Ukraine: Voting Under Martial Law

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Ukraine’s parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, has voted to keep the country in a state of martial law. The initial decree, issued by Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on February 24, 2022, had dictated that all national and regional authorities must come together to ensure the defense and public safety of all of Ukraine. The Law on the Legal Regime of Martial Law (passed in 2015) regulated temporary restrictions of the constitutional rights and freedoms of both individuals and legal entities. Additionally, all citizens of Ukraine aged 18-60 eligible for military service have been liable to be called to serve, as regulated by general mobilization. For Ukrainian citizens in their daily lives, martial law has meant restricted freedom of movement, banning public demonstrations, stricter ID checks, and an enforceable curfew. Additionally, the government can “use the capacities and workforce resources of public and private enterprises for defense needs,” including controlling public media.

The continued enactment of martial law may complicate Ukrainian elections next year. During the entire course of Russia’s invasion, Ukraine’s head of state has remained the same. President Zelenskyy was elected to serve a five-year term in 2019 and would be up for reelection in March during the 2024 cycle. In early September 2023, while the question of elections being held was still up in the air, President Zelenskyy stated that he was “ready for the elections,” but he stipulated, “I mean, we’re ready if it is necessary” — noting the challenges accompanying a wartime vote. Under martial law, elections are currently suspended, meaning Ukraine would not need to hold presidential elections in 2024. However, until early November, the question remained of whether the elections would occur. In a November 6th address, President Zelenskyy cleared the uncertainty, saying it is “not the right time” for elections in Ukraine. He continued with a message of unity, telling listeners, “We must realize that now is the time of defense, the time of the battle that determines the fate of the state and people, not the time of manipulations.”

Zelenskyy’s message touched on the difficulties of holding elections during wartime. Free and fair elections require a significant effort and devotion of time on the part of the government. For Ukraine to hold an election now would present considerable challenges for the entire country. But what should be prioritized? Even in a time of war, do democratic elections take ultimate precedence? Does holding elections protect individual rights, or does it make the entire country vulnerable? If so, should overall safety supersede personal freedom?

An election during wartime is a familiar concept to many parts of the world. For instance, the 1944 United States presidential elections took place in the throes of WWII. They ran relatively smoothly, with incumbent candidate Franklin Delano Roosevelt securing the victory. However, in 2023 Ukraine faces a vastly different situation than 1944 United States. Consider that WWII was fought primarily on European soil, and the United States was part of an alliance; it was not fighting on home soil by itself like Ukraine. So, while wartime elections are not unprecedented, Ukraine’s situation is relatively novel, which makes it challenging to seek guidance through historical comparisons.

Another complicating factor is that Ukrainians can be conscripted for service at any time. According to martial law, all males between 18 and 60 are considered liable for military service. Although many of those who are eligible for service have volunteered, Ukraine faces a troop shortage, and mobilization is a matter of survival for the country. Mandatory service adds a deeper layer of complication to a situation where elections are not being held. When individuals are called to serve a country but do not have adequate voting representation in that country, it presents serious qualms about the state of democracy. And in these times, a decision must be made – does safety come before freedom?

Understanding the impact elections have during wartime is essential to recognizing how war often prevents the full exercise of democracy. Elections are another measurable loss the people of Ukraine have suffered since Russia’s full-scale invasion. And they make a peaceful resolution of the war all the more necessary.

How I Learned to Stop Worrying about the Bomb

In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, many scholars last year wrote about the ramifications that the war would have on international security. Among the concerns was the distress about the potential impacts that the war would have on the nuclear nonproliferation regime. In their article for Foreign Policy (published in March of last year), Andreas Umland and Hugo von Essen, analysts at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, argue that the war in Ukraine will cause middle power states to derive three main lessons. First, nuclear weapons remain a powerful source of power in the international system. Second, if you are a state with nuclear weapons, it is foolish to relinquish said weapons. Third, treaties, alliances, and the like cannot be trusted as a means of ensuring security. In this article, I aim to expand the discussion via addressing and disputing these claims. I argue that even though middle power states may recognize that nuclear weapons are a powerful tool, they’ll still refrain from acquiring them and instead make use of other methods (such as international agreements), either willingly or by the coercion of a great power, to quash their security concerns.

Umland and von Essen argue that states with nuclear weapons or aspirations to acquire such weapons will perceive the invasion as proof that nuclear weapons are essential to their security. They argue that states will see Ukraine’s past efforts to denuclearize as foolish, as they eliminated the deterrence effect that was preventing a Russian invasion. Because of this, they conclude that non-nuclear weapons states are likely to rush to obtain nuclear weapons before their regional adversaries, and that nuclear weapons states are unlikely to agree to disarmament measures in the future.

I disagree with the notion that states will take away that Ukraine was invaded because it denuclearized. To start, Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons 30 years before the invasion. Assuming Umland and von Essen are right in their claim that the decisive factor determining whether Russia decided to invade the former Soviet state was its possession of nuclear weapons, then it seems illogical that they would wait so long to launch an invasion. Instead, I would argue that there is another factor that has more explanatory power regarding Russia’s behavior: Ukraine’s position relative to the West. Simply put, it seems as though the more Ukraine has panned towards the West, the more aggressive Russia’s behavior has become.

In February 2014, after Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych rejected a proposal to increase cooperation with the European Union in favor of expanding ties with Russia, large-scale protests erupted across the country, culminating in the ousting of Yanukovych on February 22nd.  As the reality became increasingly clear to Russian elites that their attempts at influencing Ukraine were facing staunch resistance from the populace, they responded by launching an invasion of Crimea, a region in southern Ukraine. Russia’s response then was motivated primarily by the fear of a Ukraine that aligns itself more towards the West and away from Russia. This factor remains prevalent in their decision calculus today, as it likely undergirded the decision to launch a full-scale invasion in February of last year, a decision that coincided with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s goal of Ukrainian integration with the EU and NATO by 2024.

Additionally, an important caveat I’ll add to Umland and von Essen’s argument is that, while the weapons were on Ukrainian soil, Ukraine didn’t have control over the weapons, which limits the ability of the weapons to act as a deterrent. For a nuclear weapon to act as a deterrent that changes the behavior of other actors, there must be a credible threat that the state would use it in the face of a provocation, a condition that cannot be meet if a state is unable to use them, whether initiated in a conflict or otherwise. Regardless, while the weapons nonetheless influenced Russia’s decision to invade, I disagree with Umland and von Essen’s analysis that states will believe their presence (or lack thereof) was the single most decisive factor behind the invasion. 

Instead of focusing on their nuclear weapons, I would argue that states will recognize that Ukraine was not part of a regional alliance, such as NATO or the European Union, with a guarantee to protect its members in the face of encroachment or invasion. This development will compel states to strengthen bilateral relations with a great power, realizing that it is a much more efficient and effective means of ensuring security than pursuing a nuclear weapon, as states can enjoy the same benefit of security without the costs of acquiring nuclear weapons. 

To clarify, I think that Ukraine was in a unique situation, in which a country’s pursuit of a network of alliances prompted an aggressive response from another. Russian President Vladimir Putin has long sought after Ukraine, a former Soviet state that he argues is “ethnically Russian” and should therefore reintegrated into Russia. Ukraine suffered from the illusion of choice: either pursue alliance commitments and aggravate Russia or don’t and risk fighting Russia alone in the event of an invasion. The lack of alliance commitments left Ukraine as a sitting duck in the event of Russian encroachment. Conversely, the shift towards the West to form alliance commitments angered Russia and accelerated any desire to invade. In this case, what Ukraine believed was in their self-interest clashed with what Russia believed was in their self-interest, which caused conflict.

In terms of the international reaction, this is where Umland, von Essen, and I agree: middle power states will look to avoid an instance in which a conflict emerges from their self-interest clashing with another state, and thus will look to bolster their security. Where we disagree, however, is in the methods by which these states will use. Umland and von Essen argue that other middle power states will interpret Russia’s attack as an indication of the necessity of nuclear weapons to ensure international security, whether it is to deter confrontations with regional adversaries or encroachments from great powers. While I won’t deny that middle power states will reconsider the power of nuclear weapons on the international stage in the wake of the war in Ukraine, I don’t think that sentiment will necessarily translate into them seeking a nuclear weapon of their own. Instead, I would argue that it provides a reason why they should enhance cooperation with their allies, especially great power allies, to achieve an enhanced sense of security.

Regarding treaties, Umland and von Essen argue that the war in Ukraine undermines the credibility of treaties to prevent non-proliferation, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and leaves middle power states with little incentive to abide by treaties writ large, given the willingness of great powers (such as Russia) to completely disregard them. However, it seems as though the opposite is happening. Instead of abandoning treaties, assurances, and the like, middle powers have begun to (and will likely continue to) cling to them, recognizing that their livelihood may depend on the security provided by a great power. 

Consider the increase in cooperation between Taiwan and the US in the past year, as evidenced by high-profile meetings, for example. Taiwan, a state that many would argue is a likely candidate for an amphibious invasion in the coming years from its neighbor China, is reaffirming the importance of its relationship with the United States. Former Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan and current Speaker Kevin McCarthy’s meeting with president Tsai Ing-Wen have signaled to China that the US’ commitment to Taiwan remains stronger than ever. These visits are rooted in a Taiwanese desire for security, as enhanced cooperation is an indication that the US recognizes the vital role Taiwan plays in advancing its national interests. This recognition is informally hinting towards a willingness by the US to defend Taiwan in the event of a conflict, thus deterring a Chinese invasion without involving the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Based on Umland and von Essen’s analysis, one would expect Taiwan, as a middle power, to pursue nuclear weapons to resolve their security qualms. Instead, they’ve taken steps to fortify their relationship with the United States, leveraging their relations with a great power to hedge back against China. 

Additionally, even if states decide that it is in their best interest to pursue a nuclear weapon, international actors will intervene to prevent this desire from translating into concrete action. China has played a key role in preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, because (among other reasons) they recognize that any such effort would be seen as aggressive by its adversaries in the region, namely Israel and Saudi Arabia, and set off a regional arms race. China cannot afford such an outcome, as they benefit immensely from stability in the region, as it ensures they can continue to trade extensively with both Saudi Arabia and Iran. As a result, they have a unique incentive to step in to prevent any actions that would jeopardize access to those markets, which, much to their dismay, means no bomb for Iran.

Regardless of whether this is an instance of a middle power reaching out to a great power to ensure its security (without the pursuit of nuclear weapons) or a great power reaching out to a middle power to provide security (to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons), or something in between, the result remains the same: no nuclear proliferation by the middle power.

Umland and von Essen’s fears that the war in Ukraine will collapse the non-proliferation regime are overblown. The war in Ukraine has done little to fundamentally change the costs and benefits of pursuing a nuclear weapon as a means of addressing security concerns, meaning that states will opt to pursue treaties and other agreements. These declarations allow countries to achieve the same security without the international backlash associated with developing a nuclear weapons program. Additionally, while the NPT in its current state may have lost credibility, any residual loss will be supplemented by the intervention of state actors. The interest of great powers to cap the proliferation of nuclear weapons (and their accompanying destabilizing effect on regional and international security) will ultimately continue to prevent any remaining desire by states to pursue nuclear weapons from materializing. 

A Deliberate Strategy

Introduction

On February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine, violating the UN Charter and creating the largest threat to European unity and security since World War Two. While the threat to European security is undeniable, the threat posed to international humanitarian law is equally alarming. In the year since the invasion, more than 8,000 civilians have been killed and 8 million Ukrainians have become refugees. As the war continues and Russia retreats from regions it once occupied, evidence of possible violations of international law is being discovered. 

While media coverage in the West has focused on alleged violations committed by Russia, that does not mean Ukraine is innocent. In the eyes of the law, Russia and Ukraine are equal and they are held to the same standards. Any breach of those standards, even once, cannot and should not be tolerated because any potential violation that is not investigated or prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law risks being repeated, either in Ukraine or elsewhere by states who watch how this war is being conducted and think they can do the same. Understanding the various alleged violations of international law that have been committed by both sides since the war began is critical if we are to not repeat them and if there is to be any measure of justice once this war is over. There are people still alive today who remember the horrors of World War Two, who remember what this world was like without the Geneva Conventions to regulate the conduct of war. 

History of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Tensions between Russia and Ukraine can be traced back to 2004 and the Orange Revolution. The revolution began in November 2004 after the second-round results of the presidential election proclaimed Viktor Yanukovych the winner, despite exit polls showing opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko in the lead. The elections were marked by widespread voter fraud and corruption in favor of Yanukovych, the Kremlin’s candidate. Russian election monitors had “validated” the results of the run-off and proclaimed Yanukovych the winner. However, the Supreme Court of Ukraine annulled the results of the first run-off and ordered a repeat of the vote in December. Yushchenko won comfortably, much to the chagrin of people in eastern and southern Ukraine, as well as Russia. Yushchenko’s victory was a setback for Russia’s plans to keep Ukraine within its sphere of influence. However, Russia got its way in 2010 when Yanukovych became president after Yushchenko’s term was riddled with infighting and he failed to integrate Ukraine with the West.

