Climate Change & The Public’s Perception In The United States

In the United States, there is not a unified public perception of climate change. Despite the scientific evidence, there is debate over whether or not climate change is real, and if it is, whether or not humans are perpetuating it. Among the people who agree that climate change is existent and perpetuated by humans, there is still controversy about whether the burden lies on the government, corporations, or individuals to counteract it. However, the situation gets even more complicated. The public’s perception of climate change has been impacted by everything from the economics of a region to the deflection of guilt from large corporations, and at this point, some people are influenced by specific global leaders and political ideologies more than science.

As aforementioned, some people do not believe that climate change is real. This perspective is not rooted in science, so it has to come from somewhere else. Accordingly, the most common opinions of climate change have a correlation to certain ideologies. For example, in the United States, the current President of the United States, Donald Trump, has a history of denying the existence of climate change. Arguably the most prominent political figure in the country, President Donald Trump has called climate change a “hoax” and asserted that it was fabricated by China. He has also referenced “global cooling,” a belief dating back to the 1920s — although it was not a widespread view at the time — in order to denounce global warming. In the same statement, he claimed that nobody actually knows if global warming is a reality, despite the evidence offered by scientists.

When President Trump discussed the current California fires, he belittled them. It took him three weeks to finally acknowledge the fires at all, but once he did, he attributed them to a forest management issue. Despite mounting criticism on his climate change rhetoric, he has remained committed to his original opinion on the cause of the fires. In 2018, the last time California experienced devastating wildfires during President Trump’s term, he blamed forest management once again, discounting the role of climate change in the catastrophes. Even when evidence of climate change is extraordinarily conspicuous, President Trump will revert back to his initial stance on climate change: pure denial. When the American people and public figures accused him of ignoring science, all he had to say was “It’ll start getting cooler, you just watch.” He also insisted that other countries did not have the same problems, implying that climate change must not be real because it would be affecting the entire planet.

There is some merit regarding President Trump’s default to blaming forest maintenance mismanagement. Insufficient forest management does contribute to the problem; even California Governor Gavin Newsom has admitted that fact. However, the fires are getting exponentially worse, to the point that forest mismanagement can no longer account for these issues. In 2018 alone, 1.89 million acres of California burned. It was “the most destructive year in California history” — that is, until 2020. As of October 4, 2020, 4 million acres of state lands have gone up in flames, and California has already had “six of the 20 largest blazes in state history” this year. Additionally, if President Trump blames California’s inadequate forest management for the fires, he should comment on Oregon and Washington’s forest management as well. For that matter, he should mention forest management in Canada, a country that proves this wildfire problem is not unique to the United States.

Misinformation has been spreading around the internet, and just like President Trump, people on social media have implied that the impacts of climate change are constrained to the United States. For example, conspiracy theories about the fires have spread on TikTok. Certain videos include maps that show how the fires stop at the United States-Canadian border, and several influencers have used them to support their narratives that the fires are fake, they were started by the United States government in a big conspiracy, or they are a problem unique to the United States. However, as many people have pointed out, it was not a global or North American fire map; it was only a fire map for the United States. Yet, influencers, President Trump, and a portion of the American people have insisted that other countries never experienced the same measure of fires as the United States.

One other semi-common view is that climate change exists, and humans do not contribute to it. This is second in the order of President Trump’s five stances on the reality of climate change. He made his belief very clear: “I am not a great believer in man-made climate change. I’m not a great believer.” Given his status as the current leader of the GOP, it is not surprising to learn that members of his party align with his beliefs more than members of the Democratic Party. Pew Research Center found that “Republicans with a high level of science knowledge were no more likely than those with a low level of knowledge to say human activity plays a strong role in climate change.” Although it is unclear whether this view stems from the members of the party or the President — the chicken or the egg — it is certainly perpetuated by President Trump. 

On the other hand, politics around the globe has played a role in the public’s perception of climate change, and a scientific study by the University of Kansas showed how framing plays an impactful role in the media. According to the study, climate change is more politicized in richer countries than poorer countries, and the conversation in richer countries is more centered around “debate or argument about political approaches as opposed to proposing policy solutions.” It is advantageous to many groups to either claim that humans do not contribute to climate change or to affirm their stance that people are not a major contributing factor.

For those who do claim that people perpetuate climate change, there are several main beliefs: it is up to the individual, corporations, government, or a combination of the three to reduce its effects. Beginning with the individual, most of us probably know someone who brings a reusable straw in their bag everywhere they go. Although it is admirable, one must acknowledge that corporations have benefited from shoving this idea and other emphases on the individual down people’s throats. Even if everyone recycles and sticks to using reusable straws, some sources say that one hundred companies are responsible for seventy percent of greenhouse gas emissions. Taking that into consideration, many people believe that the mission to limit climate change to 1.5 degrees Celsius is impossible without corporations and governments doing their part. Some corporations seem to agree and have taken measures to become more sustainable, such as Starbucks with their recyclable and strawless lids and the sustainability efforts by McDonald’s, but these actions are not enough to outweigh the damage by corporations as a whole. Many people have called for governments to sanction corporations so that they will not have a realistic opportunity to ignore the environmental costs, and others have advocated for other ways in which governments can counteract climate change.

In terms of public opinion regarding the effectiveness of climate policy, identifying with a political party in the United States is once again an indication of a person’s stance. According to Pew Research Center, 71% of Democrats and only 34% of Republicans said that policies to reduce climate change overall benefit the environment, while 43% of Republicans said they make no difference and 22% said they “do more harm than good for the environment.” However, a two-thirds majority of adults in the United States said that the federal government is not doing enough to reduce the effects of climate change. 

A multitude of people are actively pushing the federal government to do more. For instance, people have been advocating for the Green New Deal, a proposal to move the United States toward net-zero emissions by 2050. Renewable energy, new jobs with government-funded training in clean energy industries, an upgraded power grid, and modified transportation systems are just some of the proposed provisions. Others have urged the government to rejoin the Paris Climate Agreement. 

The criticism against the United States for its failure on climate action was particularly amplified when the decision was made to withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement. The United Nations Secretary-General called the decision a “major disappointment.” The New Zealand Climate Change minister gave a similar message, also conveying her opinion that the United States should be decreasing its dependency on fossil fuels. The spokesperson for China’s Foreign Ministry called the United States the “biggest destroyer of international environmental cooperation.” France, Italy, and Germany released a joint statement affirming their belief that the Paris Climate Agreement cannot be renegotiated. 

In the end, it is clear that there are many factors that cause such varied views on climate change within the United States. With the mixed signals from the government, international leaders, domestic leaders, the experience of each country, and corporations, it can be understood why the public’s perception of climate change is not necessarily based on science.

UN Vote Proves UK Acquisition of the Chagos Islands Was Illegal

For many Chagossians, the phrase “dying of a broken heart” is all too true. Known in Creole as “Sagren,” this feeling of profound sorrow still resonates among the Chagossian community more than 50 years after their eviction from Diego Garcia in the late 1960s and early 1970s by the United States (U.S.) and United Kingdom (UK). In an attempt to “cleanse” and “sanitize” the Chagos Archipelago, of which Diego Garcia is the largest island, the UK proceeded to separate the group of islands from the nearby British Colony of Mauritius to form the British Indian Ocean Territory in 1965. Years later, Mauritius gained independence in 1968 while Britain maintained control over the Chagos Islands.

In the next decade after 1965, the British forcibly expelled thousands of members of the local Chagossian population to make way for the creation of a joint U.S.-UK military base known as Camp Justice. Relocated to the nearby islands of Mauritius and Seychelles, the Chagossians received little to no resettlement aid or compensation and instead were subjected to incredibly poor living conditions. Post-relocation, many Chagossians ended up settling in the UK where they were given British citizenship. To this day, the UK government still prevents the Chagossians from returning to Diego Garcia.

Importance of Diego Garcia

The eviction of the Chagossians from Diego Garcia was purely on behalf of furthering U.S. strategic foreign policy objectives. The island’s isolated location in the middle of the Indian Ocean--south of the tip of India and nearly equidistant from Australia, the Saudi peninsula, and the eastern coast of Africa--allows the U.S. to have a military presence in an otherwise untouched geographical area. The position of the island, which houses one of the largest American bases outside of the U.S., provides the U.S. with the opportunity to exert military force on neighboring countries or provide military support to nearby allies if the need arises. Diego Garcia also remains under British control, a close American ally. This strengthens the U.S.-UK relationship by further tying the two countries together over the shared interest of the continuous operation of the base.

Additionally, according to The National Interest, the U.S. relies on Camp Justice military for “long-range bomber operations, the replenishment of naval vessels, and the prepositioning of heavy equipment to expedite the rapid deployment of Army and Marine Corps brigades.” The facility has also played a key role over the years, serving as the primary base for air operations and bombing raids during the Persian Gulf War in the 1990s and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in the early 2000s.

External Factors

Chinese Influence

China’s presence in the Indian Ocean has increased since President Xi Jinping announced the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013. The BRI is a geopolitical strategy that funds a variety of infrastructure projects that help to economically connect China with over sixty countries in Eurasia and Africa. During a 2018 tour of Africa by President Jinping, Senegal, Rwanda, and South Africa signed onto the BRI. However, because Mauritius is an economically prosperous country with high foreign direct investment from the U.S. and a booming tourist industry, it agreed to sign on at a later date. The addition of these countries to the BRI highlights China’s growing influence on the continent, exposing Africans to Chinese culture and overall strengthening Afro-Sino relations. 

China’s military presence in the Indian Ocean is also increasing with the construction of Shandong, a modified version of China’s first flattop aircraft carrier Liaoning, further expanding China’s oceanic fleet. According to the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, “the primary purpose of this first domestic aircraft carrier [Liaoning] will be to serve a regional defense mission,” but “Beijing probably also will use the carrier to project power throughout the South China Sea and possibly into the Indian Ocean.” China’s economic and military expansion into the Indian Ocean, catalyzed by the BRI, threatens U.S. hegemony in the region. This is a cause for concern for many U.S. defense scholars and adds fuel to the argument that the U.S. must maintain their naval presence on Diego Garcia in order to counter growing Chinese influence in the region.

Brexit Impact

In a landmark speech prior to the December 2019 general UK election, UK Labour Party leader  Jeremy Corbyn pledged to “right one of the wrongs of history” and renounce British sovereignty of the Chagos Islands if he were elected Prime Minister. Per their manifesto for the upcoming election, the Labour Party committed to “allow[ing] the people of the Chagos Islands and their descendants the right to return to the lands from which they should never have been removed.” As for the current status of the Chagossians living in both the UK and on Mauritius, Corbyn called the entire situation “utterly disgraceful” and asserted that “[the Chagossians] need a full apology and they need adequate compensation.” Corbyn added that “I believe the right of return to those islands is absolutely important as a symbol of the way in which we [Britain] wish to behave in international law.”

However, with Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s Brexit success in late January 2020, many of the departure’s impacts will be felt in Britain’s 14 Overseas Territories. According to a representative from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “the UK has put in place a number of measures for the Overseas Territories in the event of a no-deal.” What this means for the Chagos Islands is not entirely clear, especially because the terms of Brexit have not been explicitly defined thus far in the transition period. 

The focus of a pro-Brexit deal was primarily centered on the repercussions regarding Northern Ireland and the potential return of a hard border between the north and the south, thus news on the impact on Britain’s Overseas Territories has been limited. Some of these Overseas Territories rely on aid from the European Union (EU), and a hard Brexit is likely to severely damage the economies of these territories that rely on the UK’s involvement in the larger EU community. 

Current Affairs

In 2017, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) sent the territorial dispute between Mauritius and the U.K. to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ ruled in February 2019 that the British separation of the Chagos Islands from Mauritius was illegal and ordered the U.K. to relinquish control of the islands “as rapidly as possible.” However, because the ruling was merely an advisory opinion, the case was referred back to the United Nations (UN) for a vote. In May 2019, UNGA’s final vote was shockingly low: 116 countries condemned the UK’s decision and only six supported it. Despite extensive lobbying by the U.S. and the surprising abstention of 56 countries--many of them being U.K. allies such as Canada, France, and Germany--the single-digit support highlights the magnitude of international dissatisfaction regarding the UK’s imperialistic behavior in the Indian Ocean. While the vote was nonbinding, it affirmed the ICJ’s previous ruling and set a six-month deadline by which the UK must withdraw from the Chagos Archipelago so that it could be reunified with Mauritius. As of April 2020, no progress has been made in achieving this objective.

What Comes Next?

For the UK, the UN vote was crucial in highlighting Britain’s waning popularity in the international community, seeing as how a number of UK allies failed to actively support the UK during the voting process, instead choosing to abstain. For the U.S., they have an interest in maintaining Camp Justice. Increasing Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean and the close proximity of the island to both U.S. adversaries and allies furthers American foreign policy objectives by allowing the U.S. to maintain a formidable presence in the area. However, the United States’ lease on Diego Garcia is effective only until the year 2036. What happens after the lease runs out is currently unknown.

Is the New Hampshire Primary Losing Its Importance in American Politics?

As the Democratic Party is wrapping up its primary cycle with former Vice President Joe Biden as their nominee, it’s easy for the average American to get lost in the whirlwind of over-complicated political jargon that’s thrown around by media outlets. Yet, at a time when the political climate has become increasingly divisive, it is important that Americans are aware of how their country’s political processes work so that they are ready to cast an informed vote in November.  

To grasp how the presidential election works, it is necessary to first understand the process by which a candidate is chosen to represent his or her party. This is the function of primaries. A primary is a preliminary election where voters of each party nominate candidates for office. Primaries play a huge role in helping unite a party behind one candidate. However, in recent years the primary process has come under fire with critics taking aim at the primary’s oversized influence in picking presidential candidates. One state in particular, New Hampshire, has been under scrutiny for its seemingly disproportionate influence on America’s presidential elections. To understand this criticism, New Hampshire’s history as the first primary state and the role that it plays in the fate of our nation’s elections must be examined.

New Hampshire’s status as the first primary state dates back to 1948 when Richard F. Upton, speaker of the state’s House of Representatives at the time, passed a law allowing citizens to vote directly for presidential candidates. This new law immediately received national attention, as New Hampshire was the first state to implement such a policy. In the state’s 1952 primary, Republican candidate Dwight D. Eisenhower won in an overwhelming victory. Eisenhower later went on to win the national election in a landslide victory, setting a precedent regarding the importance of New Hampshire’s primary.

Fast forward to the present day, and the importance of New Hampshire’s primary is clear to see. Since 1976, the state’s primary has predicted five of the ten eventual Democratic presidential nominees. Yet as of late, more people have grown critical of New Hampshire’s role in America’s elections. For one, New Hampshire’s population is over 93 percent White. In addition, the Black and Hispanic communities in the state only account for 4 percent and 2 percent of the population, respectively.

The racial composition of New Hampshire is a far cry from the demographic reality of the United States. As of 2019, people identifying as “White” make up 60.4 percent of the country’s population. The Hispanic and Black demographic followed behind, with 18.3 percent and 13.4 percent, respectively. Given this data, is New Hampshire truly reflective of the nation’s demographics?

The reality is that New Hampshire bears little resemblance to this increasingly diverse country. Given the influence that the state’s primary has on the national election, it might be time to reevaluate New Hampshire’s role in the United States electoral process.

Of course, this is not an attack on the citizens of New Hampshire. Some may argue that New Hampshire is a great state to hold the country’s first primary. After all, it is one of the most educated states in America, with 36 percent of adults holding a bachelor’s degree or higher, compared to the national average of 31 percent. In addition, New Hampshire has a relatively small number of voters, making it easy for grass-roots campaigns to gain traction and momentum. Combined with the state’s small, inexpensive media market, New Hampshire provides a healthy environment for candidates to connect personally with voters.

With that being said, New Hampshire’s lack of diversity is startling and shouldn’t be glossed over. As the United States becomes increasingly more diverse, it is hard to picture a future where New Hampshire resembles the countries’ demographics. As the United States finds itself in the midst of a new decade, Americans must embrace the unique opportunities and challenges that come with living in a diverse nation. The face of America is changing — and society must change with it.

Want to Close the Gender Gap in Finance? Start with Financial Supervisory Authorities

In 2018, during the buildup to an early November vote on the European Central Bank’s (ECB) next top supervisor, an influential member of the European Parliament implied that the candidacy of Sharon Donnery, deputy governor of Ireland’s central bank, owed its strength to Donnery’s gender as opposed to her qualifications. Whether this pronouncement contributed to Donnery’s subsequent loss to her male competitor is disputable. What the remark did achieve, however, was resurfacing the discussion about the relevance of gender balance in regional financial governance – a discussion that continued gaining prominence with Christine Lagarde’s appointment as the president of the ECB. 

In 2016, the European Banking Authority (EBA) – a regulatory body of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) responsible for overseeing the “integrity, efficiency, and orderly functioning” of financial institutions across the European Union – published a report on the diversity practices of European credit rating agencies and investment firms. The only ESFS document to address gender inclusivity since the System’s creation in 2011, the report scolded private financial institutions for the disproportionately low number of women on management boards. However, the EBA’s own track record in gender diversity has only contributed to the invisibility of half of Europe’s population in the financial sector.   

Women comprise only 27 percent of the membership of the EBA’s governing, appeal, and advisory bodies, a modest increase of 5 percent from 2018. This includes the Board of Supervisors, which makes all policy decisions of the EBA, and the Management Board, responsible for the administration of the EBA’s operations. This figure even applies to bodies mandated to promote and protect diversity. The Banking Stakeholder Group, a major EBA advisory group valuable due to the “variety of perspectives and expertise that its diverse membership brings to the table,” is less inclusive than its mission suggests: a mere eight of its thirty members are women. 

As EBA officials themselves stated in the 2016 diversity report, homogenous decision-making entities are susceptible to groupthink and herd behavior. In a major regulatory authority like the EBA, these two phenomena can make it harder to spot shortcomings in governance and risk management practices that drive financial systems into crises, as they did in 2008. Indeed, a recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) study of 115 countries found that a lower number of women in financial oversight institutions is associated with a poorer quality of supervision and overall banking stability. Despite its potential benefits, gender parity in financial supervision remains the least well-studied and well-documented dimension of financial inclusion globally, the study noted. 

However, whether the 2008 crisis could have been avoided if Lehman Brothers had been Lehman Sisters is not the question ESFS officials should be focusing on. More important, the current composition of the EBA boards hampers the implementation of the European Commission’s post-2008 crisis strategic agenda, within which gender equality is not only a driver for more effective decision-making, but also an affirmation of fundamental EU values. 

Addressing gender imbalances in ESFS decision-making bodies can be challenging due to idiosyncratic board selection processes. For example, the EBA’s male-dominated Board of Supervisors comprises the heads of the national banking supervisors from each of the 28 EU member states. The EBA, as well as the broader ESFS network, has no direct control over the gender composition of governmental financial sector regulators, which oftentimes fall under the authority of national central banks. There, an even grimmer picture of women’s representation emerges: men constitute 79 percent of members of key decision-making bodies and 96 percent of central bank governors in the European Union. 

Nonetheless, the EBA can still contribute to achieving a gender-equal Europe while avoiding infringements on national interests and prerogatives. Building on the experience of the European Central Bank in introducing an explicit diversity agenda, the EBA can set long-overdue gender targets for the Banking Stakeholder Group. Since the group consists of interested parties outside of national authorities, the EBA can influence the group’s gender composition without compromising the sovereignty of European states. The Joint Board of Appeal is another EBA body whose independent, if opaque, selection process provides an opportunity for better diversity practices. Clearly, the EBA has sufficient autonomy in appointing and approving members of some of its critical decision-making bodies. What it lacks is willingness to utilize that authority to ensure women are equally represented.

The EBA is the watchdog of the European banking sector. Its treatment of gender diversity sets a standard for financial institutions across the EU. Women’s lack of representation in authoritative oversight entities reduces the already low likelihood that gender equality will be prioritized on regional and private institutional agendas. Setting concrete gender targets for EBA decision-making bodies whose gender composition is not controlled by national authorities would be a needed step toward giving women voice in the formulation, implementation, and assessment of policies that affect both providers and receivers of services throughout Europe’s entire financial sector. 

As a regulatory authority with the power to shape the gender diversity practices of thousands of financial institutions, the EBA must lead by example and demonstrate a genuine commitment to inclusivity. Until it does so, its demands to increase the visibility of women in the private sector will seem at best unconvincing, and at worst insincere. 

