the doctrine in Ukraine with constant misdirection, concealment, and stealth most recently with his military escalation in Ukraine after the death of a Russian security officer near the Crimean border, not to mention his equally rapid de-escalation.

This time, however, Russia’s de-escalation was perplexing for nearly all observers. Signs of the Kremlin’s escalation into open war were all there; an incident shrouded in secrecy that made Russian troops appear as the victim, an increase in Russian-backed separatist violence in the east, Putin’s statement of withdrawal from talks to end the conflict, and many others that Russian expertssaw as classic Maskirovka tactics. What could’ve gone wrong? The problem lies in the indicators being used by observers in media and academia. If peace and stability in Europe are to continue, a better set of indicators must be composed to monitor Russian aggression not just for Ukraine, but for all of Eastern Europe. If a line can be drawn between the realm of Kremlin disruption and imminent Russian invasion then European governments can tailor their response appropriately. Failing to understand the nature of Maskirovka and when it is being used for disruption versus invasion could mean a drastic miscalculation on the part of the local government that allows the Kremlin to capitalize on the situation. For example a scenario many scholars and defense writers think of is a crisis in a Baltic country that usually begins with an ethnic Russian protest that draws a harsh response from the local government. Seeing an opportunity to disrupt stability, Russia deploys large troops near the border and sends intelligence officers into the area to increase disruption. If the host country misreads these tactics and concludes that the military is needed to protect this region instead of routine riot police, the situation could easily spiral out of control thus allowing the Kremlin to appear as if it is forced to act on behalf of its Russian brethren. In this case, and many other cases of Russian Maskirovka, miscalculations can be fatal. This means discerning between indicators of Maskirovka that signal an impending military confrontation and indicators that are simply signs of Russian attempts to destabilize and disrupt.

Among the most often-cited indicators of an impending invasion is a Russian troop movement to a given area, but using troop movements to convince your reader of an impending invasion has proven recently to be no more than alarmism. Russia routinely moves troops in large numbers as a tool of political leverage. This is not to say that monitoring troop movement is useless, but to use it as an indicator of impending invasion will more than likely lead to incorrect conclusions and bad advice for NATO states and local partners. While Russia used troop build-up in Georgia prior to the 2008 invasion, recently Russia has moved troops in response to NATO announcements, used troop movements and exercises to exert political pressure in Moldova, and in response to Turkish actions along the Syrian border. Yet the Kremlin did not open hostilities against these countries and most likely had no desire to—the objective was political pressure and intimidation, not invasion. While it is difficult to know for sure, as the Kremlin constantly seeks to redefine its Maskirovka tactics, it is safe to assume that Russian troop movements are tools of disruption, not indicators of imminent invasion. Another flawed indicator of invasion is increased violence in separatist regions in Ukraine and other former USSR states where the Kremlin holds sway. This is flawed, since the Kremlin uses upticks in violence for the goal of political pressure in the same way it does with formal military movements. In the case of Ukraine, a rise in violence has now become a tool for political persuasion at pivotal moments such as the 2015 Ukrainian local elections when violence on the front line rose. However this uptick in violence was not the worst a sign of impending invasion as there were no reports of direct Russian involvement as in earlier parts of the conflict. Unfortunately, escalation at key moments has continued to imply that this routine escalation pattern is not a sign of impending invasion but rather of routine political pressure. The Kremlin uses this same tactic throughout the former USSR to exert pressure on local governments such as in Moldova and Georgia. Many times, these escalations in separatists regions have been cited as signs of impending invasion and have been inaccurate.

Yet some indicators recently cited as pretext of Kremlin invasion are worth retaining, namely, abandonment of peace talks, snap military exercises, and most importantly an incident (a bombing or gunfight) that ends in the death of Russians or Russian security personnel often shrouded in secrecy by the Russian government but still seemingly points clearly to a responsible party (a hostile government or terrorist organization) and thus puts the Kremlin on a defensive footing. For the Kremlin, exiting negotiations is generally a very significant decision and is not usually taken lightly—even as the battle to capture the cityof Debaltseve raged in Ukraine at Russian behest, the Russians remained in Minsk to sign a ceasefire deal with the Ukrainian government and as bombs rained down in Aleppo Russia remained at the negotiating table as well. Furthermore, snap military drills and inspections are classic Kremlin tactics used to disguise the deployment of troops as they did in Georgia in 2008, and shortly before and during the Russian military intervention in Syria. Unfortunately this indicator is tricky as snap military drills can also represent a Kremlin tactic of disruption, however if forces involved remain on alert or are kept out of their normal base of operations–as was the case in Georgia–the drills take on a different meaning. In this case in order to determine whether the Kremlin seeks to destabilize or invade, the focus must be on a micro level–watching how troops move after or during a drill–rather than a macro level. Lastly, a major incident that kills or harms Russians is the allowance of the Kremlin to appear to be in a defensive stance. This tactic was utilized in the run-up to the Georgian invasion when South Ossetian separatists baited Georgians into an attack by striking into Georgian territory with artillery—it’s important to note that Russians see Ossetians as a brother nationality. Additionally many believe the Russian security apparatus conducted alleged terrorist attacks in Russia, leading to the Second Chechen War, and thus are themselves an indicator of impending war. The Kremlin seeks to put itself on a defensive footing in order to justify its actions to the Russian public and make it seem like their actions are justifiable by international law as a part of their information warfare, a major aspect of Kremlin Maskirovka tactics that set the stage for greater Russian intervention and invasion.

However, to truly discern between Kremlin operations to disrupt and those pre-empting an invasion more new layers of analysis must be applied to the Maskirovka tactics we observe. Analysts and observers should rely on some traditional methods such as looking at operational level indicators of a Russian invasion; for example, the lack of field camps for Russian soldiers as pointed out by Nolan Peterson. Peterson, a journalist who has covered the Ukrainian conflict extensively, also notes that Russian troops only had enough fuel for one day of operation—another indicator of a lack of preparation. After the extensive reforms carried out by the Kremlin following the underperformance of Russia’s military in the Georgian invasion, it is safe to assume that if Russian forces were preparing to invade another country they would not be undersupplied. Other indicators that can be taken from the Kremlin’s preparation for the Georgian invasion include the deployment of separatists far beyond the theater of battle as Ariel Cohen and Robert Hamilton point out in The Russian Military and the Georgian War: Lessons and Implications in order to assist in laying the operational groundwork for an invading force. Cohen and Hamilton state that Russia used irregular forces from separatist states in Georgia to conduct advanced reconnaissance inside Georgian territory, a move that could easily be replicated in Ukraine. In Ukraine, “sabotage teams” from the separatist side occasionally attempt to break through Ukrainian lines, but if they were sighted farther inside Ukraine it would be a cause for serious concern.

The Kremlin, and Putin especially, pride themselves on being expert practitioners of Maskirovka and thus will always seek to confuse their enemy and change tactics. Unfortunately that means that the nature of the new age of Maskirovka is constantly changing and including more tactics of concealment, misinformation, and confusion. As the Kremlin seeks to conceal its intentions, the West must seek to pull back the curtain by analyzing more completely. As the Kremlin seeks to misinform, the West must seek to properly inform its decisions and ensure it has considered the consequences. Lastly, as the Kremlin seeks to confuse, the West must seek to understand Russian actions in order to more appropriately counter them. Western observers and analysts must have a more rigorous set of indicators to determine Kremlin goals, based on a tried and true study of Maskirovka tactics. Once again, the understanding of the goal of Maskirovka in the 21st century, whether it is simply to disrupt or to lay the groundwork for a large-scale conflict, is crucial in ensuring that the West appropriately responds to counter Kremlin objectives. The difference between an appropriate and inappropriate action has life or death consequences and could mean destroying the post-WWII peace that has become the European norm.

Crisis in Venezuela: The Fall of the Left in Latin America

Venezuela is in crisis. Falling oil prices have severely stunted the state-run economy, where petroleum products account for roughly 96 percent of total export goods. Government revenue has taken a deep plunge as the world price continues to fall, and printing money in attempts to offset decreased income has resulted in high inflation – projected to hit 480 percent in 2016 and top 1,640 percent in 2017. There are also chronic shortages of basic goods and food; store shelves remain empty, and people line up for hours with the hope of receiving necessities such as rice, medicine, and toilet paper. To make matters worse, desperation has turned violent in recent months, with incidences of protests, riots, and looting reaching into the thousands.

Venezuela’s economic crisis has been exacerbated by low oil prices, however the roots of the current situation stem from Chavismo policy implanted under the populist leader Hugo Chavez, who held power in Venezuela from 1999 until his death in 2013. As with most socialist revolutions, Chavez’s aim was to redistribute wealth and land, and improve poor Venezuelans’ quality of life. The cornerstone of Chavez’s economic policy was petroleum-funded state spending on social services and human development projects. Chavez also implanted price controls to keep the cost of basic goods affordable for everyone. In theory, these practices seem as though they would transform Venezuelan society for the better. However, while they did some good for Venezuela’s poor, in practice the long-run economic consequences of these policies proved severe.

Price controls decreased profit incentives for the increasingly shrinking sector of private businesses, discouraging them from stocking the forcibly under-priced basic goods. While a boom in the oil market meant that the government could prop up a supply of these goods in state-run stores with artificially low prices, as discussed previously, the country’s dependency on revenue from petroleum exports and high rates of government spending was unsustainable in the long run. The drop in oil prices meant government spending was forcibly slashed, and the artificially high supply of goods at artificially low prices have vanished. The official private sector is weak due to nationalization that occurred under Chavismo, and goods on the black market are being sold for hundreds of times more than their official prices. For example, a recent report found that milk, which is capped at 70 bolivares, is being sold on the black market for upwards of 7,000 bolivares. The same is true for other staple goods such a flour, sold at 3,000 bolivares instead of its capped price of 190 bolivares, and pasta, sold at 3,000 bolivares instead of its usual 15. As inflation spirals out of control, the problem is likely to get worse.

Nicolás Maduro, Chavez’s successor, has had little success in finding a solution while maintaining leftist economic and social policy in Venezuela. Maduro’s approval rating, currently hovering just above 20 percent, has plummeted along with the country’s economic stability. In December, the opposition won controlof the national assembly for the first time in 17 years, demonstrating Venezuela’s discontent with the status quo of socialism. More recently, the national electoral council has announced that they have collected enough signatures to begin the process of holding a recall referendum, and polls show that over 60 percent of the public would vote to remove Maduro from office.

Maduro has accused the opposition of organizing a coup d’état against his regime, while the opposition maintains that they are solely seeking a recall referendum to replace him. In attempts to quell the opposition, authorities have carried out numerous arrests under direction from Maduro. Other repressive techniques employed by the regime amid recent protests include deployment of military in Caracas and creating a no-fly zone above the capital. As public unrest and economic insecurity grows, Maduro will face increased challenges remaining in power. Although the military is still on his side, the opposition is gaining strength in numbers.

The case of Venezuela, though extreme, is not unique in South America. Recently, the region has experienced a falling political left and a rise of the political right. It seems that the so-called pink-tide of socialist Latin American governments is subsiding. Although this phenomenon may be observed across the continent, the most relevant cases to be discussed in this article, in addition to Venezuela, are those of Argentina and Brazil. By analyzing the political and economic situation of Argentina and Brazil, which are further along in developing center-right policies, one can consider possibilities for Venezuela’s future, and learn from the policy mistakes of other administrations.

Brazil’s senate recently impeached president Dilma Rouseff, ending thirteen years of leadership by the socialist Worker’s Party. After the 61 to 20 impeachment vote, a center-right politician from the PMDB party, Michael Temer, has replaced her. Dilma was the Worker’s Party successor to Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, who was President from 2003 to 2011. Under da Silva’s leadership, Brazil thrived.

Although also involved in a corruption scandal, da Silva was fortunate enough to enjoy high approval ratings that stemmed from a booming economy. He focused on improving the microeconomic situation of Brazilians, and thus created the Bolsa Famila conditional cash transfer program. Consequently, 36 million Brazilians were lifted out of extreme poverty and the middle class expanded rapidly during da Silva’s two terms in office. Brazilians also witnessed real wage increases, expansion of credit, and increased employment during this period. For da Silva, socialist policy worked.

However, Rouseff’s policies were far less successful. She was unable to sustain the healthy economy seen under da Silva, which caused social unrest and tension between the government and its people. Rouseff’s involvement with a corruption scandal involving her party and contract bribes with the nationalized oil company Petrobras, along with violation of state budget laws, led to her final demise. Rouseff was impeached on the latter charges, although she has pledged to appeal the impeachment, which she has called a parliamentary coup – despite parliament carrying out the impeachment proceedings in accordance with Brazil’s constitutional framework. With Rouseff’s impeachment, it appears that socialism has come to an end in Brazil.

Temer, Brazil’s new President, has vowed to restore the state’s political and legal credibility. Additionally, he is planning to enact austerity measures to improve Brazil’s credit rating – which was downgraded to junk status under Rouseff – and reduce the deficit. Temer also plans to overhaul the state pension system and transition national infrastructure projects to the private sector by auctioningthem off to foreign investors. However, he will need Congressional support to pass these tough measures that have made him deeply unpopular with the public. With Temer’s term just beginning, it remains to be seen how successful Brazil’s swing to the center-right will be.

In late 2015, Mauricio Macri, a center-right politician from the Republican Proposal party, was elected president of Argentina, ending 12 years of leftist leadership by the husband and wife team Nestor Kirchner and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner. Macri is both fiscally and socially conservative; he is anti-abortion and opposes marijuana decriminalization. In fitting with his party’s center-right platform, Macri is also a proponent of free-market economic policy, and has cut energy and transport subsidies in order to reduce government spending. However, he has promised to continue and improve upon welfare programs started in the Kirchner era.

The largest challenge facing Macri is reining in fiscal policy enough to lower the deficit and reduce inflation without letting social programs and infrastructure suffer, and while also continuing to grow the economy. Inflation in Argentina continues to rise; when Macri was elected it stood at about 25 percent, and it topped 40 percent last April. The Central Bank has raised interest rates to 38 percent, hoping to increase savings and decrease spending that contributes to inflation. Macri has also announced that the government is unlikely to meet its year-end goal of 4 percent deficit reduction, which stood at 5.4 percent of GDP when Macri took office.

However, the Central Bank expects recession recovery to begin soon, predicting that GDP will rise 3 percent next year. Macri’s is also seeking to attract investors and new business to the country to help bolster the economy. Recently, Argentina held a conference in Buenos Aires for global investors and received over $32 billion in corporate pledges, signaling that the reforms are being taken seriously by multinational industries.

Despite an 18 percent drop in approval ratings this past summer – down to a moderate 46 percent approval rating – Macri has remained committed to his economic reforms. While Argentinians are feeling the squeeze of austerity measures, they are necessary to get the economy back on track, decrease inflation, and balance the budget. However, with legislative elections set for October 2017, Macri will need to demonstrate to the people that these measures work in order to avoid the government swinging too far back to the left and halting economic reform.

As demonstrated by these cases, the fall of the Left and subsequent rise of the Right is not a singular occurrence but rather a marked phenomenon in recent Latin American politics. The region has experienced a number of political and economic ideologies since its independence from Spain and Portugal was won in the 1800s. In the last half-century alone, the region has shifted from inward looking import substitution industrialization, to socialist and communist regimes, and later responded with neoliberal economic policy. It is only expected that countries and regions undergo economic and political reform as ideology changes and people look to restore balance after moving too far in one direction. The economic policies necessary to get the economy back on track will be painful in the short term, as seen in Argentina and Brazil. If these policies are not met with political stability and social welfare programs, the people may push out these new governments just as swiftly as they ushered them in. As nascent center-right regimes take hold in Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina, only time will tell how large, and successful, the shift will be. For now, the pink tide of Latin America is receding.

