The Human Rights of Migrant Asian Caregivers

Ms. Sondos Alqattan was a a social media influencer known for her makeup Instagram, which had up to 2.3 million followers. However, makeup companies have been pulling their support for Alqattan after she released a video of herself complaining about her Filipino domestic worker, and the day off every week that Filipino domestic workers are entitled to: "How can you have a servant at home who keeps their own passport with them? And what's worse is they have one day off every week. I don't want a Filipina maid anymore." Since the release and delete of this video, many responses from Twitter have included a #StopSlavery hashtag, the plight of domestic workers equated to a modern form of slavery. This circumstance of domestic caregivers from foreign countries is not isolated to Kuwait alone. Asia’s history of abuse towards foreign care workers is an antiquated and largely unaddressed violation of human rights, which in some cases results in the ultimate price. While systems may differ across countries, abuse is a consistent factor for the caregiver populations in many of the countries where migrants work.

Migrant domestic care workers, who are citizens of different countries traveling to another to provide labor, are essential components of the healthcare in Asian countries who suffer from population ageing and lack sustainable numbers in the caregiving industry. Some governments, such as those of Japan and Taiwan, implement programs that facilitate the migration of these care workers and provide a special status without giving citizenship. These foreign care workers hold professions such as nurses at hospitals or nursing homes, or work “under the table” as nannies and house cleaners. The situation for some of these workers, however, reveals the ethical dilemma of each host country independently establishing an appropriate process either through government regulation or private enterprise that ensures the preservation of caregivers’ and receivers’ rights, both of which are owed to them as citizens of a global community and protected under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Proper healthcare is a human right, as it encourages a life in which one is free to live as one pleases. Taking steps to nurture a healthy and prosperous population requires a tentative balance between government intervention and individual attention from caregivers’ employers and patients alike.

The abuse of those within the healthcare system significantly impedes a solution intended to relieve the relatives of the elderly, especially in countries with declining populations. Governments pass policy to mitigate this difficulty, but the regulation of migrant workers puts them in a vulnerable legal position, without the rights of citizenship to protect them. The rights of migrant workers are not just important, but imperative to the health care systems of countries who depend on them.

The systems and policies in place for foreign caregivers differ across countries. For example, Taiwan has the foreign live-in caregiver programme. This program restricts populations with temporary permits, and caregivers cannot bring their family members with them to Taiwan. Meanwhile, Japan restricts populations by only allowing in highly skilled workers, under several conditions, such as requiring a degree from a 4-year university for nursing. These regulations prevent problems with migrant populations, and provide an organized and regulated system which brings migrants a means of income for themselves and their families back home.

Graphic from the PEW Research Center.

In some countries, remittances account for a large section of a country’s GDP and experts believe that receiving income from family members working in other countries mitigates the effects of severe poverty. For some households, the work of a foreign caregiver is life or death. And yet, the regulation of live-in caregivers is poorly monitored, resulting in  government regulation that is not effective outside of the migration process. This leaves live-in caregivers in a precarious position when facing abuse by their employers, especially when caregivers live in the homes they work in. In fact, exploitation of care workers is more likely in a domestic setting than in a non-domestic setting.

The impacts of the difficult nature of regulating domestic care worker conditions are notably demonstrated in the difficulties of Singapore. Singapore does not strongly enforce any policies about the condition of domestic caregivers, due to difficulties imposing such policies and Singaporean fears of overdependence on these migrant workers. Some in Singapore fear that a focus on rectifying inefficiencies such as migrant caregiver abused could bolster that overdependence.

As a result, the extent of abuse and maltreatment of caregivers and receivers is unknown in Singapore. The degree to which a government enforces its policies and caters them to the needs of migrant workers, both through institutions and through household employment, is more important than whether those policies are established in the first place. Policies can be effective in theory and be poor in implementation. In the case of migrant workers in Asian countries, the policies regarding their residence in their country of work are more strictly enforced in comparison to policies regarding their rights. A means of remedying this ethical dilemma lies within proper documentation and deeper statistical analysis of domestic caregiver abuses. While this requires participation and diligence from both analysts and victims of abuse alike, a lack of data yields no progress. Therefore, NGOs should work in tandem with governments to share data and encourage domestic caregivers to share their experiences, so that both parties understand the depth and requirements of both the caregivers and the entities they work for.

The Fate of Kyrgyzstan Institutionalism

When discussions arise over multilateralism and international institutions, organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization of American States (OAS), the European Union (EU), and, of course, the United Nations (UN) are often the central focus. Little, if any, attention is given to non-Western-centric international bodies, leaving out many regional and cooperative initiatives. One such region is Central Asia, a region void of official organizations to unite the five former Soviet republics. Additionally, the region has never experienced a culture of institutionalism or liberal democracy. Kyrgyzstan had its first peaceful transition of power between leaders without a revolution in October 2017, but this event was the first of its kind, not only in the former Soviet republic, but also in all of Central Asia. Additionally, in the lead up to the October elections, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan experienced a border spat, causing a massive logistical headache for trade and migration between the two states. However, the diplomatic rhetoric between Almaty and Bishkek has changed in recent times, reflecting a warming of relations in the region. None of this is to say that Central Asia is ripe for international liberalism. Still, the five Central Asian republics, with especial emphasis on Kazakh-Kyrgyz relations, highlight the importance of regional cooperation despite the presence of heavyweight neighboring actors like China and Russia.

The aforementioned border dispute between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan took place weeks before the Kyrgyz elections when then-President Almazbek Atambayev lashed out at the neighboring country for allegedly backing presidential candidate Omurbek Babanov. Almaty rebutted by drastically increasing border security, maintaining “the increased scrutiny had to do with concerns about contraband and smuggling of goods from China via Kyrgyzstan and other weaknesses in Kyrgyzstan’s veterinary and sanitary controls on exported goods.” However, this standoff had been brewing in the discussion rooms for several years. Since joining the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in 2015, the benefits have been unevenly felt in Kyrgyzstan. Those who work outside of the country were optimistic. Up to 25-30% of Kyrgyzstan's GDP comes from income earned outside of the country, almost entirely from workers living in Russia, who saw the EEU as a way for the Kremlin to cut red tape around Kyrgyz workers. On the other side of the economic picture, small business owners feared the mandatory tariffs EEU members place on non-members. For Kyrgyzstan, that meant an increase in prices of cheap goods from neighboring China. This disparity has led to economic anxiety for some citizens, with mixed rhetoric coming from Bishkek. These feels culminated in backlash towards Kazakhstan, who was already suspicious of the amount of contraband goods flowing from China to Kazakhstan via Kyrgyzstan.

Newly elected Kyrgyz President Jeenbekov was quick to reverse the diplomatic squabble made by his predecessor and mentor. On November 30, Jeenbekov and Nazarbayev “agreed to work out a plan to resolve the two-months bottleneck at the shared border. Starting December 4, all vehicles started passing the Kazakh-Kyrgyz border without any delays.” Kazakh-Kyrgyz relations were thus normalized. Several weeks later, the two men reconvened to discuss and sign a slew of diplomatic and economic documents “aimed at the further deepening the Kazakh-Kyrgyz cooperation. Those include the treaty on the demarcation of the Kazakh-Kyrgyz state border and the agreement on the state border regime,” President Nazarbayev stated. On the surface, it was a sign of diplomatic realignment and reestablishing or relations between the two republics. However, it was also an indication of how bilateral cooperation was possible without outside interference. Russia and China, both of whom have much at stake in Central Asia due to the region’s rich supply of oil and natural gas, did not need to step in to settle the dispute. Rather, both parties saw it as a regional issue that required a regional solution.

This sense of regional self-reliance was seen again in the March 2018 Central Asian summit of all five of the former Soviet republics of Central Asia in Astana. It was the first summit between all the heads of state in nearly a decade and the first since the death of the divisive Uzbek leader Islam Karimov in September 2016. The move was a shock to the international community. President Nazarbayev described it as a “new mood” and confidently stated “There is no need to call an outsider to resolve issues of the Central Asian nations, we are able to resolve everything ourselves -- that is why we are meeting.” However, the official title of the summit was a consultative meeting, “in an obvious effort not to raise eyebrows in Moscow. No documents from the meeting were adopted.” While it is by no means liberal institutionalism’s most recent crowning achievement, the Central Asian republics are learning that there is far more to gain collectively than when divided. The added decision that such consultative meetings take place each year in late March adds to the optimistic rhetoric of budding multilateralism in Central Asia. It is a declaration, albeit a soft one, to China and Russia that the five republics are capable of functioning as a single unit.

Looking to the future, the role of this consultative structure is unlikely to expand in scope. Russia still plays a major role in all political decisions. However, that is the extent to which the Kremlin’s influence is seen in 2018. China’s One Belt One Road Initiative may still be in an embryonic stage, but the potential benefits for the region are profound. As Marlene Laruelle of the George Washington University Central Asia Program writes in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, “[Beijing] is the only country that can mobilize huge investment in the region, far beyond what Western countries and Russia can offer.” On the other hand, these investments do not necessarily benefit the entire country as a whole. Corruption is still very prevalent in Central Asia, so the funds may instead go to the political elite and oligarchs. Regardless, the One Belt One Road Initiative will undoubtedly reshape the geopolitical landscape. Whether or not that leads to greater regional autonomy, one involving formalized institutions, or a down a path of an elite flushed with foreign investment funds with no multilateralism to speak of is yet to be seen. That being said, those two options are not mutually exclusive.

The five Central Asian republics, with especial emphasis on Kazakh-Kyrgyz relations, highlight the importance of regional cooperation despite the presence of heavyweight neighboring actors like China and Russia. Economic anxieties seeped their way from small business owners up to Bishkek decision makers, resulting in a diplomatic row with Kazakhstan. The issues have since resolved, although the back and forth rhetoric over the merits and losses of Kyrgyzstan joining the EEU is still fervent. Regardless, Kazak-Kyrgyz relations are back on track and the latter is continuing to implement reforms to meet the former’s request on imported goods. Additionally, there is a new diplomatic aura emerging from Central Asia. It is not necessarily analogous to European integration, but a step towards multilateralism nonetheless. Whether or not that step becomes a trek relies heavily on how China’s investment in the region changes the geopolitical landscape.

Fault Lines in the Groundwork: The Shortcomings of New Public Management in Asian Nations

It would be foolhardy to roll a die six times and expect the same outcome. So too it is illogical to assume that a specific theory of government will have the same results in every context in which it is implemented. New Public Management (NPM) is a government theory that attempts to revise the role of the government, taking a ‘results focused’ approach to measure the success of government operations. It attempts to achieve this by cutting government costs through a privatization of government service providers, changing the role of civil servants to that of ‘public managers,’ whose success is at the mercy of the free market. Traditional theories conceptualize the role of civil servants as public administrators, who are responsible for coordinating and providing designated services to their government’s constituents, and who are subservient to a higher bureaucratic authority. NPM reconceptualizes the role of public servants as public managers, empowered with greater autonomy and achieved through widespread decentralization, deregulation, and downsizing. Yet, NPM’s use of the free market to control the provision of government services is a dangerous endeavor, for when a private actor fails to provide such services, there is no other institution for constituents to turn to except for other private actors that have an equal propensity to fail. In Asia, NPM reforms have risen to prevalence based on their success in the Global North. Due to the vastly different environments and contexts of governments across Asia, New Public Management cannot be relied upon to achieve the same results it did in the Global North.

Understanding New Public Management

Traditional views of public administration theorize the government as a provider of civil services, while New Public Management revises the role of the government to be the coordinator of the provision of civil services. Traditional theories of government are largely based on the theories of German political theorist Max Weber, who posited that control is exerted from the top down. Thus, the government, in Weber’s eyes, aims to create a system that enables its constituents to live happy, healthy, productive lives. In this model of governance, the civil servant who is responsible for providing for certain components of the public good is directly subservient to their superior. Weber argues that civil servants must be the opposite of politicians, for while politicians passionately debate how the public good should be provided for, bureaucrats are to execute the orders of their superiors without political conscience. This is not to say that the civil servant is a husk of a human operating robotically; rather, they are meant to apolitically serve the people’s best interests, as laid out by their superiors. The bureaucrats administering civil services must be apolitical because they cannot risk varying their provision of services based on the vacillations of political thought. Instead of being amoral, they are constantly pursuing the moral good of adequately providing for the public. This necessitates providing for the good of all constituents equally, unburdened by partisan bias. While we often hear complaints concerning ‘bureaucrats,’ we cannot fault the civil servants, for they are a necessary part of any polity that provides for a large nation of constituents. While NPM intends to decentralize government in order to increase its effectiveness, decentralization does not necessitate privatization. Thus, the bureaucracy criticized by proponents of New Public Management is a necessary part of any government. Indeed, decentralization can be achieved by creating further reaching levels of public administrators, who are directly a part of the government. As postulatedby scholar James P. Pfiffner, “Similarly the exhortations to devolve or decentralize within government does not mean abandoning bureaucracy as a form of organization. It merely means shifting some functions from a large, centralized bureaucracy to smaller or geographically separated bureaucracies.” Pfiffner forwards that, through a multi-level bureaucracy,  the ‘customer focused’ service can be achieved without privatizing the provision of necessary civil services. In opposition to such conjecture, New Public Management turns to the private market to achieve the same decentralization and downsizing.

A Frayed Framework

New Public Management theorists laud NPM as a universal theory, capable of enhancing the outcomes of any government while simultaneously lowering costs. NPM attempts to achieve these ends by privatizing the provision of government services. NPM theorists hypothesize that actors that are contracted to provide such services and fail will be surpassed by actors who are more capable of providing for the public good. In reality, market-lead capitalism as a form of government is anarchy, for each enterprise inherently privileges the good of itself over the good of the public. NPM arises from the junction of desires to curb government growth: a push for privatization, a want for automation, and a desire for a more international approach to governance. In practice, the theory suffers from the ‘cargo cult’ phenomenon, wherein its spread persists despite repeated demonstrations of its failures. The aims of NPM to increase productivity, reactivity, and flexibility by delegating greater discretion to public servants are meritorious. Yet, the methods through which NPM attempts to achieve these goals yield results that differ depending on the context that they are enacted in.  

Allocating public funds to employ private contractors in nations with limited public administration budgets spawns more risks than benefits. While decreased regulation and increased privatization may work well in highly industrialized service economies with a relatively small population, such as New Zealand and Liechtenstein, the failings of NPM become clear in nations where the populace demands more from their government. Traditional administrations’ bureaucrats are held accountable by their superiors, whereas, in NPM, any public manager’s “decisions are acceptable as long as they legally produce the goods or services under contract,” as is further elucidated by Professor Pfiffner. Yet, therein lies the problem, for when such contractors fail to produce goods or services, there is no reliable contingency plan, and no goods are provided to the constituents. A key component of the discussion surrounding NPM is the amount of trust that can safely be placed in the private market to provide for crucial services that support the public good. In traditional administration, the most highly qualified candidates are hired, while in NPM it is left up to the invisible hand of the free market. Instead of measuring performance based on traditional measures, NPM quantifies success by an actor’s ability to achieve a goal at a given cost. This can result in contractors cutting corners and utilizing stop-gap measures to provide the services that they are hired to. It is necessary to analyze case studies to understand if New Public Management is capable of successfully operationalizing the free market to provide for the public good.

Understanding the Implications

In Asia, New Public Management’s reforms were undertaken by modernizing economies in order to cut costs while more effectively responding to citizen demands. Certain Asian nations attempted such revisions of the role of government in order to entice greater Foreign Direct Investment. These governments hoped that “Small government” would encourage foreign interestdue to its low levels of regulation and the high potential for private industry growth, but constituents were hurt in the process. In the Research Journal of Business Management, Thai Scholar Kulachet Mongkol utilizes a compelling metaphor to demonstrate the failings of NPM in Asia: Imagine that Asian nations are sitting down to dinner in a restaurant. Singapore and Malaysia are enthusiastic diners, with long experience creating and adapting their public bureaucracies; the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia are ‘cautious diners,’ for they have limited experience with privatization but still rely on central control; and Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia are diners unfamiliar with the menu. This metaphor illustrates the variety of different contexts that NPM is hypothesized to be broadly beneficial in. Clearly, given the vastly different circumstances of different Asian nations, NPM cannot be expected to yield the same results in each context. While NPM is theorized to be universally applicable, its outcomes depend largely on the preexisting government in the state attempting to implement it. Figure 1, below, demonstrates the incongruity of anticipating the same results from NPM in radically disparate environs. The differences outlined between the “Reform leaders” and the “Reform laggards” are clearly abundant, illustrating the absurdity of expecting the reforms of NPM to achieve the same results in both contexts.

Graphic created by Ramanie Samaratunge, Quamrul Alam and Julian Teicher.

Indeed, the strongly centrally and controlled and slowly growing Sri Lanka, and the deeply intertwined public and private sectors of Bangladesh, cannot expectto see the same results from NPM-oriented reforms as Singapore and Malaysia, both of which have successful export-oriented economies that enjoy a high level of growth. The success of NPM heavily relies on a mature private sector. Furthermore, NPM creates new ‘consultocrats,’ as termed by Hood, who leach government money that could be spent on providing services to people. These ‘consultocrats’ are similar to what development scholars term ‘beltway bandits,’ profiting off the industry that has developed from the privatization of government services. In the United Kingdom, the Committee of Public Accounts estimated that close to 18 percent of all government spending on management consultants wasted. NPM can only operate universally when it is utilized by governments with the same goals and objectives, such as EU states, but when it is used by disparate actors, it unsurprisingly yields different results.

The guiding principles of NPM emerged from the highly advanced Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development member state economies, yet these economies contrast drastically with those discussed in Asia. NPM doesn’t achieve its desired results when states lack the necessary expertise and reliable information systems. In governments with weak internal oversight, NPM can also fall victim to corruption and nepotism due to the awarding of contracts. In Bangladesh, law enforcement officials revealed a ring of unscrupulous public managers who compiled a list of candidates specifically designated for appointments and promotions. Governments that are hoping to grow their private sectors cannot rely on their private sectors to govern, for those are the sectors themselves that are intended to grow. In Sri Lanka, the 13th amendment to the constitution and the Provincial Council Act No. 42 intended to create a government that was more responsive to the needs of its people by establishing independent provincial councils entrusted with broad autonomy and powers. Yet, because these councils lacked significant bureaucratic support, they did not have the political guidance necessary to enact effective, ultimately failing to achieve their objectives. Similarly, without effective enforcement in nations utilizing private contractors, there is no insurance that contracts will be satisfactorily fulfilled. In nations where citizens anticipate the failure of public services, the ‘invisible hand’ of the free market will fail to regulate failing private actors, for citizens will not complain about contractors failing to meet their needs. Thus, New Public Management cannot be relied upon to deliver the results it was lauded for in OECD economies when utilized in Asian economies.

Conclusion

New Public Management is not malignant in its conception but can be counterproductive when implemented in the improper context. To be successful, NPM must be used in small nations where the private sector is already highly developed. When nations that do not have the capacity to ensure that the contracts they allot will be satisfactorily fulfilled, NPM will inhibit the provision of government services. The role of government is to provide for the good of the people, and that role must stand the test of revisionist ideologies such as New Public Management that attempt to shift that responsibility to private actors.