What’s in a Story?: The Role of Narrative in Polarization

Humans are storytellers by nature. Through narratives, we obtain knowledge, develop our morality, and understand the order of the world, including our role and expectations. Neuroscientists, anthropologists, historians, psychologists, and others are continuously grappling with the question of why we seem so attracted to this form of communication. Post-modernists have even raised the idea that perhaps stories are so prolific in human life that they are the only force behind the development of our realities and identities, and our entire conscious beings are merely products of socialization. So what is it that is so powerful about stories? 

Shaping Knowledge and Conception of Being

Perhaps one of the earliest and most infamous philosophers to analyze the power of the story was Plato, who recorded Socrates’s allegory of the cave. The reality and knowledge of humanity and conception of our being, according to Socrates, is shaped by the stories we are told by those who have more information, agency or power than we do. In the story, Socrates illustrates people in a cave staring at the wall where shadows are being cast by those standing behind them, telling them the stories which become their only reality. The people watching the shadows cannot turn around, so they do not realize who is behind them, nor that they are trapped in a cave. Socrates then digresses and paints the philosopher as someone who can perhaps transcend the cave. He says, however, that because the being of the people is defined entirely by the shadows, if a philosopher were to tell them about life beyond the cave, they would be defensive and not want to believe it, as it would destabilize their entire reality. This seems indicative of what we see in contemporary politics when someone shares a story that undermines our currently controlling narratives or prejudices.  

This thought is continued within many thinkers later in the era of modernity. The birth of modernity came with Machiavelli, who, in his most famous work The Prince, talked about how the virtue of statesmanship can be learned perhaps best by examining the lives of virtuous leaders before them. He also reiterates a multitude of times the distinction between the narrative a political leader must maintain for their constituents and what principles or influences should actually be guiding them. In other words, Machiavelli says that virtuous princes are putting the shadows on the wall and use stories as a powerful tool to manipulate, and this is a good thing because it sustains their power, even when it isn’t the truth.

Edmund Burke raises a similar view of stories and language in his Philosophic Inquiry into the Sublime and the Beautiful, where he says that emotion is far stronger in human passions than knowledge. Additionally, he writes that language has the power to elicit emotions and human passions more than art or stimuli of other physical senses such as sight and touch. Language allows us to be drawn both into the sublime, or that which causes awe and pain, and the beautiful, which causes relaxation and pleasure. Further, language is the medium through which we have conscious thought. He digresses a great deal on poetry, but circles back to a similar view of storytelling as a way of persuading a group of people. He also examines the importance of soft power and cultural synthesis in his writings on politics, where he outlines his theory of prudence. He explains that change and reality shifts are more persuasive, taming, and effective when introduced gradually than when they are forced. This is fusing two peoples’ overall narrative-based realities into one cohesive arc. 

Philosopher Martin Heidegger, many years later, poses the question of how human reality is shaped by meditating on the following: how one might extract the a priori understanding of being of the Dasein, or the introspective, self-aware, existentialist person who is aware of their being but who can’t answer the question of being. He suggests that, in order to formulate a question that can reach this natural understanding so that we might articulate it, one must consider everything which is persuading or shaping our understanding that is separate from nature. This he designates as historicity. While he never publishes the finished project as part of Being and Time, Heidegger says that the second part of his thesis will unpack the theories of Kant, Descartes, and Aristotle on being because these thinkers built on each other to try to answer the question. These thinkers are now the foundation of his own conscious understanding of being, so to get back to his natural thought, he has to rule out what is coming from this historicity of his thought. In other words, Heidegger says that the stories and narratives of being which are passed to us through history in some way hide from us our true being, which seems fairly in line with the post-modernist and platonic ideal that we are a product of the narratives we are socialized to adopt.

 In sum, each of these thinkers paints stories as a powerful force. They comment very little on whether they are good or bad, but describe their significance and utility in communications and politics, whether their function is to divide or bring people together. Stories, for these thinkers, are a means to an end, but a means of the highest force.

Stories and Polarization

In being the most powerful tool, stories have caused a lot of trouble. More seriously, stories have been a major force escalating polarization, politically and otherwise, within human communication, as seen in the polarization of contemporary politics. Humans have crafted their realities from stereotypes, generalized narratives, and assumptions because they are so deeply ingrained in how we think and view the world. However, the truth is that many of these persuasions are implicit in our psyches and we don’t even realize when they are the cornerstones of our decisions. 

Political parties, partisan ideology, and political stances, as a key example, have become entrenched in narratives crafted by the media and campaigns of opposite parties. These stereotypes include labeling liberals as urban “snowflakes” who are over-educated with no common-sense, rich, and engage in giving back to make themselves feel good, among other narratives. In terms of Republicans, those stereotypes include claims that they are backwoods, backwards, white supremacists who force their religion and nostalgia for a less inclusive time on everyone, among other narratives. On both sides, these narrative stereotypes have completely dehumanized people. 

In many ways, narratives can also put restrictions on civic political agency via self-censorship. When people believe that we are “less than” because of a narrative and don’t trust us or our abilities, or when we don’t see our own true strength or capacity for change because of that burden we are less likely to engage or demonstrate leadership. Narratives, in many ways, compromise our civic integrity and democratic value as a voice at the table in political discourse. Sometimes, because we are so afraid of falling into a narrative, we simply don’t speak at all. In other words, we mask our identities and live our lives feeling desperate for but unable to achieve authenticity, often making us more resentful of our opposition, or perceived opposition, and therefore, more defensive in all conversations, and less able to find allies, supporters, common ground or collaborators even if we wanted to engage despite alienation.

Stories as Path to Depolarization: Finding Common Ground

While storytelling can clearly have negative consequences in pushing people apart, is there a way in which it can have a positive effect, even in undoing trends like polarization? Reaching into the heart of someone’s humanity, and influencing their emotions doesn’t have to alienate them. It can also be used to share a commonality, and from that, find the principles and values which bring us together, and can get us to cooperate as a community and as a species. For example, several months ago when given the opportunity to speak with Fran Townsend, the former Homeland Security Advisor to President George W. Bush, we discussed the current division in politics and the importance of depolarization efforts to the stability of American democracy. She shared with me a story that she has shared with many others, and believes defines the philosophy and success of her career.

Once, when on a trip to Saudi Arabia, Townsend found herself caught in a tense meeting between President Bush and Saud al-Faysal over a 9-11 negotiation. When it seemed like endless division was going to keep them from getting anywhere, Townsend heard Abdullah playing with something in his pocket. She asked what it was, and he revealed he had been jiggling his Islamic prayer beads. Despite the dangerous risk of violating Saudi Law, Townsend immediately revealed her own Catholic rosary in her own pocket, to demonstrate they were not so different. At this point, they were able to move forward in the discussion and work together. Upon parting ways, Abdullah gifted her his prayer beads as “a symbol of trust to give to President Bush” to signify that he saw Townsend as honest and was grateful to have her as a partner. While not a story directly, religion, and symbolic religious objects, imply a narrative of a person and their beliefs, and therefore, are still connected to the means of story-telling. Common ground has since become a hallmark of her career.

If you’ve had the opportunity to meet American University’s 2020 Sine Fellow Alphonso Jackson, you’ll hear him tell share story upon story about his childhood as the youngest of many siblings with parents who he greatly admires, and an incredible life that has taken him everywhere from marching in Bloody Sunday to serving in the cabinet of the White House. The first time we met, I shared with Alphonso my dedication to depolarization, and he gave the room one of his most central kernels of wisdom. The three rules to live by, he said, were to (1) speak without being offensive, (2) listen without getting defensive, and to (3) always leave people with their human dignity. He then proceeded to share a number of stories about when he used these rules to find common ground, sharing stories and little pearls of wisdom from his parents and anecdotes about learning lessons in life. It was clear that for Alphonso, stories were not just a way to persuade, but a way to stay grounded, learn, bring people together, and cure division. He and Townsend share remarkably different stories and worked in different parts of the world, Townsend in foreign affairs and Jackson in domestic policy and civil rights activism, but both used stories to surpass even the most turbulent times dividing humanity.

Outside of the world of politics and policy, a dear friend of mine, Daryl Davis, has been using stories for deradicalization of KKK members for years and has since become a worldwide activist for civil discourse on top of being a famous black blues musician. Daryl and I have talked for hours, sharing stories about how he has listened to the stories and opinions of others in order to establish trust and dignity, as Townsend and Jackson did so that he might then share his own story and bring them out of a life of hate. By then sharing these stories of disengagement around the world, and demystifying and depowering symbols of the narrative of hate by keeping robes of former members and allowing people to touch them, Daryl has been able to soften people to the idea of redemption and humanity not being immoral even when someone has gone down the wrong path. It is not that you should condone their hate, or feel the weight of that call to action burden, for him. It is that you recognize that narrative has shaped them also, and by demystifying likewise the narrative of those they have been persuaded to hate through proximity, or contact theory as sociologists sometimes like to call it, the propaganda or conceptual narrative unravels.

I had the opportunity to speak to one of the reformed members, Scott Shepherd, and he explained to me that before joining the Klan, he had tried to join the Mafia and a number of other extremist groups because he was simply looking for purpose. He had a mentor and guardian who was black, but the narrative which provided him inclusion he jumped at, and now looks back in horror about how he let this power of story-based persuasion steer him away from those he loved into a force of evil. He now lives his life warning others about this power of narrative and encourages them to focus on Daryl, Jackson and Townsends version of storytelling of the now, of common ground, and of humanity, rather than depolarizing stories which focus on difference and drive us apart.

Better Angels, the grassroots depolarization nonprofit, has realized the power of stories for some time now. One of their hallmark marketing strategies at the founding of the organization was the television of a friendship that occurred between a Republican and Democrat where they took a road trip together and realized where they could find common ground. Those who work for the group, including James Coan, founder of his own depolarization group some time ago, have conceptualized the power of this through emotional theory, where like Townsend said, stories of humanity and commonality are able to take us from disgust to the other end of the axis towards trust and mutual respect, or feeling dignified and therefore seeing dignity in others.

The truth is, the longer you work in the world of depolarization, the more you realize that there are institutional, structural strategies, but an overwhelming heart of the work is centered around stories, representative of shared humanity and a bridge to collaboration rather than separation. I could share the stories of an endless number of people I’ve met all over the world who have used this method for depolarizing work, each as inspiring as the last. But it’s important to note that in each of these cases, what was really at work was stories against stories. Broader narratives, constructed by mass social forces from media to political propaganda and other manufactured stereotypes, countered by personal anecdotes that hit on a deeper human emotion than pure resonation with a vague trend. Stories, as such, are not holistically good or bad in communication. Anecdotal evidence is not comprehensive or representative seems to be the trouble behind why it can be used to drive people apart.

This has become a wider and wider talking point within academia and political discourse especially. It is often looked down on because of its focus on the particular or overgeneralization which is not representative of reality. However, while other evidence, such as quantitative seems important for that reason, it cannot replace all anecdotal evidence and be totally superior, as it leaves out a deeper element of information that can not be conveyed in numbers, and statistics can be just as misleading. Rather, the balance of evidence seems to be the takeaway, and stories, are simply one powerful tool. Philosophically, argued as perhaps the most powerful tool. And with that, we should wield them thoughtfully.

Water For All? An Examination of Water Scarcity and Privatization in South Africa

The importance of water cannot be overstated: it allows every form of life to flourish while also fulfilling a role of vital significance within different cultures and religions. In South Africa, it is believed that sacred waters are filled with spirits and mermaids. The Xhosa, a prominent ethnic group in the country, traditionally believe that diviners, or amagqirha, are trained to understand the health of rivers. Yet despite water’s obvious value, whether it be physical or cultural, there are many within the international community who are subjected to water scarcity, a phenomenon that refers to either a physical shortage or the failure of certain institutions to ensure a regular supply of clean water. It should be established that no matter the root cause of a water shortage, the global water supply remains fixed- it is accessibility that mutates throughout time. 

While there are instances of water shortages in specific areas resulting from natural phenomena- such as droughts- human activity has also played a central role in creating and institutionalizing disparities of who can access clean water. These disparities manifest in multiple ways, including along racial lines. South Africa, where diversity of cultural traditions find water to be sacred, is a prime example of the ways in which water access has been racialized. While black South Africans have a tradition of tending to local rivers, this relationship has been severely hindered through the policies of the Apartheid and the post-Apartheid regimes that have made beloved water sources inaccessible. 

The Institutionalization of Water Scarcity 

South Africa is known for having a progressive constitution that goes beyond simply enshrining civil and political rights- for one, it includes a mandate that everyone has the right to sufficient food and water. While outsiders may see this as a unique, or even strange, clause to include in a constitution, it is a product of British colonization and the subsequent Apartheid regime. In 1913, the British implemented the Native Lands Act, which entailed the forcible removal of rural black Africans to designated areas within the interior where the land was less fertile and had a natural scarcity of water. These designated areas were known as reservations and black Africans could not legally step foot outside of them unless they were employed. British riparian law, a subset of property law that relates to the utilization of surface water, specifically stated that only those who owned land adjacent to rivers had legal access to water. This meant that black communities, who were forcibly relocated from these waterways, could no longer legally access water on their own accord. On the other hand, the white settlers, who made up less than 20 percent of the population, had control over virtually all of the waterways. This not only gave them an economic advantage- water is, after all, a boon to agriculture, industry, and trade- but it also gave them the luxury to not have to worry about whether or not they had drinking water.

In 1923, the Native Urban Areas Act stipulated that black Africans could work in urban industrial areas but could not live there. Subsequently, black Africans were relocated to townships and forced to live in government housing whose construction and expenses, which included electricity and water, were meant to be paid back in full by its inhabitants. Many people were unable, or unwilling, to pay for these costs. As a reaction to the government’s racist and exploitative practices, many individuals established “informal settlements,” where water usually came from a rudimentary standpipe and its cleanliness could not be guaranteed. When the Apartheid government officially ascended to power in 1948, these discriminatory policies were exacerbated. As Karen Piper asserts in her book, The Price of Thirst, South Africa is one of the most natural water-scarce regions in the world, yet Afrikaaners, the white minority, were able to enjoy green lawns and swimming pools while black Africans were deprived of a basic necessity as a reinforcement mechanism for the country’s white supremacy. 

The People of South Africa versus Water Privatization 

By the time Apartheid finally came to an end, a majority of the population had access to only a small portion of the country’s water. When President Mandela first began to shape a new, inclusive South Africa, he created the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP), whose policy objectives included recognizing water as an “indivisible national asset belonging to all South Africans” and making water and sanitation services community-based. The plan that the government created to achieve these goals was meant to be completed in stages. In the short term, all households would be supplied with twenty to thirty liters per capita per day. Furthermore, an access point could not be located more than 600 feet away from every house. In the medium term, households were promised an on-site supply of water, with a subsidy for the poor. Another crucial element was that city limits would be redrawn to include the black townships that were formally excluded. This would increase the tax base, and services, such as proper access to water and sanitation infrastructure, would be available to all. This plan was purposefully designed as a way to end the racialized hierarchy of water access and begin a new era of racial equity. 

While President Mandela had envisioned water for all, these plans were derailed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, otherwise known as the Bretton-Woods Institutions. When it was clear that the Apartheid regime was not going to last much longer, these institutions saw an opportunity for investment and implementation of neoliberal policy. When President Mandela’s new government began negotiations with the IMF and the World Bank, it became apparent to the South African representatives that the conditions attached to any potential IMF loan were too similar to the economic policies of the Apartheid regime that solely benefited white people. The IMF’s push for water privatization was especially troubling as it directly contradicted the country’s constitution and would perpetuate water inequity. At the same time that negotiations were taking place, the worst drought in living memory was devastating the country. It was considered to be an economic and public health disaster that needed to be immediately dealt with through an IMF loan, thus severely reducing any leverage the South African team could wield at the negotiation table. Although the IMF was willing to grant the necessary funding for disaster relief, there was an important stipulation: the drought relief money would only appear if the African National Congress, the new ruling party, would follow its economic policies. 

These policies included not increasing wages, completely opening up the country to trade, and reducing the government’s debt by cutting public services. This was exactly what President Mandela’s team had been trying to avoid throughout the negotiation process, yet the severity of the drought gave them virtually no choice. In 1996, a new economic plan known as the Growth, Employment, a Redistribution (GEAR) program was implemented. It was problematic from its very conception. It did not mention the country’s economic history of race and Apartheid, prompting the question: How can economic policy rectify horrendous inequality when it doesn’t even recognize its existence?

GEAR’s economic policies perpetuated the inequitable water access system of the Apartheid regime. The public had to pay the full cost of water and sanitation infrastructure; this cost was often levied on poor, black communities. For example, in 2003-2004, these communities faced a 30 percent price increase versus a 10 percent price increase for “high-end” users (i.e. corporations and the wealthiest communities). Suez, the private water company in charge of water distribution, essentially inherited a similar role as the Apartheid government. Since Suez has taken over distribution, the poor have been presented with high bills which they cannot- or even will not- pay. As a result, Suez typically shuts off the water supply. Though not unique to any city, in Johannesburg, water bills are a part of monthly housing payments. When residents did not pay their water bill, they were evicted. According to Piper in The Price of Thirst, by 2007, more than two million people had been evicted from their homes for not paying their water bills. The brutal irony of it all was that residents, who had previously fought for better water access, began to protest having water connections installed as they now saw it as a threat to their livelihood. 

Water Privatization as the New Apartheid? 

Since 1994, black residents perceive that their quality of life has declined, which is astonishing considering the Apartheid government specifically existed to maintain white supremacy, yet black South Africans continue to be denied basic goods. Service delivery protests, which are often attributed to xenophobia, are actually due to a lack of basic services, such as sanitation and clean water, and often manifest in violent ways. The number of protests that had taken place by June of 2019 had already eclipsed the total for 2016 which indicates that the problem is only getting worse, not better.  

Throughout South Africa’s modern history, water has been utilized as a marker for power within a racial hierarchy. Beginning with British colonial rule, white people’s ability to access clean water represented a political, economic, and social power that black natives had been violently deprived of. Furthermore, water was not only used as a way for whites to extract power, but it was also weaponized to protect it. The threat of having a basic necessity taken away is an easy way to ensure compliance; this is something both the Apartheid government and Suez have done, albeit for slightly different reasons. The Apartheid regime shut off the water when they wanted to quell anti-Apartheid protests, while Suez does so in order to elicit payment. It is easier for Suez to maintain superficial innocence as they are not a government explicitly subjecting its citizens to racist and violent policies. However, that veneer of innocence is stripped away as it becomes clear that both are responsible for producing and maintaining racial inequities, particularly when it comes to water. 

President Mandela’s economic plan sought to equalize a country whose foundations were rooted in white supremacy. However, this plan was compromised by the Bretton-Woods institutions whose policies did not address the country’s history. The implementation of water privatization was emblematic of this ignorance: it was neglectful of the needs of black, low-income communities who needed to be empowered the most and instead perpetuated a white hegemony over water. In order to make water truly accessible to all people, it is necessary that policy leaders return to President Mandela’s original vision of water being a public good. Water is a necessity for political, economic, and social prosperity, and its privatization means that specific groups would be disconnected. Although many would argue that privatization is meant to eliminate the inefficiencies of the government, the case of South Africa has made it clear that it has done quite the opposite. By making it a collective good, the government would be honoring its own constitution and would be forced to ensure that everyone has access to clean water. This makes institutions, and its representatives, more accountable and South Africans would have a better say in water policy, thus equalizing one facet of a notoriously unequal society. 

What the West Gets Wrong About Putin

After his 2001 Slovenia Summit with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, American President George W. Bush reiterated his belief that a constructive and productive dialogue between the U.S and Russia was possible. Per Bush, “We had a very good dialogue. I was able to get a sense of his soul. He's a man deeply committed to his country and the best interests of his country and I appreciate very much the frank dialogue and that's the beginning of a very constructive relationship.” As four consecutive American presidents have faltered in their stated efforts to improve relations with Moscow while simultaneously leading the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), it is evident that American policymakers underestimated the ambitions and capabilities of Putin. 

Through the invasion of sovereign states and interference in foreign politics, Putin’s Russia has undermined European confidence in NATO and democracy. In at least some regard, the blame lies at the feet of American foreign policy analysts, whose interpretations of Russia in the early post-soviet period were largely colored by predisposed attitudes about the country and who were too eager to project the idealism of the unipolar moment onto the past two decades. For a former KGB agent like Putin who conceptualizes and compartmentalizes threats, the world is a zero-sum game where the restoration of Russia’s prestige comes at the expense of the rest of the world. This push-pull dynamic of U.S. provocations and outright Russian bellicosity has shaped U.S.-Russian relations today and demands a new strategy.