The 2016 Hangzhou G20 Summit Meeting: A Success for Anyone?

Dubbed “the political equivalent of the Olympics,” this year’s G20, or Group of 20, summit was held on September 4-5 in Hangzhou, China, and brought together the heads of state of the top 20 economies in the world. Together, participating nations make up two-thirds of the population and 85% of the global economy. The G20 has grown in influence and importance since member states’ response to the 2008 global financial crisis, when the G20 organized fiscal stimulus packages and “rebuilt confidence in the international financial system.” Since then, G20 meetings have been an opportunity to focus not only on the economy but on other international issues. The theme in Hangzhou this year, opened by President Xi Jinping, was “Towards an Innovative, Invigorated, Interconnected and Inclusive World Economy.” Yet as much as the Hangzhou Summit wanted to promote international cooperation, the reality of the diplomatic tensions between key members led some heads of state to leave less successful than others.

Before the Summit: Sherpas and Media Buildup

The official summit meetings take place between heads of state, but important discussions and negotiations are made prior to the actual conference. Nations send representatives called Sherpas who meet in order to discuss and produce preliminary agreements. This year’s Sherpa meeting was focused on climate change, a uniquely important aspect of the Hangzhou summit. Before the official Summit even started, the Sherpa meetings resulted in praise and promise to follow the Paris Agreements on the environment, drawn up earlier this year. The Sherpa meetings set a hopeful tone regarding the commitment to react to climate change at the Summit. While this seems like quite the accomplishment considering the amount of work done to even recognize climate change as a relevant global issue, the vast majority of that work was already accomplished in Paris. Heads of state were likely hopeful about, if unsurprised by, the agreements made in the Sherpa meetings and the subsequent expectation of this year’s G20 summit to produce good news in regards to the fight against climate change.

Media reporting up to the summit varied in tone. Chinese news sources focused primarily on looking forward to summit agreements regarding international trade and investment as well as the Chinese emphasis on “green financing,” which is a focus on environmentally-friendly and sustainable technology and development practices. The Chinese government also placed an emphasis on the economy as the main topic, instead of, for example, the tensions between China and Japan over the South China Sea. That dispute was recently complicated by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague ruling in favorof the Philippines and against China’s territorial claims. The careful emphasis on the economy by the Chinese government is not just due to the economy being the main point of G20 summits, but also in response to the extreme diplomatic tension over the uncertain future of the South China Sea dispute. Considering even Chinese news sources noted the less than friendly atmosphere between Japan and China, it is clear there was fear the Hangzhou Summit could have derailed into a debate on security and aggression. The Chinese government clearly wanted to avoid that outcome and instead focus on constructive and positive economic outcomes at the summit.

Lead-up to the 2016 Summit was not all focused on what agreements heads of state would produce or what topics would be discussed. China’s image and reputation were also on the line. The New York Times insisted one of China’s main goals, on a very basic level, was to successfully organize the gathering itself, quoting Matthew Goodman from the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Further than just being a successful host, nearly all news sources agree China had a keen desire to be seen less as a low-cost manufacturing state and more as a high-tech, modern economy driver. Hangzhou was not chosen at random to host the country’s first G20 summit; Hangzhou is not only a beautiful tourist destination but also the home of internet giant Alibaba and many other internet-based companies, which have drawn young entrepreneurs and international business to the city. The goal of the Hangzhou summit was to not only produce agreements regarding the global economy, but also to successfully and safely host one of the most influential political gatherings in the world while projecting China’s modern high-tech image.

Despite the carefully chosen location and determination to be a successful host, China did not escape media speculation or criticism. Controversy already surrounded the summit meetings before heads of state arrived. China prepared Hangzhou to receive the conference by extending worker’s vacation periods, cutting hours during the week of the summit, and giving incentives for citizens to leave the city altogether, citing traffic and security concerns as motivation. Restrictions on shipping and receiving packages forced many places in Hangzhou, especially restaurants, to close; in at least one case, Uighurs, a Muslim minority, were restricted from cooking. Security was also heavy throughout the city, limiting movement. These concerns were, of course, highlighted by mainly Western journalists.

Accomplishments of the Hangzhou Summit

G20 summits typically result in a series of agreements and affirmations by member states, and the Hangzhou Summit produced a number of positive outcomes centered primarily on the economy put forth in the G20 Leader’s Communique, which outlines the Hangzhou Action Plan. The White House released a report highlighting a number of positive developments, including that world leaders “reaffirmed their commitments to refrain from competitive devaluations” of their currencies. Key issues like China’s flooding of the steel market were also addressed and the G20 agreed to a Global Forum to address the issue. Positive statements on inclusive growth policies and promises to ratify the World Trade Organization (WTO) Trade Facilitation Agreement were included in the economics-heavy summit. Also present in the Communique are themes of effectiveness and efficiency regarding global financial governance, sustainable development, open global trade, and stability in the economy.

Unique to and of particular interest regarding the 2016 Summit was the emphasis placed on the environment and sustainability. The Hangzhou Action Plan put in place through the Communique lists member states’ support for the Paris Agreement on climate change as well as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on financing sustainability and development matters. Specifically, six out of 48 total clauses in the Action Plan specifically referenced and voiced support for key aspects regarding the environment. These agreements, including clause 21 on the development of green financing and clause 23 on developing efficient energy sources, were agreements highlighted by the Chinese government and the Sherpa meetings as critical focal points of the Hangzhou Summit. The other clauses included the commitment to sustainable development through the 2030 Agenda and in areas like agriculture. Leaders also voiced support for agreements on transport efficiency, including the Montreal Protocol, and on building a ‘green’ global economy, including the Environmental Goods Agreement. Overall, the affirmations made by member states are representative of the goals set forth by President Xi Jinping at the beginning of the Summit as well as the broader G20 commitment to improving and cooperating on the global economy, with the new focus on sustainability and the environment.

Aftermath of the Summit and China’s Goals

The Hangzhou Summit produced a communique that focused on an interconnected world economy with a special focus on sustainability and the environment; however, the conference was not a total success for all. From the US perspective, there were few real victories: the pledge to ratify the Paris Agreement and cut greenhouse gasses is arguably the most successful aspect of the conference, even though the conference also included consensus on a number of economic issues. However, the Action Plan, despite being the resolution of the conference, was not at all the main focus of media coverage, and according to some the actual economic and environmental issues were not even the focus of the summit itself. The 2016 Summit was a veritable whirlwind of tense diplomatic incidents, beginning for Obama before he even exited his plane. Obama met with Putin which resulted in no agreements on the Syrian crisis or cybersecurity concerns, and Obama assured that sanctions against the Russians would not be easing anytime soon. He also had a tense meeting with President Erdogan of Turkey. US relations with host country China are also incredibly tense for multiple reasons, including but not limited to the South China Sea dispute and the proposed US-South Korean Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Antimissile system, which China strongly dislikes. While these issues did not distract the US and China from collaborating on economic measures, it is also true that the summit did nothing substantial to warm or significantly change relations. The Hangzhou Summit was also the first of a few stops made by Obama in Asia, and the outcomes of the Summit was overshadowed by the tense meetings in Hangzhou and the controversy involving a cancelled meeting with the Philippines over statements made by the Philippines’ president. These diplomatic tensions made for a more dramatic story than the economic and pro-environmental outcomes, which distracted the media and the public from the positive aspects of the conference.

In contrast to the US, China should be satisfied with the outcome of the Hangzhou summit. There were no serious security concerns, and only a mild, initial focus on the effective emptying of the city and the degree to which city life was disrupted to present a better view of Hangzhou. Most importantly, the G20 meetings were successful in highlighting the commitment of China and the global economy towards ‘green financing’ and environmental sustainability. The prioritization of the environment and sustainability by summit participants is made explicit in the Hangzhou Action Plan, an aspect of the summit emphasized as a key topic for the G20 following the Paris Agreement. This was accomplished without explicitly addressing the serious diplomatic problems plaguing China at the moment – most notably, of course, the security issues around and legal legitimacy of China’s heavily contested claim to the South China Sea. Instead, most diplomatic tension gathered between President Obama and states like Turkey and Russia, effectively keeping China out of the spotlight during and after the summit. Other victories for China’s image include Canada’s submissionto join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, a recently created international organization designed to be in league with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. On the whole, the Hangzhou Summit reinforced China’s leadership in the regional and global financial sector.

Whether or not the successful completion of the G20 meeting owes more to heads of state willingly ignoring the South China Sea controversy in favor of other diplomatic tensions or to the concentration on truly dire environmental matters as a priority is up for debate; either way, China should celebrate the relatively smooth Hangzhou Summit and the progress made there. Unfortunately for the US in particular, the economic and environmental successes of this year’s G20 gathering were overshadowed by other concerns.

The Euro: A Win or Loss for Poland?

Introduction

The Euro, currently in circulation in 19 of the European Union (EU) member states, first came into physical circulation in 2002 following the electronic adoption in 1999. The introduction of the euro was originally manufactured as part of the Union’s broader plan to limit extreme nationalism following World War II and the fall of the Soviet Union. Caps on nationalism and closer economic interdependence would limit the likelihood of war breaking out again on the European continent. While originally introduced in 6 of the member states, the Euro’s rollout has extended due to the requirement, as spelt out in the Maastricht Treaty, of all member states to join. The treaty, however, does not spell out an exact timetable for accession into the Eurozone.

Accession into the Eurozone is contingent on 6 convergence criteria. The criteria as spelt out by the ECB include:

1. Low inflation: max 1.7% 2. Less than 3% budget deficit

2. Debt-to-GDP ratio less than 60%

3. ERM II Membership for minimum 2 years

4. Stable interest rates

5. Stable long-term interest rate max 6.7%

Once it has been determined a country satisfies the convergence criteria, a vote is taken in Council to permit the state to join the Eurozone. Since its conception, 8 member states have completed the accession process bringing the total membership to 19. The Euro was most recently introduced in 2015 replacing the Lithuanian lita.

In this paper I will discuss the economic basis of the euro, introduce theory behind Eurozone accession, and apply the two discussions to the current debate over Poland’s accession to the Eurozone and address some of the major concerns of citizens.

Economic Basis and the Theory of the Optimum Currency Area

Euro accession begins with the alignment of a country with the convergence criteria which cover conditions from inflation, deficit, and debt. Additionally, the national Central Bank must be independent of political control as it will be folded into the structure of the European Central Bank.

The economic benefits of switching a country’s currency to the Euro are undeniable: elimination of transaction costs of converting currencies and allowing for further integration of Eurozone economies. It contributes to the development of the single market’s free flow of goods, labor, and people which can be facilitated even easier with common currencies.

However, there are very clear economic disadvantages of joining the Eurozone. Accession to the Euro means the member state gives up its control over its monetary policy to the ECB. While that member state’s central bank will have a vote in the ECB, policies and positions contrary to that country’s interest could still be voted upon and carried out. Additionally, the ECB’s sole-mandate of price stability might play contrary to the needs of particular member states such as achieving full employment, the two of which sometimes can seem mutually exclusive.

For the majority of this paper I will be discussing the economic situation of Poland vis-à-vis accession into the Eurozone. To chart this discussion, I want to begin by discussing the economic basis of the Euro as theorized by the so called ‘Optimum Currency Area’ (OCA). The OCA theory, as developed and attributed to Robert Mundell, stresses the need to be able to control asymmetric shocks in order to build a currency union. The four main criteria he lists as needed to achieve a successful currency Union are:

i. Labor mobility across the region
ii. Open capital mobility; price and wage flexibility across the region

iii. A risk sharing system (such as a taxation redistribution)
iv. Similar business cycles across the region

If a region can meet these criteria, then Mundell stipulates it very well may be an optimal currency area. It is interesting to note that these currency areas don’t need to be multiple countries, but in fact a single country could have several optimal currency areas—but are tied under a single currency system for geopolitical reasons rather economic.

The Case of Poland

The presence of a resistance to Euro accession in Poland is clearly evident through the results of the Flash Eurobarometer 418 (FEB418). The FEB was conducted in April of 2015 in the 7 non-Euro member states with legal and treaty obligations to accede to the Eurozone. The goal was to measure public knowledge, perceptions, support, and expectations of the Euro.

In response to the question “Do you think the introduction of the Euro would have positive or negative consequences for (OUR COUNTRY)?” 54% of Poles said ‘negative’. When asked about the consequences on a personal level, 53% anticipated ‘total negative’ consequences. These results reveal that a majority of Poles see Euro introduction as a negative event (however the wording of the question does not indicate exclusivity of economic impact). This perceived negative impact, however, seems to be a native phenomenon as in the same FEB, 53% of Polish respondents indicated they believed Euro introduction has had an overall positive impact in other countries that have already introduced it versus a minority of 34% stating it was negative. The disparity in results suggests that in fact Poles do not have negative perceptions of the Euro as a whole, they just have negative perceptions about implementation of the Euro in place of the Polish Złoty.

Prior to the recent October 2015 election, Poland was under political pressure from the ECB and in particular Germany, to push towards meeting the convergence criteria, in particular officially joining the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II). Political attitudes were split at the time, with justifiable economic concerns about speculation driving down the value of the złoty. However, with the outright majority victory of the right-wing, euroskeptic Law and Justice Party in the October national elections, discussions about the Euro are now a non-starter, politically speaking.

This shift in the Polish political regime has halted progress towards accession to the Eurozone. It also raises the question of whether Poland should join economically. When I posed this question to my International Economics Professor Steven Silvia at American University, he argued the most important indicator in determining the economic vitality of accession to the Eurozone (or any shared currency regime) is understanding the business cycles of the currency regime and the country in question—the fourth of Mundell’s principles. This information can be found in DG Economic and Financial Affairs’ 2014 Report in European Business Cycle Indicators. The below graphs compare growth with the Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI).

The above graphs show the disparity of the economic conditions that struck the Euro area in the 2008 downturn versus the less dramatic recession in Poland. It is important to highlight how dramatic the disparity is: Poland’s growth rate never went negative, which cannot be said for the Eurozone. Poland’s ability to remain above the red line while the rest of Europe succumbed into recession is due to many reasons, but the main being the successful exercise of monetary policy of ‘Narodowy Bank Polski’ (National Bank of Poland).

Accession to the Eurozone, as stated earlier, means the National Bank would lose its monetary policy autonomy, and rather the country would be subject to the decisions taken at the ECB. Often portrayed as “giving up sovereignty” to Brussels, many opponents to the Euro like to leave out the fact that the National Bank will have a voting seat in the ECB. On the other hand, Poland is a single vote, and can be easily outvoted. The National Bank representative sitting on the ECB will take an oath stating that he will put the economic interests of the Eurozone as a whole before national interests. And at the end of the day, what is best for the Eurozone might not necessarily be best for Poland and vice versa.

The graphs above regarding the business cycle are telling because any central bank makes its monetary policy decisions based on the business cycle. In general, (along with other policies as well): when growth is slowing down, they will buy back bonds and infuse more money into the market, and when inflation gets too high, they will sell bonds to restrict money flows. The ECB follows the same basic logic and premises. So, with that in mind, if the Polish business cycle aligns closely with that of the Eurozone, it is safe to say we will see a history of similar policy actions taken by the ECB and the Polish National Bank. And theoretically, if Poland were to accede into the Eurozone, we should continue to see the two business cycles stay similar and thus ECB policies will continue to help the Polish economy grow.

