Anonymous the Insurgency

The domains of war have expanded over time from land, sea, air, and even to space. In 1995, the United States (U.S.) military added cyber as the fifth dimension of military operations. Insurgent groups operate in all or some of these domains, but with the increasing capabilities of technology enhancing the way humans interact with one another and with the world, a new phenomenon is occurring. The cyber domain has the capacity to affect all other domains. This new domain has caused a change in the way insurgent groups operate. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has formed a formidable “media conglomerate” utilizing online social networking systems and Houthi rebels are taking advantage of drone technology. Cyberspace has also allowed for the creation of a new type of insurgent group, a cyber insurgency, which has similar objectives to traditional insurgencies but differ in nature and means of success.

“Anonymous” is a hacktivist group that has disrupted the internet operations of businesses, governments and social groups since they began in 2006. For example, in 2010, Wikileaks released U.S. diplomatic cables, and as a result, the U.S. government pressured Amazon, MasterCard, and Paypal to disrupt the financial operations of Wikileaks. Anonymous defended Wikileaks by initiating a series of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks under the name “Operation Payback.” The group has also targeted the Swedish, Zimbabwean and Tunisian governments in an effort to promote free speech and open internet borders. On another occasion, Anonymous retaliated against the Tunisian government in early 2011 under the name #OpTunisia in opposition to the president Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali’s censorship of Wikileaks and Tunileaks. In addition to business and government, Anonymous has targeted the Church of Scientology and the Westboro Baptist Church by taking over their websites and phone systems and executing DDoS attacks to disrupt access to their resources. Anonymous is a non-state actor that disrupts operations and seeks to promote the central ideology of an open and free internet. The attacks seek to undermine the legitimacy of various government and business platforms as a response to censorship. The question then remains, is Anonymous an insurgent group?

An insurgency is a political movement by a non-state actor that aims to achieve legitimacy. Insurgent groups work outside of the political system in order to bring about change to the system within a state or region. Bard O’Neill defines insurgency as “a struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the non-ruling group consciously uses political resources and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy.” Anonymous is a movement by a non-ruling group that concentrates around the struggle to achieve a free internet. They are an insurgent group especially because they operate outside of the political system and use political resources specific to cyber to sustain their non-state persona that maintains legitimacy on the internet. Furthermore, although Anonymous does not assert any explicit political goals due to the lack of central governance, their overall aim can be described as the promotion of minimal governance on the web. Their stance towards the government demonstrates that “rather than the overthrow of a government, they seek, in their own words, independence from those governments. But, in truth, that independence is premised on weakening political authority over the cyber domain that Anonymous inhabits.” Paul Rosenweig assesses that the opposition to government interference is a type of political aim which categorizes insurgents. Although Rosenweig’s overall assessments are arguably outdated, he makes a notable point in that cyberspace limits Anonymous. Due to this, Anonymous does not perfectly fit within the definition of insurgency because of the restrictions cyberspace presents when adopting traditional techniques that insurgents employ in the kinetic world.

Anonymous’ techniques demonstrate that cyberspace confines this group but can also share similarities with insurgencies. When Anonymous wants to initiate an attack, unlike most insurgencies, they cannot command an action at will. They follow a three-step cycle to execute a cyberattack. The initiating Anons first recruit people to their cause using an online campaign. The organizers will use communication channels such as Facebook, YouTube and other platforms to rally support for a specific cause. Similar to the recruiting techniques of ISIS, Anonymous posts videos calling people to action and systematically forms networks of online activists to contribute to the attack. After recruitment, the group members initiate the “reconnaissance and application attack phase” in which they gather intelligence on the source and employ software to compromise data stored on end systems implementing methods such as SQL injection attacks or cross site scripting. These methods allow hackers to compromise data on a computer to gather stored information.  After the perpetrators harvest the data, the final phase is the DDoS attack stage by employing help from people sympathetic to their cause. Each individual downloads the attack software and begins the coordinated DDoS. Much like a terrorist group, Anonymous uses spectacle as a means to meet their goals. The techniques adopted by Anonymous elucidate the political resources used through the internet to sustain and reformulate the idea of a free internet by attacking any entity that limits this internet ideology.

The question of violence is one attribute that calls into question Anonymous' candidacy for insurgency. Although Anonymous does not pursue traditional violent means, their actions are normatively aggressive in the scope of the domain. When situated within electrical networks, the traditional kinetic violence does not exist. Violence is separate or set apart from other phenomenon as Hannah Arendt expresses, and it is intentional destructive harm to gain. It is separate because those who carry out violence and those who experience it have certain repercussions or safeguards that the government affords them due to the government’s traditional role of a monopoly on violence. Because violence constitutes destructive harming, cyber-attacks are violent when the perpetrator intends to produce harm within the frame of the attack. Anonymous acts in a manner to impair any forces that go against their open internet ideology which encompasses the notion of destructive harming. The agency behind Anonymous’ attacks constitutes violence but not in the traditional sense due to the cyber frame.

Anonymous cannot be completely described as an insurgent group, but this hacktivist group still merits attention because of the damage they can inflict on business and government operations; therefore, a new term is necessary. Anonymous is the old made new; it is a cyber-insurgency. Anonymous uses traditional mechanisms within the scope of its attack domain to achieve political goals. Although it does not go beyond its domain, within the internet, it coordinates attacks and creates chaos as all insurgencies do. The goals of this hacktivist entity are situated in a free internet, so they may not merit the “insurgency” title in the traditional sense, but Anonymous is more than just a cyber threat, this group is a new brand of insurgency namely, a cyber insurgency. 

Brazil Takes Off as Washington-Beijing Trade Dispute Grows

Despite working to meet a December 15th trade agreement, dubbed “Phase I,” President Trump has repeatedly threatened to increase the levied tariffs on Chinese imports should one not be reached. United States (U.S.) Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer explains that Phase I only includes about 35 percent of the total trade discussion with China. Despite Washington and Beijing inching closer to an initial agreement, the world’s two largest economies maintain tariffs on a combined total of more than half a trillion dollars of goods, with rates ranging from 5 percent to 30 percent. The tariffs continue the Trump Administration’s critique of China and its trade practices with the United States. 

In 2018, trade of goods and services between the two countries (two-way trade) totaled US$737.1 billion, with total exports valued at US$179.3 billion and total imports valued at US$557.9 billion. Such values put China as the U.S.’ single largest trading partner by total traded goods and services. Despite this, President Trump has maintained his harsh critique of the Chinese, fulfilling a campaign promise to combat China’s alleged unfair trade practices. As the U.S.-China trade dispute wages on with both sides retaliating with additional tariffs, Brazil —namely Brazilian farmers— have emerged as beneficiaries of the confrontation.

Chinese Trade with Brazil

Since the beginning of the trade dispute in 2017, Chinese firms have been shifting to Brazilian agriculture products. For Instance, Brazil passed the U.S. as the world’s largest soybean producer and exporter as a result of the increased demand from China—a demand increase of more than 20 percent. Brazil’s dominance in soybean production was not unforeseen; in fact, between 2011 and 2018, the overall production of the crop in the country has nearly doubled to 119.3 million metric tons and is expected to reach nearly 129 million metric tons by 2027. Since President Trump began his anti-China trade rhetoric, Brazilian soybean exports’ value swelled by US$13.86 billion, while American farmers will be left with an unwanted “record high level of ending stock,” as exports to China will be one-third of what they have been for the last few years. As a result, competitive Brazilian farmers have directly benefited from the trade dispute, while American farmers have truly felt the negative effects of the trade dispute. While Beijing and Washington work on finding common ground to settle their trade dispute in Phase I, Brazilian officials remain confident that they can retain the increase in trade. 

While trade between Brazil and China has a lesser two-way trade value than that of the U.S. relationship, Brazilian trade with its Asian counterpart has increased by 170% within the last decade, to nearly 100 billion dollars, according to Brazil’s Ministry of Economy. During the same period, trade between the U.S. and China grew by only 68 percent. China has been Brazil’s largest trading partner, ahead of the U.S. for nearly a decade. To further emphasize Chinese engagement with Brazil, 2017 Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Brazil was US$19.5 billion, comprising 31.9 percent of the total global FDI destined for Brazil; in contrast, Chinese FDI in the U.S. was valued at US$39.5 billion, more than double of that in Brazil. However, Brazil was the largest recipient of China FDI in South America. As tensions between the U.S. and China unravel as a result of the trade dispute, Chinese firms have looked at other markets to import necessary products from. One beneficiary of this market exploration is Brazil. The South American nation, home to nearly 210 million people, has experienced a direct increase in two-way trade and improved diplomatic relations with China. However, Brazil’s recently elected president made some in Beijing uneasy about China’s relations with Brazil.

Bolsonaro’s Evolving Chinese Trade Rhetoric

Despite China’s investments in Brazil, President Jair Bolsonaro had been a harsh critic of Chinese investors. In October of 2018, the same year Bolsonaro was elected with an 11 percent margin, the then-president-elect warned, “what we need is to become aware that China is buying Brazil, not buying in Brazil, it is buying Brazil.” Importantly, Brazil’s president is often referred to as the “Trump of the Tropics,” for his similar rhetoric on social, political, and economic topics, including his critique of China. In a March 2019 speech at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Bolsonaro’s Minister of the Economy, Paulo Guedes, went on to state that “Temos um presidente que adora a América,” translating to “We have a president that loves America.” 

However, President Bolsonaro’s criticism of his Chinese counterparts has not dissuaded new investments in the country. In fact, according to the Brazilian Ministry of Planning, Development and Management (now a division of the Ministry of Economy) from 2016-2018, Chinese firms announced 11 greenfields and 38 brownfield investments, a total investment value of US$19.4 billion. Greenfield investments, defined as a form of FDI, is when a firm establishes operations in a foreign company and constructs new facilities. Alternatively, brownfield investments are considered as an operational expansion of a company in a foreign market, normally seen as the expansion of an existing facility. Such investment activity indicates a long-term commitment on the part of Chinese firms to invest in Brazil. Despite President Bolsonaro’s previous rhetorical repudiations of Chinese investments, the country is actually drawing closer to China, its largest trading partner. 

Notably, the Brazilian-Chinese relationship has changed as President Bolsonaro altered his tone with China. In October, while the U.S.-China trade meetings dragged on, a Brazilian delegation including the president visited multiple countries in Asia, most significantly China. There, President Bolsonaro not only made amends with his Chinese counterparts regarding the remarks he made during his campaign trail but also signed two trade protocols and outlined strategic growth in the relationship. He went on to assure that the Brazilian and Chinese governments are "completely aligned in a way that reaches beyond our commercial and business relationship.” Preserving such a relationship is crucial to the Bolsonaro Administration, which inherited a sluggish economy with high unemployment and inflation. 

Thus far, the administration has worked diligently to position Brazil more competitively on the global stage by pushing reforms in the areas of pension and tax, easing government regulation in select industries, and negotiating foreign trade agreements with individual nations and economic unions. All these initiatives ultimately pushing for economic liberalization. In the meantime, Brazil will be the beneficiary of the U.S.-China trade dispute as escalations make a final resolution between the two countries more difficult. 

Moving Forward

While Brazil’s new government is at the center of domestic and international controversy, that parallels the political polarization in the U.S., the government has taken proper economic initiatives to stimulate its sluggish economy. By proposing and passing vital reforms, Brazil has an opportunity to catapult its industries to the world stage and develop one of the “world’s most closed big economies”. The government has already announced two of the country’s largest trade agreements in its history between MERCOSUR, the European Union, and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), valued at nearly US$22 trillion and US$1.1 trillion, respectively.

China’s agricultural purchases in Brazil and direct investment have also contributed to the necessary fundamental changes and economic opening that is needed in Brazil. However, it is important that Brazil holds its neutrality in the trade dispute between the U.S. and China, as noted by Vice-President Hamilton Mourão in a meeting last month with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing. While China is Brazil’s largest trading partner by value, historically, the U.S. imports a greater amount of higher value-added products, such as aerospace and heavy machinery products. While this may be true in the past, China’s new-founded interest in diversifying its investments in Brazil, beyond purchasing low value-added goods, could reshape political ties, as already slightly seen with Bolsonaro’s revised rhetoric. 

Until then, Brazil will continue to silently draw itself closer to China amidst the Washington-Beijing trade dispute and push necessary reforms to develop its domestic industries to a formidable global competitor.

The Perils of Democracy: Analyzing the Gradual Rise in Nationalism Among its Institutions

Democratic institutions are created with the consent of the people. More importantly, however, democracy can only remain stable and in power when the leader continues to act with the greater good’s interests in mind. People have always been at odds regarding what democracy truly constitutes, a tension that has increased since the end of the Cold War. Still, even with its systemic flaws, it is commonly believed that this form of government is the best model and that there is no better alternative. However, it is important to address shortcomings as democracy is not stagnant; in the context of democracy as a society, a political body, and an economy, it has inevitably changed over time. 

One such area that requires attention is the perceived value of nationalism. Research scholar Ghia Nodia describes how nationalism and democracy coexist in almost a permanent state of tension. According to Nodia, Western social values often teach us to see democracy as the hero and nationalism as the villain, while in reality, this is not necessarily the case. Nationalism, through a political lens, can be perceived as necessary in that it instills its people with a sense of patriotism, which a successful government requires in a specific class of people: the military. However, as Spohn and Sauer explore in “War zeal, nationalism, and unity in Christ” during World War I, even German Protestant theologians and church leaders were exceptionally susceptible to nationalism and war zeal, resulting in evangelical missions that spurred the cause for war among the masses. Religion evidently plays a large role in the proliferation of nationalist views. This seems plausible in some instances because religion as a doctrine, often teaches its devotees that tradition is the greatest principle and that their actions must seek to preserve this virtue, including a country’s identity. However, this cannot be generalized to all religions because of the differing interpretations of texts by priests or religious leaders.

Although nationalism is integral to the internal fabric of a political body, more often than not, it leads to its destruction. It is important to consider what type of nationalism is present when analyzing its effects on a specific country, however. For example, in sub-Saharan Africa, specifically focusing on the Democratic Republic of Congo, nationalism spread as a political tool. The standing government at the time used nationalism to suppress the opposition and sideline divisions among the citizenry that would otherwise pose a threat to the leadership’s power. This explains much of the instability in the region, the constant riots, and overall civil unrest, because artificially-created nationalism by the ruling class was pushed onto the people instead of “achieved nationalism,” which is rather realized by the people on their own through a sense of pride and trust for their representatives. Achieved nationalism then seems like it would be the most successful in maintaining democracy.

Nonetheless, this is not always true. In addition to religion, the changing desires of the electorate is a driving force behind the formation of nationalist perspectives. In particular, India is a region that has time and time again seen the repercussions of this prevailing attitude. Indians, tired of being oppressed by their British conquerors, sought independence from Britain to be able to have their well-deserved freedom--freedom to shape their own institutions, their own industries, their own national life. They achieved this by uniting together to throw the foreign forces out, resulting in an increased sense of nationalism. 

However, this nationalism quickly deteriorated into polarization with the conflict between the Hindu majority and Muslim minority escalating to the point of division, an ensuing trauma that continues today. The rise of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Indian politics can be attributed to nationalism. When Modi first came into the public eye, he portrayed himself as a man of the people, a common man with a modest background as a tea vendor at a local train station. His rallying calls to put India first, to rebuild the economy by providing greater infrastructure and jobs, appealed to voters of all classes. He represented the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), or the Indian People’s Party, a name which itself reflects an ideology that prizes the collective people. Through this image, he was able to champion himself as a man of the people, in contrast to his opponents, and easily won with a sweeping majority of the votes. Modi’s popularity among the people has allowed him to seemingly get away with just about anything. Most recently, Indian citizens and their belief in Modi were tested when the tensions in Kashmir escalated. By unjustifiably removing Article 370, which would remove special protections for the regions, Modi put not only India at stake, but also the people of Jammu-Kashmir, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, as well as the very meaning of democracy. This has become such a contentious topic between the Western world denouncing Modi’s actions and his partisans praising him. When I conducted interviews with my own family in India, all of them said they support Modi, claiming that he is simply helping the region of Kashmir, which had been torn politically, economically, and socially ever since its creation, and that India has the right to take over and protect the Hindu minority in the area. In their eyes, at the same time, Western media portrays a different story: that Modi is akin to an authoritarian, taking land from the people of Kashmir like the British did in India. 

There are countless examples of populism devolving into dictatorships, such as those seen in Hungary, Turkey, and Venezuela where the concentration of power in the hands of the elected leaders and their changing behaviors slowly diminish the people’s trust in democracy. Mirroring Modi’s election, these respective candidates won in the first place because they seemed to be “the people’s men.” Not fulfilling these promises leaves people unhappy and creates a class that is ripe for the revolution, a truth that these leaders clearly ignore or simply do not care about. In fact, this was one of the pressures that culminated in the Arab Spring uprisings. Due to the people’s discontent with their government, there was an overwhelming sense of anti-nationalism, which “propelled discourse about liberation from an oppressive regime,” and the lack of nationalism also leads to factionalism within the regional states as well, leading to a shift in power from the federal to the state governments, in turn harming the ruling body itself. 

These rulers are able to methodically rise to power and stay in power by ridding themselves of any possible threats by first deeming that the opposition is misrepresenting the leader’s actions and branding them with the trait of anti-nationalism. Using the bully pulpit as a medium to disseminate false and spiteful views, the leader traps the uneducated and uninformed, who fall into a mobocracy that becomes increasingly polarized, with one side supporting the leader while the other protests and seeks to promote change. This is seen most evidently with the current democratic state of the United States. Donald Trump, similar to Modi, was able to attain his presidency by appealing to the common, working-class people of American society, by promising jobs, a better economy, among others. He works under a false image of devotion to the country; rather, as Lepore writes, patriotism is animated by love, nationalism by hatred. 

Once the president or leading governing body has planted the seeds for nationalism, however, it is natural to ponder as to who sows these seeds and ensures the views prosper. Inevitably, because democracy is authorized by the consent of the people, even a nationalist leader would not be able to maintain a stable polity without their support. This is where social media comes in. When Twitter was founded in 2006, it was meant to be a platform of communication and expression, a way to stay up to date with issues whether on a person or a global level. Originally, it was just used by the common person and not given much attention by the government or its agencies. But things quickly changed with Twitter becoming a medium for hate speech. Note that it is not a question here as to whether or not hate speech should be allowed, but rather here the focus is on its relation to nationalism as a result of the discourse of the time. The propagation of such hate groups is often linked with physical attacks against minorities. Although hate speech and hate crime do not always have a direct correlation, speech often serves as a catalyst due to its sometimes incendiary and dividing nature; this is seen with how white supremacist groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan, operate with a select group of people instigating and stirring the disgruntled masses. According to statistics released by the FBI, it is clear that hate crimes are seeing no decline as in 2017 alone, over eight-thousand hate crime offenses were reported. These groups continue the cycle that began with the President all in a fake sham of nationalism. 

Again, it is necessary to consider why countries value a degree of nationalism.  As expressed in Nationalism and Democracy:

“Patriotic celebration of such things may grate on the sensibilities of individualistic liberals, but it offers no threat to ethnic minorities. On the contrary, a custom of tolerance for minorities can also become a point of national pride, as it has in the case of many Americans or citizens of other long-established democratic nations.”

In this sense, a celebration of diversity warrants feelings of nationalism. Yet, it is difficult not to find these words ironic. In a country founded on the back of immigrants and minorities, people of color are still discriminated against, with those with darker skin facing the most backlash. In addition to being underrepresented in public office and Congress, minorities feel unheard by their president. For Americans to truly be able to feel a sense of national pride in terms of their treatment of minorities then, they must take a step back and reflect on whether or not America is the same for all, or if it is a living nightmare for others. 

Countries such as the United States and India, now through its pursuits in Kashmir, as well as other well-developed and developing democracies, continue fearlessly in their endless goals of nation-building. However, given the assessment of the existence of nationalism and other autocratic tendencies, the first step is for these countries to pay greater attention and focus their political and sociological research and studies towards this exact question. Then, once the root of the problem is identified along with any other possible factors, policymakers must act to find a solution after which they can report to their officials. Convening in a national conference, global leaders can then discuss how to better the circumstances and decide whether or not compromise is necessary. While this background work is being done to widen our knowledge on the issue, if a country must intervene in the affairs of another, to help form or stabilize democracy, the least harmful method would be to station a few troops in the region--this way the country can maintain indirect control without doing anything that will cause harm in the long run. But until then, one must keep a vigilant eye on the upcoming United States 2020 presidential election.