The Pre-Putin Days

Understanding Putin’s geopolitical calculus requires studying U.S.-Russia relations in the era before he came to power. For Putin, the end of the Cold War was a formative experience. He has called the breakup of the Soviet Union and erosion of Russian power “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.”

When the U.S. came to power in this unipolar moment, as Charles Krauthammer among others would coin it, the U.S. was essentially the closest thing imaginable to a global hegemon and thus played a prominent role in the settlements of post- Cold War Europe. In particular, at the February 1990 meeting between American Secretary of State James Baker and then-Soviet Union leader Mikhail Gorbachev, Baker told Gorbachev that “there would be no extension of NATO’s jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the east” and agreed to terms that “Any extension of the zone of NATO is unacceptable.” As a former imperial power and superpower, the new Soviet leadership was petrified of a post-USSR world order in which the U.S. played a sizable role in Europe and challenged Russia diplomatically and militarily in Eurasia.. The U.S., meanwhile, wished to stabilize and securitize Europe without being overly adversarial toward Russia. These goals, not necessarily in contradiction of each other, have largely remained the same but the way each party approached achieving that means led to the thaw.

Presidents Bush and Clinton, two presidents who saw their duty as Commander-in-Chief as defending the international liberal order, sought a policy of “enlargement.” By bringing more countries into the democratic, U.S.-led order, the logic went that the U.S. could keep Europe from takeover by a resurgent revisionist Russia. Poland and a reunified Germany joined and they were followed by more than a dozen other states including Albania and Montenegro most recently. To this day, the door remains open to Ukraine as it is embroiled in a hot war with Russia over the Donbass. 

Presidents Bush and Clinton were presented with three real options for a post-Cold War NATO, as Benn Steil wrote: ignore Baker’s promise and expand NATO on the basis that Russia would always behave like the imperial Great Power it conceived itself, wait until Russia took concrete actions that infringed on the sovereignty of its neighbors (George Kennan’s position), or “expand NATO on the cheap,” figuring that the alliance faced no true enemy anymore. Bush chose the third position and Clinton continued the policy, despite the advice of Sam Nunn, the former senator of his own party, who argued, “Are we really going to be able to convince the Eastern Europeans that we are protecting them while we convince the Russians that NATO enlargement has nothing to do with Russia?” Nunn’s criticism gets to the root of the issue with Eastern European NATO expansion: while NATO has admittedly succeeded greatly in building an alliance of democracies and intervening to put an end to crimes against humanity in the Balkans, it would have had to be seen as legitimate by both the allies and Russia to avert violent resolution of disputes and it has failed to do so. The choice fundamentally was between isolating and building up against Russia in a fit of post-Cold War triumphalism and using America’s status as the sole superpower to urge Russia to behave like a responsible actor in exchange for being treated like one. Instead of isolating or cautiously integrating Russia, the United States made the well-intentioned but fatally flawed decision to ignore it.

The Reality of NATO Enlargement

The claims of NATO expansion promoters are contradicted by the historical record. While they claimed that Eastern European countries that had been threatened before by the Soviets remained vulnerable in the post-Cold War era and needed to be welcomed into the alliance, Russia was incredibly weak in the 1990s. Secondly, while the world will assuredly never know whether Vladimir Putin was fully intent on pursuing an interventionist foreign policy in his own backyard before NATO enlargement, it can be noted that tensions grew after enlargement.

In reality, the expansion of NATO’s influence into the Balkans and the proposed bids to Russian neighbors represents an unnecessary and somewhat predictable strategic mistake. In its well-intentioned bid to establish a single Europe free from an Eastern threat and united in values and security, NATO isolated Russia. In extending membership and security guarantees to the weakest European states that would simultaneously be the most difficult to defend once Russia recovered, NATO left itself with two undesirable options. The first was to let Russia have what it wants and undermine the solidarity of the alliance in the name of not having a dog in the fight. The second option was to contest every Russian challenge and put NATO troops at risk over the status of countries that are either minuscule in size or internally rife with rising authoritarianism and corruption. Washington and Brussels could live with these contradictions because they never envisioned these security guarantees would need to be fulfilled. 

Eventually, however, Putin sought a more expansionist agenda. Two major strategic decisions by the U.S. and most of its European allies served as catalysts for deteriorating U.S.-Russian relations: the recognition of Kosovo’s independence in 2008 (Russia is the closest ally of Serbia, which continues to dispute Kosovo’s claim) and NATO’s Bucharest Summit, held that same year, which guaranteed future NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine. Both decisions crossed a red line for Moscow, as statements by Russian leadership made clear. Former Russian president Dmitri Medvedev, before the Russian war in Georgia, elucidated a clear position laying out Russia’s perception of greater European integration in Eastern Europe, calling Ukrainian and Georgian accession a threat to Russian security. At the same time, then-Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov argued that Georgian accession would “lead to another stage of confrontation.” In this way, what followed, in the form of Russian instigation of wars in Georgia and Ukraine, should have been foreseen by American officials. Putin was not as much a brilliant strategist creating chaos and disorder out of post-Cold War kumbaya but rather he was taking advantage of and responding to American foreign policy on the fly. Yet in its hubris, Washington added to its security burdens and provoked Russia while getting next to no benefit out of the enlargement. 

It is also worth noting that the democratizing benefit of NATO was widely oversold beyond Central and Western Europe. There has been a great worry among NATO watchers about democratic backsliding in several NATO powerhouses and some of the newer or proposed members from recent periods of expansion. Turkey, which has the second-largest military in NATO, is rated as Not Free by Freedom House for the first time in the history of the report as Recep Erdogan has concentrated his own power and persecuted political opponents. The country once billed by the U.S. as a model secular democracy in the Middle East and Southeastern Europe is now essentially a theocracy with more journalists imprisoned than any other country in the world. In Hungary, Viktor Orban has shuttered universities, promoted white nationalist theories about immigrants, criticized liberal democracy, and now made himself a dictator for the foreseeable future through a new law granting him authority to rule by decree. Montenegro, Ukraine, and Poland each struggle with corruption and have experienced recent democratic backsliding. With this, the very democratic solidarity at the root of NATO is endangered and NATO expansion did not stop any of it from occurring.

Russia has noticed, leveraging its relationships with Turkey and Hungary to exacerbate discord within NATO. Putin sees Orban and Erdogan as ideological allies in the campaign against the European Union and European integration writ-large, and the NATO alliance did not stop Putin from politically and financially supporting anti-democratic forces aligned with them. Nor did it stop Turkey from seeking closer military ties with Russia, through the purchase of S-400 missile systems despite bipartisan congressional urging. The acquisition of the S-400 system will presumably hurt NATO’s security cooperation. Turkey’s critical role in NATO has not stopped it from turning toward Russia.

Putin and Make Russia Great Again

Another point of contention between common narratives about Putin and the historical record is whether his aspiration to “Make Russia Great Again” is (a) the main motivating factor of his foreign policy and (b) actually achievable. “[Putin] came to believe that he had been chosen for a special mission—to save Russia,” Russian journalist Mikhail Zygar wrote in Time. To some, especially those of all political stripes who have spent the past half-century projecting their worst fears onto Russia whether justified or not, it may seem that Russia will always have an interest in maintaining authoritarianism at home and behaving like an empire abroad.

The problem is that that is not the only factor at hand, and Russian interests, imperial or otherwise, are no more immutable than those of any other country. As Rutgers-Newark professor and scholar of empire Alexander Motyl writes, “As anyone with an appreciation of Russian, or any, history knows, no state can pursue identical interests for the duration of its historical existence, because states and their surroundings are always changing… As a result, foreign policy becomes a function of geopolitics, national interests, and ideologies, but also of regime type, personality of the leader, historical timing, context, and many other factors.” Take the example of the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine. It may be that Putin authorized the action in part because he wanted to restore Russian prestige, but it is impossible to ignore that the Maidan revolution that ousted Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych made Ukraine politically unstable, and thus more vulnerable than ever before. At the same time, a revolution in his own backyard led by the populace would make any dictator sweat. Thus, Putin also saw the Ukrainian state as an easy target for expansion, wanted to send a message to the West that it was overextending its sphere of influence through NATO expansion, and wanted to assert his power in the face of regime vulnerability. In the end, it was not just ideology that motivated Putin, but also geography, the stability of rival states, and vulnerability at home, a more reactive, less ideological conclusion than the prevailing wisdom.

Furthermore, Putin’s Russia does not pose the existential threat that it once did to the United States. In a very real way, Putin has not and cannot “Make Russia Great Again.” Economic growth in Russia has slowed to a crawl, in part due to falling oil prices and inequality but also due to U.S. sanctions placed on Russia for its repeated abuses of human rights and international law. Its GDP is roughly the same as it was in 2008. While Russia has improved relations with several major players in international politics like China and Turkey, it still has very few real allies. Even among the few powerful countries with which it has good relations, such as Saudi Arabia and India, the United States has a serious claim to being a closer ally. In the same sense, since being kicked out of the G-8 for the intervention in Crimea and condemned widely for foreign assassinations, Russia has lost institutional power in recent years. Finally, militarily, Russia is relatively weak compared to its rivals. The European members of NATO alone spend four times as much as Russia on defense even as some of them fail to meet the suggested guideline of 2 percent of GDP and regional powers like Saudi Arabia and India, as well as the declining great power of France, all spend more on defense than Russia.

That is not to say that Russia is not going to continue to be an important consideration for policymakers. It is not to say that Russia will not continue to be a major player beyond its own region. Indeed, through its backing of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and facilitation of peace talks in Libya and Northern Syria, Russia plays a much larger role in the Middle East than China does. Furthermore, Putin has reoriented Russian foreign policy towards the region since the Arab Spring, regaining some of the lost diplomatic clout from the Crimea invasion. Instead of a pariah state that had been absent from the region since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Russia is now being treated by even its most ardent rivals as a major player in Middle Eastern affairs. This is because the Iraq War and the U.S. intervention in Libya projected a form of regime change politics and created instability that reduced Russian trust in the U.S. while the Arab Spring showed that popular democratic movements could change international politics, a notion the ever-cautious Putin feared would manifest in regime vulnerability. It is important to note this caveat to understand why dialogue with Russia and consideration of its interests will continue to be essential even if it is not as capable of projecting power as it once was.

A New Strategy

Though often made out by those on both sides of the aisle as a master grand strategist, Putin’s foreign policy successes can be better understood as ample improvised reactions to American policy at best and outright boom or bust gambles at worst. The Blob, as former Obama Administration National Security Council staffer Ben Rhodes derogatorily refers to the network of the governmental, think tank, and media foreign policy establishment has long projected its fears onto Russia, from the Cold War to Putin’s alleged quest for world domination. To them, Putin is a brilliant strategist with a coherent worldview synonymous with decimating the institutions of the post-Cold War international order. In their eyes, there is no democracy Putin and his cronies cannot hack, no U.S. ally he would not squeeze, and no border dispute he would not settle violently in his favor. This lens, while common for the reasons outlined above, is not entirely valid.

A new Russian strategy must be devised to account for this new perception of Putin’s worldview and capabilities. With 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons on either side of the negotiating table, war must be averted at any cost. To date, the American strategy has been too militarized and focused on competition rather than a more nuanced position that acknowledges that cooperation is necessary to reduce the nuclear threat and define the rules of the road, even as the U.S. must stand ready to call out Putin’s Russia when it violates international law and foments instability. The primary challenge in this strategy of getting to peace and disarmament for U.S. policymakers will be to determine where valid Russian interests cease and where realistic red lines must lie. 

A more coherent and nuanced Russia strategy would continue to reiterate that the former Soviet republics bordering Russia are entitled to their sovereignty under international law and Russian violations of that sovereignty will be condemned accordingly. Yet at the same time, the U.S. should make clear that it does not intend to expand its sphere of influence through NATO or other means up to Russia’s border. Georgia and Ukraine’s NATO bids should be withdrawn, as they only give greater credence to the conspiracy theory that NATO exists to encircle and isolate Russia, a theory that has drawn Russia to foment war in both of those countries. Concurrently, the U.S. and its allies must cooperate to ensure that Ukraine’s territorial integrity is preserved and Russia abides by the terms of the Minsk Protocol in Donbass. Finally, in Eastern Europe, Russia must not be rewarded for its reckless and illegal annexation of Crimea, which should not be recognized. Reckless land grabs have no place in 21st century Europe and international politics, and as long as this principle remains intact, the U.S. should not recognize the annexation. 

In Syria, Moscow’s support for Assad’s regime has brought great harm to the Syrian people. Unfortunately, U.S. military misadventures in the Middle East have validated the Russian view that Washington seeks to destabilize the region through destructive regime change wars. This view may be motivated by Russia’s own interests, but that alone does not discredit it. As such, the U.S. has to be willing to negotiate an enduring peace settlement that includes all of the various factions and ultimately dramatically scales back both the U.S. and Russian presences in the region, even if it means Assad controls a sizable part of the country.

The U.S. missed a major opportunity when it chose to prioritize NATO expansion over the Partnership for Peace, which included Russia and aimed to create trust between NATO and Russia. Furthermore, the Partnership for Peace was not just a military alliance, as it facilitated cooperation on science and environmental issues, disaster response, policy planning, and civil-military relations. The Partnership was uniquely able to thread the needle posed by Nunn between assuaging Russian concerns about NATO enlargement, supporting democratic values, and preparing aspiring members for consideration. In short, it reached beyond the alliance to forge trust between NATO states and non-NATO states. While non-recognition of the Crimea annexation would preclude readmission to the G7 for good reason, the U.S. should seek to build similar low-risk institutions like the Partnership for Peace that engage with, rather than isolate Russia to facilitate cooperation on non-security issues and reduce distrust on security issues.

As stated earlier, 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons are in the hands of the U.S. and Russia. Those who huddled under desks during the Cuban missile crisis and those in the Obama Administration who worked tirelessly to approve the 2011 New START treaty that dramatically limited the deployment of strategic nuclear weapons by either side need no reminder of the danger of these weapons. Nevertheless, the George W. Bush and Trump administrations took dead aim at the various arms control and disarmament treaties governing these weapons. In 2002, the Bush Administration withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which limited the number of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems each party could possess. Russia responded by building up its nuclear capabilities. Last September, the White House officially withdrew from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which led to the elimination of almost 3,000 nuclear missiles. Even if the U.S. claim that Russia had been cheating on the deal was true, remaining a party to it would have been preferable because now Putin gets to tell the world that the U.S. cannot keep its word and that its interest in nonproliferation is not serious. Furthermore, with New START itself in danger of not being reauthorized (despite U.S. conclusions that Russia abides by the deal’s terms) by 2021, it is quite possible that there will be no legally binding limits on the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals for the first time in 50 years. Forty-five years of nuclear chicken was enough. The transparency and restrictions on proliferation and deployment instilled in these treaties reduce the likelihood of a third world war, and it is imperative that U.S. strategy prioritize getting back to the negotiating table.

Finally, Vladimir Putin’s kleptocratic authoritarian petrostate regime is as repressive as they come. The current president’s foreign policy is largely defined by his willingness to cozy up to dictators, including Putin himself. On the other end of the table, Putin has exported his particular brand of xenophobia, homophobia, all across Europe in the form of backing far-right parties and leaders like Orban. The U.S. has an obligation to support democracy and human rights through peaceful means in Russia and across Europe, as transparent, stable governments that can be held accountable by their voters make for good allies because they are sympathetic to the liberal worldview that benefits the U.S. and behave in predictable and rational ways. As Putin’s government bars his opponents from running against him, murders scores of journalists, and tortures LGBTQ people in Chechnya, the U.S., as the leader of the free world, must call him out and hold him and his cronies accountable every step of the way. 

While the last two decades of U.S. Russia policy has largely been characterized by a misreading of Vladimir Putin’s motives and capabilities that emboldened him, this new proposed Russia strategy builds upon the successes of the time period in arms control and the Global Magnitsky Act and reorients U.S. policy towards shared interests and challenges while condemning Russia’s many misdeeds. Russia may not be the imperial power some believe it to be, but its importance cannot be overstated in 21st century Eurasia and in international forums. To confront it when its actions demand it to be confronted and to cooperate and reduce tensions when changes in interests occur, nuance is essential. The status quo must go.

The Effectiveness of Declaring a Climate Emergency

On January 21, 2020, Spanish Parliament declared a climate emergency and made a promise to propose comprehensive legislation in the next 100 days. This declaration came just weeks after the approval of a coalition government including the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party with Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, and Unidas Podemos, a left wing electoral alliance. The move was prompted by Barcelona’s own climate emergency declaration in which 104 carbon emission cutting measures were unveiled, and, if successful, would cut the city’s carbon emissions in half by 2030. 

Spain is just one example of a country that has declared a climate emergency. In 2019, a variety of countries, cities, and organizations have declared a climate emergency as well, totaling 1,348 jurisdictions. Similar to Spain, some cities made the declaration with the hope that it will be a stark signal to their national governments. Similarly in the United States, 80 cities have declared a climate emergency including, most notably, New York City. On a larger scale, the climate movement was propelled forward when the European Parliament declared in November that they had set a goal to cut emissions by 55 percent by 2030 in order to become climate neutral by 2050. 

However, while the number of places declaring a climate emergency is increasing, the next steps after the declaration are uncertain. When jurisdictions declare a climate emergency, there is a mix of different outcomes. For some places, the declaration is symbolic because it is a show of solidarity with other places and movements like the Extinction Rebellion and Fridays for the Future. Other declarations, like the one that occurred in Miami, have been in response to protests and calls of action by activists, but they have no legitimate plan in place to address the issue. For some larger jurisdictions, specific plans have been set. In Barcelona and New York for example, both have created their own versions of the Green New Deal, a proposed package of legislation in the United States. Activists consider any of these at least a step in the right direction. 

Due to the fact that declaring a climate emergency has no binding aspects, those in power who make the declaration tend to make a variety of promises without a clear deadline on their delivery. In analyzing the first place to declare a climate emergency, their progress has been relatively steady. Darebin is a small city in Australia that declared a climate emergency in 2016, followed by the creation of an emergency plan that addressed a number of different sources of their emissions. Darebin’s largest source of emissions was commercial/industrial electricity followed by residential electricity. To address residential electricity, the city implemented a Solar Saver scheme in which residents were able to get solar panels installed and pay them off using a payment plan. This scheme was considered very successful, as the amount of solar energy generated in the city almost doubled in just a couple of years. Smaller steps have also been taken, such as banning plastic cutlery at city events and resurfacing local roads using recycled materials. At the start of 2020, the city also started their food waste recycling program that reduced the jurisdiction's emissions by 1,600 tonnes in the first year. While these efforts should be commended, they do very little in relation to the global issue. 

Japan is suspected of producing 4 percent of the world's CO2 emissions, making it the fifth largest producer in the world, only surpassed by China, the United States, Russia, and India. There have been a handful of cities in Japan that have declared climate emergencies in hopes of influencing the national government's choices. Japan has felt a variety of effects from climate change, including heat waves that killed a thousand people in 2018, and flooding which resulted in 2 million people being evacuated in July 2018. These climate effects have been felt in coastal cities like Sakai and Hokuei, but especially in the island city of Iki, all of which have declared climate emergencies. The efforts of these smaller jurisdictions do not seem to have had an effect on the national government, as the government announced a plan to build 22 new coal power plants in the next 5 years. With coal burning being a major source of CO2 emissions, Japan's thought process comes into question when thinking about their proposed 26 percent cut of national emissions by 2030 as a part of their pledge to support the Paris Climate Agreement. Japan is just one example of the disconnect between local and national government, thereby showing how national government cooperation is the key to the success of emission reduction.

The climate movement took a major step on the global ladder when the European Union (EU) declared a climate emergency just before the United Nations COP25 Climate Change Conference. This declaration was monumental, but it also came with some drastic ideas for the majority of the continent. Based on the 1.5 degree target set at the Paris agreement, there was a call for a reduction of emissions with a focus on the aviation and shipping industries. The success of the EU accomplishing this goal is dependent on the funds that the European Investment Fund and the European Investment Bank would provide. Additionally, 75 million euros have been allocated for the BlueInvest Fund, a fund to strategically target and support the innovative blue economy working to address oceanic shipping improvements. While these ideas do hold some potential for improving aspects of the EU's emission issues, many activists worry about how much progress can really be made in such a large area with a wide array of issues.