On the other hand, if the business cycles did not align, it makes a very clear case to not accede. If the ECB sells bonds at the same as the Polish business cycle is at a peak and inflation is increasing, the ECB decision would wreak havoc on the Polish economy with high inflation. The same goes for buying bonds at a low in the business cycle: the constriction of cash will mean even less growth will occur, and the economy could experience negative growth and even go into recession if the adverse policies are sustained for a prolonged period of time.

Looking at the above graphs of Poland and the EU, there is visually a generally similar trend of business cycles. There were disparities in growth from 2004-2006(ish) but then the trends seemed to converge. This is very much likely due to business cycle synchronization which can be achieved through strategic trade. 2004 marked Poland’s entry to the single market, and thus trade between the Eurozone (and the EU as a whole) has increased dramatically, allowing for convergence to be achieved through trade.

To address the issue of business cycle synchronization, the EU has a long-standing Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) which is designed to help move a country’s economy towards convergence with Eurozone trends in terms of inflation, long-term interest rates, fiscal deficit, public debt, and exchange rate stability. The goal of business cycle convergence explains why membership in the ERM II for at least 2 years is one of the 6 convergence criteria a state must reach to accede to the Eurozone. Poland has not of yet joined the ERM.

The remaining three ‘criteria’ for an OCA are all semi-related. They are labor mobility, capital mobility, and a risk sharing system. These three elements are seen as necessary in forming an OCA as they are essentially for “promoting balance-of-payments equilibrium and internal stability”. BOP instability was a major concern of Mundell’s as well as concerns over balancing inflation and unemployment. He argues “the pace of inflation is set by the willingness of central authorities to allow unemployment in deficit regions”—essentially one region benefits at the expense of another in a common currency area in a monetary policy decision. In order to limit these type of situations, the three criteria are needed.

If unemployment rises in one region due to higher inflation in others, it is essential that labor has free mobility to move within the currency area. If labor can move, then the region can maintain full employment without having to enact monetary policies that might decrease unemployment in one region at the expense of another. Eventually, ideally, as the economy recovers, employment levels will balance back out across the region. The single market (all EU-28 member countries) allows for the free movement of goods and labor. Within that market, the Schengen zone allows for the free movement of peoples. Poland is part of both.

Capital mobility coupled with openness of wage and price flexibility acts part of a natural economic mechanism to redistribute supply and demand across the region. This ensures that should there be any supply or demand shocks, the impacts of such will not be isolated to one area of the currency region. If it were to be isolated as such, it would result in a disparity in BOP, which can cause undue stress and uneven economic development in the currency region. Free mobility of capital and flexible prices and wages will allow the economy to naturally adjusts to those shocks and the whole region will be affected similarly. The Eurozone (as well as the EU as a whole) has these sorts of mechanisms.

The last component: a risk sharing system. The ideal example of a risk sharing system would be an automatic fiscal transfer mechanism; think government bailouts or tax redistribution. The idea is that the governing authorities should be able to reallocate resources (money) to areas and sectors that are falling behind. The EU’s cohesion funds could have been seen as a sort of risk sharing system, as it redistributes money from wealthier regions to poorer less developed regions, but it is not an ideal example. EU law forbids state aid to business, including bailouts. However, bailouts were given out in April 2010 during the Eurozone crisis. Poland is a major recipient of cohesion funds; and has not been in need of any bailouts.

Analysis

Looking at the four factors often used in considering OCAs, Poland and the current Eurozone seem compatible on all four components. In fact, the National Bank of Poland released a report in 2004 following its EU Accession about the status of Poland’s accession to the Eurozone. The Bank indicates “there is a relatively low risk of monetary policy of the ECB being inappropriate for economic conditions prevailing in Poland after euro entry”. In reaching this conclusion, the authors of the report cite several reasons including the role that free movement of capital will have on stabilizing the exchange rate, high levels of cyclical convergence due to high trade volumes, and reductions in government debt will allow for stronger fiscal stabilizers.

Economically, the transition to the Euro makes sense in theory. The people of Poland themselves have acknowledged the benefits the Euro has. So what is the problem? In talking informally with several of my colleagues and friends in Poland, a common concern kept emerging: switchover would trigger a rise in prices, which would hurt the people. More formally, they are concerned about losing their purchasing power parity (PPP). I initially suspected this concern has emerged out of Polish people’s interactions with the Euro taking place in countries where price levels are higher compared to those in Poland (such as Germany, Belgium, and other western European countries) leading to false connotations that “euro = expensive”.

This concern, however, is not unique to Poland. Giovanni Mastrobuoni of Princeton University discusses how incomplete information led to similar “euro-biases” as they are generally referred to in other Eurozone states. In Lithuania, the most recent country to switch to the Euro, Flash Eurobarometer 412, taken in the weeks following the dual-circulation period, revealed that 58% of citizens felt the Euro has increased inflation with only 26% say it maintains stable prices. Models revealed that inflation during changeover was higher for cheaper goods, which are purchased more frequently by consumers, like food and drinks. Therefore, they make overall assumptions about the status of the economy on that limited piece of information, making it seem like there is overall greater inflation than actually present in the economy.

But, why are there different inflation rates? It turns out it is a vicious cycle. Mastrobuoni extends his model to include price uncertainty. He argues that on-the-spot conversions of the new price (in Euros) to the old currency involves a level of uncertainty “about the old-currency-equivalent of the price in euros [which] is higher the higher the price in euros is”. The graph below illustrates the vast effect of this problem as more than half of citizens in new Eurozone states still thought about prices in their own currency following switchover. Each of the results are from surveys taken in the weeks after the dual-circulation period.

This phenomenon creates an artificial demand curve by consumers, which yields a higher general equilibrium. The table below, borrowed from Mastrobuoni’s paper illustrates the difference between actual and perceived inflation pre- and post- accession to the Eurozone. He also includes Denmark, Sweden, and the UK in the chart as a means of comparison to nations that were not included in the Euro switchover and consequently did not adopt the Euro.

Mastrobuoni concludes that once consumers begin to think in Euros rather converting to their old currencies, the effects of the artificial inflation will be reduced if not eliminated.

Returning to the case of Poland, the phenomenon of “euro-biases” and price hikes is founded in a widespread economic phenomenon. While citizens are rightfully worried, the EU has taken steps to try to reduce such effects. During euro switchovers, a period of “dual price display” occurs in which stores and firms are required to display prices of goods in both euros and the former currency for a designated period of time. This is an improvement from the original switchover in 2002 where dual price display was not mandated. Mastrobuoni remarks that surveys in Belgium indicated only 50% of stores participated in the dual price display, and all for varying amounts of time during the two-month switchover process. The room for error in converting currencies was much higher under those conditions. During dual price display it limits the number of conversion errors that may occur.

However, some have expressed concerns that the dual-price display may be harmful in the long-term, as displaying prices in the former local currency encourages citizens to continue to rely on that price marker rather that of the Euro. This means that once the dual display period (usually 2 weeks for new member states) ends, consumers will have to go through the same process of conversion miscalculation as discussed prior. The EU also now provides a currency calculator to citizens of new Euro member states to help them make more accurate conversions on the spot. This enables citizens to continue to gauge euro price levels in their former national currencies beyond the dual display period.

Drawing Conclusions

The case of Poland is nothing unique from an economic aspect. We saw similar concerns in other countries including Lithuania only last year in 2015. However, the political conditions of the country simply do not permit for Euro accession to happen in the next couple of years. Will we see Poland in the Eurozone? Absolutely, but it very well may be 5-10 years down the line. Poland has a legal obligation to do so under the Maastricht treaty, and no one is denying that. Concerns are about when is the best time to join.

Poland first needs to join the ERM II to bring stability to its exchange rates, and it will have to remain in the ERM II for atleast two years (unless the ECB and Council waive the requirements—which the political will to do so seems present). However, Poland will not join the ERM II under the current euroskeptic government, which will remain in power for nearly another three and a half years, and then we will have to a wait for the election results.

While citizen’s fears of price increases very well may come true: we have to remember that any shocks to the economy will be bore by the Eurozone as a whole and limit the impact on Poland. Joining the Eurozone will also only increase high levels of trade between Poland and other countries. This small economic stimulus may be essential for Poland as it struggles to keep its young population from moving to other countries and create more jobs at home to keep them.

To ultimately answer the question of whether the Euro is a potentially win or loss for Poland: I argue that it will someday be a “win”. It is hard to draw a conclusive conclusion now due to the simple fact that we don’t know what will happen were Poland to accede to the Eurozone. While the country is close to converging on the requirements for Eurozone accession, there are valid concerns about the state of the economy and how Eurozone policy will be appropriate for the economy. The government should continue to develop the economy in order to catch up with other Eurozone countries to ensure a smoother transition.

And who’s gonna pay for it? The Costs of Trump’s Anti-Mexican Platform

Among large swaths of Republican voters, it is a truth universally acknowledged that the next President of the United States must enhance border security between the US and Mexico to keep illegal immigrants from entering the country and to protect American jobs. Perhaps the most pervasive of these policy proposals is Donald Trump’s monolithic response to immigration control: we’re gonna build a wall, and Mexico’s gonna pay for it. While crowds of supporters enthusiastically echo Trump’s wall demands at his rallies, the spread of their anti-Mexican rhetoric threatens US foreign relations with its neighbor, and consequently, threatens the future of the US economy and national security.

Though the specifics of his plan remain unclear, Trump asserts that his $10 million wall, measuring around 35 feet tall (and ‘it just got ten feet higher’) would impede the flow of alleged criminal activity from Mexico to the United States. With the Patriot Act serving as his legal framework, Trump claims he has the ‘moral high ground’ to impose stricter border regulation at Mexico’s expense; not only does Mexico’s ‘unfair subsidy behavior’ threaten US jobs, Mexico has an obligation to offset the “extraordinary daily cost of this criminal activity, including the cost of trials and incarcerations.”

Citing the US’s powerful economy and political dominance as coercive tools, Trump assures that Mexico will pay for the cost of a border wall “in one form or another,” through economic sanctions, trade tariffs, and/or greater trade regulation. According to the platform on Trump’s campaign website, “Mexico needs access to our markets much more than the reverse, so we have all the leverage and will win the negotiation.” As Trump pushes his characterization of Mexico as a country of “cunning” criminals who take advantage of the US’s economy, he builds an isolationist discourse that ignores the value of our international relations and paints the US as a self-sufficient hegemon that can bully its neighbors into any position that suits it.

In response, however, past and present Mexican leaders have reassured their constituents that Mexico will not bend so easily to Trump’s will. In an interview with Excelsior, current Mexican President, Peña Nieto, likened Trump’s anti-immigrant rhetoric to the fascist mechanisms of Mussolini and Hitler, warning that his unrealistic political strategy presents “simple solutions to problems that, of course, are not so easily solved.” Acknowledging that trade relations with the US are vital to the Mexican economy, Peña Nieto expressed hope to continue cooperation with the future president, whoever he or she may be. Nonetheless, the Mexican government firmly maintains that Trump’s border wall will not be constructed with any support, financial or otherwise, from Mexico.

Regardless of the feasibility of Trump’s prospective wall, his anti-Mexico platform gravely threatens the US’s relationship with an important regional ally. The North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA, has been instrumental in promoting economic growth and development throughout Mexico, Canada, and the US. Since its beginnings in 1994, NAFTA has strengthened interactions between the US and its neighbors; through the arrangement’s framework, the three nations have instituted mechanisms to facilitate intergovernmental relations and forums for dispute resolution. Though the tripartisan trade agreement is entrenched with asymmetrical power divisions between the three partners – as studies demonstrate the US influencing policy decisions in Canada and Mexico without the reverse occurring – the United States economy has enjoyed significant benefits from NAFTA, and a fair amount of its success is pinned to the agreement’s success.

Currently, Mexico is the US’s third largest goods trading partner, the second largest export market, and third largest supplier of goods imports – in 2015, total goods traded between the two nations amounted to $531 billion. Moreover, the Department of Commerce estimates US goods and services to Mexico supported 1.1 million American jobs in 2014. Since creating stronger economic ties with the United States, Mexico’s economy has transformed into a new level of competitiveness. While the Mexican economy felt some pressure from lowered oil prices and reduced production, its expansion of exports to the United States encouraged economic growth in 2015. Projections of Mexico’s financial future also appear positive; if Mexico continues to develop close economic relations with the US, the World Bank forecasts a gradual acceleration of growth in coming years.

Furthermore, communities along the US-Mexico border comprise the fourth largest economy in the world, and in order to encourage greater development in this region both governments must coordinate their local and national economic policies. To build upon the region’s strengths, US perceptions of the border area must transform to recognize its potential as an asset rather than a problem. Successful interaction on either side demands a more developed cross border infrastructure – not to divide and separate, but to create more windows for international exchange. By continuing to support Mexico’s growth and development, the US helps make North America more competitive on a global scale, which in turn benefits its own economic situation. Despite Trump’s populist rhetoric, investments from the US to Mexico are more than one-sided aid packages – the US stands to benefit from stronger relations with its southern neighbor.

Additionally, the existing economic ties between the two countries have helped reinforce their diplomatic relationship, especially in addressing similar security concerns like drug related violence and illegal immigration. Through programs like the Merida project, the US has assisted the Mexican government scrutinize law enforcement and institutionalize rule of law south of the border. While this program enjoyed limited successes, it serves as a starting point for further cooperation in the fight against drug related violence. In her article, US and Mexican Cooperation: The Merida Initiative and Drug Trafficking, Yasemin Tenkin argues the US could more effectively eradicate root causes of the illicit drug trade and drug related violence by investing further in Mexico’s economy, targeting poverty and unemployment. To address these security concerns, the US’s conceptualization of Mexico must shift to recognize it as a permanent, strategic partnership. Contrarily, Trump’s isolationist discourse suggests the US renounce its links to Mexico, questioning the benefits the US receives from the asymmetrical relationship.

The increasingly populist tone of bilateral relations between the US and Mexico has led to tension in the past decade, occasionally putting a strain on diplomatic decision-making; as such, a Donald Trump presidency would place bilateral relations between the two nations at risk of severe deterioration. From Trump’s perspective, the US enjoys a hegemonic status in the sphere of foreign affairs, and may wield its political power for leverage in its international relations. What Trump’s rhetoric fails to recognize, though, is that his brand of isolationism is ineffective in today’s globalized reality. In order to achieve progress in shared policy areas such as immigration reform or weakening the drug trade system, the US must maintain a working partnership with Mexico. If Trump were to stifle the Mexican economy’s growth and cut off remittances, as he proposes, the consequential loss of income for Mexico’s vulnerable population would provide prospective immigrants an increased incentive to seek better opportunities in the US; by ignoring the role of American consumers in perpetuating the influx of illicit drugs, and failing to coordinate policy with Mexico, the US can do little to address long term solutions to cross border dealings.