The Enigmatic Economics of Argentina

An oft-cited bit of wisdom in the field of international economics is a quote by Nobel laureate Simon Kuznets, who argued that there are four types of countries in the world: developed, underdeveloped, Japan, and Argentina. For decades, the case of Argentina has confounded economists, political scientists, and observers of international politics alike. A pendulum has swung from liberal democracy to military dictatorship and back, overseeing rapid transformation from late 19th-century growth to 20th-century depression and hyperinflation. Once thought to challenge Brazil for regional primacy, Argentina now more closely resembles a boomerang. When Argentines went to the polls on October 27, they voiced their displeasure with the center-right regime of Mauricio Macri and declared that the boomerang will come back again in the form of president-elect Alberto Fernandez. With mounting anti-democratic, right-wing populism on the rise in Peru and in power in Brazil and countervailing anti-corruption movements sweeping the region, establishing sound democratic and economic institutions is as crucial as ever if Argentina is to be spared from the same fate of turmoil. 

A Short History of Argentine Economics 

In the early 1900s, the future of Argentina appeared promising. Just this mere century ago, Argentina rivaled an upstart and industrializing United States, as both rode the first wave of globalization in the 20th century. Its economy, facilitated by livestock exports to Europe and the labor of immigrants from Europe, entered World War I among the ten largest in the world, and its average per capita income was vastly superior to that of Italy, Portugal, and Spain. The idea that the Argentine economy would see anything less than an absolute boom given its potential at the time would seem to have been unbelievable. 

Yet the economy is worse off today than it was in 1913. While the early 1900s were a tremendous time to be a farmer in the Americas, it would not last forever. When the United States followed the British model of industrialization, it was set up to take advantage of the new economy while its Argentine counterpart, still dependent on borrowing foreign cash to distribute beef to foreign markets, was not. As soon as 1930, meat exports to continental Europe had decreased by two-thirds from their 1924 level. 

The Great Depression further exacerbated things. Between 1929 and 1932, the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 25 percent. Yet the elite political class in Argentina, with its deep distrust of government intervention in the market, refrained from taking the dramatic social-democratic actions that were undertaken by American president Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the economy continued its decline. 

The controversial reign of Juan Perón presented a mixed bag for Argentina later. From 1945 to 1955, the Perón administration nationalized key industries, such as the Central Bank and the railways, and instituted generous social welfare policies. Inflation rose and persisted, averaging 26 percent from 1944 to 1974, but the modest GDP growth the country experienced during this time was quite well-distributed. Enforcement of minimum wage laws and the expansion of health insurance programs led to increases in real wages and the development of the largest and most unionized middle class in South America at the time. By the time the military dictatorship of 1976-1983 left office, the labor rights instituted by Perón were wiped out and the anti-democratic behaviors he engaged in were further legitimized. 

What followed over the next few decades was a period of neoliberal, market-based reforms that focused on opening Argentina to the global economy via agricultural exports and drastically reducing spending in accordance with the recommendations of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Each time this path was undertaken, the results were disastrous, with foreign debt accumulating and increased poverty and unemployment. The worst of these crises came in 2001; after the economy contracted by 15 percent in less than two years, more than half the population fell into poverty, and the country defaulted on almost $100 billion in foreign debt. 

The election of Macri, a businessman and former president of legendary football club Boca Juniors, energized conservative hopes for economic recovery. Yet as his presidency comes to a close, it is evident that no such economic recovery manifested. Even after he instituted market-oriented reforms, anxiety among foreign investors mounted, and ultimately, foreign capital dried up. He piled on foreign debt and sought the largest bailout in the history of the IMF, some five times the size of the package approved to stave off economic collapse in Egypt. With budget cuts constricting economic growth and equality, GDP is expected to decrease by three percent while the very inflation he sought to curb has increased to over 55 percent, a higher number than any other country in Latin America besides Venezuela. Furthermore, Fitch, one of the Big Three American credit rating agencies, changed Argentina’s credit rating from B to CCC, indicating a significant increase in financial precarity. Once a safe bet for economic development, Argentina is now in full free-fall. 

Persistent Challenges: Corruption and Weak Institutions 

At the root of Argentina’s economic issues are its struggles with corruption and unstable democratic and economic institutions. Declining faith in government and institutions like the central bank and the judiciary have sustained the country’s state of crisis. Despite the common umbrella of Peronism, the members of the political movement were fiercely divided. Perón himself deemed left-wing Peronists immature and enlisted his right-wing guerrilla allies to target them. This manifested in the fascist Minister of Social Welfare Jóse López Rega forming the Triple-A alliance, a far-right death squad that carried out acts of terrorism against moderate and left-wing opponents of the regime. Furthermore, in its later days, the Perón regime began detaining people indefinitely without a trial, a drastic shift in human rights in Argentina. With dissent stifled and liberal values like human rights cascading off the Argentine political map, faith in democracy reached a low point. This would be exacerbated by the U.S.-backed military coup that installed a military dictatorship from 1976 to 1983. While approval of the military and more independent civil-military relations was previously high, the human rights abuses (torture and forced disappearances) carried out by the military during the period known as the Dirty War (or the “Época de los desaparecidos”) resulted in a decline in approval of these hallmarks of democratic states and democracy itself. But broad disapproval of liberal values alone does not explain the instability and lack of sufficient development in Argentina. Corruption continues to be a major issue impeding development. Nowhere is this more evident than in the judiciary, which is independent of both politics and outside interference in name only. Odeberecht, the Brazilian construction company in the midst of a multinational bribery scandal (including an estimated $35 million in bribes paid in Argentina, including donating millions to Macri’s campaign), has faced almost no legal recourse. When state-owned enterprises were privatized in the 1990s by President Carlos Menem, fraud and kickbacks were an open secret. Yet today, Menem is a legislator, not a prisoner. Impunity is the norm rather than something that is to be avoided. 

Declining faith in the judiciary is yet another lightning rod that amplifies the class conflict in Argentina. When powerful politicians and multinationals get away with committing fraud and bribery, it sends a message to ordinary civilians that the elites will always win, a message the Argentine people are all too familiar with. The legacy of politicians more concerned with an ideological crusade against socialism than supporting their citizens during a global economic depression looms in this regard. The chief factor holding back the independence of the judiciary and corruption reform is a poorly-designed plea bargain system. The 2016 law reforming the plea bargain system regrettably limits cooperation agreements to a small group of crimes, excluding such important and major crimes as criminal fraud. Cooperating witnesses are also rewarded only for evidence related to the case in which they are charged, though they may have evidence of unrelated crimes. These pointless restrictions make responsibly prosecuting corruption next to impossible and they must be dropped if Argentina is ever going to establish a viable liberal democracy for, by, and of the people. The central bank is another issue of institutional credibility. Turnover has plagued the institution, thereby inhibiting its consistency in monetary policy. It has had 23 different presidents in 36 years. Furthermore, even as most central banks in Latin America enshrined independence from the federal executive branch into their central banks during the regional hyperinflationary crisis, Argentina resisted the trend. Macri’s own selection for chair of the central bank blamed the current economic struggles on government interference in monetary policy. 

Argentina was once a rising economic star on par with the United States. Yet the downward trajectory of Macri’s political career is all too familiar to the Argentine people, who have spent the last half-century constricted by austerity and an insufficient social safety net while their elites escaped accountability for their misdeeds. Their frustrations were heard in the election of Fernandez and maybe, just maybe, their concerns will be reflected in the new administration’s policies. 

The Gambian Crisis Three Years Later: A Retrospective

In late January 2017, two presidents were inaugurated. Donald Trump took over as the President of the United States on the 20th in front of a decently large crowd on the national mall in Washington. He would take charge of the world's most powerful military and largest economy in a turn of events that sparked fears of a rising autocratic government. One day later, on the other side of the Atlantic, long-standing President of Gambia Yahya Jammeh stepped down and allowed the democratically elected leader Adama Barrow to assume office. In contrast to the situation in Washington, the resolution of the Gambian crisis marked a major success for advocates of democracy, global governance, and peaceful conflict resolution. Using the Gambian Crisis as a blueprint, we can determine how the international community can support a similar democratic transition in the future.    

The Gambia is an incredibly small West African country that is surrounded by Senegal and is only about 10,000 square kilometers large, with roughly 2 million Gambians along the shore of the Gambia River. The Gambia's woes started in the late 17th century, with Britain and France exchanging control over the region until Britain made it a colony in 1856. It was then granted its independence in 1965.  Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara would serve as president from 1970 to 1994, when Jammeh, a military officer, would take power in a coup against the government. Jammeh took over from a corrupt, though incredibly democratic government that had taken some strides towards economic development. Despite only being the 168th largest economy, based around tourism and agriculture, Jammeh was able to suck the country dry over his 22 years in office. He would embezzle nearly $1 billion in public funds and illegal timber revenue during his reign, leaving the country severely underdeveloped. In 1993, just before Jammeh took over, the nation’s GDP per capita stood at $710 per capita. In 2016, the last year of his rule, it stood at $620 per capita.

Jammeh would also prop up his rule with what Human Rights Watch described in 2015 as a “State of Fear,” heavily featuring summary executions, disappearances, arbitrary detention, and torture against “journalists, human rights defenders, student leaders, religious leaders, political opposition members, judiciary officials, lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people, and security force personnel, among others.'' He governed with boastful claims and a cult of personality, once claiming that he could cure AIDS with magical powers as nearly 21,000 Gambians were left without necessary anti-HIV medication. The oppression of the Gambians was mostly ignored. The Gambia was and still is viewed by many nations and international actors as a strategically unimportant backwater, both in political and economic terms. Also, the outbreak of civil wars in nearby Ivory Coast, Liberia, and Sierra Leone drew regional and international attention away from his regime.

Things would come to a head on December 1st, 2016 when Gambians went to the polls for the presidential elections. Jammeh had won the last three elections, though they, according to the UN, featured “widespread rigging and voter intimidation.” Standing for the opposition was Adama Barrow, a former real estate developer who was largely unknown to the Gambian public and was a unity candidate selected by a previously fractured opposition. This unity and general anger at Jammeh lead to an electoral upset, with Barrow earning 45.5% of total votes, while Jammeh received 36.6 percent. As the results shocked the country, Jammeh would shock the country even further by offering his concession and congratulations to Barrow, saying “the Gambian people have spoken and I have no reason to contest the will of the mighty Allah,” promising “guidance on your transition and when selecting a government.” Jammeh would, however, quickly reverse course. On December 9th, Jammeh called for a new election, citing irregularities. Barrow would flee over the border to neighboring Senegal the same day. The stage was set for a confrontation that would determine the future of the country. 

The international community quickly took the side of Barrow. The most notable Barrow ally was the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a regional block which contains 15 states, most notably Nigeria, Ghana, and Senegal. Barrow was signed in as President on January 19th in the Gambian embassy at Dakar. The United Nations Security Council unanimously threw their support behind ECOWAS if Jammeh did not step aside, though emphasized the desire for a political resolution first. Thousands of western tourists evacuated and tens of thousands of Gambians would flee across the Senegalese border in anticipation of violence. Jammeh would, eventually, step aside. He resigned on January 22nd just before the ECOWAS intervention was scheduled to begin. He did not have much choice in the matter. The Gambian army only numbered about 900 soldiers. In contrast, the ECOWAS force significantly outnumbered them as well as assumed complete control of Gambia’s airspace and waterways. To make matters worse for Jammeh, Chief of Defence Staff Ousman Badjie announced that he would surrender against an ECOWAS intervention force. Barrow would take full power over the country on the 26th, and then the crisis was over.

Barrow has had mixed success in his nearly three years in office. The country's human rights record has improved, and Barrow was able to raise nearly 1.7 billion Euros at a May 2018 International Donor Conference. But corruption, poverty, and political gridlock have been roughly the same as they were when Jammeh was in power. While some of the blame lays on Barrow, some of the issues are caused by excess security spending and a high level of debt inherited from Jammeh. Even with the mixed record, the situation in The Gambia can only be described as a success for the international community. The international community was able to swiftly enforce the will of the people in a nonviolent fashion to remove an authoritarian and corrupt leader from office. But how was this model so effective, and could it be applied in future situations?

First, it is important that international consensus in favor of intervention is reached quickly and delivered forcefully. The best way to achieve this international consensus is to shift the focus from large global bodies such as the UN Security Council to smaller regional organizations such as ECOWAS. Since there are fewer states in a regional body consensus is far easier reached there as compared to global bodies with far more stakeholders involved. The case of the Gambia shows that if the regional body is willing to take on the burden of intervention and peacekeeping, global bodies like the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) will quickly approve the mission. This is because they don't want to take on the burden of these types of missions, so an opportunity to punt the responsibility will be quickly taken. This holds for areas that are viewed as strategically unimportant by the west, such as The Gambia, where this type of crisis more frequently occurs. Also, this shift would lead to a less hierarchical world order. The era of non-African nations trying to govern Africans from the UNSC would diminish, and the idea of “African Solutions for African Problems” would finally take hold.   

Second, there must be an exit strategy for the dictator. No one will relinquish power if they feel that their life would be threatened if they did. In contrast with most comparable situations, ECOWAS was civil with Jammeh. The former president is in exile in Equatorial Guinea, with most of his ill-gotten wealth. The final agreement guarantees “the dignity, respect, security and rights of former President Jammeh.” Some might question the morality of such a clause. It can be argued that we are letting human rights abusers off the hook for their crimes. But if immunity isn't guaranteed, then the abusers would never peacefully relinquish power. Less death and destruction is always the best outcome, even if justice is not fully served. Most likely it wouldn't have been served either way as most dictators don't let themselves fall into enemy hands alive. Take two case studies in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Tunisia let its old dictator, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, take exile in Saudi Arabia without facing justice. Libya’s dictator, Moammar Gaddafi, got hit with an arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court. On paper, Libya got the better deal. While Tunisians would never get justice for the crimes committed against them, Libyans would. This is not how things panned out. Tunisia would become one of the only democracies to emerge out of the Arab Spring, in part because it was free from the influence of its old leadership. In contrast, Libya collapsed into an incredibly violent state of anarchy and civil war, with Gaddafi dying at the hands of rebels before he ever faced a courtroom or true justice. Libya's fate was at least partially caused by Gaddafi's unwillingness to surrender in the face of a near-certain life sentence at the Hague.          

Third, the security services are the key. One of the main reasons Jammeh resigned was because his army was unwilling and unable to defend his rule. When the army deserts the dictator, two things become true. First, the intervention is given near-guaranteed success because they face no opposition. Second, the amount of death and destruction in the country will be significantly lower as the transfer of power becomes significantly more peaceful. The question of how to get the army to desert depends on the situation. One of the best ways would be to exploit the political nature of militaries in much of the developing world. Promises of additional power and some measured support to military leaders could make all the difference in the world. Another, as was the case in the Gambia, is the deployment of overwhelming force. Militaries have historically surrendered in the face of overwhelming opposing forces rather than face certain death. This is because the decision to surrender is usually one made out of self-preservation. We saw this in The Gambia, with the Gambian military refusing to fight against the far superior ECOWAS force. Regardless of how it is achieved, flipping the military should be the priority. It is the founding pillar of the state. Take it out and the state cannot stand.

The case study of The Gambia does, however, have its shortcomings. First, Barrow has not fully transitioned the Gambia away from the issues that plagued Jammeh's regime. This cannot be fixed using the model of regional interventionism since the people will have already chosen their leader. The advantage still lies in the comparative. Even if Barrow isn't great, he is far better than Jammeh. Besides, leaders chosen domestically in elections are inherently more sustainable than leaders pick in other ways because they must have had popular support to be elected. Second, this model of regional intervention must require the region to want to intervene. The Gambia was in some ways unique because it was situated in a region that has experienced an upswell in democratic norms and a desire for legitimate governance. Combine that with Jammeh's regional unpopularity and ECOWAS has a strong motive to intervene. The Gambia is also so politically and economically small that there is no chance of major destabilization in the region or world. It is unknown whether the lessons learned in The Gambia can apply to the far more economically and politically important Egypt, for example.     

The successful resolution of The Gambian crisis heralds a potential new method of international governance and stability. A world where each region manages its internal security with global support and consent. A world where an attack on the will of the people in one country is an attack on the will of the people in all countries in the region. A world where the action is quick, peaceful, and decisive. It would certainly be a brave new world, one that will only exist if the nations of the world learn the lessons of the smallest nation in the least developed continent on the globe.  

Managing Multilingualism: Preserving the Linguistic Plurality

The reality of the current world is that, though there are a few dominant languages such as English, Spanish, or Arabic, oftentimes not even a country’s borders will accurately reflect the diversity of humanity’s linguistic heritage. Even though the world is defined by nation-states, there are minorities in virtually every state who often speak distinct languages that need to be cherished in order to show respect for their culture and preserve an entire way of thinking. To address the representation of the less dominant languages within their states, different states take different approaches; however, these laws are often not enforced properly and some languages are still left ignored. Even in today’s liberal world order, which should encourage political and public representation, these languages are tragically seeing a decline in public representation and the number of speakers. Thus, it is beneficial to examine and improve upon the laws currently existing to regulate the inclusion of minority languages and work towards making a more inclusive, diverse, and unified society. 

National vs. Official Language

A number of states have different laws pertaining to the designation of an official language and a national language. The main distinction to be made between the official and national language is that the official language is the language often mandated by a state’s founding documents and the language used in government and official proceedings, as well as one expected to be used as a definite lingua franca among speakers of different languages in that society. The national language, on the other hand, is the language spoken by the majority, and it has come to be identified as a national symbol of a certain group of people to be a more general legal description of a nation. Depending on the composition of a state’s culture and population, the relationship a country should have towards its national and official language(s) should preserve unity and peace of the society while also appreciating and promoting its potential for linguistic plurality. 

One National and Official Language 

France is one country that, although it is seeing an increase of speakers of different languages residing within its borders, is still reliant on French as both its national and official language. This is not only stated in the Constitution but also reinforced through the Toubon Law of 1994, which came as a response to the increasing use of English. This law dictates that all government documents, education, and advertisements must be in French; thus the French language is seen as a defining aspect of the country and the nation and is largely necessary in order to navigate around one’s daily life. However, publishers are still allowed to publish their work in any language they wish, commercials may be translated into French through footnotes, packaging can have translations in other languages, and the laws mandating French in the public sphere are not to infringe on the private life. Thus, there is not a need for an absolute use of French; however, the fact that French must be ever-present and is both the official and national language makes it more difficult to maintain the use of other languages, as children are exposed to French in school and media and do not need to rely on any language their parents are potentially using as much. This leads to the loss of the language in the long run. The existence of French as an ever-present language, on the other hand, makes it unifying in nature, as it is agreed that this is one language everyone would use to express themselves. This approach provides cohesiveness to society as everyone can understand each other and feel a sense of belonging in France. 

French still has this purpose in a number of African countries as well, where it is not always a national, but often at least the official language used to unify the speakers of different languages living in the same country. This is the case in Rwanda where Kinyarwanda may be the national language, but French is used for official purposes. This may lead to French eventually overpowering and becoming the national language as well as the official, as it has happened in countries such as Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo, as noted by Faingold in “Language rights and language justice.” A similar destiny beheld countries like Costa Rica and Venezuela, where Spanish became both national and official because of the pressure to have a unifying language without sufficient regard for how that would reflect on the number of speakers of other languages. While this approach may be ideal when it comes to the creation of national unity through language, it can prove to be very aggressive and detrimental towards other, often pre-colonial languages of the region, thus reaffirming the status quo of the post-colonial world.

Regional Languages

Spain is an example of a country that has one national and official language, Spanish. However, unlike neighboring France that has French as its national and official language and does not emphasize the integrity of regional or minority languages, Spain’s autonomous regions of Catalonia and Basque Country allow an elevation of Catalan and Basque to languages of greater regional importance. Whereas France does not have these autonomous regions and does not prevent people from publishing in their own language, the autonomous status of Catalonia, as Cultural Policies and Trends explains, dictates translation of government documents into Catalan. This makes it easier to live within a region majorly composed of the speakers of Catalan with the use of Catalan in daily life and in public spaces such as schools, TV programs, stores, public transportation, etc. This designation of a language other than the main Spanish has contributed to the maintenance of--and even an increase in--the number of speakers of Catalan and Basque and has also led to much hostility. Constant pushes against the autonomy and linguistic freedom assigned to these regions persisted in the history of Spain, especially during the area of the dictator Francisco Franco, who wanted to see a more unified and traditional Spain. This heritage led to violent protests and a political atmosphere that we can see to this day in Catalonia. Therefore, such designation of regional rights allowing the use of a certain language more extensively does allow, as Cultural Policies and Trends outlines, public representation of the language, such as on the street and in the news and government, and has a key role in preserving the number of speakers of the language; however, it also threatens to lead to disunion and a lack of cohesiveness and inclusivity in the long term as intolerance blooms on all sides and common ground is lost.