Jurisdictions’ decisions across the world to declare a climate emergency have led to a mixed bag of results. Efforts being made on the local level can be considered successes even if they are small. The message is still very important in those places, however, whether they make major changes or not; it is time for the world to step up. The declaration of a climate emergency puts the pressure on national governments and international bodies to acknowledge the issue and treat it as the emergency it is. Progress may be slow, but it is progress nonetheless.

Proxies and Power: Addressing the Attribution Problem in Cyberspace

In the world of international relations theory, anarchy plays a large role in the way states interact with one another. Theorists have spent decades theorizing the best way to prevent security dilemmas, encourage cooperation, and promote intercultural understanding on the world stage. Similar to the international stage, cyberspace has its own defining problem that influences its actors: the attribution problem. There are three main elements contributing to the attribution problem that, if left unaddressed by the international community, will result in the deterioration of the cybersecurity environment. These include the increasing number of actors within cyberspace, the introduction and usage of cyber proxies, and the reluctance of major cyber powers to address the attribution problem. As long as the attribution problem remains unsolved and cyberspace remains ungoverned, the cybersecurity environment grows ever closer to unmitigated anarchy.

The attribution problem is well-known, as it has plagued the cybersecurity community for years. Cyber operations are fundamentally low-risk due to their covert nature; it’s difficult to accurately locate the source of a cyber attack in time to stop the attack and identify the perpetrator. This means that actors are more willing to use cyber attacks against other actors for their own personal gain because the chances of their actions being accurately attributed to them are low. Although attributing cyberattacks is possible, it is very labor and resource-intensive. Thus, only major cyber powers have the capability to identify the source of cyberattacks. Furthermore, these major cyber powers will only out the perpetrator of an attack if it lies within their interests. This inability--or unwillingness--to create accountability in cyberspace is the core element of the attribution problem. 

Every actor within cyberspace uses the attribution problem, whether intentionally or not. This becomes problematic as more and more actors access cyberspace and begin using cyber operations to gain power and influence. For actors, the low-cost, low-risk nature of cyber operations makes them an attractive alternative to investing in traditional defense systems. As more actors without strong conventional militaries develop cyber capabilities, their power and presence within cyberspace grow. This power allows them to conduct cyber operations and, using the attribution problem, avoid consequences for any actions that are considered to lie outside of international norms. As more cyber operations remain anonymous, more actors grasp for power and the cybersecurity environment deteriorates.

Experts also posit that the increasing number of actors gaining power within cyberspace will decrease the imbalance of power in cyberspace. This hierarchy was established after World War II and was reinforced by the United Nations Security Council to govern the international community and ensure accountability. The hierarchical placement of actors within cyberspace isn’t based upon the hierarchy of the international world order; it’s based on the capabilities of different actors. This allows the hierarchy to flatten as more actors achieve the same level of capability as others, evening the playing field and granting actors without traditional means to project power to gain influence on the world stage. With the hierarchy flattened, cyberspace becomes harder to govern as actors use the attribution problem to conduct operations without consequence. This effect can be seen as actors with a small--or nonexistent--traditional defense system become major powers within cyberspace, such as Estonia and the Ukrainian hacktivist network, the Cyber Alliance.

The only way to reinforce the hierarchy is for the major cyber powers to create norms that would hold actors accountable within cyberspace. The traditional leaders of the international community, China, Russia, and the United States, are also considered the greatest cyber powers. They could, rather easily, create norms that would hold actors accountable for their actions within cyberspace and mitigate the effects of anarchy and the attribution problem. They are, however, highly unlikely to do so. Major cyber powers are not only the most influential states in the world but are also the states most likely to benefit from anarchy and the attribution problem within cyberspace. If cyber powers advocated for constraining norms within cyberspace, they’d be restricting their own capabilities, which is naturally against their interests. This dilemma is similar to the one faced by the international community during the creation of the liberal world order after World War II; however, the usage of cyber proxies has introduced a new aspect to this familiar problem.

The unwillingness of cyber powers to pursue attribution is best observed through the existence and usage of cyber proxies. Cyber proxies are individuals or groups of people who are contracted by cyber powers to conduct technical operations, such as data-mining and network infiltration, within cyberspace. Using cyber proxies to conduct operations is not only cost-effective, but it also complicates attribution. If a cyber power wants to conduct a cyber operation that they feel could have great consequences should a competitor choose to pursue attribution, they can outsource the operations to cyber proxies and redirect blame and attention. Russia has done this in multiple cases, including the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the 2016 DNC hacks, by claiming that all of the information warfare operations were simply conducted by “patriotic hackers” who had no connections to the Russian government. Although the U.S. Intelligence Community strongly suspects that Russia's intelligence agency contracted these hackers to conduct their cyber operations, it is far too difficult to find the connection between the government and the hackers to create a case against them. By using the attribution problem to their advantage, cyber power can conduct operations with few consequences and cyber proxies gain access to power and influence within cyberspace.

As non-state actors, cyber proxies are not subject to the same limitations as states. They can pursue their interests without justification and, more importantly, have no agency in the eyes of the international courts. Agency, or legal standing in the international justice system, is primarily afforded to states according to their relation to the United Nations. UN member states have agency, as do the organizations housed by and affiliated with the UN. Even if the international community were able to overcome the attribution problem and accuse a cyber proxy of conducting illicit cyber operations, actors without legal standing cannot be held to the same standards as states who do have legal standing and cannot be tried in an international court. International organizations such as the United Nations could attempt to create international laws that would govern cyberspace, but they wouldn’t be effective as they wouldn’t be applicable to non-state actors. Instead, the international community should focus on creating norms that would mitigate the effects of the attribution problem and promote accountability within cyberspace.

So far, governance of cyberspace has been a largely “bottom-up” endeavor, with individual actors within cyberspace using their power and influence to set guidelines of what actions are and are not acceptable. These guidelines, however, are different for every actor and only followed by the actors who set the rules themselves. Actors with less advanced cyber capabilities don’t have the same limitations as major cyber powers. However, major cyber powers have the ability to employ cyber proxies to overcome these limitations. Additionally, cyber proxies can avoid consequences altogether, as private actors can’t be held to the same standards as states and international organizations. Each different type of actor within cyberspace uses the attribution problem to further their own personal interests, to the detriment of the cybersecurity environment. Without a comprehensive and all-encompassing set of norms that forces all actors to be confined to the same rules, anarchy and the attribution problem will continue to define cyberspace.

Moscow’s Mad Monk: Aleksandr Dugin and Eurasianism

When referring to the most influential figures within Russia, one would be hard-pressed to ignore the exploits of Grigori Rasputin. An infamous mystic, Rasputin’s esoteric allure would grant him unparalleled influence over the royal family, allowing him to fill ministerial positions with sycophants aligned with him at whim. A person prone to a similar charisma and cryptic prose of equal indirect power in contemporary Russia is that of Aleksandr Dugin, a man who has earned himself the monikers of “The Most Dangerous Man In The World,” “Putin’s Brain,” and, indeed, “Putin’s Rasputin.”

Beginning his political career with a prominent position in the nativist neo-Nazi group Pramyat from 1987 to 1989, Dugin would continue to augment his ideology with the anti-bourgeois rhetoric fostered by Soviet thought, eventually founding the National Bolshevik Party with novelist Ėduard Limonov in 1993. National Bolshevism, an ultranationalist strand of Marxism described by the Communist Party’s Young Left Front as “a bizarre mixture of totalitarian and fascist symbols, geopolitical dogma, leftist ideas, and national-patriotic demagoguery,” served to represent the synthesis of Dugin’s ultranationalist sentiments with his influence from the former Soviet Union’s Marxist and anti-bourgeois rhetoric. This set the stage for the Eurasian ideology and its distinctly chauvinist and illiberal nature.

Eurasianism, as posited by Dugin, argues that the twenty-first century will be defined by a conflict between the Atlanticists, referring to the thalassocratic liberal hegemony and world order espoused by the United States and its allies, and the Eurasianists, referring to the land-based powers, primarily referring to Russia, who reject such an order. This narrative of conflict has differed greatly from classical proponents of Eurasianism who have traditionally portrayed Romano-Germanic Europe as a unifying threat. Such a plan involves stoking anti-American nationalism among Japan, Germany, and Iran, the last of which is of particular interest with renewed Iranian-American tensions in the wake of Qasem Soleimani’s death. Additionally, a geopolitical issue integral to Eurasianism is that of Russia’s claim to Ukraine, a belief which had served to bolster Dugin’s following in the wake of Russia’s actions in Crimea and the Donbass. 

When directly countering the American liberal world order, Dugin’s Eurasian doctrine directs its followers “to provoke all forms of instability and separatism within the borders of the United States,” mentioning historical racial divisions as a promising wedge. To cement Eurasianism as a universally appealing alternative to liberalism, much of the Eurasian doctrine is rooted in elements of both Fascist and Communist thought due to neither “belonging to the spirit of modernity” and thus are free of its supposed corruption at the hand of liberal thought. In his primary ideological work, The Fourth Political Theory, Dugin summarizes this ideology as the rejection of “socialism without materialism, atheism, progressivism, and modernism,” instead focusing on the concepts of intense religious, ethnic, and national pride. These are the criteria by which Dugin believes facilitate “Dasein,” a term in Heideggerian existential philosophy used in the context of individual identity and personhood. Whereas the Eurasian movement allows Dugin appeal to the more hawkish of the Russian elite, the integration of the Fourth Political Ideology at its foundations has served to rapidly grow his following of the disillusioned through its incorporation of all radical fringes of the political spectrum. 

While the tenets of such an ideology and its revanchist ambitions might lead one to believe such a movement exists solely on the fringes of the Russian public and political spheres, many Russian figures prominent in such realms have offered Dugin’s philosophy not only acceptance but praise. During a 1999 interview, former Chairman of the State Duma and prominent early supporter of President Putin, Gennadiy Seleznyov, publicly advocated for Dugin’s work to be made compulsory reading in Russia’s school curriculum. Though the popularity of Dugin’s work has yet to make an impression on the Russian economic elite, one may also notice exceptions to this phenomena, such as the man’s amicable ties to retail mogul President of Russian Gold, Alexander Tarantsev, who greatly helped Dugin finance the publication of new editions of his work. 

Beyond the public sphere, the works of Dugin and the Eurasian movement have also made a lasting impression within one of the Russian government’s most formidable assets: its military. Lectures based on what would become Dugin’s magnum opus, Foundation of Geopolitics, have according to an uncontested claim by Dugin himself, been used as required reading for Russia’s General Staff Academy, one of Russia’s premier military learning institutions. This lasting impression of this Eurasianist Il Principe on Russia’s policy makers has not been lost on prominent scholarship. John Dunlop, a leading figure on the topic of post-Soviet Russian nationalism, further affirms this popularity by stating that there has “not been another book published in Russia during the post-communist period that has exerted an influence on Russian military, police, and statist foreign policy elites.”

Whilst the ideological characteristics of the Eurasia Movement and the Fourth Political Theory have made a relatively small impression on the Russian political and military sphere, the aforementioned geopolitical doctrine espoused by the movement have been viewed with great interest by Russian policy makers, helping carry both its military and ideological aspects into the mainstream. With this in mind, the threat of a successful execution of the Eurasian geopolitical philosophy by the Russian government would pose a twofold threat to the democratic ideals of the United States’ government and its people, and should thus be a priority for United States policymakers. 

One such area of which action is recommended to be taken is the countering of the aforementioned Eurasian strategy of sowing discontent through “encouraging all kinds of separatism and ethnic, social and racial conflicts, actively supporting all dissident movements-- extremist, racist, and sectarian groups, thus destabilizing internal political processes in the U.S.” This policy has seen itself come to fruition through the actions of entities associated with Russian soft power, the most infamous being the pro-Russian Internet Research Agency. The organization’s skill at dividing and conquering was made apparent in the U.S. Senate Select Committee On Intelligence’s Report On Russian Active Measures And Interference In The 2016 Election, where a plethora of attempts were made by the group to incite racial hatred among Americans. In fact, 66 percent of Internet Research Agency Facebook ads mentioning race in an inflammatory manner and one of the group’s proxy accounts designed to galvanize black police retaliation, titled “Blacktivist,” garnered a total of 11.2 million engagements on Facebook before promptly being taken down by the U.S. government after its Russian ties were revealed. The Eurasianist’s efforts to galvanize identity politics in the U.S. is not restricted to Black Americans, however, as figures such as Richard Spencer and Steve Bannon have both worked with and drawn inspiration from Dugin and his nativist vision. 

As Putin’s geopolitical maneuvers in Ukraine and Georgia continue to mirror one another, the United States must look towards another former Soviet territory at high risk of hybrid warfare with Russia frequently mentioned as an invaluable prospect for satellite states under “special status” under a Russo-Eurasian hegemony: the Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. In fact, defense strategists working on behalf of the United States Armed Forces have concluded that these Baltic nations are “vulnerable to low-level, hybrid, and full-scale attacks by Russian special operations and regular military forces deployed close to their borders,'' with little preventing increased Russian military and diplomatic pressure in the region. 

There indeed exist factors that facilitate such acts, such as the traditional cultural divides that also render the United States and Ukraine vulnerable to Russian soft power. This is especially dangerous in the case of the Baltic States due to their respective Russophone population “[relying] primarily on Russian origin media for information and entertainment,” rendering them susceptible to online information manipulation. Additionally, the impact of the Baltic States’ Russophone population losing faith in their government institutions would greatly shift public opinion and, eventually, the Baltic governments themselves away from NATO. This would effectively prevent direct American intervention in the event that the three countries withdraw from the military alliance. If the Baltic States allow Russia to alienate their native Russophone population, the latter would “not require a major effort to provide a pretext for Russian intervention should Moscow desire one.”

With this in mind, it is highly recommended that policymakers urge the social media industry to adhere to the solutions offered by the aforementioned Committee, which involve the promotion of increased interindustrial cooperation through the creation of “formalized mechanisms for collaboration that facilitate content sharing among the social media platforms in order to defend against foreign disinformation” as well as the offering of “notifications to individual users [that] should be clearly stated, device neutral, and provide users all the information necessary to understanding the malicious nature of the social media content or accounts they were exposed to.” This will allow those using such online platforms to know where the information they consume is coming from and identity possibly malicious intent. However, while social media companies have agreed to cooperate “on an ad-hoc basis,” it will take continuous and sensible cooperation if the IRA or its like are to be mitigated in the United States’ political system in the future.

In regards to an all-too-possible situation in which Putin will continue to mirror the Eurasian geopolitical agenda and eye the nations of the Baltic with pragmatic interest, Stephen Flanagan of the Rand Corporation recommends that the American Armed Forces work in cooperation with NATO personnel in the specialized training of the Baltic militaries. This includes in the fields of  “crisis management, civil defense, and countering … and ‘grey zone’ attacks,” areas of which the quantitatively diminutive Baltic militaries must excel in if they are to prevent Russian engagements in hybrid warfare. 

Taking note of the prospective problems concerning Russian manipulation of media, Ulrich Kuhn of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg believes that Russian hybrid warfare can be primarily mitigated through the funding of Russophone media within the Baltic States as opposed to Russia, spanning from traditional media outlets such as newspapers, television, and radio… [to] social media and internet resources.” This would effectively provide the Baltic States’ Russian-speaking population an alternative to complete dependence on Kremlin-influenced media, an alternative that presents itself as more cost-effective than an increase in NATO defense funding. 

Constitutional Amendments and the Future Political Course of the Russian Federation

Constitutional Amendments

On January 15, 2020, Russian President Vladimir Putin of Russia gave his yearly address to lawmakers. In his speech, Putin, without warning, proposed a series of changes to the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Some of the proposed changes include increasing the power of the lawmakers in selecting the Prime Minister and Cabinet-level positions. Currently, lawmakers only confirm the President’s nomination for the post of the Prime Minister and no other high-level post is subject to lawmakers’ confirmation. Under Putin’s proposed changes, lawmakers would have the power to nominate and confirm their choice for Prime Minister and other high-ranking cabinet positions. Furthermore, the President would not be able to reject the lawmakers’ choice.

Furthermore, Putin proposed putting a constitutional limit on the influence of international law in Russia. Essentially, Putin suggested that if international law was found to be in violation of the Russian constitution, then the international law would be nullified. In another law-related amendment, Putin floated the idea of increasing the power of the Constitutional Court. The proposed change would give the President the power to request that the Constitutional Court examine the constitutionality of any legislation before it is signed into law by the President. 

Additionally, Putin suggested two amendments that would change certain eligibility requirements that have to do with holding high office in Russia. First, the residency requirements would be increased for candidates for President from 10 to 25 years. Second, members of the Duma, the Federation Council, Ministers, and judges would be prohibited from having dual citizenship or other long-term residency documents of another country.

Some other notable proposals in Putin’s address included providing a guarantee that the minimum wage and pension will remain above the poverty line, prohibiting any future President from occupying the post of President for more than two terms, and strengthening the status and role of the Government Council.

In Putin’s speech to lawmakers, he stated that “these amendments do not fundamentally change the Constitution and thus, can be adopted by the parliament. However, I consider it right to hold a referendum on all suggested amendments and only after the results of the referendum adopt the amendments.”  However, despite rumors that a national referendum on the constitutional amendments will be held in May, as of now no details have been released. 

The proposed amendments constitute one of the largest domestic political events in the Putin era. However, following Putin’s address to lawmakers, another earthquake shook the Russian political scene. Dmitry Medvedev, Putin’s Prime Minister, announced his resignation. Medvedev’s resignation meant that the entire ministerial cabinet would also resign. Sources within the Russian government told Novaya Gazeta, a prominent Russian newspaper, that resignation of the cabinet was a complete surprise even at the highest levels of government. Medvedev stated that he considered his resignation to be the proper action in the context of Putin’s proposed constitutional changes.

Appointment of Mikhail Mishustin as Prime Minister

Immediately following Medvedev’s resignation, Putin appointed a new Prime Minister, Mikhail Mishustin. Mishustin was confirmed as Prime Minister on January 16 with a vote of 383-41. Previously, Mishustin was the head of Russia’s federal tax service since 2010 but he has not played a role in national-level politics until now. 

A comparison can be drawn between Mishustin’s sudden elevation to the national political sphere and Anton Vaino’s similar unexpected rise to prominence. In August 2016, Anton Vaino replaced long-time Putin ally, Sergey Ivanov, as the Presidential Chief of Staff. Before Vaino was appointed to this position, he was the head of Protocol, and before that he held a series of technocratic positions within the Russian government.  At the time of Vaino’s appointment, analysts noted that Vaino was known for his competence as a bureaucrat and that, unlike the man he replaced, Vaino had no independent power of his own. Vaino's appointment suggested that Putin was clearing ‘the old-guard’ out and replacing them with efficient technocrats who would be able to competently pursue his agenda without developing any sort of independent influence. 

Mishustin also has a technocratic background and is known for his competence. Before becoming the head of Russia’s federal tax service, he had a long career in a series of low-profile bureaucratic positions mostly relating to taxes. During Mishustin’s tenure as head of the federal tax service, he led an extremely ambitious modernization of Russia’s tax collection methods. He focused on digitizing the process of collecting taxes with the goal of increasing efficiency in order to increase overall revenue. The Federal Tax Service is now widely considered to be the most technologically advanced department of the Russian government. Mishustin’s efforts succeeded. Due to increased efficiencies, the total amount of taxes collected has risen 33 times faster than the rate of GDP growth. 

The parallels between Mishustin and Viano suggest that Putin appointed Mishustin to execute his agenda between now and 2024, as well as guarantee that whoever holds the post as Prime Minister could not challenge Putin before or replace him after 2024. 

Mishustin’s background as an efficient money-manager is also worth noting, particularly in light of some of Putin’s domestic political challenges. Sources close to Putin’s government told the Russian newspaper, Komersant, that the shakeup of the government could be related to budgetary issues facing Russia in recent years. Putin has proposed and instituted a series of ambitious social-economic initiatives which will require serious government expenditures. There has traditionally been resistance to these expenditures within some blocks of the government. When Andrey Isaev, a Duma Deputy, asked Mishustin where he planned to get the resources to fund the initiatives of the President, Mishustin simply replied: “The resources exist.” Overall, it seems that Mishustin, with his reputation as a technocratic problem solver, was brought in to execute Putin’s national projects without dissent.

Putin is Feeling Domestic Pressure

 Mishustin’s appointment as Prime Minister along with some of the language in Putin’s address to lawmakers could suggest that he is feeling the public’s call for the government to do more to raise living standards. At the beginning of his address, Putin stated that “today in our society, there has been a clear demand for change.”  Although Putin’s popularity according to the Levada Center (one of Russia’s only public opinion polling organizations) has been stable at around 69 percent since July of 2019, in recent years there has been a series of protest movements that have called attention to poor living and economic conditions in the country. 