Yanukovych’s presidency did not last long before he was ousted during the Euromaidan Revolution in 2013 when protests erupted across Ukraine after he rejected a deal that would have led to greater economic integration with the EU. The protests spread across the country and Yanukovych fled to Russia in February 2014. A month later, Russia annexed Crimea, citing a duty to protect the rights and lives of ethnic Russians, who comprise a majority of the Crimean population. Not long after the annexation, separatist groups in Luhansk and Donetsk in eastern Ukraine declared independence from Ukraine. Russia supported the separatist groups in the war against the Ukrainian military, with some reports suggesting that Russian soldiers had crossed the border and were fighting alongside the separatists and that some shelling had come from inside Russia. 

In 2015, Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany began negotiating the Minsk Accords, with “provisions for a ceasefire, withdrawal of heavy weaponry, and full Ukrainian control of the regions.” However, the agreement and ceasefire collapsed, and fighting resumed. In October 2021, Russia began substantially building up its troop presence on the Ukrainian border, with over 100,000 troops stationed there by the end of the year. In early February 2022, Russia deployed troops to its border with Belarus, surrounding Ukraine from the north, east, and south. Finally, on February 24, 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and the war has only deteriorated: more than 71,000 alleged war crimes are being investigated by the Ukrainian authorities. 

International Law

After World War Two, the international community agreed that the conduct of war needed to be regulated or the atrocities committed during that time would be repeated. The Geneva Conventions, which are the foundation of international humanitarian law (IHL), are a set of four treaties and three additional protocols that regulate how states can wage war. One of the innovations of the Geneva Conventions is the concept of grave breaches, which are the most serious breaches of the law of war. Grave breaches are unique in that they are only applicable in international armed conflicts (e.g., the current Russo-Ukrainian war). There are articles common throughout the four conventions (the Common Articles) that describe what a grave breach is. Articles 50 and 51 of the first and second conventions describe grave breaches as “wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body of health, and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.” Article 130 of the third convention includes the previous language, adding that “compelling a prisoner of war of the right of fair and regular trial prescribed in this Convention” is also a grave breach. Finally, Article 147 of the fourth convention, building on the three previous articles, includes “unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a protected person of the right of fair and regular trial” and the “taking of hostages.” Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions are legally and colloquially referred to as war crimes, which must be prosecuted by the High Contracting Parties. 

It is widely accepted that international human rights law (IHRL) is applicable during times of war and that principle has been affirmed by numerous international legal bodies. Even though states are technically allowed to derogate some of their responsibilities under IHRL, they are only allowed to do so “to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. The measures of derogation may not be inconsistent with the state’s other international obligations, such as those under IHL.” There are also certain human rights that are considered non-derogable, such as the right to life, the right to liberty and security, and freedom from torture and inhumane or degrading punishment. Crimes against humanity are the most serious breaches of international human rights law, including violations of non-derogable rights.

This is where international criminal law (ICL) becomes applicable. ICL applies to four broad sets of crimes: war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and the crime of aggression. These are the four crimes the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over, as outlined in the Rome Statute. The Rome Statute defines war crimes as both grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, as well as “other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict” such as intentionally targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure. The Rome Statute also has defined crimes against humanity as acts “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.” Examples of crimes against humanity include, but are not limited to, “murder, extermination, deportation or forcible transfer of population, imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty, torture, and rape, sexual slavery… and any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity.” Even though neither Russia nor Ukraine are state parties to the Rome Statute, war crimes and crimes against humanity committed on the territory of Ukraine are within the International Criminal Courts' jurisdiction because the situation was referred to the ICC by 43 state parties, and Ukraine lodged a declaration formally accepting the ICC's jurisdiction over crimes committed on the territory indefinitely.

Probable Violations of International Law

On October 18, the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine published a report detailing the findings of its investigation into events that occurred between February and March 2022 in the Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Sumy provinces of Ukraine. The Commission “has found reasonable grounds to conclude that an array of war crimes and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law have been committed in Ukraine since 24 February 2022.” Russian armed forces were responsible for the vast majority of war crimes and human rights violations. The Commission found that Russia most likely used explosive weapons indiscriminately in civilian areas, including indiscriminate attacks on residential buildings, schools, hospitals, and other buildings of non-military importance. Attacking civilian infrastructure not out of military necessity is a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions. Additionally, “The Commission found numerous cases in which Russian armed forces shot at civilians trying to flee to safety and obtain food or other necessities, which resulted in the killing or injury of the victims.” The Commission also found that “violations against personal integrity” were committed in the four provinces under Russian occupation. “These violations included summary executions, torture, ill-treatment, sexual and gender-based violence, unlawful confinement and detention in inhumane conditions, and forced deportations.” These are also grave breaches under the Geneva Conventions. Furthermore, the Commission found “a pattern of summary executions in areas temporarily occupied by Russian armed forces" including in Bucha, where over 400 people were executed during the month of Russian occupation. Many Ukrainian civilians were also illegally confined, tortured, and forcibly transferred to Russia. “Russian armed forces inflicted severe physical and mental pain and suffering upon the victims.” Sexual and gender-based violence was rampant with victims as young as 4 and as old as 83. Each of these crimes described by the Commission constitutes grave breaches under the Geneva Conventions and can be considered war crimes. 

Even though Russia is responsible for most of the violations of international law, Ukraine is not absolved of wrongdoing. The Commission also found evidence of war crimes committed by the Ukrainian armed forces. “The Commission has also documented two cases in which Ukrainian armed forces shot, wounded, and tortured captured soldiers of the Russian armed forces.” In the first case, between March 24 and March 26, Ukrainian soldiers deliberately shot three Russian prisoners of war while interrogating them. The second instance occurred on March 29 when a Ukrainian soldier shot an already wounded Russian soldier three times at close range. 

The Commission’s investigation was limited in scope. It only investigated violations of international law committed through March 2022. As more Russian forces began retreating, evidence of possible war crimes and other violations of international law have been reported. In September, the Ukrainian news agency, Ukrainska Pravda, reported that 447 bodies had been exhumed from a mass grave in Izium, Kharkiv Oblast. Most of the bodies are civilians and their exact causes of death will be investigated, although most show signs of violent death, and 30 showed evidence of torture. As stated above, attacking civilians is a war crime, and the evidence, in this case, speaks volumes, but it must be properly investigated for this to be definitively called a war crime. 

A Deliberate Strategy?

International law is clear, but it seems that every day the world discovers another possible war crime or another violation of human rights. This begs the question: why? Why violate the laws of war and international human rights law? The answer is different depending on which country you are asking about, even though the law is equally applied to both. "This equal application of IHL to both belligerents is particularly difficult to accept in the current situation, where Russia is the aggressor and therefore responsible for all human suffering in Ukraine, whether or not it results from violations of IHL and even when it is directly caused by Ukraine because even that would not have occurred if Ukraine had not to defend itself from the Russian invasion.” The answer to why Ukraine committed those two war crimes is very simple: self-defense. The extent to which committing war crimes is the best way to defend your country is questionable, but that is the reason. 

On the other hand, Russia appears to be violating international law as part of a deliberate strategy. In the months and days before the war, Vladimir Putin made a series of addresses to the nation. On July 12, 2021, Putin wrote an article titled “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” in which he wrote there is no historical basis for Ukrainian independence from Russia, that Ukraine is a product of historical Russia and as such owes its existence to Russia. In this article, Putin accused Ukraine of fratricide by forcing Russians to assimilate into Ukrainian culture to create an “ethnically pure Ukrainian state, aggressive towards Russia.” Ironically, Putin ends the article by stating “we respect the Ukrainian language and traditions. We respect Ukrainians’ desire to see their country free, safe, and prosperous,” but the only way to do that is by aligning itself with Russia.” 

Exactly eight months later, three days before the invasion, Putin addressed the nation, repeating the same sentiments on the historical unity of the two nations, and proclaiming that Ukraine “actually never had any stable traditions of real statehood.” On the day of the invasion, Putin's intention for Ukraine became clearer. He stated that Ukraine was perpetrating genocide against ethnic Russians. "The purpose of this operation is to protect people who… have been facing humiliation and genocide perpetrated by the Kyiv regime. To this end, we will seek to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine, as well as bring to trial those who perpetrated numerous bloody crimes against civilians, including against citizens of the Russian Federation.” Vladimir Putin’s thinly veiled eliminationist rhetoric is contrasted by the outright eliminationist rhetoric of Russian media pundits like Timofey Sergeytsev. At the beginning of the war, Sergeytsev called the Ukrainian masses “passive Nazis” and “accomplices of Nazism” and called for a “total lustration” of Nazis (i.e., the Ukrainian people and government). Sergeytsev, echoing Putin, wrote, “Ukraine, as history has shown, is impossible as a nation-state, and attempts to "build" one naturally lead to Nazism.” Any Russian citizen or soldier, reading these articles and listening to these speeches in the Russian state media echo chamber, would undoubtedly internalize this as the truth. Many Russians have: 74% support the military’s actions in Ukraine.

Russia has made it abundantly clear it does not recognize the existence of an independent Ukraine, going as far as saying that Ukraine is run by Nazis that need to be “liquidated.” To achieve this goal of demilitarizing and denazifying Ukraine, the Russian armed forces have been deliberately brutal towards civilians in the towns they occupied. For example, Germany’s foreign intelligence service, the BND, intercepted radio communications among Russian military personnel when they were north of Kyiv. One soldier said that they shot a person on a bicycle and another soldier said, “First you interrogate soldiers, then you shoot them.” Killing a civilian and prisoners of war are both violations of the Geneva Conventions.  Committing atrocities serves as a means to an end. By terrorizing civilians and committing gross violations of international law, Russia is trying to deter resistance and assert its dominance over the Ukrainian people. “Russia’s political goals in Ukraine lend themselves to violence against civilians, even more so after Moscow’s narrative shifted the motive for the war from liberating the Ukrainian population to cleansing it from “Nazi” elements.” Asserting control over the Ukrainian people can only be achieved by dehumanizing them to the point where they no longer have the will to fight back. 

Moving Forward

There is strong evidence both Russia and Ukraine have violated international law during this war. The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine found evidence of such violations, disproportionately committed by Russia. There is also evidence supporting that this is a deliberate strategy by Russia to assert control over the Ukrainian people. Atrocities do not happen in a vacuum, but when they happen, they must be documented and investigated with the utmost urgency and respect for the people harmed. There are currently numerous international and domestic investigations open, but investigations of this nature can take months, even years, to complete. The Commission of Inquiry needed seven months to investigate crimes committed in just one month. This war has lasted for over a year, so the world may not find out the extent of war crimes until long after the war has ended. This poses its own set of challenges. Witnesses could emigrate, evidence could be destroyed, and victims, who are severely traumatized, may need years before they can tell their stories. It is also highly improbable that Russia will cooperate with any investigation, seeing as it does recognize the authority of the International Criminal Court, nor does it recognize Ukraine as a sovereign nation. None of these challenges should deter the international community from investigating, documenting, indicting, and, hopefully, prosecuting these gross violations of international law. Europe has seen the ‘cleansing’ narrative before and it, along with the rest of the world, must set the precedent now that any crimes and violations of a similar nature in a similar context will be thoroughly investigated and prosecuted, lest they will be repeated.

Crumbs in the Breadbasket: A Global Food Crisis on the Horizon

In September 2022, Ukraine’s farmers began sowing winter wheat, rye, barley, and rapeseed with the echoes of Russian artillery and the smell of burning cities fresh in their minds. Many agricultural fields such as those in Ozera, Ukraine were cratered by rockets, flattened by tanks, and littered with the vestiges of war. Tractors started with no guarantee that Russia would respect Ukraine’s right to export grain from its Black Sea ports. Many of those who would be working in these fields were off fighting against the Russian military. Ukraine’s rich black soil and its seaports which give it access to international markets make the country a critical global agricultural exporter and is the reason why it is commonly referred to as “the breadbasket of Europe.” Unfortunately, Ukraine’s Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food anticipated the land dedicated to winter grain crops would decrease by up to 35 percent. The time and resources lost to Putin’s war not only threaten Europe’s food security but could cause a devastating disruption in global food distribution. The international community recognized this threat and has acted. In November 2022, Türkiye and the United Nations negotiated a deal to extend the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI), which assures Ukraine’s grain exports safe passage past Russian naval blockades, by 120 days. Although the BSGI took a critical step in staving off the worst consequences of a global food shortage, there is more to be done.

As the March expiration-date soon approaches, Russia has telegraphed that reupping the crucial deal will come with some foot-dragging. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Vershinin said during a February 13 interview that without the “real removal of sanctions restrictions on Russian agricultural exports,” the extension of the deal is “inappropriate.” However, this statement bends reality, because Western sanctions have not explicitly targeted Russian agricultural exports. Moscow has argued that blocks on its payments, logistics, and insurance industries are a “barrier” to the export of grains and fertilizers. The Kremlin seems to be using the threat of a global food crisis to further its own interests and weaken Ukraine’s economy.