Absence of an Official or National Language

The U.S. is an example of a state without an official or national language. In the U.S., the Constitution makes no mention of the official language and all languages are legally regarded as equal; a person born in the United States could theoretically live a normal life without ever learning the dominant, de facto English. Although the dominantly-spoken English may not be required on TV or in schools, such as the case in France with French, English is still spoken by the majority of the US population. Knowledge of English is also one of the requirements when taking the citizenship test, which is one of the ways someone is designated as an “American”, so it could be argued that it is the national language. English is also necessary to obtain many jobs or participate in higher education. However, the absence of an official requirement of English makes it easier to request translations of official documents, allows for the participation of a greater amount of people in the economy, and makes it possible for many non-English or bilingual schools to exist, which supports children trying to maintain fluency in different languages. Additionally, the complexity of the U.S. identity prevents English from defining the national identity of a U.S. citizen, so it is lacking some components of a national language, especially compared to the French language which is not only the most spoken language in France but also has a long tradition of bonding society. 

This does not guarantee that the society will remain cohesive, as not having a unifying language leads to, as CNN points out, a questioning of how the national identity is defined. It also contributes to the problem of segregation, as immigrants either assimilate into the dominant English over time or are perceived as the other when they choose to only live alongside speakers of the same language and are unable to easily communicate their thoughts to English speakers. While the potential for otherization and self-segregation coming from this lack of an official unifying language is a reason for concern, by not having a national or official language the U.S. has the privilege of not being forced to follow the tragedy for multilingualism that was the empire of Spain. The Spanish Empire aggressively imposed a monolingual society upon a multilingual nation, which to this day leaves many nations struggling to protect the rights of speakers of minority languages. Instead of centralizing English and tragically recreating the linguistic experience of the Spanish empire and early English colonization, America should rather focus on using the linguistic fluidity offered by the Constitution, which did not label a national language, in order to create a society that is inclusive towards speakers of all languages, and try to restore the lost and forgotten native languages of North America. 

Other nations, such as Mexico, do not cite an official language and actively protect the language rights of minorities, including the many indigenous languages that are largely under threat now, as Faingold explains. This arrangement comes from the fact that, unlike in France, there is no need to protect the language of the majority as Spanish is dominant and not threatened, and the problem is rather ensuring the rights of the indigenous people, which is a model that the US could follow. While English and Spanish are the dominant languages of the Americas, the nations of the Americas should focus on separating themselves from the politics of a language equating a nation, which is often predominant in Europe and the “Old World”, and focus on using their inherent diversity to create a national identity that incorporates fully speakers of all languages.

Official Language with Provisions for Minorities

India is famous for being multiethnic and multilingual, but it also claims constitutionally that Hindu is used officially to unify the diverse provinces and allow for the cohesion of the many ethnicities. Unlike France, it allows many provisions to the variety of minority groups, and unlike Spain, it does not necessarily restrict this to regions to prevent partitioning. In practice, this means that schools are able to instruct in many different languages and there is freedom on how things are commercialized. Publications on the national level could also be in different languages. On the other hand, the higher education and courts operate in Hindu or English, due to the colonial heritage. This means that speakers of languages other than Hindu or English are at a great disadvantage when it comes to acquiring higher education and succeeding in “higher” levels of society. As Sharma observes, this translated into a decrease in publications in languages other than Hindu and English and a decrease in speakers of the minority languages as Hindu and English are necessitated for success in the society. This reduction in multilingualism in India is concerning, as the country is supposed to be priding itself in its very multilingual nature. 

Multiple Official and National Languages

Switzerland is a country that relies on German, French, Italian, and Romansch, and all except for Romansch have equal status as the official and national language. This means that government documents and proceedings, schools, TVs, and daily life, in general, could happen in any of those languages, and the majority of people are at least bilingual, so the system works. However, this not only makes taking off with Swiss airplanes very long as the welcoming and instructions are said in all languages but also, for some countries such as India, can result in a confusing, impossibly time-consuming translations. While the Swiss model is something to consider (and something that is also followed in multinational organizations such as the EU), it has its drawbacks of requiring reforms in the education system and huge investments in translations in order to also ensure that the society remains cohesive. 

Conclusion

To conclude, in a situation where many languages are spoken in a small area, it appears the easiest and most realistic approach is to have one lingua franca in order to ensure cohesiveness. However, this should not mean that all public affairs should occur only in one language. It would be especially dangerous for maintaining the number of speakers of a minority language, and thus ensuring that the language survives, to take the language outside of schools, TVs, and stores, as this most often leads to alienation of young generations from their mother tongues and reaffirms the domination of colonial heritage. Perhaps the idea of having one official language (so that there are grounds for mutual understanding), no national language (so speakers of all languages are seen as constituents of that nation and an inclusive environment is maintained), and many provisions to minority languages, especially when it comes to educational opportunities, so that the number of speakers is maintained, proves to be the best track of thinking in order to achieve a more just, welcoming, united, and tolerant society in the future.

Russia’s New Role as Mediator in the MENA Region

President Donald Trump made the abrupt and heavily criticized decision to pull American military personnel out of the Turkey-Rojava border in early October 2019, allowing Turkey to invade the Kurdish-controlled land and for Russian troops to quickly occupy the space that had previously been occupied by United States (U.S.) troops. Since then, the international community has been speculating about Russia’s new role as a mediator in the Middle East, as their rocky past of national-interest-driven policy in the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region has led some to call for an examination of Russia’s priorities in the MENA region. If  Russia’s future endeavors prove successful, Russia has the potential to replace the United States as the most influential non-regional power in the Middle East.

As the successor state to the Soviet Union, Russia inherited all of the experience and influence that the Soviets had earned when politicking in the Middle East. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States were constantly participating in proxy wars. Many of these proxy wars took the shape of civil wars and political coups in the Middle East and Africa, including the Congo Crisis and the Angolan Civil War. However, Middle Eastern and African allies of the Soviet Union were often “disappointed” with the quality of their support: weaponry and training provided by the USSR was less advanced than those provided by the U.S., and the Soviet Union failed to prevent the defeat of their allies. As a result, the general opinion of the Soviet Union--and later, the Russian Federation--gradually declined among Arabs and many states instead turned to the U.S. for monetary and military assistance. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s influence and involvement in the region has diminished as the state’s leaders focused on domestic growth and reform. The United States assumed the helm of the most influential non-regional power in the MENA region and has managed to protect this title without serious competitors until President Trump withdrew American troops from the contested area in northern Syria in October 2019.

Now, the tables have turned. Russian involvement in Middle Eastern politics was renewed in the early 2000’s, shortly after Russian President Vladimir Putin took office. Attempts to regain influence in the MENA region were generally unsuccessful, as before 2011 the only significant mode of influence that Russia pursued were arms sales. Middle Eastern politics were not a priority of Russia until the Arab Spring of 2011, when the protests and revolutions that occurred during this tumultuous time had the potential to destroy any remaining allies that Russia had been able to retain in the Middle East. As their allies in the region began toppling one by one, Russia began to support Syria in earnest through their diplomatic powers in the United Nations. When faced with the possibility of being deposed, the Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, began using violence against Syrian protesters and revolutionaries. Kurdish forces in northeastern Syria fought forcefully for their lands, resulting in Assad withdrawing troops from the region (now called Rojava), leaving nearly ¼ of Syria’s territory to the People’s Protection Units (YPG), a mostly-Kurdish militia. Thus, Russia’s eventual military intervention on behalf of Assad in September 2015, ordered under the guise of fighting terrorism in Syria, was welcomed by the Syrian president, and the deployed Russian forces were ordered to put down the rebels that were threatening Assad’s grasp on the rest of the country. It was this military intervention that cemented Russia’s role as a major player in Middle Eastern politics.

Russia’s decision to support Assad was not simply an attempt to retain allies in the Middle East; it was also a political power play of Putin to indicate Russia’s dedication to sovereignty and centralized government, which simultaneously affirmed Russia’s disapproval of Western leadership structures and military interventions. During the Arab Spring, protests in defiance of Putin and the illiberal policies of the Russian government were occurring throughout the Russian capital of Moscow. Instead of supporting the newly created liberal democracies like Western states (particularly the U.S.), Russia made a point to support the centralized, autocratic governance of Bashar al-Assad and, in doing so, was defending Russia’s own domestic interests. Allowing liberal democratic reform to completely destroy any relationships that Russia had in the Middle East would not only lessen the power and influence that the Kremlin had in the region, but would also diminish Putin’s own legitimacy as a strongman president.

Since the intervention in 2015, Russia has helped Assad regain control of nearly every major Syrian city outside of Rojava, launched peace talks, negotiated a demilitarized zone with Turkey, and maintained a significant military presence within Syria. Russia’s intervention is widely accepted by foreign policy experts as the only thing that ensured the continuation of Assad’s presidency, and the creation of de-escalation zones has helped Assad recapture large areas of land within Syria. Both Assad and Putin have also been heavily criticized by the international community for their use of drones and chemical weapons throughout the duration of the conflict. Russian drone strikes are estimated to have killed around 7,000 Syrian civilians alone, and more than 150 cases of chemical warfare have been reported within Syria since 2015. Although the international community has attempted many times to hold Bashar al-Assad responsible for these war crimes, Russia has proven itself to be both a difficult obstacle for the West and a steadfast ally of Syria. Turkey has been particularly vocal in their condemnation of Erdogan’s and Putin’s actions, as more than 3.6 million refugees of the Syrian Civil War have already fled to Turkey.

Turkey protested heavily when Assad allowed the lands in northern Syria to be occupied by the YPG, as the Turkish government believes the YPG to be associated with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a recognized terrorist organization that has been leading an insurgency in Turkey for many years. When the U.S. troops withdrew, Turkey’s military was able to stage an incursion into the Kurdish-controlled lands of northern Syria, displacing thousands of Kurdish people. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has stated that he plans to resettle Syrian refugees in the northern Syrian lands occupied by Turkish soldiers. Outraged and at risk, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Syria’s Kurdish militia alliance with whom the U.S. had partnered with in an effort to fight the Daesh in Rojava, were forced to make a deal with Assad that allowed his army to advance to the border of Turkish-claimed territory. Thus, the U.S. withdrawal has incited anger and conflict in a region where they had once hoped to prevent further violence.

Acting as a mediator, Russian forces directed the SDF and the Syrian army to the land which had been besieged by Turkey for the past month. On October 22nd, Russian President Putin and Turkish President Erdogan met in Sochi to negotiate a ceasefire. They reached an agreement which created a 75-square mile “safe-zone” along the Turkish-Syrian border, away from which the YPG militia was forced to fall back. Since then, a joint force of Russian and Turkish military has been patrolling the new safe-zone and nearby borderlands to ensure the YPG doesn’t return, and the U.S. has promised to assist in keeping the Kurdish out of the area. As of the time at which this article was written, clashes within the safe zone continue.

Although the Turkish incursion into Kurdish territory has upset many in the West and caused many deaths, Turkey, Russia and Syria have all benefited from the strife. Turkey received a new swath of land in which they can resettle refugees, Syria has further cemented their alliance with Russia, and Russia has gained a new role in this important region. The incursion also occurred during a time in which Russia was already seeing an increase in approval in the Middle East, which can be largely attributed to their “Astana process” dialogue between nations in the region and their well-trained diplomats. Now, having filled the space that the U.S. has abandoned as a mediator, Russia may be able to exert more influence than ever before.

In contrast, the U.S. is showing a decline in popularity within the region due to various foreign policy errors and military failures. President Donald Trump’s ban on migrants from several Muslim countries outraged the Arab community, and the U.S.’s failures in Afghanistan and Iraq have led some to doubt the American military’s ability to succeed in Middle Eastern conflicts. American approval in the region plummeted from 63 percent in 2016 to 41 percent in September 2019, before the U.S. troops were even removed from Northern Syria. This recent misstep, preceded by several years worth of unsuccessful operations and uncertain foreign policy have granted Russia many opportunities to improve their standing in the MENA region--all of which they have used to their advantage.

Since the Cold War, Russia’s foreign policy in the Middle East has been defined by competition with the West. Now that the U.S.’s influence has diminished and their reputation in the Middle East damaged, Russia is taking on the role of mediator between Syria, Turkey, and the Kurds. So far, Russia has taken to this role rather well by using the mistakes that the U.S. has made to their favor and putting the national interests of Russia ahead of the interests of the region.

Most of the actions that Russia has already taken thus far in the MENA region have been entirely self-serving in nature, and either directly or indirectly serve to improve Putin’s grasp of leadership on the world stage. The jihadist threat that created conflict in Chechnya and Dagestan has contributed to Russian foreign policy in the Middle East, as part of their national defense strategy is to prevent terrorism within Russia by fighting jihadist and Islamic terrorist groups while they remain outside of Russia. Additionally, having allies within the Middle East will give Russia access to negotiations regarding oil; as a major oil exporter, Russia would gain from the ability to negotiate international oil prices with other oil rich countries throughout the Middle East.  

By courting Turkey and Syria simultaneously, Russia accomplishes two goals--maintaining influence and power within the MENA region, and pulling Turkey away from its NATO allies. And they’re succeeding--Turkey’s western allies have been withdrawing arms deals, expressing outrage, and threatened sanctions for their recent treatment of the Kurds, engagement in Russian arms deals, and Erdogan’s newfound friendship with Vladimir Putin. Despite the complicated relationship that Turkey and Russia have had in the past, both Erdogan and Putin are more than likely to agree to a new, more friendly relationship if it proves beneficial for both leaders in the long run. Currently, Russia provides Turkey with more than half of its natural gas and almost a quarter of its oil. Additionally, a flourishing trading agreement and the status of Turkey as a popular tourist destination for Russians give Russia and Turkey a very positive economic relationship. This relationship couldn’t come at a better time for the two countries, who are both languishing under Western sanctions. All of these factors are only certain to push Turkey further into the grasp of the Kremlin, as they will be more than happy to continue providing Turkey with arms while simultaneously pulling them away from NATO.

Russian influence and presence in the MENA region is self-serving and interest-driven; however, the presence of the Russian military in Syria and the negotiations and peace talks occurring under the Russian flag have caused some to wonder whether or not a new influence is needed in the Middle East. Others argue that if the non-Western solution means selling out the Kurds, the solutions aren’t worth ponderance. Many opportunities to mediate the conflict have arisen from failures on behalf of the West, and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s skillful navigation of the relationship between Syria and Turkey has astounded policy makers throughout the international community. As Russia continues to engage in peace talks and negotiations, the world watches with bated breath. If Vladimir Putin truly wishes to restore Russia’s status as a major player within the Middle East, he’ll have to continue successfully mediating a conflict that seems to have no easy solution. 

The Miracle of Chile: A Story of Social Inequality and Civil Unrest

Chile’s carefully crafted image as the star of stability and economic growth in Latin America shattered in dramatic fashion in early October when the government announced a four-cent price increase for Santiago’s metro during rush hour. This seemingly innocuous rise in subway fares have embroiled Chile in protests for the last month. Protestors, who have come out in the millions in Santiago and all over the country, are not simply angry at the cost of transportation. While Chile is known for its neoliberal economic development, the country has one of the highest rates of income inequality within the OECD. The middle and working class struggle with high costs of living that cannot be sustained by stagnant wages. A privatized pension system has left the elderly in impoverished conditions. In simplistic terms, the Chilean demonstrators seek to create a more equal society. One of their most notable demands has been to create a new constitution that not only reflects these aspirations, but also Chile’s desire to emerge from the shadow of General Pinochet, a catalyst for this insurrection against the status quo. 

In the early 1970s, Chile captured the world’s attention. While the Latin American country had long been seen as a comparatively orderly and democratic country in a turbulent region, it was suddenly gripped in turmoil as General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, a career military officer and Commander in Chief of the Chilean army, overthrew President Salvador Allende in a US-backed coup. Allende was the first freely elected Marxist in the West- a novelty in itself, especially during the time of the Cold War. General Pinochet ruled Chile for the next 15 years in a military junta, a government led by a committee of military leaders. He was removed from power in a national referendum in 1990 and Chilean democracy was essentially reinstated. Nonetheless, Pinochet’s legacy has remained entrenched within the country as the subsequent governmental structures perpetuated the military junta’s economic model and its constitution. 

General Pinochet was supposed to rule for one year before he was to step down and allow other military leaders to take over the position. Despite this agreement, Pinochet continued to rule as President of the Republic, a nominal title, where he implemented seemingly radical economic reforms. The 1980s was a new age of neoliberalism, an ideology that famously emphasizes the role of the private sector in the free-market, and gained traction in the developing world in response to the “Third World Debt Crisis.” The Washington Consensus asserted that market-driven policies were the best way to correct these struggling economies. The Bretton-Woods Institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, created Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in order to better facilitate this turn to neoliberalism. This program was a series of reforms that countries had to commit to in order to secure any type of loan from these institutions. These reforms included: little to no government regulation, reduced government spending (otherwise known as austerity measures), privatization, and free trade. This was a radical departure from the economic policies of President Allende, who emphasized a state-led economy and protectionist policies, yet these new policies were just the beginning of a new era of capitalism. 

The SAPs were implemented in a variety of countries in order to encourage self-sufficiency and promote investment; it was believed by many that these reforms would break the cycle of dependence on loans. However, criticism is sharp and many point to the lack of success the SAPs have had in fulfilling their own ambitions. The largest criticism is the effect austerity measures have had on already poor nations, who often adhere to them by reducing funding for social welfare programs. By reducing or eliminating funding for social welfare programs, vulnerable groups, such as women and children, are faced with an added burden that can seriously impede upon their ability to survive. There is enough evidence that demonstrates that between implementation in the 1980s and the 2000s, SAPs reduced the standard of living for many. Another criticism was that these programs were essentially neocolonialism. These reforms forced countries to open up to exploitative investment by multinational corporations, thus perpetuating uneven power dynamics within economic systems that were present during colonial rule. Scholars such as Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard were able to articulate key aspects of this claim by arguing that development was not only a way for former colonial powers to maintain some form of legitimacy, it was also used by leaders in the Global South for the same purpose. This restructuring of Chile’s economy in the form of SAPs was a strategy that Pinochet employed to legitimate a regime whose conception was an illegal coup. Furthermore, these reforms were a way in which Pinochet could bring his version of Chile to fruition. 

The SAPs were successful for Chile in more ways than one. They helped usher in an era of economic growth for the country, though there are debates about who benefited from them most. It also helped to legitimize Pinochet’s legacy, as the new leader’s victory was underscored by this nation-wide expansion. Internationally, most people recognize that General Pinochet was a brutal dictator, yet there is slightly more nuance within Chile. The 60,000 Chileans that showed up for his funeral procession all seemingly believed that Pinochet “saved” the country from Marxism. Even when pundits discuss the period’s economic growth and the advent of neoliberalism, they downplay the fact that this development came at a great price, which continues to manifest itself. The findings of two National Commissions detailed the brutality and violence of the Pinochet regime which involved arbitray arrests, torture, incarceration, disappearances and political executions. Approximately 3,000 people died. No one from the left was safe from Pinochet and the hated head of secret police, Manuel Contreras. These commissions also illuminated the fact that the General mismanaged funds for his own personal benefit. Despite the systemic and rampant abuse of human rights, Pinochet’s embezzlement and corruption was the proverbial ‘straw that broke the camel’s back’. 

Pinochet’s regime also conceptualized an entirely new constitution that came into force in 1980. It was never replaced, even upon Chile’s democratization in the 1990s. The dictatorship-era document is a combination of traditional Catholic values, liberal principles, and some elements that could be considered social-democratic. The constitution also heavily reflects the neoliberal policies of the time; it is often interpreted to hand over the responsibility of health and education over to the market, instead of the government. Furthermore, the document is hyper-executive and while the legislative has the power to enact policy, they can be limited in their scope. Although it has been altered since Pinochet’s fall, including amendments that broadened political participation to left-wing groups and limited the political role of the military, it’s presence leaves a shadow. 

