Closing the Energy Access Gap: Sustainably Addressing Energy Poverty

Whether the worst impacts of global climate change can be avoided and rapidly growing developing nations have an opportunity to expand their economies hinges on how the international community chooses to address the urgent crisis of energy poverty.

Ending energy poverty is one of the 17 ambitious Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) approved by the United Nations at the UN Sustainable Development Summit in 2015.  The SDGs are intended to guide the international development agenda through 2030. Sustainable Development Goal No. 7 aims to end energy poverty across the globe by 2030, with a mission to “ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all.”

The International Energy Agency defines energy poverty as “a lack of access to modern energy services. These services are defined as household access to electricity and clean cooking facilities (e.g. fuels and stoves that do not cause air pollution in houses).”

The need to address energy poverty is clear. There are 1.1 billion people across the world who lack access to reliable electricity. Three billion people lack access to clean cooking technologies. Approximately four million people die each year from indoor air pollution coming from dirty cooking fuels.

The scale of the energy access problem is not the only reason that it is so important to address; the opportunities from ending energy poverty are notable, too. Energy is foundational to economic development. In the process of development, developing countries often pass through an industrial phase on the path to becoming a fully developed country with a strong and diverse economy. Making the transition to an industrial state is energy-intensive because large-scale economic enterprises require lots of energy.

If policymakers choose to neglect energy poverty, developing countries may grow increasingly unstable. The United States government classifies lack of energy access as a “threat multiplier.” Nigeria is an example of a country that may grow even more unstable if energy access is not expanded. Nigeria will have a larger population than the United States by 2045, but it currently has less than one percent of the US’ electricity production levels. If there is not enough energy to power economic development and create sufficient numbers of jobs for the growing Nigerian population, then restlessness and desperation may spark a degree of instability that opens the door to security threats.

Eighty percent of the electricity access gap is concentrated in 20 countries primarily located in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Of those in energy poverty, 84 percent are in rural areas that are difficult to reach with central grid technology.

There are many reasons that energy poverty persists, including insufficient financing. Closing the energy access financing gap is an area where the developed world can be of assistance. According to Rachel Kyte, the CEO of Sustainable Energy for All, energy poverty finance commitments averaged $19.4 billion between 2013 and 2014. Kyte noted in congressional testimony that this figure is much less than the $52 billion that the International Energy Agency estimated will be needed annually through 2030.

Energy poverty is supposed to be fully addressed by 2030, if the international community maintains its commitment and timeline to achieve universal energy access. However, whether fossil fuels or clean energy sources are chosen to address energy poverty will directly impact the global community’s effectiveness at addressing another key priority: limiting the impacts of climate change.

While SDG No. 7 aims to end energy poverty across the globe by 2030, SDG No. 13 is “take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts.” In addition to SDG No. 13, the Paris Agreement calls for bold international climate action, committing signatories to a shared goal of limiting global average temperature increase to 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.

The need to balance these two goals - achieving universal energy access and avoiding the worst impacts of climate change - leads to the following question: What are the most effective actions that American policymakers can take to assist the developing world escape energy poverty while acknowledging the need for rapid decarbonization and adherence to the Sustainable Development Goals? This essay focuses on exploring this question.

In order to answer this overarching question, three other sub-questions must be posed:

1.) Is multilateral or bilateral finance most effective in addressing climate and energy access development needs?

2.) What energy sources and technologies should U.S. foreign assistance for energy poverty support?

3) Should financing be prioritized for projects that provide energy access to rural populations or to projects that support industrialization?

Is Multilateral or Bilateral Aid More Effective?

To address the first question regarding the effectiveness of multilateral and bilateral aid towards addressing energy access and climate change, it is helpful to first explore how multilateral aid and bilateral aid are perceived in scholarly discussion.

Arguments supportive of multilateral aid suggest that it is more effective than bilateral aid because it is allocated based on development needs instead of strategic considerations. Bilateral aid is oftentimes delivered with the self-interest of the donor country in mind. Donor countries may choose to place self-serving conditions on the aid that it delivers, which may diminish the cost-effectiveness of the aid for the recipient country. Additionally, multilateral organizations often have accountability mechanisms that enhance the transparency of their practices. For example, the World Bank Group has an Inspection Panel and Independent Evaluation Group. These accountability bodies will investigate the practices and programs of the Bank and report on operational deficiencies and unintentional harm that the Bank may be causing through its actions. Multilateral bodies also tend to have greater specialization and expertise in development issues affecting their recipient countries than bilateral aid entities.

Arguments supportive of bilateral aid suggest that it is more effective because it attracts more funding due to the compelling strategic reasons that donor countries find to provide aid. These strategic motivations include winning and maintaining allies for military and economic cooperation, preventing rebels or adversaries from taking power away from allied governments, and increasing the standards of living among destitute populaces to prevent transnational threats from emerging. While those who prefer multilateral aid may argue that self-interested strategic considerations diminish the cost-effectiveness of aid, those who prefer bilateral aid would argue that such strategic considerations give donor countries an incentive to provide a larger volume of aid. Similarly, historical ties between donor and recipient countries often make contributing to the recipient more compelling for the donor country. Proponents of bilateral aid also argue that recipients are more likely to use their contributions cost-effectively because they are directly accountable to donor countries.

Though there are strong arguments to be made in favor of both multilateral and bilateral aid delivery channels, an analysis of 45 studies on aid effectiveness found “no empirical consensus on the relative effectiveness of bilateral vs multilateral aid in any particular outcome areas.” However, the study also noted that an examination of specific targeted outcomes from sector-specific aid may lead to different conclusions.

Recognizing that there is no consensus on the most effective development aid channel, it now becomes useful to examine specific aid mechanisms for energy access and climate financing to better understand the likely effectiveness of each financing mechanism or institution in this specific area of development.

Where Does Public Sector Energy Access Financing Come From?

As government officials consider where to allocate public financing to address energy poverty, it is important to first evaluate the current state of public sector energy access financing.

Public sector energy access financing comes from a variety of sources, including multilateral and bilateral development finance institutions (DFIs), national public banks, export promotion agencies, and domestic and international governmental institutions.

Public financing for electricity access has not increased substantially in recent years. According to Sustainable Energy for All’s report Energizing Finance: Understanding the Landscape 2018, “Within the public sector, international financing [for electricity access] from various institutions in absolute terms remained broadly the same over 2013-14 and 2015-16, changing only in the overall percentage of electricity finance, given the increased private financing.” The report concludes that multilateral DFIs were the largest public finance provider in 2015-16 (13 percent), followed by bilateral DFIs (8 percent) and export promotion agencies (6 percent).

In terms of financing for clean cooking in 2015-16, “Multilateral development financial institutions provided the majority of clean cooking finance (45%), followed by bilateral governmental agencies and aid providers (22%).” This represented a large increase from 2013-14 in the share of financing coming from multilateral DFIs. With this said, however, “The significant increase in contributions from multilateral development financial institutions is due to a single financial commitment of USD 23 million made in 2015.” Overall financing for clean cooking dropped five percent between the 2013-14 and 2015-16 periods.

Multilateral Energy Access and Climate Aid

Mechanisms like the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and institutions like multilateral development banks provide energy access and climate financing, but each have shortcomings either in the effectiveness of their governance structures or in the extent of their commitments to addressing energy access.

The GCF is a recent creation established to assist the developing world with climate mitigation and adaptation. During the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP) in Copenhagen, the developed world pledged to mobilize $100 billion per year by 2020 to support climate mitigation and adaptation in developing countries. The Green Climate Fund was officially established in 2010 at COP 16 in Cancun to help mobilize this financing. The Paris Agreement in 2015 emphasized the need to mobilize $100 billion per year in climate financing for the developing world and it prioritized the GCF as a key mechanism to achieving this mobilization.

Many of the fund’s mitigation projects focus on energy access. So far, $4.6 billion has been committed to the GCF, $1.8 billion is under implementation, and the fund has 93 projects that are anticipated to avoid an estimated 1.6 billion tons of CO2 equivalent and help 272 million people increase their climate resilience.

While this is all positive, the GCF faces several major challenges. First, while the $4.6 billion of committed funding to the GCF is helpful, it is nowhere close to the volume of money needed to reach the internationally-agreed upon goal of mobilizing $100 billion each year by 2020 from the developed world to support developing countries in the fight against climate change. While the developed world has pledged through the Copenhagen Accord and Paris Agreement to leverage $100 billion annually by 2020, only $10.3 billion has been pledged to the GCF so far.

Second, the GCF has an ineffective governance structure that is in need of reform. At its July 2018 board meeting, the GCF did not approve any projects despite $1 billion being in the queue. A lack of confidence in GCF governance may decrease the likelihood of future contributions.

Multilateral development banks have allocated funding to energy access efforts, but they have still been subjected to criticism for failing to prioritize energy poverty in their overall energy portfolios. In a 2016 Sierra Club/Oil Change International report entitled Still Failing to Solve Energy Poverty: International Public Finance for Distributed Clean Energy Access Gets Another “F”, authors graded four multilateral development banks: the World Bank Group, the Inter-American Development Bank, the African Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank. The report assigned them all “F”s for their energy access efforts and assigned each bank a poor score for the share of their energy portfolio dedicated to energy access.

The Trump Administration and current Congress have not been friendly to multilateral efforts to combat climate change and build clean energy systems in the developing world. For multilateral environmental funds in FY18, Congress appropriated $139.5 million for the Global Environment Facility and $31 million for the Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund. Though this funding is important for environmental causes, neither of these initiatives are specifically designed to address climate change or energy poverty.

The 115th Congress and Trump Administration have decided not to fund other international climate initiatives like the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. These institutions are crucial to fostering climate diplomacy and providing policymakers with high-quality climate science assessments. Expressing little dedication to its success, the federal government has also chosen not to fund the Green Climate Fund.

For multilateral development banks in FY18, Congress appropriated $1.097 billion to the World Bank Group, $32.4 million to the African Development Bank, $171.3 million to the African Development Fund, $47.4 million to the Asian Development Fund, and $30 million to the International Fund for Agricultural Development. Though this funding is beneficial to international development, energy access is only a small portion of what many multilateral development banks support.

Bilateral Energy Access and Climate Aid

Though the Trump Administration is no friend to climate financing and foreign aid, the federal government has still pursued bilateral policies to combat energy access and fight climate change.

Perhaps the most notable bilateral effort the United States takes to combat energy poverty is the Power Africa initiative. This initiative brings together government agencies and the private sector with the aim of confronting energy poverty in Africa and adding “more than 30,000 megawatts (MW) of cleaner, more efficient electricity generation capacity and 60 million new home and business connections.” Since 2014, it has spurred $18 billion of financing, mostly from private capital. It has created over 9,500 MW and 12.5 million new electrical connections with 57 million individual beneficiaries.

Most U.S. climate finance is delivered through bilateral funds. Most is channeled through the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

The Overseas Private Investment Corporation, a self-sustaining government agency that helps American businesses make investments in the developing world, provides the largest volume of U.S. climate financing at an average level of $1 billion per year for renewable energy projects. OPIC provides support through direct loans and guarantees, political risk insurance, and investment funds. The agency claims that more than half of its new project commitments each year involve a small business. OPIC takes part in the federal government’s Power Africa project.

What Energy Sources and Technologies Should the U.S. Support?

In addition to a determination about the effectiveness of multilateral and bilateral financing, American policymakers interested in addressing energy poverty must also ask themselves: what energy sources and technologies should U.S. foreign assistance for energy poverty support?

This question can only be answered by exploring whether energy access financing should be allocated for fossil fuels or renewables and whether it should be allocated for centralized or decentralized solutions.

Those who believe that energy access financing should be used to promote the use of fossil fuels argue that fossil energy sources are cheaper than clean energy sources and therefore can lift more people out of poverty. An argument for this theory can be found in the Center for Global Development’s 2014 paper Maximizing Access to Energy: Estimates of Access and Generation for the Overseas Private Investment Corporation’s Portfolio, in which authors “conservatively estimate that more than 60 million additional people in poor nations could gain access to electricity if the Overseas Private Investment Corporation were allowed to invest in natural gas projects, not just renewables.”

Those who believe that energy access financing should be used to promote renewable energy argue that energy poverty can be addressed more quickly and sustainably with decentralized renewable energy solutions. As Rachel Kyte argued in congressional testimony, an understanding of both Sustainable Development Goal No. 7 and the Paris Agreement show that the world must combat energy poverty sustainably. She argues that this path will be driven by decentralization, digitalization, and decarbonization. Proponents of renewables argue that clean energy can be easily deployed in the decentralized forms that are needed to reach the 84 percent of energy poor living in hard-to-reach rural areas.

Proponents of investing in decentralized energy sources argue that though centralized grid extension appears to be the current de facto solution to energy poverty, the grid has failed to reach rural areas, is unreliable in many areas, and is unaffordable for many poor households. They point to the 84 percent of energy poor residents who live in rural areas where grid extension is expensive. To reach SDG No. 7 by 2030, they argue, decentralized clean energy solutions must be utilized. The International Energy Agency has reported that achieving universal energy access by 2030 will require new investment for energy solutions according to the following proportions: mini-grid (40 percent), grid extension (36 percent), and off-grid (24 percent). Totaling the funding percentages needed for mini-grid and off-grid solutions shows that 64 percent of additional investment needs to go to decentralized solutions.

Proponents of centralized grid investments believe that small-scale, off-grid and decentralized energy technologies cannot meet the needs of high energy consumption associated with rising standards of living. They argue that energy consumption rather than energy access is associated with high human development outcomes. They suggest that decentralized solutions can exist where they supplement grid extension or otherwise support industrial economic enterprises or promote agricultural productivity. However, they insist that decentralized energy sources cannot replace energy and infrastructure needed for industrial-scale enterprises. To end energy poverty, this line of thinking goes, energy access financing must prioritize central grid development for large-scale enterprises.

Should Development Finance Prioritize Rural Populations or Industrialization?

With limited resources, policymakers must consider whether to prioritize energy projects for industrialization or for rural populations. Industrial-scale projects require much more energy than projects for rural households.

Those who support development finance for industrial-scale projects argue that industrialization is the main hope for developing countries to grow their economies. They point to rapid urbanization and the large numbers of developing country residents that have descended upon cities and left rural areas behind. Though rural populations suffer from energy poverty disproportionately, supporters of industrial-scale projects suggest that urbanization is necessary to achieve universal energy access. They suggest that industrial-scale investments will pay long-term dividends that will create more economic opportunity and material wealth.

Supporters of energy access investments in rural areas note that 84 percent of those in energy poverty live in rural areas. While cities have access to at least some energy supply, rural populations often have very little or none. Those who prioritize rural energy access suggest that urbanization is not necessary for universal energy access. They suggest that rural populations are being neglected as a disproportionate percentage of energy access financing is allocated to centralized grid technologies that primarily benefit urban areas. Energy access is foundational to economic opportunity and social mobility, and supporters of rural energy projects believe that rural residents deserve opportunity and mobility just as urban populations do.

Recommendations for U.S. Policymakers

As American policymakers consider how to respond to the challenge of energy poverty, they should prioritize investment in decentralized renewable energy sources for rural areas through bilateral channels.

Certainly, the U.S. should continue to support multilateral institutions and mechanisms like the Green Climate Fund and help to facilitate centralized grid extensions and connections where it makes the most sense. However, making bilateral investments in decentralized renewable energy solutions is likely the optimal way to proceed for American policymakers concerned about energy poverty.

Multilateral initiatives and institutions like the Green Climate Fund and multilateral development banks are addressing energy poverty, but sustainably addressing energy poverty is not the driving mission of many of these organizations. The GCF must address its governance challenges before the U.S. should see it as a stable mechanism to address energy poverty with low-carbon sources. Multilateral development banks must increase their contributions to energy poverty projects and the share of their energy portfolios dedicated specifically to energy access. If multilateral institutions can demonstrate greater stability and attentiveness to energy poverty, then American policymakers concerned about energy poverty can allocate more money to them with the understanding that they will be effective partners in the fight against energy poverty. In the meantime, however, American policymakers would be better off scaling up and replicating the model of Power Africa. Such bilateral initiatives also have the benefit of giving the U.S. direct control over how to spend its own money.

U.S. policymakers should primarily allocate financing to decentralized renewable solutions. Decentralized renewable energy is the best hope to effectively address energy poverty and climate change at the same time. As population and energy consumption increase in the developing world, it will become more important to identify opportunities for the developing world to avoid the fossil fuels that powered the economic rise of countries like the United States. If the developing world cannot develop sustainably, then global average temperature increase will likely surpass the internationally recognized limit of 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.

Though they will not all support large-scale industrial and economic enterprises, decentralized renewable solutions can deliver energy access to those most in need at a far faster rate than the centralized grid can. The energy access problem primarily lies in rural areas, with 84 percent of those in energy poverty residing in rural regions. Granting rural residents access to distributed renewable energy solutions supports better health, education, and economic outcomes. Such opportunities may not come along for many years if rural communities are forced to wait for expensive and logistically-challenging grid extensions and connections. While the amount of energy provided to rural households may be insufficient to transform the economic outlook of a country in the short term, providing even minimal energy access to rural areas can provide the foundation for these communities to begin a path towards greater economic growth and innovation.

As the IEA reported, 64 percent of energy access must come from off-grid and mini-grid solutions in order to achieve universal energy access by 2030. With its limited development finance resources, the U.S. should help grow the proportion of energy access financing dedicated to distributed solutions to a level proportionate with the needed share of such investment.

Conclusion

Energy poverty and climate change are two of the greatest challenges currently facing the international community. By deploying distributed renewable energy solutions across the most energy-poor countries in the world, both issues can be confronted at the same time. Bilateral initiatives like Power Africa should be prioritized as the main method to deliver energy access financing because many multilateral institutions and funds are either facing governance challenges or failing to prioritize energy access. While providing bilateral climate and energy access financing, the U.S. should also support governance reform of the Green Climate Fund and encourage multilateral development banks to pay greater attention to energy poverty. The U.S. should prioritize rural distributed renewable energy projects in its energy access financing. Investments in these technologies will address the energy access problem sustainably and in the rural regions where most of the world’s energy poor reside. By providing bilateral aid for rural distributed renewable energy, the U.S. can do its part to sustainably solve energy poverty.

Replacing Foreign Intervention for Regional Intervention: The African Union’s Critical Role in Mediating the Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon

Cameroon’s Anglophone community, which makes up 20% of the population has felt marginalized and excluded from the national government’s agenda since the country’s independence from France in 1961. These fundamental grievances have only grown during the past 50 years due to the blatant disregard of the Anglophone problem by President Paul Biya, the six-month internet shutdown in English-speaking regions back in 2017, and human rights violations by national security forces. These separate events have all contributed to the current surge of protests and sporadic violence. While the government attempted to appease the Anglophone minority, efforts proved inadequate and failed to radically dismantle the systematic inequalities and prejudice faced by the Anglophone population. Consequently, a secessionist group emerged in January 2017, under the name The Republic of Ambazonia, with goals to mobilize the Anglophone population in support of a separate ethnostate.  Cameroon’s key foreign partners, the U.S., France, and China, overlook the violence and hostilities in Cameroon’s Anglophone regions due to their ties with the national government and the protection of their interests by Biya in exchange for support. Thus, it is vital that a regional body such as the African Union (AU) intervene immediately in order to deter the possibility of armed conflict and the subsequent destabilization of West and Central Africa.

More importantly, Cameroon’s stability and security is of critical importance to the AU as Cameroon’s military is actively fighting Boko Haram in the far North of Cameroon and militias from the Central African Republic (CAR) in the East of Cameroon. Thus, from a strategic point of view, the AU has high incentives to implement peacekeeping measures in Cameroon in order to guarantee its stability. The AU can play a key role in assisting the Cameroonian government enact sustainable and inclusive reforms that benefit the whole country. Proactive series of actions include establishing an AU mediation intervention that facilitates dialogue between the Anglophone regions and the ruling regime; deploying an extensive peacekeeping operation in Cameroon to closely observe the situation and maintain peace; and urging the Cameroonian government to make immediate social and political reforms that include the voices of Cameroonians from English-speaking regions.

Historical Background & Context

The Anglophone problem dates back to the colonial era when the German colony Kamerun was passed down to Britain and France under a joint administration. Through the 1919 Simon-Milner agreement, both colonial powers unevenly divided the territory along the Picot Provisional Partition Line, with the French having a greater sphere of influence. This resulted in the regions developing separately with “legal, educational, monetary and political agreements being significantly different”. For instance, while the British territory was administered from Nigeria, with a fair amount of autonomy due to Britain’s indirect rule policy, the French applied a centralized form of governance. Once French Cameroun received its independence in 1960, the people of British Southern Cameroon chose to join the already independent Republic of Cameroun without the consent of British Northern Cameroonians who wanted to join independent Nigeria. Eventually, a constitution was drafted and implemented in 1961 for a federal state of Cameroon which united two regions with completely different political cultures. The dissolution of the federal state in 1972 by President Ahmadou Ahidjo into a unitary centralized state was the advent of a gradual effort to belittle Anglophones’ cultural history, customs and socio-political systems by the francophone majority in power. The Anglophone problem has four different dimensions, including:  the 1972 referendum which eliminated the principal idea of federalism from the 1961 constitution; the deliberate and systematic erosion of the Anglophone cultural identity from the union; the dissolution of prevalent Anglophone political parties and imprisonment of their leaders; and the continuous repression of all actions designed to improve the status of Anglophone Cameroonians in the Union. Most importantly, “the lack of proper management seems to be what has aggravated the problem” as noted by the Roman Catholic Bishops of Cameroon in their 2017 memorandum to President Biya. Thus, one can argue that the contemporary conflicts that divide Cameroonians are the result of an inimical relationship between competing European colonial powers (France and Britain), which has had far-reaching consequences due to the two different forms of colonial administration.

The Anglophone Problem: What is the Current Situation Today?

Today Anglophones in Cameroon face various cases of abject marginalization including: under representation in strategic government positions and complete exclusion from others. For instance, out of the 33 appointed ministries, only three Anglophones occupy high-level cabinet positions. In the judicial system, out of the 1,542 active magistrates, 1,265 are francophone and 277 are Anglophone. As for judicial officers, there are 514 in total, 499 Francophone and 15 Anglophones. Anglophone student unions have repeatedly complained about the institutional nepotism and the exclusion of qualified Anglophones in admissions into state professional schools, particularly schools of administration, medicine, and higher teacher training---even in the Anglophone regions. In the educational sector, there are various instances of discrimination where the francophone-majority government disproportionately appoints francophone trained teachers to Anglophone educational institutions. This is problematic because Anglophone teachers are further robbed of employment opportunities within their own native regions. Additionally, francophone teachers don’t bother to follow the English Educational Subsystem (which reflects British educational models) depriving students of a full English education that they pay for.

Another glaring inequality is the unequal disbursement of funds in the country and quality of infrastructural development in Anglophone regions versus Francophone regions. Due to the lack of an influential voice in political spaces, it is harder for Anglophone Cameroonians to advocate against the neglect of infrastructure development in the Northwest and Southwest regions of Cameroon. It is also harder for them to advocate for the relocation of top business plants to their regions that contribute to local economies. The consequence of this is Anglophone regions are under-resourced and struggle to meet annual development goals because of inadequate attention.

The issue that is really at the core of the Anglophone crisis and recent protests is public belief in the systematic erosion and disrespect of the Anglophone identity. Specific examples include national entrance exams into professional schools only being in French and state institutions only producing documents and public notes in French. While tensions have always existed between Anglophones and Francophones, they have never been as acute as they are now. The vast majority of Anglophones are frustrated with the systematic targeting of their culture and continuous attempts to absorb them into the francophone language, education and governance system.  Such grievances are what led to the most recent October 2016 peaceful protests by Anglophone lawyers followed by major teacher unions’ strikes. The government responded through repressive measures with the arrests and murders of prominent Anglophone elites suspected of fueling the resistance. While war crimes are being committed on both sides, it is important to note that the movement was originally peaceful. However, it has fallen into the hands of Anglophone extremists and separatists who responded with violence after the Cameroonian military directed attacks towards civilians.  

Since the crisis escalated in 2017, the humanitarian situation has spiraled. According to reports from International Crisis Group, at least 500 civilians have been killed during clashes between armed secessionist groups (Red Dragons, Tigers and Ambazonia Defense Forces) and national military forces. Based on a Human Rights Watch report, an estimated 32,600 Cameroonians have taken refuge in Nigeria’s Cross River state, with 244,000 civilians displaced in the Far North and 437,500 in the Anglophone North West and South West regions. Students in Anglophone (North West and South West) have been the most affected by this crisis. This is because they have been deprived of an education with schools shutting down for security concerns. According to UN Office for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), an estimated 42,500 children were still out of school as of May 2018 and most schools did not open in 2018.

What Can Be Done by the African Union?

The African Union has the potential to serve as a credible and vital mediator in mitigating the Anglophone crisis. The AU’s  mission is to help create an “integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in a global arena”. While the organization strives to resolve and establish peace in several conflicts throughout the continent, the emphasis on post-conflict resolution rather than the implementation of peacekeeping and preventive measures has left room for several countries to slip into armed conflicts. A similar situation prevails with the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon. Failure to act quickly by engaging with key Anglophone leaders and the current government to mediate inclusive, safe, and open dialogue could lead to an armed conflict which would destabilize Cameroon and ultimately undermine the AU’s security goals in the region. Aside from the prominence and influence that the organization carries in Africa, the AU has more familiarity and common ground with the Cameroonian government due to the shared African context than international organizations such as the United Nations. Thus, instead of solely relying on international assistance, as a respected continental organization, the AU should be able to approach this delicate situation with more depth and understanding of cultural context. This could increase receptivity from the local Cameroonian government and Anglophone populations.

The sporadic violence in Anglophone regions has left the vast majority of Anglophone Cameroonians mistrustful of their government, making the idea of secession even more attractive. A special envoy needs to be appointed by the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Hon.Moussa Faki, and deployed to Cameroon. A group of representatives and mediators need to be strategically positioned in the Northwest and Southwest regions as well as in the capital city (Yaoundé) to engage in both high-level and local mediation or conflict-prevention. In order to deter the possibility of armed conflict, this special envoy would have to ground their actions in the principles of confidence-building mediation. This means that their prime responsibility would be to transform the political and psychological dynamics of the parties involved.  Anglophone Cameroonians would be willing to dialogue in the presence of an honest broker that creates a calm and safe place for them to articulate their concerns to the central government.