Moscow is not too proud to hide its intentions. As a condition of the BSGI, joint teams from Ukraine, Russia, the United Nations, and Türkiye must inspect each ship to prevent the arrival or departure of unauthorized cargo and passengers. Ukrainian ship inspector Ruslan Sakhautdinov claims that his Russian counterparts systematically delay inspections by double and triple-checking fuel gages and scrutinizing crewmembers’ personal belongings. The practice has become routine and created serious backlogs. In October 2022, Istanbul’s typically beautiful sunrise on the Marmara Sea was littered with 165 cargo ships waiting for inspection. In January 2023, Ukraine exported 3.1 million tonnes of grain which fell far short of its 5 million tonne goal. In fact, the BSGI has not once met its goal since the deal was signed in August. October was the month that came closest to the target— when 194 ships were cleared for passage exporting 4.3 million tonnes of grain (compared to the 85 ships in January). October’s brief success was thanks to Moscow stepping away from the deal which in consequence allowed for the Ukrainian, U.N., and Turkish inspectors to work without the obstruction of their Russian colleagues.

One consequence is that, as the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service observed in January, “Ukraine farm prices remain low due to the increased stockpiles and decrease in export demand as some countries shifted to other suppliers.” Facing market volatility and lower expected returns, many of Ukraine’s wheat producers have made the calculation that it is in their best interest to plant fewer acres so that they aren’t stuck with silos of grain which can’t be sold. Russian farmers on the other hand have increased their grain production and exports since the war started. However, they don’t have the capacity to supplant Ukraine’s agricultural losses. Moscow has critically damaged Ukraine’s production capabilities and continues to undermine global food networks with threats to the BSGI.

Russia’s actions come as World Food Programme (WFP) boss David Beasley stressed at the Munich Security Conference that nonrenewal of the grain deal would be catastrophic for millions in Africa who are on the cusp of starvation. Beasley noted too that the initiative’s current grain flows have still not been sufficient for the needs of poorer countries that are reliant on regional exports.

Together, Ukraine and Russia constitute 12 percent of the global market share in calories. The most vulnerable countries to food shortages share some common characteristics. They typically (although not all applicable) are reliant on Ukrainian and Russian imports, are low-income, have active conflicts, and lack robust internal food distribution systems. Countries in the Middle East & North Africa (MENA), Central Asia, and Eastern Africa are most at-risk due to the Ukraine conflict. In the MENA region, Jordan, Yemen, Israel, and Lebanon are most vulnerable. Armenia (92 percent of its grain imports come from Ukraine and Russia), Azerbaijan, and Georgia are the most vulnerable Central Asian countries. In Eastern Africa, the countries with the highest reliance on Ukraine and Russian grain imports are Eritrea, Rwanda, Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, Kenya, Djibouti, Burundi, and Ethiopia.

The Brussels-based thinktank Bruegel in March 2022 following Russia’s invasion anticipated the global food implications of the conflict and forecasted three possible scenarios. In their worst-case scenario, Ukraine would need all of its grain for domestic consumption and exports fell 100 percent year-over-year. Thankfully this has not materialized and unless there is a dramatic turn in the war (possibly from Russian use of strategic nuclear warheads), this will scenario will remain a hypothetical. The second worst-case scenario would see Ukraine export half of its normal production. In the best-case scenario, Ukraine would export roughly 70 percent of its normal production. The current situation hovers in between the second-worst case and best-case scenarios. Although Ukraine exported 23.6 million tonnes of grain in the 2022/23 season (70.4% of its exports from the same stage the year prior), decreases in production will allow Ukraine to harvest only 51 million tonnes which is 59 percent of 2021 pre-war harvests.

High food prices also pose a danger to global food security. In the first stages of Russia’s War in Ukraine, food prices lept and the greatest costs were felt in low-income countries. For instance in August 2022, it cost Ayan Hassan Abdirahman— a mother of 11 children who lives in the capital of Somalia— twice as much as it did just months before to buy the wheat flour that she needs to prepare breakfasts. Increases in crude oil prices and disruption to Russian fertilizer exports have increased food production costs globally. These consequences are most visible in the ports of Brazil. The South American country is the 4th largest agricultural producer in the world and imports 85 percent of the fertilizer it requires— mostly from Russia. Sea ports across the country reached their maximum capacity due to growing stockpiles of imported fertilizer. Farmers were unable to purchase the products, delaying the sowing process, because the price of fertilizer became too expensive. In recent months, prices have decreased but are still roughly 150 percent more expensive than the 5-year average. The higher cost of production will result in higher food prices which would be unreachable from millions globally without international assistance.

WFP estimates that today 349 million people across 79 countries are facing acute food insecurity (which the Global Network Against Food Crises defines as when a person’s inability to consume food puts their life into immediate danger). This number rose nearly 200 million from pre-pandemic levels. 60 percent of the world’s malnourished populations live in areas affected by armed conflict which makes the successful delivery of food assistance more difficult. Food insecurity can be both begotten and beget violence with the notable examples of the 1789 French Revolution and the 2011 Arab Spring which were precipitated by historically-high food prices. Global food instability caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine would not only be a dramatic humanitarian catastrophe but could bring a massive destabilizing event to the world order.

Although the situation seems overwhelming, many policymakers and groups such as the Consortium of International Agricultural Research Centers (CGIAR) propose solutions to systematically reduce the risks and consequences of a global food crisis. CGIAR emphasizes the importance of reliable, real-time data analyses of food and input price volatility which can inform appropriate international and national policy responses. Governments must provide their farmers with targeted subsidies for productivity-enhancing inputs, machinery, fertilizer, and energy costs to increase yields in low and medium productivity environments. International assistance must be provided to low-income countries so that the higher costs of inputs is not passed onto consumers. Governments should invest in sustainable crops which require less water than wheat and barley and can better survive climate shocks such as quinoa and seaweed. However, not all policy responses are made equal and many government interventions could worsen the situation. Experts recommend that countries should avoid sanctions and export restrictions on food and fertilizer products and refrain from hoarding or panic buying input-products. This is not a crisis of anyone but Vladimir Putin’s making, yet it is incumbent upon the international community to make comprehensive policy solutions so that the world’s breadbasket can hold enough for everyone.

The Reports of the UN’s Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated

Disclaimer: The author is currently an intern for the United Nations within the Department of Peace Operations. This article was written by the author entirely in his personal capacity. The opinions expressed in this article are entirely the author's own and do not reflect the view of the Department of Peace Operations or the United Nations as a whole.

When Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24th, 2022 it was one of the most  geopolitically destabilizing events since the end of the Cold War. Every major international  organization and national government has been challenged and forced to re-evaluate its role in an  increasingly dangerous world. NATO has begun to add traditionally neutral Sweden and Finland  to bolster their eastern flank, while the European Union has organized severe sanctions against  Russia and temporarily resettled millions of Ukrainian refugees. No organization has perhaps  faced as much criticism as the UN. The popular perception that the UN has been impotent in  Ukraine and gridlocked elsewhere because of great power conflict couldn’t be further from the  truth. Despite the looming threat of a Russian veto, the UN has been able to help Ukraine as well  as conducting business as usual elsewhere. While there is room for improvement, this success  should be greater recognized. 

In the immediate aftermath of the invasion, the criticism of the UN was harsh. Russia, a  permanent member of the Security Council charged with upholding the UN Charter, had  blatantly violated the Charter with the UN wholly unable to prevent it. One observer described it  as an “extraordinary failure of the UN Security Council to live up to its primary responsibility to  maintain international peace and security.” Another said that there is “no better example of the  United Nations’ failure to live up to its founding ideal.” A third argued that the UN “became a  forum of superpower rivalry.” 

This has been accompanied by predictions that the UN will become increasingly  dysfunctional and unresponsive to international needs and calls for the UN to either be seriously  reformed or replaced entirely. Ukrainian President Zelenskyy has repeatedly called on the UN to  boot Russia from its permanent seat on the Security Council, and the UN general assembly has passed a resolution mandating they meet after a veto. This has been accompanied by more  outlandish proposals to disband the UN entirely and create a successor organization based  exclusively around democratic states. In the short term, there were grim predictions for UN  effectiveness. Seasoned UN observer Richard Gowan argued “the Security Council (is) facing a  period of increasing fragmentation and paralysis.”  

The UN, however, has been able to beat back these excessively pessimist predictions. In  Ukraine, the UN under Secretary-General António Guterres has been able to organize  humanitarian aid for Ukrainian civilians, mediate several key agreements that have helped  reduce the potential international impacts of the conflict, and galvanize international opinion against Russia in the UN General Assembly. Outside of Ukraine, Russia and the other great  powers have shown a remarkable ability to cooperate through the UN on other international  issues such as the Afghan crisis, despite massive disagreements over Ukraine. 

With regards to the Ukraine war, the UN and its various organs and agencies have proven  surprisingly able to reduce the conflict’s human suffering, despite the ever-present threat of a  Russian veto on their activities. While these efforts have so far been unable to end the conflict  entirely, they still show that the UN can provide value during a crisis. 

Guterres, has emerged as a key part of the shuttle diplomacy system that allows for  Russo-Ukrainian negotiations. For instance, he visited both Moscow and Kyiv in April in an  attempt to broker a ceasefire. While this effort failed, it positioned the Secretary-General so he  could negotiate two important agreements between the two states. First, he arranged for a UN-led  civilian evacuation mission from the besieged city of Mariupol. The UN and the Red Cross  would evacuate over 600 civilians on May 12th, only a few weeks after the Secretary-General's  visit. In July, the UN and the Turkish government would broker a deal that let several Russian and Ukrainian ports export wheat and other agricultural products to the rest of the world. While  the implementation of this deal has been at times shaky, the deal is critical. The war runs a  significant risk of sparking famine and high food prices in the Global South, due to a previous  inability to export grain from Russian and Ukrainian Black Sea ports. If this deal continues to  hold, the risk of mass famine and food instability will be minimized throughout the world. 

The UN has also been able to provide on the ground aid to those most affected by the  conflict, Ukrainian civilians. The UN’s various humanitarian aid services, including the World  Food Program (WFP) and World Health Organization (WHO) amongst others, have provided  basic services to over 11.5 million Ukrainians. The UN has provided over 250,000 children with  education, over 1.5 million with food, and over 8.5 million with medical care as of September  14th. This is despite the fact that the Russian government, which has frequently attacked  civilians over the course of the conflict, has significant influence on where and how the UN  operates as a result of the country’s permanent membership on the UNSC.  

Russia doesn’t, however, have veto power over the UN General Assembly. The General  Assembly, which doesn’t have the ability to make legally enforceable resolutions like the  Security Council, is still a key way to gauge international opinion. The general assembly acted  swiftly following Russia’s February invasion. The General Assembly took advantage of United  Nations General Assembly Resolution 377 (the “Uniting for Peace '' resolution), which lets the  general assembly begin an emergency session if the P5 fails to act on a matter of international  security. This was the first time that “Uniting for Peace '' was activated since 1997. The General  Assembly would pass General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1, which deplored Russia’s invasion  and demanded they withdraw their forces from Ukraine. The actual vote was a disaster for  Russia, with 141 states voting in support and only five opposed. This decisive vote left Russia isolated diplomatically, and empowered the US and EU to further support Ukraine and sanction  Russia safe in the knowledge that there would be little international backlash. While the UN has served a useful role within the Ukrainian conflict, its ability to manage  conflict outside of Ukraine is also notable. Despite the frequently espoused new era of great  power competition that has accompanied the Russian invasion, the UN has still been largely able  to maintain its prior ability to manage international security. 

Before the invasion, many international observers thought that Afghanistan would be the  UN’s most pressing issue of 2022. The Taliban victory has caused a massive humanitarian and  financial crisis throughout the country, the response to which has been constrained by an  American unwillingness to recognize and (implicitly) assist the new Taliban regime. After the  Russian Invasion of Ukraine, many observers worried that the UNSC would be unable to work  together on Afghanistan. These fears came to a head in March, only a few weeks after the  invasion, when the mandate for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan  (UNAMA) needed to be authorized. Despite concerns that the Russians might veto the extension,  the Russians abstained and UNAMA was re-authorized with an expanded humanitarian and  political mandate. 

The UN has also been able to continue its peace and security functions even when there is  a direct Russian interest. The Russian mercenary Wagner Group is currently highly active in  Mali, where they are supporting the military junta and frequently massacre civilians, The military regime, with the support of Russia, has begun to move away from its traditional security  partners and limit the ability of the local UN peacekeeping mission, MINUSMA, to protect  civilians and monitor human rights abuses. Given that MINUSMA is frequently in conflict with  the Russian-backed Malian military regime, a Russian veto of the operation would be in its interests. However, MINUSMA was reauthorized in June, with Russia and China abstaining.  While the resolution did little to improve MINUSMA capabilities, the fact that it passed at all  shows that the UN can still pass meaningful resolutions in a post-Ukraine world. 