The preservation of Pinochet’s constitution and the neoliberal policies of the 1980s has led to the current protests that are reverberating throughout the country. The protestors are a diverse group of people, but they have all articulated a similar feeling of an opportunity being taken from them. Chile’s post-tax income inequality is now the highest among countries in the OECD. The cost of living has increased, while wages remain low and social welfare allowances are insufficient. The pension system became privatized following the ratification of the constitution in 1980. The funds are managed by for-profit groups who guarantee a pension of $137 per month. This has created a serious burden for senior citizens who have to somehow be able to afford medications which are notoriously high; a result has been that people over the age of 80 have the highest rate of suicide in Chile. Another major problem which has been a central focus of the protests is a lack of access to water: although it has been formally declared a public good, the rights to use it are privatized and administered through a market system. This ‘water code’ is enshrined within the constitution. Watersheds are unevenly distributed throughout the country and with climate change affecting Chile, where the majority of the population is concentrated within an arid region, the issues of water rights and distribution have become a focal point. 

There are many dimensions to the Chilean protests, as demonstrators are seeking to create a more equitable society. The current president, Sebastian Pinera, a center-right billionaire politician, has promised reformative measures and has fired cabinet members, but it has yet to be enough. Chileans are pushing for an entirely new constitution that could better reflect the interests of the general public and finally break free of the dictatorship. 78 percent of Chileans support the idea of a new constitution, one where the people have a hand in its conception, and party leaders have recently agreed to hold a national referendum in April 2020. The protests have stretched well into November, and the sounds of the cacerolazo protesters continue to ring out. While the world has seemingly been rocked by protests, from Latin America to Hong Kong, it is important to remember that although systemic change may appear to be unfathomably difficult to achieve, it is still within reach.

The Impact of Brazilian Privatization and Economic Reform

“Privatização,” despite the word's unpopularity even across polarized Brazilian party lines, has been one of the cornerstones of President Jair Bolsonaro’s administrative efforts to stimulate Brazil’s sluggish economy. Despite being unpopular, the administration’s privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has proven to be immensely successful, yielding a total net gain of US$23.5 billion within the first nine months, surpassing the government’s expectations by nearly 20 percent. 

The Bolsonaro Administration has over 12 privatization projects in progress, with more to be announced in the coming year. Most of these projects focus on energy, transportation, and production infrastructure. Authorities of the Brazilian government cite the lack of investment funds for Brazil to maintain, expand, and operate facilities, resulting in a push of neoliberalism (market-oriented reforms) to open Brazil’s economy. 

Despite being the world’s eighth-largest economy, Brazil’s economy lags greatly in competitiveness, placing 72nd of 140 countries, the United States ranks first, followed by Singapore and Germany. Brazil also struggles with the World Economic Forum’s “business dynamism pillar,” which accesses the private industry’s ability to adapt to changing markets, new business models and risks, and technological advancements. A contributing factor to such a low ranking, and frankly, a comparatively weakened private sector, is due to Brazil’s dependence on the public sector to develop, maintain, and safeguard national industries. 

The nation’s 418 SOEs, one of the highest in the world, ranges from energy, transportation, and manufacturing infrastructure, to financial and health services. To note, Brazil has more SOEs than that of the 34 member nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Through the privatization of inefficient and non-profitable SOEs, the government can reduce its operational burden, increase market efficiency, and create a more robust private sector. Currently, many of the SOEs are unable to cover their operating expenses, and rather than generating profits, they generate more than US$3.8 billion in losses annually, furthering their dependence on government funding. which takes away from the country’s ability to invest in other social initiatives. In the Bolsonaro Administration’s detailed plan, the government plans to keep SOEs that provide critical public social services, while privatizing those that attract investors or generate losses. 

Planned for the second half of 2020, the utility giant, Eletrobras (NYSE: EBR.B), is one of the largest SOE privatization projects (PL 5877/2019) taken on by the administration. In the reported 2019 third-quarter earnings, Eletrobras reversed its 2018 loss of R$2.26 billion (US$) by an increase in net profit of 132 percent to this year’s R$716 million (US$) profit. The drastic increase is a direct result of the concession of underperforming divisions and news assets beginning operations. 

During his campaign, President Bolsonaro admitted to only understanding the basics of economics, putting his full backing in his Minister of the Economy, Paulo Guedes. Minister Guedes, a popular free-market economist, earned his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. It is also important to note that in an effort to reduce harmful bureaucracy, President Bolsonaro merged several government ministries cutting the number from 39 to 22. Under this simplification, Minister Guedes became dubbed as the “Super Minister” of the Economy, as his ministry absorbed the Ministry of Agriculture (MF), the Ministry of Planning (MP), Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC), and Ministry of Labor and Employment (MT). 

The administration’s most recent political victory comes after Congressional approval for the highly controversial pension reform bill, which passed with a vote of 60-19 in favor, late October. The much-anticipated bill will save the public nearly a trillion reals (USD$200 billion) in the next decade. Among other measures, the bill raised the retirement age for men to 65 and women to 62, raised workers' pension contributions, and reduced burdensome regulations for businesses. Special rules will apply to teachers, police, and rural workers. The Brazilian Stock Exchange Index (INDEX: IBOV) rose 1.1 percent after the vote, to an all-time high of 107,197 points, and this growth continued to reach an all-time high on November 7th at 109,580 points. Pension reform has been a pressing and intractable topic that has been relevant for several decades, passing the reform is truly seen as an accomplishment. 

The Brazilian Treasury reported that the public sector’s debt-to-GDP will reach 79.7 percent by 2022 and then decline, however, some estimates indicate that if the reform had not been passed then the ratio would have surpassed 100 percent. This would have increased Brazil’s fiscal risk and directly dampened investor’s outlook, a sentiment that the country’s market cannot afford. Moreover, Brazil’s Constitution mandates nearly 90 percent of all current public spending, providing limited flexibility in ensuring the nation’s 

With the pension reform passed, Congress will now focus on the administration’s next priority: tax reform. In an interview, the Brazilian speaker of the lower house, Rodrigo Maia, explained that there is “no other reform is more important than the tax reform,” which is expected to be sent by Minister Guedes in the coming month. Like many aspects of the Brazilian government and doing business in Brazil, tax policy and filing taxes are extremely complicated due to excessive government bureaucracy. On average, it takes Brazilian employers nearly 2,000 hours to file taxes for businesses on account of the heavily bureaucratized system. Meanwhile, for the same task neighboring Argentina and Chile take 312 and 296 hours, respectively, while OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) members take about 161 hours. To note, Brazil is in the process of joining the OECD and secured the Trump Administration’s support earlier this year. The process is also helping Brazil push the necessary reform to create sustainable economic growth. 

Brazil’s economic reform success continues abroad as Reinaldo José de Almeida Salgado, Brazil’s Foreign Ministry’s secretary for bilateral negotiations with Asia, stated that Brazil does not “intend to be selective in relation to trade opening,” a centerpiece of Bolsonaro’s market-friendly administration. It has already begun the process of signing trade protocols and agreements with nations globally.

Ultimately, by developing a stronger private sector, Brazil’s domestic industries can continue to push for greater productivity and efficiency and compete in the international markets. Although controversial, the Bolsonaro Administration continues to push for reforms to make Brazil more attractive to investors and to control the government’s quickly rising debt which limits its capacity to improve the quality of life.

Fossil Fuel Independence

Many of the 2020 Democratic presidential candidates have run on the platform of action on climate change, which has been one of the central topics that citizens have been advocating for across the globe. This goal is only possible if there is complete independence from fossil fuels. Elimination of coal, petroleum, and natural gas cannot be ceased overnight, and it will take effort from all parts of the world to collaborate on this issue.

Fossil fuels have become the center of discussion around the future of American environmental political discourse. In 2017, petroleum constituted 28 percent of American energy production. According to a 2019 Yale University study, a majority (53 percent) of Americans blame fossil fuel companies for global warming. “Climate science has found that the burning of fossil fuels (coal, oil, and natural gas) produced by fossil fuel companies is causing global warming.” Global warming is the cause of wildfires, droughts, flooding, and other dangers looming throughout the country. In California, deadly wildfires are ramping up, causing celebrity outcry and civilian displacement. Gerard Butler recalled a “Heartbreaking time across California,” after the Woolsey fire last year. The Los Angeles County Fire Chief Daryl Osby even recognized the impact of the situation, stating, “And as evident by the Camp Fire in Northern California -- which is larger than this, more structures have been lost than this, more lives have been lost -- it's evident from that situation statewide that we're in climate change and it's going to be here for the foreseeable future." The outcry has become increasingly perceptive. With the increase in attention by celebrity influencers, the younger generations have come out speaking about the climate crisis, its effect on the environment, and what it means for their future.

Climate strikes have sprung up among students and advocacy has reached new levels. Greta Thunberg, a sixteen-year-old activist from Sweden, started the Fridays for Future movement last year after a few years of striking on her own across the world. Fridays for Future is targeted at students, encouraging them to strike every Friday to demand action from their government. Greta started the movement by sitting in front of the Swedish parliament every school day, inspiring countries and students around the world to demand a solution to this overbearing threat to lives and futures. 

Greta is joining forces with Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, the Democratic United States Representative of the Bronx, New York, to create, introduce, and demand the Green New Deal, another hot topic featured in many of the presidential debates. The Green New Deal calls for the elimination of fossil fuels in the United States and to “curb planet-warming greenhouse gas emissions across the economy.” Bernie Sanders, a 2020 presidential candidate endorsed by Ocasio-Cortez, has accused the fossil fuel executives of greed and causing the climate crisis. All three of these leaders have noticed the climate crisis and the root of the problem, but the action needed will need bipartisan support within the United States as well as global support, because this problem is affecting all of humanity. Incredibly, a sixteen-year old has set the foundation and information that will be a center focus in the new decade. Greta has inspired leaders across the globe to take action and plans, such as the Green New Deal, are in place, but the elimination of fossil fuels and conversion to wind, water, and solar (WWS) power will be a difficult transition.

Strikes have helped leaders see the necessity for the large-scale conversion to 100 percent WWS power, but another obstacle has emerged. Mark Jacobson from Stanford University explored the issue that the power grid holds, stating, “the high cost of avoiding load loss caused by WWS variability and uncertainty,” is the greatest concern for achieving complete neutralization of fossil fuel power. While WWS is the ultimate goal for the global economy due to its safety, access, and cleanliness, utility and grid operators continue to find failures to accommodate wind and solar supplies.  

Jacobson has conducted a study to build a system that will test the long-term benefits of using only WWS power at low load loss and at a low cost. This is the first study to analyze long-term benefits. The system tests multiple variables on the ability of WWS installations in the United States, to further understand if a 100 percent WWS world can exist by 2050-2055. The results found that only 11 percent of the initial WWS power was lost during transmission in the 3D model system, supplies had matched the load causing zero to minimal load loss, and solar and wind power complemented each other seasonally. In his conclusion, Jacobson discussed that the social cost would be greater than expected, considering the improvements among heating and cooling systems and transportation systems in the United States. This study found that the overall load loss of the WWS power system is nothing, which means that the electricity-utility aspect of the system were balanced. For example, a pump stored heat and the current of the model converted electricity to heat. Reflecting upon Jacobson’s results, this study demonstrates that a 100 percent renewable energy system is possible.

Political leaders should be improving the funding WWS installations. Jacobson’s study conducted in 2015 was the first to test the long-term benefits of WWS power, yet this climate crisis has been emerging long before. The growth of renewable energy industries, such as the solar power industry, has skyrocketed within the past few years, yet the lack of skilled manpower in these industries is the biggest problem that they face. Global warming is still striking the world, yet global collective action to combat this issue is difficult to acquire due to the lack of agreement and perspective. This past summer the G20, the most well-equipped group to decide what the climate crisis means for the world, met. Unfortunately, the international body reached no consensus on the crisis. “Since Donald Trump’s inauguration, G20 leaders have been unable to reach an agreement on climate and have instead adopted a “G19+1” approach.” Most media implores the current administration to look at the bigger picture, but there has been no push to move the climate crisis to a top priority. More strikes have risen due to this lack of collaboration. 

If it is possible to contribute to a “no load loss,” renewable energy country, as Jacobson proved, the biggest threat to climate change is the lack of manpower and funding behind the WWS installations. This makes independence a current pipe dream due to the lack of governmental collective action. The action needed is dire, as Greta Thunberg mentions, and the need for the Green New Deal is necessary. 

From Many or One? An Ethical and Prudential Evaluation of How to Approach the Reform of American Civil Discourse

Polarization: the buzzword defining the mass perception of the current state of civil discourse. In the United States, the rift between primary political parties, red and blue, Republican and Democrat, liberal and conservative, has become an obsessive fixation of the media, political candidates, and citizens at large. Tribalism, populism, and debates over tolerance seem to be the defining trends of our political communication culture. Even within one side of the divide, in-fighting has reached an apex, where Democrats accuse each other of not being “real Democrats” or “liberal enough,” and Republicans split between that social extremism and moderate conservatism. However, in the midst of it all, it’s hard to see how things could be any other way. Despite our best intentions, working toward our respective visions of the future of the nation, so much seems to have spiraled out of our control, from the traditions of slander and scandal between politicians, and the editorialist and exploitative nature of the media, to the increasingly traditional separation of those of opposing parties in everything from dinner conversation and friendships to marriage. Individuals and even those in power, often don’t know where to start in undoing the seemingly endless cycle creating the mess. However, there currently seems to be a growing feeling of an obligation to try. Consequently, a wave of nonprofits dedicated to improving civility and bipartisan collaboration, as well as academic research around the subject and institutional changes have sprung up, particularly since the outcome of the infamous election of 2016.

The question is, with all of these varied efforts, which is the right approach, either ethically or prudentially? From the individual or local standpoint, sometimes changing one-on-one conversational habits seems to be the only thing within reach. However, if one is moved by a moral obligation to facilitate change in civil discourse, aren’t they also, in some way, morally obligated to doing so in the most effective and far-reaching way? What, exactly, is the point in bailing water in a sinking ship when the hole hasn’t been plugged? There are root problems, or structural influences behind the current state of communication we are observing. However, is it politically possible to launch a structural or institutional approach? Further, what other ethical dilemmas might result? To make a proper evaluation requires the examination of the structural roots of these symptoms. While a vast number exist, two major ones will be examined here: the electoral structures creating a tendency for polarization, and the exacerbation of this tendency by the technological changes in media, or mass communication practices.

The Electoral Contribution

One of the most important mechanisms behind the function of the American Representative government is elections. Within our political system, to achieve election, a candidate must accrue an incredibly high level of public attention and support, particularly monetary support. This creates two failures in communication; one related to maintaining incumbency, and one to elections at large. For candidates in office, to compete with the capitalist marketing of other competitors, they must spend more time trying to get re-elected than anything else. This causes them to favor monetary interests over constituent concerns- one of the origins of the “Big Money” corruption in politics. Even if a candidate’s intentions are good, the path to power is inherently structured to erode the power of the people. As a result, civil discourse becomes more difficult and less incentivized, as citizens feel that their political voices are useless.

For candidates not yet in office, each must find a way to stand out by demonstrating what makes them unique. This is accomplished by leveraging constituent interests and fears to create a campaign narrative. When voting, constituents balance their private and public interests based on what visions they have for themselves and the state. They also consider what will be prudent to support politically based on how overlapping public and private interests are. Philosophers, from the ancient period on, have been struggling to understand this psychology behind political engagement and voting behavior. In Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, the Athenian thesis determines that the psychological elements behind political engagement are fear, honor, and profit. This relates closely to the anatomy of the soul outlined later in Plato’s Republic, which describes the three human motivators as desire (profit), thumos (honor), and reason (works to control and interpret fear). In modern theory, Machiavelli and Nietzsche focus their view of political psychology further on strength and power, or resentment towards the strong. Regardless of their nuances, the takeaway is that the majority of political theorists, by attempting to map these common influences, agree that there are psychological patterns to making electoral choices. The traditions of political campaigning in the United States are crafted around this assumption- the most logical way to determine what will garner attention as a candidate is to think about what commonly motivates voters and to try to play into that.

In the earliest days of the nation, constituents were most concerned about the dissolution of the state, and what its future should look like. Thus, the priorities of a voter in choosing a candidate were things like moral integrity, history of leadership and demonstration of loyalty, as well as a vision for the future of the country. No history of elections or rhetoric beyond that maintained from Europe existed. Collaborative mores were habituated due to colonial survival and revolution, as described by Tocqueville. Thus, scandal and slander didn’t need to be as heavily involved in campaign narratives. Rather, uniqueness was still achievable by ideology alone. As a result, this generation has the ability to engage in serious political debate and proceed to an outcome or compromise without being distracted by simply attacking the humanity or character of the other side.

By the 1950s, however, several generations of political activity and rhetorical traditions had unfolded to where uniqueness in policy approaches and values was difficult to establish, and not enough for a candidate to stand out. Instead, candidates had to engineer a reason to stand out. Recognizing fear as a primary motivator of voters, a tradition of engineering emergencies to leverage votes was born. WWII, broadcasted to the masses from TV and radio, shaped the American public’s greatest fear into that of totalitarianism. The Republican Party, which was trying to reinstate a political majority following the era of Democratic control and influx of incredibly progressive policy, including FDR’s New Deal, exploited this fear by painting Communism as the new totalitarian threat and engineering the McCarthy era of campaigning as the savior mechanism to this artificial emergency. McCarthy himself was never consistently Republican or Democrat but had the demagogic personality to uphold the campaign. We saw similar patterns with the War on Drugs, and ­­Regan’s original Make America Great Again campaign, as well as in how the United States marketed the anti-terror movement following 9/11.

In each of these examples, however, the same general causal mechanism is at work. The fear motivating the public is identified and used to establish an artificial emergency in which the candidate is painted as the only conceivable hero. This heightens the tendency not just for the selection of the candidate, but for the expansion of the power of their institutional position. This is because there is now a decline in the public’s confidence in knowing how to solve their problem, as they had not previously been aware of the emergency, so it’s more reasonable to trust in the hero figure who did to take care of the situation. This is the very pattern warned against by Tocqueville. It’s especially dangerous in American politics as a Lockean prerogative, established in the founding American documents, justifies an executive to toss out the rule of law in the event of an “emergency.” However, the term “emergency” is not well defined, so the only thing that prevents the rule being abused to result in complete authoritarianism is the involvement of the democratic voice of constituents calling out such exploitation, which requires a healthy level of participation and investment.

For this campaign strategy to be successful, it has to be paired with a validation mechanism, in which anyone who opposes the demagogue in power must be identified as disloyal, and therefore, a contributor to the emergency. Citizens, obsessed with weeding these people out, begin to agree to heightened limitations on freedoms such as privacy. For the McCarthy era, this enabled the infamous era of accusations of internal communist activities and unconstitutional persecution. Post 9/11, it was Americans allowing government spying on domestic users, racial profiling in airports, and incredibly invasive security checkpoints. Within civil discourse, this translates as pushing people farther apart on opposite sides of this line in the sand, encouraging tribal partisan behavior, or polarization. It also translates psychologically as feeling more powerless and part of an impenetrable system, and likely to disengage more from political conversation, particularly with policymakers, as they are reminded repeatedly by these losses in the freedom that they are subservient to the state.

Fast-forwarding to apply this theory to contemporary politics, using the defining example of our current state of political communication upheaval, Donald Trump has followed the same pattern of McCarthy in being selected as the figurehead of his campaign. He also was able to leverage the feelings of isolation resulting from a lack of community or identity and fears resultant in racism, xenophobia, and the like by creating artificial emergencies such as the crisis at the border. He painted his opponent as being the cause of the fears of his targeted electorate, and those who opposed him as being disloyal to the cause and therefore part of this evil or cause of the things most feared. Hillary Clinton, for example, was representative of the establishment- of the way things were, which had not been working for those who were being targeted by the Trump campaign. She was also associated with her husband, who was responsible for the decision viewed as the cause of the economic turmoil being experienced in these communities (e.g. sending manufacturing away through the shifting trade balance with China). Those who supported her were often in urban, liberal hubs, not experiencing these same pressures, and in fact, very much ignorant to them, and therefore, focused on other political initiatives. 