As a trusted third party, the AU would play a critical role in stabilizing the current crisis in Cameron and ensuring that a constructive roadmap exists between the government and Anglophone minority. While sending a special envoy to Cameroon to mediate dialogue between the affected parties is important, that would only address a facet of this complex issue. In addition to the institutional measures taken by the AU, Hon. Moussa Faki should urge the Peace and Security Council (PSC) to authorize a peace support mission. This would help to bring an end to human rights abuses by military officials and secessionist groups. This peacekeeping mission could be between 2,000 and 3,000 civilian police and technical personnel to promote greater respect for human rights and serve as a buffer between the two opposing parties.

In response to grievances and political demands made by the Anglophone population, Biya’s regime has implemented quick bandage solutions that have not targeted the root causes of Anglophone frustrations. Reforms have not only been deemed inadequate but have been criticized among Anglophone leaders as being “a little too late. The AU should strongly urge the Cameroonian government to cease the continuous denial of the Anglophone problem. Instead, by recognizing that there is an issue and implementing viable solutions could go a long way in de-escalating the current crisis. An equal percentage of Anglophones and Francophones not only need to be appointed to high levels of government in order to reflect the diverse nature of the Cameroonian society, but Anglophones need to be politically empowered. This means providing equal access and real opportunities to resolve the socioeconomic and political inequalities faced by the Anglophone population in the country.

The vast majority Anglophones have lost hope in the current social contract because it curtails their freedoms and fails to hold the government accountable. The most obvious recommendation that could be made to the Biya regime by the AU would be to decentralize the government. While this is enshrined in the 1996 Constitution of Cameroon, it was never implemented.  The promotion of local governance would empower Anglophone communities in the North and Southwest regions. Returning to a federal system where Anglophones and Francophones can practice self-determination would allow different provinces to implement comprehensive policies, create impactful changes in the lives of their constituents and foster sustainable economic development. Furthermore, the devolution of power would enhance accountability and transparency in the management of state affairs, while lessening the rampant corruption in government. The prolonged crisis will further divide the country along linguistic and geographic lines. Thus, the support of these recommendations by the AU would provide viable solutions to instilling greater national cohesion amongst Cameroonians and ensuring the security and stability of the country.

Limitations & Alternatives

When considering possible gridlocks to implementing these recommendations, there are high chances that Biya’s regime will not only resist the AU mediation and conflict prevention intervention, but will also dismiss the recommended reforms. While questions of sovereignty and intervening in affairs within the domestic jurisdiction of Cameroon arise, the AU has a duty to fight crimes against humanity and the responsibility to protect (R2P) innocent African lives. The AU cannot and must not sit back and watch as the Cameroonian government marginalizes and violates the human rights of its citizens. The Cameroonian government should not be given a free pass to repress the fundamental rights of its citizens. The AU’s Peace and Security Council could also argue that compared to other African countries where the AU is involved, the situation in Cameroon has not reached a level where it deserves an intervention. This mindset is the fundamental problem with the AU:  the organization is so actively involved in post conflict reconstruction and fails to take the necessary precautionary measures for conflict prevention and peacekeeping in several African countries that are on the brink of war.

Failure to dedicate attention to Cameroon now when the situation is still semi-manageable could escalate the crisis to a point of no return. The destabilization of Cameroon would only make the AU’s job harder, as containing transnational crime and terrorists’ organizations without the help of the Cameroonian army would pose a greater challenge. In the event that the proposed measures fail, Honorable. Moussa Faki should urge the Assembly of the AU to impose targeted sanctions on the Cameroonian government and those undermining the stability of the country. Targeted economic sanctions backed by the U.S, France, China and the ECCAS regional community should be swiftly implemented. Since Cameroon has already been stripped of the right to host the African Cup of Nations, the threat of shocking Biya into action that Julius Amin proposes is currently powerless. Thus, economic sanctions will hopefully push the Cameroonian government to be more responsive to the needs of its citizens.

Three targeted solutions that would tackle the Anglophone crisis holistically include: the AU engaging with key Anglophone leaders and the current government to mediate inclusive and open dialogues amongst both parties; the AU preserving human rights through the deployment of a peace mission to Cameroon; and the AU demanding that the current Biya regime make reforms that lead to the gradual decentralization of government and the devolution of power. The potential impediments to implementing these recommendations include the resistance by the Cameroonian government to AU intervention or to implement proposed changes and the refusal of the Peace and Security Council to authorize a peace operation to Cameroon. However, the AU must play its role in promoting African security and step up to the challenge. Instead of continuously relying on foreign intervention and waiting for the U.S., France, or China to meddle in regional affairs, the AU should seek support from African countries such as Chad, Nigeria, Niger, and Ghana in order to ensure the stability of Cameroon. Cameroon, is a vital security partner in the fight against terrorism in the West and Central Africa. Thus, ensuring its stability should be one of the African Union’s primary concerns in order to deter the possibilities of a violent armed conflict, that would have serious consequences for the entire region.

Evolving Unions: Brexit, Scotland, and the British Constitution

The United Kingdom is having an identity crisis. A fast-approaching March 29 Brexit deadline has thrown Prime Minister Theresa May’s government and Parliament into a state of prolonged chaos as Members of Parliament (MPs) from across the ideological spectrum cannot agree on any single direction. On January 15, the House of Commons rejected May’s proposed deal by 230 votes, the largest margin for a government in history. Beneath the surface of procedural jargon and party politics, major existential questions about the future of the UK in Europe continue to cause gridlock and uncertainty. Leaders of the oppositional political parties, mainly the Scottish National Party (SNP) and Labour have suggested a second referendum to reverse course and remain in the EU, though Labour is also internally divided over Brexit. In the daily political circus, an often forgotten issue is the territorial nature of the modern British system beyond the center of power in London and the consequences that Brexit holds for internal divisions within the plurinational union. This article comprises discussion of political contexts in Scotland which contribute to an ongoing Brexit divide, a brief examination of SNP discourses, and a consideration of Brexit’s impact on the territorial British constitution.

Scotland’s independent religious and educational institutions, in addition to a general lack of confidence in Conservative leadership, have shaped a distinctly Scottish political culture and complicated union with the rest of the UK. Scottish institutional representation in British politics was an incremental process throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, with the creation of a largely symbolic Scottish Office in 1885 in response to criticisms that Scotland was neglected by Parliament and civil service. Administrative devolution left a legacy of limited Scottish political autonomy as well as a national identity shaped by such autonomy and nationalism. Politically, devolution of some legislative powers from Westminster arose out of discontent with conservative government policies during the Thatcher era, reaching a turning point in 1997 when Tony Blair’s government held a referendum on the formation of a Scottish Parliament with tax-varying powers. The Scottish Parliament’s purpose was described by McHarg and Mitchell as “a defensive institution, designed to protect Scotland from Westminster Governments that sought to pursue policies opposed by [the] majority opinion in Scotland.” The Brexit outcome and subsequent implementation tests the absolute limits of this balance between devolved Scottish government and Westminster, as the majority opinion in Scotland has been overruled by the rest of the UK in both a political and constitutional sense.

Contrary to the traditional understanding of the British state, the UK is not a unitary state but rather an asymmetrical union of four nations: England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. These unions developed over centuries with the English and subsequently British state absorbing Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Irish cultural identities without wholly replacing them. In the 2016 referendum, only England and Wales voted in majorities to Leave the European Union. Leave defeated Remain by a slim 52-48 margin overall whereas 62% of Scottish voters cast their vote to Remain in the EU. Scotland and Northern Ireland both voted in majorities to remain in the EU but have also expressed a desire to remain in the UK; now they cannot have both. The institutional unions between Westminster, Scotland, and Northern Ireland developed differently and gradually due to complex histories, however British internal politics adapted to plurinational unions with relative stability. According to James Mitchell of the University of Edinburgh, the changing relationship between Westminster and the UK’s component nations characterizes the UK “as a state of evolving unions […] Institutions may frame politics but people make choices as to how the institutions operate.” At the heart of Brexit lies this conflict among institutions and identities, processes of union and separation, and, above all, the constitutional adaptability and volatility of the British state.

As a regionalist political party within the parliamentary system, the original purpose of the SNP was to rally political support for Scottish independence. Ultimately, a 2014 referendum settled Scotland’s status as an independent country, resulting in a 55% “No” vote. Since 2014, the SNP’s vision seeks to advance the cultural notion of Scotland as distinct from the London-centric political establishment. As a center-left party, the nationalism encompassed by SNP rhetoric aligns with the EU and opposes the conservative and insular vision of the UK’s role in the European system. In a study of public opinion from the 1979 and 1997 referendums, Seth Jolly found links between pro-EU sentiment across Scotland and greater public support of devolution and independence. European integration is, therefore, a strategic benefit for an independent Scotland’s viability, not only as an institutional arrangement for trade but as an idea, as the EU provides an alternative to Westminster rule and traditional notions of English hegemony. This strategic relationship between Scotland and the EU is still a focal point for the SNP in the current Brexit debate.

The most principal actor in the formation of Scottish political discourse is First Minister Nicola Sturgeon, Theresa May’s counterpart as the leader of the Scottish Parliament and figurehead of the SNP across Scotland. Sturgeon has recently utilized her public platform to make clear that Scottish interests are not taken seriously by other UK political parties, therefore a renewed consideration of Scottish independence (in addition to a second Brexit referendum) should stay on the table post-Brexit. In a foreign visit to the United States in February, Sturgeon gave a speech on Brexit at Georgetown University’s Institute for Women, Peace and Security:

Scotland has a very proud European tradition. We see ourselves as a European country and people in Scotland by and large, perhaps in contrast with people elsewhere in the UK, don’t really see membership of the European Union as a threat to our own national sovereignty. […] But, amid the confusion and uncertainty of Brexit, one thing I think is clearer than ever. Scotland’s national interests are not being served by a Westminster system which too often treats Scotland as an afterthought, or too often sees our interests as not being material. In my view, they can only properly be served by becoming an independent country. But an independent country that then seeks to play its part in an interconnected world.

Framing Scotland as pro-Europe, culturally distinct from the rest of the UK, and inadequately represented in Westminster is consistent with the scholarly notion of the UK’s asymmetric union as well as the SNP’s political strategy, while the combination of these forces logically leads Sturgeon to steer discourse towards the direction of independence.

Since 2016, Twitter has become an especially relevant medium for the creation and dissemination of political discourse relating to Brexit, whether in the form of official statements, news, commentary, or jokes. MPs often post clips from their speeches in Parliament on social media in order to amplify their message among local constituencies in the Scottish political realm; however, Twitter can also extend beyond Scotland’s borders to shape the national debate. Vocal dissent amongst elected SNP MPs has brought attention to Brexit’s constitutional implications and Scottish grievances over perceived disempowerment due to the proposed Brexit deal going against the democratic will of Scotland’s Remain majority. Joanna Cherry, SNP MP for Edinburgh South West, bluntly described the power dynamic between Theresa May’s government and Scotland in a post on December 10, “Brexit has shown how unequal the Union of the UK is. The PM and her government have no respect for Scotland. Her #Brexit deal has failed and her government is failing. She must put the deal to the people. #PeoplesVote.” On January 21, Ian Blackford, SNP MP for Ross, Skye and Lochaber posted a clip from the House of Commons debate in which he framed Brexit as a precarious and existential situation: “We will not be dragged out of Europe by a Tory Government we did not vote for. We might not be able to save the UK but we can save Scotland. We have an escape route from the chaos of Brexit – an Independent Scotland.” Beyond just political difference on Brexit, the emphasis on the UK government’s authority to override Scotland’s Remain vote exposes the inherent power imbalances in the British system.

The official SNP Twitter account used similar language in a post on January 27: “We don't accept Scotland being dragged out of the EU against its will by a reckless, incompetent Tory UK government. Once the Brexit fog clears, the people of Scotland should have the right to look at a brighter future with independence.” The reality of a second independence referendum is unlikely, especially due to public fatigue with political instability and a complicated process for Scotland to hypothetically re-enter the EU as an independent country. However, the revival of SNP rhetoric about independence signifies not only strong political discontent with Theresa May’s government but a deeper frustration with the asymmetrical territorial distribution of power in the British constitution.

The largely unwritten UK constitution allows a wide range of flexibility to redefine the political fabric of the state, as legislation and convention can be rewritten, repealed, and reconsidered over time based on the governing political party’s interests. Unlike the United States Constitution, there is no single document that defines a unifying constitutional vision or clearly outlines the relationship between the central government and component nations. In the case of Brexit, the lack of a legal roadmap means that the UK is a “real-time experiment” in constitutional change. Scholarly understandings of the British constitution have changed significantly over time, as Vernon Bogdanor asserted in 1979 that the UK was “profoundly unitary” due to the supremacy and sovereignty of Westminster, in following decades a new understanding has emerged framing the UK as no longer unitary but perhaps still organized around the supremacy of the UK Parliament. Since 1999, devolution has allowed greater ambiguity in the constitutional arrangement between the UK Parliament and devolved legislatures. However, Brexit puts into question the nature of the territorial British constitution with semi-devolved powers.

A case that recently came before the UK Supreme Court shows competing constitutional visions in action. In R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, or otherwise known as the Miller case, the High Court determined that the UK Government may not unilaterally trigger the Article 50 procedure to formally exit the EU without Parliament’s approval in the form of legislation. The UK Government appealed the case to the Supreme Court which allowed the Scottish government to also claim their approval was necessary to trigger Article 50, due to “a fundamental alteration of the UK’s, and particularly Scotland’s, constitutional arrangements.” The Scottish government’s legal argument hinged upon the Sewel Convention, a principle “that the UK Parliament will not normally legislate on devolved areas without the consent of the Scottish Parliament.” The Court deemed the Sewel Convention not legally enforceable as a norm rather than a law, thus the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act passed through Parliament in March 2017 without the approval of devolved governments. McHarg and Mitchell concluded, “Brexit will affect devolved decision-making and questions of constitutional voice, in terms of how much influence they are able to exert over the form that Brexit takes, or indeed whether it happens at all.” In practice, Scotland’s constitutional influence on Brexit has been significantly limited by the UK Parliament, setting the stage for an even greater degree of SNP rhetoric about disaffection, independence, and self-determination.

It is impossible to know exactly how Brexit will affect UK politics in the long-term. The British constitution is dynamic and adaptable, though the EU referendum has exposed significant fault lines in the union between Westminster and Scotland. If the next generations of Scottish voters continue to feel perpetually unrepresented by British politics and expelled from the EU against their will as SNP rhetoric suggests, the current union arrangement may be unable to resist popular mistrust indefinitely. Similar forces of anti-establishment politics that made Leave appealing to the disaffected UK electorate in 2016 could eventually influence another referendum on a Scottish exit from the UK. Though Scottish independence seems politically improbable and absurd, the idea of Brexit itself also would have been unimaginable only a few years ago. Constant change in British politics is part of its institutional design, and as time runs out on the March 29 Brexit deadline, spectators of Parliament will find that absurd and unlikely things can happen quite often.

Rubles and Reindeer

The opinions expressed herein are the writer’s and do not reflect those of their employer.

I. Introduction

Last year marked the 100th anniversary of the Russian Revolution, which makes it an appropriate moment to discuss the plight of one of Russia’s largest indigenous populations who were victims of a modernizing and oil hungry Soviet Russia: the Khanty. According to a profile by the Guild of Inter-Ethnic Journalists, the Khanty currently have a population consisting of about 30,000 people, most of whom live in the region named for them, the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug (KhMAO). The Khanty are traditional, nomadic, reindeer-herding peoples that have long lived in western Siberia. As stated in a Russian state news profile, from 1930-1940 the autonomous okrug (or region) was “legitimized” by the Russian government, which intended to bring the Khanty into an official and governed status within the Soviet Union.

Today, the Khanty are one of the few remaining indigenous groups with their own autonomous region. Unfortunately for the Khanty, their historic region and home for centuries just so happens to sit on top of one of Russia’s three largest oil basins. In fact, 75 percent of Russia’s oil production comes from the region and the Western Siberia Oil Basin that lies under the KhMAO accounts for 67 percent of Russia’s oil reserves according to the International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy. The location of this particular oil basin puts the reindeer-herding Khanty in a precarious position and they are losing the fight for their traditional rights. They will continue to lose these rights as they confront a much stronger Russian government and Russian oil industry and there is not sign to this slowing down. The resulting environmental degradation that occurs all the while is a source of argument as well with the abuse of land and resources that could set the stage for worsening conflict. A Russian government that would support the ecology of the Khanty lands, assist representation and/or protect the local language would be the solution to this grievance; will the government actually do it is the true question.

II. The natives, oil and environmental degradation

The Khanty historically lived largely untouched alongside the Russian Empire in a fur-trading region with timber to trade, according to the region’s official website. Once oil was discovered in the 1930s and aggressively tapped in the 1960s, the once undamaged, scenic landscape yielded 70 billion barrels of oil over the following 40 years, as Paul Starobin wrote in National Geographic magazine in 2008.

A March 2017 Guardian article on the Khanty by Alec Luhn documented a specific grievance in the Khanty community that encompasses many of the problems they face (such detailed cases do not usually exist). A sub-region of the KhMAO, known as Surgut, is home to the oil and gas giant Surgutneftegaz, which was created as a combination of a few different state oil companies from the Soviet era. While this massive oil company continually drills into the Siberian land, a Khanty population of 4,000 in Surgut continues to hunt, fish, and herd reindeer as they have for centuries. With Russia’s economy in a slump, drilling increased in an effort to energize the economy with oil exports. As a result, the Kremlin knocked down Surgut’s protected status in 2013.

To compensate the Khanty for their land, Surgutneftegaz planned to pay individuals approximately 170,000 rubles (~$2,500) for the rights to their land. However, the contract that the companies have the natives sign is in Russian – a language in which many Khanty are illiterate. Lukoil, one of the largest oil companies in the world, offered 5 million rubles (~$84,700) to one family for a large parcel of land in another part of the KhMAO as reported by Georgy Borodyansky’s Open Democracy article from 2014.

Some land is worth more than others, but the variation in payouts illustrates that these companies have the ability and the will to pay off the population at any amount. Neither sum of money is enough to sustain the large family units the Khanty live in, especially when in some cases the population in question does not live close to another village, so they are unable to easily access food supplies and other goods. In fact, as Andrew Wiget and Olga Balalaeva wrote for Cultural Survival, a group that is known for research into indigenous populations, the food that the Khanty can gather from their limited river and forest land, they are legally unable to sell due to Russian government restrictions. These paltry payouts will not support them, nor are they able to support themselves. Though to the Khanty, money is not their utmost concern – the interruption of a lifestyle that they have maintained for centuries is.

A key issue regarding this situation is the local’s lack of voice in their local government. Lukoil was formed from Soviet state-owned western Siberian oil companies and Sugutneftegaz is another former state-owned oil conglomerate, which provides them strong government ties and influence. With the many sanctions hitting the Russian oil and gas industry, limiting technology to Russian domestic technologies, an oil company succeeding helps the economy keeps the country afloat. The head of Surgutneftegaz, Vladimir Bogdanov, is one of Russia’s wealthiest men. He is a member of the Khanty-Mansi okrug local government, and uses only Russian technologies and contractors. In fact, he employs a third of the city of Surgut’s 300,000 citizens as documented by Voice of America’s Russian service.

The aforementioned rollbacks on environmental protections are a result of Bogdanov’s clout. His domestic enterprise actually benefits from foreign sanctions and also from the powerless ethnic minority that is unable to push back due to oil’s economic importance. In fact, it is not only Bogdanov that represents the interest of oil in the local KhMAO government. A publication from Cultural Survival, noted in 1996 that not a single Khanty member was in the local representative council. The article goes on to describe how those who move into the KhMAO do so looking for oil work without any attachment or care for the community as a whole or the environmental situation at hand. Without a local voice, the risk of the land slipping further into ruin is more likely.

The degradation of environmental resources and general disregard for the Khanty’s lifestyle is the largest source of grievance between the Khanty and their Russian counterparts. The KhMAO suffered a great amount of damage due to the high oil yield the land has experienced. The landscape in 90 percent of the oil-producing areas has been damaged or destroyed, according to a Georgy Borodyansky’s 2014 Open Democracy article. In addition, there are constant forest fires that threaten the locals’ way of life and the lives of the reindeer they rely upon. Oil drilling fires and overall degradation have led to around 54 million acres of reindeer pasture being decimated according to an Ed Ayres piece in the World Watch journal.

The continuing uncertainty in environmental conditions led some of the Khanty victims to speak at the United Nations Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 21) summit in 2015 to air their grievances to a larger audience. The locals’ calls to the Russian government for an alleviation of drilling activities only results in the government willing to make monuments or national parks out of little corners of affected lands and, of course, allow the oil companies to pay off the locals. Unfortunately, as Wiget and Balalaeva’s article notes, this solution is hardly helpful because oil drilling already blocks access to traditional religious sites that may not have appeared on maps when drilling sites were set up. The oil companies and the indigenous population have no common interests and the former are absolutely powerless vs the latter who have local and national government’s ear.

III: Potential for violence and mitigating the conflict

The conflict’s potential for violence appears quite low. Research on this issue has only revealed a small number of violent incidents, including a 1930s revolution against collectivization and a story recounting a Khanty man shooting an oil company employee’s dog for biting his reindeer in Luhn’s Guardian article. Since, Khanty are a religious, hunting and gathering group that are in an extremely disadvantageous position against the Russian oil companies and they have no reason for violence. If they even consider fighting back or staging another rebellion, the Russian military, which has been known to use violence in suppressing violent conflict (i.e. the wars in Chechnya and Dagestan), would swiftly crush any opposition and likely elect another regional leader into power that would gracefully change laws and allow for more drilling. The more likely battle is a cultural one in which Khanty could lose their language and perhaps become extinct as an ethnic group.

The Khanty language is not widely spoken and Russia’s dependence and promotion of Russian, Khanty as well as other indigenous languages are in danger. Many Uralic languages have already gone extinct (including some Khanty dialects) and very few people today speak Khanty, according to an article on the website Languages in Danger. With fewer children speaking the language, its potential for survival is extremely low. With language, a key identifier of an ethnic group’s existence, its extinction would be a blow to the Khanty’s survival. The Russian government’s efforts to save the Khanty language are just as paltry as the oil companies’ payouts. The possibility of Khanty people eventually taking their payouts, giving up their land and moving to cities to start a new life or joining an oil company to stay close to home are the greatest threat to the culture’s survival. And this is the grimmest part of the conflict between the Khanty, the Russian state and the oil industry. The way to transform the conflict is a proactive resolution and assistance in preserving the Khanty culture, as well as to open up more opportunities for the Khanty population itself. Currently there is no violence in the region but that is simply a sign of Russian government intimidation.

Wiget and Balalaeva previously noted that not a single member of the Khanty community was on the local government in 1996. With statistics hard to come by, it is likely that this situation has not improved. For the conflict to mitigate, the Khanty will need to have more representation in their local government.  The federally-appointed current governor of the KhMAO is a woman by the name of Natalia V. Komarova from Western Russia with a background in construction and economics. This illustrates how people not from the KhMAO region are deciding on what happens to it. Ms. Komarova made a statement through UNESCO’s Russia branch that focused on promoting sustainable development and water protections in the region, but made no mention of drilling or its ramifications. Russia’s UNESCO branch also hosted conferences with the local universities, which provides a good start to promoting sustainability, but did not produce results. Having Khanty members on local councils and in State Duma seats is important, as it would check Ms. Komarova’s power in regard to processes that endanger the local ecology. She has also served on the Duma’s committee on natural resources, which influences her decision making on what is best for the Russian economy; especially given her economic educational background. While the Russian government has allowed UNESCO to establish climate change groups at the local university, but Moscow is too top heavy for this to have any effect in the short term where short term change is necessary.

IV: Specific recommendations

The problem with offering recommendations for a solution between the Khanty and the Russian government-backed oil industry is that the damage is mostly done. The derricks have been raised, the land destroyed, water resources contaminated and reindeer population reduced. Furthermore, recommendations only offer an opportunity to control or mitigate the damage rather than solve the grievance. It is important to understand what will not work before designing recommendations that could help. When dealing with the Russian Federation, for instance, sweeping recommendations that limit or hurt the oil industry will likely receive swift vetoes, as the country depends upon the extraction of natural resources. Also, intergovernmental organization decrees (like the United Nations Human Rights Council) would be taken as an insult and/or violation by the Kremlin. Any effective response must come at the local and state level.

The responses and recommendations for resolving the Khanty’s grievance with the Russian state and the country’s oil industry in the country are as follows: 1) restore environmental protections on the land with local engagement; 2) mandate the Khanty have representation in the local government; 3) provide the Khanty language with protected status while creating more local schools that teach Russian as well.

1) Restoring environmental protections is the most crucial recommendation, as the land can become uninhabitable if drilling and oil exploration are to continue at the current pace. The Russian government should meet with the local population, understand their concerns and decide with them how to properly protect their land and reindeer. The reindeer are extremely important for the Khanty, but due to drilling, it is estimated the region’s reindeer population fell by 28 percent during the 1990s as John Ross noted in Smithsonian Magazine. Data on the current status of the reindeer population decline is not easy to find. However, if oil production has yielded 70 billion barrels in the past 40 years, it is unlikely the population decline has ceased.  Allowing the land to sink further into an oil-soaked ruin, in which the rivers and forests routinely catch fire will cause problems for the native population and Kremlin alike. Adding more bureaucratic hoops to the government’s process for approving drilling operations will at least slow down the degradation and possibly lead to the reconsideration of some oil drilling operations entirely.