After the invasion, the permanent member of the Security Council decided to pursue a  strategy of “compartmentalization.” While the P5 would trade sanctions and extraordinarily  harsh language over Ukraine, they agreed to try to avoid letting that “poison the well” with other  issues. UN observer Richard Gowan, who previously said “the Security Council (is) facing a  period of increasing fragmentation and paralysis,” now argues that compartmentalization appears  to have largely worked. This is because doing so remains in both the national interests of Russia,  America, and Europe. For American and Europe, it continues to let the UN continue an agenda  they broadly support. For Russia, it keeps diplomatic channels open, prevents further  international isolation, and lets them influence UN operations by threatening, but not using, the  veto. While the situation in Ukraine demonstrates the continued limited ability of the UN to  intervene in a conflict where a P5 state is a party to the conflict, its action outside of Ukraine  shows that it still has its uses. 

While the Russian invasion of Ukraine is the most destabilizing international event in decades, it isn’t unprecedented in the UN’s history. Nearly two decades prior, another permanent member of the Security Council launched an invasion of another state in brazen violation of the UN Charter. While the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine have several key differences, they sparked similar outcries and criticisms of the UN. In the decades since the war, however, the UN has been able to support peace in war torn countries, provide humanitarian assistance to millions, and foster economic development. It’s important to keep these successes in mind as we visualize the role of the UN in a post-invasion world order.

The European Economy under Russia’s Threats

Early morning on February 24th  2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. While Russia first invaded Ukraine in 2014, and annexed the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine, this time, the invasion of Ukraine by Russia was considered by the international community to be an act of aggression.  The invasion triggered the largest refugee crisis in Europe since World War II, more than four million Ukrainians have left the country and a quarter of the population has been displaced. In response to this invasion, the international community imposed a number of economic sanctions on Russia, in an aim to limit its power and influence in Ukraine. Economic sanctions, as defined by the Council on Foreign Relations, are “the withdrawal of customary trade and financial relations for foreign- and security-policy purposes. Sanctions may be comprehensive, prohibiting commercial activity with regard to an entire country … or they may be targeted, blocking transactions by and with particular businesses, groups, or individuals.” These sanctions have been imposed by many, such as the United States, the European Union, and G7.  

Vladimir Putin, president of Russia, has mentioned that Russia invaded Ukraine in the sole purpose of denazifying Ukraine, as well as protect its citizens who have been facing humiliations and genocides by the Kyiv regime. Ukraine has a long history with neo-nazis. Indeed, Azov is a far-right military group that has been accused of harboring neo-Nazi and white supremacist ideology. The group is now part of Ukraine's armed forces. However, Putin’s claim to denazify Ukraine was quite an interesting and bold statement given that the current president of Ukraine is Jewish, and lost relatives in the Holocaust. 

This invasion of Ukraine has mostly - as expected - affected the country and its citizens. Many were forced to flee the country and seek asylum in neighboring countries such as Poland, Romania, and Moldova. However, many Ukrainians were forced to stay, and fight for their country. Ever since the invasion, Ukraine’s economy has contracted. According to the International Monetary Fund, “the loss of life, damage to critical infrastructure, trade disruption and an outflow of refugees would lead to gross domestic product falling by a minimum of 10% in 2021”. However, many countries have stepped up and helped Ukraine in these difficult times. Countries have donated weapons, funds, and have delivered humanitarian and non-lethal aid. While many countries have helped Ukraine, they have also simultaneously worked against Russia. Through economic sanctions, they hope to weaken the country and its president, Vladimir Putin. But many challenges have arisen as economic sanctions against Russia persist.    

Many Ukrainians have fled the country to a safer place. While most women and children are able to successfully escape the war and seek refuge in neighboring countries such as Poland, men are forced to stay in Ukraine to fight and protect their country. However, this conflict has greatly affected Ukraine, who found itself cut off from the world by war. Trade has been disrupted throughout the country, and according to the UN, hundreds of thousands of people inside Ukraine have been cut off from life-saving aid such as humanitarian aid due to the military encirclement of cities. Vulnerable populations in Ukraine such as elderly citizens, or the economically disadvantaged are most likely to become refugees and will have the greatest difficulty coping with rising food and fuel costs. Relief efforts are underway around the world to ensure that people's basic needs for food, shelter and psychological safety are met in the conflict zone and beyond.

Trade-wise, the conflict has disrupted the global supply chain of diverse goods, and affected international trade as a whole. Ukraine is a massive producer and exporter of seed oil, corn, wheat, and iron ore. However, since the beginning of this war, the country’s production has declined as people have fled the country and men were forced to give up their occupations to join the army and help fight against the Russians. Similarly, the concentration of wheat, fertilizer, and related production in Russia will strain food supplies globally. Securing the continuous supply of food to the countries most tied up to exports from these regions is becoming an issue. Stocks - about half of the corn Ukraine was expected to export for the season - are increasingly difficult to get to buyers, providing a glimpse of the disruption caused by the war in Russia, which accounts for roughly $120 billion global grain trade. Already disrupted by supply chain blockages, surging freight rates and weather events, markets are expecting further turmoil as shipments from Ukraine and Russia - which together account for about a quarter of the global grain trade - become more complicated and raise the specter of food shortages.        

Ports, railroads, and roads throughout Ukraine have either been closed, or taken over by the Russian army. No foreigners have really been able to get in the country ever since the start of the war due to fear. Thus, the Ukrainians that remain in the country have found themselves unable to access foreign goods and services that the country once imported. The lack of production, manufacturing, and transportation in Ukraine due to the war has also disrupted the global supply chain, as previously mentioned, which has had and will keep having a negative impact on the world’s economy and other countries that relied on Ukrainians and Russians export of agricultural goods, which consisted of a wide variety of goods. Citizens that remain in Ukraine have done so to fight for their country against the Russian army, as a result, there are fewer people than ever that work to produce and provide goods not only for Ukrainian citizens, but also for foreign citizens who relied on such goods. 

As the effects of war can be felt everywhere, other countries such as the United States and NATO cannot get involved in the conflict due to the concern that it will become a war between Russia and the West. Since Ukraine is not a member of NATO, the alliance is not obligated to defend the country. Similarly, as the United States is an ally of NATO, the country cannot get involved in the conflict, unless Russia invades a NATO country, which is not so likely to happen as this could result in World War III. However, both NATO and the United States are determined to do all that is in their power to support Ukraine. 

Their inability to get physically involved in this conflict is due to the fact that Ukraine is not a member of both the European Union and NATO. Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelenskiy, whose country is facing a massive unprovoked invasion from neighboring Russia, has called on the European Union to grant Ukraine EU membership under a special procedure as soon as possible. However, it is not as easy as it sounds, the process to gain EU membership is very long and many EU countries are against an expansion of the European Union. Similarly, Ukraine is unable to join NATO just yet, but the organization is committed to helping the country and its citizens in these difficult times.

As a response to the war, many countries have set up a number of economic sanctions in the aim to weaken Russia. But as these sanctions take place, a big question arises: who do these sanctions actually hurt? Economic sanctions on Russia have a goal to affect the economy of the country. SWIFT - the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, is a Belgian cooperative society providing services related to the execution of financial transactions and payments between banks worldwide - has banned Russia. As a consequence, Russian banks are no longer able to use the financial interface to transfer money. But financial sanctions, not banishment from SWIFT, are the key economic punishments being imposed on Russia. Economic sanctions on Russia such as a ban on exports, blocking of Russian assets, sanctions against individuals, ban of oil and gas imports from Russia. Additionally, all Russian banks have had their assets frozen. But who are these sanctions truly affecting? The government? Or the people? 

As horrible as it is, economic sanctions against Russia are actually impacting Russian citizens who have seen their assets abroad frozen, and who also cannot access goods and services that they once did. The lower class in Russia is the one suffering the cost of these sanctions, but as time passes, Russia as a whole will feel the effects of these sanctions, as many foreign companies have pulled out of the country in response to its invasion of Ukraine. Sanctions would prohibit Russian energy exports, which would traumatize the European economy, which is heavily dependent on Russia, and would worsen the surge in energy prices. As companies have pulled out of the country, Russia’s GDP is expected to heavily shrink as an outcome. Russia's central bank has been struggling to stabilize the value of the ruble and prevent a sharp rise in interest rates without access to about half of its foreign exchange reserves. The Russian stock market was also closed for weeks, suspending shares of domestic companies that could plunge as soon as trading resumed. 

The sanctions also have an impact on the European and global economy, which is heavily dependent on Russia for oil, gas, and different goods. The country is also a big importer of luxury goods, so countries such as France and Italy will see their export of luxury goods decline in the next year (and more). This will greatly impact the economy of these countries as such exports contribute to a big portion of their gross domestic product. Businesses have also been hurt, they have lost a lot of their revenues as they pulled out of Russia. However, if they had stayed in the country, with the increasing number of economic sanctions, they would have suffered the long lasting effects of these sanctions on their businesses, which would have also impacted other countries that are also home to such companies.

Oil prices have gone up throughout the world. The United States, France, or the United Kingdom are all three big importers of Russian gas and oil. The “Russian oil ban” as it is called has created a lot of discontent in many European countries, whose citizens have to suffer the cost of an increase in oil and gas prices. Europe exports 45% of gas from Russia, and has pledged to reduce its purchases of Russian gas by two-thirds before the end of the year. However, an alternative must be found in the aim to reduce the price of oil and gas in European countries. Europe has become too dependent on Russia for gas, but until an alternative is found, citizens will have to deal with the increase of gas and oil prices in their respective countries. 

Overall, the economy of Europe has been slowing down as a result of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Not only was the supply chain disrupted by this invasion, but citizens in both countries are completely left alone. No one can really get into Ukraine, as a result, the country struggles to import goods that its citizens once consumed on a daily basis. They are left with local producers and manufacturers. Similarly, countries who used to trade with Ukraine can no longer do so. Wheat and grains are agricultural goods that the country used to export, however, as a port has been destroyed, the country has been cut off from the world, unable to export its goods to countries who relied on them. But similarly, many companies have backed out of Russia, leaving citizens unable to access certain goods and services.

As Russia keeps invading Ukraine and does not seem to be willing to put an end to this conflict that has already cost the lives of many, I wonder whose economy will be the most impacted: Russia’s economy, or Europe’s economy? Both are really powerful, but the sanctions that countries in the European Union and NATO have set up against Russia have also affected more than just Russia. Although Russia’s GDP is expected to shrink this year as a result of this invasion, I wonder how much longer can the country go without the help and support of other countries, or even companies that were once in the country. Left completely alone, Russia is left with its own resources, and is fully aware that its citizens are suffering from this conflict. It makes me wonder how much longer will they be able to fund this war, and allow for its citizens, especially the lower class, to be impacted by it.

Although much has been done by the international community in response to this conflict, Ukraine is still being invaded by Russia, and many face the consequences of this conflict every day. It is extremely hard for other countries and NATO to physically be involved in this conflict as it could lead to world war III. Many fear Russia, a powerful nation that has access to numerous nuclear weapons. While it is understandable that the international community is unable to get too involved in this conflict, and with the long process that is for Ukraine to be able to join NATO and the EU, the international community is left with the options to use sanctions against Ukraine, or to donate to Ukraine, military aid, humanitarian aid, weapons, and funds. As the situation does not seem to be getting any better, the international community should do everything that is in their power to limit the influence of Russia on Ukraine, in the hope that one day, Russia will back out. 

To conclude, this conflict has taken a turn that no one really expected. While many were aware of Russia’s threats, it was still a big shock when Russia actually invaded Ukraine. As the international community is doing everything that they can to help Ukraine in these difficult times. Many countries have welcomed refugees, sent humanitarian and military aid, as well as many other resources, Ukraine and its citizens that have remained in the country still greatly suffer from this war. Russia’s citizens have also been greatly affected as the economic sanctions are directly affecting them. The economy of Russia, Ukraine, and Europe is shrinking. Unless Russia backs out of Ukraine, the consequences of this conflict will be long lasting and an entire economy will have to be rebuilt, which will take time. In the meantime, we can hope that Ukraine will be able to join the EU and NATO, in the aim to get more support and help from other countries, as Ukraine puts up a big fight against the superpower, Russia.

The Middle East’s Stake in the Ukraine Crisis

Introduction

Scholars, strategists, and pundits alike would agree that the Ukraine crisis has escalated far beyond what many originally envisioned on February 24th, 2022. Where early pieces championed a surefire Ukrainian victory and the incompetence of the Russian military, recent articles have speculated that the conflict might rage for weeks to months from now. Although unbiased stories are difficult to find, vivid descriptions of Russian war crimes pepper the firsthand accounts of Ukrainian refugees. Initial articles, such as those reporting on Russian soldiers using children as hostages in Kyiv, shocked few. But it was on April 6th, 2022 that the first mass-media reports of torture, rape, and executions in the recaptured city of Bucha emerged. The bodies of more than 300 civilians were discovered scattered around the city and its outskirts, most clearly having been bound and immobilized before being severely beaten and shot from point-blank range. In response to this and other acts of brutality, the UN General Assembly passed an emergency resolution to suspend the Russian Federation from the Human Rights Council. With 93 countries in favor and only 24 countries—mostly common opponents like China, the DPRK, and Belarus—directly opposing the motion, it is clear that numerous states view Russia as an aggressor and support Ukrainian sovereignty.