Defining Duterte’s Impact in the Philippines

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has stood as a highly controversial figure. Some people see him as the savior, and others the destruction of the Republic of the Philippines. Former mayor of Davao and now in the Southeast Asian nation’s most powerful position, Duterte has received extreme scrutiny from other world leaders as well as the global public for not just his policy, but his language as well. A man of controversy and of much debated exultation and criticism, His infamous policy of Extra Judicial Killings (EJK), which are essentially killings without proper justice proceedings and usually in response to the belief of undesirable relationships with corrupted officials or individuals. In the case of the Philippines, the victims are often people believed to have had affiliations with drug dealers, regardless of whether or not those accusations were true. However, the controversy of Duterte’s presidency is more than just a question of policy, but also a symbol of what the people of the Philippines have been frustrated with for decades. Scoring a 35 on the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), corruption is not of the past for the Philippines. Despite all that he is discriminated for, Duterte has an agenda in the Philippines, and many Filipinos believe he is exactly who deserves to be at the head of Filipino politics.

The revival of extrajudicial killings has led to polarized reactions. While this is not necessarily a new development on the global stage or in the Philippines, the resulting protests call for the end of unfair killings and for the return of due process. The policy was reinstated by the now president in an attempt to incite a war on drugs, as Duterte had even promised to kill his own children if they were commit the same crime he was punishing petty criminals and drug pushes for. Duterte has been compared to being “The Trump of the East”, both being known for their unruly and undiplomatic behavior. The former Davao mayor has been now associated with reformation and more popularly known for his populist course of action for the nation.

However, others have said that the two are entirely different. “The Philippines knows what it is getting. With Trump, America is looking at the unknown,” claims Charlie Campbell from Time. Amongst all the narratives surrounding Duterte, as a malicious dictator or a benevolent despot, in the shadows of colonial history an origin story of Philippines that goes unnoticed behind the curtains of modernity. With approximately a 78.4% voter turnout, Duterte won the majority vote with 16.6 million votes, 96.14% of the votes being processed. While not an overwhelming win, how does a man such as Duterte, who so outwardly made clear his unapologetic attitude towards sexual assault and his avowed hatred towards the drug dealers ravaging Philippine society win the vote of over 15 million people? Are the people of the Philippines the same way? He did not hide his agenda during his candidacy; he made it very clear that his intention was to eradicate drugs from the Philippines. And the people voted for him.

The path to independence for the Philippine islands is one wrought with blood and tribulation. Originally a territory of the Spanish empire, the United States took the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Cuba in 1898. In a show of rebellion, anti-colonial Filipino nationalists fought back against United States’ imperial occupation in a bloody struggle that would come to be known as the Philippine-American War. During this time, the Americans ran a pacification campaign that led to the destruction of property and the torture and slaughter of Filipino civilians. Only after a bloody war between Filipino nationalists and American imperialists was the Philippines subjugated, eventually leading to the movement of Filipino labor abroad. During the course of this brief but brutal war lasting from 1899 to 1902, 4,200 American and 20,000 Filipino combatants died during the battles, while 200,000 Filipinos perished from famine, disease, and the ensuing violence.

Since the United States permitted Philippine independence in 1946, the Philippine still suffers from great poverty, and has yet to make significant progress economically and in terms of human rights. Despite having been a territory of the United State and, having their government modeled after American constitutional law, the islands are ravaged by poverty. The economy especially suffered during the time of President Ferdinand Marcos, and since has not recovered from his policies. According to the Asia Development Bank, 21.1% of the Philippines lives below the poverty line. Some people are unable to afford food to eat. Entire villages and cities are often poor, especially in the city of Manilla, so poor that they rely on food from the trash of the middle class for sustenance. In consequence to debilitating poverty comes the rampant crime. In the Philippines in Figures 2017 report from the Philippines Statistics Authority, the instances of known drug or substance only in rehabilitation figures is on the rise since 2012, starting at 2,744 cases in 2012 and rising to 4,392 in 2014. The crime in the Philippines gives rise to general discontent in Filipino citizens.

This historical deficiency, perpetuated by unstable oligarchies and frequent practice of cronyism was especially emphasized on September 22, 1972, when then President Ferdinand Marcos announced that the Philippines would be under martial law, which some viewed as a deviation from the American ideals and values that were taught so avidly by American colonizers. The reason for this sudden change is that the instances of crime in the city Manila had risen so high that it required military intervention to mitigate. The result however, was more abuses of human rights. Marcos used this power to suppress freedom of speech and expression. Military often abused their authority, and participated in bribery, unjust killing, and the like. President Duterte received extreme criticism when he allowed for Marco’s body to be honored as a war hero, some viewing it as a betrayal to all the sufferings their families suffered as a result of Marcos’ martial law. Even later, some even began to think that Duterte would become much like Marcos himself, in that he would respond with martial law with the rising unrest in southern Philippines, concerning the people of Mindanao and the Moro Islamist Liberation Front (MILF). Fears became reality when Duterte finally declared that the entire island of Mindanao would fall under martial law, in the hopes of capturing the Islamist terrorist leader Isnilon Hapilon.

However, the conflict reached its climax when, during the fighting in Marawi city, Hapilon and the main leaders of MILF were killed, and Duterte released Marawi city from martial law. While the fighting within the Philippines is not yet over, it is suffice to say that Duterte’s actions played a part in this culmination of events, regardless of whether one views the results of Duterte’s actions as a good or bad occurrence. Duterte represents the anger of the Philippines as a nation if not for his “war on drugs,” then for change in the Philippines. The narrative of the Philippines that stands so long forgotten is that the history of the Philippines is wrought with violence and inequality, resulting in frustrated population looking for change. Whether Duterte is, at the core, a good president or not is debatable. History may have the last word on that debate. But Duterte may not be the cause of the Philippine’s problems, but rather the answer of the people to a history of struggle and poverty.

Kyrgyzstan’s Electoral Dilemma

Between Kyrgyzstan declaring its independence in 1991 and 2016, the Central Asian republic has had three presidents. However, only one was elected into office. The following two were installed as part of a transition government following the First and Second Tulip Revolution in 2005 and 2010, respectively. The First Tulip Revolution was over fixed, disputed election results. It resulted in a transition government led by the opposition party’s leader Kurmanbek Bakiyev. Yet just five years later, the Kyrgyz people became fed up with Bakiyev’s complacency with government corruption, nepotism, and stagnation with opposition parties. He was continuing many of the same practices as that of his predecessor, causing discontent among the Kyrgyz public. Protesters stormed government buildings throughout southern Kyrgyzstan and a few days later, the Presidential Palace in the country’s capital Bishkek. The First Tulip Revolution was bloodless, while the Second left between 40 and 100 dead. It set a precedent for the former Soviet republic that only revolution could create change. Democracy was a dream that had yet to be realized.

The democratic dream gained some breath this past October in Kyrgyzstan’s first competitive elections since its independence. Almazbek Atambayev was succeeded by Sooronbay Jeenbekov in the country’s first peaceful transition of power. Jeenbekov is the former prime minister of Kyrgyzstan, having served from April 2016 to August 2017, when he was nominated by the ruling Social Democrat Party to run as their presidential candidate. His main rival was Omurek Babanov, a millionaire businessman-turned-politician who leads the Respublika opposition party who also served as prime minister from December 2011 to September 2012. They were joined on the campaign trail by nine other candidates – including one woman. Jeenbekov relied on his close relations with Atambayev, who personally endorsed him. The president-elect vowed on the trail to continue the policies pursued by Atambayev. Babanov, meanwhile, promised “a crackdown on corruption, constitutional reform to reintroduce presidential rule, and more effective foreign policy.” In a turnout of 56%, Jeenbekov received 54% of the casted votes, thereby making a runoff election with Babanov unnecessary. However, not all are completely satisfied with the election results. The October elections were a success in that they created a peaceful transition of power from one president to another, although Kyrgyzstan has much to work on to become a full-fledged, liberal democracy.

In the run-up to the election, the campaign trails encountered several snags that worried voters and international observers over the legitimacy and peacefulness of the elections. Yet international observers including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) noted instances of abuse of public resources, pressure on voters, and vote buying in the weeks and months leading up to the election. The OSCE also wrote in the same report how registration laws to run for president “provide overly broad grounds for candidate deregistration, despite previous OSCE/ODIHR recommendations.” The OSCE additionally concurred with “concerns, noting that while technical aspects were ‘well-administered,’ and that candidates could campaign freely, public resources were misused in the run-up to the election.” In other words, while all candidates were able to freely advertise their campaign without censorship, teachers and government officials were forced to support Jeenbekov. Lastly, Kyrgyz citizens living abroad were denied the right to vote – omitting thousands of voters. Thus, while Kyrgyzstan has set itself apart from its more authoritarian neighbors, the country’s electoral system has many flaws that need to be improved.

The situation became even tenser after Babanov, who once resided in Kazakhstan, met in September with Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev. During the meeting, Babanov mentioned that the Kyrgyz people “appreciate and support the peacemaking efforts” of President Nazarbayev. By painting Nazarbayev as the hero, Babanov simultaneously showed himself as the representative of Kyrgyzstan and outmaneuvered the sitting president Almazbek Atambayev. In other words, Babanov began acting as president before being elected. President Atambayev railed against him and “publicly deplored the alleged Kazakh meddling in Kyrgyz internal affairs, pointing to the Kazakh government’s control.” The blunder dealt a political deathblow to Babanov’s campaign and sparked a standoff between the two Central Asian states. After Atambayev’s remarks, Kazakhstan on October 10 reintroduced border controls and customs checks to Kyrgyzstan and partially suspended the import of dairy products, which was then followed by the Kyrgyz parliament voting “to rescind an agreement to receive $100 million from Kazakhstan…. It is an ‘own goal’ of epic proportions.” The move is likely only going to hurt Kyrgyzstan more than Kazakhstan. The former desperately needs to grow its domestic industry and economy, which would have been aided by Kazakhstan’s aid. Currently Kyrgyzstan is one of the most remittance-dependent countries in the world (30% of the GDP in 2016, estimated at 37.1% for 2017). Bishkek joined the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in 2015 as a way to integrate its economy with those of its more developed neighbors. However, this standoff with Kazakhstan has raised questions over Kyrgyzstan’s future with the EEU. That being said, since its citizens are so dependent on foreign income, the chances of Bishkek leaving is minimal. Nonetheless, Radio Free Europe writes how this dispute highlights “the weakness of the Russian- and Kazakh-led [EEU].”

        On October 15, Election Day finally arrived. Polls opened and closed with few problems reported across the country. The Diplomat reports, “The election itself proceeded peacefully in most localities except Osh, the second-largest city in the country, and Jeenbekov’s home region. Here, it was marred by allegations of ballot destruction, intimidation, and violence towards reporters.” Jeenbekov began his political career in Osh, which raises question if there is any significance in this correlation. However, there is no information as to why only Osh experienced these issues. Nonetheless, they were not enough to warrant the elections invalid. Babanov accepted the results at a press conference where he said, “The people have made their choice,” but also adding, “State television channels were used to pour dirt on us. There was a black PR [campaign] against us. Our campaign activists were abused; they did not know whom to turn to as law enforcement was also one-sided.” While Babanov’s backhanded concession speech was just a small part of a brutal election campaign, the Kyrgyz election has its merits. Of the five Central Asian states that were once part of the Soviet Union, this marks the first peaceful transition of power from one president to another through the form of an election. Artur Gerasymov, Head of the OSCE delegation observing the elections, called the election “an important benchmark for the Kyrgyz Republic…. I hope that the positive developments we have seen will serve as the basis for a consolidation of democracy in this country and in the region.” That being said, Jeenbakov has his work cut out for him. His country’s GDP has shrunk by 12% in the past three years and is now in a diplomatic spat with neighboring Kazakhstan. Furthermore, with a turnout of 56%, only about three in ten Kyrgyz voted for Jeenbekov. Considering that Babanov was backed by a third of the electorate, Jeenbekov is walking a tightrope.

The October elections were a success in that they created a peaceful transition of power from one president to another. However, Kyrgyzstan has much to work on to become a full-fledged, liberal democracy. The elections were fraught with misuse of public resources, reports of voter intimidation, vote buying, and alleged media bias towards Jeenbekov. However, this election marks the first peaceful transition of power in Central Asia among the five former Soviet republics. The run-up to the election caused tensions to spark between Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan over presidential candidate Babanov’s meeting with Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, triggering a string of events that have entrenched the two republics in a diplomatic spat. President Jeenbekov has a wide range of issues to fix with high expectations set on him by the electorate. Only time will tell if the democratic dream in Central Asia will remain an idea or manifest itself into a free, fair, sustainable form of governance.

Under Pressure: Resource Scarcity and The Specter of Radicalization in Central Asia

The issue of Islamist terrorism in Central Asia has gained international attention recently, with the news that the main suspect in the October 31st terrorist attack in New York City, Sayfullo Saipov, was originally from Uzbekistan. Many accounts of why and how Central Asians have become radicalized by the Islamic State focus on repressive governments and a lack of religious freedom throughout the region. Dissatisfaction with social and political conditions is a motivating factor with regards to extremism, but extremism is not as rampant in Central Asia, and Uzbekistan specifically, as recent coverage would suggest. In fact, most Central Asian perpetrators of terrorist acts were radicalized after they left the region. Saipov himself was radicalized in the United States. The few attacks committed by Uzbeks over the past few years have more “lone wolf” characteristics than indications of a greater hotbed of terrorist activity. An issue that is often left unexamined can explain more about why some Central Asians who leave the region turn to extremism. Resource scarcity, especially scarcity of already limited water resources, has the potential to exacerbate existing identity-based conflicts and overburden the capacity of Central Asian governments to effectively deal with those conflicts. A significant problem in its own right, scarcity also creates conditions that can lead to radicalization.

The best place to examine this phenomenon is in the Fergana Valley. Fergana has been a flashpoint for ethnic conflict since the area was divided between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan under the Soviet Union. Although the twisted borders that trisect the valley seem senseless, they were carefully designed to prevent the rise of a viable political challenger to Moscow in Central Asia. Because borders between Soviet republics under centralized administrative control did not hinder freedom of movement, the consequences of this decision would not be fully realized until the fall of the Soviet Union.

After the five former Central Asian Soviet Socialist Republics gained independence in 1991, the rambling Fergana borders took on a new and troublesome significance. Reinforced by nascent nationalism, travel between countries was restricted and arbitrary demarcations were rigidly enforced. The Fergana Valley holds some of Uzbekistan’s most fertile agricultural land as well as a disproportionate percentage of its population— 26.9 percent to 4.3 percent of the country’s total land area. Uzbekistan relies heavily on its Fergana-based cotton industry and is one of the top cotton-producing countries globally. During the Soviet era, the limited water sources that irrigated the valley and its fields were managed under a large-scale resource sharing system.

Water-sharing under the Soviet Union was essentially a barter system. Central Asia’s two largest rivers, the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya, originate in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and then flow parallel to each other across the steppe. Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan are located downstream and rely on the upstream countries to store water in dams for release in the spring and summer months. In exchange for the ability to irrigate their crops, the downstream countries provided Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan with electricity, coal, and other thermal resources. With Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan lacking surplus electricity midway through the 1990s, the arrangement collapsed a few short years after the end of Soviet rule.

Now, absent a unified water management system, even one geared towards maximizing water-intensive cotton production, tensions between upstream and downstream countries have grown. Uzbekistan has opposed Tajikistan’s construction of the Rogun Dam on a major tributary of the Amu Darya since the plan’s inception. The late Uzbek President Islam Karimov declared on multiple occasions that Rogun, as well as Kyrgyzstan’s proposed Kambarata-I Dam on the Naryn River, could lead to war in Central Asia. Turkmenistan’s fancifully named “Golden Age Lake” project has drawn further ire as the immense amount of water needed to complete the artificial lake may require Turkmenistan to siphon water from the Syr Darya. There are also fears that Golden Age Lake will evaporate soon after being filled, recalling the predicament of the Aral Sea which has shrunk by 90 percent in the past half-century. The Kerkidan reservoir, once shared by Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, is little more than a puddle. In Central Asia, as in the rest of the world, control of water means greater economic prosperity and security. Uzbekistan finds itself in the precarious position of supporting a vast and costly cotton industry while neighboring states pull from its already strained water supply.

Compounding this budding crisis are astounding population projections for Central Asia. Although most post-Soviet states are facing dismal population declines, all five Central Asian countries will see varying degrees of growth. Between 2015 and 2100, the United Nations predicts that Tajikistan will have a population growth of 119 percent, followed by Kyrgyzstan with a projected growth of 52 percent. Uzbekistan is the only Fergana Valley state that will not see growth in the double digits, but the overall population boom slated for the valley is significant enough to cause concern. A declining population creates challenges, but an enormous population increase in an already fraught region comes with its own set of problems, including placing a further burden on the availability of land and water.

Migrant labor has always been a safety valve for the pressures of overpopulation and unemployment. Congruent with this fact, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan all receive the equivalent of billions of dollars in remittances from migrant workers. As of 2016, some 20 percent of the labor force of Uzbekistan works in Russia, Kazakhstan, or a Western country. However, in the last few years, Russia has mandated that workers from non-member nations of the Eurasian Economic Union, including Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, are no longer allowed to enter Russia without an international passport. This is part of a Russian effort to put pressure on states that have not yet joined the Union. Since Russia is a primary destination for migrant workers, the new visa regime delivered a hard blow to economies and unemployment rates in Central Asia. In his testimony during a 2015 Helsinki Commission hearing on “The Escalating Threat of ISIL in Central Asia,” Daniel Rosenblum, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Central Asia at the U.S. State Department, clarified the link between migrant labor and radicalization. Lacking the supportive family and community structures of home and facing discrimination and isolation in Russia, Central Asian laborers are extremely susceptible to the tactics of extremist recruiters.

As Thomas Homer-Dixon emphasizes in his book Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, environmental scarcity is not a sufficient motivator of violence on its own, but it can be powerful when combined with specific social and political factors. In the Fergana Valley, existing ethnic tensions cause disputes over land and water to escalate into violent conflict. The 1990 Osh Riots erupted over a plot of farmland in the Fergana Valley claimed by both the Kyrgyz majority and Uzbek minority. Almost exactly twenty years later, the 2010 South Kyrgyzstan Riots saw violence explode after the ousting of former Kyrgyz president Kurmanbek Bakiyev. Many Uzbeks living in Kyrgyz regions of the valley have since turned to migrant labor in Russia to escape discrimination from Kyrgyz authorities. Osh is now one of the largest sources of Uzbek Islamic State fighters in Central Asia.