2) As noted above, another key issue is the Khanty’s lack of representation in local government. Mandating two Khanty representatives in the office of the governor and encouraging others to run for local council positions is crucial. The reason for having two is that there would be a better dynamic for discussion and more diversity from even within the Khanty community. A federally-appointed governor like Natalia Komarova needs to be balanced by local, indigenous representatives. The same is true for oligarch Vladimir Bogdanov and local government member Vladimir Bogdanov. This sort of influence without Khanty opinions present is dangerous. Having political checks on this influence can mitigate the disparity the Khanty population experiences as a result of its minority status in the Russian Federation.

3) The Russian government needs to work on protecting the language while bringing the Khanty population in from the fringes of Russian society. The population of Khanty in the KhMAO is only 19,068 people (1.3 percent of the population) according to the 2010 Russian census. Declaring the language endangered would attract some needed attention to this issue within the country. The language issue is lower priority compared to the other two recommendations, as it relates to the culture’s survival, and not specifically the people. It is part of a greater challenge as Khanty typically live in more remote sections of the KhMAO, and have less access to public schools. Improving educational opportunities is essential in not leaving a population in the fringes of society.

V: Final words

When studying any Russian indigenous group it is important to understand that many of them are endangered to a severe degree. The fact that the Khanty population still contributes to a percentage of the overall Russian population is a positive sign and should lead to the Kremlin’s further preservation of it. Unfortunately, as Cultural Survival discussed in 2014, within Russia, the native population councils/forums are either relatively powerless or nonexistent. This will need to change if any of the recommendations made above are going to take place. The Khanty should be able to choose whether to integrate fully into Russian society or not. Living on top of an oil gold mine should not be the reason for their demise, but in this case it is. Currently, there is no violence and there likely will never be. The population could die out quietly, before it ever fights back against the government or oil industry. If the culture dies off, the Russian government would be to blame for being complicit in the booming oil industry’s abuses, given the oil companies’ Soviet history and close ties to the Russian state. The fate of the Khanty lies in the hands of the Russian government.

Freedom vs Equality: Considering the Relationship Between Campaign Finance Reform and the First Amendment

Campaign finance reform: a pillar of  debate in United States politics for over a century. For just as long, voters intensely debated this controversial topic. Scholarly discussion on nearly every aspect of reform increased in the years following the Federal Election Campaign Act in 1971, and major amendments to it in 1974. Subsequent court cases altered or validated campaign finance laws to varying degrees. One of the most pressing questions arising from this legal ping pong is the ongoing debate over the constitutionality of limits on two pillars of campaign finance policy: contributions and expenditures.  The First Amendment is a keystone of American democracy, and viewpoints from different sides of the debate elucidate the relationship between the constitution specifically, the First Amendment, and campaign finance reform, beginning with scholarly work focusing on the landmark case Buckley v. Valeo, then progress through opinions post Citizens United v. FEC.  

The Federal Election Commission defines a contribution as “a gift, subscription, loan, advance or deposit of money or anything of value given to influence a federal election; or the payment by any person of compensation for the personal services of another person if those services are rendered without charge to a political committee for any purpose,” and  an expenditure as “a purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit or gift of money or anything of value made for the purpose of influencing a federal election. A written agreement to make an expenditure is also considered an expenditure.”  In passing FECA in 1971 and it’s major amendments in 1974, Congress sought to limit the amount of money in politics – to level the playing field. They also attempted to halt ‘quid pro quo’ arrangements by limiting both contributions and expenditures. The 1974 FECA amendments came on the heels of Watergate, a time of heightened concern over the potentially corrupting nature of campaign contributions and fundraising.

In 1976, the Supreme Court heard Buckley v Valeo, which brought the First Amendment to the forefront of the campaign finance conversation. The case challenged the constitutionality of the contribution and expenditure limits set in FECA ’74.  In their decision, the Court equated money with speech, which is protected under the First Amendment to the Constitution. It also made a distinction between different levels of corruption, which they said may result from different amounts of contributions or expenditures. When a contribution is made, an exchange of money takes place therefore a higher risk of corruption is present, where expenditures are made independent of a campaign - people spend in isolation. Directly addressing the constitutionality in their opinion, the Court wrote,

“The Act's contribution and expenditure limitations operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities. Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political expression in order 'to assure (the) unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people…The Act's contribution and expenditure limitations also impinge on protected associational freedoms.”

To conclude, the Court added, “although the Act's contribution and expenditure limitations both implicate fundamental First Amendment interests, its expenditure ceilings impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and association than do its limitations on financial contributions.” In summary, it is acceptable to limit freedom of speech in giving money but not in how money is spent.  

The Buckley decision remains a cornerstone in the debate over the constitutionality of contribution/expenditure limits on both sides of the issue. During the 1980s, in the wake of Buckley, J. Skelly Wright, former Chief Judge of United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, calls the Buckley ruling a “serious obstacle in the path of our society's advancement toward political equality through law,” and a “vitally important and, in [his] judgment, tragically misguided First Amendment decision.” More specifically, Wright declares that in “equating spending with speech, the Court treated the First Amendment as a near-absolute in the sphere of political debate.” This is, of course, not an unchallenged opinion. Wright’s contemporary Martin Redish, a professor of law at Northwestern University, provides an opposing consideration of the Buckley case, concluding that the Court was right to strike down some of the limits set by FECA as “by limiting spending, such regulation decreases the flow of information which might produce better informed voters and thus undermines important First Amendment values.” Wright and Redish also disagree over what exactly the First Amendment protects.

A key part of the Buckley decision lies in the Court telling the government that it should not attempt to level the political playing field, which was one of the intentions of FECA. The Court famously states in their decision, “the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.” Opposing this, Wright believes “democracy is often shadowed by lopsided inequalities in campaign resources” and “the predominance of money comes at the expense of the ideals of liberty and equality that underlie our political system.” Redish is less certain on this point, providing a devil’s advocate stance on the matter, positing that “important values other than equality are at work in First Amendment analysis and that, on occasion, these values may even clash with the equality principle.”  He expands on this, with the idea that limits on contributions and expenditures with the intention of normalizing those with significant financial resources are:

“not necessarily unconstitutional, for the benefits of ‘purifying’ political campaigns and equalizing candidate access to the public may outweigh the resulting harms to free speech interests. The outcome of the conflict is, for present purposes, irrelevant. Whatever the outcome, the equality principle and the values furthered by free expression directly conflict...”

Redish notes this important idea that because the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckley equated money with speech, an intersection formed between freedom of speech and the equality principle.

Scholars continued to address this tension in the 1990s,  with Gary Stein proposing that “the theoretical conflicts [between First Amendment freedoms and reform efforts] are largely reconcilable…coexistence between the First Amendment and effective campaign-finance reform is constitutionally permissible.” Fred Wertheimer and Susan Weiss concur, citing that the Supreme Court “recognized this when it upheld the constitutionality of campaign finance contribution limits in Buckley.” Wertheimer and Weiss point to the Buckley opinion, which itself states it is “unnecessary to look beyond the Act’s primary purpose,” which is “to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption…in order to find a constitutionally sufficient justification for the $1,000 contribution limitation.” In this case, the authors draw a comparison between a lack of corruption in politics and political equality.  The idea that while freedom is speech and speech is nearly unrestricted, preventing corruption will further political equality in the same way that restricting someone from yelling ‘fire!’ in a crowded theater promotes safety.

This argument for the constitutionality of contribution limits is partially echoed by David A. Strauss, who both reinforces and scrutinizes the validity of such limits based on their intended effects, saying that “in fact it is far from clear that campaign finance reform is about the elimination of corruption at all.” He further explains, “corruption-understood as the implicit or explicit exchange of campaign contributions for official action-is a derivative problem,” and therefore, “those who say they are concerned about corruption are actually concerned about two other things: inequality, and the nature of democratic politics.” In this analysis, the Court actually qualified government intervention to ‘level the playing field’ in the Buckley decision by limiting contributions on the basis of limiting corruption which Strauss views as an extension of inequality. On this thread, Strauss concludes that corruption “is not in itself an appropriate target of campaign finance reform,” because it is an outgrowth of inequality and interest group politics, and appropriate reform will seek to address these root issues.

An interesting counter to Strauss’ connection between corruption, equality and democratic politics is offered by lobbyist Scott Harhbarger, “the effort to end unlimited campaign contributions is a fundamental civil rights issue…we need to make it just as clear what we stand for: reclaiming our democracy.” In The Fallacy of Campaign Finance Reform, John Samples describes limits on contributions as a “reason for lamentation, not rejoicing.” He warns, “no one should exercise his or her First Amendment right to freedom of speech without advice from counsel, preferably one schooled in the intricacies of campaign finance regulation.” And leaves readers with his startling take on campaign finance laws, “In the United States, speech is no longer very free…” Samples delves deeply into the anti-limits ideal that money is speech, and speech must remain free:

“The First Amendment offers a classic statement of negative liberty: it enjoins the government from abridging individual freedom. It does not “empower” the individual to achieve some good. It does not give the individual the means to speak or to persuade others. It does not direct the government to use speech as a means to some social end.”

The recurring theme of the government overstepping to promote equality in the political arena is clearly present throughout Samples’ book.  

Samples devotes a considerable portion of the book to discussing the divergent Madisonian and Progressive schools of thought on the relationship between the First Amendment and campaign finance reform. Those on the Madison side favor no limits at all, but with full and immediate disclosure requirements, while Progressives advocate public financing of all campaigns and no private money allowed. The narrative Samples lays out is not unlike the current debate over the 2nd amendment and gun control laws.

The views of authors discussed to this point were all penned prior to the landmark case Citizens United v. FEC,  a ruling issued in 2010. As such, they focus heavily on the Buckley v. Valeo decision of 1976. The following selection of sources will also include analysis of the Buckley decision, but afford considerable allowance to the Citizens United case.

Citizens United v. FEC  incurred serious implications for scholars from all sides of the campaign finance reform arena. In the decision, while the Court denied corporations and labor unions the right to make explicit contributions, it does permit them to use treasury funds to finance independent expenditures. The holding is essentially that political spending is protected under the First Amendment as political speech, and therefore the government cannot restrict corporations and unions from exerting their right to free speech through limits on corporate/union independent expenditures.

In the wake of Citizens United, Floyd Abrams penned a novel in defense of the First Amendment. Abrams spent years arguing against restrictions on the Amendment, delving deeply into issues of campaign finance when he represented Senator Mitch McConnell in an unsuccessful challenge (by a 5–4 vote) to key elements of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act which they believed violated the First Amendment. He and Susan Buckley also submitted, during the 2010 Citizens United case, an amicus curiae (friend of the Court) brief on behalf of Senator McConnell to argue orally on his behalf. Abrams favors a broad reading of the First Amendment, “sometimes nearly absolutely so.” He repeatedly describes limits on campaign related finance issues as Congress, “turning political speech into a crime.”

Expanding on this ear-catching slogan, Abrams says, “political speech…has long been considered worthy of the highest degree of First Amendment protection.” It is, in fact, meant to do just that. Justice Elena Kagan summarized the argument Abrams and his colleagues made before the Supreme Court in 2010 as saying, “political speech is the highest form of speech under the First Amendment entitled to the greatest protection and that the courts should be wary of Congress regulating in this area in such a way as to protect incumbents to help themselves.”  In turn, Abrams cites Justice Anthony Kennedy’s decision in another case, United States v. Automobile Workers, in which Kennedy wrote, “first Amendment rights are part of the heritage of all persons and groups in this country. They are not to be dispensed or withheld merely because we or the Congress thinks the person or group is worthy or unworthy.” He continues this thread, “political speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it, whether by design or inadvertence… [the First Amendment] has its fullest and most urgent applications to speech uttered during a campaign for political office.” Following his broad analysis of the perils of campaign law infringing on First Amendment protections, Abrams moved on to specific areas of such laws which he believes pose the most concerning threats to freedom of speech.

Abram identifies limits on contributions by anyone, including corporations, and statutes restricting close-to-election speech as particularly worrisome. He calls for the public to carefully examine the cost of restrictions on political speech required for almost all proposed campaign finance reform, and the ‘inherent’ constitutional dangers they present. Abram expresses his bewilderment with public outcry following the Citizens United decision, “what I find inexplicable is the willingness of so many not even to acknowledge, let alone weigh, the powerful First Amendment interests at all.” He concludes his argument on the antagonistic relationship between the First Amendment and campaign finance reform by calling limits on political spending or speech as  “an approach which views the First Amendment as an impediment as opposed to a protection, as a disagreeable, painful limitation to be overcome, evaded or eluded rather than as a shield against the government.” This impassioned expression of his views is paralleled in enthusiasm, if not in opinion by Robert Post.

Post, a constitutional law scholar and former dean of Yale Law school, offers his novel in the form of two lectures, followed by commentary from fellow scholars, and concluding with Post’s response. The arguments proposed by Post within this work are particularly interesting because he refutes both pro-regulation claims that the First Amendment supports equality and anti-regulation views that the First Amendment lends itself only to the freest forms of speech. He devotes Lecture I to a detailed – and argumentative – analysis of the history of attempts at campaign finance reform. Post begins with the Buckley v. Valeo decision, in which he says the Court tried to “...split the difference...” between the two issues at hand: freedom of speech and electoral integrity. They did this by creating an proposing an “...arbitrary distinction…” between campaign contributions and independent campaign expenditures. Limits on the former were intended to protect electoral integrity, while restrictions on the latter were prohibited to safeguard freedom of speech. He warns that this compromise is quickly disintegrating, because it “lacks theoretical structure…there is little to stop the slide into chaos.” Post argues that this chaos arises from the fundamental question raised by campaign finance discussions; how does the country reconcile “republican tradition with…our commitment to discursive democracy.”  

Post explains that campaign finance Court cases where the juxtaposition of these two American ideals is painfully present, specifically Citizens United, the Court was “forced to choose whether the nation’s commitment to self-governance would be better realized through institutions of representation or through the discursive democracy established by First Amendment rights.” The Court chose the latter path, even though, according to Post, “we have been committed to structures of representation for far longer than we have aspired to democratic self-government.”

The Court’s decision to protect representation over discursive democracy is particularly thought provoking for Post. He observes that in Citizens United “the Court applied First Amendment doctrine as though it were a repository of abstract and categorical rules,” and that because the Court “never asked what these rules are designed to accomplish, it could not begin to explain how discursive democracy might be connected to the representative integrity that campaign finance reform seeks to sustain.” Post continues to address the ambiguity of the First Amendment and the possible relationship between political speech and electoral integrity in Lecture II.

Weaving an intricate web of analysis, Post lays out his argument for the proper role of the First Amendment in campaign regulation. He states:

“First Amendment rights do not ensure that each citizen can exercise equal influence on government action. The First Amendment does not protect direct democracy; within discursive democracy, public opinion should not be analogized to an initiative. The point of First Amendment rights is instead to guarantee that each person is equally entitled to the possibility of democratic legitimation.  First Amendment rights institutionalize the hope that affording each person the opportunity to participate in public discourse can create the ‘communion of interests and sympathy of sentiments’ between persons and their government that is the foundation of self-government.”

Post’s presentation of the First Amendment centers on the idea that meaningful – not equal – participation is at the core of what the amendment means. This is in direct contradiction with the views of researcher David Strauss, who was discussed earlier in this paper. However, Post’s view clearly explains why he so vehemently opposes the Citizens United decision that gave free speech rights to corporations; he believes the corporations would use such rights to make a profit, as opposed to individual citizens who may use their political free speech to make an ideological or political position. Perhaps the only author discussed to do so, Post’s writings on the First Amendment offer a hopeful tone for the path forward – for a plausible balanced relationship between the true meaning of the First Amendment and representative integrity, via proper campaign finance reform.

While the arguments of authors presented thus far accept the Constitution as written, Senator Tom Udall of New Mexico penned a parallel plan. Udall describes the Buckley v. Valeo case as having “...laid the groundwork for  a broken system...” of campaign finance. He also condemns the Citizens United decision for putting “...the First Amendment rights of corporations  and other large organizations on par with those of individual citizens, opening the door to an unregulated influx of special interest campaign dollars.” Senator Udall advocates for an amendment to the Constitution, which he cautions should not be taken lightly.  However, he claims that comprehensive and viable campaign finance reforms will only be passed “...if there is a constitutional amendment which provides Congress with the authority to regulate all aspects of the campaign finance system.” Udall’s proposed amendment would not lay out the type of regulations passed by Congress of individual states, leaving room for debate, interpretation and change. He also discusses a more narrowly written amendment introduced by his colleague Senator Max Baucus (D-MT), which would address the issue of corporations having the same political speech rights as an individual person. Senator Udall holds that barring a constitutional amendment or reversal of the damaging Supreme Court precedent unlimited special interest money will continue to flood election campaigns, and influencing the outcomes of elections.

Over the course of this examination, the viewpoints of multiple scholars on the issue of campaign finance reform and the First Amendment have been examined. For the pro-regulatory side, J. Skelly Wright, Gary Stein, Fred Wertheimer and Susan Weiss Mane and Robert Post  argue for come form of regulations on campaign contributions and/or expenditures. Martin Redish, Scott Harshbarger, John Samples, Floyd Abrams argue degrees of the opposite: that such regulations are oppressive, illegal, and unconstitutional. Davis Strauss’ argument both viewpoints straddling a delicate and unique middle-ground, while Senator Tom Udall advocates a departure from the First Amendment the other authors all hold dear. All of these works exhibit the same obvious and deep respect for the First Amendment. Pro-regulation works tend to generally hold that the First Amendment supports equality in the political system, and that government intervention is necessary to preserve the integrity of America’s electoral process. Anti-regulation scholars broadly interpret money as speech, therefore validating the view that campaign contributions and expenditures are protected speech under the First Amendment.

Arguments continue in courts, classrooms and coffee-shops across the nation. Campaign finance is far from the only issue where clashing interpretations of the First Amendment lead to heightened tensions and legal uncertainty. Which side’s view will prevail? Currently, precedent backs the anti-regulation ideals money under the umbrella of protected political speech. However, it remains uncertain whether legislation or new court cases could pose a serious threat to this current interpretation.

Shedding Light on the “Prison-to-Jihad” Pipeline: Islam, Radicalization, and Terrorism in French Prisons

Since the Islamic State’s creation in June 2014, France has witnessed the most terrorist related violence across all of Europe and the United States. Brookings’ scholars McCants and Meserole recently published a landmark study identifying Francophone status as the biggest determinant for whether European countries experience Sunni radicalization and violence. These two data points highlight the continued risks posed by violent extremist organizations (VEOs) to the government of France and its citizens. Terrorism in France is too often wrapped up in conflicting narratives of nationalism, Islam, and immigration. Far-right candidate Marine Le Pen frequently used the trope of Middle Eastern refugees seeking to unleash violence against France in the name of Islam, a narrative that secured her one-third of the national vote in the 2017 presidential elections. Yet the overwhelming majority of recent terrorist attacks haven’t been carried out by refugees, but by French citizens socialized in the country’s secular schools. Moreover, a wide variety of groups have engaged in terrorism across France since the 1800s, including Basque, Breton and Corsican separatists, pro- and anti-Algerian independence movements, the far-left Action Directe, the far-right Organisation Armée Secrète, neo-Nazis, and more recently, Islamic extremists. Islamic extremists, as defined by the University of Maryland’s National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), engage in the violence in the name of a faith-based ideology in order to impose strict regulations on social life, though they often lack even rudimentary religious education. In the case of Islamic extremism in France, this violence is particularly anti-state, as the French government’s strict interpretation of secularism, or laicite, results in heavy restrictions on Islam in public spaces. Yet the roots of radicalization lie in specific social processes which take place at the individual rather than community level. While Muslims in France, and overlapping African and Maghrebi immigrant populations, face state violence and widespread economic discrimination, the overwhelming majority continue to reject violence and extremist ideologies. Prisons offer a clearer view of this complex relationship between government policies, Islam, radicalization, and terrorism. If authorities are to effectively dismantle radicalization networks in prisons, they must create targeted rehabilitation programs, end isolation of suspected radicals, empower Imams as independent authorities, and avoid securitizing entire populations who face continued discrimination.

Race and identity in the French criminal justice system

French pundits consistently highlight prisons as “incubators” for radicalization. The government estimates that 1,400 radicalized inmates currently reside in prison, 300 of whom are serving sentences for terrorism charges. A major blind spot for security services comes not from convicted terrorists, but from petty criminals who are radicalized while serving their sentences and who carry out attacks upon leaving. Notable former inmates charged with crimes like petty theft, drug possession, and larceny include Mohammed Merah, perpetrator of the 2012 Toulouse attacks, Mehdi Nemmouche of the 2014 Brussels Jewish Museum attack, and the assailants from the January 2015 Paris attacks, Amedy Coulibaly and Cherif Kouachi. Countering violent extremism (CVE) policies must, therefore, highlight both convicted terrorists and inmates more broadly susceptible to radicalization, despite clear indicators.

Hardline ideologies in French prisons exist alongside more broadly followed religious practices, namely Islam, which plays a major role in inmates’ social networks. Islam spread rapidly across the prison population in the 1970s with the spread of Tablighi, a movement within Sunni Islam which emphasizes piety. At first, prison authorities welcomed this trend and its stabilizing effect on prisoners, as it weakened the influence of organized criminal groups. It was only in the 1990s, during the Algerian Civil War and the growth of Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) cells across France, that prison officials began securitizing Islam, resulting in greater surveillance and the use of isolation on Muslim inmates. Currently, more than 60 percent of inmates identify as Muslim (almost 40,000 inmates total), despite making up only 12% of the general population. One reason for this overrepresentation stems from the failure of integration on the part of the government, as explained by sociologist Moussa Khedimellah. Many Muslim inmates come from banlieues, segregated neighborhoods predominantly populated by immigrant communities, with few opportunities for higher education or employment. Arrest rates in these neighborhoods far surpass the national average. While the government is prohibited from collecting statistics on race or religion, French Muslims, mostly from Arab or African descent, are estimated to comprise the majority of those arrested on drug charges, especially for marijuana. Another potential reason for the skew is widespread institutional violence directed towards France’s Arab and African population. The state of emergency passed in the aftermath of the November 2015 Paris attacks saw wide-scale police repression targeting French Muslims, with tens of thousands targeted with random searches and online surveillance, and thousands more subjected to house raids. Economic and political discrimination create additional issues. French Muslims are reportedly 400% less likely to receive a job offer than their Catholic counterparts, even when controlling for education and skill level. Second and third generation citizens with Arab and African surnames are told to change their names when submitting job applications. As a result of this widespread discrimination, charismatic “influencers” in prisons have little difficulty persuading inmates about the perceived irreconcilability of French identity and Islam when they can easily draw on lived experiences of institutional Islamophobia and the openly racist and violent discourse of political groups like the French National Front.

While the linkages between impoverished banlieue and radicalization are appealing, a closer look at recent attacks shows a more nuanced picture. In fact, while some attackers like the Kouachi brothers fit an expected pattern of fragmented social networks, poverty, barriers to employment, and repeat criminality, other attackers emerged from middle-class, secular families with access to education, like Coulibaly. Moreover, the average French citizen traveling to Iraq or Syria to fight for the Islamic State is increasingly white, middle-class, and occasionally female. France must address the rampant economic and social exclusion facing Arab and African populations in banlieu neighborhoods but should do so without the pretense of addressing the root causes of radicalization, which are far more nuanced. While difficult conditions certainly shaped the path to radicalization for some notorious individuals, the fact remains that the overwhelming majority of ‘banlieusards’ are not taking up arms against the French state. Therefore, while environmental factors can serve as stressors to sensitize an individual to radicalization, the unique social process that place in prisons requires a closer look.

The “Prison to Jihad Pipeline”

Most literature supports the idea that prisons, under certain conditions, can serve as potent incubators for radicalization. Across the Middle East, prisons hosted numerous jihadist figures, including Al Qaeda notables Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and ISIS founder Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Spanish, British, Belgian, and French prisons have all produced terrorists socialized during their detention who went on to carry out major acts of terrorism. Given the varying quality of life and style of detention across these different countries, radicalization is likely an individual process of socialization exacerbated by broader environmental stressors. Prisons offer unique opportunities for ideological indoctrination. The combination of emotional shock, isolation, and the need for social belonging push many prisoners to turn to moral frameworks or spirituality during their incarceration. Sociologist Farhad Khosrokhavar explains prison radicalization as a multi-stage process. Often, vulnerable inmates enter prison on minor charges and have little to no religious education. Once in prison, highly charismatic individuals will approach them and offer them a sense of belonging, beginning a gradual socialization process. The ideology used is designed to push individuals out of existing social isolation by giving them a worldview that is both empowering and highly intolerant, one that is especially attractive to those who already hold anti-state views. Once the relationship is established, the influencer uses a combination of violence and social norms to create a social network. These groups can outlast prison sentences, and connect former inmates to other extremists across Europe, and even with VEOs around the world. This radicalization process is seen clearly in the cases of Merah and Coulibaly. Both grew up in mostly non-religious households, and as a result of repeated experiences with criminal networks and the French justice system, came into contact with charismatic convicts who socialized them to violent, anti-state ideologies. This process of socialization continues to produce terrorists within the criminal justice system, and requires a strong policy response.

The general French state’s response to terrorism, informed by waves of domestic terrorism in the late 20th century, established a system that easily arrests and convicts suspects by casting a broad net over any individuals remotely linked to terrorist networks. While this allows a whole-of-network approach and can theoretically preempt terrorist attacks, it also solidifies otherwise weak links between terrorist networks and larger illicit economies present in banlieues. For example, the trabendo criminal networks present among first and second generation Maghrebi communities are mostly unconnected to terrorism, yet are frequent targets during mass arrests targeting potential terrorists, creating new linkages. Salah Abdeslam, the only surviving perpetrator of the November 2015 Paris attacks, managed to evade capture for over 150 days using social and family networks tied to the drug trade in the suburbs of Brussels. The very same ISIS cell involved in the attacks previously worked with petty criminals and drug dealers to recruit fighters for ISIS. While terrorism ought to be treated as a law enforcement issue, the government’s current approach is to broad and risks strengthening ties between otherwise unaffiliated criminals and terrorist cells. Moving beyond this approach would require greater intelligence gathering to target individual suspects, as well as broader policy shifts in urban development and limited drug legalization to weaken existing illicit economies.