However, this leaves 58 countries remaining that voted to abstain from the resolution, each with their own reasons for sitting on the fence. Some of these neutral states, like Angola, Barbados, or Vanuatu, likely lack a stake in the conflict and would prefer to avoid angering either side. But the diversity in these abstentions betrays an observable trend in the action, that being the Middle East’s near-universal desire to remain exempt from opining on the matter. Of the states comprising the Middle East and North Africa, only Israel, Libya, and Turkey joined with the states that pushed through Russia’s disbarment from the HRC. A majority of the remaining states refused to formally strike a side in the debate, with nations from Iraq to Saudi Arabia remaining non-aligned. Three countries in the area—Syria, Iran, and Algeria—even went as far as to officially reject the UN resolution, effectively aligning themselves closer to Russia in the wake of the conflict. Thus, one can easily see the complex relationships between the Middle East and the two forming sides in this situation. This article aims to provide an overview of American, European, and Russian relations with the Middle East and North Africa, particularly with regards to oil, as well as what stakes—if any—exist for countries in this region and what predictions surround the how these states will address the crisis as it develops.

The Middle East & The World: Addressing the Oil Derrick in the Room

It is impossible to holistically examine the Middle East’s relationships with the US, Europe, and Russia in the course of a single article. Entire volumes of literature have been written analyzing the associations between just one of these groups and the Middle East, with usually little more than lip-service provided to the others. That being said, in order to effectively organize the narrative which revolves around this issue, I have chosen to examine these relationships with respect to the common denominator present in all of them: oil. The world quite literally runs on oil. Aside from providing fuel for the estimated 1.3 billion passenger and commercial vehicles that exist across the world, oil (or petroleum) provides use in heating and electricity generation as well as in the production of the various plastics, chemicals, and other synthetic materials we use in our day-to-day lives. Understandably then, a key point of contention between states in the course of national development and prestige has been the exchange (and occasionally the appropriation) of global oil reserves. Vital players in the oil industry are largely clustered in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq all possessing a billion barrels or more in oil reserves compared to the US’ 400,000. This fact alone has irreversibly transformed the Middle East into a region composed mostly of rentier states, and has further shaped the Middle East’s relationships with the major players in the Ukraine Crisis.

Historically, the United States has engaged in a complicated relationship with the Middle East as a result of its dependence on the region’s oil reserves. Dubbed the “American Oil Strategy”, politics between the country and MENA has been almost entirely influenced by politicians shoring up support in the region to secure oil for trade. In fact, the US has even gone so far as to insist on military presence in the region, and further, to ignore blatant policy inconsistencies to maintain this oil relationship. This explains, rather grimly, why America will effectively ignore Saudi Arabia’s horrid human rights record or Turkey’s incremental shift toward authoritarianism. Anywhere else, these crimes might otherwise serve as catalysts for sanctions, condemnation, or military intervention. But the US views its stake in maintaining this Oil Strategy to be far too great to be jeopardized by moral grandstanding. Although the US has made effort in recent years to decouple itself from dependency on foreign oil—largely by way of off-shore drilling and domestic fracking—the US will be at least partly reliant on overseas oil for the foreseeable future. In turn, the Middle East’s relationship with the US is similarly blemished by the latter’s reliance on Gulf oil. While some politicians in the region praise the US as a harbinger of democracy, freedom, and liberal thought, others decry America as a neo-imperialist state with the primary concern of lining its coffers. Every praise for the Abraham Accords can be met with blame for the Iraq War, War in Afghanistan, or war crimes in Yemen, meaning few in the area view the United States as a wholly benevolent power.

Europe possesses a similarly complicated relationship with the Middle East and its near-monopoly over energy. Like the US, Europe is no stranger to hydrocarbon imports from the Middle East, with figures from Eurostat’s 2020 energy memo reporting 18% of Europe’s crude oil and 12.4% of its natural gas deriving from the region. In this same report, Saudi Arabia alone was reported to have provided more than 7.8% of Europe’s crude oil imports. Moreover, the region’s historical association with Europe in regards to its oil means that this relationship is nothing new. As early as the late-19th century, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company began surveying Gulf sites for extraction. The consequences of this arrangement—especially in relation to its history of upholding authoritarian states in the interest of protecting British and French aims—have had a jarring effect on the region’s modern political and economic stability. This has led to a paradoxical relationship over time, with European states sometimes directly interfering, for example during the Gulf War, while simultaneously staying silent on other issues. Understandably then, few living in the Middle East view the European Union or its member-states in an outright beneficial light.

Starkly contrasted with these relationships is that of Russia with modern Middle Eastern states. Unique to Russia is its heavy supply of oil and natural gas, largely attributable to its massive geographic and topographic scale. As such, although Russia has historically not been one to ignore the bountiful gains of hegemony in the Middle East, it certainly is not suffering from oil crises or shortages. Russian influence in the region has been idiomized as that of a “Jack of all trades, master of none”. What this means is that, although Russia has begun to work its way into better relations with virtually all modern Middle Eastern countries—most notably Syria, Israel, and Turkey—few (minus Syria) are willing to directly align themselves too closely to the Kremlin. Part of this is historical, owing to Soviet proxy management during the Cold War, while most of it stems from Russia’s inability to deliver on its promises for aid and support. Foreign aid inefficiencies have been best shown in Syria, where the Russian Center for Reconciliation of Conflicting Sides (CRCS) has been critiqued for 717 of its 731 communities having been symbolically serviced only once over the last five years. It is for this reason that Turkey has notably denounced Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and officially labeled it a “war”. However, states in the region continue to look to Russia as an alternative to American beneficence. Although Russia has failed in many regards, it has impressed Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and Qatar along with other Levantine states simply by virtue of valuing the status quo over democratization. Where American officials might arrange for oil exchanges that include clauses—however fleeting—on the importance of liberalized economies, Russia is more relaxed, caring little about whether these countries respect civil liberties or uphold human rights. It is because of these complicated, often conflicting variables that Israel’s PM Naftali Bennett has pledged a “measured and responsible” response to the Ukraine Crisis while still hesitating on formally condemning Russia or Vladimir Putin.

All of this is to say that it has become clear in recent years that support toward the Russian sphere is slowly but surely ramping up. Where Europe and the US are constricted in their ability to influence the region based on past crimes, blunders, and miscalculations; Russia is poised to drastically shape the politics of the region. Although few states would publicly—or even privately—praise Russia and its leaders, trends in the region point toward a closeness to the Kremlin that Europe and America could only dream about.

Shut-Offs and Sanctions: Stakes At-Home and Abroad

Thus, the question remains, where does the Middle East sit in all of this? During a time when supply-chains have been disturbed, trade agreements have been terminated, and sanctions have been employed by countries everywhere, no country can sit on the sidelines. Whether they want to be involved or not, states around the world must accept the geopolitical shift that comes with this crisis, along with the immediate, tangible ramifications that come with continued conflict between Russia and Ukraine. As indicated above, the most prominent points for policymakers right now center around how to compensate for the intense reduction in oil and natural gas imports from Russia. Although Europe certainly relies on energy from the Middle East, the same Eurostat report referenced earlier in this piece pointed out that, in fact, 25% of European crude oil and 38% of natural gas actually come out of Russia. The US, although not nearly as reliant, still imports over 8% of its crude oil from Russia and continues to import 20% of its unrefined petroleum products as well. Whether or not a state directly garners its petroleum from Russia, the fact remains that consumer-side and producer-side markets alike are suffering from the conflict. World prices for a barrel of oil have skyrocketed, hitting upwards of $130/barrel in early March of this year, while drivers everywhere have complained of soaring prices, with gas hitting roughly $4.50/gallon in the US and upwards of $7.50/gallon in Italy and $8.00/gallon in the UK as of April of this year.

Obviously, the initial plan to offset this supply shortage was to contact Middle East suppliers—specifically the 7 of those within OPEC+—and increase crude oil flow into the European continent and toward the US. Initial hopes that the organization would respond eagerly to the hope of renewed demand following the COVID-19 plunge were dashed when an emergency meeting on March 2nd between OPEC member states ended with them agreeing to only raise supply by the prescribed amount (400,000 barrels per day in April). Only lasting 13 minutes, the meeting went without a mere mention of the Ukraine crisis and its pressures on the industry. Outside of OPEC, responses are not exactly positive either. Even former-OPEC member Qatar has expressed hesitation in helping the West in its scramble to secure more oil, with Energy Minister Saad al-Kaabi stating even before tensions erupted that it lacked the capacity to remotely replace Russian oil in Europe let alone abroad. Fears have only grown after this response, with Europe increasingly eyeing an outright ban on Russian oil and petroleum products and prices only continue to rise.

The situation is not without its light, of course. On March 9th, Emirati Ambassador to the US Yousef Al-Otaiba, expressed the UAE’s desire to hike oil outputs from OPEC. Saudi Arabian officials offered the same sentiments on March 10th, and countries with the capacity to continue bolstering oil supplies to Europe and the US have attempted to support the call to arms. In yet another show of the American Oil Strategy, US officials are increasingly looking to Iran to cover the difference. In the words of Alex Vatanka of the Middle East Institute, “Iran’s Achilles’ Heel is the state of its economy…and the possibility of a new [JCPOA] presents Tehran with an opportunity.” While circumstances are continuously developing and little is certain, these factors mean that hope might not be lost for the Middle East to assist the West during a time of crisis.

But it is not only in the West that the ripple-effects of the Ukraine crisis have been felt. Virtually every state in the Middle East has reported severe economic and supply consequences directly resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It was Egypt that was first hit hardest by these ramifications, specifically with respect to its food supply. Disruption in Ukrainian supply and export chains, coupled with intense sanctions placed upon Russia, have prevented Egyptian ports from receiving wheat shipments that make up 85% of the country’s grain supply. Iran too has been hit hard by the situation, with severe threats to their supply of sunflower oil, wheat, corn, barley, and soybeans due to economic obstacles. Similar stories have played out across the Middle East and North Africa, as the two combatant states collectively make up 25% of global wheat production, 15% of barley, and 45% of sunflower. Prices have escalated not just for grain itself, but also for fertilizer and general agricultural supplies, meaning countries are increasingly incapable of growing their own crops let alone relying on others. Not only does this threaten to disintegrate the global agro-economy, it risks subjecting millions to food insecurity in a region already wracked from drought and famine. Part of the issue also stems from the fact that NGOs themselves often relied on Ukraine and Russia for food security aid. This was best put by CEO of the World Food Program David Beasley with regard to continued food aid to Yemen: “We have no choice but to take food from the hungry to feed the starving.”

Luckily, this situation is also not entirely insurmountable in the region, even in the face of the worsening conflict. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar have already pledged a collective of $12 billion in aid (with an additional $10 billion promised from Saudi Arabia in the future) to Egypt. Western leaders have been similarly jolted to action by the conflict with regard to food security, as European powers and the US have begun promising increased food aid to suffering countries. A major part of the COP26 Agriculture Innovation Mission in the Middle East involves bringing 140 public, private, and non-profit partners together to normalize the region’s dependence on foreign food imports. $4 billion has been provided by the US to the program, of which a sixth of the budget is intended to be allocated toward the MENA region’s crippled agricultural infrastructure. So soon after over 132 million in the area were made victim to starvation in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and its supply-chain deficiencies, this cannot be allowed to stand. Increasing direct investment into the region should be a top priority for not just the United States but the European Union and the developed world as a whole.

As often said, in every crisis, there arises an opportunity. Growing food insecurity in the Middle East is the perfect means through which the US and EU can not only leverage its own oil stakes in the situation, but improve relations, rehabilitate their images and save lives in the process. Especially in Iran, the time is right to completely reform relations with a state which has become increasingly abrasive over the last few decades.

Amnesty for the Innocent: Relocating Russian Dissenters Following Putin’s War in Ukraine

The current migrant crisis in Europe completely outpaces any similar crisis on the continent since World War II. A month into the offensive Russian war in Ukraine, nearly 4 million Ukrainians had fled the country seeking asylum abroad, with an additional 7 million being internally displaced. With the war continuing to escalate, more refugees are sure to continue pouring from the country. 

Though those refugees fleeing Ukraine seem to get the majority of the press attention, as well as the majority of the assistance from Western nations (and all for good reason), the crisis has also sparked a similar exodus of Russians and Belarusians from their respective countries. A mid-March survey concluded that roughly 300,000 Russians have left Russia since the start of the invasion of Ukraine, while liberal estimates predict the real number could exceed one million persons having already left, all largely due to crippling Western sanctions, the total collapse of the Russian ruble and the Russian economy, and a wide-scale authoritarian crackdown by the Russian federal government. At the start of the Russian invasion, thousands of Russians took to the streets, in over 70 cities, to protest the war; on the first day of the war the total number of protestors arrested was 1,900 while over 13,000 protestors had been arrested a month into the war, amounting to the largest scale protests and political arrests in the country’s modern history. Soon after, Russia would take draconian measures to ban social media outlets such as Facebook and Twitter, crack down on various independent media outlets (falsely labeling them as “foreign agents”), and implement a new law allowing the government to sentence individuals to up to 15 years of imprisonment for defying the Kremlin’s narrative regarding the war. Meanwhile, the Russian economy was totally ruined as Western sanctions and popular pressure caused foreign capital and investment to flee overnight, unemployment to soar, the ruble to deflate, and the purchasing power of ordinary Russians to dwindle. As the future economic prospects for all Russians suddenly changed for the worse, those Russians with the means to leave have done so. And because conditions within Russia seem to only be getting worse, more are sure to follow those who have already left. 