There’s an unwise tendency in the aftermath of a terrorist attack to generalize about the perpetrator or perpetrators. However, this reaction should not come at the expense of an entire group of people, or an entire region of the world. U.S.-Uzbekistan relations are currently stronger and more open than they have been in decades as a result of the efforts of new President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. Another hopeful development has been the new Uzbek administration’s position on the Rogun Dam issue. As Tajikistan restarted construction in the wake of former President Karimov’s death, Uzbekistan remained silent on what was once a possible path to war. This symbolic inaction may pave the way for future water-sharing agreements, or possibly a reworking of the old Soviet system to suit a more modern economy. A stable economy and more employment for a growing population can reduce the need for migrant labor and in turn reduce the opportunity for radicalization. But more importantly, eliminating the economic instability and resource insecurity that is an ever-present danger in Central Asia will create opportunities for the region to be known for more than the actions of a few individuals. Uzbekistan faces many issues, but the Islamic State is not chief among them.

Oppositional Identities: The Pitfalls of Postcolonial Identity Creation in Mongolia

As nations emerge from beneath the fold of colonial empires, they are faced with the task of differentiating themselves from their former sovereigns, yet while colonial nations had the luxury of centuries to try and test their identities, postcolonial nations are forced to hastily construct modern identities immediately after achieving their independence. The immense pressure to instantaneously distinguish themselves from their colonizers results in postcolonial nations often adopting modes of identity creation that give way to further long term hardship. One of these such pitfalls in postcolonial identity creation is the tendency to fall into the trap of grounding new identities purely in opposition to their former sovereigns. While responding to the damage done to postcolonial nations by the colonial project is an innate component of their postcolonial nations’ identity negotiation, new identities that are rooted exclusively in opposition fail to subvert the damaging material and cultural structures of colonialism that can remain latent and malicious if not deracinated by the development of entirely independent identities. The formation of a liberated and autonomous identity is an act of postcolonial resistance, yet if former members of the subaltern fail to develop identities beyond overt opposition, their identity is still inherently tied to the existence of their former oppressors. Postcolonial nations face further difficulty when undertaking efforts to economically develop, because the years of colonial exploitation often restructured their economies to be centered on the extraction of resources, without providing the technological means to even be able to extract such resources independently. The case study of Mongolia provides a quintessential example to understand the ways that postcolonial nations can fall victim to relying on oppositional identities through. While unique and independent musical and religious movements are developing in Mongolia, both movements have been closely tied to Mongolian nativist movements, and their focus on opposing external powers has delayed the development of independent cultural movements. Both the emerging Mongolian rap music scene and the resurgence of the shamanistic Tengriism religion have been tainted by nationalistic rhetoric. Problematically, the external powers, which newly created identities rely on opposing, are also some of the largest sources of the direct investment that many postcolonial nations’ economies depend upon. Opposed to following the problematic colonial model of identity creation and yielding to the simplicity of founding postcolonial identities on opposition to an ‘Other,’ true transcendence of colonial systems of oppression necessitates the development of identities founded on entirely independent ideology.

Identity creation is an integral component of truly pushing the influences of colonialism into the past in any postcolonial nation, giving citizens a way to differentiate themselves from their former rulers, yet too often this identity formation mirrors the failures of the colonial project by rooting itself in rejecting an epistemologically constructed ‘Other.’ Identities are not a monolithic entity that can be awakened from the miasma of our unconscious, but instead must be artificially invented based upon some central principles or values, as taught by Benedict Anderson in his book Imagined Communities. It is tempting to say that what principle a new identity is founded upon is irrelevant, as long as a new identity is constructed, yet this simplistic view of postcolonial identity creation problematically leaves room for nation’s growth to be stunted by singularly focusing on opposing their former colonizers. A nation cannot be expected to develop and differentiate themselves when their very national consciousness hinges on the identity of another nation. Furthermore, the damage done by the colonial system cannot be transcended when the central component of a nation’s new identity necessitates the continual concentration on the same invented ‘Other’ as their colonizers. Such an external focus perpetuates nations’ perception of themselves as the permanent victim, impeding any independent growth. In Orientalism, Edward Said expounds that Orientalism in the colonial system undertook the deconstruction and reconstruction of the colonized nations in the ‘orient,’ and that deconstruction is what can lead postcolonial nations to repeat the same mistakes as their colonizers. In Mongolia, from 1900-1911, the Chinese New Administration (Hsin Cheng) attempted to sinify Mongolia and force locals to assimilate in order to create a bulwark against Russian aggression, in essence working to eliminate the Mongolian identity that they perceived as the ‘Other.’ Yet, attempts to root the modern Mongolian identity on opposing the Chinese presence in Mongolia hinder the creation of an independent Mongolian identity, and result from the colonial system ingraining the ideology of difference into the Mongolian consciousness. Indeed, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak references Foucault to theorize that the epistemological violence that reconstructed consciousness in Europe enacted the same changes in the subaltern, elucidating that “The clearest available example of such epistemic violence is the remotely orchestrated, far-flung, and heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as the Other.” Thus, the subaltern learned to base their own identity creation on the existence of an ‘Other’ by being essentialized as the ‘Other’ by the colonial system. The narrative of colonization indoctrinated colonial subjects in the subaltern to fix identity creation on the invention of an ‘Other’ in their own societies, hindering the subsequent identity creation of nations such as Mongolia by distracting from the formation of an independent identity.

Ulaanbaatar emerged from colonization and dove head first into capitalism, leading to an increase in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), with an especially large amount of Chinese investment in the Mongolian mining sector. For centuries, Mongolia was ruled and occupied by Chinese empires. After 70 years of a command economy as a Soviet satellite state, Mongolia underwent a democratic revolution in 1990 and became “…one of the world’s fastest growing economies.” The majority of all investment flows directly into the capital, Ulaanbaatar, and the city has changed as a result of the foreign influence. The government promoted foreign investment by relaxing regulations and controls, allowing for the patterns of foreign domination and exploitation to arise from the shadows once more in Ulaanbaatar. In recent years, as economic growth boomed, new animosities have grown out of the influx of outside Chinese business investment which many Mongolians see as exploitative. The globalization and increased primarily Chinese Foreign Direct Investment encouraged by the government within Ulaanbaatar spawned new nationalists movements.

Mongolia attempted to create an environment favorable to external investment to replace the Soviet aid it had previously enjoyed. The government in Ulaanbaatar worked to liberalize policy to encourage FDI, fostering a market oriented free-trade regime. From the earliest days as a capitalist nation, Mongolia opened itself up to FDI by opening up currency exchanges. This opening up of the nation led to Mongolia relying on FDI to propel its economy from a transitioning phase to a growth phase – and it’s worked – with the GDP growth rate hitting new highs above five percent growth in 2004 and 2005. Yet, this growth comes at the cost of local control of much of the economy by the central government in Ulaanbaatar. Now the city is being dominated by outside companies looking to control the government so they can exploit that nation’s resources.

The gross majority of the FDI that flows into Mongolia flows directly into Ulaanbaatar from other Asian countries, specifically into the mining sector. China, Korea, and Japan constitute 63 percent of the total FDI. This illustrates the shifting manifestations of colonialism. Mongolia emerged from direct colonial rule under Dynastic China to neo-colonial domination under the USSR, and now became subject to imperial domination by the more developed Asian economies. Of that new investment, 95 percent of it flows directly into the new foreign company outposts in Ulaanbaatar. The hope of the government is that this investment will build linkages in the capital to other sectors of the economy, such as the service and retail industries, but in reality the only linkages that investors are creating are roads to the resources that they hope to extract. Mining investment makes up 40 percent of all foreign direct investment. While it is true that this investment is contributing to the success of the economy as a whole, with FDI increases paralleling GDP growth, native Mongolians perceive it as an exploitative relationship. China is clearly interested in Mongolia for the riches buried beneath its soil. The two largest FDI projects within Mongolia, Oyu Tolgoi and Taran Tolgoi, are both mineral extraction projects. While external companies on average invest $293,000 in Ulaanbaatar, those investing in mining interests invested $2,300,000 each. China already invested $10.8 billion in road networks to connect the investment hub Ulaanbaatar with mining prospects in the rest of the nation, laying down more than 3,000 kilometers of roads, and will further invest in Mongolia’s transportation channels with their ‘Belt and Road’ project. China even went as far as decreasing its income tariff for Mongolian goods from 24.6 percent 9.4 percent, not in order to promote equitable trade, but to promote the perceived beneficial exportation of ephemeral raw materials. External investment in the mining sector flows through the conduit of Ulaanbaatar, yet without bestowing any of the intended benefits upon it.

 In Ulaanbaatar, there are two kinds of migration occurring; that of wealthy Chinese business people entering the city’s core and that of rural Mongolians moving into the city’s periphery. While the Chinese constitute ‘skilled’ and ‘lifestyle’ migrants, the Mongolians compose ‘economic’ migrants. The Chinese are wealthy business people coming to work for the corporations such as the mining companies directly investing in Ulaanbaatar, whereas the Mongolians are forced to come to the city to find any work at all. This creates a divide between the two groups, and contributes to the Mongolian residents of Ulaanbaatar looking to separate themselves from the Chinese, and they have done so through rap. The sprawling Ger slums on the outskirts of the city, housing almost 1/3 of the entire nation have become a type of satellite city wherein the local population grows and expands such that it develops a different character than the core of the city. While many Mongolians in Ulaanbaatar have been pushed to the outskirts of the cities, the Chinese ‘middling trans-nationals’ are entering the economic core of the city given their higher economic status. The Mongolians in the slums of Ulaanbaatar have to fight with the fact that now outsiders are coming in and bringing their Chinese influence with them, while the While the Chinese are affluent enough to maintain many of their comforts of homeland, the Mongolians who are migrating into Ulaanbaatar for work are being pushed to the outskirts within their own city. Chinese became more and more prevalent as a language of business within Ulaanbaatar as a result of Chinese FDI. There is a growing fear among the periphery of Ulaanbaatar that they will be eventually pushed out due to the economic factors mainstreaming the Chinese identity. The Mongolians on the periphery of Ulaanbaatar are anxious about the increasing growth of a Chinese core fueled by FDI, resulting in animosity towards the Chinese and the evolution of a new differentiated Mongolian identity.

Chinese mining magnates’ relative free-reign allowed by the cooperative Mongolian government incites local tension due to the reinforced belief that their only intention is to strip wealth from the nation. The government is relocating the nomadic farmers which symbolize the nation on the falsified grounds that they are depleting the grasslands in order to allow mining companies to move in and take the land, sparking further anti-Chinese sentiments and provoking one Mongolian rapper to sing that “‘[o]vergrazing is a myth and a lie/ We have grazed animals here thousands of years/ Why has the desertification started since only a few decades ago?’” Mongolians know that they are being exploited by the Chinese, sparking rapper Gee to become almost violently anti-Chinses, going as far as to say that the Chinese want to take everything from Mongolia. The animosity is exacerbated by the intense connection many Mongolians feel to their land, and the destruction that Chinese mines bring to it. Many Mongolian rappers have songs that revere their beautiful grasslands which are now being turned into a dessert by bulldozers and dump trucks. The rappers see the wealth that the Chinese are squeezing dry from the teat of their nation juxtaposed against their own people starving for a drop to drink. Rapper Amraa calls for social reform and creates an economic commentary by positing that “‘[w]e have homeless children, we have poverty, but we also have a very grand history that was inherited from our ancestors. We sing about kids living in sewers, and we ask, ‘Where’s your kid living?’ We want to get a message to the corrupt upper class.’” The economic disparities present within Mongolia give fuel for Mongolian rappers to fire up their audiences calling for change, but the manifestation of that change is entrenching sinophobia in the Mongolian identity.

In the process of differentiating themselves from the Chinese colonizers, the residents of Ulaanbaatar have developed an anti-Chinese sentiment that derails attempts at forming an authentically distinct identity. When discussing sinphobia in Mongolian rap music, I reference an interview with rapper Gee in my article Straight Outta Ulaanbaatar, in which he expounds that “‘I’m not racist toward anybody… except the Chinese. I hate the Chinese.’” The attention given to former colonial powers became a predominant discourse intertwined with efforts to protect the Mongolian identity through musical proliferation, with some racial slurs against the Chinese prevalent and one group going as far as to release a song entitled ‘Don’t Overstep the Limits, You Chinks.’ The presence of Chinese investors in Mongolia is used as a focal point for Mongolian rappers to mobilize their followers against, coming as a consequence of the hyper-nationalistic rhetoric they employ. This fear and hatred stems from the superiority and chauvinism endemic to any exclusionary identity, and unfortunately by promoting the identity, Mongolian rappers are also promoting the animosity.

Rap music became prevalent in Mongolia because there are many Mongolian artists who have made the genre their own, providing a mode to create an entirely distinct cultural object important to the emergence of a new postcolonial identity, yet unfortunately the rise of Mongolian rap music is marred by the rise of Sinophobic tropes within the genre. As a consequence of ubiquitous Chinese FDI, Mongolians are fearful of their new identity being eclipsed by the influx of foreign nationals. Producing rap music in Mongolians’ own tongue is a vital component of encouraging the creation of Mongolians’ own unique identity, yet the mobilization of xenophobic rhetoric exemplifies the ways in which Mongolian identity creation is hindered by lackadaisically following the same problematic methods of identity creation utilized by foreign powers when they controlled Mongolia. Mongolian rapper Amraa and rap group TST both are proud to be outspoken nationalists, hoping to inspire young Mongolians to have pride in their language and their nation, at a time when many young Mongolians are learning Mandarin in pursuit of greater economic opportunities. The focus on protecting the Mongolian language is just one way that Mongolian rappers display their adroit social commentary; rapper Gee has lyrics that show his desire to help Mongolia differentiate itself in the face of neoliberal economic imperialism, rapping that “‘[i] n the ocean of globalization, Mongolia is like a boat without paddles. You better start to care before we … drown.’” Yet, when fighting against the tides of globalization, it is important to recognize that the ‘Other’ is entirely discursively constructed. While independent cultural identities can be created through the ‘Other,’ altering aspects of external influences to localize them in positive ways instead of ignoring them, the foundation of the new identities created does not need to be opposition to ‘Others.’ Despite the significant sinophobia present in Mongolian rap, there are aspects of the musical genre that provide reason to hope for positive identity creation in the future. Rappers have a strong emphasis on environmentalism, even if driven by nationalistic sentiments, wanting to protect their homeland. Mongolian rappers have also rejected the materialism and consumerism endemic to the music of their Western counterparts, allowing listeners to claim a new identity by emphasizing cultural identity over luxury goods in a country where roughly 30 percent of the population lives in poverty.

In efforts to differentiate themselves from their former colonizers, Mongolians have embraced the resurgence of the historic shamanistic religion of Tengriism (sometimes referred to as Tengrism), but this religious resurgence is coupled with the emergence of hyper-nationalist groups that have embraced the religion as a focal point of their identity as Mongolians. Since 1990, the population of shamans in Mongolia ballooned from 10 to 20,000. The rebirth of Tengriism was been largely influenced by the presence of Chinese mining interests within the nation, with a heavy emphasis on environmental concerns, accentuated by the fact that deities in Tengriism have physical geographic representations that are worshipped. Yet, nationalists’ approbation of Tengriism is a stumbling block for the development of a new Mongolian identity. While the resurgence religion in isolation is an incredibly positive way to reclaim an aspect of Mongolia’s precolonial identity, it is tainted by the endorsement of swastika-toting ultra-nationalists. One group, called Tsagaan Khaas, engages in violent crimes such as shaving the heads of Mongol women they suspect of having slept with foreigner. The leader of another previously hyper-nationalist group, Standing Blue Mongol, was convicted of killing his daughter’s boyfriend for studying in China. Presently, Standing Blue Mongol adopted an environmentalist agenda, and is fighting against a Canadian mining company intending to extract resources from a locally revered mountain. While this action is not problematic in and of itself, Standing Blue Mongol used to be a neo-Nazi organization that latched onto Hitler’s beliefs of ‘ethnic purity.’ Even as Tengriism offers a positive route to developing an independent identity, Mongolians turn to nationalist groups because they fear that their capital city is being overrun by Chinese foreigners who they perceive to be ethnically impure. In “Religious Revival, Nationalism, and ‘Tradition,’” Marlène Laruelle examines the ties between the resurgence of Tengriism and ethnocentrism, postulating that “a process of an ethnicization of the divine with ambiguous political consequences reveals the deep ideological changes and the process of social recompositions, which are being experienced by post-Soviet societies.” The use of distinct religious traditions to differentiate nations in the subaltern from their colonizers is widespread throughout former Soviet satellites, with ranging from neo-paganism in Baltic States to Zoroastrianism in Tajikistan. Unfortunately, the construction of this religious identity as exclusive inhibits the successful development of a postcolonial identity, for no nation is entirely homogenous and precluding members of the society from subscribing to a nation’s new identity only serves to create further internal divisions. These examples Tengriism being coopted by nativist movements in Mongolia provide important examples of how easily nations can fall victim to tacit identity creation attempts, such as chauvinism. If attempts at identity creation hinge on rejecting an ‘Other,’ then Mongolia will be inexorably tied to their invented ‘Other’ and the nation will never go on to develop its own unique identity that is necessary to dismantle the remaining structures of colonial oppression.

The process of inventing a national identity out of thin air has been shown to have many obstacles that must be avoided, such as those associated with grounding a new identity on opposing an ‘Other,’ yet the mobilization of exclusive identities to endeavor to develop a postcolonial character also has serious implications for members of nations’ own populations. Women in Mongolia are put in a tenuous position as hyper-nationalism gains prevalence, for as explained by Undarya Tumursukh, “problems arise when we deconstruct the homogeneous and static image of the nation and recognize that contemporary societies, democratic or not, are structured so as to systematically privilege some groups over others along class, race, ethnicity or gender lines.” Tumursukh elucidates that when being masculine is seen as synonymous with being Mongolian, as is evident in the rhetoric employed by nationalist groups such as Tsagaan Khaas, women become the ‘Other’ in society as much as foreigners. Just as it is dangerous for a postcolonial identity to rely on their former oppressors, it is equally dangerous for nationalism to come part and parcel with the domination and control of women’s bodies. As evidenced by the attacks perpetrated by ultra-nationalist groups against women who are suspected of copulating with outsiders, the control that such groups attempt to asset over Mongolian women’s sexuality is the antithesis of modernity and could bar Mongolia from claiming a postcolonial identity if it propagates.

As the case study of Mongolia exemplifies, nations can fail to emerge from beneath structures of colonialism if their attempts at identity creation are stained by the tendency to rely on constructing an ‘Other’ to be oriented against. Oppositional identity creation such as that invoked by Mongolian rappers and ultra-nationalists may result from external exploitation, but it is self-propagating by perpetuating reliance on an ‘Other,’ both inside and outside of the postcolonial society. Oppositional identity creation must be avoided in order to successfully develop a postcolonial identity, for it impedes the authentic identity creation necessary to transcend systems of exploitation.