In June 2018, the Russian government announced a proposal to increase the retirement age from 60 to 65 for men and from 55 to 63 for women. This proposal was met with widespread popular disapproval and protests erupted in over 80 different cities in Russia. In August of 2018, protests also erupted in cities across Northwest Russia after it was discovered that the government was building a massive landfill in an abandoned town northeast of Moscow. Waste from Moscow would be dumped in this landfill and there were fears among locals that this would lead to an ecological disaster. Additionally, in February of 2017 in response to a proposed increase in the taxes paid by truck drivers who drive on federal roads, Russian truckers went on strike for 10 days. These policy changes were proposed to raise revenues or decrease costs to the federal government. Since 2014, Russia has suffered under western sanctions and combined with the pressure of an aging population and significant expenditures on the modernization of the military, Russia finds itself cash-strapped. Putin’s appointment of Mishustin can be interpreted as an effort to improve Russia’s financial situation so that it can provide the services and benefits that the Russian populace desires. 

What Does This Reveal About Putin’s Political Future?

Putin’s current term as president will end in 2024 and it seems unlikely at this point that he will run for a fifth term. However, it is widely accepted that Putin has no intention of stepping away from politics or power come 2024. Thus, it has been expected for quite some time that Putin would find some way to ensure that he would maintain a position of power post-2024. 

The predictions regarding Putin’s possible methods to preserve his influence have varied dramatically. Some have predicted that Putin intends to become the President of a new country that would be formed by combining Russia and Belarus. Some have forecasted that Putin will follow Nursultan Nazarbayev’s, the former President of Kazakhstan, example of stepping down from the presidency but maintaining power by becoming chairman for life of the Security Councils of Kazakhstan. 

Regardless of the path that Putin takes, if the proposed amendments pass, the next Russian President will have significantly less power than the office has today. And many of the proposed amendments, like the following, could be used to centralize Putin’s power and ensure that no political opponents could challenge him. 

• Limiting the influence of international law: Russia has often emphasized that “western, democratic capitalism” is not the proper style of governance for every country. This constitutional change could codify this ideology and empower Putin even further to use authoritarian measures to maintain power. 

• Increasing the power of the Courts: The Russian court system is notoriously vulnerable to political influence. Freedom House gave the Russian court system a score of 1 out of a possible 4, stating that “The judiciary lacks independence from the executive branch, and career advancement is effectively tied to compliance with Kremlin preferences. The Presidential Personnel Commission and court chairmen control the appointment and reappointment of the country’s judges, who tend to be promoted from inside the judicial system rather than gaining independent experience as lawyers.” A more powerful court system that is easily influenced could be an ideal means for Putin to exert power after he moves on from the office of the Presidency. 

• The increasing residency requirements and prohibition of dual citizens: This measure helps guarantee that prominent Russian exiles cannot return and run for political office. Furthermore, this gives the Kremlin an excuse to disqualify individuals that have been educated, or spent extended periods of time in the West, and thus are more likely to hold liberal values, from seeking government jobs or elected positions. 

• Codifying a two-term limit for the office of the Presidency: This guarantees that no individual can acquire the same degree of long-term power to challenge Putin. 

What to Watch For

There are few times in recent memory that the political future of the Russian Federation has been as uncertain as it is now. However, there are a couple of overarching themes to watch out for in the coming weeks and months. 

• Putin will act to preserve his position of power: Any reforms proposed by Putin should be analyzed through the paradigm of Putin’s self-interest. To ascertain why the Government of Russia undertakes a course of action, examine how Putin could benefit.

• Prepare for unexpected changes in the Russian Government. Even the most attentive of Russia watchers were taken completely by surprise by the timing of this dramatic shakeup. Reports in the Russian press state that even the highest levels of the Russian government were unaware of these proposed changes. 

• Examine the backgrounds of the new ministerial cabinet members when they are announced. If the appointees have similar technocratic, low-profile backgrounds like Mishustin, this could indicate that Putin is attempting to further centralize power while also building a team that can deliver on Putin’s ambitious social-economic plans.

• Expect the Russian government to institute reforms with the aim of cutting costs and increasing the services provided to the Russian populace.

President Trump's Travel Ban: 2020 Updates

On January 27, 2017, President Trump’s administration issued Executive Order 13769, formally known as “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States”; this order is also informally known as either the “Muslim ban” or the “travel ban.” It prevented all immigration and most travel from the Middle Eastern and African countries of Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. Despite mass protests and legal challenges, the order was legally upheld by a 5-4 Supreme Court decision in Trump v. Hawaii. On January 31, 2020, nearly three years later, the Trump administration expanded the list of countries to include Eritrea, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Nigeria, Sudan, and Tanzania. The amended order was implemented on February 21, 2020. 

While the impact of the travel ban will inevitably differ widely from state to state, there is no serious universal rationale for implementing these policies. The stated reason by the Trump administration for the order’s expansion is that the countries listed have “displayed an ‘unwillingness or inability’ to adhere to ‘baseline’ security criteria,” specifically citing “insufficient information sharing from the countries’ governments about criminal and terrorism data, a lack of electronic passport systems and issues with Interpol reporting methods.” Even if this is true, the Trump administration hasn’t explained why these travel restrictions were not implemented sooner, or why similar violating countries haven’t also been hit with a travel ban. The reasoning behind the expansions is flawed at best and points to an ulterior motive at worse. Whatever the cause, by adding more banned countries to the list, President Trump disrupts vital refugee flows from Eritrea and Tanzania, angers important allies in Nigeria and Tanzania, and disrupts peace processes in Eritrea and Ethiopia.

Eritrea 

Eritrea is a small nation located in the Horn of Africa, bordering the Red Sea, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. Economically underdeveloped and politically repressed, it has been under the authoritarian rule of strongman Isaias Afwerki since independence. In August 2018, Ethiopia and Eritrea signed a peace agreement that resolved several land disputes between the two countries and brought the “frozen conflict” between the two nations to an end. Ethiopian president Abiy Ahmed's role in resolving the conflict earned him the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize. 

Unfortunately, the peace deal has stalled. Major joint economic deals that were in the treaty have failed to materialize, as have attempts to move troops away from the border. The U.S. has significant political capital in the region and could have played an important role in ensuring the peace deal functions as planned, preventing a resurgence in conflict. Nevertheless, by accusing the Eritrean government of being unable to maintain even basic security concerns, the U.S. is burning a major bridge with the power-hungry Afwerki. Eritrean Foreign Minister Osman Saleh Mohammed has directly stated that “the government saw the ban as a political move that would hurt the country's relations with the US.”  This reduces the U.S.’s ability to assist in the peace process and severely hampers its traditionally “outsized role in the region” and the peace process. Damaging the peace process is especially ironic as most of the refugees that the travel ban is trying to stop are fleeing because of the conflict and conscription efforts that have been implemented as a result of the conflict. In addition, the regional economic growth, increased U.S. influence in the region, and increased regional stability makes peace the desired outcome for the U.S. regardless of the refugee situation. 

Nigeria 

In contrast to Eritrea, Nigeria is one of the giants of Africa. As Africa’s most populous country and its single largest economy, Nigeria has been a major political force since it gained independence from Britain in 1960. Imposing a travel restriction on Nigeria harms a major strategic relationship and major U.S. economic partner.

The United States and Nigeria have been close military and political partners since the early 2010s when Nigeria’s northern regions were besieged by a violent insurgency from the Islamist group Boko Haram. Boko Haram, which swore allegiance to the Islamic State in 2015, killed tens of thousands of Nigerian civilians and forced 2.3 million Nigerians from their homes. While the threat from Boko Haram and affiliated extremist groups has subsided since 2015, the threat has not been eliminated. Since Boko Haram killed at least 30 civilians in February 2020, U.S. military and political assistance remain crucial to ensure the group can’t regain the power it had in 2015. The U.S. has been extremely crucial in the fight against Boko Haram, deploying many trainers and advisors to support Nigerian troops in the field, as well as supplying the Nigerians with the military equipment they need to maintain their counterinsurgency effort. 

U.S. assistance is jeopardized by the travel ban. Nigerian foreign minister Geoffrey Onyeama was “blindsided” by the decision, indicating a negative reaction from the Nigerian government. Any decreased trust between the two governments could lead to decreased cooperation on vitally important security matters.

In addition, these travel restrictions harm the U.S. and Nigerian economies. Both countries are among the world's largest economies and have a strong trading relationship. The travel ban jeopardizes the economic relationships between American and Nigerian companies, as face-to face-meetings and conferences become harder to organize due to decreased “access to business and visitor visas and diversity visa lottery eligibility.” This damage to economic relations couldn’t come at a worse time. The African Union is planning to implement the Africa Continental Free Trade Area in July 2020, one of the largest free trade zones in the world. These restrictions, which function as de-facto economic sanctions, could disrupt American access to the overall African market. 

The travel ban also deprives the U.S. of an incredibly economically beneficial source of manpower, as NPR explains “first- and second-generation Nigerians are typically more educated and more likely to hold professional jobs than the general U.S. population.”

Tanzania

Tanzania is a large nation in eastern Africa and can be defined as an anocratic state that has experienced a backslide into autocracy in recent years under President John Magufuli. This includes increased arrests on false charges, abductions, or extrajudicial violence. The government has also increasingly cracked down on the LGBT population, and homosexuality is punishable by a prison sentence of 30 years to life. The travel ban could prevent people fleeing from finding refuge in the United States. If no other options exist, these people will be forced to stay in Tanzania.

Despite its domestic policies, Tanzania is an important U.S. counterterrorism partner. Ever since Al-Qaeda carried out a 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Dar es Salaam, the U.S. has provided military supplies and training that has ensured that terrorism in Tanzania remains a much smaller threat compared to its neighbors Kenya, Uganda, and Somalia. In addition, U.S. training has helped turn the Tanzanian military into a peacekeeping force that has deployed on several major UN peacekeeping missions in recent years. The travel ban has the potential to jeopardize an incredibly successful security relationship between the United States and Tanzania.

Sudan

Finally, Sudan is a large and populous nation in Northern Africa that recently split into Sudan and South Sudan in 2011 following a long and brutal civil war. The nation had been ruled by dictator Omar Bashir from 1989 until 2019 when mass protests and pressure from the military forced him to resign. Sudan is currently ruled by a power-sharing accord between the protest movement and the military, with the overall head of the government falling to military leader and possible war criminal Lieutenant-General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. 

Sudan was on the first draft of the travel ban back in 2017 but was later removed after diplomatic pressure from the United Arab Emirates, who was receiving Sudanese military aid. Sudan’s inclusion in the updated travel ban only serves to further destabilize a nation that is teetering on the edge between dictatorship and democracy. The ban has sparked feelings of disappointment towards the U.S. from many young Sudanese people who are at the forefront of Sudan's revolution. By failing to signal the U.S.’s full support for the Sudanese people and their freedom of movement, the U.S. increases the possibility that the spark of democracy in one of the world's most historically oppressed countries fails to light.

In summary, the travel ban expansion is a strategic miscalculation for U.S. interests and relationships in Africa. It weakens the U.S.’s ability to fight ISIS affiliates in Nigeria and harms the U.S.’s friendship with Tanzania. It weakens an already strained peace deal in Eritrea and ensures that Eritrean and Tanzanian refugees can’t find refuge in the United States. It even hurts the economy by harming U.S. ties with the massive Nigerian economy.

Is China a Friend or Foe?

China has acquired an increasing amount of power, beginning in the 1950s, allowing it to become a globally recognized economic and militaristic powerhouse. China’s military has become increasingly aggressive in East and Southeast Asia while simultaneously promoting economic growth to accomplish the widespread acceptance of their global influence. Increased militarization in the South China Sea and Taiwan will induce a rivalry between China and the United States (U.S.) as China maintains their position as a competitor for global influence with the expansion of their Belt and Road Initiative. 

After World War II, as tensions increased between China, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia, China began seeking the opportunity to occupy islands and define maritime boundaries. The dispute over territory became increasingly complicated because the introduction of the U.S. as a presence in the area challenged China as a regional power. China used the nine-dash line as a justification for claiming a large section of the South China Sea. The long-practiced presence of Chinese fishing in this area resulted in the self-asserted assumption that this section of the South China Sea was Chinese territory. China has a historical claim over the islands and the sea, stating that it was established before the implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), even though they ratified the convention. The nine-dash-line largely overlapped with claims by Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei. Not only has China expanded their naval capabilities, but they also dumped sand and cement on numerous reefs to create man-made islands that would house military bases. China did so with the intent to counter other nation’s claims to territorial control in the South China Sea and take advantage of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which states that 200 nautical miles off the shoreline is the exclusive area for a country's economic use. Countries in their exclusive economic zones have "sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources." China's main interests in the sea include accessing oil and gas deposits, as the seabed is a potential energy supply corridor.

China's aggression in the South China Sea is influenced by their history and current narrative regarding western involvement. Throughout the Century of Humiliation, China was exploited and overpowered by western nations. In an effort to overcome a period of history that, to China, symbolized their weakness, the nation became more assertive in places with territorial disputes such as the South China Sea. China's narrative consists of the idea that the U.S. is seeking to contain China as a rising power. China firmly believes that third parties, including the U.S., should not be involved in the dispute because it is not their direct concern.

The U.S. perspective on the dispute promotes the defense of Southeast Asian nations, benefits of trading, and promotion of international law. The Obama Administration demonstrated this perspective by strengthening allyship and security ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and promoting Freedom of Navigation Operations patrols. The United States continues to reject China's nine-dash line and its claims over the island, stating that it will defend the Philippines if China attacks them militarily. To ensure that China abides by the law, the U.S. additionally patrols the sea to defend international law and the rights to sail freely within international waters. The South China Sea is an important commercial trading route for the U.S., who is struggling between the desire to leave China unprovoked and prevent them from bullying their allies. Generally, the American public does not view China favorably either. In 2019, 60 percent of Americans viewed China negatively, while 24 percent believed that China is an increasing threat, and 81 percent believed that China's increasing military power is negative for the U.S. The U.S. must act with a clear strategy in mind because the South China Sea dispute has the potential to turn into a full-fledged war. If the U.S. does not have a military presence in the South China Sea, China could be further encouraged to increase aggression in other territorial disputes such as Tibet and India. 

Increased patrolling of the sea, however, can make the U.S. look like an aggressor, legitimizing Chinese militarization. The U.S. must recognize the economic risks, considering China is in a trade war and also one of their significant trade partners. The U.S. should aim to maintain stability within the region and promote negotiation, communication, and cooperation without causing interference that demonstrates aggression and western dominance. One recommendation is for the U.S. to continue its support for Southeast Asian allies by providing equipment, sea surveillance and coast guard infrastructure to build their maritime capacity. To counter China’s overwhelming presence in the region, the U.S. must increase defense cooperation with India by jointly conducting military exercises. Helping allies, especially the Philippines and Vietnam, allows these countries to defend themselves from China's aggression and balances power in the region. By doing so, the U.S. would increase security in the South China Sea, preventing military conflict and balancing power between Southeast Asian countries and China.

In the 1970s, China began to embrace globalization, international trade, and foreign direct investment. In 2013, President Xi Jinping announced the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) during a visit to Kazakhstan, which allowed China to expand its regional influence and locations outside of the region, such as Africa, Central Asia, and parts of Europe. This multi-trillion dollar infrastructure project intends to create an economic belt and maritime "silk road" that connects China to over sixty countries in Eurasia and Africa. The BRI aims to fund infrastructure projects such as highways, railways, sea ports, airports, and oil refineries. 

Though the BRI will help underdeveloped countries, it also contains negative aspects that can simultaneously hurt the countries by ensuring their inability to repay their debts, which would prolong China’s control of their projects. Since its launch, China has been accused of putting countries into "debt traps.” The BRI has made project deals with numerous smaller economies; the most prominent and controversial one is Sri Lanka's. From 2009 to 2014, China financed almost five billion U.S. dollars on projects in Sri Lanka, including ports, roads, bridges, railways, an international airport, and a coal-fired power station. This loan, however, came at an interest rate of 6 percent and 8.8 percent, respectively. Other multilateral banks and national banks, such as Japan's, typically offered interest rates of 2-3 percent. The project was suspended due to legal issues over land, the project's financing, and environmental effects. Ravi Karunanayake, Sri Lanka's Minister of Finance, stated "'We mean business when we say we want clean, transparent, good governance... perhaps Chinese companies had to be corrupt in the past, but if they do that now they will be disqualified," showing China’s corrupt practices throughout the implementation of the BRI. The Hambantota Port project has sparked controversy within Sri Lanka because of China's "debt trap," along with the fear of China using the port for military purposes. Hambantota was historically a Sri Lankan naval base, but was built into a port and is now controlled by China. The port is under a 99-year lease to China Merchants Port Holdings for $1.12 billion, causing Sri Lankan citizens to rally against the BRI, fearing that China would use the port for military purposes to gain more influence on Sri Lanka as well as get closer to India, China's rival.

The BRI benefits countries with poor infrastructure and does not necessarily make China a "foe" of the U.S., but because China’s spread of regional and global influence challenges that of the U.S., they are still competitors. In terms of the U.S., one such policy recommendation is to increase foreign direct investment in regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa where the BRI has a strong presence. United States government agencies such as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) must continue to encourage and assist U.S. private businesses to invest in high-risk countries through its political risk insurance. OPIC has launched a “Connect Africa" investment initiative, which encourages "forging deeper ties with Africa and the world, through investing in physical infrastructure, technology, and value chains," and helps stimulate economic growth of developing countries, all while competing with the BRI. Having OPIC, a private U.S. business, invest in undeveloped countries may foster trust between the two. The U.S. would not directly invest or give loans to the country's government, which would block the potential opportunity for the U.S. to entrap such countries, as China has done with the BRI. 

Free trade agreements encourage economic growth in underdeveloped countries by allowing them to increase their trade opportunities. For example, if the textile industry in Sub-Saharan Africa was not limited by trade restrictions, the U.S. could promote economic growth in African countries while simultaneously benefiting themselves. The U.S. could additionally establish a free trade agreement with India, China’s rival in the region, who they have a positive relationship with. The Better Investments Utilization Leading to Development Act, established in 2018 by the Trump Administration, seeks to join OPIC with the newly established USIDFC. USIDFC aims to bring private capital to underdeveloped countries, make the U.S. a more "competitive leader on the global development stage,” and benefit underdeveloped countries without getting the state directly involved, which could negatively affect the countries.

China's increasing aggression toward Taiwan directly interferes with the unofficial ties that the U.S. has with Taiwan, creating tensions between the U.S. and China. The U.S. has recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) since 1979, but the U.S. still has unofficial relations with Taiwan through the Taiwan Relations Act, which outlines the commitment of the U.S. to protect Taiwan from the PRC if they were to attack militarily. In 2019, the U.S. sold $2 billion worth of Abram tanks to Taiwan, a move to which China has responded negatively by threatening sanctions and stating that the U.S. should remove military involvement in Taiwan. In 2018, China approved delivery of the Russian S-400 surface-to-air missile system with the capacity to reach Taiwan. The PRC has additionally deployed approximately 1,600 missiles on the Taiwan Strait and practiced military exercises near Taiwan. One such policy recommendation in this case has to do with the continued sale of arms to Taiwan from the United States. If China ultimately attempts to forcefully overpower Taiwan, Taiwan must be militarily prepared and receive support from the U.S., who can increase Taiwan’s defense research and development in order to compete with that of China’s. 

Overall, China must be viewed by the U.S. as a "foe" because its use of force in territorial disputes creates instability in the nearby region and tension with the United States. China certainly must be viewed as a competitor in the field of global economic influence and as a "foe" pertaining to military aggression. China is spreading its influence internationally through the use of force in territorial disputes and by taking advantage of underdeveloped countries through the BRI. China is challenging the current international order by competing with the U.S. for global dominance, showing a complete lack of compromise and assertive attitude, and earning their title as a competitor.

An Analysis on Cryptocurrency and Future Regulatory Provisions

During technology’s fast-paced evolution within the past decade, one invention captured the entire world by simplifying and changing the banking system: cryptocurrency. Cryptocurrencies have surged within the last ten years as a digital medium of exchange and an alternative to contemporary considerations of what money is, while using cryptography to ensure the security of all transactions. Owners of cryptocurrency have access to their own private keys to transfer cryptocurrencies, without any governmental oversight, making this platform extremely attractive to the general public, including private individuals who use it for illicit purposes. The government has no power to regulate these means, since it is all passed through a distributed ledger. With this decentralized medium of exchange, it has become increasingly harder to regulate, leaving the question of how countries around the world will watch over the proliferation of this digital asset. 