By promoting a characterization of Mexico as a dependent, underdeveloped, and violent country, Trump and his supporters disregard the value of Mexico’s growing economy, and hence fail to recognize the benefits of the US’s partnership with Mexico. Without cooperation and coordination between the two countries, the US would suffer the loss of a significant trade partner and destroy myriad opportunities for economic growth and employment, weakening North American competitiveness in the global market. In regards to national security, Trump’s failure to recognize Mexico’s potential as a cooperative, problem solving partner rather than the source of conflict weakens the US’s ability to create far-reaching policy solutions to stabilize the border. So who’s gonna pay for that wall, Mr. Trump? Looking at the likely economic and political future of a US without strong bilateral relations with Mexico, it looks like the United States stand to bear more costs than the presidential hopeful may have foreseen.

Who Does Foreign Aid…Aid?

In the midst of terrorist attacks and domestic economic debates, foreign aid and its implementation has not been a prioritized talking point in America’s election this upcoming November.  However politicians on both sides of the aisle have stated the importance of foreign aid throughout recent history. In April, even rock star Bono appealed to the senate, encouraging senators to increase foreign aid expenditure. So is foreign aid really that important? If so, why has it been minimally discussed in debates for the presidential bid this year?

In the broadest sense of the phrase, foreign aid is defined as “assistance (as economic aid) provided by one nation to another”.  Throughout history is has allowed the United States to have a stake in the political decisions of other countries, curb global epidemics, create wealth in other countries, among other results.  It is no secret that the amount of aid the US gives to each country often directly correlates with our interests there.  We have also engaged in humanitarian foreign aid to build relationships with other governments. In their article, Benjamin Goldsmith, Uysaku Horiuchi, and Terence Wood argue that foreign public opinion is favorable toward the United States when we “do good” in other countries, which benefits Americans abroad and our foreign policy in the long run. However while foreign aid can be a great tool and demonstrates the American values of creating a more prosperous, free world, it is also a topic of large contention.

Foreign aid is not always used effectively. In 1987, Ronald Reagan made a speech opposing the mismanagement of foreign aid funds, stating “with this money we bought a yacht for Haile Selassie”.   Since this time, more safeguards have been instituted to ensure the responsible spending of foreign aid funds. To increase transparency in foreign aid spending, a new official government website reports all foreign aid data expenditures and breaks down funding by country and type of aid assistance.  Development projects have also been increasingly contracted out to third party organizations that have greater oversight capacity to manage projects funded by foreign aid.  So while there is still a margin of error and room for improvement, foreign aid spending has become much more responsible since Reagan’s speech in 1987.

Regardless of these changes in implementation, foreign aid is a highly unpopular concept.  In 2014 the US gave a total of 32 billion dollars in foreign aid to other countries.  While this sounds like a large amount, it was only 0.19% of the US national income. The US gives the most foreign aid in dollar value, however we fall short of generous on a global scale in percent of national income.  Sweden gives the most percentage of foreign aid, with 1.1% of their national income. In reality the US is average in its foreign aid expenditure, relative to national income. However Americans do not perceive aid this way. The Kaiser Family Foundation polled Americans and found that on average they believed 26% of our federal budget goes to foreign aid—more than all of military spending, education, transportation, and veteran’s benefits put together.  

Considering these misconceptions about foreign aid, it is easier to understand why an important topic like foreign aid, so capable of shaping international opinion of the US, has not been a greater priority in election 2016.  Both candidates address their foreign aid positions on their websites. Hillary Clinton refers to foreign aid as a component of her formula for “smart power” in her statement “we have to use every pillar of American power – military might but also diplomacy, development aid, economic and cultural influence, technology, and the force of our values, that is smart power.” Donald Trump directly mentioned aid in his bid announcement when he stated “It is necessary that we invest in our infrastructure, stop sending foreign aid to countries that hate us and use that money to rebuild our tunnels, roads, bridges, and schools […].” By “countries that hate us”, Trump is referring to Pakistan and Egypt, two of the largest recipients of foreign aid.   However most—almost half—of the aid we give to each of these two countries is categorized for “peace and security”. That is what can be so confusing about foreign aid. There is no specification within the term for what is given in military aid, and what is given in humanitarian and infrastructure assistance.

President Obama has proposed that foreign aid should be combined with the defense budget, since the multifaceted wellbeing of other nations and their citizens is vital to America’s national security.   With this assertion by our sitting president and the statements made by both president-elects of America’s two largest parties, we can conclude that aid cannot be supported by the American people unless it is framed as a power-inducing factor to America’s national security.  To revisit my initial question regarding foreign aid’s nonexistence in presidential debates this past election, what I least expected in starting this research has seemed to be true—foundationally, foreign aid is a nonissue in this election, with both candidates viewing it as a similar tool, from different sides of the aisle.

It could also be the case that recent events in Paris, Brussels, San Bernardino,  and Orlando, and the nativist sentiments that followed, do not allow for discussion of spending more money on aid that would not directly result in greater safety for Americans. However Bush’s support of PEPFAR to reduce the AIDS epidemic, Obama’s “Power Africa” program, America’s support of other countries after national disasters, and funding to make elections in budding democracies more transparent are efforts that do not go unnoticed globally. By framing foreign aid as solely an endeavor for power, we may miss out on opportunities to make deeper partnerships, greater developmental advancements, and participate in the successes of lesser-developed nations. While it is strategic to use foreign aid to make America more powerful, it is just as beneficial in the long run to use our power to promote—and fund—aid projects that reflect American founding ideals of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness beyond our own borders.  To our president-elects, it may be time to debate aid, and all categories of it, more in-depth. After all, foreign aid matters, and not just to those who vote for you.

To Salute or to Burn: The Battle Over Flag Desecration did not End with Texas v. Johnson

“You are a fucking scumbag traitor piece of fucking trash.” In Missouri Donald Trump supporters shout at flag stomping Anti-Trump protesters. Violence erupts as more than 200 people take part in a standoff at the very same Trump rally. Another rally in Wisconsin includes members of the “Fuck Your Flag Tour” protesting against racial discrimination while stomping on an American flag.

Flag desecration and in particular flag burning is not a new controversy. While the act o flag desecration has been declared legal and a legitimate form of free speech by the United States Supreme Court; controversy and emotions are building over the issue again. The views of our potential candidates on this sensitive issue may be worthy of more discussion given the huge impact on our society another era division over this issue would cause.

History

In 1984 a man named Gregory Lee Johnson protested the policies of Ronald Reagan by burning an American flag outside of the Republican National Convention in Dallas. His conviction for the act was brought to the Supreme Court. Here in Texas v. Johnson (491 U.S. 397), the Court decided that “flag burning constitutes a form of ‘symbolic speech’ that is protected by the First Amendment.” The ruling was the first to protect flag desecration based on the freedom of speech. Writing for the dissent Justice Stevens argued that the government had a state interest in limiting the right to desecrate the flag due to the flag’s unique status in the United States.

When congress tried to circumvent the Johnson ruling with the passage of the Flag Protection Act the decision was upheld in United States v. Eichman (496 U.S. 310). After this ruling there were various attempted to work around the ruling by congressional statute and state laws, there were also attempts to overrule the ruling through a constitutional amendment.

Current Presidential Candidates

The most recent political battle over this issue was in 2005 and 2006 with a flag desecration bill (in 2005) and constitutional amendment (in 2006) introduced in Congress. The Flag Protection Act of 2005 was cosponsored by Hilary Clinton. This piece of legislation was different from past bills in that it sought to punish flag desecration if it were to incite violence. The New York Times equates the bill with, “attempt[ing] to equate flag-burning with cross-burning, which the Supreme Court, in a sensible and carefully considered 2003 decision, said could be prosecuted under certain circumstances as a violation of civil rights law.  A middle ground between those who want to keep flag desecration legalized and those who wish to completely forbid it under all circumstances regardless of consequences or content. Both Democratic candidates, Sanders and Clinton voted no on the 2006 Amendment due to its lack of clarity and broad nature. However, Clinton did endorse a counter measure similar to her 2005 bill to replace the 2006 Amendment.

Relevance

With flag desecration issues and events popping up more frequently in this present election the votes of the past could become more relevant than the candidates would believe. Donald Trump has stated that he believes that flag desecration should be illegal and events at his rallies have shown that violence can result when people on opposite ends of this spectrum confront each other. The candidates may need to confront this issue head on at some point in the future.

The most dangerous part of this issue aside from the violence is the near 50/50 divide among the public. A Gallup poll asked for the public’s opinion on the issue in 2006 while the Flag Desecration Amendment was being discussed. The poll asked two questions, one that gave some information about the issue and the other that was more specific, the polls fluctuated the majority on each side of the issue but still hovered around 50/50. With the public so sharply divided on the issue any conflict resulting from it would be hard to resolve. Even more difficult would be to amend the constitution in favor of those rallying against flag desecration.

This particular election has seen an unusual degree of polarization. American’s have seen what they perceive to be their own American values questioned. The foundation of the system of our democracy and electoral system has been questioned by Trump through criticisms of the nomination process. Sanders has brought an economic ideology to the table that many Americans are uncomfortable with in the form of Democratic Socialism. Donald Trump has also touched nerves with his comments on race, women, and immigration. These clashes of values are extremely volatile. The question of flag desecration is even more toxic in this environment as America is redefining its image. The American flag does not stand for the same principles for everyone anymore and these polarizing points of view of America make this a nasty time for such a dangerous discussion.

The Candidates and Latin America: Policy in our "Backyard"

Ahead of the 2016 presidential election, questions on candidates’ foreign policy positions have mainly focused on the Middle East, with tough debates surrounding ISIS, the Iran nuclear deal, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Second and third in line for candidates’ foreign policy concerns seem to be the growing economic influence of China and Russia’s political aggression. Although hailed as the United States’ “back yard,” Latin America is merely a blip on the foreign policy radar this election season. However, three issues regarding Latin America have been widely discussed by most (if not all) campaigns: Immigration reform, normalizing diplomatic relations with Cuba, and NAFTA. The candidates’ stances on the issues vary, not only between political parties but within them as well.  

Immigration

With an estimated 11 million undocumented people living in the U.S., immigration is no small issue. The two parties are vehemently divided on the issue of immigration reform. Democrats often promote a “pathway to citizenship,” while Republicans tend to favor securitization of the (southern) border.

As the son of a migrant from Poland, Bernie Sanders proposes an immigration policy that emphasizes justice and human rights to keep families together and protect workers from exploitation. He plans to build on the Obama Administration’s immigration reforms by expanding the DACA and DAPA programs. Sanders will not wait for Congress to act, instead he has said he will take executive action within the first 100 days of his administration. Sanders specifically addresses the flow of unaccompanied child migrants, primarily from the Northern Triangle – Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. While it reached a peak in 2014, the U.S. is still dealing with the repercussions of the massive influx of tens of thousands of unaccompanied children. Sanders condemns the deportation of these children, amid reports that children who are returned to their home countries are being killed by the same gang-incited violence they fled.

Hillary Clinton also supports comprehensive immigration reform. Her proposed immigration plan includes creating a pathway to citizenship, closing family and private detention centers, and upholding President Obama’s previous executive orders on immigration reform. Clinton also plans to provide deportation relief for DREAMers, DAPA candidates, and to “extend those actions to additional persons with sympathetic cases.” As a senator, she cosponsored the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act. Although Clinton mainly addresses the legal aspects of immigration reform, she also emphasizes that immigration is a “family issue” and wants to work to keep law-abiding immigrant families together.  

The current GOP front-runner, Donald Trump, proposes the radical and improbable solution of building a wall to seal the border with Mexico. Trump also plans to make Mexico pay for it, by refusing to process remittances from relatives and friends in the U.S. Trump states, “ It's an easy decision for Mexico: make a one-time payment of $5-10 billion to ensure that $24 billion continues to flow into their country year after year.” According to experts, the proposed 2,000-mile wall would be the largest infrastructure project in the U.S. since President Eisenhower’s highway program. While Trump estimates the cost at about $10 billion, it could actually cost up to $25 billion and would take until the end of his first term to complete. It is also unclear if it is feasible or even legal to halt remittances. To make matters worse, Trump has also come under fire for racist comments, equating Mexican immigrants with gang members, drug traffickers, and rapists.

In keeping with reductionist immigration reform, Ted Cruz states on his campaign website that “he will stop illegal immigration.” Not only that, but he also plans to build a wall across the southern border, as well as triple border security, and implement a biometric tracking system. Although his campaign does not delve into details, a biometric tracking system would likely include collecting the fingerprints of every foreigner who entered or exited the country. Congress passed a biometric tracking bill shortly after 9/11, but the Department of Homeland Security has maintained that the program is too costly and impractical. A preliminary study found that it would cost up to $6.4 billion to install the system just in all air and seaports, which would not even track the 79% of migrants who enter the U.S. over land.

The more center-leaning GOP candidate, John Kasich, fails to mention immigration on his campaign website. Even more vexing, Kasich has changed his position several times, even within the campaign season. In June 2015, he stated at an Iowa forum that undocumented immigrants who otherwise follow U.S. laws should have a pathway to obtain legal status. However, he also added that this legal status should not lead to citizenship, although that may have to be part of a compromise. Later, he told an Ohio newspaper that he does not support any legal status for undocumented immigrants, and he wanted to end birth right citizenship.

The Democratic candidates are proposing massive reforms, which will greatly improve the current system and provide desperately needed services to millions of migrants and their families. However, it will likely be extremely tough to get these reforms through a gridlocked Congress. On the other hand, the Republic candidates’ plans are either non-existent or so preposterous that they might as well be non-existent, as they will likely never bear any semblance of reality.

Cuba

President Obama’s actions to normalize relations and lift the embargo against Cuba have become major topics in most candidates’ foreign policy proposals. Since the process began in December of 2014, Cuba has been removed from the State Sponsor of Terrorism List, the U.S. Embassy in Havana has been re-opened, and direct mail flights have been re-established. On going efforts are working to lift the trade embargo and allow to greater freedom for Americans wishing to travel to the island.

Sanders has long supported the normalization of relations with Cuba, however, his stance is nuanced. In an interview from 1985, Sanders commends Castro’s socialist reforms to improve access to universal health care and education. While Sanders has expressed hope that Cuba move towards a more democratic system of governance, he has also emphasized the need for the U.S. to respect Cuba’s sovereignty. This last statement is evident of Sander’s non-interventionist position, and he has often criticized the U.S.’s habit of toppling left-leaning regimens in Latin America (from 1898 to 1994 there were at least 41 U.S. interventions in the region – an average of one every 28 months). More recently, in 2014, Sanders traveled to Cuba to discuss human rights, trade, and health care as part of an official U.S. delegation.

Clinton’s position has slowly shifted from her time as First Lady to her more recent position as Secretary of State for the Obama Administration. As First Lady, she supported the 1996 Helms-Burton Act, which President Bill Clinton signed into law, that prevents the embargo from being lifted until Cuba fulfills certain requirements, including fair elections, freeing political prisoners, and uncensored press. In her 2008 presidential run, she maintained her position of opposition to lifting the embargo, however she added a caveat, stating, “As president I would be ready to reach out and work with a new Cuba government, once it demonstrated that it truly was going to change that direction.” Then, as Secretary of State, Clinton recommended that Obama reconsider the embargo, as it “wasn’t achieving its goals.” In July of 2015, Clinton made a speech in Miami, a highly symbolic location due to the number of Cuban immigrants living there, in which she declared, “The Cuba embargo needs to go, once and for all.” Hillary’s changing position on Cuba could be the result of a progression in thought, though it may also just be an attempt to court Latino voters.