The North Korea Question; U.S. Strategy in the Korean Peninsula

For decades, the United States’ foreign policies toward North Korea have centered on non-proliferation, with the objective of preventing North Korea from developing nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of hitting the United States. Unfortunately, these policies have failed. Considering that change, it is time to transition into a new era of policies focused on another goal; preventing catastrophic war between the United States and North Korea. The United States has two options; the first, to use the U.S. military to either bring about regime change in North Korea, or to conduct surgical strikes on North Korean missile test sites or storage facilities; or the second, to de-escalate tensions and to adopt a policy of deterrence. The military option is no option—It likely would lead to retaliation by North Korea against the United States, or U.S. allies, and even then it might not succeed, which leaves only the second option. Sadly, both the United States and North Korea have adopted a policy of brinkmanship and threats, which does not de-escalate tension. Neither country wants nuclear war to occur, but it is quite possible that the continuation of these policies of brinkmanship will cause the U.S. or North Korea to bumble into a war with unimaginable consequences. This needs to be avoided at all costs. If the United States is going to have to learn to live with a nuclearized North Korea, which they are going to have to whether they like it or not, is necessary that a policy of de-escalation is pursued immediately.

A Slow Moving Cuban Missile Crisis? 

Robert Litwak, a scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, has described the current standoff between the United States and North Korean as “the Cuban missile crisis in slow motion.” However, one could argue that the current crisis between the United State and North Korea is actually more dangerous than the crisis President Kennedy handled so skillfully in October of 1962. For one, the Cuban missile crisis was not between the United States and newly emerging nuclear state. For another, the current standoff is between two leaders who do not have advisors who can effectively speak the truth if it differs from what their leader wants to hear. Kim Jong Un has had his own family members killed, and it has become clear during his presidency that Donald Trump does not suffer advisers who disagree with him, going as far as to call Lt. General McMaster a “pain” for correcting him in a meeting. This combination of factors means that the situation the U.S. and North Korea find themselves is even more dangerous than what the United States, the U.S.S.R, and Cuba were in in 1962.

The Military Option is No Option

When faced with options like the United States has with North Korea, it is easy to make the mistake of overestimating the United States’ chances of success, and underestimating the costs of an attack. Arguments for using preventative military options against North Korea severely overestimate the likelihood that the United States would succeed in their objectives. The history of attempted decapitation strikes by the United States is rife with failure, as is the history of surgical strikes. Given North Korea’s fears of U.S. infringement on their sovereignty, any sort of strike would need to have a 100 percent success rate. If the strikes were not completely successful in decapitating the Kim regime or in removing North Korea’s ability to retaliate, it is highly unlikely that North Korea would do nothing. If they retaliated, untold death and destruction would envelop the Korean peninsula, and potentially targets outside of the peninsula which are in range of attack.

If it were to retaliate, it is possible that North Korea would use a nuclear weapon. It is challenging to estimate the fatalities of a nuclear strike by the North Koreans, but all attempts to do so have indicate that the impact would be catastrophic. According to NUKEMAP, a modelling tool that allows users to estimate the impact of a nuclear weapon on a map, a 100 kiloton (the estimated explosive yield capability of North Korean nuclear weapons based on their tests) nuclear weapon detonated over Busan, South Korea, would kill 440,000 people immediately. A similar-sized bomb over Hagåtña, Guam would kill 14,360 people instantly, and in Tokyo around 191,820 would be killed in the first few minutes after the blast. These estimates only account for the impact of the initial blast, not the impact of the ensuing fallout, which would increase that number drastically. No matter their target, if North Korea were to detonate a nuclear weapon it would be catastrophic.

Even if the North Koreans chose not to use their nuclear weapons to retaliate and instead employed their conventional weapons, the results would also be catastrophic. The Nautilus Institute published a study in 2012 entitle “Mind the Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality,” in which they found that North Korea has thousands of pieces of artillery along the demilitarized zone which could inflict around 64,000 fatalities in Seoul alone on the first day of war. This study did not account for North Korea’s five thousand metric tons of chemical weapons, which would drastically increase the number of fatalities if they were employed against South Korea. Whether chemical weapons would be employed or not, even if the retaliation was to remain localized to the Korean peninsula, the results would be horrific. In such an event, the South Koreans would likely retaliate as well, completely enveloping the peninsula in destruction. The costs of not engaging in preventative military options are far smaller than the costs of engaging and triggering retaliation. Despite what has been said by the Trump administration and previous administrations, there is no military option.

Brinkmanship and Threats

When the United States’ goal was to prevent North Korea from obtaining nuclear weapons, utilizing threats was a viable option. In the strategic environment that exists now, this strategy is ineffective and dangerous. Brinkmanship is a strategy employed by nuclear states when attempting to convince another nuclear state to do or not do something, in which one state exerts pressure on the other state by taking steps that raise the risk that events will spiral out of control. The United States and North Korea are both employing this strategy, North Korea by repeatedly testing missiles and making threats, such as the one directed at Guam, and the United States by repeatedly threatening military action against North Korea. In situations in which brinkmanship is practiced, there is a real risk of events culminating in a catastrophic exchange. At each stage, a state is faced with the choice of acquiescing, or holding on a little longer—increasing the risk of a catastrophic event in hopes the other state will bow out. If no state backs down, the crisis continues to escalate until a state does out or events spiral out of control. In brinkmanship games, the state that has the higher resolve will prevail, unless a catastrophic event occurs in which case both states lose. According to a game theoretic model of brinkmanship designed by Robert Powell, in cases where a larger state is engaged in brinkmanship with a rogue state, the rogue state will usually prevail—the cost of an attack on the larger state is far worse than the consequences of not intervening in the rogue state. The United States will not prevail in a game of chicken with North Korea because North Korea the risk of their regime is at stake, their resolve is clearly higher than the United States’.

The Kim regime has made it clear since the outset of their nuclear program that the impetus behind the program is to prevent the United States and other states from infringing on their sovereignty. They theorize that the United States will not risk nuclear war by trying to bring about regime change in North Korea. The logic behind this has been confirmed by the actions of the United States in the past in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya, and the North Korean government knows that and has issued a number of statements in which they argue that if those states had had nuclear weapons, the United States would not have attacked them. North Korea will not follow in South Africa’s footsteps, they won’t voluntarily end their nuclear program, and they certainly won’t do so in the face of threats from the United States that just further qualify their fear of the United States. Actions by the United States to increase tensions between the United States and North Korea will not induce North Korea to give up their weapons, it will just increase the risk that a catastrophic event occurs.

De-escalation and Deterrence 

The past three U.S. administrations have stressed that “all options are on the table.” This statement sounds less threatening than the alternative threats of “fire and fury,” but it still increases tensions between the United States and North Korea in an irresponsible fashion. The longer these increased tensions exists, the more likely it is that some sort of catastrophic event will occur. To effectively navigate out of this crisis, the United States needs to convince the Kim regime that an attack on the U.S. or its allies will automatically lead to the to end of their regime, but the United States also needs to acknowledge that the United States is not interested starting a war. North Korea will not take these types of statements at face value, so it also will be necessary to stop offering a preventative strike as an option. In addition to its legally dubious status, a preventative attack on North Korea will all but guarantee the deaths of millions. The U.S. has serious qualms with North Korea, but as long as there is not an actionable threat by the North Koreans, the cost of failure is far higher than the cost of not interfering with the regime.

In 1947, George Kennan, already famous for the “Long Telegram,” published an article in Foreign Affairs under the pseudonym “Mr. X,” in which he argued that a strategy of “patient but firm and vigilant containment,” would eventually lead to “the break up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.” Kennan’s argument was based upon the idea that if the U.S.S.R. could be contained and deterred, the structural issues within the country would eventually bring about its down fall. While there are immutable differences between the U.S.S.R. and North Korea, there are many similarities, the largest being the structural problems in both of their economies. Eventually, the ineffectiveness of the North Korean economy will lead to its downfall, just as it did for the U.S.S.R. Until that point, the United States just needs to ensure that nuclear war doesn’t occur.

“Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb” 

This type of policy change runs contrary to much of the rhetoric espoused by past U.S. administrations, and it particularly runs contrary to President Trump’s “tough-talking” mantra. It also ignores the human rights abuses that are occurring within North Korea, which is a challenging pill to swallow for anyone who cares about humanitarian issues. Strategies for addressing North Korea are often referred to as the “least bad option,” and this instance is no different. The U.S. administrations don’t need to “love” the bomb, but they need to realize that the opportunity to prevent North Korea from obtaining nuclear weapons has long past. It is time to move into a new era of policies that aren’t centered around threats of military action, and instead use other methods of addressing individual crises with North Korea. Even rational actors can make mistakes, and the longer the United States and North Korea embrace brinkmanship, the higher the likelihood of something terrible happening is. The impact of such an event is unimaginable, thus everything possible needs to be done to prevent it from occurring. The United States should strategize to play the long game.

The Role of the Law of the Sea in the East and South China Sea Arbitration

For years, many of the most disputed debates within the international world have included water. Many people have even questioned whether the next world war will be about water and the shortages humans face, as a whole. To this regard, many international disputes regarding water have surfaced to greater importance, especially with the realization that climate change is impacting the world far greater than was once believed. This climate change trend has sparked what can be considered more drastic measures taken by the neighboring states in the Asian-Pacific region. Japan, China, Taiwan, the Philippines, and the Korean Peninsula are all major states impacted by adverse political and economic effects in the area, and all have disputed their contested areas for centuries. These disputes can be traced back to a time of imperialism and expansion of empires, spanning the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, World War II defeats and Cold War geopolitics, adding complexity to claims over the islands. Whether Japan is losing its fisheries and access to sustainable diet, or to China creating new islands, the coastal states in this region are starting to lack the cooperation they had when economic zones were created. Likewise, sovereignty has also been placated within this economic zones. Thus, the modern day disputes that have risen, especially with the United States pivot towards the region, have concluded a more complex understanding than just legal components of international law, climate change, and economic territorial zones.

A way to solve territorial disputes, linked to political and economic crisis, is to arbitrate between the parties, and in this context, it usually involves an international organization as a mediator. To understand how the arbitration occurs in the Asian-Pacific region, the specific outlines of the Law of the Sea need to be primarily understood within the context of the South China Sea. Most recently, in the Permanent Court of Arbitral Tribunal in The Hague between China and the Philippines, the court clarified many historic rights that have been claimed, that set a precedent for the rest of the South China Sea. The Tribunal stated that under UNCLOS (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: “there is no legal basis for any Chinese historic rights within the nine-dash line.” This is important because this dashed line (which has also been known as the ten-dash and eleven-dash line), has been claimed by the Republic of China (Taiwan), and thus the People’s Republic of China (China), which was claimed to allow a majority controlled portion of the South China Sea. The difference between this space and another geographic location are based in three factors. First, China has begun to build artificial islands with military-ready landing strips… in an area where there is still legal deliberation occurring for contested area, and claims to land that they do not have. Second, there are four other countries and the territory of Taiwan that are also claiming contested territorial claims to the area, which would definitely lead to more disputes between surrounding fishing, environmental impact and blames, military strategy placement, and more. Third, there are major ecological, environmental, and physical changes that have occurred in the area due to rising populations, state demands to sustain these populations, and unchanging demands per population metric.

The situation in the South China Sea has unduly caused stress on the environment in the area and thus, has created a major problem for the populations of animals, plants, insects, and others in the area. Non-state actors, such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), have researched and issued statements regarding the environmental impacts of these arbitrations. They claim that “total fish stocks in the South China Sea have been depleted by 70-95 percent since the 1950s and catch rates have declined by 66-75 percent over the last 20 years [even though] The South China Sea is one of the world’s top five most productive fishing zones, accounting for about 12 percent of global fish catch in 2015 [with] more than half of the fishing vessels in the world operat[ing] in these waters, employing around 3.7 million people, and likely many more engaged in illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing.” This poses an enormous problem for the sustainability of the area, both for the populations of the countries surrounding these waters, and also for the environment.

The populations of the coastal areas in the region have already begun to complain, citing shortages of food, limited diversity of species, and increased water temperatures. A well-known indicator of ocean climates, stress, and temperatures are coral systems. Corals are large bodies of cellular organisms that build on each other, and specifically, in the Asian-Pacific corridor, are known as the ‘Coral Triangle.’ This Triangle is located within the main dispute of the South and East China Sea areas. Already, major coral systems, valued at up to $100 million annually, have begun to die off. Without corals, and consistent monitoring of these systems, which is difficult to conduct with off-shore welling, building of islands, and general overfishing, the economic and sustainable benefits of these creatures will diminish. Coral ecosystem impacts are only the beginning of biological degradation that have impacted the legal system and the people, and is incredibly important to focus on.

Lastly, on the South China Sea relations, the Tribunal, which had previously ruled against Chinese historical rights also created other legal thresholds and jurisprudence. Although young and being developed, the jurisprudence of international courts is moving swiftly in the actions taken by Asian nations. Specifically and most recently, the Tribunal issued a ruling on what qualifies as an island for the first time in its history, saying “To qualify as an island, a geographical feature in its natural condition needs to be able to sustain ‘a stable community of people’ and economic life.” Since the claims made by China in the  China-Philippines area were deemed not islands, the Tribunal deemed them rocks, and rocks are incapable of ‘generating their own exclusive economic zone (EEZ).’ Which means, there is no legal basis for any entitlement by China, and by governing maritime law, the long-disputed Spratly Islands chain, or Scarborough Shoal, rather “rocks,” are under Philippine-bound EEZ territory. By declaring the Spratly Islands to be rocks, the Tribunal was able to validate the Philippines’ EEZ territory without delimiting any boundaries, which the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction, and thus, any interferences violates the Philippines’ sovereignty as a nation. These major statements in the maritime law community have ‘made waves’ in terms of understanding what an island is, what a rock is, how geographical settlements can be disputed, and what kind of jurisprudence is created for future Tribunal arbitrations.

Now, understanding the maritime law situation in the South China Sea allows for an understanding in the East China Sea. The East China Sea has a very similar occurrence. This large fishery-dispute within Asian waters have spanned Chinese intervention and claims. Understanding both of these Seas arbitrations is understanding that China is the second-largest economy, and the fastest-growing economy, that needs to support its populations, its economic and military might, and its political power. With 5.3 trillion USD trade dollars annually passing through the South China Sea and East China Sea, 11 billion barrels of oil, 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and with 90% of Middle Eastern fossil fuel exports projected to go to Asia by 2035, it is evident why the trading strengths and force of the East China Sea are imperative not only to China, but Japan and Korea. The economic powerhouses of the region have a lot to lose if international courts do not rule in their favor, and if their military strength is not strong enough to counter their opponents. The power projection from building islands, to increasing fortification, to possible losses in trade deals is monumental. At the moment, the East China Sea legal arbitrations are developing and in dispute; however, further policy actions can be found throughout various non-state organizations and international legal institutions.

The larger impact of the Asian-Pacific region from a non-national security standpoint is imperative in understanding why the situation affects the rest of the world. In a recent Congressional Research Service report, it was strictly defined that “claims of territorial waters and EEZs should be consistent with customary international law of the sea and must therefore, among other things, derive from land features. Claims in the [South China Sea] that are not derived from land features are fundamentally flawed.” This specific report further develops how the legality, or rather illegality, of many nations within the region, not just China, may be found at fault for their actions. The tragedy of the commons incurring due to climate change issues, overfishing, and environmental degradation has caused an even larger concern, and a push towards legal arbitration. Overall, this corridor in the world, which is only a small example of the many regions that are experiencing similar water issues, is of high importance, and one that should not be about competing claims; rather, the South China Sea and the East China Sea arbitration disputes are a larger example about peace and stability in the region.

A Divining Rod for Conflict: The Dangers of Faltering Water Infrastructure in Asian Metropolises

As the world changes around us, we are soon to be thrust into a future in which the availability of a particular natural resource that has formed the foundations of every human civilization throughout history is being called into question: water. At the end of 2016, former UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon spoke to diplomats gathered in Marrakech for the United Nations Climate Change Conference, gravely warning them that “no country, irrespective of its size or strength, is immune from the impacts of climate change, and no country can afford to tackle the climate challenge alone.” Indeed, the world is gradually becoming united in recognizing the importance of protecting our water resources, with 90% of countries referencing agricultural development as important to alleviating the stresses of climate change. Undoubtedly, the rural poor who conduct most of the agricultural work in these countries are among the most at risk and most egregiously affected by water scarcity because it constitutes not only a human necessity for them, but also a foundation of their livelihood. Yet, the ramifications of water scarcity are growing and encroaching on urban metropolises at a rate that will threaten significantly larger subsets of the population in the near future. While many leaders have focused on the impact of rural water scarcity, soon-to-be thirsting urban populaces will force their political representatives to address the equally vital topic of water scarcity in urban areas of Asia.

The urgency of addressing this growing threat to our planet cannot be denied when one listens to José Graziano da Silva, Director-General the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, who espouses that “from California to China’s eastern provinces and from Jordan to the southern tip of Africa, an estimated four billion people – almost two-thirds of the global population – live with severe water shortages for at least some of the time.” This problem becomes specifically pronounced in Asia when one considers that more than half of all 29 megacities (defined by the United Nations as a city with a population of more than 10 million people) are located in Asia. As our global populace urbanizes and begins to self-stratify to cities, population centers accelerate in growth to placate the need for concentrated labor sources in developing Asian economies. Population division to cities does not always align with the natural distribution of water resources, resulting in 1/3 of the global population currently living with consistent and reliable access to clean drinking water. With the populations of cities around the world projected to continue to grow, so too grows the preeminent importance of planning secure urban water supplies to quench all of these new mouths so that states are not forced to resort to violence.

It is important to differentiate between the problems caused by demand, called “water stress,” and scarcity driven by overflowing population, called “water shortage.” While economies of scale create the potential for sweeping water resource sustainability projects, megacities have not always adapted to the rapidly approaching threat of water scarcity well. With our global aquifers depleting and ice caps melting, the clock is ticking to find a solution to water stress driven by the massive populations of metropolises which will soon have serious political and human security implications – especially in Asia where the majority of these megacities lie. The first step to combatting water stress is evaluating how urgent the problem has become. With many Asian cities operating with an incredibly low buffer for water scarcity in the future, the problem of water shortage has accelerated to the point that it will pose a serious threat to the lives of tens of millions of people in Asia’s megacities if not dealt with imminently.

With a low buffer for error, many Asia metropolises are forced to wrestle with water shortage earlier than they are prepared for, which elevates the importance of the issue in the eyes of local bureaucrats but also can result in short-term stopgap solutions. Water shortage is a problem of both preparedness and infrastructure, the shortcomings of both of which were highlighted by the recent incursion of El Niño’s scorching weather patterns throughout Southeast Asia. In July of 2015, city authorities in Bangkok warned that taps may be shut off, as dams supplying the megacity with water see their usual water level of 8 billion cubic meters of water being reduced to a scant 660 million cubic meters of water. Residents were instructed to keep a reserve store of 60 liters of water on hand in case the city was no longer able to provide running water. This water stress resulted, at least partially, from poor infrastructure, for Thailand’s water is collected from rivers which become unusable in times of drought when salt water levels rise leaving the city unequipped to treat. Kuala Lumpur experienced similar strife during a period of dry weather in 2014 that was brought on from the fact that the entirety of the nation’s water comes from surface sources. These examples highlight the tribulations incurred by inadequate preparation, giving us a spyglass to a not-so-distant future if the proper steps are not taken to fight water shortage.