One of the largest issues that regulators face is the usage of cryptography in cryptocurrency exchanges. Cryptography allows codes to verify the transfer of assets, “gather...the information and data, and it all passes through blockchains, which represent the distributed ledger.” This distributed ledger is one of the key aspects of cryptocurrency. Prior to the creation of the block chain, there was the double spending problem, which did not consist of a middleman or central server to watch over transactions, causing users to double spend their currency. During the time of the double spending problem, no one knew how to spend digital currency without updates. This was solved in 2008 by Satoshi Nakamoto who created Bitcoin, the first and most popular cryptocurrency. Bitcoin uses a block chain, or a peer-to-peer network, to permanently secure all transactions through codes so everyone in the block chain can see the transaction. For example, when someone spends one Bitcoin now, there is a central server to update their currency. Nakamoto has not had any personal activity on Bitcoin since they disappeared many years ago, but there are reports that a huge amount of Bitcoins exist under their wallet. However, they have not shown activity since their disappearance. If those coins were to show activity, the price of Bitcoin would drop heavily for fear of them being sold, making the rest worthless. 

Although the movement to the electronic banking system gained momentum, there are several hacking instances that have resulted in stolen millions from cryptocurrency owners. Some of the most infamous hacks in the Bitcoin blockchain include the Winklevoss Twins, the Gox exchange, and the Facebook controversy. Before the Facebook-Bitcoin controversy, the Winklevoss twins were known for battling with Facebook founder, Mark Zuckerberg, over who actually created Facebook. 

Alternatives to Bitcoin, called “altcoins,” emerged after it had gained popularity. The two most popular include Ethereum and Litecoin, which are privacy-specific coins with the goal of being as hard to track as possible. Although cryptocurrency was initially very hard to trace, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and Congress in 2019 have developed ways of tracking the distributed ledger. True investigations into cryptocurrency-related crimes did not start until a few years ago, but these institutions were able to uncover hundreds of criminal entities on just the Bitcoin blockchain. In addition to laundering dirty money and monetizing ransomware, cryptocurrency crimes have extended to dangerous organizations, such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS. By falling into the hands of terrorist organizations, cryptocurrency has been utilized to procure funding and instill the continuation of these dangerous users. 

However, not only governmental agencies have attempted to control and observe the mysterious transactions within cryptocurrency. Law enforcement has received the help of agencies, such as ComplyAdvantage and Elliptic, that use new technologies as well to monitor deviances in the blockchains. According to Rachel Wolfson in Forbes, “By examining blockchain activity closely, companies focused on combating cryptocurrency related crimes can pinpoint accounts that appear to belong to the same Bitcoin wallet and are controlled by the same entity.” By studying trends and patterns most agencies can use their own technology to warn governmental agencies about illicit uses of cryptocurrency. However, as technology grows for these oversight agencies, more criminal behavior picks up on the other end. This ongoing battle for the highest use of technology has become less useful to lawmakers, as the regulatory processes stray from their jurisdiction in the digital world.

Another issue for attempted regulation, involves the correlation between location and prices. Countries that are generally colder and where electricity is cheaper, have more cryptocurrency mining and usage. Because the electricity is cheap and mining with massive computer systems generates heat, colder countries have thrived off of cryptocurrency investments. For this reason, because these countries have more experience with digital assets, it is more important to ensure the safety of online cryptocurrency users. Governments in colder countries use directives, such as …., while most countries use, “government-issued notices about the pitfalls of investing in the cryptocurrency markets.” 

Another important issue that has emerged is the energy usage required to mine cryptocurrencies. 

Because of the advanced technology and previous issues with cryptocurrency, agencies are starting to focus on regulatory intervention in the cryptocurrency network. The legal system's regulations should target the cases of cryptocurrency and outlying transactions rather than regulating the procedural level of cryptocurrency, such as codes and the technology. This future for cryptocurrency depends on leading the mandates of the regulation towards the middlemen, which can be enforced by the existing financial market participants and traditional gatekeepers such as banks, payment service providers and exchanges, as well as large and centralized node operators and miners.  This second check will ensure the safety of cryptocurrency. 

The future for the global economy relies on the digital world and its multiple facets. Cryptocurrency has become the greatest threat to the established financial system the world has ever seen and the most important new technology since the internet itself.

U.S. Policy Towards Saudi Arabia: The Up's and Down's

The United States’ (U.S.) policy towards Saudi Arabia restrains numerous determinants and interests. The U.S. considers the global market for oil, counterterrorism efforts, containing Iran, trade, and human rights when conducting policy towards the kingdom. The U.S.-Saudi relationship is significantly progressing as both countries share a number of interests in the Middle East. 

The U.S. trade in goods with Saudi Arabia has been steady since 1990. At that point in time, U.S. exports were $4 billion and imports were $10 billion, while in 2010, exports were $11.5 billion and imports were $31.4 billion. In 2019, exports so far have amounted to $8.9 billion and imports to $9.8 billion. Over the years there has been a pattern established where the total value of imports exceeds that of exports. The U.S. imports hydrocarbons from Saudi Arabia, which is a crucial component of petroleum and natural gas, making it essential for U.S. energy needs. The U.S. then exports weapons, machinery, and vehicles to Saudi Arabia. 

Historically, the U.S. was dependent on oil from Saudi Arabia. However, the U.S supply of oil has changed. As of now, the U.S. is the top oil producer and the largest consumer of crude oil and petroleum products, surpassing Russia and Saudi Arabia in the production of crude oil. The U.S. has numerous reserves with various natural resources, including crude oil. As a result of technological advancement in oil extraction, U.S. oil production is expected to increase even more in the future. Though the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) continues to be the largest oil producer, non-OPEC countries such as the U.S. and Canada will contribute significantly to the growth of world oil supply. Despite this, Saudi Arabia is still an important player in the world market for oil.  As a key member of OPEC, Saudi Arabia is able to coordinate with other OPEC members in order to control oil prices through the manipulation of the oil supply. As a "swing producer," Saudi Arabia is able to influence the world market quickly and independently with its spare oil capacity.

Saudi Arabia is more important to U.S. interests because of its capacity to change the world price of oil than as an oil exporter. Even though the U.S. is a top exporter of oil, it is still dependent on the world price of oil as part of the global market. If Saudi Arabia increases its supply, the world price of oil would fall, which would harm U.S. oil producers. For example, if the U.S. imposed restrictions on imports of Saudi oil, U.S. oil refineries would experience a shortage, as Saudi Arabia imports an estimated five million barrels a day to the U.S. While the five million barrels Saudi Arabia imports is significant, the U.S. is in a position to replace that with oil imports from Canada or domestically produced crude oil. However, the cost to U.S. oil producers from a Saudi-led price drop would be considerably more detrimental to U.S. economic interests. 

Because Saudi Arabia plays a major role in controlling the global oil market, U.S.-Saudi policy should be governed by collaborating on the world price of oil rather than focusing on imports and exports. As top exporters, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia could collaborate to meet increasing oil demands from emerging economies. According to the World Bank, as developing nations' economies grow, their demand for fuel and consumer goods that are dependent on crude oil will also increase. This allows the U.S. to prioritize energy independence without weakening relations with Saudi Arabia. In the long run, policy focused on cooperating with Saudi Arabia on regulating the global oil market would benefit U.S. economic interests. 

U.S. energy policy extends beyond oil to nuclear energy within Saudi Arabia. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which represented their willingness to cooperate on nuclear activities in medicine, industry, and electricity production. In 2018, Secretary of Energy Rick Perry and Minister of Energy, Industry, and Mineral Resources Khalid al Falih discussed the potential for civil nuclear engagement, including new technology sharing. In 2019, the Trump Administration stated that it would share its nuclear technology if Saudi Arabia agreed to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections. The U.S. must be especially wary of Saudi attempts to develop nuclear weapons considering escalating tensions with Iran in the aftermath of the crumbling Iran Nuclear Deal. However, if the U.S. pushes too hard for the enrichment and reprocessing restrictions, several U.S. Administration officials and nuclear advocates have argued that Saudi Arabia would search for nuclear cooperation with Russia or China. Therefore, the U.S. is constrained in its ability to push for IAEA inspections, which puts them in a difficult position since inspections are essential for nuclear security. It is necessary for the Trump Administration to demand IAEA inspections, as a nuclear conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran would be incredibly detrimental to U.S. national security. 

There have been a number of security-related events that have positively and negatively affected the U.S.-Saudi relationship. Shortly after the Cold War, the Gulf War that lasted from 1990 to 1991 strengthened U.S.-Saudi cooperation after half a million U.S. troops were deployed to Saudi Arabia in order to push back Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. At the same time, Salafi jihadism was spreading in Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia. For political reasons, Saudi Arabia suppressed the internal Salafi opposition but did not react to transnational Salafi jihadism. Saudi Arabia did not want to have a conversation about Salafism domestically seeing as it was ideologically similar to jihad and Wahhabism, an ideology central to Saudi government institutions. U.S.-Saudi relations then worsened after Al-Qaeda bombed the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and conducted the September 2001 (9/11) attacks. Saudi Arabia denied any connection to Osama Bin Laden including financial connections to Al Qaeda. Saudi Arabia additionally viewed the U.S. negatively after the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.

Despite these events negatively affecting the U.S.-Saudi relationship, they have partnered together in counterterrorism efforts. For example, Al-Qaeda campaigned against the Saudi Arabian regime and conducted terrorist attacks there in 2003. After Saudi Arabia condemned Al-Qaeda following the 2003 terrorist attack, the U.S. cooperated with the kingdom in intelligence sharing and eliminating financial sources to jihadist groups. Like the U.S., Saudi Arabia views Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaeda's affiliates, ISIS, and Salafist-jihadist groups as a threat to Saudi national security. The U.S. believes that Saudi Arabia has improved its counterterrorism efforts since the 9/11 attacks, and it has been more involved in cooperative initiatives. For example, Saudi Arabia co-chairs the Counter-ISIL Finance Group of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS, and since 2014, Saudi Arabia has prevented Saudis to travel abroad to support terrorist groups. In 2017, Saudi officials stated that they plan to contribute to stabilization efforts in Syria and get involved with Iraqi leaders. U.S.-Saudi relations also continued to cooperate because they have a shared interest in containing Iran, as it remains both a threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East and a rival power of Saudi Arabia. 

It is necessary to examine the policies that continue the counterterrorism alliance between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. because they face similar threats from common enemies. The U.S. benefits from having a counterterrorism partner in the Middle East, especially from a wealthy nation that has significant political influence over Arab states. The U.S. should ally with Saudi Arabia to contain Iran, especially because of the current high tensions between the three actors. U.S. and Iran tensions have recently escalated after potential military attacks and an Iranian shootdown of a U.S. drone over the Strait of Hormuz. If the U.S. were to get into a military confrontation with Iran, it is in U.S. national interest to cooperate with Saudi Arabia, where it could access Saudi air space and bases for troops. Thomas Lippman, Adjunct Scholar at the Middle East Institute, claims that Saudi Arabia is not crucial for U.S. security interests because its military capabilities are limited. The U.S. holds naval headquarters in Bahrain, maintains a large airbase in Qatar, and has troops in Kuwait and Djibouti, among many other areas. He claims that the U.S. should go by an "issue-by-issue basis" with Saudi Arabia, rather than maintaining a close partnership. I disagree with this point; even though the U.S. has strategic military bases in numerous areas in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia is still an important asset for intelligence sharing, and using it for additional military space would be an added benefit of partnering with them.

Though Saudi Arabia has limited military capacity, the U.S. conducts arms sales and training and service support to strengthen the Saudi military. For example, there is the United States Military Training Mission (USMTM) in Saudi Arabia and the Saudi Arabian National Guard Modernization Program (PM-SANG), which supervises U.S. defense cooperation with Saudi Arabia. In May 2017, President Trump indicated that the U.S. would continue strengthening bilateral defense cooperation with Saudi Arabia through arms sales. In 2019, Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Hale went to Saudi Arabia to meet with the Saudi Deputy Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman Al Saud and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Adel al-Jubeir. Secretary Hale emphasized the strong U.S.-Saudi partnership and shared interests in working with other regional partners to contain Iran's influence over the Middle East, as well as promote security and stability.

Encouraging dialogue between Saudi Arabia and Qatar is also in the U.S.’s security interests. Saudi Arabia has had a rocky relationship with Qatar for over twenty years as they have been concerned over Qatar's ties with Iran, in which Qatar provides natural gas reserves. In 2017, Saudi Arabia cut diplomatic relations with Qatar, closed its land borders, air space, and waters to Qatari vessels, and disallowed Saudi nationals from visiting Qatar, as well as demanded Qatari nationals to leave Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia had claimed that Qatar supported terrorism, interfered with the domestic affairs of other Arab countries, and supported Iran's push to destabilize Saudi Arabia.

This is of significant concern to U.S. security interests in the Middle East. The U.S. has close defense cooperation, including in arms sales, with both Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Because the U.S. has major facilities in Qatar, it is in the national interest to attempt to fix Saudi Arabia's relationship with Qatar, as this broken relationship is unsuitable for U.S. security interests. If the two states went into military conflict, the U.S. would be in a difficult situation because it has defense cooperation with both countries. Picking sides would further the conflict and severe one or the other relationship.

Another current event pertaining to U.S. security and human rights interests in Saudi Arabia is the Yemen Civil War. The Trump and Obama Administrations have diplomatically supported Saudi Arabia's attempts to reintegrate the Hadi government, and have also provided logistical and intelligence support to their military operations. The Saudi-led coalition has contributed to Yemen civilian casualties, a humanitarian disaster, a blockage on the flow of goods and humanitarian aid to Yemen, the empowerment of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, and Iranian support for the Houthis. Following a Saudi airstrike that killed numerous children in 2018, Lieutenant General Michael Garrett went to Saudi Arabia to pressure the government to investigate this accident. The Saudi-led coalition found that the accident violated the coalition's rules and recommended that it comes with punishment. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo additionally stated to Congress that authorities from both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are taking action in preventing the danger imposed on Yemeni civilians and infrastructure. 

U.S. arms sales and military support to the Saudi-led coalition have sparked debate within U.S. Congress. Proposed foreign military and commercial arms sales aligning with the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) have been criticized by several Congress Members because Saudi Arabia has been using them for airstrikes in Yemen, which violates international humanitarian law. Congress has also attempted to investigate an instance where an exception was made under the AECA, allowing the Trump administration to continue selling weapons to Saudi Arabia without a required congressional review period. Those critical of the arms sales argue that the U.S. should instead share more advanced U.S. technology and increase training and intelligence support to the Saudi air force. Other members offered for the implementation of conditions for the Department of Defense activities and U.S. support for the coalition. Another proposed solution is for President Trump to withdraw U.S. military forces from Yemen missions. Numerous members proposed to require more oversight reporting on U.S. activities, disallow deployment of U.S. military personnel or U.S. funds to be used for specific goals in Yemen, and prohibit sales of a specific type of weapon to Saudi Arabia. On the other end of the debate, several members argue that U.S. support lessens Yemen civilian casualties by encouraging more human rights.

The U.S. is in a difficult position in the Yemen conflict. On one hand, both U.S. officials and Saudi Arabia have concerns about the Houthi movement due to its ties with Iran. Houthi forces additionally operate cross-border attacks to Saudi Arabia, which also threatens American citizens there. Both countries are concerned about armed threats from Al-Qaeda and Islamic State supporters in Yemen. Despite these concerns, there have been civilian casualties, mass displacement, and infrastructure damage caused by Saudi intervention using U.S. weapons. 

There should be a sense of compromise to this debate. The U.S. should not discontinue arms sales to Saudi Arabia. If Saudi Arabia does not purchase U.S. arms, it will seek out other partners such as Russia and China. Russia and China would be less likely to have human rights concerns in Yemen and would not make any effort to hold the Saudi-led coalition accountable for its actions. However, the U.S. could terminate the sale of a specific type of weapon used in Saudi airstrikes. That way, it is a stronger signal to the Saudis that they should be careful of where they target. It is additionally important to not single out Saudi Arabia and claim that they are committing all of the humanitarian violations in the conflict. The Houthis and Iran are equally responsible. Therefore, it would not be tangible to simply discontinue arms sales to Saudi Arabia, because it would imply that Saudi Arabia is not there to bring a political solution to the issue. On the diplomatic side, the U.S. should continue encouraging a United Nations negotiated resolution that incorporates the GCC transition document which was signed and agreed to in 2011. 

Aside from Yemen, Saudi Arabia has a low record of domestic human rights as well. The Kingdom is run by Islamic sharia law, which does not allow freedom of expression, press, religion, or association, and political parties are prohibited as they are seen as going against the Kingdom. Saudi Arabia gives death sentences to crimes committed by minors and uses torture to interrogate alleged criminals and force confessions out of them. The government also unlawfully interferes with the privacy of families and homes. The government decides which media content can be public in order to maintain internal security and prevent chaos or division. Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi journalist who lived abroad in "self-exile," was murdered by government agents in Istanbul, Turkey. In 2016, Saudi authorities banned Khashoggi from writing, appearing on television, and going to conferences because he had made critical statements about Saudi government officials. Per the U.S. State Department's 2018 report on human rights in Saudi Arabia, human rights activists were detained and later released but warned not to use social media for their activism or reach out to foreign diplomats, international human rights organizations, and travel outside the country. The use of torture has also been employed against detained human rights activists, including women who fought for the right to drive.

Dana Stroul, a former senior professional staff member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, states that human rights in Saudi Arabia can progress with the U.S. simply encouraging change. While the U.S. does not have a say in how to run another government, their assistance can help promote long-term change. For example, the Two Holy Mosques Scholarship Program admits 50,000 Saudi students each year to attend U.S. universities, which provides them an American-style education. These students go back home with ideas they have learned through this education. Though this is a catalyst for long-term change, it is better than telling Saudi Arabia what it should and shouldn't do. If there were a situation that went against U.S. interests, U.S. policy should be direct and question Saudi Arabia's actions. For example, the U.S. should condemn and outright state that it believes that Saudi imprisoned civil-rights activists should be let out. Additionally, the U.S. must be more forward with holding Saudi Arabia accountable for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. Overall, it is better to maintain positive relations with Saudi Arabia to encourage human rights, because if the U.S. severs its economic, military, and strategic relations, then Saudi Arabia would turn towards powers such as China and Russia, which would not have much interest in encouraging respect for human rights. 

After discussing U.S. policy and interests in Saudi Arabia, it is reasonable to argue that the U.S. should continue keeping Saudi Arabia as a close security partner in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia has the potential of being an even stronger U.S. ally in counterterrorism efforts and containment of Iran because it is a wealthy and influential nation in the region. In regards to human rights, there is a more likely chance that Saudi Arabia would cooperate with the U.S. rather than other powers, which may not consider the issue. Lastly, it is important to maintain economic relations with Saudi Arabia for the world market for oil and to take advantage of emerging economies in the long run. Though there are disagreements and a difference in views between the two nations, there are more benefits than disadvantages in their relationship.

Nationwide Internet Blackout Showcases Iran’s Increasing Digital Authoritarianism, Inefficacy of Trump’s ‘Maximum Pressure’ Campaign

In what has become an increasingly common theme across the world, citizens took to the streets last month to protest price hikes ordered by a conservative national government, in this case, that of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Just like their counterparts in Chile and Lebanon, Iranians demonstrated principally in response to economic austerity measures, but they also indicated broader distrust toward government rule; “We will reclaim our rights but not be oppressed,” Iranians chanted in Ahwaz, a city of over one million near the Iraqi border. Dissimilar to manifestations elsewhere, however, was the manner in which the Iranian regime responded; on November 17th, just two days after the protests had begun, Iran’s central government shut down internet access for virtually all of its 80 million inhabitants.

The nationwide blackout marked a substantial development in Iranian domestic cyber suppression technology, as well as its willingness to use it. Iran’s development and heightened aggression forms part of worldwide trend toward ‘digital authoritarianism,’ a loosely defined term that refers to the censorship and surveillance of a population by a government via its cyber capabilities as a means of political control. From Africa to Asia, several states have harnessed the power of budding technology–not to advance the interests of their people, but to dominate them. With its unprecedented attack on its own citizens, Iran joins these ranks.