Although not entirely clear or detailed on his position, it appears that Trump is not opposed to the normalization of relations, stating, “Ultimately, it’s going to be good.” However, in the same interview, he went on to express that, “we could have had a better deal, a much stronger deal,” though he does not reveal what a stronger deal might entail. Other Republican candidates have criticized Trump, as they generally oppose lifting the embargo and normalizing relations with Cuba.

Despite his Cuban heritage, Cruz strongly opposes normalizing relations with Cuba, especially if the country remains under the Castro regimen. During the GOP primary debate in Miami, Cruz stated that he would reverse Obama’s actions and re-break diplomatic ties with Cuba, a “nation that hate[s] us.”  He has also promised to block the appointment of a U.S. ambassador to Cuba, a necessary step in re-establishing diplomacy between the two countries. Currently the ambassador is serving in an “acting” role since the U.S. re-opened the Havana embassy in July of 2015. Cruz’s plans would set a dangerous precedent for U.S. foreign policy and damage relations in the region.

Kasich has not outlined a definitive position on Cuba thus far in the campaign. However, as Representative he voted against two measures in 2000 that would reduce the economic and travel embargoes. In an interview in February, Kasich responded to a question on breaking diplomatic relations with Cuba by stating, “Well let’s see where we are when I come [into office] and what the administration has done…I think [the Obama Administration] made a big mistake because I think Cuba needed to do something. Why are we always reaching out?...They keep demanding things so I don’t understand what the administration is doing.” It seems only time will tell what his final stance is.

The candidates express varying degrees of enthusiasm for normalizing relations with Cuba. Clinton and Sanders would build on the Obama Administration’s policy, while Cruz would break ties once again, severely damaging the budding diplomatic relations. In keeping with their lack of foreign policy experience, or even interest, Trump and Kasich have said little on the issue.

NAFTA

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), enacted in 1994, is a multilateral agreement between the United States, Mexico, and Canada to increase economic cooperation. NAFTA has been highly controversial. Critics say it causes job losses in the U.S. and unfavorable working conditions abroad. Supporters respond by saying it will actually help create jobs and spur economic growth across the region. Currently, most experts conclude that NAFTA has been net positive for the U.S., although it has failed to deliver on the big promises made in its early years. Furthermore, it is difficult to distinguish the direct effects of NAFTA on economies in the wake of globalization and increased technology use.

Sanders strongly opposes NAFTA, blaming it for increased poverty in Mexico, loss of jobs, and an influx of undocumented migrants in the U.S. His plan is to rewrite trade deals such as NAFTA to promote fair trade in lieu of free trade. Sanders has been consistent in his position, stating in a debate in early March, “I was on a picket line in the early 1990s against NAFTA, because you didn’t need a Ph.D. in economics to understand that American workers should not be forced to compete against people in Mexico making 25 cents an hour.” While Sanders’ draconian interpretation of NAFTA may be a bit exaggerated, a fair trade agreement would likely be more beneficial for the American worker than the current free trade model.

Clinton has a complicated history with trade deals. She supported NAFTA as the First Lady during Bill Clinton’s Administration. As a Senator, Clinton supported free trade, as long as it “can increase living standards and foster…economic development for all parties.” In 2007, during her first presidential run, she remarked that NATFA was a mistake because it did not deliver on many promises that were made in 1994, which is mostly true. As Secretary of State, Clinton embraced free trade with the beginnings of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) – which she has since turned against. Her stance as a current presidential candidate has been fuzzy; she does not openly support NAFTA and other free trade agreements, but she does not decry them as middle-class and job destroying plans, either. This is another case of questioning whether Clinton’s change of heart is due to gradual belief progression, or, as is likelier in this case due to her sudden turn against TPP, an attempt to round up votes.

Trump also opposes NAFTA, as he believes it is destroying the U.S. manufacturing industry. In an interview in which Trump was asked how he would respond to an American car company that wished to open a plant in Mexico, he stated that he would charge the company a 35 percent tax on each product that was then sent back into the U.S. However, this measure directly violates NAFTA and disregards the fact that only Congress can establish separate tax rates. In a separate interview, Trump said, “I am all for free trade, but it’s got to be fair.” This statement under scores his lack of basic economic knowledge, as free trade, by definition, cannot be constrained by measures to make it “fair.”

Cruz’s positions on NAFTA and free trade have been murky. At press time, he has not given a position on NAFTA, and has only vaguely expressed opposition to the Trans Pacific Partnership.

Although he has not said much on this issue during his presidential campaign, Kasich voted for NAFTA as a Congressman in 1993. He has not spoken at length on the issue, but Kasich currently supports free trade, and also maintains that many American jobs are the result of free trade.

Conclusions

 The foreign policy positions of the candidates represent a large range of experiences, interests, and perceptions. Clinton, having served as Secretary of State, is by far the most qualified candidate. However, her record in Latin America is stained by revelations that she played a role in the 2009 Honduran coup d’etat. Sanders remains fervently committed to his ‘diplomacy first’ and non-interventionist beliefs, and often connects foreign policy with reducing inequality and promoting social services – two core points of his domestic campaign. Trump’s proposals are either outlandish or half-baked, and there seems to be no moderate middle ground in sight. Similarly, Cruz’s views are both simplistic and extreme, and he would not hesitate to turn back the clock to the 1950’s on the U.S.’s relationship with Cuba. Finally, Kasich leaves much to be desired in the realm of foreign policy, and, really, in his campaign in general. It seems that the only issue the candidates might be able to agree on is their condemnation of NAFTA, which, in reality, is not the catch-all to blame a stagnant economy and loss in industry jobs on that they want it to be.

Why U.S. Foreign Policy Isn’t Ready for Hillary

Hillary Clinton is now the presumptive Democratic nominee for the 2016 presidential election. While Clinton is, without question, a better fit for the job than the GOP’s inevitable nominee, Donald Trump, she might have some explaining to do before she can rally the entire party behind her. Any pro-Hillary voters who prioritize moral plans for American foreign policy should probably look into the candidate’s past in Haiti. Last summer, the Pulitzer Center hosted journalist Jonathan M. Katz for a discussion about the Clintons’ influence and rather infamous legacy in Haiti. It’s surprising how little the failures and destruction of Bill and Hillary Clinton’s presence in Haiti have been brought up so far. Hopefully by November, Clinton will have been pushed toward necessary change.

First, some background on the topic: on January 12, 2010, the deadliest natural disaster ever recorded in the hemisphere, a magnitude-7.0 earthquake, devastated Haiti’s southern peninsula and killed 100,000 to 316,000 people. Former President Bill Clinton and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton led the Haitian reconstruction effort and vowed to help the country “build back better,” so that if another disaster struck, Haiti would be able to respond more quickly and with more efficiency. Hillary described their efforts as a “road test” that would reveal “new approaches to development that could be applied more broadly around the world.”

The Clinton Foundation alone has directed $36 million to Haiti since 2010. Another $55 million has been spent through the Clinton-Bush Haiti Fund, and an additional $500 million has been made in commitments through the Clinton Global Initiative’s Haiti Action Network. But what does Haiti have to show for all of these investments? Not much, according to Katz. “Haiti and its people are not in a better position now from when the earthquake struck,” he said. The hundreds of millions of dollars and the years of reconstruction efforts have yielded negligible results. For a project so expansive, Hillary has kept relatively quiet about Haiti thus far in her campaign. Her spokesman declined to comment on how Haiti has shaped her foreign policy, saying Hillary would address that “when the time comes to do so.”

Hillary’s big plan for how she would “rebuild” Haiti in the wake of desolation was characteristically American: through business. With big corporate plans on the horizon, Bill and Hillary became exceedingly familiar faces in Haiti leading up to the 2011 presidential elections. It’s not surprising that the candidate who vowed to make Haiti “open for business” was ultimately the victor. Former Haitian pop star Michel Martelly eventually won the race, after Hillary salvaged his candidacy when he was eliminated as the number 3 candidate by convincing the parties to accept him back into the race. Katz said that this vote was fraudulent. Martelly, a businessman and strong proponent of foreign investment in Haiti, was “attractive” to the State Department, Katz noted. He very much had a “Clinton view of Haiti and a Clinton view of the world.”

That’s how Caracol Industrial Park, a 600-acre garment factory geared toward making clothes for export to the U.S., was born in 2012. Bill lobbied the U.S. Congress to eliminate tariffs on textiles sewn in Haiti, and the couple pledged that through Caracol Park, Haitian-based producers would have comparative advantages that would balance the country’s low productivity, provide the U.S. with cheap textiles, and put money in Haitians’ pockets. The State Department promised that the park would create 60,000 jobs within five years of its opening, and Bill declared that 100,000 jobs would be created “in short order.” But Caracol currently employs just 5,479 people full time. “The entire concept of building the Haitian economy through these low-wage jobs is kind of faulty,” Katz stated on Monday. Furthermore, working conditions in the park are decent, but far from what should be considered acceptable.

Not only did Caracol miss the mark on job creation, but it also took jobs away from indigenous farmers. Caracol was built on fertile farmland, which Haiti doesn’t have much of to begin with. According to Katz, Haitian farmers feel that they have been taken advantage of, their land taken away from them, and that they have not been compensated fairly. Hundreds of families have been forced off the land to make room for Caracol. The Clintons led the aggressive push to make garment factories to better Haiti’s economy, but what it really created was wealth for foreign companies. This trend was echoed when the Clintons helped launch a Marriott hotel in the capital, which has really only benefited wealthy foreigners and the Haitian elite.

Mark D’Sa, Senior Advisor for Industrial Development in Haiti at the U.S. Department of State, said that many of the Clintons’ promises remain unfulfilled and many more projects are “half-baked.” Haiti remains the most economically depressed country on the continent. If Hillary wins in 2016, U.S. policy geared toward Haiti will undoubtedly expand, meaning even more money will be funneled to the Caribbean nation to fund the Clintons’ projects, for better or for worse. According to Katz, the truth is that we don’t actually know how much money has been thrown into the Caribbean country to “rebuild” it, and that with economic growth stalling and the country’s politics heading for a shutdown, internal strife seems imminent.

The introduction of accountability for the foreign aid industry is the most important change that can be made, according to Katz. Humanitarian aid does nothing positive or productive if there are not institutions in place, managed by individuals who actually live in these countries, to oversee that aid is serving rather than hurting the people it is supposed to “help.” Hillary Clinton’s efforts in Haiti have fueled political corruption, destroyed arable farmland, and have forced hundreds of families to leave their homes and their jobs to make room for a factory that has not given even a fraction of the amount to Haiti as it has taken. If the introduction of accountability is the way to go, then we first need to start talking. So Hillary, what do you have to say about Haiti?

Taking Socialism Home to Meet Your Parents

So you come home from your first year at college. You wave goodbye to the rear fender of your friend’s beat up 1998 Toyota sedan as it drives away into the distance. You see your parents standing in your doorway smiling proudly, happy to have you back. You walk inside and sit down to a freshly cooked family dinner to reconnect after a year away. Your parents start to ask you about your life, how are the grades, have you locked down a job for the summer yet, do you remember your curfew is still midnight, and for god’s sakes do you have a boyfriend yet? “No,” you reply, no job and no boyfriend yet, but you have started to really like this idea you learned about in your introduction to political theory class; you’ve become a socialist.

Dad dramatically pushes his chair back and storms off to his study to drink scotch straight from the bottle and contemplate where he failed you, while your mother sobs into her apron, and your little brother runs off to alert the neighborhood watch that there’s a dangerous Marxist guerilla living in the area. The white-picket fence has caught on fire and all of the years of wholesome upbringing and money spent on college tuition have gone to waist…or not. Maybe it should not be so shocking that socialism is seeing a resurgence in popularity amongst many young college-age Americans. Now, this is not the socialism of the radical socialism of envisioned by dusty theorists where the government is in direct control of distributing wealth equally to all of its citizen. Instead, this article refers to democratic socialism, which is growing in popularity because it gives the government the tools it needs to administer economic policy and welfare programs, while still maintaining individual rights such as private land ownership and free markets. This allows the enhanced power of the government to be wielded by the larger populace. Indeed, to those who are educated, the ideas that drive socialism are not so foreign or exotic, but are actually reasonable and effective.

Now, in order to evaluate different forms of government, there must be some agreed upon metric by which to do so. For this article, an effective and efficient government is one that can most successfully carry out its laws and directives. Yet this comes with an important caveat, for a truly effective government must also take the best care of its citizens’ needs. In summary, an effective government must be accountable and responsive to its people, while still creating policy that is actually effective at accomplishing a government’s first job—to provide for its citizens—opposed to blindly following every brash impulse of its electorate. While an authoritarian government might be effective, it is not the most humane because large constituency of people are victim to the wants and choices of the small concentration of power in a ruling party or a dictator. A democracy, conversely, while the choices of the electorate might not always be the best or most humane, does have the largest portion of the total populace making the decisions, which is in theory the most humane form of government. Yet that large and theoretically humane electorate is slow to take action and thus is actually not the most responsive or effective in executing its policies. In this article, I posit that a socialist democracy is the best way to execute effective governmental action in the most egalitarian and humanitarian way.

A student of political theory might tell you that an authoritarian or autocratic government is one of the most effective at just directly carrying out its directives. In terms of the economy, a government that does not have to worry about any opposition, nor any approval, can make the changes it decides are the most beneficial for itself much more quickly than if it had to go through more widely accepted democratic routes. While other nations may make economic success more difficult for autocratic governments by punishing them for their system of rule, case in point the embargos that stood for decades against Cuba, authoritarian governments are some of the most capable in terms of implementing their own policy within the confines of their own economy. When speaking about economic development, Modernization theory puts forward the idea that democracy was something for rich and developed nations, and in order to achieve that affluence other less-developed nations had to go through a period of non-democratic rule. Indeed, this idea is supported by London School of Economics professors Timothy Besley and Masayuki Kudamatsu, who illustrate it thus:

[A]utocratic government is not always a disaster in economic terms. Indeed, throughout history there has been growth and development in autocratic systems of government. For example, the British industrial revolution predates the introduction of free and fair elections with mass participation. Modern China is also a case in point with a spectacular growth performance in a non-democratic setting.

The example of modern China is especially pertinent here, for many other countries in Southeast Asia—Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore just to name a few—all experienced incredible economic growth and success under military dictatorships similar to that experienced by China under single party, autocratic rule. This is because of how efficiently they are able to administer their economic policy. Columbia University economist Jagdish Bhagwati is quoted by G. William Dick to say that “No policy of economic development can be carried out unless the government has the capacity to adhere to it […] Quite often, however, democratic governments lose equanimity and determination in the face of opposition.” Yet, the ability to effectively orchestrate policy comes at a price, for few would disagree that authoritarian or autocratic systems are not the most beneficial to the average citizen, thus violating our second rule for effective governance. In China, the economic growth that the single-party government has fostered has not equally benefitted all of its subjects: the elite have become richer and the wealth is not shared equally. This leads us to one alternative to an authoritarian system: democracy.

Yet while democracies are typically far better for all of their constituents in terms of holding their governing figures accountable to the populace, the question remains: can they achieve the same economic success as authoritarian systems? As NYU professor Adam Przeworski notes, “The reason everyone opts for democracy in affluent societies is that too much is at stake in turning against it” because the alternative is so much worse for the average citizen, especially those not aligned with the ruling party. Furthermore, it is true that, as Pranab Bardhan says in the Financial Times, “Democracies are better able to avoid catastrophic mistakes, (such as China’s […] massive mayhem in the […] Cultural Revolution), and have greater healing powers after difficult times. Democracies also experience more intense pressure to share the benefits of development among the people, thus making it sustainable.”