More than half of the world’s urban population now lives in Asian cities. If water stress remains unaddressed in these population centers, it’s possibly violent effects may likely become more pronounced and more serious. As massive population centers struggle to match the pace of their solutions to rapidly approaching water scarcity, it can easily become a conflict resource. Roughly 260 rivers run across borders through two or more Asian countries, and few treaties dictate who owns the rights to use the water from the river basins many nations rely upon. This ambiguity is bound to result in conflict as we move forward into the new world of water scarcity. Furthermore, in situations where water is scarce problems with water quality often follow, so we may end up fighting wars for water we are even apprehensive to drink. Infrastructure in cities must be expanded and modernized to bulwark against shocks to the system wrought from human-influenced changes in weather patterns.

The majority of responses to water stress have been classified by recent research in the International Journal of Water Resources Development as “crisis management.” Yet, the problem with addressing a crisis is that the crisis is seen as an isolated problem to be resolved. When the crisis dissipates, any potential long term solutions to urban water scarcity evaporate with the passing crisis. City administrations are apt to deal with a problem when it is being thrust in their face by citizens who incur the immediate effects of a water shortage, but to truly handle the threat posed by water stress in megacities, urban governments must look farther than just the next conflict to bulwark against the centuries of water strife that will likely follow. In Marrakech the UN Secretary General called for the world to become more resilient, and that is exactly what countries must do. Even if droughts end, the ever-exacerbated problem of global climate change is here to stay and we must adapt our solutions to water stress as such. As our ground water depletes and rivers stop running, securing readily available water resources for population centers is key to preventing a future wrought with water-incited conflicts.

The potentially violent political ramifications of water stress in megacities can neither be downplayed nor ignored as they have the potential to become the largest drivers of conflict in the developing world. The history of China, where in the near future there will be nine cities qualifying as megacities, illustrates that “he who controls the water controls the people.” This holds true throughout the nation’s history, from the first emperor, who tamed the country’s rivers with canals, to Mao Zedong who constructed more than 80,000 dams. Marvyn Piesse, a Research Analyst at Future Directions International argues that “to maintain a hold on political power, maintain control over water.” If the grasp governments have on their water resources evaporate, so too will the governments unless they can ascertain ways to modernize and prevent shortages from turning into lasting conflicts. A world where water wars occur is often posited as a threat for the future, but few realize that it is a world we already live in. From Golan Heights to the Kashmir Glacier, the locations of water resources have contributed to conflicts for longer than is often recognized. The presence of water on land adds and additional layer of complexity to conflicts often viewed as purely territorial, for with control over aquafers comes control of the people who drink from them. Water is a resource that is inherently unevenly distributed, and when that fact is combined with inept and unstable political regimes, the propensity for conflict is high. The likelihood of larger and more widespread water-driven conflicts is more than the impetus we need to actively take a role in bulwarking against water insecurity in metropolises for the future.

To fight water stress in megacity population centers, strides must be made in three key sectors: water resources must be diversified, water infrastructure must be updated to accommodate ballooning populations, and efficiency and austerity must be introduced into water use itself. In China, efforts are being made to construct “sponge” cities, which diversify the water supply of cities to include stormwater. Many cities in China have experienced difficulties from the huge amount of concrete used in their construction, but through strategic placement, and careful urban planning and interspersing of water-collecting city parks, new cities in China are able to rely less on water from ground and surface sources and rely more on the water readily available falling from the skies for needs from toilet flushing to being purified for drinking water. The new cities hold such promise that the Chinese government has promised to fund the construction of 16 sponge cities in the near future. Singapore has similarly set an example for how to diversify water resources, implementing the “Four National Taps” policy to ensure that water comes from four different sources. While half of the country’s water comes from Malaysia, they also desalinate saltwater, collect rainwater through a system of canals and ponds, and have a sewage system with two water reclamation plants. In India, sewage reclamation has become a pillar of its water resource. Between 70-80% of domestically used water originates as wastewater before it is treated in one of 234 sewage water treatment plants. This system is crucial as India accounts for 4% of the world’s water resources but constitutes 16% of the world’s population. In the megacity of Bangalore, they fought back against 48% of their water being sent through their pipes being unaccounted for by installing approximately 4,000 sensors in their pipes and pumping helium through their pipes to find leakages to be able to address them as soon as they are identified. Phnom Penh in Cambodia is a prime example of the benefits of implementing water austerity all the way up from the infrastructure. In 1993, only 20% of the city had access to running water, and that was only available for 10 hours a day, but by cutting down on the 70% leakage they were experiencing in their pipes and cracking down on corruption to eliminate illegal connections they were able to extend reliable water access to include 90% of the city. By today, under careful leadership, the city has 24/7 access to clean water, five times the treatment capacity, and a water loss rate of only 6.63%. Some other cities are taking their infrastructure systems to the next level, such as Hoi An, Vietnam, which plans to install a smart water sensor system that can actively respond to the changing water needs of the population. Some scholars go further than to recommend modernizing infrastructure and instead recommend that we start constructing new infrastructure through dams and canals. Only be pursuing solutions such as those discussed above that transcend the parameters of passing dilemmas can we buttress against future water wars driven by human-influenced climate change.

The threats to our water supply can be dealt with in an urban environment, as demonstrated by the examples above, through a combination of diversifying water sources, updating water infrastructure, and eliminating waste. These changes are crucial to Asia megacities, who are a window into what our rapidly urbanizing future will look like. Without adequately accommodating for obstacles to come, water wars could become more than a possibility; they could become an inevitability.

Building Influence: Chinese Infrastructure Investment in Latin America

As China’s economic power grows, the Asian giant is extending its reach around the globe. While the country has maintained strong economic ties with Africa since the early 2000s, it has also recently ramped up trade and investment in Latin America. Chinese president Xi Jinping has agreed to double bilateral trade with the region to $500 billion and increase investment to $250 billion over the next decade, according to various deals signed with Latin American countries in 2015. Currently, China is the largest trade partner of three of the leading economies in the region: Brazil, Chile, and Peru. These countries, along with the rest of Latin America, mostly export primary goods and natural resources; copper, iron, oil, and soybeans account for 75 percent of the region’s exports to China. In addition to trade and investment, Chinese loans to the region have also increased from $7 billion in 2012 to $29 billion in 2015.

This investment in Latin America often comes in the form of large infrastructure projects aimed at improving transportation and better connecting the region to lower costs for Chinese imports. As the U.S. is turning its back on relations and trade with Latin America, most prominently exemplified by protectionist calls to end NAFTA and thus free trade with Mexico, China has recognized an opportunity to supplant the U.S. as the extra-regional hegemon. However, this is not due to China’s goodwill and altruism towards the region, but rather an opportunity to control global trade flows through Chinese owned transportation links, and reduce costs of trade to Asia. This is an ambitious goal, and although China has made promises of increased investment and signed deals for large infrastructure projects, it is uncertain if the plans will actually come to fruition.

Considering China’s own domestic politics, it is no surprise that the country favors trade and investment with left-leaning Latin American nations. The former Kirchner administration in Argentina had several deals with China, including plans for a nuclear plant, a satellite tracking station, and a $1 billioncontract to buy Chinese fighter jets and maritime patrol vessels. When current center-right president Macri came into office, he said the deals made under Kirchner would be reviewed and may face rejection, however after five months of internal review, the Argentine government successfully ratified the contracts. China has also loaned $65 billion to Venezuela since 2007, more than any other country in the region. China has a growing need for energy, and Venezuela mainly pays back the loans with oil. However, the current economic crisis in Venezuela could mean that the country may not be able to supply enough oil to China or pay back the loans, and so China announced in late 2016 that it would no longer issue new loans to Venezuela.

Chinese loans and investment are particularly appealing to Latin American countries since they rarely come with political and economic conditions or other requirements, such as implementing austerity of structural adjustment programs. Unlike loans from Western international institutions such as the IMF, Chinese loans have no (apparent) strings attached. Following the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, countries that sought relief from the IMF were required to implement structural adjustment policies that imposed austerity measures as a condition of the loans. This resulted in a “lost decade”of economic growth for the region, during which living standards and growth both plummeted. Considering this history with lenders from Western-dominated international organizations, China has found the ideal opportunity to shape Latin America for itself by investing in infrastructure, and, in return, gaining cheap access to the primary and natural resources needed for its booming population and industry sector. Two examples of the largest infrastructure projects currently proposed in Latin America are the Nicaraguan Canal and the Twin Ocean Railway.

Nicaraguan Canal

The Nicaraguan Canal, approved by the government in 2014 with a goal date of completion in 2020, is China’s alternative to the historically U.S.-controlled Panama Canal. The proposed design would stretch 178 miles between the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans, running across the southern portion of the country, through Lake Nicaragua. It is estimated to cost $50 billion, and Chinese businessman Wang Jing (who owns HKND, the company responsible for developing and building the Nicaraguan Canal) is the only known investor in the project.

Photo: The Guardian

It remains unclear whether or not the Chinese government is directly involved in the planning or implementation of the project. Further complicating matters is Nicaragua’s diplomatic recognition of Taiwanese independence. Every Central American country, excluding Costa Rica, is politically aligned with Taiwan. However, China refuses formal diplomatic ties with any country that recognizes the island as a separate nation. But Taiwan has little to offer Central America, and as China’s economic and political power grows, Nicaragua and its neighbors are likely to shift diplomatic ties to the mainland.

Regardless of the Chinese government’s involvement, the current project is facing setbacks due to Wang’s reported loss of 85 percent of his personal wealth in a stock market crash, which he was using to fund the canal. Additionally, the construction of the canal has faced scrutiny and backlash for its effects on the communities in the surrounding area. It is estimated that about 30,000 people will be displaced due to construction of the canal. HKND has a compensation budget of $300-$400 million, or up to $13,300 for each displaced person. This has not stopped opposition from affected communities, however, and the last two years have seen more than 80 protests against the Nicaraguan government and HKND. These demonstrations have occasionally turned violent, and there have also been reports of arbitrary detainment of protesters. Additionally, concerns have been raised over the environmental impact of the project, including the pollution of Lake Nicaragua, the largest source of fresh water in Central America, which currently supplies water to over 80,000 Nicaraguans.  

The construction of a Nicaraguan Canal would give China access to a shipping route across the geopolitically strategic isthmus without having to pass through the Panama Canal. This would lower costs dramatically for Chinese imports, since tariffs and fees for trade through the Panama Canal have tripled over the past five years. It would also give China unprecedented access to the region, with control over how both their imports and exports are traded. Like the revenue the U.S. gained from the Panama Canal, China, or at least the overseeing company HKND, could also profit from other nations paying fees to ship goods through the canal. Nicaragua, too, would benefit economically from increased trade in the region and probable shared profits with China.

While the canal is likely to be economically advantageous for both countries, its environmental and social impact could prove insurmountable. The construction has already faced setbacks due to environmental concerns, and, amid questions about funding, the Nicaraguan canal seems increasingly unlikely, at least in the near future. There has not been much additional construction since ceremoniously breaking ground in 2014.

Twin Ocean Railway

Another ambitious project proposed by China is a transcontinental railway stretching from Brazil’s Atlantic coast to Peru’s Pacific coast. As with the Nicaraguan canal, this railway would facilitate movement of goods and greatly reduce trading costs for China. There are two possible routes for the railroad: one running directly from Brazil to Peru along a northern corridor, and one that passes through Bolivia further to the south. The latter, dubbed the Twin Ocean Railway, follows a more direct route and would cost about $13.5 billion to build, stretching over about 3,700km. The former is estimated at an untenable $60 billion, and would be over 1,000km longer, measuring 5,000km from start to finish. If the project moves forward, it is likely to be built along the more feasible Twin Ocean Railway corridor.

Photo from: Inter American Dialogue

This marks a win for Bolivia, who has been in discussions with China, Peru, and Brazil about being included along the route since 2014, following the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding creating a trilateral working group on the railway that did not include Bolivia. The landlocked country of Bolivia, which has the lowest GDP per capita in South America, has been looking for a way to access the sea since Chile annexed part of its territory on the Pacific coast in a war during the 1870s. The opportunity for Bolivia to once again be connected to seaports via a major trade-based railway could provide a much-needed boost to the economy.

Like the Nicaraguan Canal, the railway project has also been met with criticisms of possible environmental degradation and threats to local communities. Some of the route passes through delicate Amazon ecosystems, and it is projected to expose up to 600 remote indigenous communities that have never previously had contact with other societies. Current Peruvian president Pedro Pablo Kuzynski has also raised concerns that the railroad will be too environmentally harmful to build.

Looking Ahead

The Nicaraguan Canal and the Twin Ocean Railway are two impressive megaprojects, which, if completed, would underscore China’s economic influence abroad, and help to further cement its role as a global economic power. However, both projects are far from completion. In addition to their environmental and community impact concerns—which could halt the projects in and of themselves—many questions have been raised about their economic feasibility and long-term success, especially given China’s track record with similar endeavors in the region.

The Twin Ocean Railway’s aims are very similar to those of the InterOceanicatranscontinental highway, which also incorporated Brazil. The project began in 2006, however it was never fully completed, and the parts that were finished are not entirely structurally sound. Today, it remains a collection of unfinished, damaged, or impassable sections of highway, with no further construction or completion date in sight. Another Chinese company signed a contract with Brazil in 2011 to build a soy processing plant valued at $2 billion; however the proposed project site remains an empty field. Plans for a different railroad to be built by a Chinese company in Colombia in 2011 never materialized, along with another train project that failed in Venezuela. Given China’s history with these other infrastructure projects, it is entirely possible that the Nicaraguan Canal and the Twin Ocean Railway could end up in a similar situation – never completed or, at best, only partially built and then abandoned.

In addition to the projects that were never finished, other contracts have been pulled due to allegations of corruption between host governments and China. A rail project worth $3.7 billion slated for Mexico in 2014 was terminated after a public outcry due to evidence that the deal benefitted allies of Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto. Additionally, a recent scandal in Bolivia revealed that the government awarded almost $500 million in no-bid contracts to a single Chinese company, raising concerns about unlawful special privileges. China’s record of not completing projects or engaging in shady contracts could sour relations with the region and foment public skepticism about foreign infrastructure investment, deterring future opportunities for China to grow its economic influence and for Latin America to develop valuable infrastructure and trade links.

Investment in large infrastructure projects in Latin America could be monumental for China’s economic influence and ever-expanding soft power, while at the same time offering sizeable benefits to many Latin American economies. However, Chinese firms must overcome their previous shortcomings and actually make progress on constructing these projects in a socially and environmentally responsible manner. Transcontinental trade and transportation links are largely missing from the region, and these proposed projects would provide much needed connections not only among neighbors, but also to Asia and the rest of the world.

Demonetization in India and the Misuse of Shock Economics

Last November, this column discussed the potential effects of the demonetization of Indian banknotes. However, the article was written while the shock of the initial announcement was still fresh and could only report what was known at the time, providing background information regarding the scale of Indian black money and offering quick glances at things to look out for in the near future. Now that the old 500 and 1, 000 rupee (₹)banknotes have officially ceased to be considered legal tender as of December 30th, an update to the initial story seems necessary.

Modi’s “Surgical Strike” on India’s Black Money Problem

Originally, the suddenness of demonetization was justified on the grounds that it would deny those hoarding black money (money acquired through illegal or semi-legal means) a chance to launder their dirty cash ahead of time. Deemed a “surgical strike” by its proponents, demonetization was billed as a way of leveraging the Indian economy’s heavy reliance on cash (98% of all transactions involve cash, and 86% of all bills in circulation were the demonetized ₹500 and ₹1,000) to either catch criminals and hoarders of black money or force them to forfeit their stashes. As reported last fall, the thinking went that while large stashes of newly demonetized cash earned via legitimate commerce could be explained with receipts and income statements, demonetized cash earned via illegitimate commerce would come with no valid receipt or income statement and would not be eligible to be exchanged for the new bills. In theory, those holding no black money would lose nothing, while those with black money would be forced to choose between admitting criminal activity and outright losing a substantial amount of money.

Unfortunately, this storyline has not played out in practice. As the December 30th deadline for exchanging old bills for new ones passed, Bloomberg reportedthat ₹14.97 trillion of the ₹15.4 trillion that was demonetized (over 97%) had been validated and exchanged for new bills. Such a high rate of validation suggests that either India’s shadow economy is far smaller than initially estimated, or that hoarders of black money were able to successfully launder their dark fortunes in a short amount of time, despite the promises of a “surgical strike.” Given that estimates of the size of India’s shadow economy are consistently reported in the billions – and was estimated at around ₹25 trillion as recently as June 2016 – it seems farfetched to assume that less than 3% of the most popular bills in an overwhelmingly cash-driven economy can be attributed to black money. Rather, such a high rate of validation more likely indicates that holders of black money were able to launder their money some way or another.

While it is unclear at this point exactly how this was done on such a complete scale, there have been reports of bankers knowingly exchanging counterfeit or unaccounted-for bills in return for payment. Interestingly, while gold prices jumped over ₹1,000 per 10g the day after demonetization was announced after staying relatively steady the week before, they immediately returned roughly to pre-demonetization levels a day later and actually steadily fell through November and December. This sharp increase in demand, followed by a quick correction and steady fall, suggests that while black money hoarders may have immediately turned to gold in order to launder their dark fortunes, this common laundering technique was not a major contributor to the unexpectedly high validation rate of old bills. Regardless of the precise technique of the laundering, the fact that over 97% of illegal bills were validated indicates that black money hoarders were able to successfully side-step Mr. Modi’s “surgical strike” against them.

Sadly, not everyone emerged unscathed from the “surgical strike.” As reported last fall, Indian housewives who had spent generations collecting personal fortunes secret from their husbands were now forced to make a choice between losing those fortunes altogether, or admitting to their families that they had been siphoning money from their husbands. Given that many women in India hold second-class economic citizenship and are kept from handling money and making purchases, these secret stashes of wealth represent a rare form of financial and personal freedom for Indian women. Now, for many, that freedom has likely vanished, perhaps along with the trust of their husbands.

More saliently, dozens of people have died as a result of demonetization, primarily due to exposure from standing in bank queues for hours and from hospitals refusing to accept old bills. Mamata Banajaree, a member of the opposition to Mr. Modi, claimed that 112 people in total had died due to demonetization between the time it was announced and the December 30th deadline. Though it is unclear as to how Mr. Banajaree came to exact number, it should be noted there were at least total 55 deaths reported merely 10 days after demonetization was announced. Because withdrawals of the new bills were limited to ₹2,000 a day during the 50 day exchange window, and banks often ran out of new bills before queues were exhausted, people looking to exchange demonetized bills often had to stand outside for hours day after day in order to exchange all of their bills. While limiting the withdrawal amount meant to prohibit black money hoarders from exchanging their entire fortunes at once, it also kept old or sick Indians trapped outside day after day, likely contributing to such a seemingly high death toll.