Beyond arrests, the French approach towards deradicalization within prison focuses on more on sentencing than rehabilitation, an approach which undermines the potential for effective deradicalization programs. Over the last decade, in light of high profile attacks committed by former inmates, the government adopted several new approaches. First, prison officials gained an increasing power to overrule prisoner rights, notably the right to privacy, in the name of security. With the creation of a new Bureau of Prison Intelligence, prison officials can now wiretap phones, place hidden cameras, and examine electronic communications, using tools previously only available to intelligence services. Second, the government launched a new program designed to separately target “influencers” and inmates in the process of being radicalized. The program involves a higher ratio of wardens to prisoners, with staff trained in psychology, sociology, Islam, and history. Inmates are offered theatre workshops, debate seminars, and courses covering subjects ranging from legal studies to Japanese literature. These programs are intended to last six months, after which the inmate is released into the general population under close supervision by prison staff. Beyond prisons, the government has attempted to passed new laws to counter radicalization within schools, by better communicating the reasons for laicites to faith communities, teaching more colonial history in classrooms, and encouraging Arabic language courses within public spaces, although these have proven politically unattractive with conservative voters. This combination of policies seeks to deradicalize individuals through a variety of tools, which combat root factors in marginalized populations, engage with individuals along the path of radicalization, and isolate individuals deemed “too far gone.”

Results so far have been mixed. While the combination of isolation targeting influencers and robust CVE engagement with those at risk of radicalization has reduced the number of reported incidents of radicalization in prisons, analysts warn against premature declarations of success. In fact, many argue that influencers are now more hidden than they were in the past, as the policies have not stopped radicalization but rather pushed it further underground. This mirrors the government’s crackdown on hardline Imams in the early 2000s. One unintended consequence of this policy was that radicalization moved underground into social spaces where it couldn't be monitored or challenged by the government or community members. Another policy, the construction of dedicated isolation facilities for radicalized inmates, poses numerous problems. First, radicalization is difficult to measure and this sort of segregation results in pious inmates being lumped in with hardened extremists. Second, isolating radical prisoners from the general population risks pushing them furthers their radicalization, as they lose exposure to information beyond their personal beliefs and that of prison officials. Finally, this move risks empowering more radical cells amongst convicted terrorists. When the UK established such a special segregated unit in 2005, it put members of Al Qaeda, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and smaller Algerian outfits in the same unit. The result was a book, Limatha Intasarna (Why We Were Victorious), written by one of the inmates, collecting lessons from different inmates on military and organizational tactics, which was then smuggled out of prison for distribution to VEOs worldwide. Isolating radicals in special units may give the appearance of greater security, but simply enforces existing hardline ideologies and reduces the chance for radicalization to be challenged through a marketplace of ideas with other prisoners. However, the higher staff-to-inmate ratios and opportunities for education are promising, and show strong results in other countries where they are already deployed.

Beyond the potential backlash produced by isolating high-level influencers and radicalized inmates from the general population, these programs fail to fully interact with the environmental stressors that make inmates vulnerable to radicalization. One major issue in French prisons is the lack of faith services available to Muslim inmates. Research points to the crucial role that Imams can play in counter-radicalization efforts, as they can use theological arguments to dispel extremist ideologies. Yet as of 2008, only 100 Imams serviced France’s 200 prisons, compared with 480 Catholic, 250 Protestant, and 50 Jewish chaplains. More broadly, general debates about religion are heavily stifled by France’s strict interpretation of secularism, or laicite. In stark contrast to the United States, which bans government interference in religion, French laicite places strict restrictions on religious displays in public, notably in schools. Yet the country’s strong Catholic roots ensure that, to some degree, these restrictions target French Muslims to a greater degree than any other group. What debates do occur within prisons, are often undertaken by underpaid Imams and Islamic scholars who are vetted by authorities.  The strict regulations placed on their sermons by officials limit their ability to engage with radicalized inmates and result in their image as a tool of the state. As a result, radicalized inmates avoid contact with them, out of suspicion or fears of being punished for interacting with them. The government ought to empower Imams with more resources and independence, in order to create strong voices in prisons which can mediate between prisoners and officials, and counteract the power of influencers.

In addition to empowering religious figures, French prisons must better support the freedom of Muslim inmates to express their faith while serving their sentences, as current restrictions on gives additional ammunition to influencers. While Muslim prisoners can forego pork products, true halal meals are not an option in most prisons. Christian inmates receive special gifts from family members for Christmas, but Muslim inmates don’t receive the same on Ramadan. French authorities can significantly weaken “influencers” by enforcing religious requirements in line with standards established by the European Court of Justice and the United Nations. These include, among other things; defined halal menu options, alarm clocks to indicate prayer times, access to Korans, flexible dinner schedules to accommodate for fasting during Ramadan, the provision of soap and water at prayer spaces, and the right to meet with spouses in a private room. Religious accommodations in line with international standards can only serve to weaken influencers, and is crucial to promoting human rights in prisons.

If France seeks to break the prison to jihad pipeline, it ought to move beyond discourses which securitize broad segments of the population and empower moderate voices in prison indirectly, by giving Imams more support and autonomy, while ensuring that prisoners can freely practice their faith. While targeted support for prisoners at risk of radicalization can provide positive outcomes, it should be done in a manner that doesn’t fully isolate them, at risk of cementing hardline views. Finally, the prison debate should force a broader discussion in French society about the treatment of Muslims in general, with an emphasis on economic inclusion and genuine police reform.

Searching For a Hero Like Trump The Parallels of Right-Wing Politics in Brazil and the United States

The arrest of Brazil’s former president, Luis Inácio Lula da Silva. As a result of his twelve-year sentence for taking part in one of the biggest corruption scandals in Brazil’s history, Lula’s arrest opened the window for the opposing political party to rise to the occasion. The Social Liberal Party’s (PSL) candidate Jair Bolsonaro has done just that: garnering support for his far-right policies and winning the presidential election with a huge margin of victory.  His election is the first election of a candidate with far-right views since the end of Brazil’s military dictatorship in 1985. Bolsonaro’s rise parallels that of U.S. President Donald Trump. Both candidates campaigned on fixing a broken political system and gained support around general dissatisfaction with the political status quo. In fact, pundits often refer to Bolsonaro as the “Trump of the Tropics”. With Trump in the White House and Bolsonaro at the helm in Brasilia, there exists the possibility of even stronger relations between the United States and Brazil on many fronts. However, with a right-wing president in charge of the world’s 8th largest economy, it should be questioned how the international community should respond to his ideas and the policies he wishes to advance. The international community should also be aware of how these election results will affect other nations whose elections are fast approaching especially in Latin America.

Despite Bolsonaro’s clear win over his competitor Fernando Haddad, his support base was not always so widespread.  The left-wing Workers Party (PT) - of which Lula and his successor, the impeached President Dilma Rousseff were members - was highly supported amongst Brazilians until the revelation of rampant government corruption under the so-called Operation Car Wash: a string of scandals involving the state-owned oil company Petrobras accepting bribes from contracting firms in exchanged for inflated prices as well as the left-wing Workers Party using funds in order to pay for the votes of politicians in order to strengthen their political campaign. Despite the numerous arrests, Lula’s charismatic personality, charm, and past political accomplishments and promises placed the corruption accusations on the back burner. When Lula entered office in 2002, it marked a turning point for a country where the political elite was controlled by upper-class white people despite more than half of the population being comprised of minorities and people below the poverty line. As a self-proclaimed “leader for the people,” he proclaimed “hope has finally defeated fear and the people have decided it [was] time to pave new roads,” in his inaugural speech. Similarly, Barack Obama’s election in the United States marked a turning point in a country that had only seen white presidents. He proclaimed that “we must pick ourselves up, dust ourselves off, and begin again the work of remaking America.” Both leaders marked the possibility of change for marginalized communities.

The Workers’ Party, both during Lula’s and his successor’s, made accomplishments that cannot go unnoticed. According to the left-leaning magazine The New Republic, some of the Worker’s Party greatest accomplishments include the establishment of different programs such as affirmative action policies which increased the attendance and retention rate of students at national universities, as well as the largest cash transfer program which gives families living under the poverty line a stable income as long as parents invest in their children’s education and health by ensuring attendance at school and regular visit respectively. Programs such as these elevated about forty million Brazilians above the poverty line. Brazil’s selection as the host of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and Rio de Janeiro’s selection as the host city for the 2016 Summer Olympics, a first for South America, signaled a dramatic improvement in the economic and political stature of the county. However, this boom was constructed on the shaky ground. Many large-scale development projects suffered significant pitfalls from pollution, crumbling infrastructure, and protests against government spending. These problems began to shed light on the poor practices and corruption within the Worker’s Party and its leaders.

Until recently, Jair Bolsonaro remained on the sidelines, waiting for the right opportunity to appear. As a Congressman for the State of Rio De Janeiro, Bolsonaro made his political opinions clear in different interviews across Brazilian media. He once told a fellow female politician “I would not rape you because you are not worthy of it;” another controversial comment he made is “the lightest Afro-descendent there weighed seven ‘arrobas’. They don’t do anything. They are not even good for procreation.” Despite these, his most controversial opinions lie on how he believes Brazil should be run.  In a 1999 TV interview when asked about what changes he make if he was elected president, he responded with ideas such as “closing Congress” and bringing about change through a “civil war.” His consistent voice in politics allowed him to create a ground of support before announcing his candidacy.

Bolsonaro’s current policies are parallel to Trump’s policies in the United States. Bolsonaro’s most important policy (and most unique compared to other candidates) is ‘law and order.’ Being an ex-army captain, he believes in order to combat the rising violence is to decrease restrictions on gun laws and give police officers bonuses for the more criminals they kill. This policy platform has been the driving force behind Brazilian’s support for Bolsonaro.

Another policy reform he wishes to implement are environmental policies specifically within the Amazon. Bolsonaro has the desire to build a highway through the Amazon rainforest, which is vital for the filtration of carbon dioxide for the earth’s atmosphere.  With the intention as well to pull out of the Paris Climate agreement, this leads to the second parallel made between US and Brazil politics. Both candidates take on a moral position in the political reformation and use hot topics such as environmental regulations and law order as the basis for their campaigns. In times where many people craved change, Bolsonaro and Trump rose to the political sphere by being outspoken candidates making promises and statements the electorate wanted to hear from their political leaders who felt out by recent liberal administrations. Many Brazilians, especially the elite, have greatly supported this change of political figure in Brazil.

Bolsonaro represents hope for a Brazil that has been suffering numerous problems. At a rally for Bolsonaro supporters, individuals such as mother Cibley Lopes believe Bolsonaro is “the future of this country...He represents hope.” Brazil has undergone so much turmoil that some individuals are willing to support any candidate that is not of the Workers Party. Many individuals like Lopes are among the group of white elite who are rallying behind Bolsonaro for a new Brazil; these individuals are also of the belief that Bolsonaro is a leader for all people, marginalized or not. In some ways similar to Bolsonaro, the supporters of Trump are primarily either one of two groups of people: educated or uneducated white individuals. Both groups of citizens are unhappy with the political status quo and wish for a hero to emerge from the ashes of despair and turmoil. Since Bolsonaro has such similar policies with President Trump in the United States, the established relationship between Brazil and the United States will most likely only strengthen. While it may seem beneficial for both of these countries to engage in even more bilateral deals, it is important to recognize and address the response from the international community.

Before Bolsonaro was elected and The Working Party was primarily in office beforehand and  the United States and Brazil already had a strong and stable relationship. According to the United States’ State Department, Brazil is US’s second largest trading partner. Besides economic trade benefits such as these, the United States has invested in Brazil through educational, technological, and their space program which had yielded positive results. All of the investments the United States has made in Brazil simply proves that Brazil needs the United States more than the United States needs Brazil.

Bolsonaro’s election is yet another wake-up call for the international community with regards to the rise of right-wing politics. The parallels between Brazil and the United States shows the rising right-wing politics specifically in Latin America. If more countries such as Peru, Argentina, and Bolivia follow the path of Brazil it would not only affect the relationships of developed countries but will change the identity of Latin America politics.

We have seen this Movie Before! Perspectives on the South Sudanese Peace Process

South Sudan’s painful history tells us that this summer’s installment is a movie that we have seen before and one that ends badly. The June peace agreement between President Salva Kiir and his rival and former vice president, Riek Machar, is not sufficiently different from the previous one to have an alternate ending. That these two villains of the story failed to even shake hands at the signing ceremony is an ominous preview.

War is the history of South Sudan. War is what led to independence in 2011 after more than six decades of conflict with the government of what is now South Sudan’s northern neighbor, Sudan. The current conflict started just two years after the independence of South Sudan, while the population was only beginning to build the new nation after so many years of violence and deprivation. The new fighting displaced more than 2 million people beyond South Sudan’s borders and about half of the remaining population has needed food aid just to survive. Horrific abuses and violence against ordinary civilians is what most characterized this conflict which has pitted communities against one another along ethnic lines, thereby only deepening the wounds and grievances which now threaten to destroy the social fabric of the world’s youngest country.

The recent agreement has silenced the guns for now, but few differences exist between the most recent peace agreement and past agreements that quickly failed. It is described as a power-sharing accord but looks more like a distribution of spoils. President Kiir will remain in power and his supporters will obtain 20 of 35 ministerial posts, and 338 of the 550 seats in an enlarged parliament. Meanwhile Dr. Machar will again become the first Vice-President of the five Vice-Presidents, and his supporters will have nine ministerial posts, and 128 of the remaining parliamentary seats. The remaining posts and seats will be distributed to smaller groups that have also become embroiled in the conflict. The peace deal even fails to specify how collective decision-making is supposed to work.

This type of transitional government is too large (and costly) and does not address the critical structural issues such as the distribution of resources from the central government to the local governments, to meet the needs of people where they live. South Sudan has yet to determine the number of administrative units (states) that will constitute the country, or even what system of governance will work best.

The agreement, moreover, does not address the crimes against humanity and war crimes that were committed during the last five years by the government and the opposition fighters. The impunity that this peace agreement actually bestows on the warring parties is mind-boggling.

South Sudan as a Nation faces complete collapse if the warring parties don’t put their nation first before any political interest. The competing political interests of the groups who control South Sudan’s future unfortunately impedes South Sudan from realizing its full potential. South Sudan as nation has an amazing potential for success, with over 73 percent of its population under 25 years old. This constitutes one of the youngest population in the world, and this population is empowered with South Sudan’s enormous natural resources from oil, diamond, gold, and Zinc etc. The unique characteristics of South Sudan itself are also imperiled by the inability of political leaders to reach a lasting agreement. The nation has the White Nile cutting the country into East and West and the biggest swamp the Sudd in Africa and an amazing animal resources with one of the biggest wildlife migration in the world. It has one of the most fertile land states in the world for agriculture and food production, yet unfortunately 50 percent of the population is in need of food aid.

The reality on the ground is that South Sudanese politics is run by old men and military generals who operate exclusively by the power of the guns. Women and young people are not allowed the space to contribute in a society where they make up the overwhelming majority of the population. South Sudan needs an inclusive environment for all its people, it is a diverse country with over 65 ethnicities and over 200 language dialects. That is an environment where everyone should and needs to have the space to voice their options and their ideas because of its diversity. The oppression and the suppression of ideological diversity leads to the quagmire we are in now as a nation.

An environment that is not only open but also empowering to its women and youth could enable South Sudan to finally reach its full potential. An environment that is peaceful means the reconstruction of schools, hospitals, and the development of institutional infrastructure of the country can occur. Such institutional infrastructure could support a functioning government with with checks and balance in place on the National Legislature, Supreme Court and executive branch so they do not have a blank check to destroys the lives of ordinary South Sudanese without consequences.  

The Civil War in South Sudan caused the death of 400,000 people in a expand of a five-year period, it has a higher death rate per a year than Syria which is also in term oil, that tells all you everything you need to know about the brutality of the war in South Sudan. It has completely destroy the social fabric, political atmosphere, and the lives of countless millions of innocent South Sudanese which we can never put a prices on, it is something that is truly gone. This why this peace agreement must succeed not just because of the dead but because of the misery millions are suffering under the current status quo in the country. This must change and it need to change to save the country from totally collapse, you have an economy that is nonexistent and a population that sadly does not see a future in their own country.  

While the fighting has stopped, South Sudanese politicians must try to build a better deal. A new peace deal should create a Special Court to bring to justice those who have committed crimes against civilians and, simultaneously, a truth and reconciliation commission to begin the hard work of publicly addressing this recent horribly violent history in a manner that permits South Sudanese to live in peace together. This is critical because of the strong revenge culture that has evolved in South Sudan due to the absence of justice. Truth, forgiveness, and reconciliation is the only way to reverse the negative cultural attitudes that exist.  

The youth and women of South Sudan are the most marginalized populations in the country, yet they are not included in the peace process even though they are the most affected by the war. Their lives torn apart, and they often have no sense of hope because opportunities are hard to find. This is because competition among the political elites neither allows for space for the youth and women to have a say in their own affairs nor does it allow for investment in the development of opportunities for youth and women.  

In order for this for this peace process to succeed this time around, women and youth must be included so that it reflects the demographics of the population of the country. It's in the best interest of the political leaders to invest in women and youth so that this peace process is not seen as the divide up of the riches between the political elites but instead a process that will transforms the country from war into a peaceful society where ordinary citizens can go about their daily lives without disruptive violence. The future of the country hang in balance unless true changes are made in regard to the inclusion of youth and women in the political process. Women and youth can make or break this peace agreement if they do not see a way forward for their lives for the better.

The South Sudan conflict must be addressed at more than the surface level and this requires new mediators to work with South Sudanese on the systemic issues at the heart of the conflict in South Sudan – representation and the distribution of national resources. The IGAD (The Intergovernmental Authority on Development) is a regional organization of east African countries. IGAD member countries have immediate, deep and often conflicting interests in South Sudan including unrealistic expectations regarding economic gains. A better mediator would be the African Union with the support of the international community, especially those countries – like the United States – who helped South Sudan gain its independence in the first place.

The African Union should be able to see the longer-term imperative of a lasting peace in the broader interest of not only South Sudan and it’s east African neighbors but of the continent as a whole whose urgent agenda of economic development absolutely requires an end to all regional conflicts. Through the assistance of neighbors and the adequate inclusion of women and youth populations in a new political space established by a revised South Sudanese peace agreement, the nation could realize its immense potential for success in the future.

Fishers, Farmers, Craftspeople—Women: Gender in Post-Conflict Economic Reconstruction

“Api anaarakshithay” repeat the widows created by 30 years of protracted war in northern Sri Lanka. The phrase translates to ‘we lack security,’ and such security can result from expanding women’s post-conflict economic inclusion. In the post-conflict setting, populations face new challenges that are created not only by the persistence of violence, but also by limited access to resurging economies. For women, such challenges compound with changing demographics and the ensuing societal restructuring. Women enter into new roles in restructured economies, offering key opportunities to establish stable post-conflict livelihoods, yet obstacles to women’s economic access too often linger unaddressed. Without addressing such structural impediments to gender equity, any progress made towards gender parity remains acutely vulnerable to backsliding if conflict reignites. Conflicts in both Sri Lanka and the Kashmir Glacier originated in the 1980s, and women’s roles in the economies of both nations transformed throughout the nearly three decades of both conflicts’ duration. Each case demonstrates a disparate component of the challenges that women face during regions’ economic reconstruction. In Sri Lanka, discriminatory systemic structures and sexual violence create obstacles to women’s economic independence. In Jammu and Kashmir, reliance on craftsmen for training and middlemen to sell their products impede women’s success as craftspeople. Analyzing both distinct contexts provides insight into the new roles that women take on in post-conflict economies. Both case studies illustrate that the full economic empowerment of women requires resolving underlying power disparities in structures that predate conflicts. Given the duress that extended conflicts inflict on nations’ female populations, it is crucial to expand women’s economic access in order to insulate their self-sufficiency against the shock of further conflict. Women in the post conflict setting can neither be essentialized as ‘helpless victims’ nor can they be assumed to be ‘fine on their own.’ National governments and international humanitarian aid organizations must consider women’s changing roles in post-conflict economies in order to most effectively support the conflict-affected populations.

Sri Lanka

The civil war in Sri Lanka lasted from 1983 until 2009, with insurgent actors endeavoring to create an autonomous Tamil state in Sri Lanka’s north: the length of the war adds emphasis on national unity in the post-conflict setting. Despite this emphasis, such call for national unity cannot be allowed to serve as grounds to prevent the discussion of gender inequity and social change. Sri Lanka’s Sinhalese majority population and the Tamil and Muslim minority groups in the nation’s north all exhibit historical gender inequity, yet conflict between the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan government permanently altered the role women play in northern Sri Lanka’s economy.

The significant number of majority-male casualties in northern Sri Lanka acted as a catalyst for more women to transition into the role of primary income generators in order to support their households. The Sri Lankan government reports that the total number of war widows in the nation is greater than 80,000, with many husbands still missing but not yet confirmed dead. Scholars in The International Journal of Human Rights explain that “war widows, female heads of households, female ex-combatants, employed women and girls are especially at risk due to their often impoverished contexts, their lack of education as a result of the war and their lack of opportunities in post-war economic reconstruction and development plans.” These war widows assume traditionally male roles in the nation’s economy to support their families, now working in the fishing and agricultural sectors at higher rates than in the prewar economy. Indeed, as elucidated by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, “another shift of women’s traditional to strategic roles occurred when women moved out of the domestic sphere and took on male roles in the absence of male family members; women consequently acquired more self-confidence and greater mobility and decision making powers within the family.” Such a transition in economic roles contributed to a 44 percent increase in hours worked by women in the service sector following Sri Lanka’s civil war. Troublingly, women’s transition into new sectors of the economy corresponds with 60 percent of women experiencing sexual harassment in the workplace in Sri Lanka, according to one survey in Colombo. Furthermore, upwards of 90% of women attested that they experienced sexual harassment in public spaces. This misogyny carries over to the conduct of regional government officials, who abuse their positions of power to ask women for sexual favors in exchange for services. While sexual violence may not be a direct result of the war, the predominance of men in positions of power and women’s need for self sufficiency during economic reconstruction creates conditions that inimically threaten to perpetuate such sexual violence. The combined antagonistic impacts of sexual violence and discriminatory land inheritance laws demonstrate the need for policies that address structural impediments to women’s success as they enter new roles in the post-conflict economy becomes clear.

In order to account for Sri Lankan women’s greater labor force participation, social and institutional impediments to their success must be confronted. The economic success that Sri Lanka enjoyed following the conflict’s close should not be seen as an overt success story, because structural gender inequalities remain. Women in Sri Lanka earn less than half of what men do, on average. While pay disparities are not a new challenge, the need for adequate compensation for women serving as their families’ primary income generators in the post-conflict setting is critical because “women who play multiple roles within households and society (such as cooking and carers of children and elderly) endure an opportunity cost for working outside the home for a wage,” according to Sri Lankan scholar Muttukrishna Sarvananthan. Women face additional challenges when working in the agricultural sector, resulting from inequitable inheritance laws. In Sri Lanka’s northern Jaffna province, women can control property in name only under the traditional Thesawalamai laws. In order to invest, receive loans, or sell their property, women need the written consent of a spouse – a spouse who the conflict possibly robbed them of. Additionally, when litigating disputes surrounding such property in court, women are treated as minors. Further difficulties are created due to the lack of equal economic growth across different sectors, for while Sri Lanka’s economic growth soared following the end of the civil war, 70 percent of this growth is in non-tradable sectors such as infrastructure construction. This unequal growth negatively impacts the livelihoods of women working in the agriculture and fishing sectors. Moreover, a large part of such construction is due to the heightened militarization of Sri Lanka’s north, and the expansion of the military presence often involves the military appropriating land that might have otherwise been farmed. The deep correlation between the military presence and sexual violence creates further impediments to women’s post-conflict livelihoods.

During the civil war, the use of sexual violence by both sides was prevalent, and the legacy of such violence persists in the post-conflict economy. The LTTE forcefully abducted women and girls previously both to use as human shields and for forced marriage, in addition to conscripting women as suicide bombers and combatants. The Sri Lankan military also used rape as a tactic to intimidate and procure information from the civilian populations in the north. Today, the growth of the Sri Lankan security sector continues, while its tendency towards sexual violence remains unresolved. Reports indicate that soldiers and police officers in some camps for displaced persons demand sexual favors in exchange for food and housing. Even outside of these camps, the military plays a large role in local economies, and that role in the economy prevents women from reporting sexual violence for fear that they will lose access to governmental support. Close to military bases, women report higher instances of sexual violence, and may experience societal exclusion due to the stigma attached to contact with the military, even when such contact was forced. In order to empower women to successfully manage their transition to the new role of breadwinners for families in the post-conflict setting, the government and international organizations must work to combat sexual violence and to promote growth in the economic sectors that women are primarily employed in.

Jammu and Kashmir

Conflict over control of Jammu and Kashmir exhibits both deep roots and sundry participants due to entrenched disputes surrounding territorial control. While China and India fought briefly over a portion of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, the brunt of the conflict manifested between Pakistan and India over control of the state in 1989. In the years following, intermittently flares of violence turned the region into a flashpoint, and spurred the creation of irregular military forces such as the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). The persistence of conflict damaged the success of sectors that rely on tourism, such as the craft industry that many women are transitioning in order to generate income in the post-conflict economy.

The discord that conflict over control of Jammu and Kashmir caused in the local economy forced many women in the region to assume new roles. Akin to the situation of women in post-conflict Sri Lanka, the region now has more women than men, with numerous war widows and ‘half widows,’ whose husbands’ whereabouts remain unknown. Such demographic changes coincide with changes in traditional roles in the economy, with one researcher’s fieldwork indicating that “the conflict has caused a shift in the gender ratio in terms of employment. Women have joined the crafts work force to generate income to support their families.” After losing their husbands in conflict, many women must now assume the role of the primary breadwinner in order to support their families. Given the historical strength of the craft industry in Jammu and Kashmir, many women joined the profession following conflict-induced demographic changes. The craft industry was traditionally dominated by men, with craftsmen also primarily driving the development of new techniques in the industry. This lack of historical experience in the craft leads women to follow established techniques, creating an obstacle for women hoping to launch their own businesses. Women entering the craft industry are prone to joining pre-existing enterprises in order to learn techniques from craftsmen already in the industry, due to the lower barrier to entry required to enter the industry in such a capacity. As more women transition into the Kashmiri crafts industry, further structural impediments to their success become evident.