By intoning complicity with these groups, and catering to the fearful ones, Trump was able to make it clear who would be protected by him, even though his policy preferences didn’t necessarily align with their interests. His rhetoric was familiar, referencing the comfortable, white male predecessors iconic of a less progressive American tradition when these communities were less vulnerable and things like racism were more acceptable. His purposeful political incorrectness made him a clear anti-establishment figure, which was both indicative of possible high risk, but also guaranteeing of radical change, for better or for worse. For many Americans, who felt they had nothing left to lose and no other opportunity relevant to them, or giving them a political voice, he seemed like the hopeful choice. This is where there is an overlap between the Obama electorate and Trump’s, or some of the more surprising demographic groups one by the Trump campaign, including many women whom he directly offended. However, his infamous dog-whistling painted him, to those minority groups and those interested in protecting them, as something to fear. His blatant disregard for restraints on executive power or traditions of state function inflates that fear to its most extreme end. Thus, for both groups, the stakes are incredibly high and emotional, making this an example of tribal polarization that resonates with those experiencing it as the worst state of civil discourse we have ever seen. The urgency for change has reached a peak. The point to remember, however, is that the very structure of our government and elections established the traditions which perhaps inevitably led to this, suggesting a structural solution is the only solution to civil discourse worth exploring, but also the degree to which this would be seemingly impossible.

The Technological Curve

The influx of technological advancement, such as social media, has added another dimension to the situation, as it has increased the speed at which communication happens, allowing for a more natural blending in of false or misleading information, and therefore, common acceptance of it, changing the quality and nature of trust within debate and civil discourse. It has also changed the intensity of radicalism acceptable, and allowed for the faster building of movements, heightening the fear that the opposite party or opinion will gain traction and destroy the vision one holds for the future of the state faster than can be stopped. Finally, the phenomena of echo-chambers have made all of these fears artificially more vibrant, and misunderstanding or ignorance between groups much deeper. All of this has contributed both to heightened extremism, polarization, and intolerance in our current culture of civil discourse, being used largely as a tool with the actors motivating the campaigns previously unpacked, as well as by those trying to resist them, creating a pattern in heightened sensationalism on both sides, in almost a Cold War of civil discourse. 

Evaluation: Grassroots vs. Structural Initiatives

Having taken stock of the mechanisms leading to the current state of civil discourse, an evaluation must be made, morally and prudentially, of what would be the right approach to undoing them. The grassroots perspective has been largely headlined by several local and nonprofit initiatives. On the local end, for example, some communities have taken to painting benches or tables a particular color to mark them as a safe place for civil discourse, hoping to encourage more conversation. On a larger grassroots scale, full organizations have sprung up to systemize these conversational tools in a way that can be spread easily to a wide array of places. Better Angels, for example, is a nationally reaching nonprofit which brings free civil discourse workshops to local communities and college campuses. They aim to maintain equal participation from what they refer to as “reds” and “blues,” or traditionally conservative learning vs. traditionally liberally leaning people. Their workshops come in three varieties to meet communities with the methods most resonating to them, but all involve a debrief for opposite sides to reflect on the origins of their political identities, and what psychological influences may have created the identities they don’t share. Bridging the Gap is another Washington, D.C. based bipartisanship initiative, which offers professional training and public resources, as well as scholarships to try to encourage better and more frequent policy debates. More specifically, within education, there are many civil discourse and communication-related projects, such as American University’s very own Project on Civil Discourse. These often produce both workshops and research on the subject.

These organizations are far from alone. Rather, they exist in a wave of projects that have sprung up, which aim to a degree to work together, but have hesitated in making partnerships to expand the traction of their work as they all fear being associated with an organization which fails to maintain the bipartisan dedication. In other words, the anxiety of polarization is so high, that it is creating road-blocks in projects to combat it because no one can fully trust anyone to not fall into the red-blue tribes. The same is occurring within grant distribution towards these projects. So, while a bunch of small initiatives teaming up at first seems like a nice compromise between structural and local change, it may be just as futile as working on the local level without targeting the structural roots of communication failures. 

But is it prudent, or ethical, to work from an institutional and structural upheaval perspective, either? To create a structural change, the most common considerations, as explained previously, are a literal restructuring of the government’s elections systems, public media, speech, etc. The reason is that to change education, the values passed from parent to child, or the habits of both local communities and media, which shape political psychology, you need to change the institutional practices that build these things, which come from governmental institutions and delegations of freedom. This drifts into an incredibly slippery slope of limiting civic freedoms and freedom of the market. This is visible through the simultaneous wave of free speech initiatives popping up in opposition to efforts to control things like hate speech, or fake news on social media. It also would be politically nearly impossible, unless one were to utilize the same sensational fear which fuels the current state, a major hypocritical choice at best. Finally, a concentration of power would have to head the change, which makes the rest of the nation’s future dependent on their morality. As seen in other authoritarian states, while it can all feel great while everyone’s being taken care of, it only takes one set of leadership making bad choices to reach a very dark place, at which point no one will know how to politically associate in order to fix it, having been disengaged for so long. 

Thus, society needs to balance control over the practices promoted and the desire to make the ethical evaluation of communication practices a more democratic process. Space between is occupied by one final option, less clear to explore, but perhaps quite effective. The social movement approach is hardly unique historically. Compassion becomes virtue within the Civil Rights Movement, LGBTQ+ Advocacy, the fight for gay marriage, Women’s Suffrage, and more. All of these combined grassroots initiatives of civil disobedience, media attention, and local conversations with the push for legislation, but not without the simultaneous shift in a large portion of public values, so that the change would be more democratic. Society cannot necessarily rely on this transition for civil discourse, as the media previously used slacktivism online, and civil disobedience loses its power, particularly as sensationalism is lost as quickly as it’s gained. All of this happens through communication, rhetorical and symbolic, and the entire point is to address the failures of communication. However, there certainly must be something that can be learned from it as a clue to what to do.

No Labels is an organization that is proving a great example of this mode of work. They are trying to work to provide local resources and grassroots tools for dialogue through guidebooks on how to approach policy and discussion events. However, they are also making soft strides in trying to habituate communication change from the inside of government, through their lobbying to establish the Problem Solvers Caucus, which brings together a bipartisan balance of Congress members to solve policy under a set of different communication methods and overcome traditional partisan blocks. Critics have accused the caucus of not “solving many problems.” As a concept, it is an interesting hybrid of a more democratic grassroots approach trying to create a government change to find solutions without a total overhaul of the system, and maybe create a democratic space to find further change. Rather than delegating power to a tiny group, it ensures that those working towards change are committed to a certain set of predetermined values such as bipartisanship. The question is how to take this approach to the next level, of one with more traction, which can “solve more problems?” Is there a way to speed up the change without losing ethical value?

In sum, there is certainly no easy fix in the race to solve the crisis of political communication. The stakes for the communities being hurt by current failures, as well as for preserving the democratic stability of our country, have reached a peak crossroads. However, the political feasibility and ethical considerations are both an all-consuming and unclear part of any transition. The questions and influences that have brought us here are hardly new, hence their having been fleshed out for theorists of numerous generations. The U.S. is just one in a whole host of countries experiencing parallel communication problems. However, by pulling back from the anxiety of the current generation and reflecting on the origin of the situation, as well as the critical consequences of each path forward, society approaches the best chance of finding one that works and can restore the American mores of E. Pluribus Unum.

The Chinese Approach to Strategic Thought Through the Game of Wei Qi

The game of chess has long been associated with strategy and the art of statecraft. Indeed, during the 1972 World Chess Championship in the midst of the Cold War, such emphasis was placed on the match that former chess champion Garry Kasparov would later recount that the subsequent American victory “was treated by people on both sides of the Atlantic as a crushing moment in the midst of the Cold War.” With the 20th century now a mere chapter in our history books, the dissolution of the Soviet Union has left a new player on the world’s chessboard: China. This time, however, the United States (U.S.) does not have the privilege of having its rival playing the same game. No longer can a game theory approach to geopolitics be viewed purely in terms of chess. To truly examine the Chinese approach to politics, we must examine the roots of their cultural interpretation of strategic thought, known as the ‘shi’ (勢), through their own game of strategy--Wei Qi--colloquially referred to by the rest of the world as ‘Go.’ 

Despite it being the basis upon which Chinese military and political strategy has been historically built, the Chinese concept of shi has remained untranslatable to the English language. The U.S. military, however, has long taken an interest in demystifying the concept, with the Department of Defense describing the term in their 2002 Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China as the “potential born of disposition…that only a skilled strategist can exploit to ensure victory over a superior force.” Sun Tzu, a famous ancient Chinese strategist and attributed progenitor of the concept of shi, added nuance to this definition through his allusion to the concept in his treatise, The Art of War, another piece of Chinese heritage that can help in understanding Chinese strategic thought. In his magnum opus, Sun Tzu refers to shi as the ability to “[make] the enemy move… by creating a situation to which he must conform.” With both ancient and contemporary interpretations taken into account, we can confidently presume that the essence of shi derives from a strategic advantage created through the manipulation of the environment and changing circumstances, a technique heavily utilized in the game of Wei Qi.

Appearing as early as 400 BC in the works of Confucius and speculated to have been practiced for millennia earlier, the game of Wei Qi is a game of unparalleled historical and strategic value. It’s viewed as a practical simulacrum of Sun Tzu’s aforementioned military treatise, Art of War as well as being one of the four arts historically seen as necessary for Chinese scholar-officials. The game involves two players strategically placing colored stones on a square grid for the purpose of surrounding and capturing the opponent’s stones whilst also preventing them from doing the same. A player’s stones are not required to be placed adjacently, often resulting in multiple attempts of encirclement across the board occurring simultaneously.

Chess, a hallmark of Western strategic thought and game theory, has always placed a heavy emphasis on relative strength and hierarchy. Dr. David Lai, a professor at the American Strategic Studies Institute, notes that the effect of this mindset has been just as detrimental to the U.S. as it has been beneficial, noting that while it has led to Americans “[tending] to pay more attention to the balance of military power in conflict situations,” the emphasis placed on total war leads the player “[becoming] overly aggressive so that he will stretch his force thin and expose his vulnerable parts in the battlefields.” This single-minded desire for victory is no doubt a doctrinal product of Carl von Clausewitz, a Prussian military strategist known for his seminal military treatise On War, arguably the Western equivalent of Sun Tzu’s work and incontestably as influential. In his work, Clausewitz extolls the importance of a proverbial “center of gravity” in warfare, wherein a single, watershed battle, will  always be the deciding factor in a war. The strategic thought developed from thinking in terms of shi and Wei Qi, however, could not be more different. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was no doubt correct in his belief that, “if chess is about the decisive battle, Wei Qi is about the protracted campaign.”

Contrary to chess’ uncompromising emphasis on the order of command and complete decimation of the enemy, Wei Qi is played in such a way that multiple offenses occur in various areas of the board, forcing the player to examine the situation holistically and contradict  Clausewitz’s center of gravity and, by extension, Western military theory. In the same vein, speed and relative power in Wei Qi is of little importance since each stone is equal in value. In the context of military strategy, this often encourages a protracted war since the game cannot be won immediately upon the death of a single, valuable piece. With these radically different methods and goals in mind, one can see these differences in priorities take shape in China’s military and foreign policy. 

One can see an exemplary instance of Wei Qi and, subsequently, shi coming into practice during one of the most pivotal moments of Chinese history, the Chinese Civil War.  During this time, Communist Chinese forces would often be surrounded due to the superior manpower of the Chinese Nationalist forces, an occurrence that would be described by Communist soldiers as a “[campaigns] of encirclement and annihilation.” This would often result in a counter-encirclement in which Communist forces would retreat in the hope that, “while the retreat was in progress and contact with the enemy broken or sporadic,” they would be able to deny Nationalist forces an encirclement. Eventually, as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) turned the tide of the war in the wake of Japan’s withdrawal from the mainland, their increasingly aggressive retaliatory offensives resulted in a situation “in which the previous Communist and Nationalist roles were reversed,” with the PRC now adopting encirclement tactics as soon as they were in a position to do so. This dance of encirclement and counter-encirclement performed by Nationalist and Communist forces is not unlike two types of stones on a Wei Qi board, wherein the only way to prevent an enemy from surrounding and removing one’s pieces is to maneuver  past the enemy until the time is ripe to respond in kind. The founder of the People’s Republic of China, Mao Zedong, is known to have related the popularity of this doctrine to the game of Wei Qi himself in his 1938 treatise, Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan, wherein he would go on to state that the “campaigns and battles fought by the two sides resemble the capturing of each other's pieces, and the establishment of strongholds by the enemy and of guerrilla base areas by us resembles moves to dominate spaces on the board.” 

As the world slowly transitions from a unilateral American-dominated international system towards a multilateral world order, American policymakers would do well to realize that there is often more than one game of strategy being played. There are a multitude of possible solutions that may serve to reconcile this shift in tactical norms with the United States’ traditional Clausewitzian strategic thought. One such proposition, put forward by former U.S. Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, involves encouraging U.S. policymakers to master the game of Wei Qi themselves. This recommendation was based on the belief that the flexible thinking developed through the game would serve to ameliorate the traditional rigidity--and thus perceived weakness--of American strategic thought whilst also augmenting the United States’ traditional advantages of “strength, capabilities, ingenuity, and American spirit.” This advocation for doctrinal synthesis is further reinforced by the conclusions of Dr. David Lai, a professor at the Strategic Studies Institute. Dr. Lai likened China’s flexibility and the United States’ rigid hierarchy to the yin and yang, two opposing forces in Chinese culture that create balance through their reconciliation. There are, however, those who oppose this consensus and express skepticism towards attributing all of China’s strategic initiatives to a mindset influenced by Wei Qi and the concept of the shi. 

One such case is that of Lauren Dickey, a research analyst under the CNA corporation’s China-Indo-Pacific Division, who arguesthat the U.S. must “move away from a reliance upon cultural traditions as a causal link between Chinese strategic thought.” Dickey instead believes that the Chinese are merely pursuing a policy of realpolitik and that any connection between such policy and the Chinese culture is a misattribution. Nonetheless, the general consensus does imply that the game of Wei Qi has the possibility to yield invaluable insight into the Chinese concept of shi and, subsequently, China’s unique strategic methodology.

The Legacy of the College Board: An Analysis of Puerto Rico's Parallel Education System

In recent years, the United States’ (U.S.) higher educational system has become increasingly dominated by a focus on standardized testing practices: politicians, pundits, parents, and even educational leaders emphasize test scores--whether from AP exams, SATs, ACTs, or state-mandated tests. However, most schools in Puerto Rico do not even encourage students to take the SAT or ACT, two of the College Board’s most popular and widely accepted standardized tests. Instead, schools on the island have opted to use the Puerto-Rico specific Prueba de Aptitud Académia, or “PAA,” known locally as “el College Board.” Due to the widespread acceptance of the PAA in Puerto Rico, mainland colleges’ obsession with tests like the SAT and ACT comes at the expense of Puerto Rican students who wish to study at universities other than the few options available on the island. Further, the Puerto Rican educational system parallels the rest of the country in a way that is undeniably flawed and continues to be fueled by a long record of colonial violence.

The root of Puerto Rico’s educational crisis goes farther back than Hurricane Maria. In fact, it stems from a 1964 decision by the College Board to expand its market to Latin America with a Spanish-language edition of the college entry exam. The College Entry Examination Board (CEEB) was founded in the late 1800s and has since been working tirelessly to promote a Testing-Based Accountability system in the U.S. This system places emphasis on standardized test scores such as the SAT and ACT as an important predictor of student success. During the early sixties, Puerto Rico became the ideal location for the College Board’s base of operations due to its American-style social and economic infrastructure. When their attempts at drafting a “Spanish SAT” failed to aid U.S. admissions due to the low number of test-takers, the College Board instead decided to implement widespread educational reform throughout Puerto Rico. Shortly after--and with the assistance of the College Board--the PAA was adopted as Puerto Rico’s national college admissions exam, marking the birth of a Puerto Rican education system parallel to that of the mainland U.S. As is evidenced by the increasingly low number of Puerto Rican applicants to elite mainland schools, Puerto Rico’s educational system has inadvertently created a status quo that precludes mainland universities as an option for Puerto Rican high schoolers due to the unequal advantages mainland applicants have by means of standardized testing. The College Board saw an economic opportunity and seized it, with little regard for the impact their decision would have on the development of Puerto Rico. The result has been a severe underrepresentation of Puerto Rican students in higher education, as well as a glaring lack of opportunity and educational mobility as a result of mainland admissions standards. 

The average Puerto Rican faces significant hurdles to applying to out-of-state universities, much more than U.S. citizens elsewhere. The biggest driver of this inequity is the United States’ deep-seated commitment to standardized testing practices. Unless educational policymakers address the issue of standardized testing, this disparity will only continue to grow, with an increasing number of students leaving Puerto Rico each year in hopes of achieving higher education due to the crippling economic impact of Hurricane Maria. The University of Puerto Rico is a viable option for students, but it too has become imperiled by hurricanes, the island’s $73 billion in public debt, and competing demands for government funding. As such, more students will consider leaving the island in the years to come, and mainland colleges and universities need to accommodate this influx of students in a way that will best promote equality of opportunity. 

About 30,000 students graduate from high school in Puerto Rico each year, and almost all of them take the PAA. By contrast, only 3,000 Puerto Rican students took the SAT in 2017, which pales in comparison to the roughly 43 percent of all U.S. seniors who took the SAT. This discrepancy, while unnoticed by most educational analysts, has a huge impact on the recruitment of Puerto Ricans to mainland universities. While many evoke a moral imperative for U.S. colleges to use SAT data to recruit students from poor and rural communities, these efforts specifically miss out on those students living in Puerto Rico, who have not been exposed to the same testing structures as mainland students. Since Puerto Rico’s college admissions process solely considers PAA scores and Grade Point Averages (GPAs) to evaluate applicants, the emphasis placed by mainland colleges on standardized tests like the SAT and ACT acts as a barrier to entry for many deserving Puerto Rican applicants. Not only does this represent a failure on behalf of the U.S. government and U.S. educational system to uphold equality of opportunity, it serves to further solidify the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico as second-class in relation to the mainland U.S. 

In the words of Harvard Professor and Puerto Rico native Roberto Rivera, the admissions process that developed in Puerto Rico is domestic in nature, but foreign in practice. Just as Puerto Rico’s educational inequities began long before the negligence that followed Hurricane Maria, colonialism has been a part of Puerto Rico’s history since its inception. After the U.S. seized Puerto Rico in the 1898 Spanish American war, what little autonomy the people of the Commonwealth had achieved was taken away. The U.S. quickly attempted to ‘Americanize’ Puerto Rico by implementing the English language, making it a federal offense to have a Puerto Rican flag, and even making it illegal to sing the Puerto Rican national anthem. Notably, despite their relegation to second-class citizenship, Puerto Ricans were the first to be drafted during the Vietnam War. Furthermore, Puerto Rico’s status as “territory” means it can’t re-negotiate its debt to Wall Street banks in a manner similar to how U.S. states can. All of these examples only exemplify the fact that, despite the efforts and victories of those who fought for the Island’s freedom, Puerto Rico has never truly been sovereign. 

Instead, the people of Puerto Rico have been subjected to a capitalist dominated empire that sacrifices the lives of the less fortunate in the name of big business interests. As such, the college admissions process that developed mirrors the second-class status of Puerto Rico within the U.S. Rivera argues that standardized testing practices cannot be isolated from the history of colonial neglect that has shaped the Puerto Rico’s sociopolitical development. He instead sees the island’s educational system and reliance on the PAA as a mere extension of the same legal disenfranchisement employed by the U.S. federal government throughout history, borne out of the desire for profit and control instead of commitment to equality. The question, however, remains to be answered: What should governments be doing to address this inequality? 

Independently, many colleges are beginning to shift towards test-optional policies, in which students are able to determine whether or not their test scores are included in the admissions process. This could be an indication that mainland schools are taking notice of the harmful effects of testing focus. Further, test-optional policies represent an opportunity to alleviate the burden of testing practices on Puerto Rican students, and thus offer a potential alternative to a total elimination of test scores in admissions. However, such independent movements are unfortunately not standardized across the U.S. and Puerto Rican students still face considerable barriers to entry when attempting to enter the higher education realm. 