A Move to the Digital Economy

However, while demonetization may have come up short in its public goal of surgically striking hoarders of black money, evidence exists to suggest that it may still yield positive results in the story of India’s long-term growth. By November 30th, less than a month after demonetization was announced, 30 million new bank accounts had been opened nationwide, and it has been reported that many of the previously “dormant” bank accounts (accounts without any transactions for 24 months or more) have awoken as well. Furthermore, as money moves from cash to digital form, previously reliable practitioners of the cash-only business model, such as laundry washers, rickshaw drivers, and street vendors, have started offering digital payment options. Paytm, an electronic payment service, reported over 14 million new accounts in November, and Oxigen Wallet, a rival e-payment service, has reported a 167% increase in daily users since November 8th. Though only small steps on a long road, this is good evidence that India’s journey toward a digital economy has been nudged forward by the shock of demonetization.

The obvious benefit of a digitized economy is that it makes economic activity much easier to regulate and tax, due to greater ease of electronically tracing transactions as opposed to them being conducted under the table with largely untraceable cash. On December 29th, just before the 50 day window for exchanging notes expired, India’s Finance Minister, Arun Jaitley, declareddemonetization a success for tax collection purposes. According to Jaitley, direct tax collection (collections of taxes directly billed by the government, such as income taxes) increased 14.4% through December 19th, and indirect tax collection (collections of taxes that are paid to the government through a third party, such as sales taxes) increased by 26.6% through the end of November. Moreover, government reports from 47 cities in India have reported a combined 268% increase in tax revenue for November 2016 as compared to the previous November. For a developing economy, such a dramatic increase in tax collection efficiency is especially important , and demonetization should be given credit for nudging the Indian economy down the path toward digitization, even if it did so as an afterthought to punishing black money hoarders.

Of course, while the digitization of India’s economy is increasing at record levels, it still remains an overwhelmingly cash-driven economy at the moment. This is especially true in rural areas, where access to banking services often involves walking miles to the nearest ATM, rendering economic digitization inconvenient at best. Moreover, stores and shops in rural areas tend not to be equipped to accept digital payment, fostering little to no immediate need to open a bank account. Similarly, truckers and transportation services rely heavily on cash and walked off the job when they ran out of legal tender in the early days of demonetization, oftentimes abandoning their cargo on the side of the road. Getting transportation and cargo-moving providers to go digital in the near future seems difficult, as it would require them to have access to e-payment options wherever they go, which would involve all or most of the entire country getting on board with digitization.

Lessons for the Future

While the dust is still settling and new information about the effectiveness of demonetization is coming in every day, a clear question has emerged: why make the move a surprise? Of course, Mr. Modi made it known at the outset that demonetization was meant to catch hoarders of black money off guard and therefore needed it to be a surprise in order to deny hoarders a chance to plan ahead. However, that over 97% of the demonetized currency was validated suggests that hoarders of black money were able to adjust on the fly despite a lack of warning. Instead, those who were unable to adjust tended to be the poor, who could not afford to queue at a bank for hours, truckers and transportation services who also couldn’t afford to queue at a bank for hours and who rely on being able to use cash anywhere to refuel and conduct business, and those in rural areas without easy access to banking services or e-payment infrastructure. Making demonetization a surprise hurt these types of people the most by inconveniencing them after denying them the opportunity to plan ahead. As has been shown before, and as Mr. Modi should have been expected to consider beforehand, it is often the most disadvantaged that are most severely impacted by the economics of shock.

Additionally, there is little evidence to suggest that demonetization needed to be a surprise in order to have the effect it has had on economic digitization. In convincing Indians to go digital, Mr. Modi only needed to give them a reason to get to the bank and not trust cash so blindly, and there is no reason why this couldn’t have been accomplished via a lengthy rollout of demonetization, wherein the public would be warned months or even a year before 86% of the bills in circulation were to be invalidated. This would allow Indians of all types of backgrounds to plan ahead, but would still force them to go to a bank and exchange or deposit their old bills eventually, thereby achieving the major win of demonetization without throwing much of the nation’s economy in temporary turmoil. For future governments looking to fight black money or digitize their economies, the lesson they may learn from India’s experience with demonetization should simply be to take their time.

Of course, politics do matter in economic decisions, and demonetization was arguably just as much a political move as it was an economic one. For Mr. Modi and his ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a grand “surgical strike” against corruption plays better politically than does a slow, methodical nudging of the Indian economy toward digitization. As it happened, Mr. Modi and the BJP were better able to frame demonetization as a grand, patriotic sacrifice for a better India. One might imagine an opposing scenario wherein Mr. Modi rolled out slow banking reforms aimed at digitizing India’s economy, having to drag Indians through months of inconvenience and spend months drumming up support for such a dull measure.

With five states in which the BJP is active holding elections in the coming weeks, it shall be seen how effective Mr. Modi and the BJP can be at continuing to frame their move as one of heroic patriotism. Home to over a fifth of India’s population and comprising a multitude of castes and demographic groups, elections in these five states have been regarded as a referendum on demonetization. Early polling suggests that the BJP is poised to put forth a strong showing in Uttarakhand, and win the large state of Uttar Pradesh, indicating at least an acceptance of the necessity of demonetization.

However, with the polls in the large state of Uttar Pradesh staying open through March 8th and the state of Manipur not voting until March 4th, the BJP’s political opposition still has some time to turn the tide. To do so, they will almost certainly need to brand demonetization as an unnecessarily quick, ill-prepared economic move made with political gain in mind. Luckily for the BJP’s opposition, the economic justification for this narrative is there.

The Economics of Sanctions: Half Measures, Tit-for-Tat Strategies, and Why North Korea is Not Iran

On September 9th, 2016, North Korea conducted what South Korean and Japanese estimates called its biggest nuclear test to date, with a nuclear yield equivalent to approximately 10 kilotons of TNT (the bomb dropped by the U.S. on Hiroshima had a yield of about 15 kilotons). The international community, including the United States, was quick to condemn the test, and calls for new rounds of sanctions came immediately, almost reflexively, and as if it was understood exactly what these calls were requesting. The actual mechanics of sanctions, however, are often hidden behind catchphrases such as “snap back,” “tough,” “tightening,”or “loosening.” While these phrases give one a general idea as to what a sanction is and how it works, an explanation of the actual workings of any given set of sanctions would certainly go further in explaining their severity and meaning.

The term “economic sanctions” refers to the deliberate withdrawal of economic activity that, in the absence of the sanctions, would have probably occurred. The intent, essentially, is to change policy via the punishment of an individual or group. However, the effectiveness of sanctions in achieving their goals has not received unanimous support following the Second World War, and it is not clear whether their success rate should be considered anything beyond marginal.

However, despite their dubious track record, one should not expect the use of sanctions to cease for the foreseeable future, as the enforcement of economic sanctions carries political benefits for powerful world leaders. Retaliating against a perceived wrong with sanctions offers displeased leaders an option that is more coercive than a one-off statement of protest, but less antagonistic than direct military action. Playing this middle ground is domestically popular, and allows a country to convincingly declare its displeasure with a given government or set of individuals without getting their military’s boots dirty.

As a way of modeling the process of sanctions, one can think of the threat of sanctions as a game played between two countries; the sender and the target. Consider the following, where the numbers to the left of each comma refer to the payoffs realized by the sending country at a given outcome, and numbers on the right refer to the payoffs of the target country at the same outcome. For example, at the outcome in the top left where each country cooperates (C,C), the sending country receives a payoff of 5, and the target country a payoff of 1. Of course, the exact numbers of 5 and 1 are not tied to any specific real world measurement, but rather just show that both parties prefer to be in the cooperative stage than in, say, the punishment stage (C,D) in the bottom right.

If this were a one shot game, we would expect a result akin to the prisoner’s dilemma, as the target of sanctions would benefit more by defecting, regardless of the strategy of the sender. Knowing this, the sender will choose a punitive strategy to receive a payoff of 0 instead of cooperating for a payoff of -1. However, assuming multiple iterations of the game, both the sender and target country would seek to maximize their payout over an indefinite time horizon, rather than just grabbing as much as they can in one shot. This requires both players to consider the effect that their actions today have on payouts in the future when evaluating the costs and benefits of a given action.

If the sender’s threat of indefinite punitive action in response to deviation is credible (and in this case it is, as the payout of punitive action is preferable to continued cooperation, so long as the target country continues to defect), and the costs that this punitive action inflicts upon the target country will be greater over an indefinite time horizon than the benefits from deviating once, then it is not in the interest of the target country to defect. Given the payoffs in the game above, so long as the game is played more than 3 times after the target country’s deviation, it is not in the interest of the target country to deviate.

This strategy of cooperating until the other player defects is referred to as a “tit-for-tat” strategy, named after the sender’s strategy of only punishing the target when they deviate from the status quo. Economic sanctions are a “tit-for-tat” game between a (usually more powerful) sender country and a target country, where the sender threatens to punish the target via two principal methods: upsetting the target’s trade balance and impeding the target’s financial infrastructure. Upsetting the target’s trade balance is perhaps the more straightforward example, given that this strategy simply aims to either limit the target’s exports or impede its ability to import certain resources. In so doing, the sender attempts to deny the target either the raw materials or tax revenue that it otherwise would have received, thus raising the costs of the target’s disliked policy. In theory, trade sanctions will work if these costs outweigh the benefits of the target’s disliked policy.

However, this type of sanction requires a limited market for the goods that the sender wishes to restrict. If other countries are willing to buy the target’s exports, or if the sender does not own a significant market share of the good that it wishes to keep the target from importing, then the effectiveness of these sanctions will be limited. Additionally, the coercive power of trade sanctions is inversely related to the price of the good the sender is restricting. If the price falls by half its original value six months after the sender country begins sanctions, the target may replenish their original supply at half cost, severely limiting the coercive influence of the sanction. Similarly, if the price of the target’s export rises significantly during sanctions, the target will better be able to accommodate the sanctions.

Impeding the target’s financial infrastructure however, presents a more flexible sanctioning strategy. Financial sanctions generally involve either the freezing of assets of particular individuals involved in the sanction-triggering activity, or the termination of subsidies from the sender previously sent to the target country. Financial sanctions are more difficult for the target to evade, particularly if the target country is embroiled in political or economic instability, or for some other reason may find it difficult to establish new lines of credit. Additionally, deploying financial sanctions allows the sender to better target particular individuals who are either involved in the action that triggered the sanctions or who have a direct ability to address the action, such as politicians and business elites.

Sanctions enforced as a punitive response to the development of nuclear weapons function the same way, as the sanctions aim to raise the overall costs of pursuing the development of nuclear weapons above the overall benefits that that country would receive if they did develop nuclear weapons, all while minimizing the effect of those sanctions on third parties and the economy of the sender country. In game theoretic terms, the target deviates by pursuing nuclear weapons, and the sender country looks to punish this deviation harshly enough to keep the target from choosing the deviation strategy now or in the future. It is important to note that there are certainly non-economic benefits at play in these scenarios such political prestige or regional hegemony, but the punishment strategy of economic sanctions looks to raise the economic costs of the deviation high enough to override whatever benefits might come from an active pursual of nuclear weapons.

Contemporary U.S.-Iranian relations represent a high profile, and tentatively successful example of economic sanctions being used to punish the pursual of nuclear technology. The United States assumed the role of the sender country after then-President Ahmadinejad chose a strategy of deviation by lifting the suspension of Iran’s uranium enrichment program. The U.S. punishment came in two waves, one in 2005 with Executive Order 13382, which froze the assets of individuals connected with Iran’s nuclear program that were held in the U.S., and one in 2010 with the passage of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act (CISADA), which further targeted individuals connected with the nuclear program, but also limited US reception of some of Iran’s key exports. After 2010, the U.S.’s sanctions targeted both the financial and trade sectors, draining the pockets of Iranian elite, and seeking to diminish Iranian exports of goods like oil, pistachios, and rugs. While effective due to the close ties the Iranian economy had to the sanctioned goods, the newly limited access to the U.S. market hurt third-party Iranians as well as those involved with the uranium enrichment program.

Nevertheless, despite the collateral damage of CISADA’s trade sanctions, it would be difficult to argue that they did not help to bring about the correction that the U.S. demanded, as the current President Rouhani’s victory in 2013 and positive reception to news of the lifting of sanctions in 2015 indicate a displeasure with the Ahmadinejad administration’s continued pursual of nuclear weapons in spite of the effects of the sanctions. Though perhaps imperfect, the U.S. eventually got the deal they were looking for. For its part, Iran has begun to reintroduce itself to world markets to the tune of a forecasted 5 percent overall GDP growth in 2016, despite the low worldwide price of oil. In game theoretic terms, the game has returned to an equilibrium of cooperation, with both players are receiving nonzero payoffs greater than in the punishment equilibrium.

However, all is not well with the rest of the world. Like Iran, the U.S. (along with much of the international community) has targeted North Korea with both financial and trade-focused sanctions. The assets of North Korean elites held abroad have been frozen over again and again, and the “direct or indirect” importation into the United States of any North Korean goods is prohibited as of President Obama’s Executive Order 13570 in 2011. However, while the U.S. and the international community have found new financial holdings to freeze and trade restrictions to impose time after time, North Korean officials have not shown any sign of relenting.

Of course, major differences exist between the domestic atmospheres of Iran and North Korea that may play a role in the international community’s inability to correct the deviation of the latter in the same way they have the former. Most importantly, Iran holds presidential elections every 4 years, where the public may voice their displeasure at the current government’s nuclear ambitions and remove them from office, replacing them with someone who opposes nuclear capabilities in favor of economic growth and a better reputation among its peers. North Korea, of course, does not have this luxury, and, short of a coup, Kim Jong-Un and his nuclear ambitions are here to stay so long as he wants them to. Additionally, the Iranian government is hurt more by trade-based sanctions than North Korea, as the Iranian government cannot function via black and grey markets as efficiently as Kim Jong-Un’s regime has proven to be able to.

A key difference, however, is that Iran can feasibly become a world player at some point down the road. As of right now, Iran controls the 4th largest reserve of oil in the world, is located in an enviable geopolitical location, and has taken advantage of the chaos of the region since the fall of Saddam Hussein to extend its influence. For many, a far-reaching imagination is not necessary to see Iran’s future as a serious player on the global stage at some point in the foreseeable future. By continuing its nuclear program, Iran jeopardized this capability by becoming a target for sanctions from the international community, contributing to miniscule or negative economic growth. In the end, the overall benefits of a return to the cooperative equilibrium were obvious, as this equilibrium better suited an Iran who wished to realize its international potential.

Given its limited land area, limited natural resources, and its lack of technological development compared to its peers, North Korea does not have a realistic chance to realize a similar level of global or regional influence. In fact, given the permanent nature of the regime and its apparent willingness to operate on the periphery of the world stage, financial or trade-based sanctions may offer very little additional costs for the North Korean government. In fact, fostering a scenario in which the whole world works against North Korea may serve Kim Jong-Un’s agenda quite well, substantiating his claimsthat the Western world is conspiring against North Korea. While it is tempting to simply “impose sanctions” on North Korea as punishment for their nuclear ambitions and play the middle ground between a statement of protest and military action, a closer look into what those sanctions would actually entail offers a bleak picture of their effectiveness. Granted, dealing with Pyongyang is a difficult task with no obvious answers, but instead of reflexively calling for another round of sanctions in response to the next successful nuclear test, one should offer a clear and comprehensive understanding of the truly unique situation that one finds in North Korea, and an explanation as to how exactly the next round of sanctions will stop or slow the development of a nuclear North Korea.

The Maldives and Climate Change: A New Type of Refugee

“If you allow for a two degree rise in temperature, you are actually agreeing to kill us,” argued Maldivian President Nasheed regarding the international community’s attempt to mitigate climate change at the Copenhagen Climate Summit in 2009. This country is comprised of 1,200 tiny islands, only 345,000 people, and a GDP per capita of only $14,000.  This might seem inconsequential, however Maldives is likely to be the first victim of climate change. In the next 100 years the Maldives may be completely uninhabitable by humans, which would make it the first nation to be eradicated by the effects of climate change. The emission of carbon dioxide around the world, but especially from the United States, China, and India cause warming and thus a melting of arctic ice.  The resulting sea level rise could engulf the Maldives, since it is one meter above sea level. The Maldives is a victim of climate change because its vulnerability and minimal contribution to the problem. Due to the continued rising of sea levels, migration will be the best possible option for the Maldivian people. As the Maldivian government has previously states, a new refugee status should be considered because they are being robbed of their national identity, property, and culture by the political decisions of nations that contribute most heavily to carbon emissions.

There are natural and geographical factors that put the Maldives in an extremely vulnerable position to the effects of climate change. As aforementioned, the Maldives is the lowest lying island in the world only a meter above sea level. According to the Environmental Protection Agency, if the ocean rises only one meter, it would be enough to put the island entirely underwater. Even a small rise in sea level would be enough to make the island uninhabitable while other unaffected nations would be reluctant to change their lifestyles or policies. In addition to rising sea levels, the warming sea is bleaching the coral. The coral reefs are becoming “bleached” because they lose their color. 15% of the coral is now white and 50-70% has begun to pale.

Maldives’ perilous future is largely caused by human dilemmas that have had destructive effects on the island. Rising sea levels are a direct effect of the way top emitting nations release exorbitant amounts of carbon dioxide (CO2) into the atmosphere. This carbon dioxide is then trapped, which causes the planet to warm and sea levels to rise. The top six emitters of carbon dioxide (China, the United States, the European Union, India, Russia, and Indonesia in that order) are responsible for over 60% of the Earth's CO2 emissions. The emissions already released into the atmosphere affect the environment gradually. The current situation suggests that even if humans stopped emitting CO2 immediately, there would still be a built up effect of two degrees Celsius of warming.  This amount is enough to rise sea levels over one meter and thus enough to sink the Maldives.

The Maldives was colonized by the Dutch, the Portuguese, and the British consecutively. During this time, its resources were taken advantage of and the country is consequently underdeveloped. The Environmental Kuznets Curve demonstrates how the Maldives as a developing nation is not in an ideal position to fight climate change. The Kuznets Curve states that less developed nations emit more but have fewer resources to combat climate change while developed nations can afford to begin to preserve their environment. The nation primarily runs on diesel. Diesel is a carbon rich energy source which is particularly destructive for the environment, yet the country cannot afford to invest in sustainable energy such as solar energy. This abused island does not have the infrastructure to effectively combat its rising sea levels because of their low GDP, limited resources, and the overwhelming political and economic power that top emitters possess by comparison.

The current trends of climate change, sea levels rising, and the delayed effect of emissions on warming suggests that migration away from the Maldives is an inevitable reality for the Maldivian people. As I discussed previously, it will be difficult to prevent sea levels from rising less than one meter. There have been a lack of sufficient changes in emissions to save the Maldives from an imminent disappearance, paired with past emissions which will still contribute two extra degrees Celsius to the world's temperature. This is enough to rise the sea about one meter and put the Maldives underwater. Research indicates that the Maldives has about 100 years to live and that it has already broken a threshold in allowing the Maldivian people to survive and live on their own island. It seems we may have already hit a tipping point with the Maldives, which would make it uninhabitable. If the Maldivian people cannot inhabit their homeland, they will have no choice but to travel away and find new homes and nations in order to survive.