Chart created by Neelam Raina.

Barriers to women’s success in the post-conflict craft sector include reliance on middlemen, attitudes towards women in the workplace, and the lasting impact of the conflict on the economy. The decentralized nature of the population in Jammu and Kashmir creates difficulties for craftspeople looking to sell their wares, resulting in many craftspeople entirely relying on middlemen to sell the products they craft. These middlemen pay for craftspeople’s pieces in advance, which provides income for craftspeople in the short term, but prevents them from accumulating a catalog in the long term. Craftspeople’s lack of a catalog forces them to rely on the word of middlemen to attest to the quality of their work. Furthermore, reliance on middlemen to sell their goods robs craftspeople of control over their financial futures, placing the sustainability of their livelihood at the mercy of fluctuations in the demand for their products. Middlemen reap the majority of the profits from the work of craftspeople, for because they are removed from the market, craftspeople do not have a good measure of the true value of their work. This disparity in power is exemplified by the chart above. Beyond this, Kashmiri women must also overcome the stigmatization of their employment. Kashmiri women who work to support themselves often feel shame in doing so, and combined with the prevalent lack of education and skills training among women, this contributes to women’s frustration and psychological struggles. Craftswomen also experience stigmatization from other people, who use women’s employment as grounds to question their morality and piety. This attitude translates to limited access to important information about opportunities for economic funding and support, due to an exclusionary tendency amongst majority male regional bureaucrats. This exclusion further extends to union involvement, which results in the benefits of such union action sometimes failing to extend to women. The conflict in Jammu and Kashmir greatly diminished the tourist trade in Jammu, and thus, “notwithstanding the fact that Kashmiri arts and crafts have enjoyed worldwide fame and name, their production suffered to a large extent …” according to economists in the International NGO Journal. To successfully ensure women’s livelihoods in the post-conflict setting, they must be equitably integrated into local industries, and regional and international actors must take action to spur the growth of such industries.

Conclusion

Women’s entrance into new roles in post-conflict economies heralds an opportunity to permanently, economically empower nations’ female populations. To achieve this goal, national and international actors supporting post-conflict economic development must proactively account for obstacles to women’s economic access and focus their support on the sectors of the economy that women transition into. Economic growth does not always extend to women, given that the specific industries they join may not grow at the same rate as nation’s broader economies. Moreover, antiquated laws and social dynamics hinder women’s ability to act independently, even when serving as their families’ sole breadwinners. Sexual violence in the workplace and by government officials must be eradicated. Women must be recognized as equal participants in the industries they join. While gendered power disparities in legal systems and industry practices may predate conflicts, resolving them is crucial to enabling women to fully participate in the post-conflict economy. Finally, gender-responsive development support requires a sector-by-sector analysis of women’s new workforce participation in order to rectify existing inequalities so that future conflict cannot erode the achievement of women in post-conflict economies.

Citizens United v. Our Democracy

In 2016, Secretary Hillary Clinton, the Democratic presidential candidate, was thought to wield specific political advantages over her Republican opponent Donald Trump. Secretary Clinton had the experience, she was more knowledgeable than Mr. Trump was in regards to the issues being discussed, some said she was more articulate, and Secretary Clinton raised a lot more money. Typically, a candidate’s advantage in campaign fundraising was always an indicator that they had more support from more people, they had more exposure, and had more power to sway the undecided and independent voters.  In the 2016 election, we learned that this is not always the case. Super PACs do not have complete sway power over the voters, but they do greatly influence the politicians in office.

In this day and age, campaign donations do not directly go to the campaign and candidate themselves. Since Citizens United v. FEC in 2010, the floodgates opened and soft money barreled into our elections. Super PACs, through independent expenditures, send money towards media buys in hopes of advancing their candidate of choice or encouraging the public not to vote for another candidate. Since the Citizens United decision was held, we saw dramatic increases in independent expenditure spending and independent expenditure spending posited as a significant and unfair game changer in elections, but Super PACs are not having the affect many people thought they would have. We are now entering an era where independent expenditures by Super PACs only have a large impact over politicians and are not reflective of the people.

Secretary Clinton raised over $563 million dollars and independent expenditures spent over $231 million in support of her. Mr. Trump raised a little over $333 million, most of which ($66 million) was his own money, and he received $75.2 million from independent expenditures. The significant amount of money flowing into Secretary Clinton's campaign coffers led political experts to come to the conclusion that she would win. However, Donald Trump beat Secretary Clinton - even taking states that historically supported democratic presidential candidates.

Super PACs funnel an exorbitant amount of money into political campaigns in order to sponsor and advocate for and against specific candidates. While ads and media buys by independent expenditures may have some sway on the undecided and in swing states, Super PACs and their outreach in campaigns are not the ultimate decider in elections. President Trump and his campaign proves this. He won the election, yet independent expenditure spending for Secretary Clinton spent was $155,849,637 more than it was for President Trump. However, just because Super PACs aren’t the ultimate decider in elections doesn’t mean they do not have a great impact on our government. What we are seeing is Super PACs becoming the deciders in how the politician they are supporting will view particular issues.

When a politician receives most of their support from Super PACS, either directly or indirectly, they are going to be likely to view issues in the eyes of the Super PACs regardless of their constituents’ views. The issue of gun control exemplifies how Super PACs shape politicians' views on issues. According to a Gallup Poll taken in October 2017, 60% of people want stricter gun control laws. This poll also revealed that 96% of people asked support background checks - with 86% saying they support a universal system, 75% support a 30 day waiting period when purchasing a weapon, and 70% of people polled would support privately-owned guns to be registered with the police. With all this information and other information from other polling organizations that reflect similar  results, politicians would be jumping at the chance to put their name on a gun control bill or that the President would pass an executive order reflecting what the people want - but that is not what we are seeing.

Let’s look at everyone’s favorite lobbying group, the National Rifle Association. The NRA goes above and beyond, shelling out an exorbitant amount of money to defend the right to bear arms. The NRA's influence is felt not only through campaign contributions, but also through millions of dollars in off-the-books spending on issue ads. Lobbying expenditures for the National Rifle Association regularly exceed $1.5 million and increased from $3.2 million in 2016 to more than $5.1 million in 2017 and 2018. The organization's lobbyists frequently try to exert their influence over government agencies including members of Congress and they are consistently successful in doing so. In just 2018, the NRA lobbied for and against 283 bills concerning gun laws. Politicians, particularly Republicans in regards to this issue, are doing everything in their power to avoid the issue or appease public opinion by agreeing to small things because the money they receive through ad buys and media wants them to keep an anti-gun control stance.

The same can be said with Democrats as well, who receive a lot of support from Super PACs, like Priorities USA. In the 2016 election, Priorities USA acted as if they were Secretary Clinton’s actual campaigning team and they did more campaigning in states, like Pennsylvania, than Secretary Clinton did herself. Priorities USA actually broke fundraising records, raising over $175 million dollars in the 2016 election cycle. Priorities USA targeted swing states and battleground states, drafting specific pro-Clinton messages that would appeal to each state’s populations and needs. In a way this Super PAC did a better job than the Democratic Party did, yet it still didn’t work. States that Priorities USA targeted with big media buys didn’t swing in Clinton’s favor, contributing to her overall loss. A majority of people in states like Michigan, Florida, and Ohio - where a lot of those ads aired - voted for President Trump, clearly indicating that Super PACs’ ads did not do much to sway the voters. People in these states for the most part wanted to hear from the politician who was running for office. While voters wanted to hear from Secretary Clinton that she would meet their needs, it is possible that they didn’t respond well to hearing about it from an ad paid for by a Super PAC that wasn’t directly connected to Secretary Clinton herself.

The Center for Responsive Politics predicted that over $5.2 billion would be spent on the 2018 midterm elections, making it the most expensive midterm election ever by a wide margin. More than $4.7 billion was already spent by candidates, political parties and other groups such as PACs, super PACs and nonprofits a week before this year’s midterm elections. Prior to this election cycle, no midterm election had surpassed more than $4.2 billion in spending when adjusted for inflation. Sheila Krumholz, the executive director of the Center for Responsive Politics, postulates that “the significance of this election is clear. But whether it’s a blue wave or a red wave, one thing is certain: A wave of money is surging toward Election Day, much of it coming from the wealthiest donors targeting this year’s most competitive races.” Now that the midterms are over, the Center for Responsive Politics estimated that at least $5.1 billion was spent on this year’s midterm.

Established politicians align their views to those of Super PACs in order to receive their money and get away with it because they carry the incumbency advantage over opponents who barely have any visibility due to a lack of support from financially powerful Super PACs. It is too soon to see what kind of long term effect the 2016 election will have on the way politics is run in the country and how elections will function in the months and years to come. One thing, however, is clear. Super PACs do not have the sway many people believe they do. They are not representative of the population. Candidates’ ability to receive the benefit of ‘free media’ worth millions of dollars from independent expenditures does not mean they have the public support necessary to win an election. Voters have the power to control the election and it is politicians who have become hypnotized by Super PACs and what they believe those PACs can give them.

Fixing an International Dilemma in an Unstable Region: U.S. Mitigation of the Turkish-Kurdish Conflict

The Dilemma

The long-standing relationship between the United States and Turkey continues to deteriorate due to the intensifying armed conflict between the Turkish military and Kurdish insurgent groups in Syria, Iraq and Iran who desire an independent Kurdistan that would give them greater political and cultural rights.

To combat the Islamic State (IS), the United States supports the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union (PYD) and relies on the PYD’s military wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG). Yet the main reason for the ongoing U.S.-Turkey military conflict lies in US support of the PYD. Because Turkey is battling the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), a listed terrorist group that President Erdoğan believes is an offset of the PYD, Turkey sees American support for these Kurdish organizations as undermining their interests and regional power.

It is imperative that the United States act immediately to de-escalate the tensions between Turkey and various Kurdish insurgent groups while continuing the fight against the Islamic State, who, despite recently losing territory and influence in the region, continues to pose a threat to nearby countries and the US. The United States in particular is one of the leading actors in this issue, and must continue to be a primary fighting force, because national interests are at stake. As long-term NATO allies, the US and Turkey not only share an allyship, but Turkey is in a key geopolitical position, serving as a central point between Asia, Europe, and Africa. By mending their relationship with Turkey, the US will continue to be able to rely on Turkey as the only Muslim NATO member to serve as a bridge between the Western and Muslim worlds, which can help stabilize the volatile Middle East. Furthermore, Turkey similarly relies on the United States and its Western forces to battle the IS, a group that continues to engage in violent terrorist attacks within the country.

Failure to immediately rectify the situation may result in the degradation of the US-Turkey alliance and the growth of the Islamic State. Should the US side with the Kurds, they run the risk of Turkey strengthening their political and economic relationship with Russia, and it could push Turkey to further retaliate against the YPG and ultimately the US. Yet, the United States relies heavily on Kurdish insurgency groups, such as the PYD, as the main fighting forces against the IS on the ground, especially in aiding local Arab militias in Syria. Therefore, if the United States sides with Turkey, they may lose critical Kurdish trust and military support in the fight against the IS due to the tension between the Turks and the Kurds. Nevertheless, fixing the rising tensions is possible and can be done three ways: by revising the current Turkish Constitution, continuing to supply Kurdish fighters with American weapons, and utilizing the US-Turkey relationship as NATO allies to begin talks of a ceasefire.

First Recommendation: Modify the Turkish Constitution

The United States should encourage Turkey to make changes to its 1982 Constitution to grant basic rights back to the ethnic minority groups that reside in Turkey. Successfully updating the constitution should be a priority in solving the Turkish-Kurdish dispute. The conflict’s origins and subsequent intensification stems from the lack of rights attributed to the Kurds in the country’s constitution. The Turkish government historically oppressed Kurdish cultural identity and language through impediments in the process of assimilating them into society. After declaring itself a republic in 1923, Turkey’s capital of Ankara adopted an ideology with the goal of eliminating non-Turkish elements within Turkey, all of which were primarily Kurdish. The country’s efforts to “Turkify” individuals by relying on Turkish ethnicity to define citizenship resulted in the mass persecution of the Kurdish population, which is one of the driving forces behind the desire for an independent Kurdistan today.

As of now, the Turkish Constitution is authoritarian and alienating to those who aren’t of Turkish ethnicity, but unfortunately the discussion and possibility of revising the constitution has decreased. The lack of an inclusive constitution with rights and protections that extend to minority groups has been a factor in causing social unrest among the Kurdish population and furthering the mission of the PKK. This, again, contributed greatly to the Kurds’ desire to create an independent Kurdistan that would allow them to have greater political and cultural autonomy. Therefore, the Turkish Constitution should be revised immediately. Significant changes would make it more democratic and establish that all differences, such as ethnicity or language, are protected under the constitution. With this, the improvement in the view and treatment of the Kurds may lay the foundation for peace talks in the future.

Second Recommendation: Return to Supplying Arms

The United States should return to supplying weapons to Kurdish fighters in Syria who are combating the Islamic State. As of late 2017, President Trump announced that the US will no longer provide arms to the Kurds. However, the supply of weapons by the US is vital in creating a strongly armed group of Kurdish fighters that can successfully defend themselves as they counteract the IS. For example, in May 2017 President Trump approved a plan to arm the Kurds, and therefore the YPG, directly to prepare for their assault and capture of Raqqa, which was the IS’ de facto capital of the caliphate. Subsequently, after arming them with machine guns and other warfare weapons, the American-backed YPG successfully seized Raqqa in October of 2017 in what was a major blow to the legitimacy and control of the IS.

However, a drawback of this recommendation is that it could cause even more tension between the US and Turkey. Due to US support of the YPG, a group Turkey believes to be an extension of the PKK, Turkey’s President Erdoğan could see the supply of arms to the YPG as a threat to the country because those weapons could end up in the hands of the PKK. Yet, a benefit of this recommendation is that it aligns with America’s desire to decrease the number of troops deployed in Syria. By providing the Kurds with more weapons, the US can rely more on local forces and slowly begin to withdraw American troops from the conflict zone.

Third Recommendation: Negotiate a Ceasefire

Lastly, the United States should take advantage of its relationship with Turkey as NATO allies to lead a political peace process that negotiates a ceasefire between Turkish military forces and the Kurdish YPG in Syria. The YPG are instrumental in fighting the IS on the ground, yet they are suffering immense losses due to air and land attacks by Turkey’s military force.

However, a downside of this recommendation lies in the fact that Turkey views the YPG’s presence in Syria as a security threat to the country. Turkey’s President Erdoğan also considers the US’s support of the YPG militia to be a betrayal as he sees the YPG as an offset of the terrorist group PKK. Furthermore, the ceasefire would only provide a temporary solution to the complicated conflict so that the two sides could focus on defeating the IS.

An upside of this recommendation is that previous ceasefires between the Turkish government and the PKK succeeded for many years before they were eventually broken. While a ceasefire may be temporary, it would help centralize the fight around the IS and provide the foundation for more comprehensive peace talks and a long-term ceasefire in the future between the two groups.

Looking to the Future

The Turkish-Kurdish conflict began the moment Turkey failed to make a provision for a Kurdish state, thereby leaving the Kurds, a population of around 15 million in the country, with a minority status and a lack of both representation and rights. The tension between the two sides has been ongoing ever since, and as an ally to the United States politically and militarily, as they are instrumental in fighting the Islamic State, the US is heavily interested and involved in the conflict as well. As a result, all three recommendations for ways in which the United States can mitigate the Turkish-Kurdish conflict are presented with the following goals in mind: first, by successfully mitigating the conflict between the two groups, the US can begin to minimize the threat that the IS poses to them, as combating the IS would be easier when the two sides are working together with the same goal in mind; second, the US can start to decrease the volatility of the Middle East, as there will be one less pair of warring groups, and consequently states, to add to the mix.

The conflict continues in 2018, thirty-four years after the insurgency began, with little change. Since President Trump took office and called for a halt on the provision of arms to the Kurds, the Islamic State has lost territory, but still remains a threat, and tensions between the Turks and the Kurds remain high. Not much progress has been made between the two groups to de-escalate the situation, and the United States has failed to enact any significant changes. Unless these recommendations are made, the future for these two warring groups and the prospect of an independent Kurdistan looks to be the same as it currently is now: bleak.

World Heritage in the Medina in Fez, Morocco: Blessing or Curse?

The Medina in Fez, Morocco is a labyrinth of alleyways that intersect Moroccan culture, religion, and economy. It is a place like no other in the world, and indeed being inside the Medina walls is to be in an entirely different realm. To visitors, who are often left astounded at its sheer mass and intricacies, it may come as no surprise that the Medina is under UNESCO protection as a World Heritage site; it is truly unique. However, while the title of being a World Heritage site sounds beneficial, the Medina and its inhabitants may be suffering for it. Indeed, while some cultural buildings within the Medina have benefitted from rehabilitation, its inhabitants are suffering from a fresh wave of colonial prejudice. The original plans for the Medina’s rehabilitation relied heavily on French colonial literature about the Medina. Today, colonialism is coming back to life using UNESCO and other contributors’ money. Manifestations of these harmful policies include forcibly removing Medina inhabitants, moving traditional craft activities to outside the Medina walls, and proposing mandatory standards of hygiene. These policies inordinately affect the current Medina residents, primarily rural migrants from Morocco’s countryside seeking low-income housing. Thus, while the Ministry of Culture, which lays claim to the Medina, may enjoy UNESCO support and protection in its  rehabilitation efforts, it is doing little for the Medina’s inhabitants. This paper will investigate the initial need for UNESCO protection, the proposal submitted, and how the program has affected the Medina to measure the consequences and benefits of the program.

History of the Medina

The Medina has historically been a cultural institution of the Fessi people, and a neighborhood bursting at the seams with craftspeople, religious centers, and buildings that seem to defy earth’s gravitational pull. Yet, the Medina is not considered to be a desirable residence, and just outside the Medina walls, lay cleaner and wealthier neighborhoods, which once belonged to the French protectorate. Following the French withdrawal from Morocco in 1956, there was a mass exodus of wealthier Fessi to Ville Nouvelle (the French quarter). The Fessi who moved did so to improve their quality of life, and their economic status as the French quarter was much closer to economic opportunities not accessible from the Medina. In the spaces that the wealthy Fessi left in the Medina, rural migrants from the countryside soon entered. Many large medina homes were divided into apartments and the population of the Medina began to spike. From 1957-1982 the average yearly increase of residents was 8,000. As the numbers rose, so did the social tensions: the Fessi people had long prided themselves on their ‘city’ lifestyles and crafts, and consequently looked down on Moroccans from the countryside. A narrative of crisis in regards to artisanal crafts appeared in the 20th century, whereas it does not appear in pro-colonial texts which praised the Fessi crafts and craftspeople.  Much of this discourse is a thinly veiled commentary on the new social actors in the Medina and mimics discourse of the French, who delegated the Fessi as superior to all other Moroccans.  Therefore, discourse of pride for Medina crafts disappeared and, in its place, narratives of a crisis and anti- rural Moroccan emerged. The shift in discourse corresponds with the French departure from Morocco, a power vacuum that  allowed the Fessi to take control of the hierarchical narrative and used it to their advantage. However, the narrative of crisis that was employed to continue the set hierarchy became the public narrative and prompted outside intervention.  

Proposal

In the 1970s the Moroccan Department of Urbanism proposed building an access road through the middle of the Medina. This road would have fundamentally changed the structure of the Medina and a proposal to protect the Medina was quickly constructed. In 1976 Medina actors petitioned UNESCO to include the Medina as a World Heritage site. This plan included the “continuation and blossoming of the ensemble of the social, economic, cultural, and religious life that made the particular genius of the Medina”. Thus, the plan included rehabilitation, economic aid, and the continuation of a way of life provided by the Medina’s ecosystem. In this vain, the Medina’s residents were explicitly included in the proposal. Indeed, one such project called for action by the residents in facilitating its success. The “Fez Medina Rehabilitation Project” funded by the World Bank, aimed at restoring heritage and improving the quality of life in the Medina, through participation and collaboration with locals. Yet, while the projects and proposals asked for local participation and directly affected the population, many projects seemed to undercut their way of life. The UNESCO and the United Nations Development Program jointly created a ‘master plan’ for Morocco. This plan recommended a decrease in the Medina’s population through building new housing outside the Medina walls and moving residents. In addition, this plan supported removing merchandised crafts from the Medina and introducing standards of hygiene. At face value, these recommendations may not seem of mal intent, yet, behind the eloquence of the plan a lay proposal for a forced mass exodus, the removal of the essential economy of crafts from the Medina, and the forced imposing hygiene codes. These programs were approved because the background information provided to aid organizations portrayed the Medina in a colonialist manner and relied solely on French writing about the Medina. Such writing reflected the aforementioned narrative of crisis, helping to prompt intervention. The source texts also reflected the unfavorable attitude of the Fessi people towards rural Morrocans (an extension of colonial implemented higherarchies). The consideration and later implementation of these texts in UNESCO action in the Media thus created a resurgence of colonial policies based on discriminatory racism.

Direct colonial policy is evident in the Atlas of the Medina in Fez (1990). The Atlas was created at the request of UNESCO, by academics at the University of Fez. The Atlas described the population density changes in the Medina as well as what the authors called ‘ruralization’ or “the impregnation of the city with semi-rural modes of life marked by deplorable hygiene and lack of urban traditions”. Furthermore, this ‘ruralization’ was described as directly causing the decline of traditional social relations in the Medina. This information, provided to UNESCO and other programs, scapegoated the rural migrants for deteriorating Medina conditions and the resulting programs acted as punishments. In this manner, 50,000 inhabitants were relocated outside of the Medina, and more found new restrictions on their crafts and lifestyles. Thus, through the façade of aid and preservation, colonial era hierarchies have been revitalized and are directly impacting the Medina and its residents today.

Conclusion

UNESCO World Heritage sites have the purpose of aiding places under its protection through the rehabilitation of cultural sites and through economic benefits. However, in the case of the Medina in Fez, intervention has caused more harm than good. Medina residents are being placed, once again, under colonial age policies as various programs and plans orchestrated to help, actually support a harmful social hierarchy first established under French rule. For effective and truly beneficial change to occur in the Medina it will be necessary for air organizations and UNESCO itself to base aid on recommendations by Medina inhabitants. Until such collaboration is met, however, the title of World Heritage will bring severe consequences to Fez.

Nationalism in Asian Education

Origins and Impact

Franklin D Roosevelt stated that “we cannot always build the future for our youth, but we can build our youth for the future.” The use of nationalism in education is prevalent in many countries spanning from the United States to India. Often, state-sponsored and regulated education is synonymous with selective education, including and rejecting certain narratives and stories over others, bolstering the good and glimsming over the bad. Thus, through education policy, governments control the effective indoctrination of mass populations into a constructed idea of society. The use of selective education and taught nationalism creates biases that prohibits clear and effective diplomacy.

Combining the control of information and ideas with impressionable youth can result in a continuation of taught ideals and politics and ultimately control of a population. When taught values and stereotypes are passed down from generation to generation, prejudice and discrimination exist.

Every human has a set of values and habits that are based in language, religion, philosophies, and communal cultures. Taught nationalism is both good and bad; it is inherently a part of a culture identity. Nationalism creates an alterity that often results to discrimination, bigotry and at worst genocide for those who don’t fit into the nationalistic idea.

This concept is not only positively used in everyday cultural communication that creates identities, but also used negatively to manipulate people. Taught nationalism diffuses throughout the world, regardless of region, language and religion. This article explicates the causes, forms, and impact of taught nationalism in Asia, specifically in China and India, where textbooks are rewritten to curate students’ ideas of their national identity.

Asian Nationalism in Education - looking at China and India

Education is often a tool through which state sponsored nationalist ideas are instilled. With an increase of foreign influence from Western nations such as the United States, countries turn towards more conservative approaches as nationalism is on the rise globally.

China

Scholar Suisheng Zhao of University of Denver argues that the origin of Chinese nationalism came into existence during the Opium War in the 1840s that ultimately opened China to Western imperialism. Nationalism takes on many forms in China from Han ethnic based nationalism to ideological liberal nationalism, or “the nation as a group of citizens who have a duty both to support the rights of the state and to pursue individual freedom.” While China opened its doors to the West, a 3rd form, pragmatic nationalism gained popularity allowing legitimacy and political control of the Communist party. The pragmatic nationalism allowed for the adoption of democratic ideals and loosening of communist ideology as long as it aided the continued growth and stability within China. From this movement came about the Patriotic Education campaign.  

The Patriotic Education campaign began in 1991, and shortly after the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy movement.  The campaign targeted young school-aged children to teach about past greatness and the “humiliating experience in the face of Western and Japanese incursion” and how the Communist led revolution created China into the power it is today. A primary mode was through the use of changing the narrative of collective Chinese history with a version in favor of the communist one party rule. The textbooks were replaced and “the old class struggle narrative” was replaced with a “ Maoist ‘victor narrative’ (China won national independence) was also superseded by a new ‘victimization narrative; which blames the ‘West’ for China’s suffering”. The teaching of this narrative by Chinese textbooks instills a sense of shame and effectively associates China’s problems to the West imperialism and forces. This goes as far as questions of national humiliation have become topics in the nationwide examination for attending universities.

India

The rise in nationalism originated with the decolonization movements at the end of the 1940s and 1950s. While the idea of a national identity, especially in the case of India and Pakistan was formed before the founding of the nation-states, it wasn’t until after full independence from the British Empire that nationalism was able to fully manifest.