The federal government should therefore mandate that all colleges and universities in the U.S. no longer consider standardized tests when deciding whether or not to admit Puerto Rican applicants. This would go a long way to mitigate the barriers to accessing  higher education that results from the mainland’s focus on standardized tests at the expense of Puerto Ricans. Furthermore, research on testing policy from Johns Hopkins indicates that an increased focus on GPA in place of standardized tests would favor minority students in the admissions process. For instance, students that identified as African American, Hispanic, female, or lower-income tended to have slightly higher standardized GPAs than ACT Composite scores. Conversely, white, male, and middle and higher-income students tended to have slightly higher standardized ACT Composite scores in comparison to their GPAs. This is an indication that forcing colleges to reform their admissions procedures and shift away from a focus on standardized testing could have overwhelmingly positive impacts with regards to equality of opportunity. 

In considering the facts, the data speaks to a larger trend: the tendency for standardized testing to foster inequality at a systemic level. While history points to the urgent need for addressing the crisis of educational equality in Puerto Rico, this analysis also sheds light on the exclusionary tendencies of the College Board and U.S. government writ large, begging investigation into the harmful effects of the testing culture on mainland communities as well.

Can One Business Ownership Model Profoundly Shape Country-Level Wealth Distribution?

The face of global economic inequality has changed greatly since the 1970s. Up until the early 2010s, the most common way to conceive of disparities in income was by referring to countries as “developing” and “developed,” or “low-income” and “high-income.” However, this binary distinction has largely turned obsolete in the past decade. Nowadays, although clear cross-national differences do undoubtedly persist, the most dramatic gaps in income exist not so much between countries as they do within states. Despite the phenomenal technological and economic progress achieved transnationally, not everyone has been able to reap the benefits of that progress equally.

Parallel to the worldwide evolution of the very nature of economic inequality was a shift in the corporate world that prompted commentators to refer to the 2010s as a “golden age of employee ownership.” A rise in the number of businesses totally or significantly belonging to their employees, through direct individual share ownership, indirect employee ownership trusts, or a combination of both, amounted to 17.2 percent in 2017 and 18.5 percent in 2018 in the United Kingdom (UK) alone. More than 60 percent of the total company conversions to employee ownership in Britain happened in the past seven years. About half of United States (U.S.) workers currently have a stake in businesses through employee shares, company stock, or profit-sharing, which includes 20 percent of private-sector workers having some form of ownership in the companies employing them. Although data availability on employee-owned businesses outside the UK and the U.S. is limited, such corporate giants as Danone in Southeast Asia, Huawei in China, and Mondragon in Spain are opening up to or are already fully embracing the idea of employee ownership.

Aside from being an increasingly widespread business model trend, employee ownership is an area of rare and overwhelming partisan consensus in the U.S. In a 2019 General Social Survey (GSS), 72 percent of Republicans and 74 percent of Democrats said they prefer working for an employee-owned company over one that is owned by investors or the government. Distinguished Professor Joseph Blasi (Rutgers University), who designed GSS questions in collaboration with Professor Richard Freeman (Harvard University), elaborates on the remarkable convergence of opinions on employee ownership:  “Democrat or Republican, female or male, black or white, union or non-union, a majority of respondents said they prefer to work for a company with employee share ownership. It is rare to find such a national consensus on anything.” Some unambiguous benefits must be at play here for one business model of moderate prominence to invoke such broad popular support.

There are, indeed, advantages commonly associated with employee ownership. According to the National Center for Employee Ownership based in Oakland, California, employee-owned companies lay off fewer workers, experience higher rates of growth, and pay higher wages than their conventionally owned peers. Researchers from the City University of Hong Kong and Villanova University, Pennsylvania, find that employee ownership had a small but significant impact on overall firm performance of over 1,500 European companies in 2006-2014.

Empirically proven productivity and performance advantages aside, many expect employee ownership to bring benefits beyond the economic realm. From its earliest stages, a transfer of a company’s shares to its workers is oftentimes motivated by ethical concerns. Mark Constantine, co-founder and CEO of Lush, a natural cosmetics shop, cited his worry that his business can be taken over by a firm that does not share Lush’s values when commenting on his decision to consider an employee ownership model, which Lush ended up adopting. Julian Richer, founder of home electronics retail Richer Sounds, admitted that his motivation to transfer ownership to the company’s workers was “one of morality.” Ethical arguments in favor of employee ownership are not groundless: the first-ever study on the impact of employee ownership on lower- and moderate-income workers. conducted in March 2019 by the Rutgers Institute for the Study of Employee Ownership and Profit Sharing, the study’s findings suggested that this ownership model has the potential to significantly narrow racial and gender income gaps in the future.

This brings us back to the discussion of global intra-country income inequality: Can employee ownership move beyond making founders of companies feel good about themselves after the noble deed of transferring their shares to workers? Is it within the capacities of this ownership model to provide a solution to wealth disparity? Empirical evidence on this front is mixed. The Rutgers Institute finds that, while employee ownership does generally help improve family economic stability and financial security, most of the workers who own a stake in their companies are male and high-income. Nevertheless, workers of color who do participate in employee ownership stock plans (ESOP) in the U.S. tend to do far better financially than the national average--American Latinx ESOP employees, for example, are 12 times more wealthy than the median Latinx employee. Meanwhile, staggering income gaps persist among white and black women participating in ESOPs, whose wealth on average amounts to $225,000 and $55,000, respectively. These figures demonstrate that employee ownership does not seem to be a panacea for income inequality, and its success in closing the wealth gap has so far remained mixed – at least in the U.S.

A growing body of scholarship has focused on describing and explaining unequal returns from employee ownership programs. Edward J. Carberry of the University of Massachusetts Boston used the results of a survey involving over 40,000 employees in fourteen U.S. companies to show that women and African Americans benefit less from profit sharing and gainsharing employee ownership generates, compared to their male and white counterparts. This is consistent with existing patterns of occupational segregation, work devaluation, and discrimination. Since groups with lower levels of discretionary income, such as women and racial or ethnic minorities, have fewer opportunities to invest in ESOPs, they will benefit less from such plans. What is more striking, however, is the finding by Carberry suggesting that, on average, women receive less value from all types of ESOPs than men, even when controlling for occupation, education, and income differences. This suggests a worrisome propensity of employee ownership to further magnify unequal wealth distribution – the exact opposite of what its enthusiastic supporters expect it to do. 

Considering this evidence, policymakers should be more cautious about granting unconditional support to expanded employee ownership across all industries. In light of Carberry’s findings, predictions about the growing popularity of ESOPs hardly resemble promises of an inevitable triumph of inclusivity and fairness in the corporate world. Policymakers’ confidence in the ability of ESOPs to eradicate existing structural impediments to economic equality should not be blindly unquestioning. It is true, as the Rutgers Institute’s study demonstrates, that the average worker in an employee-owned company is financially better off than the average worker in a conventionally owned company. However, evidence shows that ESOPs are not the holistic vehicles of social justice that some commentators portray them to be. Instead, ESOPs replicate, with alarming similarity, patterns of nation-wide unequal wealth distribution among men and women, white workers and workers of color, and other demographic groups. Before further government support is offered to companies wishing to transform themselves into employee-owned enterprises, policymakers need more convincing evidence of the capacity of this ownership model to produce meaningful redistributive outcomes. 

Therefore, when it comes to income inequality mitigation and the creation of organizational cultures of fairness, employee ownership follows the same stratification patterns as conventional ownership models. Instead of creating a qualitatively different system of equal access to economic opportunity, evidence indicates that this model can actually reproduce dissimilar wealth distribution outcomes among different demographic groups. Despite its undeniable benefits, such as improved worker motivation and preserved founding values of companies, employee ownership as it stands today is not a cure for income disparities caused by gender, racial, or ethnic dimensions. With the topic becoming more and more salient as a growing number of firms choose to offer their workers a share in the business, more attention should be diverted to examining whether this business model can do more harm than good by exacerbating--instead of eliminating--the existing economic disadvantages that women and minorities face. 

Great Power Competition in Ukraine

The conflict between the Ukrainian government and Russian-backed separatists, which started in 2014 in Eastern Ukraine, has killed approximately 12,000 people, maimed a least 27,000, and displaced about 1.3 million people. However, over the last five years, with the exception of the occasional news cycle, Ukraine stayed out of the collective consciousness of the public of the United States (U.S.) until September 2019. A whistleblower report informed the public that the President of the United States may have used his office to pressure the Ukrainian government to investigate a leading political Rival. 

Suddenly Ukraine was on the lips of almost every talking head in the country. Judging by how many U.S. lawmakers still use the literal Russian translation of “The Ukraine” in public remarks, it is likely that many policymakers also haven’t thought too much about Ukraine over the last five years. Nonetheless, the lack of public attention doesn’t negate the fact that Ukraine has been on the frontlines of a Great Power Competition—Russia and China are both pursuing strategic objectives in Ukraine. Understanding precisely what these great powers’ objectives are in Ukraine and how these regional objectives fit into the global outlooks of these states is critical. This understanding enables the prediction of future actions of these states on both a regional and global level. 

Frozen Conflicts and Russian Grand Strategy 

Russia, in both its 2009 and 2016 national defense strategy, has stated that it views the eastern expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the positioning of NATO troops ever closer to the Russian border as a direct threat to the country’s national security. After the rapid eastern expansion of the NATO alliance in the 1990s and early 2000s, Russia developed a strategy to block certain countries from integrating into the Trans-Atlantic alliance. In both Moldova and Georgia, Russia was able to successfully leverage the separatist tendencies of ethnic minorities in the respective states to create frozen conflicts. Until these frozen conflicts are resolved, the prospect for European Union (EU) or NATO integration remains dim. 

These autonomous entities, which are generally unrecognized at the international level, would not survive without Russian patronage. In 2015, The Guardian reported that 70 percent of the separatist’s entity in Moldova, Transnistria, the national budget came in the form of Russian aid. In the case of Georgia, in September 2019, Putin publicly expressed his continued support for the separatist regions which included the allocation of funds to provide for the modernization of the entities’ armed forces of the separatist republics of Georgia. However, this relatively modest level of support has significantly complicated the EU and NATO aspirations of two former Soviet republics–in the case of Moldova, it’s been 27 years and for Georgia, it’s been ten years. 

The Utility of a Frozen Conflict in Eastern Ukraine

In the case of Ukraine, the line of contact that represents the de-facto border between the separatists and the Ukrainian government has been relatively stable since 2016.

The conflict is now characterized by low-intensity trench warfare, sniper attacks, artillery barrages, and the occasional skirmish. It is in Russia’s interest to keep this conflict unresolved. Although Russia denies that it has military assets deployed on Ukrainian soil (which many investigative reports have conclusively debunked), Russia makes no secret of the economic and political support that it provides to the breakaway regions. No official numbers exist regarding the exact amount of aid that Russia sends to the separatist regions, but Western analysts estimate that Russian aid to these regions amounts to 2 billion USD annually. This figure is less than .01 percent of Russia’s GDP—which, for Russia, is a relatively small price to pay to achieve a major geopolitical objective. 

As long as this conflict remains unresolved, significant complications will persist regarding Ukrainian aspirations to join the transatlantic security apparatus. The implicit threat of the conflict in the east of Ukraine going from frozen to very hot will hang over any move by Ukraine to become a more integrated member of NATO. Russia desires to maintain this tripwire to Ukrainian integration into the West, and thus will continue economically supporting the separatist regions and will work to sandbag any efforts to fully resolve the conflict. 

For instance, Volodymyr Zelensky, the former comedian-turned-president of Ukraine, during both his presidential campaign and his time as president, has been a strong proponent of undertaking public diplomacy campaigns in an attempt to convince the residents of the separatists’ regions that they would be welcomed back into Ukraine. Furthermore, in his inaugural speech in May of 2019, he stated that “for years the government [of Ukraine] has done nothing to in order for them [the Russian separatists] to feel Ukrainian. They are not strangers, they are ours, they are Ukrainian.” However, Russia seeks to discourage the residents of the separatists’ republics to think of themselves in any way Ukrainian because that could eventually lead to a resolution of the conflict. Thus, in an attempt to solidify a non-Ukrainian identity in the separatist republic, in April of 2019, Russia distributed Russian passports to the residents of the breakaway regions. While these types of small provocations rarely make it into the Western news cycle and garner very little attention, they further solidify the frozen conflict in Ukraine. In the near term, expect Russia to sponsor similar actions, particularly if any progress is made in negotiations that could lead to a resolution of the conflict. 

When states that border Russia start to strategically align themselves with centers of power independent of Moscow, Russia feels threatened. Although Russia will most likely attempt to avoid open conflict in dissuading its neighbors from aligning with other powers, they will not shy away from using their less-then-war playbook to achieve their strategic objectives. For instance, if Central Asian states start to reorient themselves towards China (as a result of China’s far-reaching Belt and Road Initiative), and if this reorientation reaches a tipping point, one could expect Russia to undertake a similar strategy as it has in the Caucuses and in Eastern Europe. 

China: Belt and Road Initiative, Trade, and Access

Unsurprisingly, China has made inroads into Ukraine via its Belt and Road Initiative, as China envisions Ukraine as a major transit hub that can deliver Chinese produced goods to the EU market. In fact, government officials and businesses of both countries have proposed ambitious infrastructure projects to make this vision a reality. In August 2018, during a roundtable of officials and experts from Ukraine and China, the group unveiled the concept for an 1100 kilometer high-speed rail line in Ukraine. It is important to note, despite the unveiling of this plan and many like it, very few projects have actually been started. Thus far, the Belt and Road Initiative in Ukraine remains largely an abstract concept instead of a concrete project. 

However, the growing trade relationship between Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital, and Beijing is very real. In 2018, Ukraine’s single largest import partner was China. Ukraine imported 7 billion dollars worth of goods from China in 2018—only the EU exported more goods to Ukraine that year. Furthermore, in the first half of 2019, China became the 3rd largest destination for Ukrainian exports. Although the EU is still undoubtedly Ukraine’s most important economic partner, China has cultivated its economic relationship with Ukraine quite quickly. 

This budding trade relationship with Kyiv allows Beijing access to the Ukrainian goods that it most desires: weapons. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), China was the largest customer for Ukrainian arms in 2018. To note, China is not acquiring mere old soviet weapons stocks that have been rusting away in warehouses since the 90’s – they are acquiring high-tech aerospace technology. 

Ukraine was a critical part of the Soviet defense industry and much of the infrastructure and human capital are still present to this day. According to Michael Carpenter, an arms control expert at the Atlantic Council, Ukraine “is blessed with extraordinary human capital: world-class engineers, designers, and top-notch universities that feed qualified science and engineering graduates into the job market.” The Ukrainian military-industrial complex has the exceedingly rare capability to produce high-tech helicopters and jet engines from start to finish. Although China has made incredible advances in aerospace technology, it still struggles with the production of high-precision equipment like jet engines.  For instance, China’s fifth-generation fighter, the J-20, is currently outfitted with a Russian engine because China’s engine development program for the fighter has been plagued with problems. Fundamentally, China has a high demand for this Ukrainian technology and know-how and, since 2014 when they dramatically cut their arms sales to Russia, the Ukrainian military-industrial base needs the customer. 

Traditionally, China has acquired this type of quality military technology from Russia. However, after Russia meddled in the 2016 U.S. election, the U.S. Congress passed the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act  (CAATSA). This law allows the United States to enact sanctions against any entity that does business with the Russian defense sector. In September 2018, Washington used this authority to sanction China in response to China’s acquisition of Russian fighter jets and missile systems. Arms acquisitions from Ukraine are also not subject to CAATSA, making Ukraine an even more attractive supplier for China. Furthermore, there is the possibility that Moscow ceases supplying Beijing with military technology if the Sino-Russian relationship becomes more competitive. China has a strategic interest in retaining and expanding its access to the Ukrainian military-industrial complex. 

In order to protect this interest in the short term, China will most likely continue various public diplomacy and investment efforts with the goal of developing good-will among the Ukrainian citizenry. In the past, China has gifted 50 ambulances, 50 search-and-rescue vehicles, and provided 137 million dollars for medical equipment to regional hospitals. These types of “hearts and minds” campaigns make it easier for China to grow its influence in Ukraine without provoking a negative reaction from everyday Ukrainians. 

In addition to public diplomacy efforts, China may use more direct means to protect its image and popularity in Ukraine. For instance, in early October Ukrainian media reported that a number of high-profile members of president Zelensky’s political party had been pressured by Chinese agents to act against Ukrainian civil society groups supporting the pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong. This type of interference in domestic Ukrainian politics could become more common as China increases its influence in Ukraine.

Moreover, China will most likely seek to invest in and develop the Ukrainian arms industry. In June 2019, a Chinese firm with connections to the Chinese government bid to buy a 50 percent stake in Motor Sich for 100 million dollars above market price. Motor Sich is one of the largest defense contractors in Ukraine that produces engines and employs over 30,000 Ukrainians. China can be expected to continue attempting to gain control over these types of Ukrainian companies in order to ensure its access to these firms’ products and to potentially acquire the technological know-how of these companies. 

On a strategic level, China, like Russia, has an interest in keeping Kyiv from fully integrating into the EU and the transatlantic community. The EU has enforced a moratorium on arms sale to China since 1989 in response to Tiananmen Square. If Ukraine were to join the EU or even make moves towards EU ascension that would require Kyiv to align its foreign policy to Brussels—to include the restrictions of arms sales—China would push back. Most likely, Beijing would attempt to leverage its economic influence that it is developing in Ukraine to lobby Ukrainian leaders to keep a degree of distance from Brussels. Therefore, much like Russia, China has a strategic interest in keeping Ukraine neutral. However, it is very unlikely that China would ever support or recognize the Russian-separatists in Ukraine in order to achieve this goal. China has a strict policy of not recognizing the breakaway regions of other countries for fear of emboldening any number of separatist movements in China itself. 

Overall, China is concerned with access—access to goods, access to markets, and access to resources. The case of Ukraine illustrates how China goes about quietly acquiring and then protecting this access. 

Implications for Ukraine

Traditionally, when discussing the geopolitical situation in Ukraine, commenters have underscored the supposed divide between the Russian-speaking east and the Ukrainian-speaking west, the implication being that Ukraine is a divided country. However, in the 2019 elections, Zelensky ran a campaign that attempted to rise above the east/west divide.  Although Zelensky spoke mostly Russian (as he is primarily a Russian speaker) during the election, he still emphasized the importance of the Ukrainian language—identity politics was not the focus of his platform. Instead, he focused on formulating a series of ambitious reforms that would seek to clean up Ukrainian politics, make the country more business-friendly, and simplify the bureaucracy. Zelensky’s campaign was successful and he won support that transcended the traditional east/west divide. Ukraine is not nearly as divided as many pundits portray. 

Zelensky has expressed support for Ukrainian ascension to the EU and has stated that he believes that the Ukrainian people should vote in a referendum to decide the future course of the country. Concerningly, as demonstrated, outside powers have distinct interests in keeping Ukraine from undertaking the EU ascension process. Moreover, these outside powers also have levers they could push that could seriously complicate any referendum.  If this referendum takes place, it is pertinent to remember that Moscow wants to halt western encroachment and it will capitalize on its influence over the separatist republics to accomplish this strategic goal. China, on the other hand, will seek to preserve its access to Ukrainian goods, know-how, and markets, and will leverage its growing soft-power tools to protect these interests. 

The Dangers of Mirrored Thinking: CAATSA Sanctions

Since the 1990s, the United States (U.S.) has employed various sanction regimes at an increasing rate in order to accomplish its foreign policy objectives. After Turkey’s October incursion into Northern Syria, U.S. policymakers immediately started pushing for the introduction of new sanctions against Turkey. Included in the Turkey sanction bill that passed the House of Representatives on October 29, 2019 was a provision to impose a previously defined set of sanctions called Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). However, the specific CAATSA sanctions provisions that Turkey would be subject to are extremely ineffective in accomplishing U.S. foreign policy goals and could actually increase the influence of Russia. The root of the ineffectiveness of CAATSA sanctions is “mirrored thinking,” as U.S. policymakers automatically assume that other states “think” like the U.S. The case of CAATSA sanctions serves as a warning to policymakers to avoid the analytical trap of mirrored thinking in future policy decisions. 