While environmental science supports that sea levels are rising in the future, this tragedy isn’t the only reason to migrate away. Climate change has negative impact on the Maldives even today. As the atmosphere accumulates carbon, the ocean absorbs more of this carbon.  This process results in ocean acidification, which has a plethora of negative effects, such as decreased numbers of fish able to survive in this area. The Maldives depends heavily on fish as a main source of food and jobs. Those who depend on fishing to make a living or as a food source are going to face a lowered quality of life. Climate change also provokes a heightened degree of natural disasters, thus the area will become more physically dangerous to inhabit. Lastly, the people of the Maldives will have to face the extremely challenging psychological reality that they come from an island that their grandchildren will never be able to live on or fully understand their roots with, and the tombs stones of their grandparents will soon be lost at sea. These damages to the environment, economy, and psychology of the Maldives is enough to make the nation a very unsustainable and unfulfilling place to live.

Although the Maldives contributes minimally to climate change, the nation is investing billions of dollars into going carbon neutral by 2020.  Through this effort, the administration hopes to send a symbolically political message to top emitters who have more resources. The Maldives’ emissions are not enough to change whether or not they will go underwater but they are still investing their capital to reduce the few emissions they produce. The Maldives is an ideal place for solar panels, since it is sunny and flat. The Maldives is also offering individual incentives to help citizens lower their carbon footprints. Other nations have much higher GDPs and thus a much greater access to resources to lower emissions. The Maldives is leading by example in order to make a political statement to other nations and portray that since they can limit emissions, others can as well.

As migration is increasingly necessary for survival, the Maldivian people will need a new type of refugee status that combines political and environmental aspects which respect the loss of the Maldivian people. The current status for political refugees is one that is temporary, individually granted, and catalyzed by the presence of a totalitarian authority. This definition does not apply to the Maldives as their migration from the island would be permanent, would apply to all people on the island, and is not the fault of a totalitarian dictatorship. Another possible status that does not fully encompass the Maldivian experience is that of displaced people because of natural disasters. While the natural world is causing the sea levels to rise, this is not a random arbitrary act of nature as a hurricane or a tsunami might be. The reason for displacement of the Maldivian people is because of the action (and inaction) of nations like the United States, China, and India. These nations emit large amounts of carbon, accounting for about 60% of the world's emissions as a whole. The Maldives contributes only a tiny fraction to this number but is deeply affected by the carbon emissions of other nations. The Maldives is certainly a victim of climate change, and there are many perpetrators. Individual nations need to be held accountable for the effects of climate change, including the tragic destruction of the Maldivian national identity, culture, property, and sense of home. For this reason, Maldivians should be granted a refugee status that is somewhat political as a way to hold others accountable. This is an environmental disaster, but it is not without human apathy, destruction, and slander. In Geneva in 1951, the Maldives asked in a conference to be given a new definition for political refugee, as the description of the time period did not suit their needs or properly explain their circumstance. Over 70 years later, the international community has not pursued status, but Maldivian people have continued to suffer at the hands of greedy international emitters. These nations do not curb their emissions in time to save a nation they are destroying with their lack of concerned action.

The Maldives is arguably the first and most significant victim of climate change, yet they do not have any significant contribution to the problem. In less than 100 years, only a couple generations, they stand little chance of being above water. This “Small Island Developing State” could be the real-life version of the mythical City of Atlantis. Attempting to go carbon neutral by 2020 with a very small GDP and few resources, the Maldives asks the political question: “if we can change to make a sustainable future with so little, why can other nations who have so many more resources not do the same?” Without hope of ever regaining a homeland, the Maldives’ people will migrate as refugees whose status and future location have yet to be determined. This terrible injustice deserves to be met with respect and recompense or reparations. There are several possible solutions that would be respectful of the trauma involved in permanently losing one's nation, and hold major emitters accountable for the damage they have directly caused. One option is requiring large emitter nations to pool money together and buy another island that is bigger and less low lying than the Maldives, allowing the Maldives to maintain their status as a sovereign state, but relocate as a nation. The second, more plausible option is for major emitters to accept refugees from the Maldives into their nations based on the amount they emit. The greater the emissions, the more refugees a nation could accommodate. This scenario would not allow for Maldivian people to continue in their native cultural tradition but it would not require the Maldives people to build a new nation on a recently acquired land as in my first scenario. Both of these options must be paired with a serious commitment to lower carbon emissions, otherwise they would be treating the symptoms of a larger problem. The Maldives is arguably the first nation to be this intensely victimized by climate change, but other nations will undoubtedly face similar dilemmas. The Maldives is a serious warning of the atrocities soon to affect all human life. If we do not change our apathetic ways, the Maldives will be the first in a series of human atrocities that touch the whole world.

Environment-Related Displacement: Climate Change and Environmental Manipulation

Climate change is a growing concern in the international community for good reason. Yet, while several individual states within the international community have made pro-environmental changes, there several serious issues related to climate change remain unaddressed. One such problem concerns international migration resulting directly or indirectly from climate change, which currently plagues certain Southeast Asian countries like Bangladesh. Due to war’s displacement of so many people, environmental migrants trying to escape unlivable conditions are not prioritized and often refused. Of course, climate change is not the only factor behind environment-related displacement; environmental degradation caused by some Asian development projects transcend international borders and force people out of their homes.

Situation in Bangladesh

The climate change situation in Bangladesh remains dire, even as the government’s corrective efforts have been noteworthy. In terms of renewable energy, Bangladesh is a leading world example of steady success, especially in sustainable solar energy development. An initiative to install solar home systems in rural Bangladesh, currently being carried out by the state-run International Development Company Limited (IDCOL) along with 47 partner organizations like the World Bank, has provided 9% of the population with solar-produced electricity, and there are plans to expand “mini solar grids” to provide for irrigation pumps. This clean-energy system is being implemented as the first source of reliable electricity for many in Bangladesh. Despite the prevalence of the clean-energy debate and the progress being made in the country, Bangladeshi citizens are increasingly being displaced due to water shortage issues. The main issue driving climate change migration in Bangladesh is the destruction of the delta region connected to the Bay of Bengal: massive amounts of flooding has led to the salinization and degradation of fertile land from brackish or salty river water, and the massive storms that occur periodically threaten the habitability of the area. Drought, especially in the northwest region of Bangladesh, largely contributes to the displacement of people and often leads to permanent internal or international migration.

Intersections between climate change and environmental manipulation

In Bangladesh alone, there have been serious challenges to the population’s ability to survive and work, especially in agricultural fields. Regions in the center and south are consistently flooded while regions in the northwest may endure months of drought at a time. This has serious implications for Bangladeshi food production capabilities, aside from the documented internal displacement. Urbanization can only account for some of the massive population increases around cities, and in the capital of Dhaka researchers estimate that over 1/5th of the slum population is made up of migrants from the Bengal Bay area in response to flooding.

Broader implications for Bangladesh and its neighbors concern the massive and unavoidable migration that will continue to increase due to environmental conditions. Already, many Bangladeshi have fled to the Assam region of India, putting a strain on both Indian-Bangladeshi relations and the land in the region. Pakistan deals with serious issues concerning migration as a result of climate change, and the extremist influence in the region is worrying many that the destabilizing effect of climate change could not only displace more people, but also cause them to turn to extremist groups promising better living standards. In terms of diplomatic relations, environmental manipulation (such as the damming and political control of rivers by both China and India) causes a great deal of diplomatic tension. The ability to manipulate water flows upstream of India is, some suggest, a legitimate security threat to India; others are, alternatively, unconvinced of the threat to India’s security and insist the two Asian powers would never escalate the situation to actual conflict. Bangladesh has a long history of water-related bilateral negotiations with India, but has little bargaining power when faced with the long-term effects of infrastructure inside their neighbor’s borders. Meanwhile the water crisis in Bangladesh’s northwest regions pushes more agricultural workers to the city or out of the country entirely.

Response of the international community

What, then, could the international community do to counter the negative effects of both climate change and environmental manipulation on vulnerable populations in Bangladesh and other areas? Large-scale environmental change was, of course, discussed on the international level in Paris last year, but while countries made an agreement to combat environmental change, no binding treaties were proposed or signed. Instead, the environment remains a domestic policy issue that can only be affected on a broad scale by pressure from one state or another. Unfortunately, little has been discussed with regard to the implications of migration as a result of worsening environmental conditions. UN Special Envoy for Climate Change Mary Robinson believes there should be more policies and programs designed to support those specifically migrating due to environmental degradation. She also believes, crucially, that these individuals should be treated as refugees, and that the international community is currently not honoring the UN Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. Essentially, the international community should eliminate the “line drawn between refugees fleeing political oppression and migrants seeking better opportunities” due to environmental factors.

The implications of amending the UN Convention on Refugees to include those displaced due to environmental factors are serious. Under the Convention, states are held responsible for both the acceptance and the well-being of individuals; and yet, few states readily or easily accept the economic and security risks of doing so, or severely limit the number of accepted refugees. Additionally, accepting a broader definition for refugee status would greatly increase the already sizeable refugee population, and the current pressure on states especially in the European Union and the US make the topic highly politically controversial. Would this broadening of status affect all those impacted by environmental stress, or just climate change-related environmental conditions? Do we exclude consideration for people living in regions like southern Bangladesh, which naturally experiences cyclone and flood damage, even when global warming has increased the severity of these cycles? It is relatively unlikely that the broadening of the term refugee under UN standards would ever occur, and the failure of the current UN Convention to cover these individuals perhaps indicates the need for a new way to categorize and deal with this kind of necessary migration.

The response of issues like upriver damming and other environmental changes that affect more than one state are delicate issues the international community is not yet effective at dealing with. For starters, the means to resolve disputes that arise from building dams that affect countries downriver have not been effectively institutionalized in Bangladesh’s case, though the government has tried to address the issue in the past. In an international community that is unable to come to a binding agreement on climate change even in high-profile situations, it is extremely unlikely that a greater focus will fall on environmental manipulation which can be labeled as isolated, regional, or simply bilateral in nature. It is more likely that until the ramifications of the population displaced by environmental concerns gains more attention than conflict refugees, the international community will focus on positive, state-based environmental policy, rather than negotiating or considering transnational environmental concerns.

Straight Outta Ulaanbaatar: Class Consciousness and Sinophobia in Mongolia’s Economic Periphery

Ulaanbaatar is a rapidly modernizing city, but some of its residents fear its new development may come at the price of its former uniquely Mongolian face. From the times of Chinggis Khaan, Mongolians have had their own united character as a people – despite all odds. After the collapse of the Mongol Empire, they were conquered and subjugated by the following Chinese dynasties. After being consumed into the Soviet bloc in the 20th century, the Mongolian people were subjected to further decades of anti-Chinese propaganda, when the USSR hoped to use Mongolia as a buffer to the possibility of a Chinese threat on its southern border. In recent years, as economic growth has boomed, new animosities have grown out of the influx of outside Chinese business investment which many Mongolians see as exploitative. Yet one new idea that globalization has brought to Mongolia has truly resonated with the population: hip hop. Mongolia’s crisis of identity, combined with a deep-seeded want to be separate from China, has spawned a new movement of nationalistic rap within the capital city—empowering the youth to feel a sense of pride, creating a commentary on modern Mongolian society, and exemplifying the underlying class tensions present, while also fanning the flames of anti-Chinese sentiments.

A New Nationalist Identity:

Emerging from Soviet colonialism, rappers within Mongolia are using the genre as a new platform to foster a nationalist sentiment within their youthful audience. Some older Mongolians had feared that the young generation would entirely discard their national identity for the glamorized Western way of life, yet Mongolian rappers are doing all they can to prevent such a loss of culture. One prominent rapper, Gee, inspires a powerful sentiment of unity within his audience. He grew up with a single mother in the Ger district of Ulaanbaatar – an extensive and destitute slum which houses nearly two-thirds of the nation’s largest city’s residents. Gee raps that “[i]n the ocean of globalization, Mongolia is like a boat without paddles. You better start to care before we [...] drown.” He is imploring his audience not to lose their Mongolian identity in all of the foreign influences pouring into the growing capital city.

Many Mongolian men are also afraid of losing their national identity by not being able to marry another Mongolian woman. They see their city as becoming overrun with Chinese foreigners who are impure, compared to their Mongolian blood. Yet the problem for these Mongolian men arises when Mongolian sex workers and even local women mix with members of the Chinese expatriate community within Ulaanbaatar. These fearful Mongolian men find comfort in music which promotes and glorifies the culture they are afraid of losing.

Rappers also fight against cultural assimilation within Mongolia, working to keep their own identity separate from all of those which globalization has brought to Ulaanbaatar. A member of the rap group TST says that “[w]e rap in our mother tongue, and we identify and distinguish ourselves from other groups with our own language,” and even their name TST translates roughly to mean “mother tongue.” The group wants to “inspire ethnic pride among their fans,” says reporter Yuan Ye, for more and more young Mongolians are learning Mandarin Chinese in hopes of economic benefits. The early adopter of the rap genre in Mongolia Sukhbaatar Amarmandakh, or Amraa for short, says that “[h]e is an unashamed Mongolian nationalist, hoping to instill young Mongolians with feelings of pride.” The rap culture is helping to rekindle an ethnic identity within the newly globalized population of Ulaanbaatar, and giving them a new way to voice their pride and opinions.

Rapping with a Conscience:

The Mongolian rappers set themselves apart from the hip hop scenes in many other countries by focusing on social issues over pop culture. Rappers use the platform to critique their society in hopes of improving their nation, and by doing so fostering even more national pride among the Mongolian people. The aforementioned rapper Gee says that “[m]ongol hip-hop should be wise and should tell the people what is right to do.” Indeed, there are significant hardships that a modernizing and urbanizing city endures, yet through rap music, Mongolians can create a commentary on these issues in hopes of solving them. The rappers work to combat substance abuse and violence within their city. Mongolian rapper Quiza states that “[t]here are lots of under-age victims who are addicted to alcohol and tobacco. This is because tobacco and alcohol companies are very powerful.” To combat this, both Gee and Quiza reject sponsorships from beer and cigarette companies, because as Quiza puts it, “[w]e have a responsibility to think about how we affect the younger generation.” Al Jazeera was right when they tweeted out that “Mongolian rappers have less bling, more heart,” for the rappers in Ulaanbaatar are really working to make a difference in their city. They are fighting to combat corruption within the government alongside social issues, so that common people can have a larger say in their own lives. The rappers of Mongolia contribute positively to their society in hopes of helping to create a new positive postcolonial identity as the nation reinvents itself socially and economically. As theorist Stuart Hall puts it, “[t]he very notion of an autonomous, self-produced and self-identical cultural identity […] had in fact to be discursively constructed in and through ‘the Other.’” Hall argues that new identities come from making existing influences their own, and through taking the increasing westernization spawning from the Chinese investment in their young capitalist economy and using the new western styles of music the modernization has brought to create positive change, Ulaanbaatar’s rappers are creating a modern Mongolian identity with their music.

Class Consciousness on the Steppes:

Mongolian rappers are well aware that a divide exists between the core and the periphery in Ulaanbaatar, and that much of the core is made up of rich foreigners. The massive mineral deposits beneath the nation’s grasslands draw in Chinese mining companies who invest billions of dollars, but thanks to corrupt officials within the core, 30 percent of the nation still lives below the poverty line. In a studio surrounded by newly-opened upscale western clothing stores one rap group sings that “[a]lthough we grew up in yurts, after years in the city we’re forgetting our culture.” Yet the rappers are speaking out against some of the more seditious aspects of capitalism. The Mongolian rapper MC Bondoo says that “[w]e don’t admire luxury culture. We hate materialism, and the worship of expensive things.” Despite the efforts of Mongolian rappers to empower the periphery of Ulaanbaatar, the divide becomes even more profound when you examine how the core makes their money.

Chinese mining magnates have relatively free reign from a corrupt and cooperative government to strip the nation of all the wealth they can. The government is relocating the nomadic farmers which symbolize the nation on the falsified grounds that they are depleting the grasslands in order to allow mining companies to move in and take the land, sparking further anti-Chinese sentiments and inciting one rapper to sing that “[o]vergrazing is a myth and a lie/ We have grazed animals here thousands of years / Why has the desertification started since only a few decades ago?” Mongolians know that they are being exploited by the Chinese, sparking rapper Gee to become almost violently anti-Chinese, going as far as to say that the Chinese want to take everything from Mongolia. The animosity is exacerbated by the intense connection many Mongolians feel to their land, and the destruction that Chinese mines bring to it. Many Mongolian rappers have songs that revere the beautiful grasslands which are now being turned into a dessert by bulldozers and dump trucks. The rappers see the wealth that the Chinese are siphoning out of their nation’s well of resources juxtaposed against their own people starving for a drop to drink. Rapper Amraa calls for social reform and creates an economic commentary by posing that “[w]e have homeless children, we have poverty, but we also have a very grand history that was inherited from our ancestors. We sing about kids living in sewers, and we ask, 'Where's your kid living?' We want to get a message to the corrupt upper class.” The economic disparities present within Mongolia give fuel for Mongolian rappers to fire up and unite their audiences by calling for greater change.

The Smoldering Embers of Sinophobia:

Lauren Knapp quotes rapper Gee to say that “I’m not racist toward anybody… except the Chinese. I hate the Chinese.” This sentiment is shared by most Mongolian rappers and much of the local population. Gee even released a new song whose title, “Hujaa,” is a racial slur against the Chinese, and rap group 4 Zug released a song of their own called “Don't Overstep the Limits, You Chinks.” A history of conflict between the nations, alongside modern fears of Chinese economic imperialism, have heightened the racial tensions within Mongolia to a shocking level. It is possible that some of the sinophobia also stems from the sentiment in Mongolia that they are always a step or two behind China. Watching the Chinese mega-companies turn their national resources into huge profits, Mongolians might wish that they were able to do it themselves and see its benefits. On the world stage, China is seen as a key player, while Mongolia sitting immediately next to it has been relegated to backwater country. Thus, it is natural that anti-Chinese sentiments are a negative of the pan-Mongolian nationalism churned out by Mongolian rappers, for they can use universal hatred of the Chinese to further unite their people. A consequence of the postcolonial attempts to reclaim some lost Mongolian identity is a xenophobia. This fear and hatred stems from the pride and chauvinism endemic to any exclusive identity, and unfortunately by promoting the identity, Mongolian rappers are also promoting the animosity.

In Mongolia, rappers have helped to cultivate a new identity as the nation emerges from centuries of subjugation and adjusts to its new role as a part of the periphery within the capitalist global economy. They evoke pride and a new sense of ethnic identity within the youth of Ulaanbaatar, and fight against addiction and political corruption. Yet, they also incidentally feed into ultra-nationalist sentiments which can lead to hatred and racism against the economic core Chinese.