In essence, Bardhan is saying that democracies avoid dangerous blunders because all decisions must first come from the people or those who they elect to represent them. Yet while it might be better for the average citizen in terms of sharing the wealth, a democracy can prove to be painfully slow and inefficient when it comes to deciding upon and administering economic policy. One needs only to look at the struggle the American government goes through every year to pass a budget to simply keep itself operating, and the number of times it has shut itself down due to partisan differences, to see how cumbersome and lethargic a democracy such as our own can be. As Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate posit in the American Economic Review, “[W]hile political equilibrium does satisfy a certain efficiency property, this does not imply that policies are efficient according to standard economic criteria,” for even if we do manage to agree on an economic policy, there is no guarantee that all of the concessions made to reach that agreement have not stripped the policy of all actual effectiveness. This leaves us with one essential question: how do we maintain the economic efficiency of an autocratic government while imparting the social equity of a democratic one?

Our answer lies back in that one dirty word—socialism. A socialist government has a large federal government empowered by its electorate to be able to more directly implement its economic policies, while giving the fruits of its prosperity to its citizens equally instead of having it funneled directly to the top as an authoritarian system would. Cedric Muhammad of Forbes put it eloquently when he said of socialism that

[a] socialist system that is working well is one that is fully deploying the nation’s resources through a central plan that has the approval of the people. It would be superior to a capitalist system that is working so poorly that its adherents must find excuses for mass unemployment, widely diverging income classes, and deepening social pathologies.

Indeed, it is the effective implementation that is the crux of what makes democratic socialism the best choice for America. In post-WWII America, we had a massively powerful federal government that was able to capitalize on the economic success that the nation was experiencing and return it to the people in terms of social welfare programs. This union of the ability of the government to make decisive and responsive economic actions while still having a government by and for the people that makes socialism such a potent and attractive form of governance. I’ll leave you with another quote from Jagdish Bhagwati of Columbia University: “Another advantage of the socialist countries is their passionate conviction and dedication to the objective of economic growth—which contrasts visibly with the halting and hesitant beliefs and actions of democracies.” A socialist system gives the government the power it needs to enact successful policy, while still being accountable to and benefitting its people, and that’s an appealing concept.

A Tale of Two Governments: How American Politics Affects Iranian Politics

On November 8th 2016, millions of Americans will flock to their local polling places. Voters will be faced with choices for the senate, house, local elections, and of course, the presidency. While the conversations dominating the American political sphere are largely focused on the economy, healthcare, immigration, and ISIS, the party who gains control of American politics will also be well placed to craft a foreign policy that will have an immense effect on the political, economic, and cultural path of another country, Iran.

The main cleavage separating the democratic and republican parties regarding Iran is whether America, and the world, should open up or to continue imposed isolation. The lack of political consensus regarding Iran is reflected by the American population, which also holds a mixed view on the debate. The Iran nuclear deal further intensified the argument about the two possible paths, and will likely serve as a hot button issue in the general election. A democratic win in November means continued support for the agreement. Continued support for the agreement will empower both moderating voices and loud reformers in Iran, while a return to forced isolation due to a Republican win will continue to empower the hardline conservatives and radicals. Iran’s politics, economy and culture, oddly enough, is quite dependent on American politics.

The Iranian Political Context

Following former Iranian Supreme Leader Khomeini’s consolidation of power after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, three main factions eventually emerged. Reformers, conservatives (who can also be split into two factions, neo-conservative and pragmatic), and the hardliners constitute the political identities in the officially party-less state. The current state of the balance of power between the three main factions can best be explained by policies implemented immediately following the 1979 revolution regarding families. Iranian hardliners, as well as many conservatives have a demographics problem, called the youth bulge.

The youth bulge was brought on by calls for young and large families during the brutal Iraq-Iran war. Large families would contribute more soldiers and material benefits to the war effort. The residual effect of this policy, however, was an ever-growing youth population, and a shrinking middle aged and elderly population. The youth were required to make sacrifices during and after the war, often being compelled to join Basij groups or to join the Iranian paramilitary force, the Revolutionary Guard. In turn for this sacrifice, young Iranians were promised jobs, security, healthcare, and education. This “Iranian dream” can be seen as analogous to the American dream, if a person works hard, they should expect to see success.

The internal reaction to the Islamic Revolution, however, can largely be blamed for the Iranian government’s inability to provide this reality to young Iranians. Sanctions levied by America or by other countries with America’s backing placed severe burdens on the Iranian economy, environment, and general ability to function as a member of the world community. Because of this, Iranians looked inwards, either blaming their own government, or outwards, blaming America and other countries viewed to be antagonistic.

The Rafsanjani and Khatami presidencies highlight one response to outwards pressure. Both presidencies are marked by moves to somewhat liberalize society (resolving a major grievance of many Iranian youth), open economically, and to engage in discussion with both foreign countries as well as to resolve issues internally through discussion. Rafsanjani, who was much more the pragmatic conservative than the fervent reformer, re-engaged in diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, economic privatization and development was encouraged in a Five Year Plan, and lifted some cultural restrictions, such as allowing fraternization between unrelated men and women. Khatami, who was Rafsanjani’s cultural minister, continued many of Rafsanjani’s policies, as well as emphasizing civil law, the importance of civil society, introducing language to legitimize Israel’s claim to existence and to call for an open dialogue between Iran and America.

This pragmatic conservative and reformist response to outwards political pressure, however, was swiftly undone with the election of Ahmadinejad in 2005. After allowing for some foreign and cultural détente and economic liberalization, the hardliners quickly realized that their place in Iranian society would be endangered with a continuation of these policies. Hardliners in Iran faced the decay of their core cultural and political tenants, and thus moved to return to the pre-reform Iran. After ostensibly moving to help the youth and disenfranchised, why would this pro-reform momentum stop?

To put it bluntly, the reforms failed to reach their full effect. The main cause for this can be directed to two problems: the conditions produced by outward sanctions; and an internal backlash at a changing Iran by the clerical and hardline establishment. Although the Iranian economy is actually quite diversified , sanctions prevented full integration into the world economy, which meant that exports were kept to a minimum. The Iranian economy may have been internally diverse, but the inability to export goods and services to some of the worlds largest markets, such as America and Europe, meant that Iran would never quite exceed a certain level of economic success. This meant that jobs and resources would be scarce, dampening the enthusiasm for reformist politics.

Secondly, an internal backlash facilitated by Iranian hardliners and conservatives meant that even with popular support, the tenability of reformist politics may not have actually been as robust as some would believe. After Khatami’s success in 2000, pro-reform publications were closed, intellectuals and journalists were jailed, security forces and members of the Basij assaulted students at the University of Tehran, and political and judiciary oversight organizations were banned by the constitutional watchdog the Guardian Council. Khatami never put up much of an effort to stop the backlash, demonstrating his inability to direct Iran towards a major change.

After the enthusiasm for reform was significantly dampened, President Ahmadinejad came to power in 2005. Ahmadinejad was the immensely popular former mayor of Tehran. Furthermore, Ahmadinejad came from a certain background that made him more appealing to the culturally conservative poor, as well as to certain military institutions. Ahmadinejad was a commander in the Revolutionary Guard, Iran’s major paramilitary force. Framing the reformist politicians as morally bankrupt and economically self-interested, Ahmadinejad easily came to power. In the aftermath of the election, however, Ahmadinejad began to appoint former Revolutionary Guard officials to important political posts, highlighting his view that politics should be one in the same with the standard bearers of the Islamic Revolution.

In 2009, Ahmadinejad retained power in a widely disputed election, in which he was accused of voter fraud by several different important figures in the reform movement. Despite the large protests plaguing urban centers throughout Iran, Ahmadinejad retained power. Following reelection, Ahmadinejad would hurt relations with Arab states by endorsing the Arab Spring uprisings, hurt relations with the West through inflammatory comments about Israel and the Holocaust, and mismanaged the Iranian economy and political system, often arguing with his advisors and superiors as well as undertaking pet projects and needless reforms that distracted from improving the failing Iranian economy.

The constitution of the Islamic Republic requires that presidents cannot serve more than two consecutive terms. After Ahmadinejad served his second term, a new zeitgeist swept the country, demanding a return to competent and moderate rule. Hassan Rouhani, an establishment yet pragmatic member of the conservative faction, won the election with a promise to return Iran back to its pre-Ahmadinejad path. Perhaps the most significant of all of Rouhani’s accomplishments is the hotly debated Iran Nuclear Deal. As in America, Iranians too have a mixed reaction to the agreement, with some seeing it as a capitulation to the West and others seeing it as a fair trade off in order to secure Iran’s economic security. Nonetheless, the deal is still present, signaling Iran’s intent to join the world community and to secure its future.

We can see, then, that there are two main discourses on what Iran’s purpose should be. Some in Iran believe that Iran should be the standard bearer of the Islamic world, while others hold a less parochial view, recognizing the importance of existing as a member within the inter-country community. When one faction gains too much power, a reactionary current takes hold of the Iranian zeitgeist. Too much liberalization and integration results in a rapid snapback to the revolutionary fervor of politicians like Ahmadinejad and groups like the Basij and Revolutionary Guard. On the other hand, the Iranian youth are highly educated and underemployed, which is a recipe for political change if they are not satiated. A pattern has emerged, and the budding détente between Iran and the West might tip the balance of which political current maintains its power.

Democrats, Republicans, and Iran’s Future

Republican presidential front runner believes that the Iran Nuclear Deal is so bad, it is almost like it was constituted that way on purpose. On the other side of the aisle, Democratic front-runner Hilary Clinton claimed that it was unrealistic to get a better deal, arguing that it was the best possible compromise for both parties. Within those two instances, the different American paths towards Iran are demonstrated; one towards a gradual opening of relations, and another towards an immediate return to the last several decades, which, ironically, parallel the Iranian approach.

The Republican plan is to “undo” the agreement, returning to the previous sanction regime and to continue America’s forced isolation on Iran. Who would this help? And who would this hurt? By forcing Iran to return to its previous internalized nature, it is likely that groups such as the Revolutionary Guard and the hardline clerics will be empowered. A common theme in authoritarian regimes is to paint an outside actor as an enemy of the state. Iran has long been a pawn in a greater geo-political tool by outside powers, which is reflected by an important theory accepted by the Iranian polity called Gharbzadegi, which translates to a “Westoxification,” essentially meaning that Iran (and, indeed, the Muslim world) has been corrupted by the West through its imperial pursuits. Continued forced isolation will push Iranian politics down this path, increasing internal and external tensions, and empowering the extreme elements within the country.

The Democratic plan, on the other hand, will have the opposite effect. Through easing the path towards economic integration, the highly educated yet underemployed youth will see new economic opportunities, facilitated by an influx of foreign investment, which will provide new avenues for employment. The Iranian reformist movement, along with the pragmatic conservatives, could see a new wave of enthusiasm as the quality of life within Iran slowly improves. Furthermore, integration between countries tends to have a moderating effect. Foreign investment would be hard to come by if a corporation owned by the Revolutionary Guard would likely embezzle it. Efforts to improve the infrastructure and accountability of Iran’s economy would increase, as new opportunities to seek outward investment present themselves.

For two countries ostensibly at odds, it is a humorous irony that the politics of one can have such a large effect on the politics of another. When Americans go to the polls this November, they should remember that they are likely not only choosing who they want to lead their country, but also, the path that Iran will follow. A vote for a continuation of the long held policy of sanctions and forced isolation could mean a strengthening of the hardliners and a suppression of the moderators and reformers. A vote for a change in policy and the beginnings of a real détente could mean the reformers and moderating voices could finally get the break they have long needed. The future of Iran stands at a crossroads, much like that of America, a vote for one party over the other will have a wide range of effects, and could push Iran towards true reform or towards a consolidation of extremist politics. 

Can Donald Trump the WTO?

Yes—it’s another piece covering Donald Trump’s policies—but don’t leave quite yet; I promise to not fall into the enticing leitmotifs typical of the current status quo for journalistic coverage of Trump. Allow me to explain.

Be it on the left or the right, there seem to be two major fissures into which commentators fall whenever Trump’s name is mentioned—sardonic, arrogant insouciance, and melodramatic fear-mongering. Those in the former camp will attempt to write the entire Trump phenomenon off as a manifestation of angry whites too ignorant to see that his proposals are all nonsense and that he is leading them to an inevitable slaughter in a general election; they don’t deem his policies worthy of analysis because they believe the probability of his winning is zero. Those in the latter camp will attempt to spin every Trump statement as an apocalyptic forecast, harking a potential Trump presidency as the harbinger of immediate international Armageddon. Both seem, to me, ridiculous. The first comes with the assumption that Trump’s campaign has exposed nothing useful whatsoever; whereas, I concur with scholars like Dani Rodrik and Paul Krugman who believe that the populist wave of support behind a candidate like Trump has highlighted a failure of the US system to share adequately the fruit of globalization and international trade equally amongst the US population. The second sacrifices the reality of the US constitutional system of checks and balances in favor of exaggeration for the sake of ratings and clicks; after all, what would attract more viewers—a piece that recognizes the relative impotence of the US presidency given the division of power between the three branches of government, or one that harks Trump as a Hitleresque totalitarian who will destroy the world?

As with most political polemics, clinging to one ideological line doesn’t lead to much in the way of constructive discussion. Thus, I will not caricaturize Trump using a broad, ideological brush. Nor will I go soundbite-hunting (which honestly requires little creativity during this campaign cycle) in order to cherry-pick quotations that could then be falsely described as Trump’s trade policy. Instead, wary of the aforementioned chasms that flank me on both sides, I will attempt to go straight to horse’s mouth to analyze Trump’s trade policy reform proposals, basing myself only on his one and only official campaign position paper that pertains to trade—“U.S. – China Trade Reform.”

A few final disclaimers before proceeding to the targeted analysis are apposite. First, the paper the policy paper under scrutiny here only directly apostrophizes China; however, the policies proposed implicate much more than the bilateral US-China trade relationship. As a result of this, even though this is the only trade-related policy paper of Trump’s, we can deduce a great deal from the suggestions therein when it comes to understanding Trump’s broader approach to trade. Trump’s trade policy paper does contain a variety of economic figures used to justify the proposals therein. I will not be fact-checking any of these myself; there are plenty of better-suited sources that do precisely this type of work. My intention is to examine Trump’s major reform proposals, explicating both the international legal mechanisms they target, as well as the potential effects they would have if carried out in their entirety.

Distilling the signal from the noise

Some have called the Trump campaign “substanceless,” arguing that he is all talk with no concrete policy proposals. While hyperbolically effective, that is not true when it comes to trade; there are certainly enactable proposals contained within Trump’s policy paper. That said, there is also a great deal that is simply talking point fodder disguised as policy. There are many examples of this type of non-policy proposal peppered throughout the paper—too many for each to be explained in this article—hence, I want instead to begin by offering a framework for sifting through these purely rhetorical proposals, identifying a few glaring examples of strong words, without any legal authority behind them.