CAATSA Overview

In 2017, Congress passed CAATSA with sanctions targeting North Korea, Iran, and Russia. For each country, CAATSA lays out a separate justification for sanctions and the specifics of the sanctions differ for each country. Thus, CAATSA is effectively three sanction regimes folded into one. However, despite the fact that the targets of CAATSA sanctions differ for Iran, North Korea, and Russia, CAATSA universally implements secondary sanctions on targeted entities.

Per country, CAATSA created a list of persons and entities that are directly targeted by sanctions. Secondary sanctions direct the U.S. Treasury Department to also sanction any persons or entities that partake in “significant” transactions with listed persons or entities. Secondary sanctions on Iran and North Korea are not revolutionary, however, whereas Iran and North Korea are relatively isolated from the international business community, Russia is not. European businesses have significantly more ties to Russia than they do to North Korea or Iran and thus, are more likely, whether intentionally or unintentionally, to do business with a CAATSA targeted entity. Sanctioning a European entity could lead to complications between Washington and Brussels. Thus, the imposition of secondary sanctions on Russia has the potential to weaken U.S. partnerships. 

The Russia-specific sections of the CAATSA legislation state that Congress implemented the sanctions to respond to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, cyber intrusions, and human rights violations, and codifies many existing Russia sanctions programs. In addition, CAATSA Section 231E added provisions that target the Russian Defense and Intelligence sectors. Russian arms exports account for a predominant portion of the country’s technology-intensive exports and are one of the main avenues by which Russia integrates with the global economy. Therefore,  CAATSA sanctions targeting the Russian military-industrial complex are supposed to have a chilling effect on the sales of Russian arms and defense technology. This would theoretically degrade the economic health of the Russian military-industrial base and decrease Russia’s ability to expand its sphere of influence through arms deals. However, the effectiveness of the policy is predicated on the assumption that Russia leverages arms sales to create close ties with states and that Russia is attempting to generate a profit from arms sales. This assumption stems from the U.S. usage of arms sales but does not acknowledge the fact that Russia employs arms sales differently. 

U.S. Use of Arms Deals in Foreign Policy

It is no secret that the United States is the largest arms exporter in the world. In 2018 alone the U.S. made 136 billion dollars in arms deals. According to the U.S. Department of State, “Arms sales and defense trade are key tools of [U.S.] foreign policy.” The vast majority of analysts agree that the purchase of an advanced U.S. defense system creates an extraordinarily strong incentive for the recipient country to preserve a close relationship with the U.S.  For instance, a single U.S. cooperative defense program, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), involves 46 percent of the global economy and ensures that the states purchasing the JSF will be largely dependent on maintaining stable relationships with the U.S. to competently sustain the jet over its projected 50 year lifespan. The U.S. sells arms to make other states dependent on the U.S. in order to preserve their national security. 

In addition, promoting interoperability between the U.S. military and militaries of ally states has been a long-standing goal of U.S. arms sales from administration to administration. In 2014, the Obama administration released a directive stating that one of the primary goals of U.S. arms sales was increasing interoperability capabilities. The Trump administration’s public rhetoric focuses on the benefits of arms sales to the U.S. economy. However, in the Trump administration’s April 2018 National Security Presidential Memorandum Regarding U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, the importance of promoting interoperability is still highlighted. Administrations understand that increasing interoperability results in an increase in ease by which the U.S. can project its military power. 

U.S. planners understand that the outcome of any great power confrontation will hinge on the ability to gather, analyze, and disseminate information quickly. Allies that use U.S. compatible technology enable the U.S. military to easily incorporate the allies’ military assets into the broader U.S. information network. Jonathan Caverley of the U.S. naval war college highlights that “Interoperability among networked drones from multiple countries will likely play an enormous role in future “informationalized conflicts.” Interoperability results in increased lethality, therefore cultivating interoperability through arms sales remains a priority of U.S. foreign policy. 

CAATSA-style sanctions decrease the effectiveness of arms sales to build strong bilateral relationships and to cultivate interoperability. One can imagine that significant disincentives to buy U.S. arms would arise if China were to impose CAATSA- style secondary sanctions on U.S. arms sales. If that were to occur, the primary partners of the U.S., such as the UK, France, Australia, and Germany, would surely continue to purchase U.S. arms. However, states which the U.S. is trying to court might be dissuaded from purchasing arms in the quantity required to produce a dependent relationship and create interoperability capabilities with the U.S.. Thus, CAATSA sanctions would be effective against the U.S.—but Russia’s use of arms sales in its foreign policy is fundamentally different. 

Russia’s Use of Arms Deals in Foreign Policy

Russia’s primary objective of arms sales is to support its image as a first-rate, global power, promote the creation of a multi-polar world, and keep the Russian military-industrial base employed. 

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russia is the second most prolific seller of arms in the world (the most prolific is the U.S.). This is a point of pride for Russia. In a public meeting of the Commission for Military Technology Cooperation with Foreign States, the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin stated: “The arms market is complicated. Competition in this sector is very fierce. That Russia is the world’s second biggest arms and military hardware exporter is thus all the greater an achievement. I think it is an important indicator of our country’s industrial, technological, scientific, and political capabilities…. Russia has a time-tested reputation as a top-class producer of the most sophisticated military hardware.” Furthermore, Russian equipment is less expensive than U.S. arms and that is also a point of pride for Russia. For instance, in February of 2019, the Defense Minister of Russia, Sergey Shogiu, bragged that “Our foreign colleagues realize that our weapons are hundreds of times cheaper than the systems deployed to be used against us. And that does not apply only to the US missile defense system.” Russia’s arms sales enhance Russia’s prestige abroad and, arguably, more importantly, helps cements the perception of Russian power in the collective consciousness of the Russian citizenry.

Furthermore, Russia does not necessarily make money from its arms exports. It has been widely documented that Russia will provide loans to states who are cash strapped but looking to buy Russian weapons. A high-profile example of this policy is Turkey’s purchase of Russia’s advanced anti-air missile system—the S-400. This acquisition has an estimated value of 2.5 billion dollars, and 55 percent of this purchase is being financed via a Russian loan.  Additionally, in 2018, Russia issued a 200 million dollar loan to Armenia to finance the purchase of anti-aircraft and radar systems and, in 2013, Bangladesh was issued an 800 million dollar Russian loan in order to purchase Russian training jets. The chance of Russia actually seeing profits from these sales are relatively low. However, this is the trend for the entire military-industrial complex in Russia—Russian production of weapons is not profitable and thus requires state-funded subsidies. The export of arms that are financed by Russian loans is just another way to subsidize Russia’s military-industrial complex. These foreign arms sales keep the Russian military-industrial complex, which employs over two million Russians, operating. Keeping production lines running guarantees that Russia will have a domestic source of arms. Moreover, the two million Russians that are employed in the military-industrial complex and the oligarch owners of these firms provide stable political support to Putin’s government. 

Moreover, Russia’s sales of arms are opportunistic and do not represent any concerted effort to form tight alliances with the states who purchase Russian arms. In 2018,  there was significant media coverage of China’s participation in Russia’s Vostok-18 military exercises. Combined with China’s purchase of S-400’s, many analysts suggested that there was a deepening strategic partnership between China and Russia. Despite appearances, in Vostok-18 Chinese forces only represented one percent of the troops involved. Despite the fact that Chinese and Russian officials might state that arms sales and joint exercises symbolize a growing strategic relationship, actions speak larger than words and so far, Russian-Chinese cooperation has been quite superficial. But, the appearance of Russia creating interoperable capability with any state gives the appearance that Russia is forming an alternative to the western-dominated international system. This promotion of a multi-polar world is referenced many times in Russian foreign policy. Arms sales contribute to the appearance that Russia is creating this alternative system regardless of the actual imperial effects.

How Russia Can Leverage CAATSA Sanctions

As demonstrated, Russia’s geopolitical use of arms sales differs significantly from how the U.S. employs arms sales. Due to these differences, Russia is actually able to leverage CAATSA sanctions to advance its foreign policy objectives—chiefly, the promotion of a more multipolar world. 

Although, as discussed, Russia does not always seek to build close partnerships with other states, it is always looking to undermine other countries’ partnerships. A world where the overall cooperation between states is lower than it is today is inherently more multipolar—an objective of Russian foreign policy. When the U.S. sanctions, or even threatens to sanction another state, the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and the state being targeted is strained—and thus, a step is taken closer towards the realization of Russia’s objectives.

The case of Turkey’s acquisition of Russian arms highlights this “partnership degrading” characteristic of sanctions. Turkey's purchase of Russian made S-400s has resulted in a significant straining of the U.S.- Turkish relationship since Turkey announced the acquisition in December of 2017. Turkey is a NATO ally and the prospect of the United States unilaterally sanctioning Turkey was met with profound dismay by many foreign policy experts. As a result of Turkey’s acquisition of Russian arms, the U.S.  kicked Turkey out of the F-35 consortium (a major U.S. effort in developing closer strategic partnerships with other states) and there has been the talk of even reevaluating Turkey’s membership in NATO.  It is important to note that this tension arose before Turkey’s incursion into Northern Syria- which has even further degraded the U.S.- Turkey relationship. 

Russia was counting on its sale of weapons to undermine the Turkish-U.S. relationship. Russia was therefore willing to make concessions during this arms deal to help achieve this goal. Included in Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400’s were significant technology transfer provisions. These provisions will enable Turkey to maintain the S-400’s independently from Russia. Moreover, this technology transfer, in the future, will enable Turkey to domestically produce an analogous missile system. Thus, the technology transfer provisions negate the “dependency” building characteristics of arms sales which is critical to the way that the U.S. uses arms sales. Furthermore, as noted previously, Russia provided a loan to Turkey to finance 55 percent of the S-400 purchase (decreasing the likelihood that Russia will see a profit from the deal), and Russia also promised to expedite the delivery date of the missile system. The sale of S-400’s does not create a basis for a long-lasting partnership between Russia and Turkey and is not profitable for Russia. However, the sale of S-400’s raised the profile of the Russian arms industry which contributes to the image of Russia as a great power (this effect of arms sales happens regardless of CAATSA sanctions), and in large part because of the threat of CAATSA sanction, there was a significant chilling in the U.S.- Turkish relationship. 

The Perils of Mirrored Thinking

The case of CAATSA sanctions demonstrates how foreign policy can stumble when policymakers transpose their own policy-making paradigms onto the leaderships of other states. Sanctions can be a valuable tool for policymakers; however, not all sanctions regimes are created equal. To craft an effective sanctions policy or any policy in general, policymakers must have a clear understanding of the policy’s goals and how the state that is being sanctioned will react. U.S. policymakers wanted to push back on what they perceived to be Russia’s expanding influence. Because the U.S. gains such a great deal of influence in its own export of military equipment, U.S. policymakers projected that limiting Russia’s ability to sell arms would be an effective way to counter Russia. However, as demonstrated, Russia applies arms sales in its foreign policy very differently than the U.S.. Thus, CAATSA sanctions on Russia’s military-industrial base do not degrade Russia’s ability to project power, but if anything, enhances it. 

When Art Imitates Death: A Look At Contemporary Aestheticized Politics

In a world that prides itself on the values of democracy, why are people all too willing to acquiesce their freedom to the state abandoning democracy with relatively little resistance? One might ask themselves such a question while observing Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi “effectively [bypassing] parliamentary [requirements]” to prematurely annex Kashmir whilst also maintaining a relatively high approval rating of 64 percent. One might also face such a dilemma when observing the apathy of the Filipino people to the “12,000 extrajudicial killings” under President Duterte, another strongman enjoying “record-high approval.” The key to understanding this cognitive dissonance might lie in a key phenomenon behind the historical rise of populist authoritarianism: the aestheticization of politics.

The aestheticization of politics is a concept first explored by political philosopher and cultural critic Walter Benjamin, who used it to serve as an explanation “for the seductive fascination of fascism.” The aestheticization of politics shifts the focus of politics to artistic expression rather than effective governance. The underlying danger behind the existence of this phenomenon is that it is more often than not abused by authoritarian regimes to apply “the grotesque impropriety of applying criteria of beauty to the deaths of human beings,” presenting any deaths as a result of injustice or tyranny as a small contribution to a profoundly artistic and pure national struggle in which suffering is appreciated as a normal and reasonable means to an end. Examples of aestheticized politics can be found being used to significant success in propaganda such as Leni Riefenstahl’s Nazi propaganda film, Triumph of the Will, as well as the various works of the fascist-sponsored Italian futurist movement, both of which detail a great struggle in which the purity of the human spirit is shown to be recognized through violent struggle against all that is degenerate, leaving its viewer feeling “threatened by extinction by images and a simulacra of reality.” It is then only a matter of time as repeated exposure to such media leads to death being seen as a mere fact of theatrics, and a society experiencing an “inhumane indifference to ethical... and moral considerations” of political action. 

Though the ideologies espoused by the societies Benjamin referred to when formulating his theory, Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s Germany, are by no means widely accepted today, the aestheticized political process that underpins their allure is just as present as ever: A blatant abuse of the aestheticization of politics is occurring within the Indian political sphere through Bollywood, the Indian film industry. For example, in the 2018 Bollywood film Baaghi 2, the protagonist, a stoic military man Ronny, grabs a man and “ties him to the front of his jeep and uses him as a human shield to get through a lane full of stone-pelters.” By this point in the film, viewers are more likely to see Ronny and his goal of rescuing his lover’s daughter in a noble light, leading them to glance over this ignobility. Viewers might recall, however, an event one year before the movie’s release, in which Kashmiri civilian Farooq Ahmed Dar was apprehended by the Indian military and subsequently “tied to the front bumper of a military jeep as it patrolled villages… serving as a human shield against stone-throwing crowds.” One must ask themselves if, by being shown a dramatized facsimile of the real atrocity in which the perpetrators are displayed as heroes, they would still view the event as a blatant abuse of human rights or as much of an inconsequential artistic display as the film, which went on to gross over $2 billion. 

President Duterte of the Philippines, another strongman often accused of demagogy, is equally as adept in aestheticizing politics, with the basis of his successful campaign being rooted in promises of keeping the streets safe and clean of drug lords. In this case, the aestheticization of politics is heavily facilitated due to the promise of visible benefits without the ethical violations that were the means to reach this end. While an outsider may observe the clean and drug-free streets of Manila and think well of Duterte, it is all to easy for the 12 to 20 thousand victims of violent police and paramilitary action in this pursuit to slip out of mind. 

The dangers of viewing the ramifications caused by political action as a mere byproduct of artistic expression has also taken its toll on the American political landscape, albeit not to a lethal degree. No words can provoke a more vivid image than “Build That Wall”, a long-running popular chant expressing support for the expansion and renovation of the US-Mexican border wall. Glaring problems with such a feat, such as the fact that over two thirds of illegal immigration comes from visa overstays as opposed to border crossings and the rapidly climbing estimates of the construction expenses reaching over $20 billion, are undermined by the aesthetic of an “immigration invasion” prevented only by an immovable wall protecting a rejuvenated nation. The preference of emotional appeal to pragmatic action is blatant in this aspect, and it is apparent that this political narrative of invasion is fueled by an all too human desire to gravitate towards struggle and redemption. One must not underestimate President Trump’s experience in conveying the appeal of such aesthetic struggles, as his past experience in the television industry ensures that he is seasoned in the art of subjugating reality for the purpose of media consumption. Benjamin noted in his observations of 20th century authoritarianism that much of the aesthetic appeal of a government comes from its film industry. With this in mind, one must take note of how President Trump’s allies within the film industry portray him. In the promotional image for his film Death of a Nation, Dinesh D’Souza presents an amalgam of the faces of both President Trump and President Lincoln. The association of Lincoln and his deeds to that of Trump are of great significance, as it has been theorized by Benjamin’s contemporaries that the conflation of an aesthetic conflation of a modern struggle to a previous one is a commonly used tactic in aestheticized politics. 

With the very real implications of a politics aestheticized posing a threat to the ero of modern democracy, it is apparent that the free nations of the world must take measures to ensure that it does not find its democratic foundations eroded by deceiving theatrics. To prevent a reality of harmful political action from being non-differentiable from media, the film industry is urged to avoid contracts entailing an artistic interpretation of violence for political means solicited by aspiring authoritarian entities. The film industry, often complicit in pushing the narratives of demagogues, must reevaluate this relationship lest they risk eroding the independent nature of the film industry, losing their autonomous nature, and resulting in both the producer and consumer being negatively impacted whilst their democracy is undermined. Individuals sympathetic to the democratic way of life must be mindful of the policies proposed by their legislators, ensuring that there is no hidden suffering masked by grand narratives of prosperity. The aestheticization of politics is, ultimately, unavoidable, and the burden lies on the citizens of their nation to remain mindful about separating the violent and political from the aesthetic and the abstract.

Playing God: An Evaluation of the Ethicality of Gene Editing Technology

One of the most exciting things about scientific research is the way in which it allows us to transcend current understandings of the human potential. Genetic engineering exemplifies this power, as it often involves questions of what a human ought to be. Put simply, genetic engineering is “the direct manipulation of DNA to alter an organism’s characteristics in a particular way.” This practice, while holding a large place in modern-day discussions of bioethics, has a long history rooted in scientific exploration. Beginning during the early 1950s with the discovery of the double helix DNA structure by Rosalind Franklin, James Watson, and Francis Crick, the study of genetics became a recognized topic within scientific circles. Shortly after, geneticist Arthur Kornberg performed the first DNA synthesis, marking the official birth of genetic engineering as we know it. It wasn’t until the seventies that the field really began to take off, with the introduction of new technologies, like gene splicing and DNA mapping techniques. These innovative methods served as the early foundation for modern genetic engineering practices, as they allowed for unprecedented ease of manipulation of genomes. In the succeeding decades, substantial innovations were made in vaccines and synthetic drugs, as well as an investigation into the prospect of cloning and genetic modifications for organic plant life. With the turn of the century, the genetics community began to center their focus on the study of the human genome. It wasn’t long after this transition that renowned biochemists Jennifer Doudna and Emmanuelle Charpentier developed the first CRISPR mechanism, a tool that would offer unprecedented potential in a variety of fields yet pose an equally momentous challenge to the ethical foundations of modern science. 

CRISPR-CAS9, more commonly referred to simply as CRISPR, is a biochemical technology that allows for cheap and easy gene editing. Utilizing what is known as “clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats,” CRISPR gives scientists the ability to combine endonucleases or proteins that cleave DNA at specific sites along the molecule, to pieces of RNA to add, delete, or turn off a certain sequence in the DNA. This means that, theoretically, biologists could harness CRISPR to make fine-tuned changes to an individual’s genetic makeup, whether it be curing a formerly incurable inherited disease, or enhancing certain traits, such as strength or intelligence. The most recent use of this technology among the scientific community was by a Chinese scientist named He Jiankui. On the last Monday of November 2018, Jiankui announced that he had created what would instantly become known as “CRISPR babies,” by editing the genomes of two unborn twins and altering their DNA sequences using CRISPR. The goal of this experimentation was to use CRISPR to delete a genetic mutation from the twins’ genomes that has been known to increase the probability of contracting HIV. The news of Jiankui’s work was met with overwhelming condemnation from the scientific community and society writ large. Experts called his work “sloppy” and its application “unnecessary,” citing a failure of Jiankui to meet germline editing requirements, a set of ethical and moral guidelines established by the 2017 National Academies of Science Report. However, the ultimate criticism of Jiankui’s attempt to edit the human genome stemmed from accusations of a lack of moral conscience. While Jiankui can be seen as noble in his attempt to remove the gene that causes HIV from the twins, the effect of his tampering was an overall decrease in life expectancy, something that was neither foreseen nor acknowledged by Jiankui himself. In light of the uproar over Jiankui’s perceived callousness, a host of important questions have arisen regarding both the feasibility and moral efficacy of gene editing as a practice. 

Despite the outcry over Jiankui’s irresponsible use of CRISPR technology, the larger conversation regarding the benefits and drawbacks of genetic engineering, gene-editing technology in particular, demands an analysis that accounts for the industry’s multitude of different potential applications. Many ardent supporters of gene-editing technologies argue that technologies/innovations like CRISPR could cure medical conditions and ailments that substantially reduce the quality of life, offering an enormous boost to modern medicine’s ability to address genetic diseases that result from mutations, like cancer or HIV. Some experts even assert such technology has the potential to cure sickle-cell anemia, a genetic blood disorder that--until now--has been believed to be incurable. Additionally, gene-editing technology bears another, potentially less intuitive application: agriculture. Since CRISPR allows precise and efficient modification of genomes, scientists could use it to improve certain agricultural traits, like crop resiliency, adaptation, and end-usage. Since agriculture is crucial to the advancement of the United States (U.S.) economy, it’s essential that we use the technology available to us to improve farming practices however we can. 