The Rise of Digital Authoritarianism

Digital authoritarianism is loosely defined as the censorship and surveillance of a population by a government via its cyber capabilities as a means of political control. A 2011 study, among the earliest on the subject, observes that the global rise of information technology (IT) over the latter half of the 20th century sparked hope that liberal democracies would flourish; the logic goes that authoritarian regimes, rendered incapable of suppressing dissent, would go extinct. Clearly, this has not been the case; not unlike interstate cyberwarfare, the IT revolution only offered a new theater of competition in which intrastate opponents –the state and its dissidents– engage.

Unlike interstate cyberwarfare –in which sabotage of financial and government institutions provides perpetrators with diplomatic leverage– censorship plays a central role, as dissent alone can jeopardize a state’s grasp on society. In the absence of robust government cyber capabilities, domestic-based dissidents can communicate freely, allowing them to plan rebellious-natured activity; by blocking messaging apps like Telegram and WhatsApp, states stifle protests and coordinated attacks on security targets. Furthermore, censorship is among the least offensive weapons in the repertoire of state oppression, so states choose it to avoid condemnation from trading partners and other members of the international community relevant to their interests. Fredrik Erixon and Hosuk Lee-Makiyama, the authors of the 2011 study, also make note of the “wide net” authoritarian regimes cast when they perceive a viable threat to their power; targets of censorship may “range from telecommunication and broadcasting networks to infrastructure and simpler conveyors of information.” In short, censorship in cyberspace can be a low-cost, high-efficacy means for authoritarian regimes to maintain political control.

China as the Digitally Authoritarian Superpower

Cyber specialists and political analysts widely agree that the first and most egregious perpetrator of digital authoritarianism was China. Erixon and Lee-Makiyama posit that China is “increasingly reshaping” the internet’s “usage, regulation, and role in society,” underscoring its influence on other authoritarian states’ domestic cyber policy. In 2013, researchers analyzed Chinese online censorship practices, concluding that the state allows “even vitriolic” criticism of the state but snuffs out any move toward social mobilization, evidence of the state’s sinister desire to maintain a semblance of freedom while safeguarding its centralized political structure. Adrian Zenz, whose research centers primarily on China's ongoing ethnic cleansing of the Uyghurs, more recently warned of Chinese facial recognition technology and identification scanners outside of mosques and churches, in addition to an algorithmic “social credit system” that “could result in a nationwide apartheid-like system.” 

China’s domestic cyber policy has far-reaching effects; some have argued that depreciating costs for cyber censorship and surveillance as a result of rapid advances in artificial intelligence will only make digital authoritarianism more appealing for anocratic states, and those already headed down the autocratic path –like Iran– will be extremely difficult to influence for the better.

Origins of Iran’s ‘Halal’ Internet

Iran’s 2009 ‘Green Movement,’ which saw thousands of citizens take to the streets of Tehran in defiance of the government, is not only significant in itself –demonstrations were among the largest since the 1979 revolution– but in relation to the development of Iranian domestic cyber policy as well. The flurry of protest videos and photographs posted to social media prompted Western observers to refer to the movement as the “Twitter revolution,” and although the impact of networking sites on the protests’ proliferation is contested, the international media hubbub induced the Iranian government to ban Twitter and Facebook. A decided shift toward cyber authoritarianism soon followed.

Writing for Wired, Lily Hay Newman notes that historically autocratic countries like China and Russia “architected their internet infrastructure from the start with government control in mind.” Iran did not, but since the Green Revolution a decade ago, it has sought to centralize its national internet by “retrofitting traditional private and decentralized networks with cooperation agreements, technical implants, or a combination.” The result is an increasingly closed, easy-to-police network known as SHOMA. Jon Gambrell, the Associated Press’ lead reporter on Iran, refers to SHOMA as ‘halal’ internet, a reference to Islamic law. “It is essentially a net neutrality supporter’s nightmare: The network has some 500 government-approved national websites that stream content far faster than those based abroad, which are intentionally slow,” Gambrell reported in 2018. “Search results also are gamed within the network, allowing the government to censor what users find.”

What’s Next? The U.S. ‘Maximum Pressure’ Campaign and Iranian Domestic Repression

SHOMA’s highly-centralized structure enabled November’s nationwide blackout, which then served as a shroud for the arrests of thousands and murders of at least 200. Previously, the Iranian state had been either unwilling or incapable of disabling internet access for its 80 million people; protests at the start of 2018 resulted in the blocking of popular mobile messaging applications, but nothing occurred on the scale of a countrywide blackout.

Iran’s move toward digital authoritarianism may have been inevitable, as the country has long shown little compunction in cracking down on its citizens. President Donald Trump’s ‘maximum pressure’ campaign, however, has only accelerated this trend; in its 2018 withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Trump Administration reinstated crippling economic sanctions on the Iranian government, which eventually led to the recent fuel hikes and widespread civil unrest.

President Trump would probably tell you his plan is working –indeed, he tweeted solidarity with the protestors in early December and lamented the Iranian government’s violent response– but in actuality, the demonstrations are unlikely to unseat the present regime or influence it toward more responsible behavior. The administration’s aggressive policy only serves to score political points at home by creating a self-fulfilling prophecy; in other words, the crackdowns serve as justification for current policy, not a consequence of them. President Trump can present himself as a defender of human rights and a courageous commander-in-chief – all the while, common Iranian citizens suffer heavy-handed oppression, on the streets as much as in cyberspace.

What's Next? A Recap of Israel's Elections and What Lies Ahead

 It is unlikely, but not impossible, that Israel will return for the third round of elections this year, with the most likely outcome being a unity government with power-sharing between Blue and White and Likud, with Yisrael Beytenu leader Avigdor Liberman maintaining a senior cabinet position. It remains to be seen whether Blue and White leader Benny Gantz will give up his opposition to splitting the premiership while Likud Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is under indictment, or whether Likud will buck Netanyahu as the head of their party in order to form a government.  

On October 24, 2019, it was announced that Netanyahu and Gantz will meet in the near future to discuss the possibility of forming a unity government. After Netanyahu’s failure to form a coalition, President Reuven Rivlin has tasked Gantz with doing so. Blue and White has said that Gantz has spoken with each of the leaders of the various factions elected to the Knesset. Likud confirmed there would be a meeting between Gantz and Netanyahu, but Netanyahu would be negotiating on behalf of the bloc of right-wing and religious parties loyal to him and stressed he would not enter a coalition without those 55 members behind him. Blue and White previously rejected this negotiation. 

The Knesset is Israel’s unicameral parliament which is made up of 120 lawmakers. The prime minister is the coalition leader of the Knesset, generally the head of the party with the greatest number of seats. In an election, voters vote for a party rather than individual candidates, with seats in the Knesset apportioned according to the percentage of votes each party receives in the election. After the election, a coalition government must be formed by the elected representatives in the Knesset. A ruling coalition generally must have at least 61 members to ensure a majority of the 120 seats, though it is possible to form a “minority government” with less than 61 seats, provided opposition parties approve the coalition from the outside. 

The president of Israel formally asks whichever party leader he or she feels is most likely to be successful in forming a government to attempt to form a governing coalition. Since no party has ever achieved a 61-vote majority on its own, they have always relied on other parties to join the coalition. Following the September 17th election, President Rivlin gave Netanyahu the first mandate to form a government, which lasted 28 days and ended on October 21st when Netanyahu returned the mandate, having failed to form a coalition. 

The 22nd Knesset was elected on September 17th, 2019 and features nine political parties, represented by 120 members of Parliament. There are three main political groupings: Blue and White, Likud, and Orthodox parties. Blue and White, with 33 seats, is a newly formed party led by formed Israel Defense Force (IDF) Chief of Staff Benny Gantz, a political neophyte who ran on a centrist platform primarily against perceived corruption by Netanyahu and his government. Gantz pledged on the campaign trail that he would not form a government with Netanyahu, who will soon face indictment on several alleged corruption cases. Next is Likud with 31 seats. Likud is Prime Minister Netanyahu’s party and is the largest right-wing party in Israel. The party remains committed to keeping Netanyahu in office despite the pending indictments. Finally, there are 17 seats held by two primary Orthodox parties: Shas and United Torah Judaism (UTJ). Shas has previously joined coalitions led by Likud, supporting Netanyahu in the elections. The party has no stance on a two-state solution, and they lean right on other social issues. On the other hand, UTJ is a non-Zionist faction which does not endorse the creation of a secular Jewish state, but which supported Netanyahu in the elections.

Additionally, there are also other factions playing a role in the elections. Joint List, with 13 seats, is a unified ticket of four major Israeli Arab parties that have become the third-largest faction of the Knesset. There is the communist party Hadash, the secular Arab interest party Ta’al, the conservative Islamist United Arab List, and the nationalist Balad party. Then there are Left-wing Zionist parties with 11 total seats. The Israeli political left is represented by the Labor-Gesher and the Democratic Camp, two smaller parties who adhere to leftist domestic and foreign policies but also embrace Zionism as opposed to the Joint List which is generally anti-Zionist and made up of majority Arab-Israeli parties. There is also Yamina with seven seats, which is a united list of right-wing parties who are in support of Netanyahu, and Yisrael Beiteinu with 8 seats. Yisrael Beiteinu is the right-wing political party led by Liberman that was founded to represent the concern of Israel’s million-plus Russian-speaking immigrant community. The party is a proponent of Lieberman’s plan to achieve a two-state solution, which calls for Israel to annex large parts of the West Bank in Israel that are predominantly Arab.

To summarize all of the competing parties, the Israel Policy Forum groups them into three blocs. The first is the pro-Netanyahu bloc, which is a united front of right-wing and ultra-Orthodox parties that has 55 total seats. The second bloc is comprised of a group of centrist, left-wing Zionist and Arab political parties that oppose Netanyahu with a total of 57 seats. The last bloc is Yisrael Beiteinu who controls eight seats and whose secularist leader Liberman has pledged not to sit in a coalition that includes either the religious parties or the Arab ones. In all, there are four potential outcomes to the elections: a unity government (Gantz, Netanyahu, Liberman); a unity government minus Netanyahu (with Gantz, Gideon Saar, Liberman); a Minority government with Gantz, Liberman, and Arab parties in minority, or a bloc of the left and religious parties. 

A unity government between Kachol Lavan (33 seats), Likud (32 seats), and Yisrael Beiteinu (eight seats) would total 73 seats. This would require compromises from both Likud and Kachol Lavan. Netanyahu and Likud would be required to cede control over the right-wing “bloc,” the smaller parties the prime minister is currently negotiating on behalf of. There is also President Rivlin’s proposal, which calls for a rotating premiership, something Kachol Lavan adamantly opposed on the campaign trail. Mr. Netanyahu would serve as prime minister first, but if charged, he would declare himself incapacitated while he sorted out his legal troubles. Mr. Gantz would then serve as acting prime minister with full powers. Finally, there is Liberman’s plan, which is somewhat like Rivlin's proposal. Like Rivlin, Liberman calls for a rotating premiership between Netanyahu and Gantz. However, Liberman’s plan would also require Netanyahu to back out of an agreement with the religious right-wing bloc. These parties (Shas, United Torah Judaism, and the Ayelet Shaked-led Yamina alliance) could only join the government later based on agreements that the three parties will have to reach amongst themselves. As a part of his plan, Liberman also hopes for this unity government to focus on two key issues. First, he wishes to reach an agreement with Likud and Kahol Lavan to pass a law that would force ultra-Orthodox yeshiva students to draft into the military and nix a law that would keep supermarkets close on Shabbat. Second, Lieberman wants the parties to discuss minimizing budgets, raising taxes and finding a permanent solution for the situation in the Gaza Strip. 

For a unity government without Netanyahu, there would be Gantz, Gideon Saar, and Liberman. Theoretically, Likud could have joined a unity government without Netanyahu and with Kachol Lavan.  However, the party supported the prime minister’s push for new elections instead. Likud MKs like Gideon Saar and Michal Shir, perceived as critical of Netanyahu, ultimately voted in favor of dissolving the Knesset and moving to new elections. 

Gantz could form a minority government with Liberman and Arab parties in the minority. Likud said in its campaign that both Liberman and Joint List chairman Ayman Odeh had spoken about recommending Gantz as prime minister. However, a government that includes both those parties, which despise each other, seems impossible. Liberman has said he won’t join a coalition with the Arab parties, and most factions within the Joint List reacted with outrage to Odeh’s comment about possible political cooperation with Gantz. Gantz has the option of forming a minority government with outside support from the Arab parties — a course advocated by Democratic Camp’s Ehud Barak — but neither side would be thrilled with that arrangement and the resulting government would be on extremely shaky ground. 

A coalition government between the Left and Religious blocs is unlikely, but at this point could very well be possible. The question remains what would it take to get the left-wing bloc without the Arab parties, but concessions to get the orthodox parties onboard? One option could be for the ultra-Orthodox parties to join Gantz, Labor-Gesher and the Democratic Camp. Similar center-left governments with the Haredi parties existed in Israel decades ago, but Shas and United Torah Judaism (UTJ) have in recent decades become automatic supporters of Likud. UTJ already declared it stood by Likud “all the way.” Another problem is that as it stands, those parties seem to add up to a very narrow majority — not a recipe for a stable coalition.  

Israel is returning for the third round of elections, signaling a second failure by Netanyahu to form a government, as well as a failure by Gantz in his first test as a political leader. The responsibility to form a unity government shifted to Gantz and he had 28 days to do so. The 28 days passed and no coalition was formed, so a third election is the last resort. If Gantz couldn’t form a government within his allotted time, the president also had the option to hand the task to Parliament, giving lawmakers an additional 21 days to come up with a candidate who can command a majority. Many thought this was the more likely option, as no one desired another election. Netanyahu was also reliant on the fact that the public and political pressure to avoid a third election would have persuaded the half-dozen additional lawmakers, whose support he needed, to come to his side. 

Israel could have avoided the third round of elections if any of the major parties dropped their necessary conditions for an agreement: Likud’s retention of Netanyahu as head of the party, Gantz’s refusal to share the premiership with Netanyahu under indictment, and Liberman’s refusal to serve with the Arab parties. As a dual kingmaker and spoiler, Lieberman will likely prevail with his demands.  

The early polls for the third Israeli election in the span of a year, scheduled for March 2, 2020, predict another inconclusive result: that is, neither the Center-Left-Arab bloc (to the extent that such a thing actually exists) nor the Right-Religious bloc, minus Avigdor Liberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu party, are expected to win a majority in the Knesset. Likud and Kachol Lavan are still in a horse race with the latter having a slight edge. There will be nearly three months of campaigning, which can always make a difference, but if the election were held today the needle would barely move.

Israeli politics should not be where it is today. The second election was an unnecessary embarrassment, brought on by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s refusal to play by the same rules applied to his immediate predecessor, Ehud Olmert, and the prospect of a third vote is out-and-out shameful for the very same reason: think what you will of Kachol Lavan’s inconsistent and muddled negotiating strategy, it is Netanyahu’s insistence on serving as prime minister through at least the early stages of an indictment while requesting the Knesset grant him immunity, that has prevented a new coalition from being formed. Gantz has a slight advantage in the blame game, but the anger that may erupt with the dissolution of the twenty-second Knesset (perhaps exacerbated by President Reuven Rivlin’s intervention, in which he blamed both sides equally) can turn on anyone in a volatile news cycle.

The Proliferation of Organized Crime Groups in Europe’s First “Narco-State”: A Look at Albania in the post-Cold War Era

“While organized crime is not a new phenomenon today, some governments find their authority besieged at home and their foreign policy interests imperiled abroad. Drug trafficking, links between drug traffickers and terrorists, smuggling of illegal aliens, massive financial and bank fraud, arms smuggling, potential involvement in the theft and sale of nuclear material, political intimidation, and corruption all constitute a poisonous brew.”

James Woolsey, Former Director of the CIA

In the early twenty-first century, the international community adopted a policy of indifference towards the Balkan peninsula after the United States (U.S.) successfully commandeered NATO-led military interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo to prevent the escalation of a conflict that threatened to “taint the post-Cold War world.” However, as democratic backsliding and rising nationalist-populist parties threaten to reverse European integration efforts, stability in the Balkans is no longer guaranteed. While a large number of European countries are currently experiencing calls for secession, the Balkans face a greater, more established threat: transnational organized crime. These organized crime groups (OCGs) have been operating in the Balkans since the Yugoslav Wars, and they continue to threaten states’ efforts to democratize and stabilize. As the “hub” for organized crime in the region, the impact of these groups is especially visible in Albania, whose accession to the European Union (EU) has been halted due to the proliferation of organized crime and group ties to the country’s economic and political systems. However, the question remains as to what conditions have enabled Albania in particular, and not another Balkan state, to become the regional hub for organized crime groups and the illicit drug trade in the post-Cold War era?

It is critical to understand why the situation in Albania differs from the other Balkan countries that also host a number of OCGs. The factors of analysis that will be used to examine the reasons for this difference include Albania’s poor social and economic conditions, the magnitude of political corruption, and the country’s porous border as a result of their geographic location. In addition to analyzing these factors, this piece will also examine the implications of the proliferation of organized crime in Albania, particularly as they pertain to the country’s potential for acquiring EU membership, and as well as the overall impact on both the Balkans and contemporary Europe.

Historical Context

The Balkans and Organized Crime

Comprised of twelve countries, including the states that made up the former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and Greece, the Balkans lie at the crossroads between Europe and the Mediterranean Sea, essentially serving as a bridge between Europe and Asia. While economically beneficial, this geopolitical location also makes the Balkans extremely susceptible to transnational criminal activity. Following the demise of the Soviet Union, the Balkan states were left politically weak, with no real governmental structure left in place. These conditions, paired with a fractured economic system, made the Balkan peninsula vulnerable to transnational organized crime groups.

Historically, organized crime in the Balkans was facilitated by means of “Balkan routes” which ran primarily through Turkey, Greece, Italy, and Bulgaria. Through the use of these routes, transnational criminals were able to smuggle illegal drugs like heroin and marijuana, and now also cocaine and human beings, to other European countries such as Austria, Hungary, Poland, and Germany, among others. The outbreak of war in the Balkans in the 1990s increased smugglers’ use of these routes, as smuggling became a “survival strategy” for citizens who required basic supplies, as well as for groups like the Kosovo Liberation Army, who needed weapons and ammunition in order to fight. As a result of war-time smuggling, criminal profits made during the conflicts translated to political power in the post-war period. This led to corruption and the establishment of criminal structures in the Balkan countries’ political systems, such as the judiciary, the bureaucracy, and various state law enforcement agencies.

Albania as the “Hub” for OCGs

However, while transnational OCGs threaten the entirety of the Balkan countries, Albania is especially vulnerable to this type of clandestine criminal activity. Regarding the centralization of organized crime, Albania serves as the main hub, acting as both a “producer country” and as a “distribution node” for groups such as Hellbanianz. According to the U.S. Department of State’s 2018 Strategy for International Control of Narcotics, “Albania produces and exports a significant amount of marijuana [and] is a transit country for Afghan heroin and cocaine,” making it one of the fastest-growing threats in contemporary Europe. As the primary exporter of cannabis in the region, Albanian OCGs take advantage of the historical “Balkan routes” that were used by smugglers and ensure the safe transportation of their products by placing “Soldiers” and “Capos” along the route to ward off public inquiries. The U.S. State Department also describes Albania as home to “rampant corruption, weak legal and government institutions and weak border controls” where drug trafficking and smuggling are among the top sources of revenue.

Factors of Analysis

Poor Social and Economic Conditions

Albania’s economy has experienced significant growth since the end of the Cold War. However, underlying social issues still prevent the country from achieving further economic success, the greatest being a lack of job opportunities. This can be attributed to the period between 1996-97 when the Albanian economy was besieged by a series of financial pyramid schemes. Despite enjoying success after transitioning to a market economy in the post-war period, Albania’s new economy was rudimentary and unstructured. This weak financial system enabled pyramid schemes to be carried out. A form of fraud, pyramid schemes are a way to make money based on the recruitment of investors, who are drawn in with the promise of high returns. The more investors involved, the more levels reached in the “pyramid” until eventually there are no more investors, profits are lost, and the system is rendered unsustainable. 

In Albania, the proliferation of these schemes was detrimental to social and economic growth. Once schemes began to collapse, riots ensued as an estimated 800,000 individuals lost their money, leading to the acquisition of approximately $13.3 million in illegal proceeds. While knowledge about the true nature of pyramid schemes later reached the masses and people became more careful about where they invested their money, the impact of these schemes in the late 1990s set the stage for financial failure in an economic system that had a weak foundation. 