The decolonization of British India and the creation of India and Pakistan left complex feelings, with celebrations of independence tinged with regret surrounding the violence brought about by partition - essentially, a divided freedom. The independence movement of 1947 created different narratives in the history of partition in Pakistani and Indian textbooks. Many Indian textbooks often portray the Muslim League as focusing solely on Muslims’ interests and the National Congress party as “Guardians of all Indians, regardless of religious affiliation”. Many Indian textbooks focus and revere the work of Gandhi. Where as comparsionly the same events in 1947 are taught in Pakistani textbooks as freedom and created a nation-state focused on social justice and Islamic Ideology, and more critically, the justification for the creation of Pakistan and the Two-Nation Theory. In the past few year in India as the BJP party has come into power and the rise of Hindu Nationalism within India, has resulted in the rewriting of history textbooks to portray Muslim Mughals as military brutes and Hindu rulers as victorious. Standard social science textbook for class 8 fail to mention Prime Minister Neru and the events of Gandhi’s assassination, which is particularly significant because the assassin, Nathuram Godse, was a member of the RSS which was the precursor to the BJP, the current political party in power.

What Taught Nationalism means in IR

Nationalism itself is a purely constructivist political theory in that it is centered on collective ideas and communal identities. Nationalistic portrayals of collective identity can instill a chosen trauma, or “the horrors of the past that cast shadows onto the future” and a chosen glory “myths about a glorious future, often seen as a seen as a reenactment of a glorious past” in an attempt to strengthen a group identity. This directly impacts international relations when countries, such as in the case of China, blame “Western” powers for economic, political and social challenges.

How the collective Chinese population views Western powers creates challenges during diplomatic exchanges. If nationalistic educational narratives instill distrust in Chinese leaders and Western leaders, actors will either work to deconstruct biases held against them or they will internalize those biases if their experiences validate them. As relations between the United States and China are currently marred by economic tension in a trade war, knowing of the biases of collective histories in the United States with anti-communism movements and the Tiananmen Square anti-democracy movements could aid in more diplomatic solutions. When nationalism is effective, chosen trauma and chosen glory impacts generations and cannot easily be corrected or significantly altered.

In the case of India, the distancing of Indian history from Mughal history is another example of how education can increase tensions between Hindus and Muslims. As political parties focus on Hindu identity, often hate-crimes become overlooked and a narrative of religious-political battle becomes prevalent in the media. As India becomes more Hindu-centric, it disengages from the realities facing the nation and surrounding states. India, known for taking in Tibetans, Sri Lankan Tamils and other persecuted people purportedly turned away Rohingya Muslim refugees from Myanmar in the name of national security, while in reality the religious difference plays an important role in the decision.

Conclusion

Young Adults are powerful political entities that are often forgotten, however even without the right to vote, their voices are undeniable. Youth are often easily impressionable as well. Education systems instill their young students with values, ideals and cultural understandings. While schools instill positive qualities for youth, they can just as easily instill  discrimination and hatred. China and India are not alone in the attempts to erase or hide specific aspects of their national histories. In understanding history, it is always important to be aware of what stories are being told and which ones are not. The education in the United States often glosses over many of the complexities of American History such as Native American massacres, freedom struggles for African Americans, modern-day race relations and institutional racism. When considering the impact of national education curriculums, it is important to ask what is missing and, more importantly, why?

Advocacy in American Politics: Examining the Quality and Effectiveness of Lobbying in the Trump Era

The quality of the United States’ advocacy and lobbying practices, as well as the effectiveness of the profession’s role in policymaking, have become a recent subject of debate. The transition to the Trump administration has particularly served to amplify an ongoing criticism of the lobbying profession, particularly in regard to the influence of special interests and the economic elite. The quality of practice towards the end of a pluralist representative democracy and the profession’s ability to adapt was, and continues to be, scrutinized by the media, political pundits, and lawmakers alike. Ultimately, the quality of advocacy and lobbying practices within the United States is lacking, despite its effectiveness in adapting strategy and tactics to fit the unique political situation, particularly in response the growing distinction of partisan interests as well as congressional gridlock.

In measuring the quality of advocacy practices within the Trump administration, the standard that the Framers, particularly James Madison, envisioned for competing factions must be recognized. An “extended” republic, or a pluralist model of democracy, was proposed by Madison as the best defense against partisan factions, special interests, and a potential “overbearing majority.” This pluralist model ideally limits the influence of a singular dominate interest – the “tyranny of the majority:” a potential ill-effect of democracy addressed by Madison in Federalist No. 10 and later by Alexis de Tocqueville in his observation of American democracy. Ultimately, the standard of quality that contemporary advocacy practices should reflect is that of  Madison’s “extended” republic, with special interests remaining numerous and equally competitive within the policymaking process.  

The quality of contemporary advocacy practices, however, does not meet this standard of a well-functioning pluralist representative democracy. This concept is widely explored within political and sociological academia; one recent study conducted by Dr. Martin Gilens and Dr. Benjamin Page creates individual and comprehensive statistical models for four distinct theoretical perspectives of democracy. Gilens and Page measure the relationship between the policy preferences of average citizens, economic elites, and special interests and respective policy outcomes. The results suggest that organized interest groups maintain significant influence over the majority’s preference in the policymaking process, especially with the assistance of PAC contributions, lobbying expenditures, and membership. Moreover, this study reaffirms Madison’s argument that a domineering majority can be restrained as various interests in the United States compete for political influence. Yet, sociopolitical variables like money and organizational agency impede and conceivably discourage the open competition of interests. In short, today’s advocacy process fulfills the intent of a pluralist model of democracy, but the process is facilitated through an inequity of resources.

The inequity of monetary resources and organizational agency has led to an increased likelihood of ethical misconduct with contemporary advocacy practices. Indeed, these variables can influence how advocacy strategies engage in the policy-making process and influence their adherence to ethical standards. Attempts have been made, specifically by the American Bar Association, to limit the influence of financial contributions, “shadow” lobbying, and to emphasize organizational accountability by reforming the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA), which made significant strides in establishing transparent and ethical advocacy practices. The recommended reforms that target these key issues include the requirement for LDA registrants to specify specific public offices that are being targeted, as well as reporting all activities of the advocacy and partner entities. Yet, these reforms have faced setbacks, especially following the landmark ruling of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission in 2010 which lifted restrictions on campaign and advocacy donations. Nonetheless, the advocacy profession ideally fulfills the intent of a pluralist model of democracy with a competitive and level playing field for special interests.  

The role of special interests and their influence in the policymaking process has contributed to the negative disposition that the public has of lobbying practices, prompting notable responses from the Obama and Trump administrations. With the media’s reinforcement of a negative special interest narrative, both President Obama and President Trump crafted unique responses pertaining to ethics in order to reflect the public’s negative opinion on lobbying and corruption. For instance, both administrations established direct ethical standards by way of executive order, targeting gift bans and the “revolving door.” Even more pertinent is the Trump administration’s unorthodox structure, which creates indirect challenges for advocacy practices. Specifically, the Trump administration’s lack of intervention points/points of contacts, as well as the President’s frequent use of social media, mainly Twitter, as a platform to disrupt, veil, and shape his intentions, creates a dynamic and unpredictable environment to maneuver for advocacy practices.

Though the methods and strategies vary by organization, there are three distinct tactics that have proven effective within the Trump administration: (1) anticipating unpredicted outcomes, (2) isolating and targeting key players, especially through social media, and (3) emphasizing the player over the policy. Each of these tactics effectively counters some aspect of the Trump administration’s direct and indirect approach to impede the role of special interests and advocacy practices. Ultimately, the ability for advocacy practices to maneuver this political climate is noteworthy and illustrates the adaptability and effectiveness of the industry.

The intense partisan gridlock and the unpredictability of Trump’s style of governance has prompted organizations to anchor their advocacy strategies with administrative networks and the rulemaking process. Though Trump’s victory was not predicted within most academic circles, engaging with the Trump campaign and transition teams proved to be advantageous compared to strategies that relied on their established connections in presuming Secretary Clinton’s Beltway-insider victory. Moreover, the executive institution has grown in administrative authority and is uniquely comprised of appointed and hired officials with backgrounds in advocacy and special interests, such as the appointments of former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos. With the anticipated momentum of a unified government falling short on several legislative failures, strategies sought key administrative intervention points, despite facing difficulties with empty roles and a lack of appointments. Demonstrating network connections within the Trump administration displays to potential clients that an advocacy organization maintains control within an unpredictable administration. As such, strategies have been reallocating efforts towards the rulemaking process in an increasingly partisan and gridlocked environment.

Isolating and targeting key players through social media, especially Twitter, has become an increasingly utile strategy within advocacy. Though it is unclear whether President Trump’s Twitter habits are impulsive or calculated, the acute fixation on Trump’s tweets and other social media platforms provides publicity and the potential for earned media to promote targeted messages. For example, a coalition effort known as “Boot Pruitt,” which targeted EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt, promoted a targeted Twitter-ad campaign to reach key public officials in areas that EPA and Trump administration heads frequent, like the White House, the EPA, and Trump’s private club Mar-a-Lago. In subscribing to the media effects model, in that the media takes on an agenda-setting role in the policymaking process, Trump’s usurpation of the conversation has now become a manipulation of the policy-making agenda. In adapting to President Trump’s governing strategy, advocacy groups can easily test, deploy, and reassess their messages, tracking them through polling, focus groups, or statistical data gathering software, to refined and better implement their issue campaigns. With the media’s, political pundit’s, and the public’s attention focused on social media, advocacy strategies have increasingly become centered on social media issue campaigns.

The most noticeable adaptation that advocacy practices have made in response to the Trump administration is how issue-oriented campaigns now focus on the key players as opposed to the policy. Rather than emphasizing an issue and anticipating the opposition’s arguments, targeted messaging now pinpoints key players within the policymaking and/or rulemaking processes, as opposed to specific policies. As it turns out, the Trump administration has a high tolerance for unpopular public officials and contentious issues, notably with Secretary of Education DeVos and EPA Administrator Pruitt. Rather than argue over policy provisions, advocacy organizations and coalitions, like “Boot Pruitt,” have targeted messages surrounding the player’s background, qualifications, and overall character, which can be measured through focus groups, benchmarks, and brushfire surveys. While these messages can vary, a successful campaign can dehumanize key players and render their policies unpopular and without support.

The state of advocacy and lobbying practices in the United States consists of several, yet surmountable, issues. In an ideal pluralist model of democracy, public competition between interests over policy preferences is undoubtedly encouraged. Advocacy strategies and tactics of the profession are rather effective in adapting to President Trump’s unorthodox administration. The ability for lobbying organizations to skirt professional norms and ethical codes, however, detracts from the demonstrated effectiveness of advocacy practices. It reaffirms the negative perception lobbying and strikes at the quality of the practices. In adapting strategies of network engagement, message targeting, and discrediting attacks, it is necessary to increase transparency and oversight of the industry in order to encourage an open competition of interests.

Bolsonaro and the Far Right’s Arrival in South America

Introduction

In modern day studies of geopolitics and international relations, South America unfortunately lingers on the global backburner in comparison to regions such as Eurasia and the Middle East/North Africa (MENA). After centuries of colonialism and imperialist control by Western nations, many perceive South America as an underdeveloped continent with little political power.  This belief stems from racist rhetoric and inaccurate assumptions. While many countries within South America are not considered “developed” in the eyes of the Western world, this is due to years of political and economic destabilization by the west. Perhaps this very history of Western meddling provided the right conditions for a growing far-right movement, which has steadily been gaining traction in several South American countries. At the end of October 2018, Brazil, South America’s most populous country, elected the far-right candidate Jair Bolsonaro as president. Believers in democracy and human rights defenders alike were shocked and dismayed in his election, and fear for the changes that Bolsonaro will inevitably bring to the continent, and their lasting implications on relationships with other countries and the geopolitical balance.

Political History and Legacy of Brazil

Brazil, unlike the majority of South America, was claimed as a Portuguese colony from 1500 until its independence in 1822. One of Brazil’s most distinguishing sociopolitical features is its long established  history with slavery. Beginning in the sixteenth century, Brazil was noteworthy for having brought over more African slaves than would ever reach North America; in total, Brazil imported half of all the slaves that crossed the Atlantic Ocean. Brazil was the last Western country to abolish slavery, in 1888, more than two decades after the United States did. The social repercussions of the slave trade meant that Brazil became a heavily ethnically mixed nation, with significant intermingling of African, indigenous, and Portuguese populations. While it may expected that a sizable mixed race population would foster societal equality and tolerance, to this day Brazil remains a deeply unequal society, especially in regards to the intersections of race and socioeconomic status. The roots of Brazil’s unequal society largely stem from a failure to restructure society post-slavery. Freed slaves were left without land, money, or education, and centuries later millions of their descendants continue living with these same circumstances. In the modern day, Afro-Brazilians make up two thirds of the 60,000 annual victims of crime and two thirds of the prison population. After the eradication of slavery, Afro-Brazilians often still worked in modern forms of slavery, which was not outlawed until 1995. Contemporaneously, most instances of modern slavery and forced labor occur in rural areas, often in industries tied to environmental destruction, such as the logging industry. In 2016, the Global Slavery Index estimated that there were over 300,000 people in conditions of modern slavery on any given day.

In addition to the brutal and bloody legacy of Brazil’s slave trade, corruption also plays a large role in Brazil’s political history from colony to present day. Like many other South American countries in the 20th century, a military dictatorship ruled Brazil from 1930 to 1945. After less than two decades of democracy following 1945, the military once again intervened in 1964, overthrowing the leftist Goulart administration, and established Castelo Branco as the newest dictator.  Following Branco’s regime, military governments ruled Brazil until 1985, and the country had its first democratic presidential elections in 1989. In the 21st century, Brazil’s many presidential administrations were marred by corruption and scandal, and a growing distrust in the Worker’s Party which had been in power for several decades. Both “Lula” da Silva and Dilma Vana Rousseff were criticized for reckless spending and corruption during their respective administrations. However, under these Workers’ Party-backed administrations, the government made combating and assuaging hunger and poverty one of their top priorities. On a social level, Brazil’s rural vs urban struggles also take on another dimension when considering the debate regarding the use of natural resources and sustainability. In present day, there exists little to no data on peoples living in the Amazon rainforest and little regard for their residency in the region.

Brazil’s society, like many around the world, found itself at a crossroads during its most recent election, with its people divided between leftist and right-wing movements. The left wing of Brazil’s politics has become fragile, weakened by widespread corruption, while the right came out as the party of reason, calling for the restoration of order at any cost. With Bolsonaro’s recent election, Brazil is waiting to see just how high the cost of order will be.

Bolsonaro’s Rise and Popularity

After suffering the frustration and betrayal of several leftist governments ending with corruption charges, a 2016 poll found that Brazilian society as a whole had become more conservative, with 54% of the respondents shifting their social and justice beliefs to the right. As a whole, this has been accompanied by a growing movement of conservative Christianity, both in the public sphere and in the national legislature. Later during the same election cycle, public-opinion polls demonstrated that one in three Brazilians would look favorably upon a military intervention to oust the leftist government. It is important to know these facts in order to properly contextualize the environment in which Bolsonaro’s administration was born.

Jair Bolsonaro is a figure that is mostly known to the Western world as a “tropical Trump.” In actuality, Bolsonaro’s political history and infamously controversial statements may prove him to be a much larger threat to democracy in the Southern cone. Bolsonaro rose in the public consciousness by serving as a seven-term congressman after his military career. During his congressional tenure, Bolsonaro became known as a hardlined believer in law and order, and for some of his more inflammatory statements. Beginning with Brazil’s military and dictatorial history, Bolsonaro gained attention for saying in 1999 that he believed the dictatorship should have killed 30,000 more people. Additionally, Bolsonaro became known for several misogynistic, homophobic, and racist statements, over the course of several years. Since the beginnings of his political career, Bolsonaro has established himself as an extreme member of the conservative party, with many cautioning his neo-fascist ideas.

Once Bolsonaro publically entered the presidential race, he advertised himself as the candidate who would defend democracy and uphold the constitution. To help him achieve these goals, Bolsonaro promised his policies would focus on relaxing gun laws, reducing state involvement in the economy, and leaving the 2015 Paris Agreement. Bolsonaro entered the race as the candidate of the Social Liberal Party (PSL), an anti-establishment party known for their combination of social conservatism and pro-market policies. Bolsonaro’s running mate, Mourãu, hinted that Bolsonaro’s administration would go as far as to redraft the 1988 constitution, taking away representative input, in order to stack the Supreme Court. One of Bolsonaro’s key campaign promises was to help address the growing violence in Brazil. Unlike most countries, Brazil’s biggest threat to national security is not terrorism, but the heavily growing homicide rate within cities, especially in the favelas. In 2017 alone, Brazil broke its own homicide record, with a 3% uptick in murders, resulting in the murder of 63,880 people. Bolsonaro promised to face security issues with no-nonsense iron fist policies, such as relaxing gun control laws, allowing police more freedom to use violent tactics, and employing military forces to occupy the notoriously violent favelas. In Brazil, the drug trade and the resulting war against drugs further contributed to a nation-wide increase in violence.

Bolsonaro’s supporters mainly come from the more conservative members of society, as well as those who have felt betrayed by the Workers Party (PT), including the middle class, small business owners, independent professionals, members of the police, and armed forces. While some poorer populations were motivated to support Bolsonaro due to the worsening public security situation, the majority of Bolsonaro’s supporters are the rich and educated-- members of society whose voices are seldom silenced. Many members of Brazil’s upper-middle classes and elite have been fueled by class hatred, aimed at the PT. Echoing the dictatorial roots of Chile, Bolsonaro’s chief economic advisor (also hailing from the University of Chicago) promises to focus on privatization, a policy very popular with financial markets as well as media representatives. Many political analysts have cautioned that much of Bolsonaro’s rise to power has followed traditional steps towards establishing a fascist regime; Bolsonaro has threatened political opponents, activists, and labeled leftist organizations as terrorist organizations.

Spread of Far Right Movements in a Post-Trump World

In a post-2016-election world, it has seemed like there has been an outcropping of far-right movements all over the Western world. In the last decade, new right-wing movements have combined neo-Nazi groups with traditional free-market conservatives. Under the Trump administration, right-wing political rhetoric, often stemming from the president himself, has begun to normalize these ideologies. In Western Europe, this same rise in right-wing thought is not necessarily attributed to the working-class’s response to the economic state, rather, according to Liz Fekete, it stems from reactionary prejudice surrounding the war on terror, and its resulting increase in refugee presence. In the last decade, Europe has experienced several stunning terror attacks, from the attack on the Charlie Hebdo offices to last year’s attack on an Ariana Grande concert. These attacks, often attributed to young people of color, have led to a distrust in the growing immigrant population, and a resurgence of xenophobic and islamophobic attitudes. In many European countries, the uptick in immigrant populations has led to stricter policies, including media censorship and frequent raids on left-wing organizations. The purported stress on welfare states  brought on by an increase in immigration into Europe left many joining right-wing thinkers in criticizing the policies and norms as laid out by socialist states. As with the United States’ 2016 election, many who voted for right-wing parties did so out of frustration with the leftist parties and their governments.

Bolsonaro’s election is not only notable within the context of its impact in Brazil, but also the entire continent. His election seems to mark the arrival of the far-right wave into the Southern cone, after its spread to countries like Germany, France, and Sweden. Bolsonaro’s far right policies have two simultaneous effects: threatening Western-established democracy and following the Western neoliberal order. However, for some, fascism spells good business. Some Canadian and American businesses suggested that Bolsonaro’s presidency creates good business opportunities within the resource, finance, and infrastructure sectors.  As outlined in his campaign promises, Bolsonaro has promised to considerably weaken environmental regulations in the Amazon and also privatize government-owned companies. While Bolsonaro’s administration presents a threat to democracy throughout South America, for many Western nations, fascism pairs nicely with neoliberalist economic policies.

Conclusion

Bolsonaro’s election was met with strong emotions from members of Brazil’s left and right wings. Throughout Brazil’s recent election cycle, Bolsonaro quickly gained notoriety for his offensive statements involving women, the LGBTQ+ population, and Afro-brazilians. Since its very inception, Brazil has been a socioeconomically unequal society, with racial and class tensions existing to this day. Brazil’s swing to the right is due in part to the population’s disappointment in the Worker’s Party, but also has much to do with rising inequality and violence in the country. Bolsonaro’s election means Brazil now joined the ranks of the United States, Hungary, and the Philippines in its election of a right-wing populist leader. Based on Bolsonaro’s campaign rhetoric, Brazil’s newest president exhibits a commitment to erase what the left-wing sees as years of progress towards a more democratic and socialist society. Analysts concerned with human rights within South America argue that Bolsonaro’s administration poses a great threat to democracy within South America, as well as human rights concerns for Brazil’s indigenous populations. The world will see if these fears manifest into reality when Bolsonaro takes power beginning in January of 2019.

Warding Off the Resource Curse: How Ghana’s Political Institutions Help Manage Oil Wealth

As global energy prices begin to recover from a four year slump, oil majors are shifting their focus towards oil and gas deposits in sub Saharan Africa. The African continent is rich in energy resources, and extractive industries play a prominent role in several African economies. At the same time, however, major energy producers including Nigeria and Angola suffer from underdevelopment, conflict, and varying degrees of corrupt governance. This is likely due to the resource curse, which describes how resource wealth undermines political, economic, and social growth. With strong empirical and real-world evidence to support the existence of the resource curse, observers may be worried about the growing oil industry in Ghana, a country often lauded for its healthy democracy. Yet Ghana continues to sidestep this expectation of instability, and its experience with oil highlights how strong political institutions can channel resource wealth into development funds, turning a curse into a blessing.

The Resource Curse: Too much of a good thing

Existing literature identifies several paths through which resource wealth undermines economic growth. When commodities account for a significant portion of exports, global commodity prices drive currency value, undermining other export bases. Fluctuating global prices also reduce the potential for long-term macroeconomic planning, as constantly shifting revenue bases undermine budgeting. Finally, resource rich states face much weaker incentives to raise productivity, reducing investment in education. Tellingly, Nigeria, Africa’s largest oil producer, continues to struggle with development and poverty reduction even as oil exports reached $34 billion in 2017.

Moreover, resource wealth appears to undermine good governance. Leaders in oil rich states often depend on patronage networks for support, weakening representative rule. These governments break the social contract; without the need to secure public support, and with it, tax revenue, they forego spending on public goods. Since Chad developed its domestic gas market with international funding in the early 2000s, notorious autocrat Idris Debby has bolstered spending on those security services which are personally loyal to him, while reducing his dependence on popular support for continued power.

Despite the strong body of evidence supporting the resource curse, countries like Botswana, Chile, Malaysia, and Norway stand apart from Nigeria, Venezuela, and Algeria. While both groupings hold significant resource wealth, the former have used their wealth to substantially reduce poverty and increase output as a direct result; the latter grouping struggles with corruption, poverty, and political violence. This disconnect points towards a new academic discussion regarding the role of political institutions in mediating economic outcomes, popularized by Acemoglu and Robinson’s Why Nations Fail. Acemoglu and Robinson argue that political and economic institutions exert feedback on one another, and are either extractive, in that they benefit the ruling elite at the expense of the public, or inclusive, in that they have low barriers to participation and provide collective benefits. Even within democratic and inclusive governments, specific types of political formation affect the management of resource wealth. Political institutions which promote political cooperation, distribute revenue to the local level, and maintain accountable institutions can ward off the resource curse, as seen in the case of Ghana.

Ghanaian Petropolitics

In 2007, the Ghanaian government announced the discovery of the Jubilee oil field in the Gulf of Guinea. With an estimated capacity of two to five billions barrels of oil, oil exports will generate approximately one billion USD in annual revenue for the Ghanaian government until 2032. The initial discovery resulted in tempered enthusiasm. Politicians expounded the benefits of oil, promising high rates of growth and increased government spending. Members of civil society, such as communal groups, community-based organisations (CBOs), national CSOs, and networks and coalitions, warned of the potential risks for corruption and environmental degradation. Given the literature on the resource curse, Ghana stands to lose significantly if governmental institutions fail to effectively manage resource wealth, with potential implications for economic and political stability.

As a model of post colonial political and economic success, Ghana is a stable democracy with competitive elections and a vibrant civil society. The two main parties, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC) hold similar levels of support, and the electoral process is bolstered by strong norms of accountability, as ineffective politicians are often voted out. The military is civilian controlled and independent media is prominent. To match its healthy political profile, Ghana also benefits from a robust economy, despite its dependence on commodity exports and agriculture for revenue. Ghana’s profile makes it a darling of the international business community, with FDI experiencing strong growth over the last three decades.

Ghana rapidly developed a complex legal framework to govern oil wealth in response to the 2007 Jubilee field discovery. Civil society groups, with the case of neighboring Nigeria in mind, put heavy pressure on both parties to develop a transparent governing body to oversee the management of oil export revenue, resulting in the creation of the Petroleum Revenue Management Act (PRMA). Under the PRMA, 70% of oil export revenue is allocated to the annual budget, where it is distributed into categorical grants across the four “pillars” of development identified by the PRMA: amortization of existing loans, infrastructure, agricultural modernization, and capacity building. The remaining 30% of funds are distributed between two sovereign wealth funds, the Ghana Stabilization Fund (GSF), which receives 21%, and services debts and hedges against price fluctuations, and the Ghana Heritage Fund (GHF), which uses the remaining 9% of funds to invest in economic diversification and maintain good credit standing. However, as Ifediora points out, the existence of sovereign wealth funds alone does not guarantee accountable resource wealth management. Instead, countries must avoid volatile political party competition, decentralize governance, and ensure strong mechanisms of accountability within and outside of government.

The first factor, party competition, determines the degree to which politicians in resource-rich states prioritize funding on long-term development versus partisan goals. In countries where fierce political competition , parties focus on delivering short term benefits to core constituents, undermining much-needed investments in infrastructure and modernization. Mohan and Asante characterize Ghana’s two-party system as a “competitive clientelist state,” as free and fair elections contrast with parties’ use of political office to dispense patronage. Moreover, the Ghanaian constitution concentrates power within the incumbent party, which turns elections into winner-take-all affairs. This system may exacerbate the risk of the resource curse. Given the current state of politics, it’s likely that the NPP and NDC would use oil revenue to spend on influential voting blocs, notably public servants, without making the investments needed to sustain development. While the PRMA should keep politician’s hands out of the money purse, both parties have raided special funds for mineral wealth in the past. In addition, the winner-take-all system undermines macroeconomic planning. When a new party comes into power, key civil service positions experience high turnover. With opposing ideological views of the management of oil wealth, the NDC and NPP will likely politicize key government organs involved in the process, undermining economic planning.