Impuissant Islands: Yakuza Influencing Japanese Sovereignty

Japan has a long history with organized crime, and the recent propagation of corruption has undermined Japanese state security by influencing crime and banking regulations. The Yakuza, Japan’s breed of organized crime, involve themselves in nearly all levels of the economy and society, and have been accused of playing a prominent role in hindering Japan’s economy. To be categorized as a transnational organized crime network, political theorist Phil Williams postulates that a group must have a formal structure, regular illegal activities, and strategies. The Yakuza have bribed and corrupted some politicians into becoming their puppets in order to advance their own illicit political and economic interests. Williams demonstrates the problems that can come from the prevalence of organized crime actions such as those by the Yakuza and the power they command, positing that “[t]ransnational organized crime activities […] fundamentally challenge sovereignty of states.” The Yakuza utilize bribery to create venal politicians, weakening the nation’s law to serve their corrupt interests. That, compounded with operating on such a large and unchecked scale, demonstrates that the activities of the Yakuza in Japan undermine the state’s power by showing it incapable of regulating actions in and across its borders. Thus, Japanese Yakuza fundamentally challenge the sovereignty of the state government in Japan through the use of corruption, manipulating domestic criminal and banking policy, and serving as a surrogate government in some cases.

Corruption demands that members of state government perceive that they can benefit from illegally accepting bribes and shares of the Yakuza’s profits, and such is the case within Japan. Underhanded politicians know that if they create policies favorable to the Yakuza, then the criminals will be more successful and be able to continue to bribe them. The corruption is so ingrained in Japanese political culture that the head of one Yakuza gang had all charges against him dropped when a case was brought against him, and the mayor of Nagasaki was assassinated in 2007 when he attempted to cut ties with the Yakuza. The impact of corruption is not a matter of how prevalent it is, but how effective it is when it occurs; in Japan, as critic Stephanie Nakajima puts forth, “… it is the fact that criminal elements and corruption have infiltrated the very structure of Japanese governance that makes it so dangerous.” Although we typically examine cases of particularly effective transnational criminal organizations in states with weak governments, they can also be effective within states with strong governance. Within Japan, the Yakuza have infiltrated society by procuring significant funds. In order to achieve this affluence, the Yakuza have utilized corruption strategies to bribe politicians into rigging the system in their favor. Thus, if leaders are motivated by personal gain, they will be more susceptible to corruption, allowing for Yakuza in Japan to challenge the sovereignty of the state by buying out politicians, such as in 2007, when the Transportation Minister in Japan admitted to receiving $6,000,000 from a Yakuza organization. This corruption could be motivated by the fact that by cooperating, politicians and Yakuza can mutually achieve greater benefit from their activities, for the Yakuza can operate unhindered and the official can profit more from larger bribes resulting from the policies which allow for criminals’ increased returns. The gaps in government control within Japan allow the Yakuza to influence policy to their advantage and reflect long term failures within the government. The Yakuza have crossed a line from exerting what corruption researcher Eric Messersmith calls “primary corruption” to “secondary corruption,” in which the perpetrators do not fear prosecution and their activities hinder legitimate economic development.

The Yakuza’s political corruption is on such a widespread scale that it challenges Japanese sovereignty.

The Yakuza operate relatively unhampered by government regulation, further challenging state sovereignty by operating in direct opposition of the law, and aided by politicians supposed to be fighting against them. The aforementioned governmental corruption has been utilized by the Yakuza to allow them to create conditions conducive to their illicit activities. In short, the Yakuza are perverting Japan’s government for their own profit. Systemic corruption within Japan has created what Williams would call a “political-criminal nexus.” The Transportation Minister who accepted millions from a Yakuza organization was allowed to retain his position, and even more worryingly, in 2012, the prime minister of Japan sparked outcry when he appointed a heavily Yakuza-affiliated Justice Minister. The Yakuza have achieved what Williams calls a “functional hole” through their use of corruption—directly challenging state authority by rigging the rules in their favor. One lawyer went as far as to say that “[t]here is an institutionalized culture of illicit money-making in the NPA [the Japanese police], and since it has gone on for so long it is now very deep-rooted.” Indeed, the corruption is so endemic that bribery takes place casually and publicly, and politicians are reticent to confront Yakuza because of their reliance on them for campaign funding. The Yakuza have created an environment which allows them to operate outside of the state, which poses a threat to the state’s authority.

One major way in which the Yakuza challenge Japanese sovereignty is by corrupting the police force to allow their actions to take place freely. Sovereignty is composed of having supreme power or authority, and by freely violating laws and changing laws to allow for illicit actions, the Yakuza are putting that authority in question. One police officer came forward as a whistleblower in 2009, explicating how the police even operated outside of the state themselves—this illegal behavior is the result of a corruption-culture exacerbated by Yakuza activities. The Yakuza have even been able to influence criminal policy in their favor, breeding further police corruption, as the newest anti-Yakuza laws are incredibly vague, which allows for the police to interpret the laws as they please. The Yakuza are so free from the jurisdiction of the state that the police will often just entirely overlook their transgressions. By controlling the body which is supposed to control them, the Yakuza operate as an extra-state entity, thereby challenging governmental organs’ autonomy over segments of their population and territory—two of the basic requirements for sovereignty.

The Yakuza further erode Japanese sovereignty by corrupting the banking sector. The lack of an enforced regulatory framework designating who can receive bank loans can not only result in commercial benefits for the criminals, but it can also detract from the economic abilities of the government. In 1991 one Tokyo bank extended a loan of ¥30 billion ($222.2 million) to a well-known Yakuza organization, money that could have been used to develop legitimate businesses which in turn can actually be taxed by the government, unlike the Yakuza. For Japan to reassert its authority, some critics argue that it should extract “the yakuza [sic] from the policy-making areas of the Japanese banking system.” Currently, some of the biggest operations the Yakuza have undertaken involve economic and commercial crimes such as embezzlement and money laundering, due to increased governmental pressures that push them into a more covert role. Yet, these new operations have proven largely ineffective. The Yakuza are able to take out loans from a corrupt banking system with no expectation of ever repaying them, and then invest those sums in their racketeering operations. This has plunged the Japanese banking industry into trouble, negatively impacted the Japanese national economy, and left the government struggling to compete with the Yakuza as a result.

Beyond acting for their own commercial benefit, the Yakuza in Japan have also gone as far to act as a surrogate government when the legitimate one has been unable to do so, further illustrating a breakdown in state authority. When the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami decimated the islands and compromised the Fukushima nuclear power plant, the Yakuza were the among the first to react, providing food and preventing looting, as well as supplying many of the “Fukushima Fifty” who sacrificed their safety to stay behind and work to stabilize the critical plant. This comes after the Yakuza had already previously intervened on behalf of the people in the same way after the 1995 Hanshin earthquake that devastated Kobe, Japan, where the Yakuza provided aid and relief before the government could even respond.  Both of these instances are indicative of the fact that the Japanese government is failing in one of its sovereign obligations: to provide for the welfare of its people. Despite the Yakuza helping the legitimate government take care of its people, the fact that it is the gangsters and not the government doing it erodes the power of the government in the eyes of its people. As Williams forwards, when a government cannot do its job and a crime syndicate steps in and does it in its place, it can only benefit the organization and reflect badly on the government in question.

By utilizing bribery and policy influencing strategies, the Japanese Yakuza have been able to create a functional hole in which they are unhampered by police and economic regulation, and can serve in the government’s place. Their actions demonstrate how the balance of power is shifting away from the state in Japan, allowing for transnational criminal organizations like the Yakuza to play a larger role in Japanese state-making.

As it has been demonstrated, the Yakuza are ingrained deep into the core of Japanese society, yet the nuanced nature of the relationship between the pseudo-benevolent gangsters and the Japanese people they supposedly serve is difficult for someone with a Western perspective to fully understand. They see themselves as the gentlemen protectors of the people, the new-world Robin Hoods looking out for the general welfare of the underrepresented populace. They have formal offices, business cards, and even fan magazines. Especially in rural areas, further removed from direct government contact, the Yakuza command great sway because of the special relationship they have with the Japanese populace. On New Year’s every year the Yakuza would give children cash-stuffed o-toshi-dama envelopes, and at Halloween they would play along and let children rob and extort them before the government banned public Yakuza operations in 2011. It is because of this unique relationship between the criminals and the common people of Japan that the Yakuza’s influence cannot be fought in the traditional ways.

I postulate that if Japan’s government wants to reclaim the power that the Yakuza have eroded away from it, it must do three things: disentangle the government, provide better for its people, and increase transparency. The government has been complacent in combating if not entirely complicit in allowing the Yakuza to be involved in both Japanese society and governance. There exists a culture of corruption that has led politicians to see the Yakuza as an almost necessary part of the lawmaking process. In rural parts of the country the Yakuza act as almost a second municipal government. There are some observers who posit that the new efforts by the government to disinvolve with the Yakuza could turn them violent and end up making Japan less peaceful, such is the extent of the entanglement. Full scale rejection of the corruption-ridden culture is Japan’s only path to success. Secondly, the government needs to take a more active role in providing for its people in disaster relief and work to ensure that they have effective local governments. In a democracy, the power of a government comes from its ability to supply services to its constituents. Only when Japan fails its people do they turn to the Yakuza. Lastly, the next step to move forward after repairing all the damage already done is to increase government and campaign finance transparency so that one as ridden with corruption will never develop again. Japan is being impacted by the illegal activities of the Yakuza almost implicitly intertwined with their politics, and must work even more aggressively than it already is to combat them.

Chinese and Vietnamese Strategies for the South China Sea Dispute

China’s recent infrastructure and military developments in the South China Sea has aggravated tensions between multiple countries for several decades now, especially with neighboring Vietnam, and the issue has grown more important to the south Asian region and its allies in previous months. The recent diplomatic strategies and possible future moves of both China and Vietnam differ in approach: the more aggressive China is unwilling to halt development of an airfield and use of oil rigs in the region, while Vietnam is pursuing primarily legal and defensive measures against what it claims as a Chinese invasion of territory. I will give a brief contextual overview of the South China Sea dispute’s overlapping claims of sovereignty of several island chains. I will then outline the most recent foreign policy and diplomacy decisions made by the Chinese and Vietnamese governments, with a focus on the somewhat nebulous Chinese policies. Finally, I offer several predictions about how China and Vietnam are likely to react in the immediate future regarding the claims over the disputed islands, based on their current diplomatic trajectory.

Context of the South China Sea Dispute

The dispute in the South China Sea began in 1947 when the Chinese released a map updating their territorial claims to include, among others, both the Paracel and Spratly island chains. The Chinese seizure of the Paracel islands from Vietnam followed in 1974, along with a brief conflict between China and Vietnam in 1988 over the Spratly islands which resulted in the deaths of 74 Vietnamese and the loss of 3 Vietnamese ships. Despite anger from Vietnam over these actions, international tensions in the region simmered but did not result in military action. Instead, China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) completed and signed a nonbinding Declaration of Conduct for the area, which was approved by the Chinese government. This did not stop China from claiming sovereignty in the region and pursuing infrastructure development, and in 2012 the creation of Sansha City, an armed government outpost, sparked anti-Chinese protests in Vietnam. Further exacerbating tensions, China installed an oil rig, complete with an armed flotilla, only 120 nautical miles from Vietnam’s coast in 2014, a distance considered far too close for the Vietnamese. More importantly and explained below, this rig is within the Exclusive Economic Zone of Vietnam. Certain aggressive engagements between the two countries, including Chinese boats non-fatally attacking Vietnamese boats, threatened to dissolve into armed conflict; however, the situation deescalated as China agreed to move the oil rig further away.

Most recently, China successfully completed the construction of an airfield on a reef in the Spratly islands, referred to in China as the Nansha islands. On January 9th, the Chinese tested the airfield by landing a civilian plane. As a result, the Vietnamese government issued a protest to the Chinese embassy and the UN, claiming the act violated Vietnamese territorial sovereignty.

Under the resolution adopted by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Part V, articles 55-75, Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) extend a coastal nation’s sovereign rights and duties to a zone no more than 200 nautical miles around the country. A separate Vietnamese declaration specified the EEZ to extend the full 200 nautical miles around the country, with its territorial sea extending 12 nautical miles from the coast. Crucially, the state in control of a given EEZ retains the rights over natural resources, as well as the building and maintaining of any structures or artificially constructed sites, whether for the harvesting of natural resources or not. China, by building oil rigs and airfields within Vietnam’s designated EEZ, and by claiming territories within the EEZs of other countries like Japan and the Philippines, is in direct violation of the UN Law of the Sea. By the time of this declaration, however, China had already asserted the territories were within its sovereign control, making it possible for the Chinese to exploit this loophole in the EEZ boundary regulations.

Recent Chinese Foreign Policy and Diplomacy

Chinese foreign policy in recent years has been a mix of isolationism and interference marked by the steadfast support of their state sovereignty and economic interests. There have been several noticeable shifts in Chinese diplomatic strategy in the past few years, however. Until mid-2015, the Chinese subtly but undeniably claimed the aforementioned territories in the South China Sea. Essentially, the Chinese diplomatic strategy employed towards these issues is one of delay and, if not full, at least superficial willingness to proceed without declaring or engaging in serious aggression. Scholars Shih Chih-yu and Yin Jiwu examine the dichotomy of China’s focus on national interest and belief in a harmonious world order. They conclude that, in regards to the South China Sea conflict, China has given mild concessions (including moving its oil rig further out to sea and agreeing to a non-legally binding declaration of conduct, explained below) in order to avoid diplomatic isolation from Vietnam and other Asian nations, but remains committed to its claims to the disputed territories. In the 2002 Declaration of the Conduct of Parties (DoC) in the South China Sea, which was negotiated in the ASEAN, China conceded that the territory was disputed, rather than entirely within Chinese territorial sovereignty. The declaration also stated the signing parties would not use military force and “exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability.” This may not seem like a victory for Vietnam and other Asian nations contesting China’s territorial claims, but combined with the DoC meant China does, to a certain extent, show willingness to cooperate within the existing international order. The lack of legal formality of the DoC and a failure to translate the declaration into operating policies means China has not stopped developing its airstrip and clashing with various navies in the decade and a half after its signing, and supports Shih and Yin’s “harmonious disciplining” theory of Chinese foreign policy. China’s engagement with fishing boats around the shoals and its expansion of military-capable infrastructure are certainly aggressive; congruently, China’s careful use of non-naval ships in these engagements and its agreement to participate in transnational diplomatic channels like ASEAN are meant to delay outright retaliation. Essentially, China walks the line between blatant aggression and token diplomacy meant to pacify other regional actors. Significantly, Shih and Yin expect China’s agreeable but mildly aggressive diplomatic strategy to continue as long as “global influences are not direct,” highlighting the unwillingness of the Chinese to engage in aggression with powers outside the region on the South China Sea issue. Escalated tensions between China and the US in the region fail so far to incite any real action between the two countries aside from government statements.

Others view recent Chinese foreign policy as softer and more flexible in the previous few years. In Foreign Policy, Robert Manning notes that the Chinese have made legitimate and considerable attempts to repair relationships with Vietnam, the Philippines, and Japan, as well as other neighbors in the region. Manning credits this in part to cooperation on other issues unrelated to the South China Sea, such as Chinese involvement in the Middle East and its Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) project, a new World Bank-scale investment project.  What is important to note is the increasing relevance of the AIIB to China’s domestic and foreign interests. In a recent talk, Professor Erik Berglof noted that the AIIB was both an attempt to provide strong economic support to entire region, but also to counteract and change China’s lack of influence in the International Monetary Fund and the International Development Bank.  Manning also recognizes that China was no doubt carefully monitoring the threat of “global influence” mentioned by Shih and Yin. The US remains in strong ties with many competing countries in the region with notable military defense pacts with Japan and the Philippines in particular.

Recent Vietnamese Foreign Policy and Diplomacy

It is both difficult and unfair to compare the strategies of China to Vietnam, and indeed to those of other countries such as the Philippines, because of the difference in scale of power between the two. Vietnam has less leverage over China due to the weakness of Vietnam’s economy, military, and influence relative to China. Chau Bao Nguyen’s July 2015 article concludes that military aggression towards China is not an option for Vietnam, a reality reflected in Vietnam’s limit to verbal outrage. However, the Vietnamese remain adamant and defensive over the South China Sea islands—in particular the Paracels and Spratlys. Vietnam continues to uphold its original territorial claims that contest with Chinese declarations in 1947 and asserts their national sovereignty over the area through their EEZ mostly through government declarations. Vietnam does, however, have the legal upper hand: Vietnam appealed to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf separately but in conjunction with the Philippines, and more importantly, The Hague agreed to hear an arbitral trial over the dispute. In terms of military alliances, Vietnam has the arguable advantage: China’s foreign policy in the region revolves around the lack of global power interference, especially from the United States, while Vietnam is supported by the US’s military. The Philippines and Japan, also key US allies, back Vietnam’s complaints against China. The South China Sea issue was brought to the table when Vietnam and the US entered further cooperative negotiations following the 2014 oil rig incident. The Philippines, Japan, Malaysia, and other Southeast Asian countries also support Vietnam’s position and have a particular interest in keeping Chinese military capability outside of their own EEZs. A combination of international pressure and Vietnamese anger over the 2014 oil rig incident did result in China moving the oil rig further away from Vietnam’s coastline. While this should not be considered a full victory for Vietnam—China is still inside their legal territory, with no plans to leave—it shows China’s reluctance to fully break diplomatic ties with Vietnam, as well as the power of international leverage, even within the region.

What to Expect Next

The South China Sea dispute is one that is still evolving, though at a very delicate pace. Serious damage could be done should the Chinese move too aggressively against key US allies and it is well within their best interests to not antagonize the US into an actual military conflict. Concessions over cybersecurity in the past two years and the cooperation seen at the COP21 environmental conference are just two pieces of evidence in the case against the Chinese wanting to provoke the US. China is likely unwilling to completely alienate the rest of the countries involved, since President Xi’s diplomatic efforts have been far too great within the countries involved to disregard, and because the success of the AIIB, which would have far-reaching positive consequences for China’s economy and reputation, is a far more important issue. This is not to say that China will agree to back off from the intrusion into whichever islands they claim over Vietnam or the Philippines. China can continue to develop the area in dispute while Vietnam and the Philippines protest through various methodical and soft-handed international organizations. China has already seen that it can get away with slow progress, soft concessions to organizations like ASEAN, and superficial diplomatic efforts in regards to its presence on the disputed islands. More blatant aggressive acts like those against fishing boats has not been enough to garner more than an increased US presence in the region; at this point, China is betting (and relying) on the entire region’s unwillingness to escalate the situation. A truer test of China’s desire for the islands will come if any country in the region is offended or threatened enough to fire upon another. That will almost certainly involve the US and other international powers and cause China to reassess the importance of perceived national sovereignty relative to harmony in the region.

The Vietnamese, on the other hand, have limited options in terms of recapturing the area currently held by the Chinese. Modernizing the navy was not enough to make Vietnam a threat to China, but maintaining US and broad international support on the issue did cause a reaction. The best strategy currently for Vietnam is to petition for change within ASEAN and the UN on proper legal grounds and maintain in close contact with other powers in the area. Potentially, advocating on these broad platforms could give Vietnam the support and international pressure it needs for China to lessen its advances without the use of international military action.