In light of these potential advancements, it may seem difficult to understand why so many within the scientific community were so starkly opposed to Jiankui's application of CRISPR technology to human embryos. After all, he was trying to help them, albeit in an irresponsible and unnecessarily hasty way. The question of how we ought to judge Jiankui’s use of gene editing practices begs inquiry into how capable we, as a society, are in controlling the potential negative side-effects of such a technology. Framed in this manner, it becomes less a question of the intrinsic features of the technology, and more so one of technical feasibility. Tied up in the debate over the feasibility of gene-editing technology are philosophical questions of future value since any use of CRISPR runs the risk of harming future generations in unknown ways. In this sense, it becomes clear why an expert consensus was opposed to Jiankui’s use of CRISPR: although his intentions may have been good, the state of the technology was such that Jiankui was incapable of preventing the negative side effects of meddling with the human genome. 

Independent of determining whether or not the technology is ready for responsible use, some, such as theology and ethics professor Ted Peters, argue that gene-editing practices are unethical since they create the risk of using the technology for eugenics. As is evidenced by the current state of CRISPR technology, gene-editing tools are not widely accessible to the public yet. Since the development of such advanced technologies is expensive, tools like CRISPR are likely to become available to those who are higher on the socio-economic ladder first. This poses a massive threat to the fairness of society; since wealthy people will be the first customers of gene editing, genetically enhanced people can form a distinct socioeconomic class, raising the specter of inequality. According to Peters, the difference between a world of ethical gene editing and the much darker, socially stratified scenario laid out above lies in the distinction between therapy and enhancement. The therapy model for understanding gene-editing is one that emphasizes the potential for technologies like CRISPR to materially improve the lives of those suffering from genetic diseases. The enhancement model, on the other hand, sees CRISPR as a means to raise the standard for human genetic makeup in hopes of elevating the status of the human race as a whole, often resulting in class-based stratification of human worth. The line between these two interpretations is admittedly blurry, and the difference between therapy and enhancement is a hard line for bioethicists to draw. As a result, it’s likely that a world with CRISPR would be one in which certain castes of society are seen as more fit to reproduce than others, justifying mass oppression of those at a lower genetic “tier.” 

How can one reconcile the relative advantages and disadvantages of using something so transformative as gene-editing technology? First, it’s important to distinguish between various degrees of relevance when considering the drawbacks of CRISPR. The uncertainty tied to the readiness of these technologies is by no means intrinsic to its use since our ability to effectively operate on the human genome is purely a matter of empirical circumstance. The potential for serving as the foundation of a modern eugenics’ movement, however, is not something that can be separated from the moral quality of gene-editing technology. This concern, while merely hypothetical, is inherent to the technology itself. In fact, it’s undergirded the entire field of genetic engineering since its conception in the 1950s. 

Given that CRISPR poses an imminent threat to the equity of our society, what should we do about its proliferation? Maybe He Jiankui’s lapse in moral judgment was, in retrospect, a good thing. After all, his error did, at the very least, make clear to the scientific community and the world how unprepared we are as a society for things like CRISPR, potentially delaying widespread acceptance of the technology. No matter the answer to this question, gene-editing is undeniably unethical due to its propensity to increase inequality within a society, and thus anyone who willingly pushes the development of the technology would be making a mistake. While those who parade the potential benefits of CRISPR do so out of good intentions, their advocacy is dangerously short-sighted and could contribute to a path of development that is neither safe nor equitable.

China's Belt and Road Initiative: Is it Truly Neocolonialist?

During a visit to Kazakhstan in 2013, President Xi Jinping proudly announced the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This multi-trillion-dollar infrastructure project seeks to create an economic belt and maritime "silk road" that connects China to over sixty countries in Eurasia and Africa. The BRI aims to fund infrastructure projects such as highways, railways, seaports, airports, and oil refineries. Since its launch, China has been accused of enforcing neocolonialism through the BRI. By using the Hambantota Port and Colombo Port City project in Sri Lanka, I will argue that although China may have demonstrated neocolonialist intentions, partnering countries are equally responsible when making BRI project deals and can combat neocolonialism through negotiation. To expand off that, this piece argues that the BRI is not so much an example of neocolonialism as it is economic regionalism. 

The Belt and Road Initiative could potentially economically integrate several developing countries in the Asian region and beyond. But what's in it for China? The policy goals of the initiative include enhancing communication between foreign governments, implementing hard and soft infrastructure, strengthening cultural ties, and promoting regional cooperation. Hard infrastructure includes building transportation, networks and power grids, while soft infrastructure includes creating regulatory standards and trade deals. Cultural ties refer to sustaining intellectual and cultural exchanges, as well as tourism. The BRI would economically integrate countries within the Asian region by having fewer trade tariffs and standards for China when trading goods with partnering countries.

Because the concept of neocolonialism is interpreted in numerous ways, it is essential to first define it. The first Prime Minister and President of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, argues that neocolonialism has emerged as a substitute for traditional colonialism, where hegemonic powers exploit developing countries as colonies. Neocolonialism occurs when the economic and/or political system of an independent state is manipulated by another state. In other words, an outside state gains control over another state through "economic and monetary means," In neocolonialism, a state gaining economic control through the banking system or private industry is the start of foreign control over government policy. Nkrumah claims that because of this, the outside state uses the neocolonial state for exploitation rather than genuinely developing the state.

It is widely discussed that the BRI is neocolonialist because of its infamous "debt trap." A debt trap is a form of predatory lending in which a borrower is not able to pay their debts, so they continue to borrow until it becomes a cycle. It is often caused by high-interest rates. Akshan DeAlwis, John Jay Scholar at Columbia University, argues that the economic goals of the BRI are a facade, and by using the debt trap, China would be able to establish a military presence in the Asian region. DeAlwis further discusses non-economic factors of the BRI. He argues that China is trying to exert dominance through this opportunity to destroy local economies. DeAlwis also mentions the "String of Pearls" theory, which proposes that China is planning to develop overseas naval bases along the Indian Ocean to expand military forces in order to become a regional global power quicker than its rival power, India. 

China has made several deals with Sri Lanka through the BRI, and the two most prominent projects are the Hambantota Port and the Colombo Port City Project. These projects have demonstrated that partnering countries are equally responsible when making deals with China.

It is important to acknowledge that the host country is also responsible for its actions when making deals with BRI projects. In China's Asian Dream, author Tom Miller visited Sri Lanka to discuss China's involvement in projects under the government of Mahinda Rajapaksa, who went out of power by the January 2015 election. From 2009 to 2014, China financed almost $5 billion in ports, roads, bridges, railways, an international airport, and a coal-fired power station. This $5 billion loan, however, came at a high interest rate. Other multilateral banks and national banks, such as Japan's, typically offered lower interest rates. Ravi Karunanayake, Sri Lanka's Minister of Finance, stated that the high-interest rates by China's banks came from corruption on China's part, but also Mahinda Rajapaksa's corrupt regime of the past. Once Maithripala Sirisena's administration took over in 2015, it made sure to hold China accountable for its actions by suspending the Colombo Port City project. The project was suspended due to legal issues over land, the project's financing, and environmental effects. Karunanayake clearly states "'We mean business when we say we want clean, transparent, good governance... perhaps Chinese companies had to be corrupt in the past, but if they do that now they will be disqualified.'" When current President Sirisena visited Beijing, he blamed the previous regime for the issues that Chinese banks faced with the projects. Sirisena's administration renegotiated loan repayments with Chinese banks, lowering the interest rate and including additional environmental protections. 

China's neocolonialist intentions and the String of Pearls theory can be disproved by Sri Lanka's Hambantota Port project on the southeast coast of Sri Lanka. Dr. Natalie Klein, author of Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea, states that the Hambantota port is a commercial port and that BRI deals are commercial deals and loans, emphasizing that there is a difference between a commercial port and a military base. Klein continues to argue that the coastal state in which the port resides in is the one who has authority, regardless of who operates the port. This law has been established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). China cannot move forward with its projects without the acceptance of the host country. Therefore, Klein believes that no matter how big foreign investment is in a port, the coastal state still has control. 

The Hambantota Port project has sparked controversy within Sri Lanka because of China's debt trap and the fear of China using the port for military purposes. Hambantota was historically a Sri Lankan naval base but has switched into a port that has been built and now controlled by China. The port is under a 99-year lease to China Merchants Port Holdings for $1.12 billion. Because of this, there have been rallies conducted by the Sri Lankan public, fearing that China would use the port for their military to gain more influence on Sri Lanka as well as get closer to India, China's rival. Despite popular fears, the port deal has a clause that clearly states that the port cannot be used for military purposes. Additionally, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe's office stated that the Sri Lankan government has informed China that they are prohibited from using the port militarily, as the port is still under the control of the Sri Lankan navy.

 Sri Lanka has planned to create economic opportunity and jobs back to Colombo, its capital city. Through the BRI, the Sri Lankan government made a deal with the China Harbour Engineering Company to construct a $1.4 billion Port City development. The Colombo Port City would be used as an urban center for residential and commercial use. Bendix further explains that the China Harbour Engineering Company aims to add about 17 billion gallons of sand along the coast of the city, which has sparked concern from the Sri Lankan government due to environmental issues. Because of this concern, the project was suspended in 2014 by Prime Minister Ranil Wickramasinghe. Though this angered the China Communications Construction Company, the project's investor, the Sri Lankan government, and the China Communications Construction Company were able to continue the project after new environmental protections were implemented. The China Harbour Engineering Company had to obtain a permit to dredge about 3 miles out the coastline and at a depth of slightly less than a mile, and the company was not allowed to dredge near reefs and fishing grounds. Last, the company had to put aside $7 million in reparations to fishing associations considering the project's economic cost to local fishermen.

Stepping aside from Sri Lanka, the BRI has demonstrated a sense of cooperation when creating policies for the initiative. Many of the BRI's core tenants are consistent with international rules that have been written into the United Nations (UN), Group of Twenty (G20), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and other international and regional organizations. Additionally, China signed about 170 cooperation documents with 150 countries and international organizations. The BRI also promotes financial connectivity by supporting the Guiding Principles on Financing the Development of the Belt and Road with 27 countries. Lastly, the People's Bank of China co-financed more than 100 projects in 70 countries and multilateral development institutions, which involves numerous nations acting together. 

After analyzing two of Sri Lanka's significant BRI projects, it can be concluded that the BRI is not so much neocolonialism, rather it is economic regionalism. Economic regionalism pertains to the liberalization of trade between neighboring countries in the same geographic region. The most important tenet of trade liberalization is economic interdependence, which intertwines national markets, making countries wealthier and raising the cost of war with their trade partners. Amitav Acharya, a scholar and author of The End of American World Order, discusses the emergence of regionalism within the changing international system. He states that emerging powers, such as China, take part in the world of interconnectedness and interdependence by focusing on initiatives based on infrastructure and economic strategy rather than trade and political strategy. Local and regional initiatives like the BRI are the future to this international system. 

China's President Xi Jinping spoke against protectionism in a 2017 speech in Davos, and Chinese policymakers, such as current Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs He Yafei, have also spoken in favor of globalization. Additionally, in a 2016 Pew Survey, 60 percent of the Chinese public thought that being involved in the global economy is positive. On April 25 to 27 of 2019, President Xi Jinping held the second Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, welcoming leaders from 37 countries and delegates from 150 countries. President Xi Jinping discussed concerns raised by the United States over the BRI, trade, and infrastructure. He additionally addressed China's commitment to open its economy, enhance the interests of partnering countries, and implement environmental protection to BRI projects. China has made an effort to calm the fears of nations like Sri Lanka and the United States, advocating for economic liberalization and more particularly regionalism, as it would most strongly connect the Asian region. After decades of being closed off from the world, China has opened itself up to connect with neighboring countries and promote trade and infrastructure development, which benefits not only China but its neighbors as well. 

National Security Concerns in Outer Space: The Dawn of a Space Force?

On August 29, 2019, the Trump administration officially reestablished the United States (U.S.) Space Command. The endgame of the Trump administration is to ultimately create a sixth branch of the military: the Space Force. This objective was best illustrated by Secretary of Defense Dr. Mark T. Esper when he said the following: 

“Establishing the United States Space Command as a unified combatant command is the next critical step towards the creation of an independent Space Force as the sixth branch of the armed forces.”

Upon hearing the words “Space Force,” it’s difficult not to initially laugh at such an absurd sounding idea. One conjures images of starships from science fiction movies and thinks about how ridiculous it would be to create a new military force dedicated to military affairs in space. However, upon closer examination, such a proposal may prove to be both pragmatic and even overdue. The intention of the Trump Administration raises an important question: is the creation of a Space Force needed?

The Militarization of Space: Recent Developments in Satellite Technology

As costs for spaceflight have drastically been cut in the last decade, the frequency of satellite launches by both corporate and state actors has substantially increased. At the same time, innovations have been made in technology that has the potential to interfere or effectively ruin existing satellites in orbit. 

The National Air and Space Intelligence Center recently released a report highlighting how both the Russian Federation (Russia) and the People’s Republic of China (China) continue to “develop, test, and proliferate sophisticated anti-satellite weapons to hold U.S. allied space assets at risk.” Those weapons have the capacity to jam or completely destroy satellites used for both global navigation systems and military reconnaissance purposes. The aforementioned countries have simultaneously been “developing new space capabilities to achieve military goals and reduce their reliance on U.S. space systems.” Such developments provide a legitimate cause for concern given that attacks on existing satellites have the potential to be incredibly disruptive to location services, such as GPS, relied on by both military and civilian purposes alike. Therefore, an analysis of the current situation in outer space affairs and determination of what efforts the US could take to secure its position in outer space for itself and its allies is warranted.

China’s Strategic Support Force

In December 2015, China established an independent branch of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) called the Strategic Support Force (SSF). The SSF was designed to centralize Chinese military efforts in “space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic domain.” In 2007, China demonstrated that it could use an anti-satellite missile to destroy its own weather satellite.

Given such a development on the Chinese side, it logically follows that the Trump administration might seek similar consolidation of its space and cyber operations to at least match the level of organization of the PLA. However, as Elsa Kania and John Costello from the China Cyber and Intelligence Studies Institute point out, the U.S. Strategic Command is already quite similar in that it is “…responsible for space, cyber operation, and strategic C4ISR support.” However, it differs from both the U.S. Strategic Command and the U.S. Cyber Command in that it is its own military branch. As it currently stands, “there is no true military space career path and Air Force officers with no space background are often shifted into space work,” as noted by Associate Director of the Aerospace Security Project of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Kaitlyn Johnson. The creation of a new military branch dedicated to space would also serve to create a career path specifically for those interested in that field. This may prove useful for the U.S. military in attracting talented personnel. 

What Would the Space Force Be?

Before determining whether or not a “Space Force” is needed, it is important to define what such an entity would look like. Under the Trump administration’s proposal, the Space Force would be a separate and sixth branch of the U.S. military that ultimately reports to the Secretary of Defense. The Space Force proposed by the Trump administration would not-- at least for now-- be focused on pouring resources into the development of battleships for outer space. Rather, it would be primarily focused on protecting one of the military’s greatest assets that also impacts most of our lives directly: satellites. Satellite technology has been utilized by the United States military for decades and has applications ranging from GPS location technology to imagery production that is used to determine the location of foreign weapons systems. If such technology were to be lost or intentionally destroyed, the U.S. would lose some of its best ‘eyes in the sky’ that it relies on to make informed decisions. Put simply, inadequate protection of precious satellite technology makes the U.S. and its allies vulnerable. The protection of satellite technology should therefore be taken very seriously.

The United States previously had a Space Command that was established under the Department of Defense (DoD) in 1985. However, post-9/11, the major command then merged into the larger U.S. Strategic Command, where the main focus became the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan. However, recent developments in the proliferation of anti-satellite capabilities among rivals of the U.S. have convinced the Trump administration officials that greater consolidation of and attention to military capabilities in space is necessary. 

The federal website does not provide much further information for how the U.S. Space Command is currently organized. However, the DoD did release a report detailing a proposal for how the Space Force would be brought into existence and how the Space Command would continue to play a role. According to the report, the following three components would be created: first, the Space Development Agency, which would be tasked with “capabilities development and fielding” and suggests that part of this process includes transformation of the Air Force’s Space and Missile Center; second, the Space Operations Force, which will “develop the Space Operations force to support the Combatant Commands”; and third, the support and services functions that will be assisting the Space Force and developed by the Department of Defense. The Space Command, led by a four-star general, would be included in the process as it would provide direction to the use of the Space Force’s combined assets during times of military conflict. 

The U.S. Space Command is currently led by General John W. Raymond and is comprised of two main parts: the Combined Force Space Component Command (CFSCC) and the Joint Task Force Space Defense (JTF-SD). The former serves as more of a center of planning, assessment, and integration of space capabilities. The latter, the JTF-SD, is responsible for deterring aggression and defeating adversaries in conflicts. 

Current Agreements in Outer Space

During and after the Cold War, the United States signed a number of treaties with the Soviet Union and other world powers to set rules on what kind of activity would be tolerated in space. One such treaty is the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, otherwise known as the Outer Space Treaty. Among other things, the treaty states that signatory parties agree to not militarize outer space and celestial bodies beyond Earth. This includes a prohibition on the placement of nuclear weapons and military bases on celestial bodies other than Earth. It also requires that a base built on any celestial body be open for use by other nations, provided that advanced notice is given to the nation that built the base The United States, the Soviet Union, and over a hundred other countries signed this treaty, with some even ratifying it in their respective national legislatures. One such participant was China, who signed the treaty in 1967.

While the Outer Space Treaty has proven useful in discouraging the construction of military bases beyond Earth, it does not mention the use of satellite interference or destruction technology that now poses a greater threat as cyber warfare strategies continue to develop. A separate treaty called the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects lays the groundwork for determining liability in scenarios in which another one state’s assets are damaged by another state and claims that the state whose assets have been damaged shall be entitled to compensation. Again, this treaty does not prohibit the use of anti-satellite technology to damage another state’s satellites outright.

Conclusion

In order to be adequately prepared for potential conflicts in outer space, the U.S. will need to take strategic action to reorganize and consolidate its capabilities in the protection of its satellites. The creation of a permanent branch of the military to fulfill this need, such as the proposed Space Force, is a reasonable solution to this challenge and provides the additional benefit of creating a true military career path and mechanism for recruiting talent.

In the 21st century, China has emerged as a formidable rival on the world stage. From its demonstrated capability in outer space to its signature Belt and Road Initiative, it is safe to say that protecting U.S. interests in foreign and defense policy includes greater consideration of China’s actions. Furthermore, the example of the Strategic Support Force may provide a useful example in determining how the U.S. should go about this task. The SSF’s combination of outer space and cyberwarfare expertise in this branch of the military could provide a framework for the U.S. military for how to go about combining those capabilities.

While the effort of restructuring U.S. capabilities in outer space has been undertaken to some extent with the reintroduction of the Space Command, future developments and threats to U.S. interests would likely be better addressed if there were a permanent organization with outer space affairs as its area of expertise. As of 2016, the Government Accountability Office concluded that there were over 60 organizations “strewn across the Department of Defense and intelligence community with responsibility for space acquisitions,” which will likely prove unacceptable in future as greater centralized authority is needed in the future. This fact coupled with the reality that a command dedicated to this issue was gotten rid of in the past in order to focus on another international conflict further supports the conclusion that the permanence of the proposed Space Force would greatly support U.S. goals.

The long-term objectives of the U.S. should also include a reexamination of current applicable international law, specifically as it applies to the proliferation and usage of anti-satellite technology. The Trump administration should seek greater dialogue and new treaties with China and Russia to avoid escalation of the militarization of outer space. Chances of positive diplomatic outcomes on this issue with China may seem slim given the current state of affairs between the two nations in the ongoing trade war, however diplomacy should nevertheless be utilized to the fullest extent possible in outer space affairs.

Ultimately, the U.S. has a full plate with regards to how it should be acting with regards to the rise of China and others. In the realm of outer space affairs, a number of solutions exist to strengthen the position of the U.S. and its allies in outer space. Among these, the Space Force proposal presents a reasonable step in the direction of achieving U.S. defense and foreign policy objectives and should therefore be seriously considered.