When looking for practical trade proposals that could actually be enacted, it is important to remember that the executive branch in the US has relatively little power in determining trade policy. The U.S. Constitution is perfectly clear in its delegation of trade authority to the Congress, not the Executive. Article I, Section 8 gives Congress the sole authority “to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.” This power is no longer absolute, however. In the 20th century, it was quickly discovered that logrolling in the Congress was a political tendency that would make crafting trade deals in the Congress alone untenable. As such, the so-called “fast track presidential authority” to broker trade agreements was created by the Trade Act of 1974. While this act did delegate the authority to negotiate trade agreements to the President, it is an impermanent power that must be persistently re-authorized by the Congress. Even today—an age that many would commonly believe is dominated by trade agreements in-the-works such as TTIP and TPP, the president’s authority is very limited. The only TPA authority currently active is the Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015, which grants the Obama administration limited “power to negotiate major trade agreements with Asia and Europe.” In short, the next president of the United States will have to seek renewed TPA from Congress, and even if it is allotted, any deals made or tariffs proposed are entirely at the mercy of congressional approval. With all this in mind, we can craft a strategy for identifying concrete proposals—finding the signal amidst the noise. We should interrogate every proposal by inquiring: what mechanism is being used to accomplish the policy aim (tariffs, duties, etc.), and what legal entities ultimately control said mechanisms.  

As an example of a proposal that is backed by no concrete policy, let’s examine one of Trump’s suggestions regarding a harmonization of environmental and labor standards:

China’s woeful lack of reasonable environmental and labor standards represent yet another form of unacceptable export subsidy. How can American manufacturers, who must meet very high standards, possibly compete with Chinese companies that care nothing about their workers or the environment? We will challenge China to join the 21st Century when it comes to such standards.

As can be seen, this proposal offers the perfect opportunity to test the framework laid out previously. We see very clearly that there is a policy aim—ensuring that the US and China are both held to similar environmental and labor standards—but there is no mention of the mechanism that would be used to accomplish this policy aim. This is surprising, because resorting to tariffs as a default policy tool is a well-documented favorite of Trump’s. Even though the paper mentions no mechanisms and thus cannot be analyzed as policy, we can still answer the second question of our framework, because there is a legal entity that does in large part oversee the standards that Trump would like to see more equally followed: the World Trade Organization (WTO). In fact, this is not an outlier; in most of the instances in Trump’s trade policy paper where a policy aim is announced without a specified mechanism or legal entity being referenced, the issue likely falls under the umbrella of disputes for which the WTO already serves as a forum. This incongruence hints at what I find to be the most confusing and, in my estimation, untenable characteristic of Trump’s trade policy. It seems to argue on various fronts for vigorous US reengagement at the WTO, pressuring other countries—namely China—via the WTO dispute settlement mechanisms more than ever before, while concomitantly arguing for the brandishing of tariffs and other protectionist measures the likes of which the US has not seen since Herbert Hoover held the presidency.

A trumped-up WTO strategy? – Enforce some rules ardently, while breaking others unabashedly

The internally contradictory nature of Trump’s policy proposal as concerns the United States’ role at the WTO is difficult to untangle, but perhaps no better microcosmic representation of the strategy exists than this paragraph concerning how Trump plans to combat “China’s illegal export subsidies and other unfair advantages.”

The U.S. Trade Representative recently filed yet another complaint with the WTO accusing China of cheating on our trade agreements by subsidizing its exports. The Trump administration will not wait for an international body to tell us what we already know. To gain negotiating leverage, we will pursue the WTO case and aggressively highlight and expose these subsidies.

As we can see, the second sentence intimates that a Trump presidency would not wait for the WTO dispute-settlement process to run its course. While an alternative legal mechanism is not proposed, we can insinuate from the rest of the policy paper that what is implied is that the US would pressure China with countervailing duties and tariffs. That said, the following sentence is a complete reversal; without even skipping a sentence the proposal pivoted from “not wait[ing] for [the WTO] to tell us what we already know,” to “pursu[ing] the WTO case” aggressively.

For the sake of a thought experiment to explore the implications of this internal contraction if actually put in practice, let us assume that Trump carries through on all such promises—both of more aggressive WTO dispute settlement action against China, and of simultaneous tariff use. What would come from this? Those who paint Trump’s policies as perfectly pursuant to John Bolton’s view of international law would be exposed as wrong, because even Bolton, who believes that international law has no moral character and instead is only what states will it to be, acknowledges that certain systems exist—such as the WTO—that can be used by states to secure beneficial outcomes if adhered to. If the two previously mentioned Trump policy proposals were both enacted, the result would be devastating for the United States because of the current structure of the WTO dispute resolution mechanisms.

WTO dispute resolutions over subsidies are governed by the “Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,” and given the diverse ways that subsidies can be disguised (which Trump rightly identifies in the policy paper), successfully winning a dispute before the WTO takes time and a great deal of fastidious effort. On the other hand, the levying of a tariff such as those for whose implementation Trump argues all throughout the policy paper, beginning with the very first paragraph of the “Details of Donald J. Trump’s US China Trade Plan,” is in blatant violation of a host of more universal obligations, and Trump’s proposals would bring the US into immediate breach of GATT Article I—the most favored nation principle that WTO members should treat all imports equally—as well as GATT Article II—the restriction of tariffs to a maximum of the “bound rate” established in the tariff schedule.

Why then, would this be so detrimental? Again, it is a matter of the legal mechanisms that undergird these two separate processes. While the WTO dispute settlement for subsidies is a long, complex process, tariffs are the most overt form of protectionism, and, as Scott Lincicome of The Federalist appropriate states, “such an obvious violation of WTO rules would make for the easiest WTO dispute in the organization 20-year history.” Hint, the US would lose.

Thus, the hypocrisy of Trump’s proposals as concern the US’ role in the WTO is damaging not just because they are difficult to understand and ideologically self-contradictory (are we for or against the WTO?); they are prejudicial because if they were actually to be enacted, they represent a fundamental misunderstanding of how the WTO dispute-settlement processes operate, and would lead to disproportionate harm for the United States, while China—the target of all of these policies—would actually be able to impose countervailing duties, and the rest of the WTO member states would be justifiably on China’s side, as they have the strength of numerous international legally binding accords behind them.  

But what about efficient breach? International legal scholars agree that’s a thing, so…

No. Allow me to stop you there. Efficient breach definitely is a thing, but to apply it in light of Trump’s policy recommendations here would be a gross misunderstanding of that legal school of thought. Eric A. Posner—the intellectual father of efficient breach—agreed with Bolton, in that both espoused the belief that international law had no moralistic underpinning, and was thus a tool for states to use to maximize their well-being. This is a line that sounds like it would fit very well with Trump’s “America First,” doctrine, but to take the next logical leap and say that Trump’s plan is thus one that might be espoused by the likes of Posner and Bolton, would be to convolute sound legal theory with obfuscous rhetoric.

The principle undergirding efficient breach is that of economic efficiency of trade-offs; i.e., international norms (such as adherence to WTO rules) can be broken if the relative economic efficiency of breach outweighs that of continued compliance. Trump’s international trade policy proposals highlight a variety of key problems that are sadly oftentimes left undiscussed because of the polemical—and thus media-attracting—nature of other claims therein. He addresses many issues that should be addressed by the next president—be it the disproportionate distribution of benefits from international trade amongst Americans, to the need to pursue greater harmonization of compliance with international commercial standards so that some nations are not disadvantaged while others are able to dodge safety and labor regulations. That said, all of these issues are overshadowed by the self-defeating nature of Trump’s policy proposals vis-à-vis the WTO. Without even broaching the cultural, sociological, and political implications of overtly breaching the GATT—a subject which would merit an entire article of its own—Trump’s trade policy is currently plagued by a coherence problem identified by our previously established analytical framework.  Even if one agrees with every beginning presumption and aim expressed in Trump’s policy paper, the legal mechanisms in place that govern international trade would result in a terribly inefficient breach. WTO law is not all trumpery, and Trump would do well to remember that that which is rhetorically powerful matters much less than that which is legally efficient.

More of the Same: Bernie’s Foreign Policy, Just War Theory, and International Humanitarian Law

The 2016 presidential race has, without a doubt, become one of the most significant electoral phenomena in recent American history. Moreover, the Islamic State (IS) poses a historic problem for candidates, and although foreign policy has not taken center stage, a quiet but vociferous debate goes on about whether the Democrats’ left hand—Bernie Sanders—is more of a hawk or a dove. Sanders basically has no chance of winning the Democratic nomination, but has affected the presumptive Democratic nominee’s position in significant ways. We know enough about Clinton’s foreign policy history given her tenure as Secretary of State, but we know little about Sanders’ positions and how they would possibly influence Clinton. Is Sanders’ policy towards IS theoretically legal? If it reaches the threshold of legality, does that necessarily mean it fulfills the requirements of jus ad bellum and jus in bello? Two useful yet tragically under-utilized lenses for analyzing candidates’ proposed military aggression are those of just war theory and international humanitarian law.

Just War Theory and International Humanitarian Law

International humanitarian law, sometimes called the laws of war, is a set of international legal obligations that applies to states during times of conflict and proscribes them or their agents from certain actions in order to mitigate the harmful consequences of armed conflict. Just war theory provides the legal justification for international humanitarian law, and: jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Jus ad bellum relates to states’ preparatory actions for engaging in conflict before actually doing so. Jus in bello states that, whatever states’ motivations, their wars must be conducted justly. Without going into too much detail, the international humanitarian legal regime takes jus ad bellum and jus in bello as given requirements of warfare—these are like constitutional principles that cannot be violated. The rights granted to states by jus ad bellum and jus in bello are the rights to (1) declare war with just cause and (2) respond to force proportionally. Jus ad bellum derives legal support from Articles 2 and 51 of the UN Charter. Jus in bello’s derives legal support from the Geneva and Hague Conventions, and from customary international law. States have five minimum requirements according to just war theory. First, any just war must be waged by an internationally recognized actor, such as a state or a coalition of states, and must be announced publicly ahead of time. Second, wars must be waged with just intentions, such as the maintenance or restoration of peace. Third, states waging war must only do so if there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the war’s objectives are achievable—the laws of war prohibit mass violence if nothing will likely come of it. Fourth, wars must be waged via proportional means. In other words, if one state invades and conquers another’s territory, then the latter only has the right to take back what is due, not conquer more than its fair share of the former’s territory. Finally, war must only be a last resort after exhausting all other, non-violent means of conflict resolution. As long as states meet these five requirements, their foreign policies are theoretically legal under a just war framework.

It is not useful to list every illegal offense in this essay, which is only concerned with Sanders’ response to IS. Matters of international humanitarian law are almost never as clear-cut as deeming something legal or illegal; they depend on innumerable factors and can be justified in myriad ways by a competent lawyer. However, international humanitarian law relates to jus in bello and derives its authority from two principle legal sources. First, international humanitarian law derives support from hard sources of law in treaties like the Geneva and Hague Conventions, and other legal documents. Second, although not every state is signatory to the relevant treaties, and less have ratified the legal statutes in question, but customary law criminalizes the most severe violations of international humanitarian law. For example, drones are not explicitly banned by any international legal statute, nor are they considered inherently indiscriminate according to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). But all states going to war must satisfy the principle of distinction, meaning that they must distinguish between civilians and combatants. Drone strikes against terrorist groups like al Qaeda have a higher threshold for distinction because it is not always clear whether the target is a combatant or not. This means that tactics like signature strikes, for example, are “clearly unlawful,” at least according to the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions Christof Heyns.

Sanders’ Foreign Policy

During the first Democratic debate, Sanders said, “I am not a pacifist […] I support airstrikes in Syria and what the president is trying to do.” Sanders has also shown himself wary of deploying boots on the ground. And he has even called the situation in Syria “a quagmire in a quagmire,” claiming to “make sure that the United States does not get involved […] like we did in Iraq, the worst foreign policy blunder in the history of this country.” So, if he sticks to his campaign promises, we can expect that Sanders likely will not support boots on the ground, opting instead for airstrikes and a coalition of Middle Eastern nations to combat IS—a policy the Senator first supported in 2014.

So, would Sanders’ proposed airstrike-coalition plan comply with the laws of war, and would they adhere to just war theory? On the first question, maybe. On the second, no.

Few would dispute that fighting IS sufficiently constitutes a just cause, especially if the belligerent nations include those most proximate (e.g., the hypothetical members of Sanders’ proposed coalition) and those whose citizens were killed by IS members, not just those who would be indirectly threatened (e.g., the U.S., France, and other victims of IS attacks). Barring more cynical theories that the IS was created by the West in order to justify intervention, going to war because your people have been beheaded or blown up in terrorist attacks does not represent a war of aggression, even if they may do harm to the region. Moreover, Obama’s announcement that his administration will “degrade and ultimately destroy” IS could reasonably count as a public declaration of war by an internationally recognized actor: the United States. What remains is to provide sufficient evidence that military operations are (1) the last resort and (2) likely to achieve the war’s objective. As long as Sanders sticks to his belief that “unilateral military action should be a last resort” and proffers a solution that will likely “degrade and destroy” IS, he has satisfied jus ad bellum.

Sanders’ plan does not fulfill jus in bello, however. Considering that drones are not inherently illegal, but must satisfy the principle of distinction, airstrikes comply with the law only to the unlikely extent that military leaders refrain from signature strikes and other, similar indiscriminate tactics. If, however, the military did not refrain from indiscriminate attacks à la Obama administration, the types of attacks Sanders only says are “counter-effective,” then the drone policy would violate the principle of distinction. The U.S. has not ratified Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions—the protocol officially codifying distinction—but the ICRC considers distinction distinguishing between civilians and combatants part of customary law, or “general practice accepted as law” and independent of treaties. Furthermore, assembling a coalition of Middle Eastern states might relieve the U.S. of any legal responsibility for wars of aggression—whether or not the coalition’s actions would violate the laws of war is beyond this essay. However, if the U.S. knowingly provides funding, weapons, or training to the hypothetical coalition and the latter subsequently violates any international humanitarian law, a case could be made for the U.S.’s complicity. Lastly, if the Senator’s plans include indefinitely and illegally detaining prisoners at Guantánamo Bay—or any other military prison for that matter—and employing enhanced interrogation methods with the purpose of discovering information about IS, then the plan’s detention strategy would violate international humanitarian law. In the abstract, Sanders’ vagueness puts his IS plan in the clear. But as a strategic campaign maneuver, it leaves open the possibility of violating the law when the situation supposedly calls for it. As Sanders described himself, “I am not a pacifist.”

Significant evidence suggests that drone strikes—arguably the centerpiece of Obama’s and Sanders’ plans—engender anti-American sentiment and support for IS. According to a public letter written by four Air Force service members with more than 20 years of experience between then, mistakes that result from the drone program, such as the killing of civilians and U.S. citizens “fueled the feelings of hatred that ignited terrorism and groups like [IS], while also serving as a fundamental recruitment tool similar to Guantánamo Bay.” The number of drone strikes sharply increased under Obama, which Sanders considers “constitutional and legal.” Therefore, Sanders faces an uphill battle to prove that continuing airstrikes will likely achieve the war’s objectives, and that his IS policy will comply with international humanitarian law’s jus in bello requirements.

Conclusion

As with any election, foreign policy has taken a back seat to important questions such as what to do with the economy, and this is no more evident than in Sanders’ campaign. However, all candidates’ policies towards IS represent no less important questions. Sanders can easily justify waging war against IS, thus fulfilling jus ad bellum, however his plan’s strong support for drone strikes sends it into questionable legal territory under the best circumstances, and frankly illegal territory under the worst circumstances. Insofar as it might comply with the law and established principles of justice in international relations, we might accept it as a legitimate plan, but the vagueness with which it has thus far been proffered do more for leaving open the possibility of omission of the U.S.’s legal obligations than to assuage any concerns over its illegality.