The legacy of these pyramid schemes enables the success of OCGs in modern-day Albania because they are often cited as the reason for the lack of employment opportunities, which OCGs then use as an argument to draw people in to commit criminal acts as an alternative means to make money. Compared to the greater Euro Area, where unemployment rests at 7.5 percent as of October 2019, Albania has an extremely high national unemployment rate, recorded at 12 percent in December 2019, and an even higher youth unemployment rate, which averaged out at 20.9 percent in the second quarter of 2019. The country’s unemployment rates, paired with an aging population and high levels of emigration to Greece and Italy, help contribute to the phenomenon known as “brain drain,” which occurs when highly-trained or intelligent people leave their home country in search of better opportunities and a life outside of widespread poverty. This is where the impact produced by OCGs is the greatest, as these groups flourish in fragile states where post-conflict conditions ensure weak governance, poverty, and inequality. Albanian nationals who are living in poverty and are unable to find jobs are drawn to the idea of making fast cash through the illicit drug trade, which only serves to further the success of OCGs and perpetuate their existence in society.

Political Corruption

Coined “Europe’s first narco-state,” which the International Monetary Fund defines as a state “where all legitimate institutions become penetrated by the power and wealth of the illegal drug trade,” political corruption is key to the success of organized crime groups and the growth of the illicit drug trade in Albania. Corruption was rampant in the highest levels of government in the capital of Tirana under former Prime Minister Enver Hoxha until his death in 1985, and that trend persists today under Prime Minister Edi Rama, who, along with other government officials, is said to be in collusion with drug traffickers. According to the Independent Balkan News Agency, cocaine gangs such as the “Avdyli group” successfully rigged Albanian elections in 2016 by engaging in vote-buying for the mayor of Durres, a major port city in the country. Additionally, allegations that ties between OCGs and government officials influenced 2017 parliamentary elections in Albania were verified in a three-year-long study, which found that 20.7 percent of Albanians were offered favors in exchange for their vote. In Albania, which is said to be the most corrupt Balkan state by the Corruption Perceptions Index, the best way to secure people’s votes is by paying them in the cash that is generated by the drug trade. This enhances the level of top-down corruption that occurs in the public sector, of which drugs and OCGs play a participatory role, and allows Albanian government officials to perpetuate unorthodox practices. Rudina Hajdari, a member of the Assembly of the Republic of Albania, summarizes the issue in Albania:

“Young Albanians feel angry and cheated by the government. We have seismic, mind-blowing problems with corruption. When drugs came into the picture, so much cash was flowing that it actually shook the national currency. Money dictates our country’s decisions, and as that money is provided by drug cartels-to individual politicians, and to all political parties-anyone fighting corruption hits big hurdles.”

This exchange of dirty money for votes helps to ensure job stability of politicians who wish to remain in office and perpetuate the cycle of corruption from which they are benefitting. Saimir Tahiri, former interior minister under Prime Minister Rama, resigned in May 2018 amid investigations into his culpability regarding drug trafficking charges and accusations of corruption, of which he was later found guilty of abuse of office. As interior minister, Tahiri was responsible for the conduct of elections. A corrupt official in this position is detrimental to Albanian politics, as elections are more susceptible to the demands and desires of the politician in charge rather than to the votes of the people. The implications for Albania’s democratic government are therefore greater if this corruption and criminal association between politicians and OCGs have infected the rest of the political system.

The effects of this systemic interaction between corruption and OCGs are seen by Albania’s slow progress towards attaining EU membership. Serbia, another Balkan state that yearns to join the EU, is also facing halted progress due to corruption and poor human rights practices. If Serbia, who is ranked as being less corrupt than Albania, cannot be accepted into the EU without intense negotiations, then Albania’s chances of becoming a member in the near future are slim. While Tirana has made impressive progress towards eradicating organized crime and was granted candidate status in June 2014, the influence of OCGs and the illicit drug trade are still prevalent in many areas of the country. 

The overall rampant corruption and lack of government stability highlight the degree to which the illicit drug trade, through which OCGs operate, is intertwined with Albania’s democratic system. The high level of government corruption not only hinders Albania’s ability to adequately address the ingrained nature of OCGs, but it also impedes the country’s efforts to join the EU, membership that could improve their international standing as well as boost their economy. With an upcoming presidential election in 2022, continued reports of criminal groups infiltrating the government to gain political power do not bode well for Albania, the country’s EU ambitions, nor the rest of the Balkans.

Ideal Geographic Location

Externally, Albania’s unique geographical position at the crossroads between eastern and western Europe enables OCGs to take advantage of both the country’s land and maritime borders to facilitate the transportation of drugs to the rest of the Balkans and greater Europe. Located in the Western Balkans, Albania shares a land border with Montenegro, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Greece, and Italy, and a maritime border with the Adriatic Sea. While other Balkan states such as Croatia and Bosnia also have access to the Adriatic Sea, the sea is heavy utilized by criminal groups in Italy who allegedly have ties to OCGs in Albania in particular and are either bringing drugs to them or picking drugs up. As a narcotics hub, Albanian OCGs have also formed connections with other organizations in Latin America, Central Asia, and Western Europe as a result of easy access routes. These connections allow Albanian OCGs to operate successfully and continue to challenge both Italian and Turkish traffickers even when maritime operations run by local law enforcement attempt to stop them. 

Internally, Albanian OCGs have a strong presence in the port cities of Durres and Vlore where a majority of business occurs and there is established financial infrastructure. The locations of these cities, along the western coastline of the Adriatic Sea, help contribute greatly to smuggling efforts. In February 2018, Albanian law enforcement seized 613 kilograms of cocaine that was concealed in a shipment of bananas headed to Durres from Colombia, a market value of $219.96 million. The use of these port cities as stops in a longer distribution line that connects countries and continents highlights the global reach of these OCGs and the interconnectedness of their relationships with one another. Albania’s particular location makes it an ideal location distribution-wise and source-wise for many OCGs given the wide range of options that can be taken to disseminate the product, whether that be drugs or human beings, to other areas of the world.

Conclusion: Lessons for the Balkans and the EU

Albania’s role as the epicenter of organized crime, and subsequently the illicit drug trade in the region, is a problem pertinent to both the Balkans and the entirety of Europe. Currently, the EU is in the midst of another wave of enlargement, of which it hopes to integrate the remaining Balkan countries in a controversial move according to current member states. Infamously known as the “Colombia of Europe” due to the prevalence of drugs and organized crime in society, Albania’s weak economic system and high level of political corruption, which are aided by their strategic geopolitical location, make it extremely susceptible to the influence of OCGs and makes it even more difficult for them to acquire EU membership. While Albania has made significant progress towards internal reformation, including partnering with the EU to strengthen judicial cooperation and destroying cannabis farms, Albanian OCGs have simply evolved and adapted their methods in response to government actions. This is visible in a report disseminated by the U.S. Department of State, of which the agency concluded that “The Government of Albania made no significant progress toward thwarting money laundering and financial crimes in 2018” despite substantial efforts, and the country still remains extremely vulnerable to money laundering due to corruption and OCGs.

However, the biggest takeaway regarding the proliferation of OCGs in Albania regards what their behavior means for the rest of Europe. While organized crime is not exclusive to Albania and the Balkans, Albania’s existence as the regional “hub” for organized crime and their role as a facilitator for the transnational drug trade should be of great concern to the Albanian government, the Balkans, greater Europe, and even the West. The willingness and ability of Albanian OCGs to successfully cooperate with rival criminal groups in Latin America, Central Asia, and Western Europe demonstrate the scope of the problem, as the desire for profit-making now exceeds the groups’ feelings of rivalry and competition. The global reach of these groups is shared by other OCGs in Europe, which can impede institutional efforts to better the community, a problem that the EU is facing amidst the Brexit debacle and upcoming Parliamentary elections.

Going forward, Albania should keep working on internal structural reform despite the amount of time it will take to fully eradicate the problem. In this case, organized crime groups will continue to pervade every element of society within Albania unless the government amps up its efforts to fight corruption, prevent the perpetuation of unorthodox practice, and boost the economy by investing more in other countries and exporting more products to create more employment opportunities. By engaging more with other regional economies, Albania’s own economy could experience growth and prosper, which would help improve the lives of the country’s impoverished citizens and deter them from joining these OCGs in the first place.

Irish and British Relations post-Brexit

When former Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson succeeded Theresa May as British Prime Minister in July of 2019, his first commitment to the House of Commons was to fulfill the October 31st Brexit deadline regardless if there was a deal or not. Four months later, instead of this promise being met, British Parliament has until January 31, 2020 to agree upon a deal that will be approved by the European Union (EU). While members of Parliament still hold contention regarding proposed provisions in Johnson’s revised Brexit deal, a subject in both May’s and Johnson’s plan that has held constant significance is the role of the Republic of Ireland and the counties in Northern Ireland that are a part of the United Kingdom. 

The long history between the three regions that lead to the thirty-year period of political turmoil known as “The Troubles” resulted in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. Although this tension can date back to the 12th century, the major key players of these tensions were the nationalist and unionist parties. A significant point in the history of the two feuding parties was the Government or Ireland Act implemented shortly after the Irish War of Independence. This act allowed Northern Ireland to operate as a self-governing region that was a part of the United Kingdom and not the Republic of Ireland. 

The divide between the two opposing groups was also visible in the political parties that dominated the political landscape of Northern Ireland. More specifically, the Ulster Unionist Party, a political party that was mostly comprised of Protestants,  instilled different measures to ensure that local political power would remain within the party. Some of these measures included gerrymandering and discrimination against the nationalist individuals. The individuals that were discriminated against attempted demonstrations fighting for equal rights, which quickly escalated by bringing  different military forces into the picture in an attempt to try and stabilize the situation. The presence of three different military forces, the Irish Republican Army, the Irish National Liberation Army, and British Army within the conflict zones of the border only deteriorated the issues regarding  injustice interments and shootings. 

After almost 30 years of political turmoil between these two areas in Ireland, a peace agreement was reached in 1998 which declared the northern counties of Ireland to be a part of the United Kingdom unless there was a majority vote to reunify the two areas. All of the provisions written into the agreement primarily established an equitable government that would prevent things such as gerrymandering from occurring and created institutions that work to foster peace and cooperation between Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, and Great Britain. 

The specific provisions of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement allowed for Northern Ireland to remain a part of the United Kingdom and coexist peacefully with the rest of the public. The agreement has four main pillars which politically establishes the rule of law for Northern Ireland and how for the northern counties interact with each other. The four main pillars are the following; devolution, power-sharing, designation, and a three-strand approach to dealing with peace and cooperation. Although there are other provisions enumerated within the agreement, all of them address  the central theme of peace where the government of Northern Ireland will constitute a power-sharing system. This means that  there are two ministers, one from each of the dominating political parties. In addition to top officials needing to identify with a specific political party, all members of parliament must identify with some political to ensure equality. This is another rule to ensure that all members of parliament remove any form of policy that could disenfranchise a group of individuals. 

Additionally, another important provision worth mentioning is the demilitarization of the border towns of the northern counties such as Londonderry/Derry. Heavy militarization occurred within these towns between all military fronts. Finally, the last two significant provisions of the Good Friday Agreement centralized on creating institutions which foster cooperation among the feuding regions. Institutions such as the British-Irish Council and the British Irish Intergovernmental Conference are just some of the institutions that were created from the agreement to ensure there is cooperation between all three parties. 

With both Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland being members of the European Union, there is no border or border checks  between the Republic of Ireland and northern counties that are a part of the United Kingdom. As members of the European Union, the benefits stretched beyond economic and political integration. In terms of the Irish and Northern Ireland conflict, EU membership indirectly promoted cooperation between the two regions. One way the benefits of both areas being a part of the EU is reflected through the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The lack of distinctive border between the two regions allows for goods and services to be easily transported. To place this into perspective, the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, a border that was once highly militarized, is now a soft border that has no militarization but instead, a simple sign which states that you are either entering or leaving a specific area. The lack of a border allowed for the process of reconciliation and peace to go at an accelerated pace. Economically, the lack of a border has lead to economic integration and benefits. The lack border has allowed for trade, businesses and labor to move very freely between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Much of the progress made, however, could be destroyed under new provisions put forth by Johnson in his proposed Brexit deal.

With the likelihood of a deal being reached by the extended deadline of January 31, 2020, provisions regarding the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland will jeopardize both the political cooperation between Ireland and Northern Ireland but the economic relations between Great Britain, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. In the original Brexit deal created by May, there would be no barrier between Northern Ireland and the Republic. This lack of any form of border allowed Great Britain to have a very close relations with the republic of Ireland without the supervision of the European Union. In Johnson’s edition of the Brexit plan, a customs and regulatory border would be established between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, which means that goods from Great Britain entering Northern Ireland would be subjected to EU import taxes. Overall, provisions within the new Brexit deal do not fully take into account significant provisions that were made in the Good Friday Agreement.

Policy Recommendations

In order to maintain the peace that was built between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, there should be increased conversation between three general players: the British Parliament, the Northern Ireland Parliament and the Republic of Ireland. When considering the thoughts of any amendment to the new plan, having the voice of both Northern Ireland and Irish ministers present within these meetings will ensure that the values behind the Good Friday Agreement are upheld and not jeopardize. It is crucial for the voice of both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland to be present because if not the alternative possibilities which undermine the  Good Friday Agreement could destroy the decades of work for Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland to be cooperating under one island. 

The Battle Over Language Policy in Russia and Former Soviet Republics

The role and rights of minority languages around the world is part of a growing area of human rights law. Article 4, Section 3 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities argues that “States should take appropriate measures so that, whenever possible, persons belonging to minorities may have adequate opportunities to learn their mother tongue or to have instruction in their mother tongue”. Russia is one battleground for minority linguistic rights. In the various semi-autonomous republics inside of Russia, the changing environment for minority language education has brought up issues of autonomy from the federal government of Russia and the central government's growing influence within the semi-autonomous region. In the independent former Soviet republics, the pushback against the Russian language reflects fears of “Russification” while establishing their language as a bellwether for national identity. Latvia provides a notable example of this, where, while taking different stances, their concerns over identity, linguistic rights, and Russia’s more aggressive approach to cultural influence beyond its borders create parallels. Going forward, language and other cultural elements are set to become more important to minorities as Russia’s semi-autonomous republics see autonomy as more than political, and countries on Russia’s border become more concerned about their own sovereignty through Russia’s soft power tactics. 

There are over 35 languages other than Russian recognized as official languages in Russia. These are the languages of the various republics inside Russia. The republics are able to declare their own official language, institute their own form of government and formulate independent policy that secure these republics' autonomy and preserve their unique ethnic identities.  However, this policy of relative autonomy has come under assault in recent years. In 2018, Russia passed a law that limited the amount of time per week that classroom time could be dedicated to minority languages. Furthermore, the 2018 language law made all language instructions optional except for Russian. Public reception has been mixed, with those inside the autonomous ethnic republics seeing the state’s push to further Russian identity as a threat to their own. Ethnic Udmurt sociologist Albert Razin committed self-immolation in protest over the new language law, quoting Soviet poet Rasul Gamzatov with a sign saying ““If tomorrow my language will be forgotten, I am ready to die today.” This brought the issue to national prominence, with many Udmurts and other ethnic minorities supporting Razin’s cause, and Kremlin advisor Valery Tishkov continuing to argue for Russian language superiority. The law has also brought up broader issues of ethnic identity, the importance of autonomous republics, and how language interacts with the local and national politics affected by this law. For example, a lawsuit filed in Tatarstan regarding the claimants unwillingness to learn Tatar, instead preferring Russian on identity-based terms, was rejected. However, in an interview with TRT World, a seventeen-year old from Dagestan argued that “This law is a threat to this linguistic diversity” and that the law “put limits on our education and deprive[s] us of studying our own language.” This shows a divide inside the ethnic autonomous republics, between those who prefer to learn and study the language of their ethnic group, and those who are willing to assimilate into the broader Russian identity. The Council of Europe noted that “The greater emphasis on the Russian language and the uniform approach to educational reform have weakened the position of minority languages ​​in the education system” and advocated for education that is bilingual/multilingual, and greater involvement of minorities in affairs related to their cultures and cultural autonomies. 

In Latvia, recent legislation doubled the amount of Latvian-taught classes in minority Russian schools to 80 percent of classes. Latvia has a sizeable Russian minority population, and Russia has made efforts to re-engage them with the Russian state and further emphasize Russian identity within the population. Russia’s OSCE envoy, Alexander Lukashevich called plans to increase Latvian language usage in classrooms a“discriminatory policy with the goal of forced assimilation of the Russian-speaking population.” Furthermore,previous legislation reducing Russian language education has set the stage for a potential domestic divide in Latvia’s “two-community society.”

Russian minority political parties, in Latvia,  have framed this as a human rights issue, similar to the arguments of the ethnic minorities facing linguistic repression inside Russia.For example, European Parliament MP Tatjana Zdanoka called on the European Commission to further protect linguistic minorities, using the Lisbon Treaty to argue that countries “who act[s] against the rights of persons belonging to minorities (including linguistic rights) act[s] against the core values of the European Union.” In 2018, three different UN Special Rapporteurs expressed concern on the pushes to “Latvianize” the Latvian education system. They referred to Articles 19 and 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, along with other international human rights documents, to express their concern over possible legal and human rights violations targeting the Russian minority population. The Latvian government has justified their actions by focusing on broader issues of national identity and societal harmony. The most recent Education Law was brought up to the Latvian Constitutional Court, where the Court stated that “every person living in Latvia should be able to understand the Latvian language to participate fully in the life of a democratic society” and that “the state must support the preservation and development of the individuality of ethnic minorities within the framework of a unified education system, promoting the development of the identity of a common democratic society.”

Additionally, school autonomy is a right that schools inside the Russian republics have enjoyed for years, but has been threatened in recent years. Latvian schools for Russian minority students have also seen this threatened through educational policies over the last 15 years. Beginning in 1992, the Latvian government has ordered Latvian to be the primary language in all levels of education. This has varied over time, with new laws ranging from Latvian-only education in public education, to loosened guidelines after protests in 2004 which led to minority high schools teaching up to 40 percent of their curriculum in a minority language. One primary argument that proponents of minority language education use is that the education system’s Latvianization would “cause irreparable damage to national minority schools” due to rising inequality as a result of less allocated resources. Russkiy Mir, a Kremlin-backed organization promoting the Russian language, paralleled their situation in Latvia to the ongoing situation in Ukraine, arguing that it is a violation of human rights and “very disturbing that in the Baltic republic, Russophobia is becoming more and more intense, and the authorities act according to the same scenario as Kiev, where the ruling regime purposefully destroys everything Russian.”

The Latvian government, however, has justified their actions by focusing on the need for a stronger national identity in order to prevent internal strife between the two main ethnic communities as fears of Russian influence become more prevalent. International observers have continued to voice concern, and have generally gone against the stance of the Latvian government and its justification for the increasingly restrictive policies. In Freedom House’s 2019 Freedom of the World Report, Latvia’s score on academic freedom went down one point, with the organization noting the reason for the demotion being the most recent education policy changes, saying that “the measures [are] generally viewed as targeting Russian-language instruction”. Allowing these linguistic divisions and restrictions to continue inside Russia, while simultaneously criticizing similar practices by neighboring countries and former Soviet states, is hypocritical on the part of the Russian government. While calling on European human rights bodies to show concern on Latvian policies is valid, ignoring their own policies of linguistic repression makes their argument much more questionable.

The various laws outlined above show a clear desire by Russia to use the Russian language as a first step towards establishing influence inside the country’s various semi-autonomous republics that have, since the beginning of the Soviet Union, preserved their ethnic identity and culture through their separation from the larger Russian state. Latvia, on the other hand, seeks to affirm official national identity based upon the language of the ethnic majority in the state, at the expense of their Russian minority. The criticism of policies and practices that limit the freedom for linguistic minorities to use their mother tongue should not be selective. The protection of their language in day-to-day usage, education and official recognition is a right enshrined by the United Nations, and cannot be twisted for nationalist pursuits. Russia has echoed concerns of human rights observers to restrictive language policies against Russian minorities in Latvia and Ukraine, but has echoed the same rhetoric of maintaining a single, unified national identity across a linguistically diverse population. Doing so has put minority languages under threat, and must be seen as a threat to personal rights of minority populations. As both Russia and Latvia continue their push towards identity formation through nationwide language policies in education and the public sphere, we must continue to frame and shame any policies that threaten one's ability to communicate and learn their native language, and promote ways to balance cultural and linguistic diversity in all areas of society.