Another area of risk lies in the lack of decentralization of political power in Ghana. Government centralization determines the ability for resource wealth to be effectively distributed to sub-national units. Fiscal federalism is designed to channel wealth to local institutions, which are often more effective than the central government at spurring local development. Ghana’s unitary political structure is designed to centralize governance and weaken Metropolitan Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs), as MMDA’s are given little discretionary authority and are often controlled by nominees appointed by the ruling party in Accra. Oil wealth risks further centralizing political authority. As a small number of actors in a political system gain access to increased revenue, the risk of corruption increases, and the incentives for the government to pursue decentralization decrease. In the case of Nigeria, politicians in Lagos derailed early efforts at widespread fiscal decentralization in order to secure control over oil wealth. In the long term, even if Ghanaian politicians pursue development with their newfound funds, programs will likely be top-down and centrally driven, instead of the locally tailored development initiatives proven to be the most effective way to achieve poverty reduction.

The third and final area of focus is accountability. While volatile political party competition and centralized government increase the risk of a resource curse, a strong civil society can use accountability mechanisms to mitigate the worst outcomes. When oil was discovered in 2007, Ghanaian civil society responded with several demands. In March 2010, political and environmental activists established the Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas to educate voters about their rights and expectations with an oil-exporting government, and to create linkages between politicians, oil companies, and communities affected by oil extraction. The Platform rallied the necessary political support to pass the PRMA and create the Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC), which is a thirteen-member independent body which audits government oil-wealth expenditure. In response to attempts by political parties to secure control over the PIAC during the drafting process, the Platform used social media and rallies to ensure PIAC’s integrity. As a result, 90% of all Platform suggestions were incorporated into the final versions of the PRMA and PIAC. Yet, in terms of their operational capacity, the PIAC remains underfunded and the PRMA is occasionally flouted. The strength of these institutions doesn’t come from their formal capacity, which is weakened by top-down pressure, but from their bottom-up linkages to civil society, which can engage in activism on behalf of these bodies when political parties mismanage oil wealth.

A case for limited optimism

In summary, Ghana will experience nominal benefits from oil wealth. Due to the presence of sovereign wealth funds and civil society pressure, the worst effects of the resource curse on Ghana’s political economy will be avoided. On the economic front, Ghana will successfully avoid revenue instability and investment crowd out. Its diversified commodity exports and GSF serve as cushions, dampening the negative effects of price volatility. Investment crowdout is a low risk, since the GHF is committed to reinvesting into the agricultural sector, which is typically the first victim of currency valuation in oil-exporting nations. Ghana should invest more heavily into commodities with inelastic prices to bolster existing efforts within the GHF to keep the cedi’s value stable. On the other hand, the emergence of oil will require careful management of debt. The PRMA allows the government to use oil revenue as collateral for international loans, despite the best efforts of the Platform to get the provision removed. Given parties’ propensity to spend heavily before elections, and the ever shifting price of oil, the NDC and NPP risk raising the debt level. Since the discovery of oil, external debt has ballooned by 200% to $14.8 billion. On the political front, Ghana will see more volatile electoral politics, although the worst risks of corruption will be avoided thanks to the efforts of civil society groups. Incumbent’s access to oil revenue will make patronage more convenient and favor short-term spending. As elections become more polarized, independent institutions like the military and judiciary will be subjected to increased political pressures, already a growing issue in the status-quo. Centralized decision making reduces the chance that oil wealth will reduce poverty at the local level. If Ghana does move towards decentralization, the state should work with local civil society to create accountable institutions at the subnational level to ensure that it doesn’t end up exporting corruption to local governments.

Ghana represents an effective application of good governance to resource management.  Despite the volatile structure of politics at Ghana’s core, the worst effects of the resource curse will be avoided, thanks to a combination of strong civil society and a few highly effective institutions. While a wholesale accountable government is the best possible scenario for a resource-rich state, it is not the only way to achieve accountable resource management. World Bank research highlights how the creation of just a few highly-effective institutions, or “pockets of effectiveness” can mimic these effects on a smaller scale. These islands of good governance can channel the positive effects of inclusive political systems without requiring serious governmental reform. In Ghana’s case, these institutions include the independent agencies set up by the PRMA, supported by civil society. Ghana therefore supports the growing body of economic literature which highlights the important role of institutions in managing sustainable growth. Policymakers should use Ghana as an example of how to implement effective reform to staunch the risk of a resource curse by supporting civil society and few strong institutions. While Ghana’s party system and unitary politics entail small risks, realistic development programs should focus on high-impact support to a few effective institutions instead of seeking wholesale reform of a political economy.

Boots On The Ground: Accountability and Responsibility for Private Military Contractors Abroad

Private military contractors (PMCs) are a fixture on battlefields across the globe dating back thousands of years. Their form continues to evolve as state governments become increasingly reliant on them. Today, military contractors are divided into three groups which perform distinct tasks within the broader PMC grouping; military provider firms (MPFs) focus on tactical elements and engage in direct fighting; military consulting firms (MCFs) provide training and advice for the restructuring and operating of a client’s military; and military support firms (MSFs) that provide military services categorized as supplementary including intelligence, technical support and logistics.

As the United States’ use of contractors continues to grow, with contractual obligations rising from $187 billion in 2000 to $283 billion in 2011, the amount of control the US government has over these contractors declines. This lack of oversight and accountability gives rise to situations where the actions and/or ethics of members of the private firms who, while operating on American dollars, are bound by neither the same rules nor protections as American troops operating in the same regions; producing situations such as the Blackwater killings, and raising concerns about their ability to act outside the confines of U.S. laws while under the umbrella of government funding. Allegations of PMC involvement in human rights violations also fuel upset.

PMCs cannot be labeled as purely good or bad, they exist in a complex market wherein they are private firms with leading roles in the theatre of public warfare. They enjoy a level of autonomy which has become increasingly problematic; the incidents of PMC misconduct or mishandling rose as their degree of use in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts did the same. There has long been a debate over the loyalties and motives of PMCs. Leaders of the contracting groups claim their employees are subject to contractual accountability, and that it is just as binding as the oaths of enlistment taken by government armies.

Conversely, advocates of PMC policy reform state that controversy occurs when public interests diverge from those of the company. PMCs are businesses first and their ultimate goal is profit, which will always serve as a roadblock to the contractors effectiveness as military forces. By this line of reasoning, finding a way to more closely align the two sets of interests - those of the US military and PMCs - would bring about a more harmonious and successful relationship. In the case of the PMCs this may be done by writing contracts more carefully with stricter regulations or enforcing changes stipulated by the Commission on Wartime Contracting.

The aforementioned issues are largely boardroom fights; the most difficult scenarios to provide answers for take place in the field, where tensions run high and the most important component of maintaining order is a clear, respected chain of command. In the military, soldiers are subject to their immediate supervisors, but also to court-martials and ultimately to the President of the United States, as well as the nation herself.  Alternatively, PMCs have little to no disciplinary structure aside from their shareholders. International law currently addresses only traditional mercenaries; there is little to no legal recourse for misconduct. PMC employees currently fall into the grey area also inhabited by detainees of Guantanamo Bay; they are neither civilian nor soldiers. This can be dangerous for the contractors, who are not protected under the Geneva Conventions.

Shrouded in secrecy, PMCs “diffuse” responsibility across actors, and in doing so, the answer to who should be held accountable becomes more and more elusive. Speaking on the subject, U. S. Army Colonel Peter Mansoor said the Army needed to take:

“a real hard look at security contractors on future battlefields and figure out a way to get a handle on them so that they can be better integrated - if we’re going to allow them to be used in the first place...if they push traffic off the roads or if they shoot up a car that looks suspicious, whatever it may be, they may be operating within their contract –to the detriment of the mission, which is to bring the people over to your side. I would much rather see basically all armed entities in a counterinsurgency operation fall under a military chain of command.”

Even before stepping onto foreign soil, PMCs represent a problematic threat from within their ranks; member recruitment is private. While many recruits are well-qualified ex-servicemen, a sizeable percentage lack proper experience or have unsavory records which include possible human rights violations. PMCs like to keep violations hidden from the media and may release employees who are then hired by other firms, unaware of their past misconduct. In the Balkans, a group of DynCorp employees was found to be involved in sex crimes, slavery, illegal arms trade, and prostitution rackets. There was even a tape of the Bosnia supervisor raping two women; DynCorp whisked the men out of the country and they never faced prosecution. Instead, they fired the “whistleblowers.” Another similar situation occurred in the Abu Ghraib prisons.

The lack of oversight present in the operations of PMC is alarming in another facet; it often allows governments to complete public goals through private means. While governments favor this option, it is a slippery slope wherein they can partake in endeavors which may not otherwise be approved, either by the public or by legislative branches. Although PMCs receive government money, their activities are not state-sponsored. Activities are happening away from public view which may have lasting impacts on foreign policy. One example of this is how President George W. Bush used PMCs to interfere in the Colombian Civil War to a greater extent than approved by Congress for U.S. military forces.

This was a source of serious discussion and debate during the Iraq war, where an average of 21,000 PMC troops in the region from 2003-2009, spiking from 10,000 to 40,000 between 2003 and 2008. PMC troops carried out countless military operations which are not accessible under the Freedom of Information Act, and which will remain secret as private contractors are not answerable to Congress.  This is another grey area inhabited by PMCs; some engage in tactics not sanctioned, or even not legal, in the countries they are working in and/or under contract with. This issue again has roots in the lack of structure for assigning responsibility and accountability to employees of PMCs as they operate, and the absence of legal repercussions for misconduct.

The foundation for reforms will be the PMCs legally binding contracts. In writing and negotiating them, the DOD has the opportunity to include strict outlines for a chain of command; akin to a hierarchy for responsibility one might find in the U.S. armed forces. The establishment of a clear and necessary power structure will be instrumental in controlling the behavior of PMC employees abroad. While it is unrealistic to expect an immediate willingness from the PMCs to cooperate, the US government funnels billions of dollars to these companies every fiscal year and taking a hard line with them over contractually based responsibilities will be beneficial as the DOD continues to do business with them in the future.  

Perhaps even more important than the presence of a mandated accountability apparatus is the need for it to be enforced once agreed upon. As mentioned before, there are currently some documents which place limitations on PMC conduct but they remain unenforced, enabling the accountability vacuum presently seen in the PMC theatre. Enforcement and oversight procedures must be put in place at the same time as the new chain of command.

As there are currently no international statutes under which PMC can stand trial for misconduct, the DOD must require their contractors to submit to U.S. jurisdiction or jurisdiction of the region in which they are operating under in each specific contract. This will likely be the hardest point to reach agreement on with the PMCs, but it is arguably the most important. Creating and enforcing a chain of command aimed at requiring accountability for one’s actions are crucial steps forward, but if at the end of the day PMC employees still cannot face legal consequences for misconduct, some instances being horrific acts of violence, then contractors are able to remain in their loop of unchecked power. The capacity to follow through with disciplinary actions is critical.

These are not all encompassing solutions, there are other issues which will need to be addressed. Presently, the issues of accountability and responsibility for PMC actions abroad are the most pressing in this realm and the basis for reforming these areas lies in the power of contracts.

Damming to Disaster: The Dangers of Hydropower Proliferation in Laos

The proliferation of renewable energy is rarely a controversial issue, but painting the construction of new hydroelectric dams in the Lao People's Democratic Republic as exclusively positive ignores the negative impacts of such dam construction on rural communities. Laos hopes to transform itself into the ‘the battery of Southeast Asia,’ enacting a plan that aims to construct upwards of 140 dams at a furious pace. This plan includes building numerous dams on the Mekong itself, which is the lifeblood of 60 million people who fish the river and farm the lands along its banks. Stemming from China, where it is known as the Lancang River, the Mekong flows through Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam before emptying into the South China Sea. The fish caught from the Mekong alone account for more than 10 percent of the world’s trade in fish, with the river supplying food to more than 300 million residents of the Mekong’s riparian nations. Yet, while dam building presents an important opportunity for Laos to utilize the vast stretches of the Mekong that languidly meanders through the nation’s territory in the Indochinese Peninsula to generate power and revenue for the nation, improper project planning and a lack of adequate precautions threaten to destroy the river’s ecosystems and displace the communities that depend on it. The shortcomings in damming projects specifically impact the rural population in Laos, while benefiting the investors and government officials driving the dams’ construction. In order to assuage the harsh criticisms of Laos’ hydroelectric aspirations, the Laotian government must open channels for local input into projects before they are approved, ensure that the proceeds of dams’ construction benefit those who dams displace, and strictly adhere to regional processes addressing the transboundary impacts of the project.

Proposed dams on the Mekong River

The Mekong is the second most biodiverse river in the world, but inadequately planned dams could denude the fragile balance of life in the ecosystems it supports, robbing littoral communities of crucial food and revenue sources. The Mekong River Commission (MRC), an intergovernmental management institution with representatives from regional administrations, reported in a six-year, multimillion-dollar study that current dam development plans would result in a loss of 97 percent of the sediment in the Mekong by 2040 and reduce yearly fishing revenues by nearly 5 billion dollars. Sediment is a crucial fertilizer for much of the Mekong’s littoral farmland, and plays an important role in preventing sea-water creep in the Mekong delta downriver in Thailand. Existing dams already threaten fishing and farming communities, currently reducing sediment in the river by 40 percent. Another study by the MRC indicates that the losses that local fishing industry would incur as a result of the dams would reduce the economic benefit of the dams’ construction by roughly 25 percent by 2020. While more than 1,300 species of fish currently breed in the Lower Mekong Basin, dam construction plans that do not account for environmental concerns threaten to inhibit fish from migrating to their breeding grounds. The partially-constructed Don Sahong dam in Laos lies a few miles from the habitat of the only 80 Irrawaddy dolphins left alive, and the destruction in habitat caused by the dam may drive the species to extinction. Proper consideration of environmental concerns could mitigate such fears, yet unfortunately the government of Laos and the private investors building the dams fail to demonstrate such adequate consideration. Accusations emerged recently that the officially released impact assessment of the proposed Pak Lay dam contained major sections that are copied and pasted from the previous Pak Beng dam assessment, an assessment subsequently disproven by the MRC. The copied sections falsely claimed that the environmental impact of the dam would be “insignificant or positive.” The paucity of substantial pre-construction environmental consideration  illustrates the Laotian government’s callous attitude toward the toll levied on riparian communities by changes to ecosystems and presents significant obstacles to Laos’ goal of becoming a sustainable dynamo for Southeast Asia.

Laos’ dam construction plans particularly impact rural communities where citizens wield insufficient resources to surmount the challenges posed by their forced displacement and changing sources of livelihood. The Lower Mekong Basin’s population is 85 percent rural, and not only relies on the Mekong for more than just their commercial livelihood, but also for their very subsistence, with locals eating 18 times more fish than citizens in the United States. Even if communities downstream of dams successfully weather the water-related shocks, state-sanctioned forced displacement will uproot numerous communities upstream of dams. The reservoir created by the aforementioned Pak Lay dam will displace 20 villages, necessitating the forced relocation of at least 1,000 families. The construction of the Xayaburi dam, Pak Beng dam, Nam Theun 2 dam, and Theun-Hinboun Expansion Project further displaced roughly 20,000 people. Beyond flooding and erosion, the nearly 5,000 people relocated for the Theun-Hinboun Expansion Project face serious concerns about their ability to sustain themselves in their new towns. Now living in consolidated villages without access to the Mekong, this population lost access to land that they historically fished and raised rice on, and land near their new village is predominantly allocated to rubber tree plantations. Dam projects also significantly impact the communities living downstream of the dams. The Xayaburi dam impaired the agricultural and fishing capacity of 200,000 people, placing the population at acute risk of food insecurity, according to estimates by the NGO International Rivers. The construction of the Pak Beng dam altered the water level in regional rapids and pools, damaging the ecosystems that many local villagers fished to eat from and earn a living. The Cambodian director of the World Wildlife Fund criticized the decision to construct the Don Sahong less than two miles from the Cambodian border, given that in Cambodia upwards of 70 percent of the protein eaten by the local population is from fish, noting that “the dam will have disastrous impacts on the entire river ecosystem all the way to the delta in Vietnam.” While the government of Laos is a clear proponent of dam construction, it must commit adequate resources to easing the relocation process for the affected rural population. A decreased number of fish in waterways and insufficient governmental allocation of land for farming specifically endanger the primary income sources of the rural population. The forced displacement of large subsets of the rural population coincides with an effort by the government of Laos to switch agricultural practices from crop rotation to large-scale cash crop cultivation. Such rice and other cash crop cultivation requires lowland areas for farming, which is expensive to acquire because it is already limited in Laos and made further scarcer by the construction of dams in lowland areas. Indeed, although the populations forcefully displaced are often in some of Laos’ poorest regions, switching to monoculture farming requires significant upfront investment, forcing many displaced farmers to go into debt in order to switch their agricultural practices. Furthermore, monoculture farming places farmers at risk of price shocks in the market and pestilence. The government of Laos must pay specific attention to the struggles that the rural population faces as a result of the state-enacted forced displacement in the name of hydropower projects.

Laos’ hydropower proliferation projects follow a prototypical narrative of unequal core-periphery relations, with the governmental elites ignore the impact of dam construction projects on local income and food sources in order to profit off of foreign investment in hydropower projects. While energy from Laos’ dams sold to other nations could yield 17 billion dollars in profits, the damage to the Mekong River could result in costs as high as 66 billion dollars. Scholars criticize international institutions such as the World Bank and the Asian Development bank, along with private investors, for ignoring the needs of local communities in favor of their own profits. Indeed, the Laotian government is similarly at fault, for its model of dam construction relies almost entirely on foreign investment, and the government consistently proves itself unable to ensure that such foreign investors adequately account for social and environmental concerns. Still, the government of Laos continues to pursue such projects because they view them as crucial to maintaining Laos’ growth rate, which is currently characterized as “a star in South East Asia,” at roughly 7 percent. One cannot begrudge Laotian growth aspirations, yet growth-oriented projects such as dam construction must benefit the Laotian people, rather than lining the pockets of governmental officials. The high growth rates enabled by new projects such as hydropower that capitalize on Laos’ factor endowments will evaporate unless the profits of such projects are used to fight poverty and develop human capital resources. Troublingly, Professor Martin Stuart-Fox of Queensland University characterizes the government of Laos as “massively corrupt,” elucidating that “if you are the top of the party you get a lot of money, and there’s a lot of Chinese money coming in, of course, and there are top people in the politburo who are extremely wealthy.” While Laos transitions to a market economy, it remains a single-party political system, allowing those in power to benefit from their privileged position. The Laotian government argues that the revenues of energy sales from dams will finance anti-poverty and social welfare programs. This is a sound policy in theory, but in practice the gross majority of power produced by the dams goes to the foreign companies that financed the dams, and is then reimported back into Laos at a higher price, resulting in electricity prices tripling for some citizens in Laos. After a catastrophic dam collapse in late July of this year, the government supposedly issued a moratorium and nationwide review on dam construction, yet the developers constructing the Pak Lay and Pak Beng dams reported that they received no instructions to halt construction. Just days after the moratorium’s release, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam agreed to begin the regional consultation process for the Pak Lay dam, a clear indicator that the government of Laos does not plan to end its dam construction any time soon. Laos itself does not require greater hydropower to meet its domestic electricity demand, with energy sales already constituting 30 percent of its national exports. The lack of domestic need for hydropower signifies that the construction of new dams is aimed at foreign markets, thus involving foreign investors who will likely offer monetary incentives to the officials approving such projects, while the rural population continues to bear the burden of new dam construction. Obstacles to Laos’ goals of expanding energy exports may cause the hardship inflicted upon the rural population to be entirely unnecessary. While Laos and Thailand signed an understanding concerning expanding Laotian energy sales to Thailand through 2036, experts caution that Thailand already meets its energy needs, and thus may not be a sustainable market for future energy sales. In March, Thailand retracted its plans to purchase energy from the planned Pak Beng dam, the construction of which was predicated on an agreement to sell 90 percent of the energy it produced to Thailand. The Laotian National Policy on the Environmental and Social Sustainability of the Hydropower Sector outlines that all projects must include full public disclosure of the dams’ impact, yet without a free press and with Laos ranked near the bottom of global corruption indexes, there is little indication that the government of Laos will change its course and properly account for the struggles of the rural population.

Inequitable land titling regulations in Laos exemplify both the preferential treatment of foreign investors and the dearth of Laotian governmental capacity to protect both rural populations and the environment around them. Scholars in Energy Research & Social Science elucidate that without “stronger supervision and conditionality for project implementation,” elites will be able to capture the benefits of dam construction. Indeed, rather than protect rural populations, regulatory apparatuses can also further disenfranchise rural populations. When planning new dam construction, the government is able to designate land as ‘underutilized’ in order to justify the forced displacement of the local population. Given that since the governmental transformation in 1975, the Government of Laos controls all land in the nation, thus requiring that the government give titles for all land use. The Laotian Land Titling Program gives permanent land usage rights to those in urban areas, which cannot be easily withdrawn. In contrast, the Land and Forest Allocation policy in Laos grants rural residents temporary land use rights. As a result of this, not only are rural residents not secure in their homes due to the temporary nature of their land use permissions, but the process to acquire those permissions is also more lengthy. In 2015, the Government of Laos issued barely half of the number of titles that they intended to. Even when titles are issued to the rural population, “...due to corruption, titles may simply be ignored and land taken regardless of titling schemes that involve local land and resource users,” according to the NGO Global Witness. Global Witness estimates that private companies leased between 1.1 million and 3.5 million hectares of land, affecting 18 percent of the villages in Laos.  As previously discussed, the forced changes in rural agricultural practices make farmers more vulnerable to crops’ price fluctuations and harvest failure, which may lead to ‘distress sales,’ wherein the residents of an area are forced to sell of their land to survive. For foreign investors, on the other hand, Special Economic Zones grant land at a far more expedited rate to foreign investment projects. Additionally, new dam building plans such as the Build-Own-Operate-Transfer scheme result in foreign investors controlling the majority share in many newly constructed dams. This significantly erodes the Laotian government’s ability to regulate the effects of dams. The Laotian government only owned 25 percent of the Xe-Pian Xe-Namnoy dam, which collapsed in summer 2018. This precedent is increasingly worrying, given that the Laotian government will control as little as 10 percent of the shares in some new dam projects. Researchers write in the journal Global Environmental Change that “ownership and finance is increasingly private and less sovereign as use rights and decision making power over the exploitation of natural resources have been centralized and privatized into the hands of a consortium that has financial interests in maximizing power production.” The trend of decreasing Laotian government ownership in damming projects and the preferential treatment given to foreign investors in land titling demonstrates the need for stronger governmental oversight in the planning of new dam projects.

If Laos aims to transform itself into the renewable hydro-power engine of Southeast Asia, then foreign investment is the gear that allows that engine to turn, but derisory regulatory oversight allows the interests of foreign investors to supercede those of the local populations. Laos’ insufficient capacity to construct dams independently results in 80 percent of the funding for dam projects originating from foreign investors. The demonstrated interest of foreign investors creates new pressure on the Laotian government to use hydropower projects as a catalyst for greater national growth, resulting in greater numbers of dams. The subversive power of foreign capital shifts the Government of Laos’ focus from specific goals such as poverty reduction through dam development to the act of dam construction itself, due to the monetary incentives for officials to support such foreign-funded construction projects. Foreign investment is a large enough component of the Laotian economy that different groups emerged with the Laotian one party government, with a faction of older party members and party members from the South of Laos favoring Vietnamese investment, and a faction of younger party members and members from the North favoring Chinese investment. Serious Laotian infrastructure projects even outside of dam-building exist with both Vietnam and China. A newly announced highway will link the Laotian capital, Vientiane, with the Vietnamese capital, Hanoi. Entirely landlocked, Laos also gained access to the Vung Ang seaport in Vietnam after the two governments signed a joint agreement, with a railway between Vientiane and the port projected to cost 5 billion dollars. In 2013, China surpassed Vietnam to become Laos’ largest foreign investor, with China footing the bill for the most expensive infrastructure project in Laos, a railway connecting China and Laos, which will cost, 6 billion dollars, half of Laos’ GDP. China also funds the construction of the Pak Beng dam, with a Chinese firm to control the sales of the gross majority of energy from the dam.  Singapore is also involved in Laotian investment, spending more than a quarter million dollars in the nation. As public debt reached 60 percent of the Laotian GDP in 2017, combined with plateauing demand for the energy produced by Laos’ dams, fears arise about if Laos will ever be able to repay this debt, and about the influence that Laos’ lenders may wield on Laotian policy decisions. The now collapsed Xe-Pian Xe-Namnoy dam was constructed by a South Korean company, with Thai and Laotian partners. Shalmali Guttal, executive director of Focus on the Global South, argues that the dangers of the Xe-Pian Xe-Namnoy dam were sidelined in favor of corporate ambitions, positing that “The risks are masked to make the investment worth it.” The Laotian Prime Minister, Thongloun Sisoulith, aims to combat corruption such as that which enabled the construction of dangerous dam projects during his tenure, yet his administration’s former finance minister was arrested along with four other senior officials for giving out bonds for infrastructure projects that never existed. Thongloun took important steps by advising an audit of public officials’ finances, and banning the opening of new banana plantations and the export of timber to China, both of which caused significant pollution and environmental destruction. While Thongloun’s stated belief that “we can have foreign investment, but we must share the benefits. There should be fairness,” is encouraging, Laos must strengthen its government oversight of foreign investment projects and enforcement of protective regulations in order to achieve such fairness.