Most of those Russian nationals leaving Russia consist of the urban college educated youth as well as the middle class. The young and the middle class were most likely to work in the service sector and with foreign companies before sanctions, while this section of the population is also most likely to be critical of Kremlin talking points regarding the war. Additionally, middle class Russians (aside from perhaps Russia’s elite, affluent ruling class) have the most financial means to resettle, while they also have comparatively better career opportunities abroad; young Russians also tend to have better skill sets for work abroad and have fewer commitments and responsibilities tying them to Russia—such as family or an existing committed career—and many seek to avoid being drafted into the Russian armed forces in the midst of war. Generally, the majority of those who are leaving Russia are “academics, IT specialists, journalists, bloggers” or protestors, who all fear that the unpredictable climate within Russia could quickly make their lives impossible. Most of these Russians fleeing are destined for countries which offer visa-free entry for Russian citizens, namely Georgia, and Armenia, with other common destinations including Azerbaijan, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Serbia to name a few. Though the Russians fleeing predominantly consist of individuals who are adversarial towards, or are at least skeptical of, Putin’s regime, their reception has been somewhat mixed. In Georgia, for example, Russian nationals in the country have been experiencing high degrees of discrimination, both on the street in day-to-day life and while looking for apartments and opening Georgian bank accounts. That being said, the majority of Georgians remain receptive to Russian expatriates and for good reason, as Russians leaving Russia offer the country a valuable, new, educated labor market. With more than 1,000 companies being founded by Russian nationals within Georgia in the last month, the benefits of taking on Russian expatriates are undeniable. But, despite their somewhat mixed reception in Georgia and other countries, Russians have been received far worse in Western countries, namely in the European Union and in North America. The Czech Republic, Latvia, and Lithuania have all announced that they will no longer be processing visa applications from Russian applicants due to the war in Ukraine, while Greece has placed additional restrictions on Russian nationals seeking visas; meanwhile, instances of hate crimes and discrimination against individual Russians abroad in Europe and North America have skyrocketed following the invasion. Therefore, much of the world suddenly seems to be a very hostile place to many Russians, and as Russians continue to flee and seek out safe havens from political persecution and economic ruin, those countries which accommodate the masses of young and educated Russians leaving will have much to gain. Countries across Europe, but namely those Baltic states with large Russian-speaking communities, should embrace the current wave of migrants from Russia, both as a means of securing talent and educated labor but also as a contribution to the Western strategy of punishing Russia for its ongoing offensive invasion. 

Putting entry and visa requirements aside, countries in Central and Eastern Europe are among the most suited to take in Russian expatriates. For one, the Baltic countries of Estonia and Latvia are particularly suitable for Russian immigrants, as both countries already house large Russian diaspora communities. Estonia’s population consists roughly of 24% native Russian speakers, with the concentration of these ethnic Russians mainly being in the country’s Northeast, around the urban center of Narva where the percentage of Russian speakers accounts for 90% of the city’s population. Latvia maintains a similarly sized Russian population, consisting of 25% of the country’s total population, over 35% of the population of Latvia’s capital city, Riga, and 56% of the population of the country’s second-largest city, Daugavpils. Therefore, with a large Russian speaking community already being present, urban centers like Tallinn, Riga, Daugavpils, and Narva all make realistic and comfortable options for Russians looking for new homes abroad. 

Additionally, repatriating Russian nationals could serve as a highly effective strategy to encourage economic growth in some of the poorest parts of the Baltic States. For example, Latvia’s poorest region, Latgale, also contains a large Russian speaking majority, making up 60% of the region’s population. Should educated, young and middle class Russians seek residency in Latvia, they will likely resettle either in Riga or in parts of Latgale, such as the large post-industrial city of Daugavpils, as these are the two main areas with dominant or large Russian-speaking communities. Once in the country, these expatriates might contribute greatly to the economic rebirth of the country; cities like Narva and Daugavpils are both post-industrial cities where poverty and poor quality education have proven to be massive problems. Should Russian entrepreneurs resettle in Daugavpils or Narva, and start new businesses, they will surely bring with them great employment opportunities for members of those respective communities already living there, possibly leading to the revitalization of these urban areas.. And should Russian expatriates also settle in Riga or Tallinn, they can further contribute to the relative success that these two cities have been experiencing in recent years, in terms of economic development. 

Furthermore, Estonia specifically is an exceptional possible destination for many Russian expatriates, specifically those who work in fields relating to IT (a large portion of those Russians fleeing, as already discussed). Information and Communications Technology has quickly become Estonia’s dominant economic sector, contributing the most to the country’s GDP growth over the past decade. With over 6,000 IT companies calling the small Baltic country of 1.3 million home, and with Russian language, similarly to the Latvian case, still playing a major role in daily urban and business life, Estonia makes for an unrefusable opportunity for many Russians looking for better job security abroad. 

Aside from contributing to economic success, Russian immigrants might also deradicalize the Russian-speaking communities already in the Baltic. In Estonia, 89% of ethnic-Russians watch Russian state media, while only 49% follow Western media outlets; in Latvia a stark 97% of Russian-speakers watch state media while only 10% follow Western media outlets. Looking at these figures, it becomes quite clear that there is more than just a linguistic divide between Baltic-Russians and dominant Baltic national identities like Latvians or Estonians; there is also a deep political divide partially originating from the forms of media that individuals choose to consume. By contrast, the largely urban educated and young population of Russians leaving Russia are far less likely to buy into Kremlin narratives; therefore, if the Baltic countries were to take in some of these more liberal and democratically minded Russians, this could easily contribute to diluting the influence of the Kremlin within Baltic-Russian communities and alleviate their radicalism over time. 

But before any of the potential positive effects of Russian expatriates resettling in the Baltic can be felt, Estonia and Latvia will need to adjust their visa policies towards Russians. As previously mentioned, Latvia has suspended the processing of all visa applications for applicants from Russia, a move which clearly must be reversed. Estonia and Latvia should offer Russians six months to a year of visa-free stay in their respective countries, and they should offer a clear pathway thereafter towards permanent residency and citizenship. Of course, it is not enough to merely accept these migrants. The respective Baltic states, and any country accepting migrants for that matter, must do all they can to integrate these migrants into their broader, national identities and into national society. Baltic countries could offer short-term business loans to Russian migrants who meet certain qualifications and who agree to remain in the country for a certain period of time to increase their economic integration with the host society, and Latvia and Estonia could offer subsidized formal instruction in their respective national languages to improve rates of social integration. Such actions would also need to be accompanied with a massive reworking of the media narrative surrounding Russians and Russian-speakers in the Baltic. Instead of allowing media outlets to malign Russian nationals as being totally loyal to the Kremlin and complicit in the actions of the Putin regime, government spokespersons should actively counter these narratives; instead, they should paint a more fair picture of ethnic Russians, as a people living subjugated by an authoritarian regime, who live in fear for their lives and their families, and who need the help of the West in order to achieve fair standards of living. Without such a shifting of the mainstream narrative within the regional context of the Baltic, Russophobia is certain to continue to increase, social integration will be made more difficult for those Russian-speakers already living within the Baltic, and the possible slew of benefits from accepting Russian migrants will be discarded, with those benefits instead being directed to countries accepting those Russians fleeing Putin’s regime. 

Even worse, if these migrants are not given good opportunities wherever they may resettle, many of them are sure to return to Russia, where they will continue to live and work under the Kremlin’s iron fist, contributing to economic productivity and the growth of the Russian economy. For a West concerned with punishing Russia after its offensive invasion of Ukraine, accepting Russian migrants plays directly against Putin’s hand. It gives some of Russia’s brightest and most productive the promise of a free, safe, and prosperous future out of the reach of authoritarian strongmen, and it eliminates nearly any incentive to ever return to Russia, permanently depriving Russia of its next generation of skilled labor. 

Putting all else aside, the very moral legitimacy of Western liberal democracy depends on our reaction to authoritarian leaders, like Putin, who threaten peace and antagonize innocent civilians at home and abroad. The West has responded positively by helping Ukrainian victims of the Russian invasion restart their lives, safe from the shelling of Kharkiv or the bombardments of Mariupol. Meanwhile the West has ignored the desperate cries of so many Russians, who too live in fear for their lives, their freedom, and their livelihoods. Only by answering the calls of all those in need can the West truly fulfill its prerogative in safeguarding human rights and human dignity the world over.

Great Power Competition in Ukraine

The conflict between the Ukrainian government and Russian-backed separatists, which started in 2014 in Eastern Ukraine, has killed approximately 12,000 people, maimed a least 27,000, and displaced about 1.3 million people. However, over the last five years, with the exception of the occasional news cycle, Ukraine stayed out of the collective consciousness of the public of the United States (U.S.) until September 2019. A whistleblower report informed the public that the President of the United States may have used his office to pressure the Ukrainian government to investigate a leading political Rival. 

Suddenly Ukraine was on the lips of almost every talking head in the country. Judging by how many U.S. lawmakers still use the literal Russian translation of “The Ukraine” in public remarks, it is likely that many policymakers also haven’t thought too much about Ukraine over the last five years. Nonetheless, the lack of public attention doesn’t negate the fact that Ukraine has been on the frontlines of a Great Power Competition—Russia and China are both pursuing strategic objectives in Ukraine. Understanding precisely what these great powers’ objectives are in Ukraine and how these regional objectives fit into the global outlooks of these states is critical. This understanding enables the prediction of future actions of these states on both a regional and global level. 

Frozen Conflicts and Russian Grand Strategy 

Russia, in both its 2009 and 2016 national defense strategy, has stated that it views the eastern expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the positioning of NATO troops ever closer to the Russian border as a direct threat to the country’s national security. After the rapid eastern expansion of the NATO alliance in the 1990s and early 2000s, Russia developed a strategy to block certain countries from integrating into the Trans-Atlantic alliance. In both Moldova and Georgia, Russia was able to successfully leverage the separatist tendencies of ethnic minorities in the respective states to create frozen conflicts. Until these frozen conflicts are resolved, the prospect for European Union (EU) or NATO integration remains dim. 

These autonomous entities, which are generally unrecognized at the international level, would not survive without Russian patronage. In 2015, The Guardian reported that 70 percent of the separatist’s entity in Moldova, Transnistria, the national budget came in the form of Russian aid. In the case of Georgia, in September 2019, Putin publicly expressed his continued support for the separatist regions which included the allocation of funds to provide for the modernization of the entities’ armed forces of the separatist republics of Georgia. However, this relatively modest level of support has significantly complicated the EU and NATO aspirations of two former Soviet republics–in the case of Moldova, it’s been 27 years and for Georgia, it’s been ten years. 

The Utility of a Frozen Conflict in Eastern Ukraine

In the case of Ukraine, the line of contact that represents the de-facto border between the separatists and the Ukrainian government has been relatively stable since 2016.

The conflict is now characterized by low-intensity trench warfare, sniper attacks, artillery barrages, and the occasional skirmish. It is in Russia’s interest to keep this conflict unresolved. Although Russia denies that it has military assets deployed on Ukrainian soil (which many investigative reports have conclusively debunked), Russia makes no secret of the economic and political support that it provides to the breakaway regions. No official numbers exist regarding the exact amount of aid that Russia sends to the separatist regions, but Western analysts estimate that Russian aid to these regions amounts to 2 billion USD annually. This figure is less than .01 percent of Russia’s GDP—which, for Russia, is a relatively small price to pay to achieve a major geopolitical objective. 

As long as this conflict remains unresolved, significant complications will persist regarding Ukrainian aspirations to join the transatlantic security apparatus. The implicit threat of the conflict in the east of Ukraine going from frozen to very hot will hang over any move by Ukraine to become a more integrated member of NATO. Russia desires to maintain this tripwire to Ukrainian integration into the West, and thus will continue economically supporting the separatist regions and will work to sandbag any efforts to fully resolve the conflict. 

For instance, Volodymyr Zelensky, the former comedian-turned-president of Ukraine, during both his presidential campaign and his time as president, has been a strong proponent of undertaking public diplomacy campaigns in an attempt to convince the residents of the separatists’ regions that they would be welcomed back into Ukraine. Furthermore, in his inaugural speech in May of 2019, he stated that “for years the government [of Ukraine] has done nothing to in order for them [the Russian separatists] to feel Ukrainian. They are not strangers, they are ours, they are Ukrainian.” However, Russia seeks to discourage the residents of the separatists’ republics to think of themselves in any way Ukrainian because that could eventually lead to a resolution of the conflict. Thus, in an attempt to solidify a non-Ukrainian identity in the separatist republic, in April of 2019, Russia distributed Russian passports to the residents of the breakaway regions. While these types of small provocations rarely make it into the Western news cycle and garner very little attention, they further solidify the frozen conflict in Ukraine. In the near term, expect Russia to sponsor similar actions, particularly if any progress is made in negotiations that could lead to a resolution of the conflict. 