Will Doves or Hawks Fly? An Analysis of Democratic Policies in the Levant

In 2011, the streets of Cairo were teeming with political, financial, and religious fervor—with Egyptian President Mubarak at the root of discontent. Young protesters led by the Muslim Brotherhood and pro-democratic groups such as the “Tamarod” movement, took to Tahrir Square to oust a dictator representing three decades of Egyptian strife under secular autocracy, a militant ruling party, and economic strain. While uncertainty loomed in Tahrir Square, discord loomed in the White House Situation Room. Obama and his administration were bereft of time—with the choice of opting for “the right side of history” with young, pro-democracy protestors, or with a decades-old status quo embedded in the Mubarak regime. Answering the pleas of his advisors, President Obama chose to support the rebels. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton—the current 2016 Democratic Presidential frontrunner -- unsuccessfully advocated siding with Mubarak based on the rationalization that supporting an unstructured, youthful revolutionary movement would not be any less than naïve. The rebels represented change and renewal, but Mubarak represented years of American investment, relative stability, and guarantee of U.S. access and provision.

Such a decision is congruent with Clinton’s so-called “hawkish” foreign policy agenda—yet scholars, critics, and constituents alike are still scratching heads in regards to Clinton’s strict theoretical framework. Many point to former First Lady, Senator, and Secretary of State as an oscillation between neo-conservatism and liberalism in international affairs. Clinton’s opponent, Vermont Senator Bernard Sanders, staunchly falls within liberalism, yet is misunderstood in his policy projections. In the largest and arguably, most historic presidential election this country will witness, the media machine has detracted voters from dissecting Hilary’s ideological direction or Sander’s exact foreign policy agenda. In this piece, I seek to dissect Clinton’s and Sanders’ theoretical identities and visualize their policies in the most precarious geopolitical hotspot of the 21st century: the Levant region.

Neo-con, Realist, or both? Assessing Hillary’s Ideological Conundrum

Advisor Jeffrey Bader once remarked that Clinton is “not an ideological person, she’s a deal-maker.” The ambiguity that surrounds the exact identity of Clinton’s foreign policy has been the subject of widespread speculation in this election. Her extensive record appears to be a conjectural blend of realist, idealist, and neo-conservative policy selections. As a New York Senator, she voted yes for intervention in Iraq. In her “pivot to Asia” as Secretary of State, she sought a role for the United States in territorial disputes in the South China Sea. She has angered Jewish voters when she has remained neutral with Israeli-Iranian tensions, while acknowledging Israel’s pivotal role as an American ally in the Middle East, and even proposing support of Iranian democratic attempts at a 2016 appearance at AIPAC. Public perception has suggested that Clinton reflects all three ideological identities of realism, liberalism, and neo-conservatism. Yet, when we arrange her record comprehensively, we will discover that Clinton is unapologetically neo-con in every crease and corner of the fabric that is her foreign policy agenda. Clintonism will champion hard power over soft, politics of preconditions, shoe-leather diplomacy, and operating from a position of strength. Is Hillary the next Kissinger? No, but expect a hybridized version of Kissinger, Kagan, and Robert Gates. Hillary will exemplify her appreciation of using clout of diplomacy, but realizes militarized strength may be necessary to sit parties at the table in the first place.

To compare the Democratic candidates, one must comprehend Clinton’s appreciation for statecraft abroad, while Sanders focuses on the American state itself; external reformation runs divergent to internal reconstruction. Clinton and Sanders both exercise caution when flexing their foreign policy muscle, yet differ in nature. Clinton sees the military as a valuable mechanism, while Sanders sees it as a potential deterrent. Clinton practices caution in the calculation and execution of hard power initiatives, keeping her cards close to her chest. Yet in retrospect, she keeps a maximalist thirst for an American militarized footprint across the world. Secretary of Defense Gates recalls Clinton favored 40,000 boots on the ground when he advised 30. After all, Clinton’s education in the world of foreign policy began not in her tenure as Secretary of State or even as First Lady, but as a freshman New York Senator on the Committee on Armed Services, where she developed a great appreciation for American military capability. Sanders on the other hand, is more cautious in foreign policy. He voted against intervention in Iraq and champions that decision as representative of his strong anti-interventionism. Many have compared Clinton’s foreign policy as a continuation of the Obama Administration, such as non-intervention in Syria, but in fact it is Sanders that would replicate “skeptical restraint” best. While critics have pointed to Sanders as immature in foreign policy and avoidant of the topic altogether, they must explore Sander’s liberal logic of policies he has already presented on debate floors across the country. To understand Sander’s global strategy is to understand his domestic platform. His policies abroad are anchored to his economic strategy to alleviate collegiate debt, combat Wall Street, and improve social welfare programs; the United States cannot pour money into carpet-bombing the Islamic State that drains taxation at home, nor expend resources fighting for democracy in Iran or Egypt when democratic ideals are endangered at the expense of the corporate machine.

Visualizing the Levant

The Levantine region of the Middle East has become characterized by regenerative, endless conflicts, ruptures in the ethnic and religious foundations, and proxy interests intersecting in Iraq and Syria. Civil wars are incubated within civil wars—spurred initially by democratic fervor and devolving into foreign manipulation of rebel factions to install puppet leadership. These conflicts are consequential; it is fuddled, it is not simplistic enough to characterize with theory alone. A presidential candidate who claims to contextualize a policy strategy in all corners of this conflict is lying, but a candidate that can produce a doctrine America can commit to, is integral in the Democratic race. Senator Sanders has accomplished this, publicly advocating commitment to non-intervention in the Middle East. Clinton’s stance tethers its “globocop” approach to combatting the swath of violent non-state actors, bloodthirsty dictatorships, proxy interests battling from the Gulf, and militarized “aid” from China and Russia. To Clinton, Putin has no business fighting in Syria. To Bernie, neither does the United States.

Clinton mutually supports an Israeli state and Palestinian forces, yet shies away from the high dive board when pursuing the hunt for a two-state solution like presidential predecessors have done, believing the timing is not ripe in 2016. Senator Sanders additionally will pivot towards the acknowledgement of the right for a Palestinian solution, playing what he called an “even-handed role” in the interaction between Israelis and Palestinians. While Sanders is Jewish, he has shied away from proclaiming himself a Zionist. Sanders has proven to be tactical when approaching the Palestinian question; he wholeheartedly supports the Israeli right to exist, but does visualize an emerging landscape of a new Middle East. Does this make Sanders a realist on Israel? Possibly. It is not clear whether Sanders will pursue a two-state solution, but it’s clear he will not isolate the Palestinians, as have previous administrations. With both candidates, the world will see an American presidency that will re-balance its allegiances in the Gaza Strip.

The question of Syria has deeply characterized the foreign policy agenda of the Obama Administration, and will quite possibly plague the remainder of the twenty-first century. The Syrian Civil War is a tumultuous blend of civil war, proxy interests, terrorism, and underlying cultural and religious tensions—remnants of colonialism and the 1917 Sykes-Picot Agreement. Both Sanders and Clinton understand that any future policy decision in Syria should represent the American people’s aversion to intervention, yet nips the humanitarian strife in the bud. Such a policy has posed presidential politics in a state of flux; Senator Ted Cruz advocated carpet-bombing campaigns, Trump called for the elimination of local gas sources, and many other candidates have called for the eradication of ISIS before approaching the Syrian Civil War. To evaluate the stances of the two Democratic frontrunners, one must first question what beast the candidates will encounter first: Assad or ISIS? Clinton has chosen ISIS, opting to place a larger American presence in the region, surpassing Obama’s authorized 50 Special Operation Troops. The former Secretary of State has advocated the preparation and training of Syrian Sunni and Shiite rebels to fight in Syria, believing they would be a “psychological boost to the opposition” that would back American enemies into a dark corner. Mrs. Clinton sees it necessary to unite under a common international enemy, and then seek regime change with the dismantling of Assad in Damascus. Senator Sanders, on the other hand, has chosen to avoid what he calls a “never-ending quagmire” between American boots on the ground and ISIS fighters, and additionally has not supported a no-fly-zone in Syria. Clinton’s threaded short-term strategies starkly contrast with Sander’s isolationist long-term vision of the struggle with ISIS. While Clinton sees it necessary for the American struggle to incorporate international cooperation, Sanders finds it necessary for the fight to be a globalized one. Sanders has called for an international coalition to combat the Islamic State, emulating the Jordanian King Abdullah's plan to build a coalition of Muslim nations on the ground, while remaining international powers carry airstrike campaigns and economic measures to cut off the blood-flow of the Islamic State.

Looking Towards The Future

The presidential strategies in Syria best reflect two very contrasting tones set in the Levant region. Clinton’s neo-conservative approach and foreign policy chops will utilize hard and soft power to promote democratic, American ideals in fluctuating political systems. Under a Clinton administration, Hawks will predominately fly over the Levant—a product of the former Secretary of State’s step-by-step strategizing, teaming diplomatic strength with military muscle to accomplish infrastructural stability and political peace in the Levant. Sanders will, by contrast, engage the global arena in coalition building and aversion to on-the-ground intervention. His foreign policy decisions will reflect that of his domestic platform, illustrating the Senator’s long-term vision of a cooperative and welcoming United States in the international community. As Levantine conflicts have begun to pour into the political, economic, and cultural borders of Turkey, the Balkans, and Europe, the world holds its breath as candidates assemble policy projections for such a delicate region. While running within the confines of the Democratic Party, this race is showcasing candidates that will envision two very different faces of the Levant Region in the next four years to come. Doves may fly, but under the shadow of hawks.

Hope and Change in the Time of Police Violence: From Obama's Inauguration to Trayvon Martin’s Murder

“Euphoric. It was unbelievable to really see that we could do anything we put our minds to. I never had a plan to go to an inauguration before that day.” Dr. Omekongo Dibinga’s eyes lit up as he shared his feelings on President Obama’s 2008 inauguration. He claims it is one of his happiest memories from any public event, one which “sparks something in his heart.” Dibinga is not alone in this sentiment. For so many Americans, Obama’s election seemed to represent the beginning of a new era. As he stood in the freezing cold that January night at the National Mall, he held his little toddler on his shoulders. It was as though, for just one moment, he was holding her up higher than the scourge of a country whose legacy was rooted in slavery, eugenics, and mass incarceration. She would be hurt by these injustices later, but tonight she would witness her father's joy. An eternity of oppression and despair, seemed for just a moment, to fade in the triumph of a new narrative of hope we can believe in.

At the time, Dibinga was a motivational speaker and diversity counselor in schools that served predominantly low income youth of color. The morning after Obama was elected, he believes his students arrived to class with a new light in their eyes, a new sense of pride and belonging. “I saw my students show up to my class wearing Obama t-shirts. I had never seen my students choose to represent a politician on their clothing before. I had seen rappers and musicians, but never a president.” Dibinga recalls that Wednesday in the classroom with a Jay-Z quote: “The day Obama won the election, the gangster became less relevant.” His students were able to see themselves in a new light, one where they finally saw a representation of themselves beyond entertainers and athletes, a president who looked like them. “I saw black people stand and pledge allegiance to the flag for the first time in their lives. To be alive and witness that moment, I wouldn’t trade it for the world. People finally felt like they were part of this country after being on the outskirts for so long.”

Dibinga was very careful with his word choice. This was just a moment in time. A powerful moment, but far from the end of a nation fueled by white supremacy. Maybe it felt like the start of an era where a man of color could lead the free world, but it did not feel like the end of an era where white supremacy remains as prevalent as the air we breathe. It wasn’t until a black man could sit in the Oval Office that we heard proud utterances of a “post-racial United States.” Nevermind the photoshopped images of a lynched Obama with the phrase “hope” replaced with the phrase “rope,” or the fact that congress seemed completely unwilling to get anything passed under his watch. At first these messages were whispered on our social media, and later they became more and more confident, even self-righteous shouts of “Your president is black, so what are you people so upset about?” So many, including Dibinga, feared this narrative. We only needed to look at the worn faces of those in the ultra-segregated communities in our home city of Boston, the crumbling state of Boston’s public schools, the hopelessness of our voter turnout, the clearly inequitable way the “T”  subway system skipped over our black and brown neighborhoods, and the way communities lived in an inescapable state of chaos and poverty. “It was projected that people like me wouldn’t live past the age of 25, that if we weren’t killed by them we would be incarcerated,” said Dibinga. These realities proved to us that regardless of how our president lived, we were very much living in a harsh and unforgivingly racist society.

This has become particularly clear in the recent resurgence of a new civil rights movement which has been sparked in part by the death and subsequent lack of justice for Trayvon Martin. Patrisse Cullors coined the hashtag #BlackLivesMatter after Mike Brown's death, and it has needed to be used countless times since when we face yet another pointless act of police brutality. After Trayvon's death, President Obama stated “If I had a son, he would look like Trayvon.” This emotive sentiment was one of the first times Obama had been so vulnerable about his position as a person of color for the whole nation to hear. While Dibinga and many others felt affirmed by these words, many others felt threatened by having the president make a statement that connected him exclusively with other Americans of color. The president who Dibinga celebrated had just claimed something Dibinga also felt; this representation from a president was a new experience.

“I see myself in everyone of these guys who is killed.” Dibinga is referring to his reactions to the recent deaths of young black and brown men and women. In 2015, 1205 people were killed by the police in the United States. Black men and boys are twenty-one times more likely to be killed by the police than their white male counterparts. He carries the memory of Obama’s election deeply on his conscience, but says that the media coverage of those killed by police is “always on [his] mind.” Dibinga is somber as he shares how he is scared and sad to hear media “come up with all these theories about why a kid deserved to die. You can’t help but wonder, what story will be told if it happens to you?” As state-sanctioned violence against people of color increases, how can we return to that feeling of unlimited possibility on November 4, 2008 without it being tainted? How can we believe in the hope Obama promised without feeling a sense of fatalism or frustration? Dibinga quietly shares “you feel like you are being minimized at every step… I wonder if people even care about who I am here...”

The media didn’t help to dispel this sense of being one dimensional. For the media, these murders are shown as must see TV. “Why is it in America we have to see proof of a black man being killed? Why do people have to see us get slaughtered in order for us to believe it?” Over the summer a twitter hashtag, #iftheygunnedmedown, began to gain traction. The hashtag showed two pictures side-by-side of a man in a suit, and that same man dressed in clothes where he would be perceived as a “thug.” “When we die they show us at our worst, if I get killed by police tonight they won’t show the picture of me getting my diploma… To the media at the end of the day your accomplishments aren’t going to mean anything if you are killed by police.”

Dibinga began to share negative interactions with the Boston police that further fuel how much he saw himself in each man who had been lost. “My Congolese mother [with a Ph. D.] who didn’t learn English until she was 29 was in the train station and a white girl told the cops she was selling drugs. Without question my mother was arrested and when my father came to pick her up in jail, she only had her shirt on.”  These stories are so common that they sometimes feel inevitable. If this is the reality, how can we believe in any hope or change? Even for Black and Latino Americans without stories quite as intense as this one, many more did wonder why there were no train stops, grocery stores, or decent schools in our neighborhoods. Each individual's story is unique, but they also include patterns caused and upheld by a legacy of racism. Today, Dibinga’s daughter is nine years old, and she doesn’t remember being present for Obama's original inauguration. Although she was born in a time characterized by hope and change, she is now being raised in an era of heightened cynicism and mistrust. Will she grow up to  live a life more boldly stamped by a Black president or by the mindless state sanctioned violence her grandmother experienced?