The Mekong crosses the borders of six nations, and any change to it will inherently affect the other riparian nations, yet the Laotian government worryingly circumvents the processes of regional regulatory mechanisms. The Mekong Agreement established the Mekong River Commission in 1995, aimed at analyzing the transnational impacts of projects on the river. Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam all signed the agreement, with China and Myanmar not joining the agreement in an effort to escape its jurisdiction. This effort succeeded, with 8 Chinese dams already on the Mekong and 20 more soon to come, none of which were subject to approval by the MRC. This exhibits a clear weakness in the MRC, for it lacks the enforcement power necessary to ensure that nations adhere to its directives. Laos’ unilateral decision to proceed with the Xayaburi dam’s construction illustrates this institutional weakness, for while Article 5.4.3 of the MRC’s procedures states that the committee of nations must jointly approve a proposed project, Laos decided to begin the dam’s construction without the approval of its fellow riparian nations. Laos instead cited a report by a Swiss company that used more than 40 still-unfinished studies to falsely argue that concerns about the dam were adequately addressed. This is a further example of corporate interests subverting regulatory mechanisms and endangering both the local ecosystems and population. The copied and pasted report that Laos submitted to the MRC was at best a tacit attempt to conform the regional body’s rules. The lack of concern for the regional impact of national dam projects sets a worrying precedent for the future of the Mekong and the communities that rely on it.

On July 23rd, 2018, an auxiliary dam at the Xe-Pian Xe-Namnoy hydropower complex burst, releasing a thunderous wave of 5 billion cubic meters of water that claimed 36 lives, with 98 people still missing, and destroyed the homes of more than 7,000 people. Less than a year before the Xe-Pian Xe-Namnoy collapse, the Nam Ao dam broke after the company constructing it did not follow standard practices, yet regulatory enforcement did not expand following that previous collapse. The collapse affected 13 villages, and reportedly destroyed 95 percent of the homes in some of the villages affected. The man made crisis has lasting repercussions, with families losing vast food stores that would have fed them for months, and with waist-deep mud preventing those whose homes survived from returning. The CEO of the MRC expressed hope that following this most recent collapse, sustainable and less contentious paths for development along the Mekong could be explored. Yet, just weeks after the collapse, the MRC began the consultation process for the proposed Pak Lay dam. This raises concerns about the Laotian government’s ability to protect its citizens from predatory business practices, for the dam’s builders knew that something was wrong before it collapsed. The Xe-Pian Xe-Namnoy project was previously criticized in 2013 for its inadequate public consultation, environmental planning, and impact assessments. The support provided to those displaced by the dam’s original construction also proved insufficient, with those displaced without adequate access to food, water, and new land. Following the dam’s collapse, citizens criticized the government’s efforts to conceal the disaster through social media posts, given that all other forms of media are tightly censored. Authorities also failed to notify Cambodian officials about the incoming water, with 1200 Cambodians displaced by the dam collapse. The effects of the collapse stretched as far as the Mekong Delta in Vietnam, where farmers’ fields were damaged. The question remains if this disastrous loss of life and the monumental crossborder impacts will prove sufficient impetus for the Laotian government to reconsider its hydroelectric ambitions. Former analyst for the U.S. Department of Energy, François Le Scornet, expounds that “..hydropower development is too important for the political power in place to significantly challenge the overall development plan,” demonstrating the conflict between the political motivation for dams’ construction and their sometimes-lethal impact on rural communities. The widespread impacts of the Xe-Pian Xe-Namnoy auxiliary dam’s collapse should serve as a call for Laos to reexamine its policy of forcefully displacing its citizens to serve foreign corporate interests.

The former vice minister of energy and mines who was behind Laos’ unilateral decision to proceed with the controversial Xayaburi dam responded to news of the Xe-Pian Xe-Namnoy collapse by saying that “For me, it is for the better. We have done so many projects; it is time we reassess.” Such reassessment is critical to ensuring Laos’ prolonged success. Renewable energy is an admirable aspiration, but it must be constructed in a way that does not unfairly inflict harm on the rural population through forced displacement, insufficient available land, and environmental destruction. The government of Laos must develop regulatory mechanisms capable of standing up to the powerful capital of foreign investors. Furthermore, the Laotian government must follow the procedures of the MRC, to assuage the transboundary impacts of its rapid dam proliferation. Laos as a whole can benefit from dam building, but only if the concerns of local communities are addressed, environmental impacts are analyzed, regional partners are engaged in discussion, and above all else, if the proceeds of dam building benefit the communities where dams are built rather than corrupt officials.

The Mirroring of the Two 9/11s

The infamous images of hijacked airplanes hitting the World Trade Center’s twin towers are etched into the minds of every American old enough to remember the morning of September 11th, 2001. The terrorist attacks of that day spurred a decades-long war in the middle east and heightened tensions surrounding what it really meant to be an American. 9/11 is a date known all around the world, but rarely does the world talk about the first violent 9/11 that occured in Chile. Whereas the United States’ 9/11 was the doing of jihadist groups, Chile’s 9/11 was a government military coup. The morning of September 11th, 1973, the military began to bomb La Moneda, the presidential palace. By the end of the day, the president, Salvador Allende, was dead, and Chile’s government transformed from a burgeoning socialist democracy into a bloody military dictatorship that would last seventeen years. Both 9/11s have eerie similarities beyond their dates; the two events can trace their origins to the Cold War, and the United States’ desire to prevent the spread of communism.

The Cold War and the Creation of the Taliban

With the creation of the Truman Doctrine, stopping the spread of communism became one of the United States’ biggest foreign policy focuses. During the Cold War era, the United States’ geopolitical strategies throughout the world were aimed at curbing the slowly spreading reach of the Soviet Union. Beginning in the late 1970s, the Soviet Union attempted to gain control over Afghanistan, first invading the country in 1979, and later establishing a puppet regime in Kabul. Afghanistan’s complex history and ethnic diversity made it difficult for a country-wide takeover, and as a result, the Soviets’ invasion carved out pockets of the country where power was divided between the control of communist forces and Afghani rebels. The Soviets’ attempt to take over the country was met with significant resistant from locals, especially from Muslims who felt that the communists atheist beliefs threatened the practice of their religion. These resistant groups later developed into mujahideen groups, consisting of Muslim rebels. One of the largest forces supporting the mujahideen groups was the CIA.

After failing to prevent Iran’s Islamic revolution, the United States viewed Afghanistan as a key player in the middle east region, and was intent on not letting it fall into red hands. Thus, the CIA created rebel training camps in Pakistan where they trained Afghani muslim rebels, including Osama bin Laden. The United States, along with other anti-communist allies, allocated funds to help arm Afghani rebel groups in their fight against communist forces. The Reagan administration armed the mujahideen with anti-aircraft missiles, breaking previous policies against supplying rebels with American-made weapons. From the underbelly of the CIA training camps, the beginnings of what would later become the Taliban emerged . Michael Rubin of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, explained that following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States left Afghanistan, creating “a policy void in which radical elements” would flourish. The Taliban quickly conquered areas of southern Afghanistan, gaining power and support, viewed as an alternative to the conflict created by territorial control by rival mujahidin forces. The Taliban took control of the Afghan government, under a platform promising peace, disarmament, and a return to Islamic values. Later on, Osama bin Laden came to the aid of the Taliban, providing a few thousand highly trained soldiers, and creating the foundation for the alliance between al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

Neoliberalism and the rise of socialism in Chile

While much of the spread of the Cold War was occuring on the eastern continents, the United States quickly became aware of a communist wave gaining momentum in South America. Prior to the rise of the Unidad Popular, Chile’s left wing party composed of socialist and communist groups, Chile had been one of the first nations to wholeheartedly embrace the neoliberal policies laid out by the Bretton Woods System and the Washington Consensus. Historically, Chile had always suffered from great classism and vast inequality gaps between socioeconomic classes. Once neoliberal policies were implemented, these inequality gap only grew larger, also widening social tensions between the wealthy American-educated upper class, and the lower class dwelling in campamentos on the outskirts of the city. Free market reform was heavily supported by the political-economic elites in Chile, whose wealth would only further increase from foreign trade, but in the long run, neoliberal policies led to high unemployment and the banking collapse of 1982.

Social and economic tensions played out across Chile’s three main political parties, the Unidad Popular, la Democracia Cristiana, and the Partido Nacional. These societal tensions took center stage during the 1970 elections, and as a result, Salvador Allende, running as the Unidad Popular’s candidate” won the presidency with 45% of the popular vote, establishing the first democratically elected socialist government. Allende promised the nationalization of Chilean resources, income distribution, and agricultural reform, all changes that appealed heavily to the lower class who suffered under neoliberal economic policies. While Allende was popular with the lower class, the Unidad Popular lacked a majority in congress, creating a major obstacle in accomplishing his administration’s policy goals. One of Allende’s first steps towards transitioning Chile from a democratic state to socialism was to nationalize the copper mines, Chile’s largest export. One year into his administration, the worldwide price of copper fell, causing the deterioration of the economy. While Allende did not come to power through a revolution, the United States saw him as a threat, due to his close friendships with Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, as well as his staunch defense of the Cuban Revolution.

The morning of September 11th, 1973, Santiago woke up to the sounds of machine guns, and soldiers marching towards La Moneda, as part of an American-backed military coup. By the end of the day, General Augusto Pinochet had poised himself as the head of the new military dictatorship, and Allende had taken his own life rather than surrender himself to the military. Backed by the United States, Pinochet sought to eradicate any and all traces of socialism in the country. Under his leadership, Operation Condor was created. This alliance of right-wing dictatorships included Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Brazil. With the aid of the United States, Operation Condor launched a campaign of political repression, targeting socialist and communist leaders and sympathizers throughout the continent. Additionally, US interests in the region were represented by the Chicago Boys, a group of economists trained at the University of Chicago. While working with Pinochet’s regime, the Chicago Boys helped to once again revert the Chilean economy to its previous neoliberal practices. Throughout Pinochet’s seventeen year long military dictatorship, an estimated 1,198 people were disappeared, with hundreds more being subject to torture, and political executions.

The United States’ indifference in the face of the human rights violations committed under Pinochet’s regime is a topic rarely discussed. The United States’ involvement in the military coup reached far beyond simply supporting Pinochet in the name of preventing the spread of communism. In one of the more infamous cases, it came to light that the CIA trained the head of the DINA, Pinochet’s secret police force. Manuel Contreras oversaw the DINA, whose operations were responsible for the torture and disappearances of thousands of political enemies. Contreras also claimed that at Pinochet’s request, eight CIA agents came to Santiago with the intention of helping to organize the structure of the secret police. The United States humored the brutality of Pinochet’s dictatorship, a small price to pay for one less communist state. After evidence arose that Pinochet’s DINA was responsible for the assassination, in the middle of DC,  of a former Chilean diplomat, public outcry around the world largely condemned the actions of the military dictatorship, but the United States took no concrete steps to sever its ties with the regime During the mid 80s of the Reagan administration, foreign policy advisors and analysts began to feel frustrated at Pinochet’s refusal to return Chile to its former democratic state. Pinochet had served his purpose in eradicating communism, and in 1988 US officials pressured him to hold a plebiscite, where he was succeeded by a member of the democratic christian party.

In Chile, the implications of the military coup still resonate to this day. Under Pinochet’s regime, basic human rights were violated, and the entire country lived under a reign of terror for seventeen years. During the dictatorship, many right wing supporters praised Pinochet for his quick improvement of the economy, while the poor suffered. Pinochet’s regime focused on destroying the informal campamentos that surrounded Santiago, instead forcing the poor to move into conventillos, where multiple families were crammed into small homes. Not only did this forced migration destroy the social fabric of the campamentos, but it also decreased sanitation and nutrition standards for many of Santiago’s urban poor.

9/11’s Impact and Legacy in the United States and its Foreign Policy

Exactly 28 years after Chile’s military coup, American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center at 8:46am. By the end of the day, the terrorists’ actions killed 2996 people. Shortly thereafter, Osama bin Laden, founder of al-Qaeda, stepped forward to claim responsibility for the attacks, claiming that “it was confirmed to [him] that oppression and the intentional killing of innocent women and children [were] a deliberate American policy. Destruction is freedom and democracy, while resistance is terrorism and intolerance.” Thus, the American  “war on terror” was launched with the Bush administration vowing not to end until every terrorist group was defeated. Under the guise of battling terrorism, the United States invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, from 2001-2006. Now, almost two decades since the 2001 terrorist attacks, US troops still remain in both countries.

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 impacted the United States in more ways than just in simple casualties and injuries. After decades of enjoying its position as the hegemonic world leader, the United States felt vulnerable for the first time, shedding the illusion that its power  was untouchable. In response, strong pro-American, nationalistic sentiments flooded the country, appearing in everything from renaming french fries to freedom fries to the increasing popularity of the American war hero movie genre. The aggression with which the United States launched its counterattack in Afghanistan was met with widespread hostility towards the west. Since 9/11, the U.S. government has spent more than $7.6 trillion on defense and homeland security, in addition to implementing policies like the Patriot Act, aiming to make America safer against the threat of terrorism.

The Two 9/11s and the Construction of Memory

In both Chile and the United States, the legacies of their respective 9/11s persist  to this day. In Chile, there still exists much social division in regards to public opinion of the dictatorship. Outside of the classroom setting, the dictatorship is a taboo subject, with most reluctant to admit their past support of Pinochet. Many Chileans still support Pinochet, emphasizing the good he did for the economy, while glossing over the atrocities committed under his regime. Other former supporters claim that they had no idea that the tortures and disappearances were anything more than rumors. In the many years since the end of the military dictatorship, relatives of the disappeared and tortured have led the human rights movement in the country. Many NGOs dedicate their time to helping to secure evidence of torture and killings, in hopes to bring forth charges against the responsible parties. While many continue fighting to know what happened to their loved ones, others have fought to repress this knowledge. The Bachelet administration fought to lift the 50 year “veil of secrecy” over the testimony heard by the National Commission on Political Prison and torture. Bachelet’s bill was hotly contested, with supporters urging the disclosing of detention sites, and the identities of over 30,000 torture victims. For family, the failure to lift the veil was devastating. Because the identities of many of those who participated in the torturings and killings are still unknown, these individuals continue to enjoy military benefits and pensions. It is undeniable that the dictatorship forever changed the landscape of Chilean society, instilling a chilling sense of terror over the entire country, that to this day still leaves its trace.

Just seventeen years after the United States’ own 9/11,  the marks of the terrorist attacks still appear on everything from pop culture to the attitudes of Americans towards foreigners, and vice versa. The surge in American nationalism unified many Americans, while at the same time gave rise to a growing sense of islamophobia throughout the western world. In 2001, 93 anti-Muslim related hate crimes were reported to the FBI. Strong nationalism gave way to strong anti-Muslim, anti-terrorist sentiments. Additionally, research showed that post-9/11, Americans’ preferences for media changed, with most movie-goes now being more likely to prefer films that do not require much cultural engagement. While xenophobic beliefs seemed to have had reduced gradually over the years, they have seen a resurgence in recent years due to anti-Muslim remarks made by then-candidate Trump throughout the duration of the 2016 election cycle. Recent studies have shown that in 2016, anti-Muslim hate crimes actually surpassed those reported in 2001.

Conclusion

With both the Chilean and American 9/11 events, their origins can be dated back to the Cold War and the United States’ anti-communist doctrine. While the two events may seem unrelated at first glance, their roots and aftereffects mirror each other. In both countries, many suffered human rights violations as a result of events that took place in 9/11. In the present day, both Chile and the United States have undergone political shifts towards the right, with the respective administrations of Piñera and Trump. In both countries, the younger generations have shown strong leftist tendencies, fighting to question the beliefs of the right-leaning administrations. While Chile’s 9/11 can oftentimes be mistaken as a long-ago part of the nation’s history, today people still remember that it has many consequences. Recently, the Chilean minister of culture was forced to resign after old Facebook posts of his resurfaces, where he had called the National Museum of Memory and Human Rights leftist propaganda that failed to accurately represent the dictatorship. Even now, many people within Piñera’s administration have faced criticism for their past support of Pinochet. Defenders of human rights urge the importance of preserving national memory in both countries, sparking many conversations surrounding how exactly the respective 9/11s should be remembered and represented for generations to come.

Birth Control: Uses, History, and Policies

Across the country and the globe, some women are fortunate enough to take personal control over their health, economic opportunities, and lives. They are granted an unprecedented freedom with the help of various contraceptive. However, it is only the fortunate that control their fate for various state and federal laws within the United States make this freedom all the more onerous to attain. To understand how we came to these restrictions it is first necessary to explore the purpose of the medicine and then the history of restrictions and allowances in the United States. Finally, alternative methods of access as seen in in certain states will illuminate potential future policy aspirations.

Uses and Affects

All women have personal reasons to take birth control, in any of the many forms available. One such reason is preventing unwanted pregnancy. Of sexually active women of a reproductive age (15-44) in the United States, roughly 70% are at risk of an unwanted pregnancy. Within this group 68% of women who use contraceptives only account for 5% of unwanted pregnancies. The combination of risk and preventability profess the incredible need for accessible birth control. Statistics show the demand; in 1960 the pill became available and within five years 6.5 million American women used it. Today,  80% of sexually experienced women have used the pill. Also, alternative methods are increasing in popularity including sterilization, hormonal methods, IUDs and male condoms.

Photo from: https://www.guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/contraceptive-use-united-states

While many women choose to take birth control to avoid becoming pregnant, there are multiple uses for the drug. An estimated 72% of women take oral contraceptives for non-contraceptive reasons alone, or for non-contraceptive reasons in tandem with contraception reasons. The pill has the ability to reduce cramps, menstrual pain, regulation, and acne treatments. It also has farther reaching effects like controlling endometriosis and polycystic ovary syndrome. Endometriosis is a condition affecting millions of American women that causes such severe pain as to drastically affect women’s ability to go about their daily lives. Polycystic ovary syndrome, on the other hand, can increase the risk of endometrial cancer and death if not properly regulated. This condition affect one in ten women and hormonal birth control is the most common treatment. In addition to health concerns, birth control has the ability to affect many aspects of a women’s lives.

Birth control and reproductive control are essential to women’s legal and economic status. Indeed during her Senate confirmation hearing, Ruth Bader Ginsburg famously said:

“The decision whether or not to bear a child is central to a woman's life, to her well-being and dignity. It is a decision she must make for herself. When Government controls that decision for her, she is being treated as less than a fully adult human responsible for her own choices.”

Restricting women’s access to birth control methods is discrimination on the basis of sex.  Sex discrimination is treating someone unfavorably because of their sex; it is cited both in terms of sexual harassment and economic opportunities. To understand access to birth control as a discriminatory issue it is essential to recognize the legal and economic repercussions. First, in regards to legality, women are only treated as independent persons under the law when they have the freedom to choose. Restricting women from this right is paramount to treating then as a lesser person under the law, unable or unqualified to make decisions for themselves. Second, birth control access is essential for protecting women’s economic opportunities. When women are able to regulate pregnancy on their own terms, the results are swift and definite. Birth control advances women’s economic status and educational opportunities. In the job market, young women have previously been relegated to low level jobs and deprived of promotions because companies assumed that they would leave within a few years to start families. Birth control has helped cull this trend and has allowed women the freedoms to choose when and if to start families. Indeed, more women are choosing to put off having children, many in favor of their job opportunities; today, a third of wage gains to women are a result of birth control access. Additionally, women’s educational opportunities are affected. Birth control is the most influential factor in women choosing to stay in college and is a large component of many women’s choice to attend in the first place: even with a bachelor’s degree, an estimated 30% increase of women in skilled jobs (medicine, law, dentistry) can be attributed to birth control access. The effects don’t merely stop with opportunities; oral contraceptives are associated with lessened risk of ovarian and endometrial cancers. However, it is important to mention that there are potential costs to taking oral contraceptives as well; namely, the associated increased risks in cervical (5% increased risk) and breast cancer (7% increased risks). Yet, both risks decline or disappear when use of oral contraceptives end.  Considering the evident benefits both to women and the economy it is important to investigate the political history of birth control to understand today’s regulations.

History

The history of birth control is riddled with inaccuracies. Since the beginning of humankind people have avoided unwanted pregnancy. However, many historic methods were very unsafe, if effective. In more modern times researchers have focused on safe and effective methods to prevent unwanted pregnancies. In the early 19th century many methods of birth control were available and easily accessible including condoms, diaphragms and douches. However, the American Medical Association began attacking these options in the 1850s. Anthony Comstock, in particular, crusaded against contraceptives and orchestrated the 1873 ban on sending contraceptives or distributing information through the mail. It was not until the 20th century that birth control increased in popularity, largely in part to the efforts of Margaret Sanger. She is attributed with coining the term “birth control” and started the American Birth Control League, later known as Planned Parenthood Federation of America. Sanger also lobbied biologist Gregory Pincus to develop a birth control pill. Pincus partnered with physician John Rock, a catholic doctor who educated people on sex and treated and tested infertility. Rock’s research on infertility paved the way for birth control pills that were later approved by the FDA in 1957. Regardless of the serious side effects of the first available version of the pill, by 1965 6.5 million American women were taking the pill. Only five years later, President Nixon signed Title X into law providing federal funding for family planning services. Other methods of birth control began taking off following this funding, most notably the IUD.

Other notable victories for birth control include the 2000 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) decision on contraceptives. The EEOC ruled that employers must cover contraceptives costs if their health insurance plans also pay for a number of other products that enhance well-being.  Various legislations of this nature were already in effect in 28 states by the mid-1990s.  The right to contraceptives through health plans were solidified at a federal level in 2010 when President Obama signed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). The ACA added contraceptives to the list of preventative services covered without patient co-payments. Ultimately, protections of this manner have been lessened by President Trump. Religious and moral opt-outs by companies are now affecting thousands of women’s access to birth control. The religious exemptions have a basis in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby in 2014. The case allowed Hobby Lobby to opt out of providing contraception under the Religious Freedoms Act. Justice Ginsburg wrote the dissenting opinion, stating that “the exemption sought by Hobby Lobby and Conestoga would…deny legions of women who do not hold their employers’ beliefs access to contraceptive coverage.” A similar case has recently come under scrutiny with the nomination of Judge Brett Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court by Trump. During the senate confirmation hearing Judge Kavanaugh was asked about his decision in Priests for Life v. the U.S. Department of Human and Health Services. Judge Kavanaugh sided with the religious organization that argued against health plans covering birth control because IUDs and emergency contraception are “abortion inducing drugs.”  This term, used by Judge Kavanaugh is alarming to those who use and promote access to birth control. This turn of events and increasing restrictions for birth control are making access increasingly difficult, especially considering the price of attaining birth control.

Policies

Birth control varies in cost by type of contraceptive. The average cost of the pill is anywhere in between $0-$50 before insurance that covers birth control. To be able to get the pill, many states require a yearly doctor visit costing from $0-$350, again dependent on insurance. Many have rallied against the provision of having a doctor’s visit, especially considering that many women who take the pill have done so for years, and that women have been proven to be just as accurate at self-screening as a doctor. Additionally, there is a shortage of  OB/GYNs in the United states, making it difficult for women to get a prescription in the first place. Indeed, many parts of the world have easier access to oral contraception than America.

Photo from: http://ocsotc.org/world-map/

In response, seven states have made it possible to get the pill without a prescription. California, Oregon, Colorado, New Mexico, Hawaii, Maryland and Colorado all allow pharmacists to sell birth control over the counter. States considering legislation of this manner include Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, and New Hampshire. The District of Columbia and Utah also recently authorized similar legislation, although they have yet to implement it. This ease of access will not only lower the cost of entry, but this free-market solution also has the potential to drive down costs.  Also, birth control via mail is more readily accessible. Companies like Nurx let women get a prescription and order birth control online. The prescription part of the service is mere health questionnaire that is later reviewed and submitted to a partner pharmacy. Nurx offers over 40 types of contraception and emergency contraception. This service is already available in 18 states and is particularly popular in “contraception deserts” where women lack access to health services. Other services offer different types of birth control and have their own methods of prescribing.

Apps are also going up in popularity. There are both apps for ordering birth control via mail or to a pharmacy, and apps that provide birth control advice. Natural Cycles is an app based on the temperature method. The temperature method is the tracking of a woman’s temperature to estimate her fertility on any given day. Natural Cycles tracks the temperature and alerts women to days when pregnancy is likely or unlikely to occur after unprotected sex. The method, if used properly, is 91% effective— the same as the pill. In August of 2018 the app was approved by the FDA.

Policy Recommendations

Birth control is a necessary medicine to the equal opportunity of women under the law and in regard to economic and educational opportunities. Birth control also provides women with needed protections from various ailments and conditions. Given the obvious need for access as seen in statistics mentioned earlier as well as contraception deserts and economic restrictions to obtaining birth control, as well as religious infringes, the United States needs to pass comprehensive legislation protecting and expanding women’s access to birth control. The approval by the FDA of Natural Cycles is an excellent start that will affect many women, yet women who chose other methods or need other methods to curtail personal conditions are not protected. Federal legislation should be pursued to include the following:

Allow pharmacies to write prescriptions

Allowing pharmacies to write birth control prescriptions ensures that women have an ease of access to vital medicine while still receiving a consultation. If a woman has any questions on birth control types or situations, she has a trained professional to ask who won’t cost her. This method is also necessary for contraception deserts where alternative medical professionals are not available.  

Allow prescriptions to be sent via mail

Contraception deserts tend to be in rural areas, away from many medical professionals and urban areas. Women in these areas must be allotted the same rights to birth control as women elsewhere, and thus should be able to revenue medication through the mail. Mail prescriptions have already been proven to be highly affected in these areas, and the opportunity should be afforded to all American women.

Restore protections to birth control under all health care plans irrespective of  the provider

Companies that refuse to provide their employees with access to birth control are not only overstepping their bounds as a capitalist business but are also imposing their beliefs on their employees. All Americans are free to pursue their own belief system and to not be coerced into a certain religion. The federal government should protect this right by imposing a level rule over health care: companies should not be able to opt out and disproportionately affect their employees. Furthermore, this precedent opens door to refusing such services as antidepressants and anesthesia, to name two medications opposed by various religions.

Conclusion

Birth control is a divisive topic in America, yet it helps both individual women and the enhancement of the American society and economy. Certain companies and states are making headway via online access with enormous success, and should be considered an ideal for the future, yet the government needs to act to apply these benefits across all 50 states. To best serve American citizens and to yield the highest possible results for the country, birth control should be made more accessible through health care protection and ease of access.