When states that border Russia start to strategically align themselves with centers of power independent of Moscow, Russia feels threatened. Although Russia will most likely attempt to avoid open conflict in dissuading its neighbors from aligning with other powers, they will not shy away from using their less-then-war playbook to achieve their strategic objectives. For instance, if Central Asian states start to reorient themselves towards China (as a result of China’s far-reaching Belt and Road Initiative), and if this reorientation reaches a tipping point, one could expect Russia to undertake a similar strategy as it has in the Caucuses and in Eastern Europe. 

China: Belt and Road Initiative, Trade, and Access

Unsurprisingly, China has made inroads into Ukraine via its Belt and Road Initiative, as China envisions Ukraine as a major transit hub that can deliver Chinese produced goods to the EU market. In fact, government officials and businesses of both countries have proposed ambitious infrastructure projects to make this vision a reality. In August 2018, during a roundtable of officials and experts from Ukraine and China, the group unveiled the concept for an 1100 kilometer high-speed rail line in Ukraine. It is important to note, despite the unveiling of this plan and many like it, very few projects have actually been started. Thus far, the Belt and Road Initiative in Ukraine remains largely an abstract concept instead of a concrete project. 

However, the growing trade relationship between Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital, and Beijing is very real. In 2018, Ukraine’s single largest import partner was China. Ukraine imported 7 billion dollars worth of goods from China in 2018—only the EU exported more goods to Ukraine that year. Furthermore, in the first half of 2019, China became the 3rd largest destination for Ukrainian exports. Although the EU is still undoubtedly Ukraine’s most important economic partner, China has cultivated its economic relationship with Ukraine quite quickly. 

This budding trade relationship with Kyiv allows Beijing access to the Ukrainian goods that it most desires: weapons. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), China was the largest customer for Ukrainian arms in 2018. To note, China is not acquiring mere old soviet weapons stocks that have been rusting away in warehouses since the 90’s – they are acquiring high-tech aerospace technology. 

Ukraine was a critical part of the Soviet defense industry and much of the infrastructure and human capital are still present to this day. According to Michael Carpenter, an arms control expert at the Atlantic Council, Ukraine “is blessed with extraordinary human capital: world-class engineers, designers, and top-notch universities that feed qualified science and engineering graduates into the job market.” The Ukrainian military-industrial complex has the exceedingly rare capability to produce high-tech helicopters and jet engines from start to finish. Although China has made incredible advances in aerospace technology, it still struggles with the production of high-precision equipment like jet engines.  For instance, China’s fifth-generation fighter, the J-20, is currently outfitted with a Russian engine because China’s engine development program for the fighter has been plagued with problems. Fundamentally, China has a high demand for this Ukrainian technology and know-how and, since 2014 when they dramatically cut their arms sales to Russia, the Ukrainian military-industrial base needs the customer. 

Traditionally, China has acquired this type of quality military technology from Russia. However, after Russia meddled in the 2016 U.S. election, the U.S. Congress passed the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act  (CAATSA). This law allows the United States to enact sanctions against any entity that does business with the Russian defense sector. In September 2018, Washington used this authority to sanction China in response to China’s acquisition of Russian fighter jets and missile systems. Arms acquisitions from Ukraine are also not subject to CAATSA, making Ukraine an even more attractive supplier for China. Furthermore, there is the possibility that Moscow ceases supplying Beijing with military technology if the Sino-Russian relationship becomes more competitive. China has a strategic interest in retaining and expanding its access to the Ukrainian military-industrial complex. 

In order to protect this interest in the short term, China will most likely continue various public diplomacy and investment efforts with the goal of developing good-will among the Ukrainian citizenry. In the past, China has gifted 50 ambulances, 50 search-and-rescue vehicles, and provided 137 million dollars for medical equipment to regional hospitals. These types of “hearts and minds” campaigns make it easier for China to grow its influence in Ukraine without provoking a negative reaction from everyday Ukrainians. 

In addition to public diplomacy efforts, China may use more direct means to protect its image and popularity in Ukraine. For instance, in early October Ukrainian media reported that a number of high-profile members of president Zelensky’s political party had been pressured by Chinese agents to act against Ukrainian civil society groups supporting the pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong. This type of interference in domestic Ukrainian politics could become more common as China increases its influence in Ukraine.

Moreover, China will most likely seek to invest in and develop the Ukrainian arms industry. In June 2019, a Chinese firm with connections to the Chinese government bid to buy a 50 percent stake in Motor Sich for 100 million dollars above market price. Motor Sich is one of the largest defense contractors in Ukraine that produces engines and employs over 30,000 Ukrainians. China can be expected to continue attempting to gain control over these types of Ukrainian companies in order to ensure its access to these firms’ products and to potentially acquire the technological know-how of these companies. 

On a strategic level, China, like Russia, has an interest in keeping Kyiv from fully integrating into the EU and the transatlantic community. The EU has enforced a moratorium on arms sale to China since 1989 in response to Tiananmen Square. If Ukraine were to join the EU or even make moves towards EU ascension that would require Kyiv to align its foreign policy to Brussels—to include the restrictions of arms sales—China would push back. Most likely, Beijing would attempt to leverage its economic influence that it is developing in Ukraine to lobby Ukrainian leaders to keep a degree of distance from Brussels. Therefore, much like Russia, China has a strategic interest in keeping Ukraine neutral. However, it is very unlikely that China would ever support or recognize the Russian-separatists in Ukraine in order to achieve this goal. China has a strict policy of not recognizing the breakaway regions of other countries for fear of emboldening any number of separatist movements in China itself. 

Overall, China is concerned with access—access to goods, access to markets, and access to resources. The case of Ukraine illustrates how China goes about quietly acquiring and then protecting this access. 

Implications for Ukraine

Traditionally, when discussing the geopolitical situation in Ukraine, commenters have underscored the supposed divide between the Russian-speaking east and the Ukrainian-speaking west, the implication being that Ukraine is a divided country. However, in the 2019 elections, Zelensky ran a campaign that attempted to rise above the east/west divide.  Although Zelensky spoke mostly Russian (as he is primarily a Russian speaker) during the election, he still emphasized the importance of the Ukrainian language—identity politics was not the focus of his platform. Instead, he focused on formulating a series of ambitious reforms that would seek to clean up Ukrainian politics, make the country more business-friendly, and simplify the bureaucracy. Zelensky’s campaign was successful and he won support that transcended the traditional east/west divide. Ukraine is not nearly as divided as many pundits portray. 

Zelensky has expressed support for Ukrainian ascension to the EU and has stated that he believes that the Ukrainian people should vote in a referendum to decide the future course of the country. Concerningly, as demonstrated, outside powers have distinct interests in keeping Ukraine from undertaking the EU ascension process. Moreover, these outside powers also have levers they could push that could seriously complicate any referendum.  If this referendum takes place, it is pertinent to remember that Moscow wants to halt western encroachment and it will capitalize on its influence over the separatist republics to accomplish this strategic goal. China, on the other hand, will seek to preserve its access to Ukrainian goods, know-how, and markets, and will leverage its growing soft-power tools to protect these interests. 

Fork in the Steppe: Ukraine’s Difficult History with Western Integration

The success of American strategy in the European continent relies on key instruments, particularly NATO with respect to military affairs, and the European Union with respect to economic and social spheres. These institutions compete with Russian initiatives to the east, which demonstrate a lack of commitment to the liberal norms and values championed by the West, and replace them with opposing governing models and a willingness to assert military force to achieve national objectives. This is particularly concerning for policymakers in Kyiv, who, prior to 2014, attempted to maintain a balance between a Central European and Eurasian identity, and are now trapped in a heated “frozen conflict”. As Ukrainian political debate began to find itself increasingly calling to engage in economic integration with one side or the other, Kyiv realized the mounting difficulty in maintaining its claim of neutrality. The series of events surrounding this struggle within Ukraine demonstrates the disparity between Western and Russian worldviews. Ultimately, they suggest that the United States and its European allies may be unprepared to prevent a long-term Russian success in the region, rendering the prospect of Ukrainian accession into the European Union and NATO low.

Ukraine and Russia have a long and intertwined history, spanning interactions both remembered positively and negatively. Russia notably recognizes the founding of the Russian state in the Christianization of Kievan Rus’, and emphasises the mutual historical and cultural links between Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus whenever it can. Other events, however, such as the Treaty of Pereyaslav in 1654, or the more well-known Holodomor, are understood in the Ukrainian historical narrative as events characterizing a relationship of mistrust with Russia. The former is noted as having legally commenced the characterization of Ukrainians as an inseparable part of the Russian people, after the Zaporizhian Cossacks controversially pledged an oath of loyalty to the Russian Tsar in exchange for protection against Poland-Lithuania. The image of Ukraine as being a branch of the greater Russian nation has survived throughout the Imperial and Soviet eras, and is an important factor in understanding their current relationship.

On the other hand, Ukraine also has a strong Central European influence, most notably in its west. This is best expressed by Foreign Minister of the Ukrainian SSR Anatoliy Zlenko’s assertion in 1990 that “a common history existing a thousand years and a deep cultural, linguistic, and ideological closeness have linked [Ukraine] with neighboring Poland. The western regions of Ukraine and the eastern provinces of Poland … are similar in makeup of population and economy”. While it cannot be denied that historic links exist, he refrains from mentioning that they have been experienced as mostly negative, perhaps even worse than with Russia. Despite this friction, policymakers in Kyiv saw their interests as increasingly aligned with those of Central European states following the collapse of the USSR, lending truth to Zlenko’s claim of the region’s close ideological proximity to Ukraine.

This is largely due to the fact that Central European nations were successful in both severing Moscow’s influence, as well as crafting a new identity for themselves as “Central European.” In search of a similar future, the Ukrainian authorities made it their priority to become a part of several Central European institutions, most notably in what was then the Visegrád Triangle in 1992. Today the Visegrád Four, this institution was a grouping of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, and was instrumental in developing a post-Communist Central European bloc independent of Moscow’s control. Despite close Polish-Ukrainian relations at this time, the initiative to “join” Central Europe ended in failure, hampered by other nations’ fears that accepting Ukraine would diminish their claims of a Central European identity and anger Moscow.

This aversion to antagonizing the Kremlin was not out of bad faith, as it is now understood that Russia certainly views social influence, such as perceptions of national identity, in zero-sum terms. In a world marked by greater international cooperation, a failure to participate in blocs or alliances can result in a significant loss of influence. In this way, a truly neutral Ukraine, as neither a part of the European Union or the Eurasian Economic Union, could have been in danger of marginalization. This led to pressure on Yanukovych to engage in an economic agreement with either the Eurasian or European Union, as maintaining equal partnership with both is technically and legally infeasible. Recognizing this, Russia did everything in its power to prevent a preference for greater Western ties, envisioning the risk of the eventual full admission of Ukraine into the European Union and possibly NATO. The Russian strategic mindset places a great importance on land as a defensive resource, most vehemently in the Northern European Plain, where no natural barriers exist between Russia and Europe. A Ukraine in NATO would put Western troops deep into this region, constituting unacceptable threat from the perception of Moscow.

This tug of war manifested itself in the back and forth saga over whether or not President Yanukovych would allow the passing of a Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement, which is designed to significantly increase the nation’s interactions with European institutions. Although having been largely committed to the agreement since March 2014, he experienced a last minute change of heart due to fears of Russian economic retaliation, a move which did not go over well with the Ukrainian public and sparked the Euromaidan Revolution. This climaxed in Yanukovych’s descent from power, putting celebrations in Moscow on hold.

A change in the balance of power almost never passes calmly, and this proved no exception, as, in early 2014, President Putin decided to use military force in Ukraine. This decision was partially inspired by NATO’s expression of military force against Serbia in 1999 as support for the self-determination of Kosovo. This use of hard power mixed with an emphasis on territorial self-determination was expressed in Russia’s use of unmarked soldiers to secure and eventually annex Crimea through referendum, as well as their support for armed separatists in eastern Ukraine. The annexation of Crimea was especially informative, as it not only violates international agreements, but levied accusations of disregarding the precedents set after the Second World War regarding the respect of territorial integrity between states in Europe. The Russian Federation thus revealed itself as a revisionist power in Europe, with a lack of commitment to the current world order that is seen as hypocritical and having been solely crafted by and for the West.

How the frozen conflict in Ukraine will mature is still to be seen. No nation engaged in territorial conflict can be admitted to the NATO alliance, and Ukrainian accession to the European Union has since become more unpopular with some member states, particularly Hungary. The reasons for this shift in Budapest’s positioning towards Ukraine are complex, but generally revolve around the Orban government’s newfound faith in illiberalism, a school of thought associated with Russia. Hungary has also espoused concern for the rights of the Hungarian diaspora in Transcarpathia, after a law was passed that greatly restricted the position of minority languages in education. This law was part of a broader movement of growing Ukrainian nationalism, which has crystalized in ways that would not have been possible without the spectre of an aggressive Russia. This national feeling is also marked by significant growth in Ukrainians’ positive perception of the European Union and Western institutions. This is a result of previous sentiments in Ukraine’s east, which were favorable to Russia, suffering due to the increased perception of a Russia that will act maliciously towards Ukraine, coupled with the loss of the most pro-Russian territories in the country: Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk. This has given way to a victory of western Ukraine’s vision of the nation. While there is still a great deal of caution when dealing with Ukraine, Central Europeans have recognized this more profound Western national consciousness, allowing Kyiv to make its way into institutions like the 2016 Visegrád Battlegroup. This stands in contrast to Ukrainian attempts to join Central European institutions in the early 1990s, when Central Europe itself was still fragile, Ukraine divided, and Russia less predictable.

Unfortunately for the current Ukrainian administration, the Russian strategy relies solely on time. As soon as it becomes clear that pro-Western Ukrainian officials are unable to fulfill their promises of economic and political integration, the public will become disenfranchised. This could lead to a rise in the support for more extreme platforms, such as Ukraine’s far-right, which is the most vehemently anti-Russian of Ukraine’s political movements, and has already gained a deal of respect due to its effectiveness in the War in Donbas. However, with enough time, economic stagnation, and Russian resiliency, disenfranchisement could also lead to a more pragmatic approach, one in which there is consensus that admission into the EU and NATO is quite unlikely, and only rapprochement with Russia is a viable path to developing into a prosperous nation. With Ukraine back on cordial terms with Russia, or even latter as a member of the Russian led Eurasian Economic Union, the public would experience increased economic growth and stability, the tangible benefits of which would likely cement support for this policy. Although with the potential to foster greater resentment, this strategy has already proven relatively effective. Moldova, the first country to experience a frozen conflict with pro-Russian separatists, since moved to become an observer state of the Eurasian Economic Union in 2017, 25 years after the Transnistria War.

The series of events surrounding Ukraine are a testament to the zero-sum reality that have materialized out of conflicting perceptions and onto the Ukrainian Steppe. For the post-Soviet nation, a difficult moment of choice between the values and identity of the West or Russia has begun, but only time will tell where that decision ultimately falls. In order for Ukraine to remain committed to Western values, it is in the interest of the United States and its European allies to ensure that Ukraine does not feel it is left out of Western institutions, even if NATO or EU membership is out of the question for the time being. Western assistance to Ukraine can be delivered not only politically, but also economically and militarily, and it would be unwise for Western policymakers to take these off the table. Corruption should be understood as an important piece of the Kremlin’s arsenal, and a tool with the potential to bypass unfavorable public sentiment. With popular support on the side of the West, decreasing the prevalence of corruption and helping to maintain Ukraine as a transparent democracy is a worthy strategy for Brussels and Washington. Despite their ultimate policy choices, however, it is critical for them to understand that time is not on their side.

Ukraine’s Debt to Russia: Efficient Breach Vindicated

Russia has had quite a year. The Kremlin’s militaristic gallivanting has become a staple of this year’s news cycle, with perhaps its most pugnacious acts of hostility being those involving Ukraine. While Russia’s armed harassment of Ukraine has received the lion’s share of the media’s attention, it is its financial badgering with respect to sovereign debt that may prove to be most harmful of all to the bedeviled nation.

In this article, I endeavor to explicate briefly Ukraine’s sovereign debt dispute with Russia, with an eye towards arguing how Ukraine might make use of different international legal remedies to exculpate itself from its regrettable situation. One of the most discussed of these remedies is the legal notion of “odious debt,” and many—most prominently Georgetown University Professor Anna Gelpern and Newsweek’s Anders Åslund—have argued that the “odious debt” legal remedy is Ukraine’s golden ticket out of repayment. I will argue that the legal grounds for the use of the “odious debt” solution are shaky at best, but that rather “efficient breach” is the optimal legal remedy for Ukraine in this case. On the first day of 2016, Russia formally began legal proceedings against Ukraine over the non-payment of their $3bn debt, as reported by the Financial Times. This issue will now come down to a courtroom battle, and to understand the legal implications of this dispute, we need to understand its history.  

The story behind Ukraine’s sovereign debt to Russia is convoluted. The Economist called it “the world’s wackiest bond.” Ukraine has had many issues with external debt as of late. In August of 2015, Ukraine finished negotiations with numerous creditors (primarily investment houses) over Ukraine’s international bonds, altogether valued at around $18 billion. These renegotiations included a slashing of 20% of the bonds’ principal on average, as well as postponement of repayment until 2019. Even in August, Russia’s immediate rejection of these terms adumbrated the growing conflict brewing today over the $3bn bond that Ukraine was due to pay Russia on December 20th, 2015.

The bond in question was issued in December of 2013. Listed on the Irish stock exchange, the bond was clearly backed by spurious motives. As the Economist’s Christmas double-issue summarized:

The bond was essentially a bribe to Viktor Yanukovych, Ukraine’s now-ousted president, who was dithering between European and Eurasian integration. Senior Ukrainian officials say that the government itself never saw the money; most probably it was spirited out of the country by Mr. Yanukovych’s cronies.

While some might disagree with such a malicious characterization of the Russian debt, they would be in the minority, as numerous reputable sources—from the Financial Times, to Reuters, to Bloomberg—have lamented Ukraine’s unfortunate situation. Vladimir Putin proposed a staggered plan in November in which Ukraine would pay back the debt over three years, but the stipulation that a western government or bank serve as guarantor went unfulfilled, and the deal fell through. Some have attempted to argue that the whole issue of a legal remedy to Ukraine’s debt to Russia does not merit consideration, as the debt is commercial, not sovereign. On this issue most of the international community disagrees with Kiev, including the IMF, that on December 16th confirmed the sovereign status of Ukraine’s debt to Russia.

So, where does this leave us? The December 20th deadline has come and gone, along with the 10-day grace period thereafter, and Russian President Vladimir Putin has given the green light to file a lawsuit against Ukraine. In short, the bond, as it stands, will not be repaid. Given that the solution doubtlessly lies at the tail end of arduous, drawn-out courtroom arguments, let us now delve into some potential legal remedies to which Ukraine may take recourse as it attempts to rid itself of this debt.

As Anders Åslund argues in his piece on Ukraine’s debt to Russia, published on the Atlantic Council’s site, one potential legal remedy is proposed by Professor Gelpern from Georgetown, who argues that “Ukraine should not pay this debt because it amounts to "odious debt.” I refute this argument, as the argument for the applicability of the “odious debt” remedy is tenuous at best in this scenario.

“Odious debt,” as defined recently by the Centre for International Sustainable Development Law (CISDL), is a debt that meets three criteria: “it was contracted without the consent of the population of a debtor state, without benefit to it, and the creditor had knowledge of the circumstances.” To borrow the summary of odious debt from Jeff King of CISDL, this means that “under the contemporary definition… a debt is said to be odious when there is an absence of popular consent, an absence of benefit, and creditor awareness of these two elements.” As those familiar with the field of International Law will know, the sources of International Law are treaties, customary international law, and general principles. While some may disagree with the legitimacy of certain sources of International Law, these are the principles that will govern the courtroom arguments between Ukraine and Russia. Given that Russia and Ukraine are not signatories of any binding treaty that references odious debt, and there is no “general principle” of odious debt, to prove the applicability of the odious debt remedy in this situation, it is necessary to prove that it has crystallized as customary international law in a way applicable to Ukraine’s case.  

For customary international law to be considered binding, certain thresholds must be met; namely, the “thresholds in customary international law of uniformity, consistency and generality of practice, together with the requisite opinio juris,” as explained by King. Thus, Professor Gelpern and those who advocate for the doctrine of “toxic debt,” are arguing against the customary international “rule of repayment,” arguing instead that there are cases where forgoing repayment is a legal norm of customary international law due to toxic debt.

Upon examining the legal history of “toxic debt” as a defense against repayment, one can recognize that the argument is instantaneously weakened given that for most of the history of the “toxic debt” doctrine, the defense only referred to cases of “cessation and dissolution of a state, where the legal personality of the borrowing state often remains intact.” As the Ukrainian case involved neither cessation nor dissolution, the interpretive window whereby the “toxic debt” defense might be applicable is quite small.

Next, we can look for cases in which a successful application of the “toxic debt” defense has been outlined. In the Tinoco Arbitration case, we saw that for the debt to be toxic, there must not only be a change in regime (normally revolutionary), but also a failure on the part of the bank or government in question to show that the funds were used for “legitimate governmental use.” Few doubt that Ukraine’s debt was not used for legitimate governmental purposes, but the lack of a concomitant regime change renders the application of the “toxic debt” defense unsupported by precedent.

There is only one subset of legal scholarship on “toxic debt” that may support the applicability of the defense in Ukraine’s case: O’Connell’s “hostile debts” doctrine. Also referred to by scholars such as Mohammed Bedjaoui as “subjugation debts,” this subset of “toxic debt” is defined as “debts that are contracted by a state representative without the population’s consent and against its interests, with both these issues to the creditor’s knowledge.” While this may sound perfectly fitting in Ukraine’s case, Bedjaoui—the intellectual father of “subjugation debts”—suggests a “very high threshold for the standard,” specifically: “debts contracted by a State with a view to attempting to repress an insurrectionary movement or war of liberation in a territory that it dominates or seeks to dominate, or to strengthen its economic colonization of that territory.” While most of the evidence suggests that Mr. Yanukovych did not use the funds for the benefit of his country, it would be challenging for anyone to make the argument that Yanukovych used the $3 billion to quell insurrection.

In summary, given the lack of precedent in utilizing the “toxic debt” defense in cases where no revolutionary regime-change took place, the “toxic debt” defense is weak in Ukraine’s case. There is a small possibility that Ukraine could argue its bond debt to Russia is a “subjugation debt,” but here there is no precedent of such an argument being made when it has not been proven that the state leader who incurred this debt utilized the funds to quell an insurrection. Moreover, all of these considerations necessitate the assumption that the “odious debt” doctrine can be considered customary international law, which, on its own, is questionable. While, in theory, legal scholars might wish that such a norm had crystallized in the system, there appears to be no case in recent history where a tribunal has accepted the “toxic debt” defense. Moreover, there is a dearth of opinio juris et necessitatis, meaning that for the “toxic debt” defense to crystalize as customary international law in the future, we must not only see more states decline to pay “toxic debt,” but we must see more states officially argue that the reason for their forgoing repayment is their belief that they are absolved of the responsibility because of the “toxic debt” defense.

As I have argued, there is little chance that a “toxic debt” defense will exculpate Ukraine from paying Russia; so, the question remaining is, what might? In general, my perspective on international law derives from an economic perspective of international law similar to that advocated by Dunoff & Trachtman. Put colloquially, this is a legal perspective based on optimal welfare outcomes, not one based on any a priori assumptions of the morality and bindingness of international law. For this reason, the case of Ukraine offers an interesting case where Posner & Sykes’ argument of “efficient breach of international law” may pertain. The logic behind Posner’s “efficient breach” theory is that if the costs of compliance outweigh the costs of non-compliance, then a breach of international law—such as the customary law of repayments in Ukraine’s case—is efficient, and thus, can be an optimal remedy.

In the case of Ukraine’s sovereign debt, simple non-compliance with the law of repayments may be optimal. Differently stated, one of the best present legal strategies for Ukraine might simply be not to pay back Russia until they concede more in negotiations. The reasoning behind this ploy is simple: few entities aside from Russia are against Ukraine in the case of its bond debt. Most of its private international bondholders have already settled a restructuring package with Ukraine. Moody’s—the international rating agency—has made it clear that it expects Russia eventually to restructure Ukraine’s debt. Perhaps most importantly, however, is the surreptitious way in which the IMF has gone about altering its rules for aid provision, so as indirectly to show its support for Ukraine. On the 15th of December, the FT reported that the IMF decided “to change its strict policy prohibiting the fund from lending “to countries that are not making a good-faith effort to eliminate their arrears with creditors.” The decision was criticized by Moscow, as it will allow the IMF to continue doing business as usual with Kiev even if it fails to pay its sovereign debt to Russia.”

Most of the western world—i.e. most of the power players in international finance—are in Ukraine’s camp. Ukraine is trapped by a predatory bond deal orchestrated by a lecherous former leader with no desire to use the funds to strengthen Ukraine. While Ukraine has been left with a repugnant debt to pay, it is not one that meets the legal thresholds necessary to deem it “toxic debt.” That said, if one is willing to accept an economic perspective of international law in place of a moralistic one, then “efficient breach” seems to be both the current choice Ukraine has selected in proceeding to deal with its debt, as well as the legal course of action that may be most beneficial for Ukraine, as even the IMF—one of the most important entities with a role in determining Ukraine’s economic wellbeing—appears to be supporting Ukraine in its abstention from repayment by the accommodations it is making in its policies. With Russia’s foreign reserves tanking, and its economic outlook growing dimmer each day due to the plunging price of oil, it is likely that Russia will eventually take whatever they can get from Ukraine, and, like Moody’s predicted, will agree to restructure Ukraine’s debt after a period of suffering efficient breach.